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Abstract. Civil War. Although many lessons learned have been documented, the Army s training

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Lessons Learned from the Philippine Insurrection and Intervention into Mexico Impact Army Doctrine Today

SGM Mitchell R. DuVall

United States Army Sergeants Major Academy Class #35

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Abstract

The United States Army has engaged in counter-insurgency operations since prior to the Civil War. Although many “lessons learned” have been documented, the Army’s training

doctrine does not reflect those lessons learned and the documentation of successes and failures in operations and policies are limited, at best, in both professional writings and military manuals. Two of the most successful counter-insurgency operations that the United States military enjoyed are as early as the Philippine insurrection from 1899-1902 and the U.S. military interventions into Mexico between 1914-1916. Yet, the army’s doctrine still does not reflect the basic lessons learned from these counter-insurgency operations and we continuously fail to apply this

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Lessons Learned

Santayana’s law of repetitive consequences states that, “those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” The constant struggle in the United States Army should be to find methods to collect lessons learned from historical military operations and institutionalize them in the training doctrine so that the Army will not continue to make the same mistakes in future operations.

There were many lessons learned during the Philippine insurrection and the interventions into Mexico, concerning the Army’s counter-insurgency doctrine and the nation’s foreign policy. However, for various reasons, doctrinal changes were minimal and documented lessons learned of successes and failures in operations and policies were limited in both professional writings and military manuals. Lessons learned from the successes and failures from the Philippine insurrection, 1899-1902, and the interventions into Mexico, 1914-1916, have a definitive impact on Army doctrine and foreign policy of current and future operations such as Operation Iraqi Freedom. These lessons learned should be implemented into current doctrine and trained accordingly.

Policies of Attraction and Chastisement

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Initially, the United States government and the U.S. Army followed a pacification policy of attraction (Birtle, 2003). The military governor and commander, and his field commanders, issued guidelines that enforced strict discipline while ordering soldiers to respect the Philippine people and their customs. The army established municipal governments, built roads and schools, restored markets, and introduced sanitation efforts into towns and villages. These pacification programs created heavy operational work-loads on small unit commanders who had the responsibility to administer local governments and manage civil military operations while performing normal operational and administrative duties; accomplishing all of this without additional training or personnel. The small unit commander was an essential element in the pacification process in that only when he demonstrated the character, the will, and the means to protect the population, did the Filipinos accept the American authority (Birtle, 2003).

Although the “pacification policy of attraction” had some positive results, it failed to be strong enough to counter the insurgency for several reasons. First of all, the military was unable to contain discipline issues and foster a good American-Filipino relationship due to biases and disorderly conduct. Also, the insurgents’ willingness to use intimidation, violence, and terror on their own population prevented U.S. forces from “winning over” the local populace (Birtle, 2003). Lastly, the United States government and military completely miscalculated the

complexity of the insurgency. American forces soon found themselves moving to a “pacification policy of chastisement” (Birtle, 2003). At the tipping point of this move, Filipinos found

American benevolence to be a sign of weakness while they were impressed with the insurgents’ ability to attack American forces.

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It allowed for punitive action ranging from fines, communal punishment, destruction of private property, to exile, imprisonment, and even in the case of insurgent activity, execution. The policy shift did not happen immediately. The more oppressive forms of the policy of chastisement did not occur until military governors changed from General Otis to General McArthur, after the Presidential election of 1900, and after the military force reached an all time high of 70,000 soldiers from an initial force of 26,000. It soon became clear, that decisive, offensive operations, backed by extreme forceful measures (Birtle, 2003), coupled with and extensive American intelligence system were key elements to a successful counter-insurgency operation. Ultimately, both policies brought an end to hostilities due to the policy of attraction being defined by the policy of chastisement. As Secretary of War Root stated in a report made at the end of the war, “it is evident that the insurrection has been brought to an end both by making a war distressing and hopeless on the one hand and by making peace attractive” (Birtle, 2003).

Direct parallels can be drawn between the Philippine War and insurrection and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The similarities are almost eerie in comparison starting from the initial invasion of Iraq to the pacification, the growth of the insurgency, to the surge of U.S. forces.

Using Force as an Instrument of Foreign Policy

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Coordination of Civil and Military Operations and Policy

Civil affairs and civil military operations that occurred in the Philippine insurrection and interventions into Mexico and lessons learned from those operations epitomize some of the major problems that plague our current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Issues that the army is dealing with now, due to lack of coordination with the Department of State and lack of national policy can be scrutinized from models of civil affairs operations that pre-date the 19th century. The frustration’s that the army felt during these operations can be summed up with then Chief of Staff Scott, when he said, “I could have burned down the State Department with

everybody in it”, in reference to the lack of support that the administration was giving General Pershing during the interventions into Mexico.

Civil affair activities that the army executed in both the Philippines and in Mexico range from simple tasks such as opening schools, building roads, beginning vaccination programs and restoring markets and other public facilities to complex tasks such as establishing public

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Counter Arguments

The main counter argument to my thesis statement is one that has been used throughout the history of the United States Army and is very indicative to operations that occurred in the Philippine insurrection and the interventions into Mexico. This argument is that lessons learned are operation specific and have no bearing on future operations. Documentation of successes and failures of previous counter-insurgency operations into current doctrine is counter productive to training and is inefficient in the execution of that training. This argument can easily be refuted by going to General Pershing’s training philosophy in dealing with counter-insurgency operations during the punitive intervention into Mexico. His training relied two basic principles; “march light, travel at night, and take adversaries by surprise in dawn raids” (Birtle, 2003) and

concentrating his training and small unit tactics such as combating ambushes, escorting convoys, scouting, raiding, and patrolling. These are all basic soldier tasks, but for some reason, they have been systematically eliminated from the army’s institutional training.

Conclusion

While tactics, techniques, and procedures tend to change with time and technology, doctrinal issues tend to repeat in counter-insurgency operations throughout time. It is important for doctrine to be documented with lessons learned and updated accordingly so that training is properly implemented. Time is a critical issue in the success of counter-insurgency operations. It is imperative that the Army capitalizes on previous successes and prevents the repeat of failures in order to be successful in current operations that the Army faces in the Global War on

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References

Birtle, A. (2003). U.S. Army counterinsurgency and contingency operations doctrine 1860-1941. Washington, DC: Center of Military History United States Army.

Donnelly, T. & Serchuk, V. (2003).U.S. counterinsurgency in Iraq: Lessons from the Philippine war. National Security Outlook, November, 1-7.

Kahl, C. (2006).How we fight. Foreign Affairs, 85(6), 1-6.

Kahl, C. (2007).COIN of the realm: Is there a future for counterinsurgency. Foreign Affairs,

References

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