• No results found

Sipe_unc_0153M_18627.pdf

N/A
N/A
Protected

Academic year: 2020

Share "Sipe_unc_0153M_18627.pdf"

Copied!
53
0
0

Loading.... (view fulltext now)

Full text

(1)

R. Joshua Sipe

A thesis submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Arts in the of the Department of

History in the College of Arts and Sciences

Chapel Hill 2019

(2)
(3)

ABSTRACT

R. Joshua Sipe: Evolving Jim Crow: An Analysis of the Consolidation Movement on the Virginia Peninsula, 1940-1958

(Under the direction of Jim Leloudis)

(4)
(5)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION………...1 THE RISE OF WHITE ANXIETIES OVER A GROWING BLACK POPULATION IN

NEWPORT NEWS………..3 CONSOLIDATION: AN ANTIDOTE FOR WHITE ANXIETIES……….19 JIM CROW EVOLVES ON THE PENINSULA………..25 CODA: A NEW CITY, LITTLE CHANGE—NEWPORT NEWS AFTER

(6)

INTRODUCTION

On July 1, 1958, a little over a year after citizens of Newport News and Warwick voted to consolidate into a single city on the Virginia Peninsula, a young James Hershman, Jr. and his friends gathered on Warwick Boulevard near the former border between the City of Newport News and Warwick. The day marked the beginning of a newly unified city with a large

ceremony to celebrate the momentous occasion planned for that afternoon. While Hershman and his friends sat talking an roar began to fill the air. As the rumbling grew louder and moved towards the group, James turned to identify the source of the sound. As he turned, James witnessed a caravan of Newport News’ police officers clad in jackboots and sunglasses astride motorcycles led by Police Chief William F. Peach heading up Warwick Boulevard from downtown Newport News towards their newly acquired territory. Though a young boy,

Hershman recalled the spectacle had an appearance of malice.1 The officers jackbooted ride into

their new jurisdiction that James witnessed on July 1st linked the old city of Newport News’ legacy of white supremacy with the newly unified city. The Newport News’ police embodied more overt forms of white supremacy on the Virginia Peninsula during the 1950s and 1960s, such as racial profiling and police brutality, while the creation of the newly unified city of Newport News and Warwick demonstrated a more covert form of white supremacy.

Across the South during World War II, Jim Crow came under attack by politically active African Americans. With the emergence of wartime defense industries, blacks moved to cities in

(7)

search of employment. As local black communities developed, African Americans influenced by the war’s rhetoric of democracy began to challenge systems of Jim Crow by paying poll taxes, voting, and demanding equal access to facilities.2 This increase in political activism continued

throughout the post-war years as the civil rights movement began to emerge.3

White citizens and leaders across the South responded to African Americans’ attack on Jim Crow in a variety of ways. In Mobile, Alabama, white workers at the Alabama Dry Dock and Shipyard assaulted approximately 50 black workers in an attempt to make Shipyard leadership reinforce traditional Jim Crow hiring practices.4 Many of the South’s white leaders

turned towards the strategy of massive resistance in response to Brown v. Boards’ challenge to Jim Crow.5 While other white leaders and citizens turned towards different methods as Jim Crow

“demanded a multifaceted defense.”6 In Washington D.C., Theodore Bilbo as the District

Committee chairman used the guise of “law and order” to reduce black political activity in the city and displace African Americans in the city.7 While James Francis Byrnes of South Carolina

employed reformist rhetoric and a drive to equalize segregated school spending in order to attempt to stave off desegregation.8

2Patricia Sullivan, Days of Hope: Race and Democracy in the New Deal Era, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North

Carolina Press, 1996), 136.

3 For information on the Long Civil Rights Movement see: Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, “The Long Civil Rights

Movement,” The Journal of American History 91, no. 4 (March 2005): 1233-1263.

4 Harvard Sitkoff, “African American Militancy in the World War II South,” in Remaking Dixie: The Impact of World War II on the American South, ed. Neil R. McMillen (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 1997), 83.

5 For more on massive resistance see: John Kyle Day, The Southern Manifesto: Massive Resistance and the Fight to Preserve Segregation, (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 2014); George Lewis, Massive Resistance: The White Response to the Civil Rights Movement, (London: Oxford University Press, 2006).

6Jason Morgan Ward, Defending White Democracy: The Making of a Segregationist Movement and the Remaking of Racial Politics, 1936-1965, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 68.

7 Ibid., 71.

(8)

In Newport News, Virginia, local white leaders and citizens turned towards the tactic of reconfiguring local government on the Virginia Peninsula by way of consolidation to attempt to save Jim Crow. Exploring the evolution of tactics used by white citizens to maintain racial control in Newport News illustrates the determination and creativity of white southerners to protect Jim Crow. With an expanded and politically active black population after the war, Newport News’ leaders also faced white flight into neighboring counties and cities threatening the white control of the city. Therefore, consolidation of surrounding counties and cities became the main solution adopted to impede potential black political influence. White city leaders and citizens believed consolidation could bolster the white population of the city to offset the increase in the African American population.

Beginning in 1947 with the launching of a study on consolidation, Newport News’ white citizens fought black advancement for rights until consolidation with Warwick became a reality a decade later, thereby, solidifying white control of the Peninsula and limiting black political influence. The process of consolidation was tumultuous and influenced by economic, social, infrastructural, and political concerns, but none of these were far removed from race, especially by 1956. The case of Newport News from World War II through consolidation in 1958 and the decades after depicts not only the frailty of Jim Crow, but also white citizens’ fear of a collapsing system and their attempts to re-inscribe white supremacy. It also portrays the long lasting effects and damage of white supremacy even after the end of Jim Crow.

The Rise of White Anxieties Over a Growing Black Population in Newport News

(9)

James River from the developing city of Norfolk, Virginia.9 Huntington recognized the areas

close proximity to Norfolk and its deep-water access provided the opportunity to establish a ship-building hub supplied by a railway connection. Therefore, Huntington established a Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad and created the Newport News Drydock and Shipbuilding Company. During the first decade of the twentieth century, the shipyard, railroad, and other developing industries nourished the city of Newport News’ growth to a population of 20,000 citizens.10 The thirty-year

period of growth allowed for the infrastructure of the city and the population to rise in tandem.

The First World War challenged the city of Newport News greatly and ignited its first crisis over blackness. American involvement in World War I led to a demand for “man power in Newport News to be used for shipbuilding.”11 Homer L. Ferguson, the Lieutenant of the

Newport News Drydock and Shipbuilding Company, began hiring African Americans to help the shipyard meet the rising labor needs. With the new infusion of black and white labor the number of shipyard employees rose from 5,000 to 12,500 by the end of the war.12 The large increase in

Newport News’ population created a severe housing shortage.13 To address the problem shipyard

leaders, local officials, and private citizens rapidly constructed housing units. The far east end of the Peninsula became the location for cheap and hastily built African American housing.14

9 U.S. Census Bureau, “Population in Each State and Territory, by Counties,” 1880.

10 U.S. Census Bureau, “Population-Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,” 1910.

11 “Build Ships and Win the War,” Daily Press, July 12, 1917.

12 “The Greatest Ship; The Greatest Shipyard,” Daily Press, March 17, 1915; Joint Employee-Management War

Production Drive Committee, The Shipyard in Peace and War, (Newport News Virginia: Newport News Dry Dock and Shipping Company, 1944), 16.

13 “Build Ships;” “One Thousand New Homes are Needed,” Daily Press, August 7, 1917; “The Housing Problem,” Daily Press, August 28, 1917.

(10)

Despite the efforts to build cheap units to house black workers, Newport News could not meet the high housing demands, as over the war the African American population grew from 7,259 to 14,077.15 The continued lack of housing forced many African American workers to live in shanty

towns of tents on open lots in the east end of the city. City leaders viewed the existence of the shanty towns and ill-constructed homes as a temporary wartime measure. However, at the end of the war the need for these ramshackle houses and tent cities remained high due to continued employment of African Americans in skilled and unskilled positions at the shipyard. For the following decade and a half, African Americans continued to migrate to the city and seek shelter in the crowded and poorly constructed communities on the eastern tip of the peninsula.16

By the mid-1930s, white citizens of Newport News viewed the black neighborhood a dangerous slum that bread disease. Whites believed the slums created public hazards including “breeding distinct social problems,” and most importantly, “the transmission of disease from slum residents to the white community.”17 One white resident declared that African Americans

“come from their disease-breeding surroundings [of lower Jefferson Avenue] daily to rub elbows with the rest of the citizenry...decentraliz[ing] the slums and carrying them into homes the city over.”18 The fear of black workers, especially black domestics, spreading disease from “slum

areas” into the white community was a common trope used by white southerners to police

15 1910 Census ; U.S. Census Bureau, “Composition and Characteristics of the Population-Virginia,” 1920.

16 Housing Authority of the City of Newport News, Better Homes, (Newport News, VA, 1946), 6.

17 “Slum Clearance is a Public Problem,” The Daily Press, January 15, 1935, 1.

(11)

blackness in urban areas.19 By tagging African American areas as disease and poverty ridden,

whites could continue to consign black Americans “to the mudsills of Southern society.”20

While white citizens equated slums and blackness with disease, African Americans suffered from inadequate living and sanitary conditions forced upon them by Jim Crow society. During the decade and a half following the war, epidemics of influenza and whopping cough affected the east end of Newport News. Overcrowding and unsanitary living conditions contributed to both of these waves of sickness.21 The burden of blame for overcrowding and

unsanitary living conditions resided with white citizens and city leaders. According to a 1938 survey of the seven and a half block area of the far east end of the city conducted by two leading African Americans in Newport News, over seventy percent of houses were not connected to the city’s sanitation system.22 Of the thirty percent of houses connected to the system, many lacked

indoor plumbing. Conscious decisions by white property owners to not install plumbing and a lack of a suitable city infrastructure led to these inadequacies. The same report found an average of eight tenants living in a single dwelling. A large portion of the tenants living in these

overcrowded houses were shipyard employees, who could find no other housing within walking distance of the shipyard.23 While the conditions threatened residents’ physical wellbeing, the

landlords of many of the properties undercut any economic wellbeing the African American

19 Terra Hunter, To Joy My Freedom: Southern Black Women’s Lives and Labor after the Civil War, (Cambridge,

MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 190.

20 Ibid., 188.

21 Housing Authority, Better Homes, 8.

22 “Survey by Hampton Institute Focuses Attention on Slums in Newport News,” Daily Press, May 1, 1938; “City

Appoints Race Men to Mark Survey of Slums,” Journal and Guide, October 22, 1938; “Slum Committee May Make Report on Survey Monday,” Daily Press, November 5, 1938.

23 Minutes of the Newport News City Council, November 7, 1938; “Housing Authority Approved to Study Slum

(12)

residents might be able to gain. The shortage of housing in the area for African Americans allowed predominantly white landlords to set high rent prices, while pushing many African Americans further into poverty.24

While white citizens wrestled with anxieties over blackness attached to disease and poverty in the 1930s, the city’s ever increasing and politically active black population during World War II in Newport News amplified white fears. By 1940, the growing American involvement in the European conflict led to the start of another wave of migration to Newport News by white and black laborers.25 As in World War I, the federal government relied on the

Newport News Shipyard to build and repair ships to assist in the American defense effort. Also, the military used the Chesapeake-Ohio Railroad and the Hampton Port of Embarkation to transport munitions and war supplies to Europe.26 The demand placed on these industries by the

United States government required an expanded workforce. As in many other defense industry hubs, white and black Americans from across the region began moving to the city to secure employment in defense industries. African American workers particularly sought out jobs at the Newport News Shipyard, as it was one of the few places that employed African Americans in skilled positions. Despite wage discrepancies between white and black workers, African Americans viewed the shipyard as a place of employment where their labor was valued.27

Fearing another housing crisis like the one the city faced during WWI, the Newport News City Council along with the Newport News Housing Authority (NNHA) began to build defense

24 Ibid.

25 Annie Lash Jester, Martha W. Hiden, Kemper L. Kellogg, and William T. Stauffer, Newport News during the

Second World War, (Richmond, VA: The Baughman Company, 1948), 3.

26 Ibid, 16.

(13)

housing communities for war workers. City officials were particularly concerned to avoid the “slum problem” that followed the First World War.28 On July 2, 1940 Congress passed the

National Defense Act, which authorized the use of “money appropriated for the War Department for national-defense purposes” by cities and government agencies to “expedite the building up of the national defense.”29 With funds from the federal government, the NNHA launched its first

housing initiative to meet the “acute housing shortage” brought on by the “large increase of work contracts” at local defense industries.30 The NNHA initially planned to construct two defense

housing communities: a 300-unit community for whites; and a 200-unit community for African Americans. However, Newport News Shipyard Lieutenant Homer Ferguson advocated for the city to construct 400 units for white workers and only 100 for African Americans to best match the needs of his employees.31 Additionally, he advised the housing authority the shipyard

expected in the next year “a probable increase [in] employment of at least a 50%.” Therefore, the shipyard alone would need “at least 4,000 housing units.” In requesting the NNHA begin to consider the massive need for housing, Ferguson “stressed the importance of constructing substantial units rather than barracks or tents” as the latter only served people of “a type not desired in the community.”32 Ferguson’s requests were in hopes of keeping undesirable black

laborers out of the city.

28 Housing Authority, Better Homes, 14-15.

29 U. S. Congress, House, National Defense Act of 1940, HR 9850, 76th Cong., Introduced to House July 2, 1940.

July 2, 1940. https://www.loc.gov/law/help/statutes-at-large/76th-congress/session-3/c76s3ch508.pdf.

30 Minutes of the Housing Authority of the City of Newport News, June 27, 1940; “New $1,500,00 Housing Unit for

Newport News,” Norfolk Journal and Guide, July 20, 1940.

31 Minutes of the Housing Authority of the City of Newport News, July 10, 1940.

(14)

Ultimately, influenced by the continued growth of defense jobs, the NNHA and the federal government constructed thirteen defense housing projects, five for African Americans and eight for whites, in and around the city of Newport News throughout the war.33 These

defense communities ranged in size from as few as 80 units in College Court (White) to as many as 3,195 in Copeland Park (White). The three largest projects, Ferguson Park 1,200 units

(White), Newsome Park 1,591 units (African American), and Copeland Park, were all constructed in 1943 during the height of the war and were designed to be used solely for the duration of the war.34 Additionally, the houses in these three communities were “demountable,”

meaning they could be easily transported to other important defense-industry cities with housing needs.35 However, the continued in-migration of defense workers, especially black workers,

quickly filled these projects. The need for black housing was so great, city officials were forced to redraw the border between the all-white Copeland Park and the all-black Newsome Park to provide more units for African American defense workers.36

In 1943, as the African American community continued to grow, two events sparked the black citizenry of the city to become more politically active: the refusal of the City of Newport News to hire black police officers and the unjustified firing of six black educators by the

Newport News City School Board. The lack of police presence in black communities along with some officers displaying “racial bias” led African American residents to petition for the

33 Lower Peninsula Planning Commission of Virginia, “Map of Housing Projects on the Lower Peninsula of

Virginia,” June 20, 1946.

34 Ibid.; Minutes of the Housing Authority of the City of Newport News, August 25, 1943; “Largest Single Housing

Project on Peninsula,” Journal and Guide, February 6, 1943; “Newsome Park Homes Defense Workers,” Journal and Guide, March 6, 1943.

35 “Allot 1,350 Demountable Units for Workers in Newport News,” Journal and Guide, February 21, 1942; Newport

News City Council Minutes, September, 19, 1944.

(15)

employment of black policemen. Black leaders of Newport News believed the employment of black officers to be crucial to maintaining local “racial morale and [black] faith in American Democracy.”37 In early 1943, the City Council granted a presence at a council meeting to a

committee of African American citizens led by Professor L. F. Palmer, a leading black educator and civic leader. The group requested the City Council employ African American police officers to patrol the black communities. In support of his call for the hiring of black officers, Palmer pointed to the success of black police in Galveston, Texas and Charlotte, North Carolina. Palmer argued employment of officers in these cities led to better racial harmony and a stronger moral among the black populations. Additionally, he declared the employment of black officers in these cities in no way disrupted the racial hierarchy in place. Following Palmer’s request, the City Council absolved itself of responsibility for addressing the matter by citing its lack of authority over city employment. Members told the black audience the City Manager handled all hiring decisions; therefore, any action by the City Council on the matter would be an

overreach.38

In the late spring of 1943, the City of Newport News School Board’s decision to fire six black educators without cause fueled the already galvanized black population to turn to the power of the ballot in city elections. In May of 1943, the Newport News School Board fired three black teachers and three black principals in a closed meeting. Among those fired was L. F. Palmer, who had recently vocalized the black community’s concerns to the Council.39 The firing

37 “We Want Police Officers,” Journal and Guide, April 10, 1943.

38 Newport News City Council Minutes, February 1, 1943.

39 “3 Principals and 3 Teachers Dropped,” Journal and Guide, May 22, 1943; “Teachers Granted Right to ‘Limited

(16)

of the teachers infuriated black citizens who believed the decision to be unjust. Citizens quickly made their voices heard at the next city council meeting, where they demanded the City Council force the School Board to rehire the educators. Black leaders then warned that black residents’ anger could lead to massive riots and violence if the School Board did not immediately reinstate the teachers. As with the issue of black police officers, the City Council claimed that it lacked the power to influence the School Board’s decisions. Additionally, members of the City Council defended the School Board’s actions by claiming that it had “full authority over employees from the Superintendent down.”40 African American Attorney R. Wendell Walker argued the City

Council had a “moral right” to respond to “dereliction of duty” by the School Board, no matter the legality of authority.41 Despite the anger of the black community the City Council and School

Board upheld the decision to release the six black educators.

With African American residents’ concerns falling on deaf ears blacks began to reconsider their longtime support of white candidates. Local black leaders and organizations turned to the possibilities of creating a black voting bloc to support a black candidate for City Council in the 1944 elections. Throughout 1943, Newport News’ growing African American community began to create an infrastructure to get voters registered and more involved in the political process. The NAACP, in conjunction with the newly formed East End Voters League, held numerous meetings, rallies, and voter drives. African American citizens were “calling for a campaign to increase the Negro voting strength” in the city in order to vote out of office the city officials who continually ignored their complaints.42

40 Newport News City Council Minutes, May 24, 1943.

41 Ibid.

(17)

African Americans in Newport News used their higher defense-job wages and community groups to counter the state poll tax. With increased wages, some black defense workers could now pay their poll tax and register to vote. Additionally, the NAACP, tenant councils, and the Newport News Voter League held “poll tax drives” in hopes of raising money to assist those who could still not afford to pay the poll tax.43 These grassroots efforts helped

slowly increase the number of black voters on the Peninsula. Dr. Luther P. Jackson argued that paying the poll tax “enable[ed] Negroes to right wrongs and arrest racial discrimination through action at the ballot box.”44 By January, the Journal and Guide reported a record number of

African Americans in Newport News had paid their poll taxes and registered to vote in the upcoming primary in April. The Newport News Voters League and the NAACP continued to work to enroll as many voters as possible in the upcoming election.45

The rising focus on voter registration and political activism by African Americans in Newport News was a part of the NAACP’s nationwide “Double V” campaign. The “Double V” campaign focused on using wartime rhetoric of democracy to win victory on two fronts: in Europe against the fascist axis powers and at home against racism.46 Across the nation

membership rolls of local chapters of the NAACP grew as more African Americans, especially in the South, demanded that America finally fulfill its promise of democracy. While Peninsula residents did not respond to the growing political activity of black citizens with violence as in other southern cities, such as Mobile, Alabama, racial harmony was not fully present either. An

43 Ibid.

44 Luther P. Jackson, “May Abolish Poll Tax by Paying It,” Journal and Guide, December 4, 1943.

45 “Predicts Hottest Primary in Past 25 Years,” Journal and Guide, January 29, 1944.

(18)

article in the Daily Press warned that residents who believed racial prejudice and tension did not exist were “foolish in the extreme.”47 For on the Peninsula “there [were] persons who take

delight in stirring up prejudice and hate.”48

By the start of 1944, momentum from voter registration drives provided the opportunity for African Americans in several southern states to run in white primaries.49 In Newport News,

attorney R. Wendell Walker announced his candidacy for City Council in early February becoming the first African American to run for City Council since the turn of the century.50 In

the primary race, Walker faced off against eight white candidates. The black community of Newport News quickly rallied behind Walker as he garnered endorsements from the NAACP, the Voters League, and other community groups. Knowing he faced an uphill battle, at an

NAACP rally, Walker “stressed the importance of Negroes safeguarding their rights as American citizens by paying the poll tax, registering and voting in all elections.” Walker pledged that if elected he would work to ensure the city council embraced its “moral responsibility” to uphold democracy by pushing local officials to address the concerns of the black community. 51

As the democratic primary election neared, white citizens and leaders looked to prevent black voters from employing a “single-shot ballot.” The “single-shot ballot” or “single-shot voting” was a strategy that could be employed by groups to counteract numerical disadvantages in voting population by voting for a single candidate, rather than the three candidates allowed.

47 Ibid., 160-162; “Peninsula Record Good,” Daily Press, December 17, 1942.

48 “Peninsula Record.”

49 Sullivan, Days of Hope, 134.

50 “Walker Files for Newport News Council,” Journal and Guide, February 12, 1943.

(19)

By only voting for a single candidate, voters could add to a selected candidates vote total without helping opposing candidates. Also, whites feared African Americans “bloc voting,” where African Americans collectively decided who they should vote for in the election thus creating a voting block of support for a ballot of candidates. African Americans across the South employed these strategies in hopes of voting black candidates or liberal whites into office. Combining “one-shot-balloting” in and “bloc voting” created a potentially potent black political tool for African Americans to dismantle white rule.52 Therefore, white leaders in Newport News, fearing

Walker could succeed if black voters embraced a “one-shot ballot,” discussed whether “single-shot ballots” could be counted as invalid. The debates located a discrepancy between local and state election laws on the validity of “single-shot ballots,” with the state considering them valid ballots. However, city leaders decided to uphold local election laws from the cities charter to validate only ballots with votes for three candidates, as it was “the safest course” of action and ensured “single-shot balloting” would not lead to a Walker victory.53

In the election on April 4th, Walker’s performance validated black hopes and white fears about the potential strength of black voters. It also highlighted the obstacles a black candidate faced in Newport News. Walker finished sixth out of the nine candidates running in the primary. The result left black citizens ecstatic at the “remarkable showing” their candidate put forward. The Journal and Guide reported Walker “beat down” his white opponents in the two black precincts. Walker received 1,039 votes in the election, with 892 of them coming from African Americans. The Daily Press reported that the rest of his votes came from white precincts where

52Ward, White Democracy, 157.

(20)

he received between “9 and 21” votes respectively. 54 Though small in number, the white votes

Walker received pointed to the existence of white southern liberals in the community. Walker’s performance demonstrated to black citizens that they could potentially garner enough votes to desegregate the City Council and that Newport News possessed a small number of whites with whom they could ally. These white southern liberals were a part of the “Silent South” that worked as an internal threat to the “Solid South’s” social structure.55

White city leaders saw the rise in black voters as a threat to their power and sought to appease the black community. Less than two weeks after Walker’s surprising election finish, the City Council announced they intended to concede to the black community’s demand for the employment of black police officers. The City Council explained their decision as a response to a constant manpower shortage in the police force. But African Americans linked it to their new-found political clout. The Journal and Guide reported, “the announcement caused widespread speculation because of the sudden decision to employ Negroes on the force immediately after the recent councilmanic primary in which one incumbent was defeated for reelection.”56 Black

citizens celebrated the decision as a victory.

The City Council’s decision to appease the black community most likely was influenced by a faith in an adaptive style of racial management and the Council’s belief the racial

composition of the city would return to its pre-war levels. White leaders in Virginia, and especially the Tidewater area, used paternalistic relationships with black leaders to shape race relations and maintain white control over much the first part of the twentieth century. Over the

54 “Wornom Noses Out Jones; Taylor and Anderson Win Re-Nomination,” Daily Press, April 5, 1944.

55 Luther P. Jackson, “Rights and Duties in a Democracy: Southern Whites Rallying to Negro,” Journal and Guide,

August 18, 1945.

(21)

1930s and early 1940s, Virginians adapted to allow token African American roles throughout society within a paternalistic framework.57 Within this tradition of race relations, Newport

News’ councilmen could elect to appease the black community by allowing a small number of highly qualified candidates to become officers with jurisdiction only over black areas of the city. As such concessions posed no threat to white control.

Additionally, City Council members believed the rise in defense jobs and defense housing would only last for the duration of the war. City leaders predicted the shipyard and railroad would scale back employment as defense spending would decrease dramatically, leading to layoffs of the migrant defense workers, especially black workers.58 Additionally, a report

released by the authorities at the Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation suggested that “Negro personnel show a greater tendency to migrate” and predicted “about two-thirds intended to return” to their pre-war lives.59 City leaders thus expected without other employment options the

large black population that had migrated to the city would move away searching for new economic opportunities.

Similarly, Newport News’ leaders expected many of the defense communities to be torn down following the conclusion of the war. The expectation of a labor exodus in addition to fear of the semi-permanent defense community devolving into pre-war like slums led leaders to anticipate that many of the communities including, Newsome Park would be torn down.60 The

57 J. Douglas Smith, Managing White Supremacy: Race, Politics, and Citizenship in Jim Crow Virginia, (Chapel

Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 9-11.

58 Newport News City Council Minutes, August 23, 1943.

59 “8 of 10 Service Men Would Go Back to Homes,” Daily Press, February 10, 1945.

(22)

firm belief in the migratory nature of the black defense working population and the ability to decrease available housing in conjunction with traditional views on managing race relation created an environment in which white city leaders reasoned they could temporarily appease the black community until the loss of population would limit the growing black political power.

Black citizens of Newport News also assumed there would be an exodus of workers and citizens from Newport News at the conclusion of the war, though they believed it would be of whites not blacks. Like many war workers across the United States, African Americans who moved to Newport News during the war had previously worked as sharecroppers in rural

southern communities.61 The improvements in living conditions brought by the housing projects

and the large increase in wages of the defense industry led many to believe that even if layoffs occurred the opportunities that still existed in Newport News were greater than one could find elsewhere. Additionally, throughout the war black citizens developed a vibrant black run economy to sustain the communities. The creation of black businesses in and surrounding the defense communities created bonds to the city that anchored citizens to the area. Together the creation of a vibrant black community and the belief in the economic opportunity led black citizens to believe they would persist in the city and could continue to improve their political power to garner better resources for the growing community.62 However, black citizens believed

61 “Hampton Roads Negro Population Shows Great Gains in 4 Years,” Daily Press, March 9, 1945. “Caring and

Sharing:” a Memoir of Newsome Park, 1990; Annie Pollard, interviewed by R. Joshua

Sipe, September 21, 2015, audio recording, Hampton Roads Oral History Project, Christopher Newport University, Newport News, VA; 5; Albert McIver, Jr., interviewed by R. Joshua Sipe and Alex Szymanski, October 18, 2014, audio recording, Hampton Roads Oral History Project, Christopher Newport University, Newport News, VA; Helen Foster, interviewed by Katie Fisher, November 13, 2014, audio recording, Hampton Roads Oral History Project, Christopher Newport University, Newport News, VA.

62 “Caring and Sharing;” Elwood Hill, interviewed by R. Joshua Sipe, August 31, 2015, audio recording, Hampton

(23)

white war workers would migrate to other cities that could offer better wages or employment.63

The two divergent views on the future population of the city and the potential of black political development would set the stage for continuous black challenge for the city council and white leaders attempts to mitigate black political power.

After the war, Newport News’ leaders faced the reality of African American defense workers remaining in the city and needing housing as the city became a permanent defense industry center. Despite the end of the war, the shipyard and railroad would continue to be central to post-war military plans, especially with the rising tensions between the US and Soviet Union. The continued boom of the shipyard and the railroad meant continued employment of African Americans creating the potential for a second housing crisis in the community if the city removed “temporary” black housing, such as Newsome Park. Therefore, city leaders reluctantly accepted the need to keep the black defense communities functioning in the city.

Simultaneously, white working and middle-class citizens of Newport News moved from the central urban core surrounding the shipyard to the suburbs in Warwick County and Elizabeth City County. Attracted by better housing, quality schools, and lower tax rates, the white

population that had helped offset the rise in Newport News’ African American population were slowly syphoned off over the next decade.64 The migration mirrored the suburban movement

across America, as whites relocated to new housing developments or further populated the streetcar suburbs of the First World War, such as Hilton Village just inside the Warwick County line.65 The counties of Warwick and Elizabeth City experienced a large white population growth

63 “Oppose Demountables as Permanent Housing,” Journal and Guide, March 31, 1945.

64 “Benefits from Complaints,” Daily Press, January 30, 1945; Burt Garnett, “Slum Clearance Slow,” Daily Press,

March 29, 1948; Cynthia Skove, “East End: A Tale of Lives and Livelihoods,” Daily Press, September 23, 1979.

65 John Quarstein, Newport News: A Centenial History, (Newport News, VA: City of Newport News, 1996),

(24)

between 1940 and 1950. Warwick County’s white population grew from 6,703 to 27,434 and Elizabeth City County’s grew from 25,275 to 43,748 , while Newport News’ increased from only 21,772 to 24,059.66 The diminishing racial buffer caused by white flight intensified anxieties of

potential black political success, especially with the growing influence of the NAACP in the city.67

Consolidation: An Antidote for White Anxieties

The city leaders of Newport News turned towards consolidating local governments on the Peninsula as a means to address postwar economic, social, and political concerns, including black political influence in the city. In the fall of 1946, the City Council of Newport News ordered their newly formed Lower Peninsula Planning Commission (LPPC) to begin

investigating the possibility of consolidation on the Peninsula, including Hampton, Phoebus, Elizabeth City, and Warwick.68 City leaders sought consolidation of the Peninsula as each area

could benefit “politically and economically...under a single united administration.”69 The

potential economic benefit centered on continued industrialization in the post-war years within the communities. As a consolidated city could provide incentivizing tax rates and improved city structures leading to companies building industries within the city. While hope of further

industrialization was an important factor in the creation of the LPPC, politicians focused much of

Press of Virginia, 1972), 47. For more on postwar suburbanization in the United States see: Kenneth Jackson,

Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).

66 U.S. Census Bureau, “Characteristics of the Population-Virginia,” 1940; U. S. Census Bureau, “Characteristics of

the Population-Virginia,” 1950.

67 Temple, Merger Politics, 47-48.

68The Lower Peninsula Planning Commission, “Report of Study Committee of the Lower Peninsula Planning

Commission of Virginia on Consolidation of Local Governments,” May 19, 1949, ii.

(25)

the discussions on how consolidation could develop “political harmony” and address mutual “urban issues,” such as duplicated services, efficient city governments, and appropriate tax bases.70 Therefore, between 1947 and 1949, the LPPC, made up of politicians, business

representatives, and prestigious citizens of the five areas under consideration for consolidation, researched and contemplated various ways the Peninsula could be merged to address city leaders’ concerns.

In April of 1949, the LPPC released its report on the potential for consolidation. The report presented solutions the committee deemed “practical, feasible, and wholly desirable.” The suggestions provided by the LPPC were intended to create a more efficient and effective

government to shape a “homogeneous community.” In examining consolidation the LPPC believed “democratic governments” on a local level should function with “a balanced population by age, educational and cultural attainment, economic substance and racialbackground to minimize the possibility of appeals to or political control of a special group, the growth of disproportionate burdens and the development of disadvantageous, deteriorating conditions.”71

Though using terms such as homogenous community, which appeared benign, the LPPC’s report was about race and ways to limit the threat posed by black citizens in Newport News.

With this in mind, the LPPC evaluated four potential consolidation plans: The

Metropolitan Commission Plan; The Metropolitan County Plan; The Urban-Rural Plan; and the City Plan. The Metropolitan Commission Plan proposed that each respective government would remain politically intact, but an elected area commission would be formed to make political and

70 Lower Peninsula, “Consolidation of Local Governments;” “The Consolidation Study,” Daily Press, October 27,

1946; Temple, Merger Politics, 1-2.

(26)

economic recommendations. The Metropolitan County Plan consolidated all five areas into a single county, which would function under Virginia county laws and would be tax friendly to residents. The Urban-Rural Plan consolidated the rural areas of Elizabeth City County and Warwick County into a single government, and the Cities of Newport News, Hampton, and Pheobus, into a single city government. This plan would allow each area to maintain

governmental and tax structures similar to those already in place. The City Plan, also known as the “Greater City,” consolidated the five areas into a single city. Ultimately, the LPPC believed the City Plan offered the greatest benefit to each area.72

The “Greater City” offered tremendous potential economic growth to the area because of its size and the resources at the city’s disposal to attract investment from industries, but most importantly created a political and racial balance for Peninsula communities. The Greater City plan would create the third largest city in the state of Virginia, behind Richmond and Norfolk, with a total of approximately 127 square miles of territory containing 148,000 citizens.73 This

large city could rival Norfolk and other port cities across the United States as an economic hub of trade and military industry. However, in outlining the advantages the Greater City offered all areas, the LPPC first cited the consolidation could “accommodate problems that develop— political, social, civic, and cultural—that, unsatisfied, effect a deteriorating influence” on the area.74 Once again, the LPPC used coded language of good and efficient government to highlight

the impact consolidation would have on limiting black political influence on the Peninsula. In the eyes of the LPPC, the “Greater City” offered the greatest flexibility and potential for sustainable

72 Ibid, 8-15.

73 Ibid. 16.

(27)

economic growth, while also adequately addressing urban concerns of city leaders, especially in regards to the growing black population in Newport News.

By combining the five areas the white population would regain a strong hold on population rule, securing white political power, even with a growing number of “progressive” minded whites in the area. In 1947, African Americans made up approximately thirty-five percent of the population of Newport News. In the new “Greater City,” African Americans would only comprise twenty-six percent of the population.75 This decrease in percentage of black

population would give whites a stronger grip on power. Additionally, the LPPC noted the consolidation “provid[ed] ample room for future expansion and growth and [would] remove any likelihood of the need for further changes in boundaries in the local government structure.”76 By

encompassing all potential areas of future suburban growth, the consolidated “Greater City” would help white leaders solve Newport News’ “white flight” and suburbanization problem.

Initial reactions to consolidation from residents across the Peninsula were generally favorable, though many wanted to know more details regarding its benefits and costs. Some residents, such as Rutherford B. Thompson of Elizabeth City County, were skeptical of Newport News and Warwick having too much influence over a merged city.77 Despite these concerns, the

general mood of most white citizens in Newport News and Warwick was supportive. Citizens, such as L. M. Rutherford of Hilton Village, stated, “I am for consolidation because it will be better for the Peninsula and lower taxes. Also, it will add prestige to the city and make it more wholesome.”78 For many citizens on the Peninsula, consolidation promised the greatest

75 U.S. Census, 1950.

76 “Consolidation of Local Governments,” 17.

77 Matt Fulgham, “Sentiment Widespread for Consolidation but Many Seek More Data,” Daily Press, Jun 12, 1949.

(28)

opportunity for improved resources and an efficient local government.79 In addition to support

from citizens, consolidation was backed by Lewis A. McMurran, Jr. and the local branches of the Byrd Organization, the statewide political machine headed by Harry S. Byrd, Jr.80

African Americans on the Peninsula were torn on whether to support consolidation or fight against it. A strong contingent of African Americans, including religious leaders, believed consolidation could be beneficial for the black community. Joining together the various

communities could potentially better connect black institutions across county and city lines. African American citizens also felt consolidation presented the chance for the education systems on the Peninsula to improve, as more resources would be available to use for black education. Additionally, African Americans thought a unified Peninsula could offer better municipal services, such as policing and public transportation. Finally, those in support of consolidation imagined that creating a singular political body on the Peninsula would provide African Americans the best chance to impact politics.81 Ernest Williams of Newport News’ favored

consolidation because “there [was] strength in unity, making possible the accomplishment of many things.”82 But others in the black community viewed consolidation as a ploy to limit black

power. Newport News resident Willie Braxton argued that if consolidation passed, “the balance

79 “Unity’s Opportunity,” Daily Press, January 7, 1950; Charles L. Hurst, “Charter OK’d by House as March 21

Vote Date Gets Court Signature,” Daily Press, March 5, 1950.

80 Temple, Merger Politics, 30-37. Temple details the involvement of local branches of the Byrd Organization in the

consolidation process on the Peninsula, but suggests the state level of the organization was not actively involved. For more on the Byrd Machine in Virginia see: James Ely, The Crisis of Conservative Virginia: The Byrd Organization and the Politics of Massive Resistance, (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1976).

81 “Colored Jaycees Back Consolidation,” Journal and Guide, February 18, 1950. “Ministers’ Alliance Favors

Peninsula Consolidation,” Journal and Guide, March 4, 1950.

(29)

of power held by Colored in Newport News would be lost forever. Records have proven what the fate of the minorities is.”83

In March of 1950, voters from the five areas went to the polls to vote on a referendum on whether or not the areas should consolidate. The votes resulted in Elizabeth City County,

Hampton, and Phoebus blocking the first attempt at consolidation on the Peninsula. In Hampton and Phoebus, consolidation failed by margins of 3 to 1 and 6 to 1, respectively, while Elizabeth City voted the measure down by a 2-1 margin. The three areas appeared to be concerned with Newport News’ government, and the desire of the three areas to consolidate into a single county of their own.84 While those three regions firmly rejected consolidation, Newport News

expectedly voted in support of consolidation by a large number. City voters cast 3,692 votes “for” and 640 votes “against” consolidation. The turnout in Newport News was one of the largest the city had ever seen. Meanwhile, Warwick supported consolidation by a 2 to 1 margin.85 Black

voters in all areas reflected the divided black opinion on consolidation, with more African Americans favoring consolidation than rejecting it. However, in the solidly pro-consolidation city of Newport News the strongest opposition came from within all black precincts, which totaled nearly 200 votes against consolidation.86 These black precints likely rejected

consolidation as it most threatened their growing political power. Though consolidation in 1950 was defeated, events over the next five years in the city and nation at large would lead to the

83Ibid.

84 “Hampton, ECC and Phoebus Vote Against Unification Plan in Near-Record Ballot,” Daily Press, March 22,

1950.

85 Ibid.

(30)

most explosive fight for consolidation on the Peninsula, in which considerations of race became the most contentious issue.

Jim Crow Evolves on the Peninsula

A month after consolidation was defeated, African Americans citizens led by W. Hale Thompson, a fiery local black lawyer, began a two-year battle to desegregate the Newport News Public Library. In April of 1950, Thompson and other African American leaders in Newport News attended a city council meeting and requested access to the main branch of the library.87

After hearing the black citizens’ request, Mayor Taylor furiously declared, “the library should stay as it is” because the city had “opened up a fine library for [blacks] in the East End and it [had] plenty of books.”88 The library Taylor referred to was an annex on the second floor of the

Doris Miller Recreation Center that housed approximately 50 books. The city council agreed with Taylor citing Plessy v. Ferguson’s standard of separate but equal as justification for refusing to desegregate the library. Additionally, city leaders, as in previous incidents, claimed they did not have legal authority over the library, since the library operations were run by the Newport News Public Library Inc., a private entity.89

Following the refusal of the city council and mayor to act, Thompson filed suit in Federal District Court against the City of Newport News and Newport News Public Library Inc. for equal access to the Main Library. In response to the suit, the Newport News Library board of directors filed a request that if the suit proceeded to trial, it would be decided by a jury instead of

87 “Mayor Cowles Cold Toward Equal Library Use Request,” ˆJournal and Guide, April 29, 1950.

88 Ibid.

(31)

a federal judge.90 The suit was continuously moved down the docket throughout 1951 and much

of 1952. With the trial approaching in the late summer of 1952, the library board of directors stunned locals by voluntarily desegregating the public library in July. While the board of directors released no official statements, observers believed the library willfully integrated to prevent a forced integration by the courts.91 Court ordered integration of a public facility such as

the library could have created a precedent to undo segregation elsewhere on the Peninsula, upsetting the racial hierarchy of the city.

In 1952, Newport News not only experienced desegregation of its library system, but also had another black candidate for city council. In January, W. Hale Thompson announced his candidacy for one of the three open seats on the city council. Thompson, like his predecessors, believed the city’s government continuously failed to address the needs of black citizens.

Inspired by recent successful candidacies in Richmond, Virginia and parts of North Carolina, the black community felt they could lead the way towards integration of local governments on the Peninsula. Thompson and his supporters believed that as in other urban areas where black candidates successfully competed in elections, Newport News had a growing progressive white class who possessed an “awakening sense of social responsibility.”92 Thompson was not the only

black candidate in the state hoping to ride such a moral awakening. Black candidates also took aim at city council seats in Portsmouth, Petersburg, Charlottesville, and Lynchburg.93

90 “Newport News Library Issue May Go to Court,” Journal and Guide, July 29, 1950; “Newport News Library Suit

Discussed,” Journal and Guide, August 5, 1950; “Library Board Demands Jury, If Case Goes to Trial Stage,” Daily Press, September 15, 1950.

91 “Main Library Opens Doors to All Adults,” Daily Press, July 9, 1952.

92 “Two May Aspire for Council in Newport News,” Journal and Guide, January 12, 1952; “Candidates for Office

Find Favorable Trend,” Journal and Guide, January 12, 1952.

(32)

In the Newport News race, Thompson faced eight white candidates in the primary

election. As in previous primaries, local black institutions rallied behind Thompson and led voter registration drives. When the votes were counted, Thompson finished fourth, the best a black candidate had finished in any election on the Peninsula. Thompson accrued 1,438 votes, with 953 coming from African American wards of the city. Thompson’s strong performance in black districts was augmented by the significant pockets of support in certain white districts. The progressive white vote in Newport News had grown significantly since Walkers strong run in 1944. The good performance of Thompson in the primary along with the desegregation of the library began to build momentum among threated whites for another large scale push for Peninsula consolidation.

The emergence of lawsuits across the United States, including in Newport News to desegregate public schools further ignited local white support to pursue consolidation. With the ruling of the Supreme Court in Brown vs. Board to desegregate schools, local citizens largely trusted their local leaders to address the questions brought about by the Brown case.94 However,

local clergy members in Newport News immediately came out in support of the lawsuit, citing segregation and racism as expressions of moral depravity that needed to be resolved.95 Despite

the presence of “pro-integration” sentiments by local religious leaders, the majority of Newport News’ white citizenry firmly rejected the notion of integration.96 William Stephenson, a resident

of Newport News, stated to the Virginia legislature that “pro-integration” speeches by local

94 “Better Not Guess: Just Wait Confidently,” Daily Press, April 15, 1954; “Hurtful Impatience on School

Integration,” Daily Press, May 26, 1954.

95“NN Resident In Blast on School Issue,” Daily Press, November 16, 1954; “Much Opposition to Racial Integration in the Church,” Daily Press, August 28, 1955.

(33)

religious leaders “made [him] sick to [his] stomach” and that he and at least 3,800 other residents of the city were ready to support closing schools to prevent integration. 97 In 1955 the Newport

News’ chapter of the NAACP, led by W. Hale Thompson and William Walker, another African American attorney, sued the School Board of Newport News to integrate local schools.

Thompson and Walker’s lawsuit to integrate began a long battle in which Newport News’ white leaders supported statewide attempts to prevent integration.98

Amidst the growing anxieties about federal interference in state and local issues brought on by the Brown decision and the local integration suit, white Peninsula leaders revived

discussions of consolidation. Leaders in Newport News, Warwick, and Hampton, which consolidated with Elizabeth City County in 1952, commenced the development of a Tri-City Consolidation Plan. The initial arguments for the plan echoed those from 1950, with leaders citing the need to create larger land areas to attract more industry to the area. Furthermore, “working as one instead of three [cities] would [result in] a better school system, equal facilities and teacher salaries, [and] more adequate police and fire protection.”99 Many officials viewed

consolidation was “essential to the progress of the Peninsula.”100

Throughout 1955 and 1956 leading up to the Peninsula wide vote on the Tri-City consolidation referendum in November of 1956, community members and leaders specifically discussed consolidation in terms racial control of the Peninsula. City leaders from Hampton and Newport News held public forums to allow the public to discuss support for and concern about

97 “NN Resident.”

98“Hamilton, “Race, Politics, and Education,” 151; “NN Board Turns Down Bid for Integration of City Schools This Fall,” Daily Press, July 13, 1955.

99 “Consolidation Views Argued Before Group,” Daily Press, October 26, 1955.

(34)

consolidation. Pro-consolidationists from Newport News contended inaction would lead to what they characterized as “Negro domination” on the Peninsula.101 Newport News resident William

Ferguson declared, “Newport News is fast coming under the control of a colored government of undesirable persons controlled by Negroes.”102 J. B. Woodward, a shipyard leader and

prominent citizen, argued that white citizens needed to “take a look at the trend indicated by recent elections and by the school population in Newport News now reported to be 60 to 40 (white in the minority) and in about four years estimated to become 70 to 30.”103 Woodward and

other consolidationists feared the continued growth of Newport News’ black population and the continued challenge for seats on the city council by black citizens. Consolidationists “predicted that unless consolidation [was] accomplished, the Newport News government may in a few years be in the hands of ‘persons ill fitted and out of harmony with those in Hampton and

Warwick’.”104 In addition to gaining political control, consolidationists argued African

Americans would overtake businesses and the economy. One citizen argued, “Negroes…in a short time hope to gain control of millions in tax values and control of the Newport News

Waterworks…by controlling Newport News, the Negroes would get control of the economic and business hub of the Peninsula.”105 Therefore, if white citizens of Warwick and Hampton did not

agree to consolidation their economic future was in peril.

101 “Consolidation Debate Hears Industry Quiz,” Daily Press, October 17, 1956.

102 Ernest C. Downing, Jr., “Statistics Apart,” Daily Press, October 9, 1956. 103 Ibid.

104 “Increase of Colored Population Causes Fear,” Journal and Guide, March 17, 1956.

(35)

Most white citizens in Hampton agreed with this belief in a threat of black political power. One supporter of consolidation believed that if citizens in Hampton refused to help secure white rule in Newport News, the city of Hampton would be the next to fall under the terror of “Negro rule.”106 Meanwhile, members of the Hampton Citizens Committee for Consolidation

decried those who did not believe in the race threat posed by Newport News’ black community. They argued that white leaders with anti-consolidationist sentiments were “co-workers” of W. Hale Thompson and Joe Richman, a Newport News politician representing the black Second Ward, which was known for vote rigging, bribery and other political underhanded tactics.107

Linking white anti-consolidationists with Richman and Thompson suggested such men strove to corrupt the political system of the Peninsula by opening the door to African Americans in political offices.

While supporters of consolidation waived the banner of black political power, anti-consolidationists, especially in Hampton, discussed the supposed “Negro problem” as either mythical or of no concern. In a consolidation debate hosted by the Buckroe Beach Civic

Association, Hampton city councilman Von Schiling announced he believed the “Negro problem would have never been brought into the open,” if it were not for “race baiting” by

consolidationists. Additionally, he felt that even if black citizens gained control of the city of Newport News, catastrophe would not follow, as black citizens had a strong interest in the continued economic success of the city.108 Other citizens in attendance at the meeting claimed,

“it [was] not Hampton’s responsibility to save Newport News from a threat of Negro

106 Ibid.

107 “Three Councilmen’s Anti-Merger Statement Hit by Hampton Group,” Daily Press, October 29, 1956.

(36)

domination, when Newport News leaders failed to have the proper foresight and act through annexation powers to prevent the threat. [Furthermore,] the councilmanic election in Newport News last year showed that the threat was largely imaginary.” Citizens who ran an ad in the

Daily Press echoed the idea that Newport News leaders were issuing false claims about the possibility of “Negro domination” (See Figure 2). The ad pointed to the still “2 to 1” majority white citizens had on the black population of Newport News.109 Despite the belief that the fear of

black political control was false, the one speaker at an anti-consolidation rally avowed his belief that white supremacy was an absolute necessity in local government for years to come. Another anti-consolidationist bolstered this claim arguing that if the Peninsula merged “the Negroes of Newport News, Warwick and Hampton could band together to elect one or two men to the council and the could hold the balance of power, something they haven’t been able to do in Newport News at the present.”110 Meanwhile three councilmen from Hampton opposed to the

merger declared, “Consolidation is not a solution to the race question that is foremost in the minds of many.”111 Instead, other actions could be pursued to address the concerns of the “race

question” plaguing the South. The centrality of race and the desire to maintain white control of local government by proponents on each side of the consolidation debate demonstrates how white southerners could possess similar goals of reaffirming Jim Crow, yet determine different strategies as most effective.

Unlike in 1950, African Americans on the Peninsula fully rejected consolidation as it was a direct attempt to limit their potential power. Hale Thompson denounced the Peninsula

109 “Race Issue without Fact,” Daily Press, October 29, 1956.

110 “Faget.”

(37)

governments’ attempt to consolidate. In front of a gathering of black residents of Newport News, he argued, “the present situation in Newport News offers a good opportunity for Negroes and right-thinking people to produce a model city government in which all can work together.”112

Additionally, Thompson addressed the manufacturing of racial fear by white leaders using the “threat of Negro domination.” He described “the motive of continued white supremacy behind consolidation an ‘unwholesome unchristian’ motive,” and characterized “proconsolidationists as trying to ‘drive a wedge between the Negroes and the Whites.”113As an outside observer, Oliver

Hill an African American attorney in Richmond argued that African Americans needed to continue to fight for representation, meaning the defeat of consolidation and election of an integrated city government that would work towards the benefit of all citizens of the

Peninsula.114 Thompson and Hill’s comments on consolidation underscored the desire of African

Americans on Peninsula for an equal voice in city decisions.

The November 1956 referendum once again defeated consolidation; however, in the aftermath consolidationists accused African American voters of hijacking the desire of the white majority. The city of Newport News and Warwick County largely supported consolidation with results of “5,385 ‘for’ to 2,058 ‘against’ and 5,336 ‘for’ to 3,532 ‘against” respectively.

However, the City of Hampton blocked the Tri-City Consolidation plan by 856 votes, with a tally of “ 6,192 ‘for’ and 7,048 ‘against.”115 The Daily Press reported “about 53 per cent of the

voters were opposed to consolidation, or a ratio of about 1.08 to 1.”116 While a large portion of

112 “Thompson Asks Defeat of Consolidation,” Journal and Guide, October 30, 1956.

113 “Hale Thompson Urges Negro Voters Oppose Tri-Cities Merger Plan,” Daily Press, October 16, 1956.

114 “Negro’s Role in Economic Life is Cited,” Daily Press, August 2, 1956.

115 “Proposal Loses by 856 Votes in Hampton Area,” Daily Press, November 7, 1956.

(38)

Newport News supported consolidation, the four primarily black precincts in the city were a heavy voting force against measure. African Americans in Warwick and Hampton voted similarly as their Newport News counterparts dampening the consolidation vote.117

Pro-consolidationsists, energized by fear of “Negro dominance,” quickly decried the results of the consolidation vote as the direct result of “the color issue” infecting the Peninsula.118

On November 9th, the day after consolidation failed, a letter from one unnamed consolidationist

under the pseudonym “Second Looker” ran in the Daily Press. In his letter, “Second Looker” expressed his understanding of why consolidation failed despite “a majority of white citizens’” support. The author claimed that while white anti-consolidationists and African American residents decried the discussion of race in debates leading up to the vote, the voting results confirmed white fears of “Negro domination” of the white majority.119 The “Second Looker”

continued, “The Negro voting strength in Newport News was brought into the open during the campaign and the outcome of the voting on Tuesday indicates that the Negro voters play an important part not only in Newport News, but Hampton and Warwick as well.”120 Finally,

“Second Looker” concluded with a grave warning, “To know the colored vote has strength out of all proportion to its size and, further, that such vote cannot be counted on except to vote for its own interests...In a short time they [African Americans] will control Newport News with dire effects on Hampton and Warwick…It CAN happen here and is going to unless the majority of

117 Ibid.; “Peninsula Colored Voters for Ike, Against Merger,” Journal and Guide, November 10, 1956.

118 Second Looker, “The Color Issue,” Daily Press, November 9, 1956; “Did a Minority Bloc Defeat

Consolidation,” Daily Press, November 9, 1956.

119 Looker, “Color Issue.”

References

Related documents

The parameter values of path loss exponent, body shadowing, and multipath fading are adjustable based on the use cases, channel conditions, location of patient in the room, and the

Assuming sensitivity of IOO percent, the Static-99 would correctly estimate that i1o of the iio would recidivate (true positive) and falsely predict that o would not (false

Given a set of cell clusters that have been annotated with estimated radial position and chromatin compaction, along with genome browser views of (1) the genomic windows in

For the grace to care for the suffering For the grace to comfort the sick For the grace to feed the hungry For the grace to shelter the homeless For the grace to protect the

To prevail on their claim, plaintiffs bear the ultimate burden of proving that a special relationship did in fact arise and that they relied on CHI's expertise in calculating the

15 Ringer Types 6 levels/ Meeting Mode/ Off On/Off Auto/ 16 Languages Call Type (Ext Ring/ Int Ring/ Group Ring) Colour (Green/Red/ 4 Display Type (Base Number/ Handset Number/

In the United Kingdom this report is approved and/or communicated by Deutsche Bank AG London, a member of the London Stock Exchange and regulated by the

We shall therefore successively define the concept of attitude, indicate how environmental attitude has been measured up to now, report the results obtained from such