Case Analysis - Exam Question 1 Case Analysis - Exam Question 1
Parties involved: Parties involved:
Defendant: Apple Inc. Defendant: Apple Inc.
Plaintiff: US Government Plaintiff: US Government
Relevant Facts Relevant Facts::
On Dec 2nd 2015, San Bernardino o!nt" #ealt# in$pector S"ed %i&'an (aroo), 'it# On Dec 2nd 2015, San Bernardino o!nt" #ealt# in$pector S"ed %i&'an (aroo), 'it# #i$ 'ife, *a$#feen +ali), attac)ed at t#e Inland %eional enter in San Bernardino. *#e #i$ 'ife, *a$#feen +ali), attac)ed at t#e Inland %eional enter in San Bernardino. *#e !nfort!nate incident claimed live$ of 1- people and left 22 'o!nded. (aroo) and +ali) !nfort!nate incident claimed live$ of 1- people and left 22 'o!nded. (aroo) and +ali) died a fe' #o!r$ later in a $#ooto!t 'it# police. *#e police recovered iP#one 5c on Dec. died a fe' #o!r$ later in a $#ooto!t 'it# police. *#e police recovered iP#one 5c on Dec. in
in a 'arrant $earc# of a 'arrant $earc# of (aroo)(aroo)/$ mot#er/$ car. Apple provide/$ mot#er/$ car. Apple provided t#e d t#e (BI (aroo)$ ilo!d(BI (aroo)$ ilo!d ac)!p$ t#ro!# midOctoer, and it 'a$ di$covered t#at (aroo) #ad $topped ac)in ac)!p$ t#ro!# midOctoer, and it 'a$ di$covered t#at (aroo) #ad $topped ac)in !p #i$ iP#one $ince Octoer. *#e data left on t#e p#one i$ encr"pted 'it# 253it A4S !p #i$ iP#one $ince Octoer. *#e data left on t#e p#one i$ encr"pted 'it# 253it A4S $e
$ec!rc!rit"it", , '#'#ic# ic# ma)ma)e$ e$ a a r!r!tetefoforce rce attattac) ac) on on t#e t#e iPiP#o#one ne 5 5 " " t#e t#e (B(BI I nenearlarl"" impo$$ile. Apple enineer$ $!e$ted t#at if p#one i$ connected to a familiar i(i impo$$ile. Apple enineer$ $!e$ted t#at if p#one i$ connected to a familiar i(i net'or), it 'ill create a ne' ilo!d ac)!p '#ic# 'o!ld #ave t#e mi$$in information net'or), it 'ill create a ne' ilo!d ac)!p '#ic# 'o!ld #ave t#e mi$$in information et'een t#e Octoer ac)!p and Decemer 2. +ean'#ile, 'it#o!t con$!ltin Apple et'een t#e Octoer ac)!p and Decemer 2. +ean'#ile, 'it#o!t con$!ltin Apple Inc., (BI tried to re$et t#e ilo!d pa$$'ord 'it# t#e #elp of San Bernardino o!nt" Inc., (BI tried to re$et t#e ilo!d pa$$'ord 'it# t#e #elp of San Bernardino o!nt" official$ '#o o'n$ t#e p#one. *#e pa$$'ord re$et meant t#at $omeone 'o!ld need to official$ '#o o'n$ t#e p#one. *#e pa$$'ord re$et meant t#at $omeone 'o!ld need to lo in to t#e p#one and enter t#e ne' pa$$'ord efore it co!ld $"nc 'it# Apple$ ilo!d lo in to t#e p#one and enter t#e ne' pa$$'ord efore it co!ld $"nc 'it# Apple$ ilo!d $erver$ aain. Accordin to (BI, (aroo)/$ p#one #a$ iOS 6 '#ic# i$ prorammed to $erver$ aain. Accordin to (BI, (aroo)/$ p#one #a$ iOS 6 '#ic# i$ prorammed to $#!t do'n after 10 failed attempt$ at t#e pa$$ code. (BI i$ $ee)in $oft'are from Apple $#!t do'n after 10 failed attempt$ at t#e pa$$ code. (BI i$ $ee)in $oft'are from Apple
to modif" it$ iOS and "pa$$ t#e $ec!rit" feat!re and remove a dela" et'een pa$$code attempt$ t#at/$ !$!all" intended to ma)e r!teforce entr" even more diffic!lt.
Procedure: ivil a$e
Main Issues:
*#i$ ca$e #i#li#t$ a ver" intere$tin i$$!e of privac" v$ $ec!rit", #o' m!c# of diital $ec!rit" i$ re7!ired e$peciall" '#en it come$ to terrori$m. *#i$ i$$!e #a$ m!c# roader per$pective t#an 8!$t ao!t !nloc)in one p#one. If 'e loo) at t#e ier pict!re, t#in$ et complicated '#en 'e introd!ce diital information from $mart p#one$, $mart'atc#, car$, or an"t#in connected to internet. *#e i$$!e i$ not '#et#er Apple $#o!ld !ild $oft'are to "pa$$ t#e $ec!rit" mec#ani$m$ in iOS 6 to !nloc) (aroo7/$ iP#one. Main issue lie$ in developin a $ol!tion t#at 'o!ld ive la' enforcement $ome 'a"$ to $top act$ of terror "et not creatin ac)door into adet$ '#ic# co!ld e provide acce$$ to #ac)er$. In t#i$ ca$e, ot# $ide$ are aidin " it$ d!tie$ to protect it$ c!$tomer$.
FBI’s aruments:
• Direct data e9traction from t#e p#one 'ill #ave more information t#an t#e ilo!d ac)!p $ince ac)!p doe$ not contain all t#e information availale on t#e p#one. • *#e co!rt$ are rel"in #eavil" on t#e All !rits Act of 1;6 '#ic# ive$ t#em t#e
a!t#orit" to order Apple to #ac) t#e iP#one !nder a <la'f!l $earc# 'arrant< in t#e San Bernardino ca$e.
• *#e U.S. S!preme o!rt$ 16 r!lin in United State$ v. =e' >or) *elep#one o. $et precedent for allo'in t#e All rit$ Act to e !$ed to force companie$ to provide tec#nical a$$i$tance to #elp 'it# a federal inve$tiation.
• (BI ar!e$ t#at t#e order re7!irin Apple to create t#e $oft'are proram to crac) t#e iP#one$ encr"ption doe$ not rai$e an" (ir$t Amendment i$$!e$, #avin <an incidental effect on $peec#.<
• (BI/$ re7!e$t to Apple to #elp !nloc) t#e iP#one doe$ not po$e a !rden on t#e compan", allo'in t#e co!rt$ to order t#e a$$i$tance to aid la' enforcement. • (BI i$ re7!e$tin Apple to perform t#e pa$$code"pa$$ in it$ o'n la, !$in it$
o'n tec#nician$, 'it#o!t revealin an"t#in to t#e overnment. *#erefore, rantin t#e application 'ill not affect t#e tec#noloical $ec!rit" of an" Apple iP#one nor #and t#e overnment a ?ma$ter )e".@
• On m!ltiple occa$ion$ Apple #a$ e9tracted data from a pa$$codeloc)ed device. (e'
e9ample$: United State$ v. an$en, =o. 0;%5, United State$ v. =avarro, =o. 1 %5525.
A""le’s aruments:
• *#e All !rits Act of 1;6 allo'$ co!rt$ to "issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law."
*#e compan" ar!e$ t#e All rit$ Act doe$ not ive t#e co!rt$ $!c# road a!t#orit" to <commandeer< t#e compan" to #ac) t#e iP#one, t#reatenin t#e privac" ri#t$ of an"one in t#e 'orld 'it# a $martp#one. +oreover, t#ere are limit$ '#ere t#i$ la' i$ applicale. *#e 8!de m!$t #ave no ot#er leal option$ availale, t#e taret of t#e 'rit AppleC m!$t e clo$el" connected to t#e ca$e, and t#e co!rt order cannot impo$e an !nd!e !rden.
• *#e overnment$ re7!e$t violate$ t#e First Amendment eca!$e forcin Apple to create t#e $oft'are proram to #ac) t#e iP#one amo!nt$ to <compelled $peec#<. +oreover, Apple #a$ to cr"ptorap#icall" <$in< an" $oft'are it create$. • *#e Fourt# Amendment ri#t of t#e people i$ to e free from !nrea$onale
$earc#e$ and $ei&!re$. (BI/$ demand to compromi$e t#e $ec!rit" of t#e iP#one ma" e9tend to ot#er iP#one$ in f!t!re '#ic# 'ill violate t#e (o!rt# Amendment ri#t$.
*#e order violate$ it$ Fi$t# Amendment ri#t$ " re7!irin it to 'rite a <Government OS< t#at 'o!ld affect t#e interit" of t#e compan"$ prod!ct$.
• *#e order to develop t#e $oft'are proram 'o!ld not e limited to one iP#one, !t in$tead 'o!ld provide a <ma$ter )e"< to t#e overnment to $ee) $imilar a$$i$tance in co!rt$ aro!nd t#e co!ntr".
• *#ere i$ no leal precedent for a co!rt to force a compan" to 'ea)en it$ o'n $ec!rit" $"$tem$ to ive overnment !nfettered acce$$ to individ!al$ private information.
• If (BI 'in$ t#e ca$e, t#en it co!ld act a$ a precedent for f!t!re.
• +odified iOS 'o!ld create a <ac)door< into t#e iP#one t#at #ac)er$ and malicio!$ overnment$ co!ld !$e to !ndermine t#e privac" and $ec!rit" of all iP#one !$er$.
• Apple 'ill #ave to inve$t in more re$o!rce$ in a ne' #ac)in department< to $ervice overnment re7!e$t$.
• A4A doe$ not re!late man!fact!rer$ of con$!mer device$, onl" telecomm!nication$ carrier$.
• *#e 4lectronic omm!nication$ Privac" Act of 16;3 ?4PA@C i$ directed to electronic comm!nication $ervice$ and remote comp!tin $ervice$ and t#!$ i$ not applicale to Apple. 4PA doe$ not addre$$ t#e d!t" of Apple to a$$i$t in e9tractin data from an iP#one.
• *#ere i$ no proof t#at $#o'$ t#at t#ere mi#t e an" !$ef!l information on t#e p#one.
(!rt#ermore, Apple co!ld !$e follo'in ca$e$ a$ precedent$ to $!pport ar!ment for con$iderin $oft'are a$ $peec#.
1. Bernstein v. United States E Apple co!ld !$ t#i$ ca$e a$ a precedent for (ir$t Amendment ri#t$. Under t#i$ ca$e, t#e =int# irc!it o!rt of Appeal$ r!led
t#at $oft'are $o!rce code 'a$ $peec# protected " t#e (ir$t Amendment and t#at t#e overnment$ re!lation$ preventin it$ p!lication 'ere !ncon$tit!tional 2. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reierdes E con$ider $oft'are a$ a $peec#.
. In a dr! ca$e in t#e United State$ Di$trict o!rt for t#e 4a$tern Di$trict of =e' >or) in Broo)l"n, Apple #ad previo!$l" c#allened t#e U.S. Department of !$tice$ a!t#orit" to compel it to !nloc) an iP#one.
Court reasonin:
Before ivin r!lin, #ere i$ an anal"$i$ of t#i$ ca$e !$in five principle$ of t#i$ co!r$e:
%eal: Apple/$ ar!ment$ aain$t All rit$ Act i$ 8!$tified a$ Apple i$ not connected to t#e ca$e, it merel" man!fact!red and $old t#e iP#one to a c!$tomer. Al$o, (BI/$ a$) po$e$ a reat amo!nt of !rden on Apple not onl" to !ild t#e ?Govt OS@ !t to maintain and fi#t $imilar f!t!re ca$e$. A$ $tated aove, t#e order violate$ (ir$t Amendment and (ift# Amendment ri#t$ of Apple.
Moral: Apple #a$ a moral d!t" to'ard$ it$ c!$tomer$ to en$!re t#at t#eir data remain$ private and $ec!re. At t#e $ame time, it i$ a moral re$pon$iilit" to #elp t#e (BI in ca$e$ '#ic# involve$ act$ of terror. *#ere i$ a ver" delicate alance et'een c#oo$in t#e privac" of it$ c!$tomer$ and $ec!rit" of t#e co!ntr". Apple 'a$ #elpf!l in providin t#e information '#ic# it co!ld retrieve from (aroo)/$ ilo!d acco!nt. B!t developin $oft'are '#ic# co!ld #ac) t#e privac" doe$ not $eem to e a moral $ol!tion from c!$tomer/$ per$pective.
Et#ical: Apple i$ $tandin " it$ et#ic$ to provide a $ec!re and private platform to it$ !$er$. If Apple develop$ t#e #ac) '#ic# co!ld potentiall" et into #and$ of #ac)er$, t#at 'ill r!in '#at Apple #a$ inve$ted $o far in it$ encr"ption tec#nolo". Al$o, t#i$ co!ld al$o #!rt Apple/$ ottomline a$ c!$tomer$ ecome le$$ confident F tr!$tf!lC of Apple device$.
&ocietal: *#ere $#all e a #!e impact on t#e $ociet" if Apple decide$ to !ild t#e ?Govt OS@. 4ncr"ption i$ not onl" ao!t privac" !t it i$ ao!t p!lic $ec!rit" a$ 'ell. People 'ant to addre$$ ot# t#e i$$!e$ of privac" and $ec!rit" to o #and in #and. If #ac)er$ $ome#o' et t#e encr"ption )e" for t#e iP#one, it 'ill ecome a t#reat to per$onal $ec!rit" a$ people $ave all $ort$ of data on t#eir iP#one. Apple i$ actin to pre$erve certain ri#t$ at t#e e9pen$e of !rdenin la' enforcement/$ intere$t in inve$tiatin crime$.
Business: If Apple aree$ to provide #ac) $oft'are to (BI, it 'ill co$t t#em lot of mone" to !ild $!c# $oft'are. 4ven after t#i$ ca$e i$ over, Apple fear$ t#at $!c# re7!e$t$ 'ill not end and it #a$ to $et !p a $pecial department to r!n t#e over#ead of #andlin overnment re7!e$t$. +oreover, people pa" premi!m to Apple to )eep t#eir data $afe and #elpin (BI to crac) do'n iP#one and potentiall" to #ac)er$ 'ill $everel" impact Apple/$ !$ine$$.
A$ a 8!de, I 'o!ld r!le in favor of Apple and not force Apple to !ild a ?Govt OS@ '#ic# co!ld open door$ for #!ndred$ of $!c# open re7!e$t$. *#i$ ca$e co!ld ecome precedent for $imilar ca$e$ in f!t!re. If ?Govt. OS@ et$ lea)ed $ome#o', it 'ill e cata$trop#ic in term$ of privac" and national $ec!rit" a$ 'ell. B" providin t#e #ac) $oft'are to (BI, Apple 'ill e #armin it$ !$ine$$. #en people !" iP#one or an" ot#er prod!ct$, t#e" #ave an e9pectation t#at t#eir data 'ill remain $ec!re and private, and Apple intend$ to maintain t#e reliale rep!tation amon it$ c!$tomer$.
Re$erences: • #ttp$:'''.8!$t$ec!rit".or'pcontent!pload$20130Apple4D=>AA GovernmentDi$tricto!rtApplicationforOrdertoompel.pdf • #ttp:'''.c$oonline.comarticle0;1$ec!rit"applev$t#efit#eleal ar!ment$inan!t$#ell.#tml • #ttp$:en.'i)ipedia.or'i)iBern$teinHv.HUnitedHState$