1975-Vanmeter-Policy Implementation Process- Conceptual Framework

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Administration & Society

DOI: 10.1177/009539977500600404 1975; 6; 445 Administration & Society

Donald S. Van Meter and Carl E. Van Horn

The Policy Implementation Process: A Conceptual Framework

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PROCESS

A

_Conceptual

Framework

DONALD S. VAN METER

CARL E. VAN HORN

Department

of Political Science Ohio State

_University

Political scientists have turned their attention to the

_study

of

public policy

with

_increasing

_frequency.

The

_topics

with

which

_they

deal and the

_{methodologies}

_{they employ}

reflect the

diversity

of their interests. The

_disparate

character of the

public

policy

literature

_complicates

the task of

defining

the

scope of

policy analysis

and

bringing

order to the concerns of

policy analysts.

Some order can be achieved

_by

utilizing

a

model of the

_{policy delivery}

_system,

which facilitates an

organization

of the

policy

literature

_(see

_Figure

_{1 ).1}

More-over, it identifies

relationships

among the diverse concerns of

policy analysts,

directs attention to the determinants of-and

the _consequences

_{of-public policy,}

and

_{gives emphasis}

to the

AUTHORS’ NOTE: This is a revised version of a _{paper delivered} at the 1974 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, August 29-September 2, 1974. Research support provided by the graduate school _of the Ohio State _{University greatly} facilitated the completion of this paper. We are indebted to Gillian Dean, William Gormley, Michael Reagan, Randall _Ripley, and _{Stephen Wasby for} their helpful comments on an earlier

version _of this _{paper. We also} wish to _express our _appreciation to Rebecca Howe

often

_{imperfect correspondence}

between

_{policies adopted}

and services

_actually

delivered.

The

_components

of this model are:

₍₁₎

an environment

that both stimulates _government officials and receives the

products

of their

work; (2)

demands and resources that _carry

stimuli from the environment to

_policy

makers; (3)

a

conversions _process,

_including

the formal structures and

procedures

of government, that transforms

_(converts)

de-mands and resources into

_public

_{policies; (4)}

the

_policies

that

represent

the formal

_goals,

intentions,

or statements of government

officials; (5)

the

_performance

of the

_policy

as it

is

_actually

delivered to

clients;

and

₍₆₎

the feedback of

policies

and

_performances

to the

_environment,

which is transmitted back to the conversions _process as demands and resources of a later

_point

in time. In most _respects this framework differs little from other

_adaptations

of

_political

systems models first introduced

_by

Easton.2 Its

distinguish-ing

feature is that it considers

_{&dquo;policy&dquo;}

and

_{&dquo;performance&dquo;}

as two distinct

_categories.

Some features of the

_{policy delivery}

_system

_clearly

have been

_explored

more

_fully

than others.

_During

the _past

quarter century, a

disproportionate

effort has been made to

analyze

the character of economic and social

_problems,

the

claims made for _government

_action,

and the _processes

_by

which

_policy

decisions are made. More

recently, policy

analysts

have turned their attention to the

_impacts

or effects

which

_policies

_may have on the

people

and

problems

at

which

_they

had been directed.

These foci on the determinants and _consequences of

public

policy

have added much to our

_{understanding}

of the

_policy

process. Yet neither tells us a

_great

deal about how

policy

decisions are transformed into

public

services:

they

tell us

little about the

_application

or

implementation

of

public

policy.

In

_{short, they}

have not

_given

sufficient attention to

the

_linkage

between

_policy

and

_performance.

It is one

_thing

to examine the determinants of

_policy

decisions and to

identify

their

_impacts

or

consequences-it

is another to

provide explanations

for these observed consequences.

Our purpose in this _paper is to

_explore

the process of

policy implementation.

To this end we define the concept of

implementation

and _survey the current literature in an effort to ascertain whether what is

_presently

known will inform a

conceptualization

of this _process. We _present a model that can be used to

_{analyze policy implementation,}

both where it

involves actors within a

single organization

and across

organizational

boundaries.

DEFINING POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

Several

_{often-conflicting}

uses of the

_concept

of

implemen-tation are found in the

existing

literature.3 Our definition is

quite explicit: policy implementation

encompasses those

actions

_{by public}

and

_private

individuals

_{(or groups)}

that are

directed at the achievement of

objectives

set forth in

_prior

policy

decisions. This includes both one-time efforts to

transform decisions into

_operational

_terms, as well as

continuing

efforts to achieve the

_large

and small

_changes

mandated

_{by policy}

decisions. Williams

(1971:

144)

states it

In its most _{general form,} an _inquiry about

implementa-tion ... seeks to determine whether an organization can bring

together

men and material in a cohesive organizational unit and

motivate them in such a _way as to _carry out the

_{organization’s}

stated _objectives.

We should

_emphasize

that the

_{implementation phase}

does

not commence until

goals

and

objectives

have been

estab-lished

_{(or identified)}

_by

_prior

_policy

_decisions;

it takes

_place

only

after

_legislation

has been

_passed

and funds committed

(or

after a

_{judicial ruling}

and

_{accompanying decree).}

As

Pressman and

Wildavsky

(1973: xiv)

argue: &dquo;After

all,

the

world is full of

_{policy proposals}

that are aborted. You can’t

finish what _you haven’t started. Lack of

_{implementation}

should not refer to failure to _get

_going

but to

_inability

to

follow

_{through.&dquo;}

_Therefore,

the

_study

of

_{implementation}

examines those factors that contribute to the realization or

nonrealization of

_policy

_objectives.

A clear distinction is made between

policy

implementa-tion,

performance,

and what

_generally

has been referred to as

policy impact.

These are distinct

_though

not unrelated concepts. The

study

of

_impact

searches for the consequences

of a

_policy

decision. Do school prayer

practices change

as a

result of a

_Supreme

Court decision? Do

_{disadvantaged}

children

_improve

their

_reading

or math skills as a conse-quence of an innovative education

_program?

_By

_focusing

on

those activities that affect the

_rendering

of

_public

services

(i.e., performance),

the

study

of

_policy

_{implementation}

highlights

one of the forces that determines

_{policy impact.}

Hence,

as Dolbeare

(1974) observes, impact

studies

typically

ask &dquo;What

_{happened?&dquo;}

whereas

_{implementation}

studies ask

&dquo;Why

did it

_happen

this

_way?&dquo;

We should

_point

out that we are not

_maintaining

that the

study

of

_{policy implementation}

will resolve the issues

revolving

around the

question

of &dquo;real&dquo;

_impact

_(e.g.,

does compensatory education have

_salutory

_effects).

Our model

measure and

_explain

the ultimate outcomes of

_governmental

policy,

but rather to measure and

explain

what we

_prefer

to

call program

performance

(i.e.,

the

degree

to which

antici-pated

services are

_{actually delivered).}

We

_recognize

that some

services could

actually

be delivered without

having

any

substantial

_impact

on the

_problem

to which the

_policy

is

supposed

to be related. A

_policy

_may be

_implemented

effectively,

but fail to have a substantial

_impact

because it

was ill-conceived-or because of other circumstances.

Hence,

successful _program

_performance

_may be a

_{necessary-but}

not

sufficient-condition for the attainment of

positive

ultimate

outcomes.

THE STUDY OF IMPLEMENTATION

At _present we know

relatively

little about the _process of

policy implementation.

This is an unfortunate

_deficiency

in

our

_{understanding}

of the

_policy

_process and _may lead to

ill-advised conclusions on the _part of

policy

makers. When

faced with an unsuccessful _{program, many} observers will

attribute its failure to insufficient

planning

or the

inadequacy

of the _program itself. This attribution of blame is often

unjustified.

Viewing

the Great

_Society’s

social

_policies

generally,

Levine

(1968:

86)

has concluded that most of the trouble with the War on

Poverty

resulted &dquo;not so much from

the nature of the _programs as from difficulties of administra-tion.&dquo;

_Pointing

to the

_possible

_gap between the intentions

and statements of

public

officials

(policy)

on the one hand

and the

_delivery

of

_public

services

_{(performance)}

on the

other,

Dolbeare and Hammond

(1971:

149)

have

_argued

that very little may really be decided by the words of a decision or a

statute: the enunciation of such national _policy may be just the

beginning

of the decisive process of determining what will

_happen

to _whom, and _{understanding} this further _stage is essential to a full

Hence,

the

_study

of

_{implementation}

adds a new dimension to

policy

analysis.

It

_gives

the student of

_politics

and the

_policy

maker a new

_{understanding}

of how the system succeeds or

fails in

_{translating general}

_policy

_objectives

into concrete and

meaningful

public

services.

Why

do we know so little about the

_problems

of

_policy

implementation?

If this _process is so

_important,

_why

has not a _greater effort been made to

_identify

its basic features? This

neglect

is due in _part to the naive

_assumption,

_implicit

in

many

studies,

that &dquo;once a

policy

has been ’made’

by

a

government, the

policy

will be

_implemented

and the desired

results of the

_policy

will be near those

_{expected by}

the

policy-makers&dquo; (Smith,

1973:

197-198).

The

_{implementation}

process is assumed to be a series of mundane decisions and

interactions

_unworthy

of the attention of scholars

_seeking

the

_heady

stuff of

_{politics. Implementation}

is

_deceptively

simple;

it does not appear to involve any great issues. Most of the crucial

_policy

issues are often seen to have been resolved

in the

prior

decisions of

_executives,

legislators,

and

judges.

Second,

the

_growth

of

_{Planning Programming}

_Budgeting

Systems (PPB)-the leading

analytic technique

of the

1960s-may

have

_{encouraged policy analysts}

to

_ignore

the

problems

of

_policy

_{implementation.}

PPB concentrated

_policy

makers’ attention on the choices between

_competing

meth-ods of

_achieving

selected

_goals

and

_objectives,

_focusing

attention

_primarily

on decisions made

by policy

makers in

Washington

to the exclusion of the lower echelons of

agencies responsible

for

implementation.

PPB’s concern with

improving

the basis for

_{policy-making}

did not address the

problems

of

_{delivering public}

services. As Williams

(1971:

139) points

out, PPB

_emphasized

_program

_objectives

and alternative means of

reaching

those

objectives.

Such a

focus,

however,

did not

_require

that serious attention be

_given

to

the

implementation

or

_operation

of

public

_programs.

Third,

the

_difficulty

of the task has

discouraged

detailed

study

of the _process of

policy

implementation.

The

_problems

of

_{implementation}

are

_{overwhelmingly}

_complex

and scholars

have

_frequently

been deterred

_{by methodological}

considera-tions. Relative to the

_study

of

policy

formulation,

the

analysis

of the

_{implementation}

_process raises serious

bound-ary

problems.

It is often difficult to define the relevant

actors.

_Furthermore,

_many of the variables needed to

complete

an

_{implementation study}

are difficult-if not

impossible-to

measure. Unlike

_legislative

and

_judicial

arenas

where votes are often

recorded,

decisions in an administrative

setting

are

_frequently

difficult to isolate.

_Finally,

a

com-prehensive

analysis

of

implementation

requires

that attention

be

_given

to

_multiple

actions over an extended

_period

of

_time,

thus

_involving

an enormous

_outlay

of time and resources.

This is not meant to _suggest that the

_{implementation}

process has been

ignored by policy

makers and

policy

analysts,

nor that these obstacles are insurmountable.

Policy

makers have turned their attention to the

problems

of

implementation,

perhaps

as a _consequence of the

disappoint-ing

results of the Great

_Society’s

_{social programs.}

_Among

the

most

_important

_published

studies of

_{policy implementation}

are Kaufman’s

₍₁₉₆₀₎

_study

of the U.S. Forest

_Service,

Bailey

and Mosher’s

₍₁₉₆₈₎

examination of the

administra-tion of the

_Elementary

and

Secondary

Education Act of

1965,

Derthick’s

_{(1970) analysis}

of federal

_grant-in-aid

programs, Gross and associates’

(1971)

examination of

planned organizational

innovation,

Berke and Kirst’s

₍₁₉₇₂₎

study

of federal aid to education programs, Derthick’s

(1972)

analysis

of the Johnson Administration’s effort to create new

communities on

federally

owned land in

metropolitan areas,

and Pressman and

_{Wildavsky’s}

_{(1973) study}

of Oakland’s

community

development

program These and other studies

have

_{helped identify}

factors that contribute to an

under-standing

of the process of

policy

implementation.

While these studies have been

_highly

_informative,

their contributions have been limited

by

the absence of a

theoretical

_perspective.

To

_date,

no one has advanced a

can be examined. Without such a

framework,

it is difficult to

further our

_{understanding}

of this _process in

_{disparate policy}

areas and

_{jurisdictional}

_settings.

The few efforts

(Smith,

1973;

Bunker,

1972)

to

_provide

such a

_perspective

are less

than

_adequate.

For

_example,

Smith asserts that

implementa-tion is a

_problem

in Third World

_nations,

where

_private

interests seek to _prevent a

_{beleaguered bureaucracy}

from

implementing public policies.

Smith

_(1973:

₁₉₉₎

argues that

this situation is found

_{only infrequently}

in Western societies.

As we have

already observed,

this

_position

is difficult to

defend. The

_problems

of

_{implementation}

are

profound

in

Western and non-Western nations alike:

they

are

_generic

to

complex organizations.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

In their

_study

of the Economic

_Development

Administra-tion’s Oakland

_Project,

Pressman and

Wildavsky

(1973:

166)

write :

There is

_(or

there must

_be)

a _large literature about

implementa-tion in the social sciences-or so we have been told by numerous

people....

It must be there; it should be there; but in fact it is not. There is a kind of semantic illusion at work here because

virtually everything

ever done in

_public

administration must, in the nature of

_things,

have some _bearing on

implementa-tion.... Nevertheless, except for the few _pieces mentioned in the

body of this _book, we have been unable to find _any

_significant

analytic work _dealing with

_{implementation.}

While we share Pressman and

Wildavsky’s

concern that far too little attention has been

_paid

to the

question

of

_policy

implementation,

their criticism of the literature is

unneces-sarily

harsh and

_{short-sighted.}

Our

_argument

is

_put

_simply:

there is a rich

heritage

from the social sciences that is often

imple-mentation process. This literature includes theoretical and

empirical

work in several

_{disciplines, including sociology,}

public

administration,

social

_psychology,

and

_political

science. While most of these studies do not examine

specifically

the

_{policy implementation}

_process, close

inspec-tion reveals that it takes little

imagination

to

comprehend

their relevance.

In

_developing

our theoretical framework we have been

guided by

three bodies of literature:

_{(1) organization}

theory-and

more

specifically,

the work in the

general

area of

organizational

change (innovation)

and

_control;

₍₂₎

the

impact

of

_{public policy,}

_{particularly judicial}

decisions;

and

(3)

selected studies of

_{intergovernmental}

relations. Our task in this section is to delineate the contributions of these fields of

study.

Primary

attention will be

_given

to the literature on

organizational

change

and control since we believe that it has

the greatest theoretical contribution to

make,

and since it has been

_ignored

_{generally by}

others

_studying

the

_policy

imple-mentation process.

Students of

organizational

theory

and

_practice

have dealt

extensively

with the

_topic

of

_change

_(Bennis,

_1966;

_Downs,

1967;

Gross et

_{al., 1971;}

Katz and

_Kahn,

_1966).

In one of

the most

_{insightful analyses}

of

_{organizational change,}

Kauf-man

(1971) explores

a

variety

of

impediments

to innovation

in

_{organizational}

structure and action. He examines a number of factors

_(e.g.,

resource

_limitations,

sunk _costs, the collective benefits of

_{stability, psychic}

_costs, and the accumulation of official and unofficial constraints on

_behavior)

that &dquo;tend to

keep organizations

doing

the

things they

have been

doing

in

the recent _past, and

_doing

them in

_just

the _way

_they

have been

_doing

them&dquo;

(Kaufman,

1971:

39).

Kaufman

recognizes

the many

advantages

of

_stability

and makes a serious effort to

_identify

those forces conducive to

_{organizational}

change-those that occur both

_{involuntarily}

and

_{by design.}

Yet he

concludes that most

_{organizations}

&dquo;are

imprisoned

in the

threatens them unless

_they

do&dquo;

_(Kaufman,

1971:

_40).

Organizational

control has also been a

_frequent

research

topic.

The relevance of this

_subject

for our focus on

implementation

may be seen in various definitions found in

the literature. For

_{example, Wilensky}

_(1967:

₃₎

defines

control as &dquo;the

problem

of

getting

work done and

_securing

compliance

with

_{organizational}

rules.&dquo;

_Anthony

_{(1965: 17)}

defines

_{&dquo;managerial}

control&dquo; as &dquo;the _process

_by

which managers assure that resources are obtained and used

effectively

and

_efficiently

in the

_{accomplishment}

of the

organization’s objectives.&dquo; Finally,

Etzioni

_{(1964: 68)}

de-fines

_{organizational}

control as a _process intended to &dquo;ensure that rules are

obeyed

and orders followed.&dquo;

Numerous

_headings

have been used to

_explore

this _aspect of

_{organizational}

life. Control has been discussed in terms of

leadership

authority, coordination,

hierarchy,

human

rela-tions,

democracy,

incentives,

and

_compliance.

For our purposes the final concept is most useful.

_Compliance

may be seen as a

special

case in the

study

of

implementation-usually

related to the

_specific

obedience or lack thereof to a law or

directive. Yet studies of the _process

_by

which

compliance

is

obtained or avoided

_give

us

insight

into the

problem

of the

implementation

of

complex policies

in a

_{fragmented political}

system.

In A

_{Comparative Analysis of}

_Complex

_{Organizations}

( 1961 ),

Etzioni utilizes the concept of

compliance

as a basis for

_{comparing organizations.}

It

permits

one _{to compare many}

features of

_complex

_{organizations:}

the

_goals

_they

_pursue, their _structures, their motivational characteristics, the power

and interaction of their

elites,

the level and kinds of

consensus

_attained,

and their _systems of communication and

socialization. Central to Etzioni’s thesis is the notion that different _types of

organizations

will

_require

different kinds of

compliance

systems. For

_example,

where

_participants

in an

organization

are alienated and have an intense

negative

application,

or the threat of

_application,

of

punitive

sanc-tions-may

be

_required

to achieve adherence to the

organiza-tion’s rules and

_objectives.

Where most

_participants

have intense

_positive

orientations and are

_highly

committed to the

organization’s

goals

and

_{objectives, compliance}

can be

achieved

_usually

_through

the use of normative

_power-the

allocation and

_manipulation

of

_symbolic

rewards and

depriva-tions.

_Finally,

where

_participants

do not have intense orientations toward the

organization

and their involvement is

a function of

perceived

costs and

benefits,

remunerative

power-the

allocation of material resources such as

_salaries,

commissions,

fringe

benefits,

and services-is

_likely

to be the

most effective means of

_{achieving compliance.}

Integral

to Etzioni’s

_thinking

and to all discussions of

control is the

_relationship

between

_superiors

and

subordi-nates in

_{complex organizations.}

The classic Weberian

inter-pretation

of this

relationship

holds that the ideal role of subordinates is one of

implementing faithfully

the decisions

made

_by

their

_superiors.

Policies are made at the

_highest

levels; they

are then carried out

_by

lower

_participants

whose discretion is

_acutely

limited.

_(The

classic &dquo;ideal

type&dquo;

is

described

_by

Max

_Weber,

1946:

_chap.

_8.)

While this

interpretation

is

_{widely accepted,}

most

_{organizations}

deviate

considerably

from it. Numerous studies have shown that such &dquo;lower

_{participant&dquo;}

_groups as attendants in mental

_hospitals

(Scheff, 1961),

maintenance workers in factories

(Crozier,

1964),

and

_prison

inmates

_(Sykes,

₁₉₆₁₎

can exercise _power

and,

therefore,

affect the

_performance

of

complex

organ-izations.

Not

_infrequently

these instances are dismissed as

excep-tions to the rule. Mechanic

₍₁₉₆₂₎

_suggests,

_however,

that

they

are manifestations of a

_general

_pattern.

_{By acquiring}

control over _persons,

_information,

and

_{instrumentalities,}

lower

_participants

can wield considerable power that is not

normally

associated with their

formally

defined

positions

&dquo;organizations,

in a _sense, are

_continuously

at the _mercy of

their lower

_{participants.&dquo; Recognizing}

that hierarchical

con-trol is never

_perfect

and that

_policy

_implementors

_may

possess great power, Baum

(1974)

has constructed a

_theory

of

judicial impact

that reverses the traditional

_{interpretation}

of

_hierarchy

in

_{organizations.}

Baum proposes that &dquo;instead of

viewing

any power

possessed

by

lower

participants

as

aberrant,

we _may

begin

with the

assumption

that

they

alone

will determine the content of the

_{policies they}

execute.&dquo; He

recognizes

that this

_assumption

cannot be defended

empiri-cally,

but he asserts that its use

&dquo;requires

that we discover the

forces which counteract

_autonomy

rather than

_taking

them for

_{granted&dquo;}

_(Baum,

1974:

6).

The _power of lower

_participants

in

_{organizations}

is enhanced

_{by superiors}

who

_frequently

have little idea what their subordinates are

doing.

The

monitoring

of subordinate

behavior,

hence,

becomes an

_{important question}

in the

_study

of

complex organizations.

There are several means

by

which

superiors

keep

themselves informed about activities in the

field,

including

reports

required

of

_{subordinates,}

_personal

inspections

and _contacts, and formal

_{investigations. However,}

as Kaufman’s

(1973) study

_reveals,

administrative feedback

systems are often

inadequate,

and

superiors

often do not want

_knowledge

about activities in the field. Increased

compliance

on the _part of subordinates will come

only

after

superiors

have been

_given

new incentives to use what

information may become available to them.

(For

a more

comprehensive

discussion of this

_topic,

see

_{Kaufman, 1960;}

Downs,

1967:

_{chap. 12; Wilensky, 1967.)}

The literature on the

_impact

of

judicial

decisions also has

much to contribute to the

_design

of a

_theory

of

_policy

implementation.

To

_date,

most students of

judicial

impact

have

emphasized empirical

investigation

rather than

con-scious

_{theory development.}

A

_{few, however,}

have advanced

inventories of variables to

_explain

their

observations;

and

impact.4

Relying

on

&dquo;utility theory,&dquo;

Krislov

(1965)

empha-sizes the

relationship

between

_{superiors (the}

_Supreme

Court

and

_appellate

_courts)

and subordinates

_(lower

trial courts and administrative

agencies).

He

_posits

that subordinates

_accept

and

_comply

with the directives of

_superiors

if the incentives

to do so are _greater than are those not to

_comply.

Krislov identifies three areas of

possible

motivations for

compli-ance-personal

utilities, organizational utilities,

and

psych-ological

utilities-and _argues that

compliance

is at its _greatest when

_personal

_advantages are _highest,

organizational

sanctions _{against opposition} are certain and severe, and the

_legitimacy

of the _{issuing authority} is _{acknowledged.} Conversely, it will be at its minimum when the individual utilities all _point in the direction of _opposition,

_{organizational}

sanctions

are lenient and-most _{important-erratic} in

application,

and the legitimacy of the higher authority is doubtful

_[Krislov,

1965:

136] .5

Another

_study

relevant for our _{purposes is} Dolbeare and

Hammond’s

(1971) analysis

of the

_impact

of the U.S.

Supreme

Court’s school _prayer decisions.

_{They identify}

four

categories

of factors which

shape

the response to court

rulings:

the substance of the

_decision;

institutional mecha-nism and

procedures;

the

_{politico-cultural}

_context; and the

interests, priorities,

preferences,

and behavior of

political

actors. In

doing

so,

they

(1971:

134)

suggest

that &dquo;similar or

analogous

categories apply

to other _types of

_policies

gener-ated

_by

other institutions of the national

_{government.&dquo;}

Finally,

there are several studies of

intergovernmental

relations that deal

_directly

with the

_problem

of

implemen-tation and that serve to

_highlight

the

_problems

of intra- and

interorganizational

relations.

_Among

the most

_important

ones are

Bailey

and Mosher

(1968),

Sundquist (1969),

Derthick

_{(1970, 1972),}

and Pressman

_{and Wildavsky}

_(1973).

The literature

_provides

numerous

_insights

into the conflicts

interdependence

of

public

officials at all levels of govern-ment. More

_important,

it identifies factors that confound the

implementation

process in

organizations

that are neither well

integrated

nor self-contained.

Hence,

it

_gives

_emphasis

to the

autonomy

of subordinates-both in intra- and

interorganiza-tional affairs.

A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

The natural

_{starting point}

in the elaboration of our

theoretical framework is with the

_policy

_itself,

where

_goals

and

_objectives

are established. It is here that the

implementa-tion process

begins.

Following

Lowi

(1964)

and Froman

(1968),

we submit that the

_{implementation}

_process will _vary

depending

on the nature of the

_policy

to be carried out.

Different types of decisions will

_display

characteristic proc-esses, structures, and

_{relationships}

_among factors that

influ-ence the execution of

_{public policy.}

We will

_{classify policies}

_according

to two

_{distinguishing}

characteristics: the amount of

_change

_involved,

and the

extent to which there is

_goal

consensus _among the

partici-pants in the

implementation

process. The element of

change

is

_important

in at least two respects.

First,

implementation

will be affected

_by

the extent to which the

policy

deviates

from

_previous

_policies.

As a number of scholars

(Braybrooke

and

Lindblom,

1963; Lindblom, 1965;

Wildavsky,

1974)

suggest, incremental

_changes

are more

_likely

to

_engender

a

positive

response than will drastic ones. In similar

fashion,

Derthick

(1970:

63)

has written that the _response of state

governments

to federal initiatives

_{&dquo;depends}

in _part on whether the grant is for an

_activity

in which it is

already

engaged.&dquo;

Second,

the

_{implementation}

process will be influenced

by

the amount of

_{organizational}

change

that is

_required.

implemen-tation is most

_likely

when the

_implementing

_agency is not

required

to

_undergo

drastic

_{reorganization.}

This view is

reenforced

_by

Levine’s

(1968)

argument that _many of the

failings

of the Great

_Society’s

social _programs resulted from

the increased demands

_being

made of

_existing

administrative

structures and

procedures.

Policies which mandate

changes

in the

_{relationships}

_among

_participants

involved in the

imple-mentation _process will be more difficult _{to carry out} than

will

_policies

which

_require

_{only marginal change}

in

estab-lished

_{relationships.}

The other critical feature of the

_policy

is the

degree

of conflict or consensus over its

_goals

and

objectives.

To what extent do

implementing

officials agree on the

goals

of the

program?

Dolbeare and Hammond

(1971:

137-138)

point

to

the

_significance

that

_goal

conflict may have for a _program

when

_they

_suggest that the &dquo;value-based actions of officials and leaders... may be most determinative of ultimate

policy.&dquo;

In

_reviewing

the literature on

_planned

_{organizational}

change,

Gross and associates

(1971:

24-29)

identify

several factors that affect

_goal

consensus-and thus

_{implementation.}

One of these factors is the extent to which subordinates

_(or

implementors)

have

_participated

in the

making

of the

_policy

decision. Their literature review finds _support for the

following

arguments:

&dquo;( 1 )

participation

leads to

_higher

staff

morale,

and

_high

staff morale is necessary for successful

implementation; (2)

participation

leads to greater

commit-ment, and a

high

degree

of commitment is

required

for

effecting

change; (3)

participation

leads to greater

clarity

about an

innovation,

and

clarity

is necessary for

implementa-tion ;

(4) beginning

with the

_postulate

of basic resistance to

change,

the _argument is that

_{participation}

will reduce initial resistance and

_thereby

facilitate successful

_{implementation;}

and

₍₅₎

subordinates will tend to resist _any innovation that

they

are

_expected

to

_implement

if it is initiated

_{solely by}

their

_{superordinates.&dquo;}

It cannot be

_{argued, however,}

that

subordinate

_{participation}

in

_{decision-making}

will

_necessarily

result in

_goal

consensus; nor can it be concluded that the

problems

of

_{implementation}

will be removed once

_goal

consensus has been achieved.

The combination of these two features

_produces

a

typol-ogy of

public

policies,

as

_depicted

in

_Figure

2.6 Not

surprisingly,

the

_{preponderance}

of

_policies

are found in the

&dquo;major

change/low

consensus&dquo; and &dquo;minor

_change/high

consensus&dquo;

_categories.

_Programs

that

_{require major}

_change

frequently

lead to

goal

conflict on the _part of relevant _actors,

while

_goal

consensus is

_usually

_highest

where little

_change

is involved.

_Major

_change/low

consensus

_policies

evolve from

protracted controversies,

as in the case of the

Elementary

and

Secondary

Education Act

_(1965),

the Economic

_Opportunity

Act

_(1964),

the Medicare

legislation

of

1965,

major

tax

reforms,

a radical

_{reorganization}

of bureaucratic _structures,

and

busing

to achieve school

_{desegregation.}

In _contrast, the

struggles

which minor

_change/high

consensus

_policies

cause are less severe. Such

_policies

are reflected in the nature of

incrementalism,

a

political

routine that

stipulates

that current

policy

decisions are

_largely

a function of

_previous

decisions.

By definition,

incremental

_{policies discourage}

_controversy

_by

deviating only marginally

from

_previous

accommodations and

practices (Braybrooke

and

Lindblom, 1963; Wildavsky,

1974).

These first two

policy

types are the most common ones

found in the American

_political

_system.

_{However, exceptions}

to this

_pattern

are not unknown. While

policies

adopted

following

the attack at Pearl Harbor in 1941 mandated

major

change-factories

were converted for the manufacture of armaments, and the

_rationing

of scarce

_goods

and basic raw

materials was introduced-there was also a wide consensus

that such actions were both desirable and necessary. The space program and Peace

Corps

are additional

examples

of

major

change/high

consensus

policies.

Finally,

while con-sensus

accompanies

most

policies

which involve minor

change,

it is not uncommon to find minor

_change/low

consensus

policies.

This occurs

_frequently

when

controver-sial programs, such as federal aid to

_{education, Medicare,}

and

public

welfare,

are

_given

reauthorization with

only

marginal

modifications made in

_{appropriations}

levels or the formulas

used to distribute funds.

_Hence,

while the

_{policy adopted}

may

depart only

slightly

from the past, it may nevertheless

spark enduring

controversy.

In

_developing

this

_typology

of

public

policies,

we are

suggesting

that the

_probability

of effective

_{implementation}

will

_depend-in

_part-on the _type of

_policy

being considered,

and that the

specific

factors

_contributing

to the realization or

nonrealization of program

objectives

will vary from one

policy

type to another. More

specifically,

we are

hypothesiz-ing

that

_{implementation}

will be most successful where

_only

marginal

change

is

_required

and

goal

consensus is

high.

Conversely,

where

_{major change}

is mandated and

goal

consensus is

low,

the _prospects for effective

implementation

change/high

consensus

_policies

will be

_implemented

more

effectively

than

_{policies involving}

minor

_change

and low

consensus.

_Hence,

it is our

_expectation

that

_goal

consensus

will have a _greater effect on the

policy

implementation

process than will the element of

change.

With these

sugges-tions

_(or

_hypotheses)

in

_mind,

it is essential that we turn our

attention to an examination of those factors

_(or

_independent

variables)

that are involved in the

implementation

_process.

A MODEL OF THE

POLICY IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS

Our basic model-as

_depicted

in

_Figure

_3-posits

six

variables which

_shape

the

_linkage

between

_policy

and

performance.

This model not

_only

_specifies

the

_{relationships}

between the

_independent

variables and the ultimate

depend-ent variable of

interest,

but also makes

explicit

the

relation-ships

among the

independent

variables. The

linkages

included

implicitly

represent

hypotheses

which could be tested

empiri-cally,

assuming

that

satisfactory

indicators could be

con-structed and

_appropriate

data collected.

_By

_approaching

the

problem

in this manner, there is greater

promise

for

elucidating

the _processes

_whereby

_policy

decisions are carried out than

_simply

_by

_correlating

_independent

and

_dependent

variables in a

relatively

unthinking

fashion

(Van

Meter and

Asher, 1973).

The model has been constructed on the basis

of the three bodies of literature cited

_above,

as well as the

authors’ own research and intuitions about the

implemen-tation _process.

POLICY STANDARDS AND OBJECTIVES

Given our

_primary

interest in the factors that determine

the

performance

of

policy,

the identification of

performance

u 0 a: Q. z 0 H <t I-z w S w -i (L :E U -i 0 Q. w I l-LL 0 J LU C 0 s 4 M d :::¡

LE T

LL

performance

indicators assess the extent to which the

policy’s

standards and

_objectives

are realized. Standards and

objectives

elaborate on the overall

goals

of the

policy

decision.

_They

move

_beyond

the

generalities

of the

_legislative

document to

_provide

concrete and more

_specific

standards for

_assessing

_program

_performance.

These standards and

objectives

are self-evident and

_easily

measurable in some cases. For

instance,

the Economic

Development

Administra-tion’s Oakland

_{Project sought}

to create

_jobs

for the

unem-ployed

through

several

_public

works

_projects

_(e.g.,

the

construction of an

airport hangar,

marine

terminal,

_port

industrial

_park,

and an access road to the

_city’s

_newly

built

coliseum) [Pressman

and

_{Wildavsky, 1973 ] .}

To ascertain

whether

implementation

has been

_successful,

one must

determine the number of

_jobs

that have been

_created,

the

identity

of those who have been

_hired,

and the _progress on

the related

public

works

projects.

In most cases it is much more difficult to

_identify

and

measure

performance.

This _may be due to the

program’s

breadth or the

_complex

and

_far-reaching

nature of its

_goals.

It

may also be a _consequence of

_ambiguities

and contradictions

in the statement of standards and

_objectives.

It should be

recognized

that

ambiguity

in standards and

_objectives

_may be

fostered

deliberately by policy

makers in order to ensure a

positive

response on the _part of those

_responsible

for

implementation

at other levels of the

organization

or the

policy

delivery

system. Yet the

_study

of

_{implementation}

requires

that

goals

and

objectives

be identified and measured

since

_{&dquo;implementation}

cannot succeed or fail without a

_goal

against

which to

_judge

it&dquo;

(Pressman

and

_Wildavsky,

1973:

xiv).

In

_determining

standards and

objectives

one could use

the statements of

policy

makers,

as reflected in numerous

documents such as _program

_regulations

and

_guidelines

which

spell

out the criteria for an evaluation of

policy

performance.

In some cases,

however,

the

policy’s

standards and

objectives

may even wish to use the criteria for evaluation of

_policy

performance provided

by

clientele _groups.

_Ultimately,

the

choice of

performance

measures

_depends

on the _purposes for

which the research is conducted

_(Rivlin,

_1971;

Rossi and

Williams,

1972).

POLICY RESOURCES

Policies furnish more than the standards and

objectives

against

which to

_{judge implementation: they}

also make available resources which facilitate their administration. These resources _may include funds or other incentives in the program that

might

encourage or facilitate effective

imple-mentation.

_(For

a more detailed discussion of the

_utility

of

incentives,

see

Levine, 1972,

and

_{Schultze, 1969.)}

It is

obvious that funds are

usually

not

_adequate.

In

_fact,

Derthick’s

_{(1972: 87)}

&dquo;new-towns&dquo;

_study

_suggests that the

limited

_supply

of federal incentives was a

major

contributor to the failure of that _program: &dquo;To induce local _governments

to _accept the burden of

developing

new towns

_in-town,

the federal _government had to

_give

them

_something

of value. The

President assumed that low-cost

surplus

land would be

available for this _purpose, but this

_assumption

turned out to

be

_wrong.&dquo;

Four additional factors are included in our model:

interorganizational

communication and enforcement activi-ties ; the characteristics of the

_{implementing agencies;}

the

economic, social,

and

_political

environment

_affecting

the

jurisdiction

or

_organization

within which

_{implementation}

takes

_place;

and the

_disposition

of

_{implementors.}

Each of

these factors consists of several

_variables,

some of which will

be identified here.

Interorganizational Communication and Enforcement Activities Effective

_{implementation requires}

that a

program’s

responsible

for their achievement.

_Hence,

it is vital that we concern ourselves with the

clarity

of standards and

objec-tives,

the _accuracy of their communication to

_{implementors,}

and the

_{consistency (or uniformity)}

with which

_they

are

communicated

by

various sources of information. Standards and

_objectives

cannot be carried out unless

they

are stated

with sufficient

_clarity

so that

implementors

can know what is

expected

of them. Communication within and between

organizations

is a

_complex

and difficult _{process. In}

transmit-ting

messages downward in an

organization,

or from one

organization

to

_another,

communicators

_inevitably

distort them-both

_{intentionally}

and

unintentionally

(Downs,

1967:

133-136).

Furthermore,

if different sources of

communica-tion

_provide

inconsistent

_{interpretations}

of standards and

objectives

or if the same source

_provides

conflicting

interpre-tations over

_time,

implementors

will find it even more

difficult to carry out the intentions of

_policy.

Therefore,

the prospects of effective

_{implementation}

will be enhanced

_by

the

_clarity

with which standards and

_objectives

are stated and

by

the accuracy and

consistency

with which

they

are

communicated.

Successful

implementation

often

_requires

institutional mechanisms and

_{procedures whereby higher}

authorities

(superiors)

may increase the likelihood that

implementors

(subordinates)

will act in a manner consistent with a

policy’s

standards and

objectives.

As Neustadt

_{(1960: 18)}

has

observed with _respect to

_presidential

_directives,

orders are not

_{self-executing:}

_{they require}

the _presence of an

action-forcing

mechanism.

Within the context of a

_{single organization superiors}

have access to a wide range of such mechanisms.

They

have the

standard

_personnel

powers: recruitment and selection,

assign-ment and

relocation,

advancement and

promotion,

and

ultimately,

dismissal.

_{Moreover, they}

have control over the

budgetary

allocations of bureaus and field offices which

they

may inflate or reduce in _{response to}

satisfactory

or

unsatis-factory performance.

While

_they

cannot command

obedi-ence,

superiors

have substantial

capacity

to influence their

subordinates’ behavior.

In _contrast, when we examine the

relationships

_among

members of different

organization-or

among

federal,

state, and local

_{officials-many}

of these mechanisms are absent.

Schultze

(1969: 202)

has summarized this condition:

actions cannot be commanded. There is no _hierarchy of officials

in a single line of command who can be directed toward a set of

predetermined objectives. In such cases the careful

_{specification}

of

_plans

and

_objectives

_by a

public

_agency will not suffice to guarantee effective programs.

In the context of

_{interorganizational}

_(or

intergovern-mental) relations,

two _types of enforcement or

_follow-up

activities are most

_{important. First,}

technical advice and

assistance can be

provided. Higher

level officials can often do

much to facilitate

_{implementation by aiding}

subordinates in

interpreting

federal

_regulations

and

_guidelines,

_structuring

responses to

policy initiatives,

and

obtaining

the

physical

and

technical resources

_required

to carry out a

_policy.

Second, superiors (or

federal

officials)

can

rely

on a wide

variety

of sanctions-both

_positive

and

_negative.

We can

explore

this _aspect of enforcement

by

referring

back to

Etzioni’s

(1961:

5-8)

distinction between

_normative,

remu-nerative,

and coercive power. Even

though

the federal

government is not a

_{&dquo;superior&dquo;}

in its relations with states and

localities, by extending

the

analogy

we can use this notion as an

_ordering

device for

_thinking

about

_{interorganizational}

relations and the role of enforcement.

The use of normative and remunerative _powers is most common. For

example,

the federal government seeks to

influence state and local

_{activity through}

the allocation and

most

_important

techniques

of federal influence is the

socialization,

persuasion,

and

_cooptation

of state and local

actors.

_By

_attempting

to build a

_professional

alliance around

the

organization

and its

mission,

federal officials will

_try

to

cultivate allies at the state and local level who will

_implement

their

_policies

willfully.

The

fragmentation

of the federal

system adds

significance

to this

_technique,

since it makes

monitoring

effective and

_oversight

_{virtually impossible}

_(see,

for

example, Kaufman,

1960; Derthick, 1970;

Bailey

and

Mosher, 1968;

and

_{Etzioni, 1965).}

Another _{way to} achieve influence is to _get states and

localities to

_participate

in a _program. The _prospect of

receiving

federal dollars is often sufficient to secure their

participation

and at least

_implicit

acceptance of the

objec-tives of federal

_policy.

This is a

_{significant beginning point.}

Research has shown that the amount of federal influence

over _aspects of a _program increases as the _percentage of the

federal contribution rises

_(Porter,

1973:

_{85; Derthick,}

1970:

69-70).

Finally,

federal officials may induce state and local

participation

and

_cooperation

_by

_rendering

valuable services.

For

example,

many grants do this

by

offering

a

healthy

percentage

of program funds for administration at the state

and local

level;

and such crucial _support services-technical

advice,

staff

_loans,

and

research-may

be offered to

partici-pating

organizations.

Federal officials also have more

_compelling

devices at their

disposal,

which range from

gentle

to

explicit

forms of

coercive _power. A common

_practice

is to

_require

states and localities to draw _up elaborate

_plans

for the administration of

a federal _program. Once these assurances are

made,

the

federal

_government

will allocate funds on the

_assumption

that

_they

can be withdrawn if the conditions

specified

in the

plan

are not fulfilled.

Through

this

_device,

federal officials

A similar _strategy is to

_specify

conditions and

procedural

requirements,

such as

_{thorough reporting}

and

accounting

systems, in the

_regulations

that accompany the acceptance of federal funds. In this manner the federal _government

hopes

to achieve the substantive ends of federal

_objectives.

As Derthick

_(1970:

₂₀₀₎

_points

out,

however,

there are

dangers

in this

_procedure:

Specificity

entails risks.... The more specific the language of the

federal _{requirements,} the lower the federal capacity to _adapt to state

_{peculiarities}

and the greater the _danger that the limitations

of federal capacity to

_compel

conformance may be revealed.

Moreover,

stringent regulations

and

_guidelines

may induce a sort of

_{goal displacement,}

wherein state and local officials

strive to meet federal

_requirements

in order to obtain funds and avoid

sanctions,

while

_ignoring

the basic mission of the

program.

Recognizing

these

_problems,

federal officials tend to

employ

more reliable forms of surveillance. Such activities

include on-site

_visitations,

program

evaluations,

administra-tive and _management

_reviews,

_audits,

and other feedback

mechanisms-including

reports

by nongovernmental

advisory

committees set up to oversee state and local

governmental

units

_(see,

for

example,

Downs,

1967:

_145-153;

Blau and

Scott,

1962:

_170-172;

and

_{Kaufman, 1973).}

_Wilensky

(1967:

60-61)

adds an

_important

_caveat,

however,

on the limitations

of

oversight:

Where field or branch products and local operating conditions

vary, surveillance machinery

proliferates.

Such machinery is often

ineffectual-especially

where the local people must submit to inspection either _by those outside their

_profession

or

specialty

or

by those of different

_ideological

persuasions.... Where the

... doctrinal distance between the inspectors is great, the