The right of way of necessity : a constitutional analysis

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The Right of Way of Necessity:

A Constitutional Analysis

Tshilidzi Norman Raphulu

17439140

Thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Laws at Stellenbosch University

Supervisor: Prof AJ van der Walt

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Declaration

By submitting this dissertation electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the authorship owner thereof (unless to the extent explicitly otherwise stated) and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

Raphulu Tshilidzi Norman 20 August 2013

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Summary

The right of way of necessity is a special type of praedial servitude that is established over neighbouring property in favour of landlocked property – that is, property without access to a public road. The purpose of granting the landlocked property a right of access to a public road is so that it can be put to efficient use. The servitude is created by operation of law and it binds the surrounding properties as of right at the moment when the property becomes landlocked. It can, however, be enforced only against a specific neighbouring property. This servitude can only be enforced by way of a court order, against the will of the owner of the neighbouring property. This servitude, specifically the manner in which it is established, may raise significant constitutional issues as regards the property clause of the South African Constitution. Therefore, it was necessary to investigate the constitutionality of the right of way of necessity in view of section 25 of the Constitution.

To this end, the study provides an overview of the law relating to the right of way of necessity and the general principles regulating this servitude in South African law. Subsequently, the justifications for the right of way of necessity and specifically for allowing the courts to enforce this servitude are analysed in terms of public policy, jurisprudential views and law and economics theory. The conclusion is reached that, in terms of these justifications, there are sufficient policy, social, and economic reasons for having the right of way of necessity and for the courts to enforce it without cooperation and against the will of the affected servient property owner.

These justifications are used to examine the constitutionality of the right of way of necessity, specifically to determine whether the enforcement of this servitude by court order constitutes a section 25(1) arbitrary deprivation or even a section 25(2) expropriation of the affected owner’s property rights. The study concludes that the granting of the right of way of necessity will not amount to an expropriation and, following the FNB methodology, does not constitute arbitrary deprivation of property either. Therefore, if all the requirements are met, the granting of a right of way of necessity will be constitutionally compliant.

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Opsomming

Die saaklike serwituut wat ten gunste van grond wat van openbare verkeersweë afgesny is (blokland) oor naburige eiendom gevestig word, staan bekend as noodweg. Die rede waarom toegang tot ’n openbare pad aan blokland toegeken word, is sodat die grond effektief gebruik kan word. Hierdie serwituut word deur regswerking geskep en dit bind omringende eiendomme vanaf die oomblik dat die blokland van openbare verkeersweë afgesluit word. Dit kan egter slegs teen ’n spesifieke naburige eiendom afgedwing word. Die serwituut kan slegs deur middel van ’n hofbevel afgedwing word, teen die eienaar van die naburige eiendom se wil. Wat die eiendomsklousule van die Suid-Afrikaanse Grondwet betref, kan hierdie serwituut en veral die wyse waarop dit gevesig word belangrike grondwetlike vrae opper. In die lig van artikel 25 van die Grondwet was dit dus nodig om die grondwetlike geldigheid van noodweg te toets.

Om hierdie doel te bereik, verskaf die studie’n oorsig van die regsbeginsels aangaande noodweg en die algemene beginsels van hierdie serwituut in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg. Met verwysing na openbare beleid, regsfilosofiese benaderings en Law and Economics-teorie analiseer die tesis vervolgens die regverdigingsgronde vir noodweg, spesifiek vir die feit dat die howe dit afdwing. Die gevolgtrekking is dat daar ingevolge hierdie regverdigingsgronde genoegsame beleids-, sosiale en ekonomiese redes bestaan vir die serwituut van noodweg en vir die howe se bevoegdheid om dit sonder die dienende eienaar se medewerking en teen sy wil af te dwing.

Hierdie regverdigingsgronde word gebruik om die grondwetlike geldigheid van noodweg te ondersoek, spesifiek om vas te stel of die afdwinging daarvan neerkom op ’n arbitrêre ontneming vir doeleindes van artikel 25(1) of op ’n onteiening vir doeleindes van artikel 25(2) van die Grondwet. Hierdie studie kom tot die slotsom dat die toestaan van ’n noodweg nie as ’n onteiening kwalifiseer nie en dat dit, indien die FNB-metodologie nagevolg word, ook nie op ’n arbitrêre ontneming van eiendom neerkom nie. Indien al die vereistes nagekom word, sal die toestaan van ’n noodweg dus aan die Grondwet voldoen.

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Acknowledgements

I offer praise and thanks to the Lord God through Jesus Christ, for the gift of life and wisdom.

A sincere word of gratitude to my supervisor, Professor AJ van der Walt, for giving me the opportunity to learn from him and, most importantly, for believing in my abilities. I will be forever grateful.

Thank you to the South African Research Chair in Property Law (SARCPL), sponsored by the Department of Science and Technology, administered by the National Research Foundation and hosted by Stellenbosch University, for their financial support. If not for the generous financial support provided, this research would not have been possible.

To Ms Annette Lansink, Dean of the School of Law at the University of Venda, for encouraging me to apply for the LLM position at the SARCPL.

To Dr Ernst Marais, many thanks for reading and commenting on several drafts of this thesis.

To my colleagues and friends at the SARCPL for the different roles they played in the completion of this thesis: Dr Reghard Brits, Sonja van Niekerk, Priviledge Dhliwayo, Nzumbululo Silas Siphuma, Karen Bezuidenhout, Lizette Grobler, Elsabé van der Sijde and Nhlanhla Lucky Sono, amongst others thank you. A special word of thanks to Mrs Gerda Adams who took care of my workstation where I wrote and completed this thesis. I also wish to thank Mrs Annette King, the secretary of the Department of Public Law at the University of Stellenbosch, who made me feel at home in the faculty.

Aluwani Mahuluhulu, thank you for your special love, patience and support. I would also like to thank my family (especially Mavis, Masindi, Mushe, Jeffrey, Mashudu, Mabel, Phindile and Penny) and my friends for their endless support. Phumudzo, Orifha and Khuthadzo, your phone calls meant a lot to me. To my intellectual friends, Gogome Kharikhode and Albert Mudau: “The Ethiopians are conquering.”

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To my young sister, Cecilia Raphulu, as Dr Martin Luther King Jnr. said: “Intelligence plus character - that is the goal of true education.”

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1 1 Introduction

A situation may occur where an owner (dominant owner) of a piece of land (dominant tenement) finds himself in a landlocked or geographically enclosed location that denies him access to the public transport system such as public roads and railroads. In these circumstances, the first option for the dominant owner is to seek assistance from the neighbouring land to negotiate for a connection to such public transport facilities. This situation is exacerbated when the neighbouring owner (servient owner) refuses to give access over his land (servient tenement) or when it is for some reason impossible to negotiate for such a right. When a particular dominant tenement does not have access to a public road and the dominant owner is unable through negotiation to acquire such access over the servient tenement, it is said that his property is landlocked. Land may become landlocked through various factors, for example natural causes and human action.

Landlocking problems may arise from subdivision and subsequent alienation of part of a tract of land with the consequence that either the land conveyed or retained loses access to a public road. This is usually caused by an omission or oversight to reserve a right of way for the landlocked piece of land by the parties to the subdivision, or when the owner of the subdivided piece of land does not immediately require the right of way due to other access arrangements over adjoining properties.1

1_{AJ Bradbrook “Access to landlocked land: A comparative study of legal solutions” (1983) 10}

Sydney Law Review 39-60 39.

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In Wilhelm v Norton,2 an omission to provide a right of way upon the subdivision of properties left the plaintiff landlocked. In that case, the defendant subdivided his farm into two portions and sold one of the portions to his son, who in turn mortgaged it as security to the plaintiff.3 The portion sold to the son was landlocked in a way that denied the owner immediate access to a public road.4 No servitude of way was registered in favour of the subdivided property. The son continued to use the road that his father had used before him, gaining access to the public road over his father’s property, without the benefit of a registered right to do so. The son was later declared insolvent and his property was bought by the plaintiff at a public auction. The plaintiff’s property became landlocked when the defendant denied the plaintiff a right of access over the defendant’s land due to lack of a servitude agreement between them.5

Voluntary action or negligence on the part of the dominant owner can also cause landlocking, for example where the dominant owner neglects a road that connects him to a public road, allowing it to reach such a state of disrepair that it becomes unusable. This is what happened in Rudolph v Casojee.6 In that case the plaintiff and his predecessors in title abandoned a road that had been used for more

2

1935 EDL 143. On the issue of subdivision, see Lewis v S D Turner Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others

1993 (3) SA 738 (W) 740D: “It is common cause that at all material times prior to 23 August 1944, the lot from which the respondents’ properties were created by subdivision in later years was landlocked in the sense that it was not abutting on any public road.” See further CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right to forced passage compared with the South African way of necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1365.

3

Wilhelm v Norton 1935 EDL 143 148.

4

5

6

1945 EDL 190. See also AJ Bradbrook “Access to landlocked land: A comparative study of legal

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than thirty four years to gain access to a public road,7 and started using a road over the defendant’s land.8

The abandoned road reached such a state of disrepair that it became practically useless, unless it was repaired at substantial cost.9 The plaintiff was left without access to the public road when the defendant eventually refused him access over his land.10 Another example is where the dominant owner wilfully procures the closing of a public road or abandons an existing servitude of way, consequently denying himself access to the public road. A similar situation occurred in Riddin v Quinn.11 In that case, the joint owners of a farm subdivided the farm and agreed to close all existing private roads.12 Consequently, one of the subdivisions was left without direct access to the main road. The defendant subsequently bought the subdivision, only to find that it has no access to the public road. A similar example is found in Bekker v Van Wyk.13 There, the appellant (dominant owner) and his brother jointly procured the closing of a public road which ran over their farms, in terms of legislation. Special arrangements were made between the appellant and his brother in law, allowing the appellant access over his brother in law’s property, without a registered right of way being constituted.14 However, this arrangement came to an end when the appellant’s brother in law sold his property to the

7

Rudolph v Casojee 1945 EDL 190 194.

8

9

10

11

(1909) 23 EDC 373.

12

Riddin v Quinn (1909) 23 EDC 373 375-376.

13_{1956 (3) SA 13 (T). See also CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right to forced passage compared}

with the South African way of necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1365.

14

Bekker v Van Wyk 1956 (3) SA 13 (T) 14. See also JE Scholtens “Law of property (including

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respondents, who subsequent to the purchase closed the appellant’s road by means of a fence, thereby denying him access to the public road.15

Landlocking can also be caused by natural disasters, for instance where flooding destroys the road that connects the affected land to the public road.16 Finally, a change in land use can also result in landlocking, for instance when the initial access road is no longer suitable for the new land use, which is what happened in Naudé v Ecoman Investment.17 In that case the change in land use, from agricultural to public resort, left the initial access road redundant due to the heavy traffic the road had to endure for the new use of the dominant land.

Landlocking has the effect of depriving the landowner of the right to interact with the world at large.18 It actually limits his freedom of movement. The owner is also barred from the effective exploitation of his land. He is unable to utilize his land for the purpose it had been acquired for or is being used for. Consequently, this could render the land useless, depreciating in value and causing the dominant owner to suffer economic loss. Furthermore, landlocking also causes loss for the public at large, who might have benefited from efficient use of the land in the form of job creation or production of food and other valuable produce.

South African property law, more notably servitude law, provides a solution for the abovementioned problem. It provides legal relief in the form of the possibility to acquire a servitude, in the form of a right of way over the neighbouring land, by

15

Bekker v Van Wyk 1956 (3) SA 13 (T) 14.

16

Trautman NO v Poole 1951 (3) SA 200 (C) 202. See also CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right

to forced passage compared with the South African way of necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review

1363-1413 1365.

17

1994 (2) SA 95 (T).

18

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operation of law, in other words without the cooperation of the servient owner and even against his will. This servitude is known as the right of way of necessity, also referred to as noodweg.19 A right of way of necessity accrues to a landowner, as of right, immediately when his land becomes landlocked, leaving him without access or reasonably sufficient access to a public road. It binds all the surrounding properties, but only one of these properties is directly affected by this servitude once it is established. In the absence of agreement between landowners to create a servitude that would give the affected land access to the public transport systems, the courts have the power to impose this servitude over a specified servient tenement and to identify the route that the servitude must follow. It can either be a permanent right of way or a temporary right of way, depending on the nature of the landlocking and the requirements of the affected landowner. A temporary right of way of necessity is usually limited to access in emergency situations. However, this study is limited to a permanent right of way of necessity.

1 2 Research question and hypothesis

The common law pertaining to the right of way of necessity gives courts the authority to enforce a servitude of right of way over the identified servient tenement against the will of the servient owner. This method of creating a servitude could obviously raise constitutional issues, specifically with reference to section 25 of the Constitution Republic South Africa 1996 (“the Constitution”), since the servitude is not created as usual by negotiation and agreement between the landowners involved, but instead by operation of law and court order, without the cooperation of the servient landowner and even against his will. Section 25 of the Constitution plays

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a role to the extent that the imposition of a servitude of right of way by operation of law affects the servient owner’s property rights to the extent that it brings about a forced transfer of rights. Section 25(1) provides that “[n]o one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property”. When the courts by way of court order enforce a right of way of necessity against the servient tenement, they place restrictions on some of the servient owner’s property rights. The effect of the creation of a right of way of necessity by way of court order can be described as a deprivation of the servient landowner’s property. Unless there are sufficient reasons justifying this infringement of the servient owner’s property rights, the infringement could constitute an arbitrary deprivation or even an expropriation of the concerned property rights. These effects of the creation of a servitude of right of way have to be analysed and explained in terms of section 25.

Taking into account the manner in which a servitude of way of necessity is created, the main question for purposes of this study is whether the creation and enforcement of this servitude by the courts amount to a deprivation of the servient owner’s property rights, or even an expropriation of such rights, and whether such a deprivation or expropriation complies with the requirements in section 25 of the Constitution. The assumption on which the study is developed is that the creation of this servitude by operation of law may cause a deprivation of the servient owner’s property rights and that such deprivation has to be justified in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution. Furthermore, it is also assumed that the creation of this servitude could even constitute an expropriation of the servient owner’s property rights and that such an expropriation has to be justified in terms of section 25(2) and 25(3) of the Constitution.

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As a first step to determining the constitutional validity of the judicial creation of the right of way of necessity, this study sets out the background of the law pertaining to this servitude. This involves a brief overview of the law regarding the South African right of way of necessity and an analysis of the general principles regulating this servitude, particularly as they have been developed in case law. Regarding the general principles, this study discusses the place of the right of way of necessity in servitude law, the creation of the right of way of necessity, the requirements for the creation of the right of way of necessity, the conditions for the creation of the right of way of necessity, the real nature of this servitude, and finally its termination.

This study also analyses the rationale for the right of way of necessity and specifically the rationale for allowing courts to enforce this servitude. Three justifications concerning the right of way of necessity are discussed, namely public policy, jurisprudential views, and law and economics theory.

Finally, this study subjects the common law right of way of necessity to constitutional scrutiny. In this regard this study uses the methodology set out in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance (“FNB decision”)20

for resolving constitutional property disputes. In terms of this methodology, the first question that has to be asked is whether the creation of a servitude of right of way of necessity by way of court order constitutes arbitrary deprivation of property. This entails asking the following questions: Firstly, does the granting of the right of the right of way of necessity affect property as recognised in terms of section 25(1)? This involves defining what property is for purposes of section 25. Secondly, does the effect of the creation of this servitude on the said

20

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property rights constitute deprivation as understood by section 25(1)? This entails defining the concept of deprivation. Thirdly, if it is established that the rights in question constitute property for purposes of section 25, and that the granting of the right of way of necessity constitutes deprivation, the question is whether the deprivation is in line with section 25(1).

For a deprivation to be in line with section 25(1), such deprivation must first of all be authorised by law of general application. Secondly, such law may not allow arbitrary deprivation. Hence it must first be established whether the common law regulating the right of way of necessity constitutes law of general application. If it does, the second question is whether such law allows arbitrary deprivation. In terms of the FNB decision, a deprivation is “arbitrary” in terms of section 25(1) when the law complained of “does not provide sufficient reason for the particular deprivation in question [substantive arbitrariness] or is procedurally unfair [procedural arbitrariness]”.21

Regarding procedural arbitrariness, this study raises the question whether a deprivation caused by court order can ever be procedurally unfair. As for substantive arbitrariness, the central question of the study is whether there is sufficient reason to justify the imposition of a servitude of right of way of necessity by court order. According to the FNB methodology, a complexity of relationships must be analysed in answering this question. The most important question in this regard is whether the justifications that have been identified for allowing the courts to establish a servitude of right of way by operation of law are sufficient to prevent the deprivation from being arbitrary.

21

First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100.

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The final question in terms of the FNB methodology is whether the right of way of necessity amounts to expropriation contrary to section 25(2). Chapter four briefly considers the question whether the common law can authorise an expropriation under South African law and concludes that the common law right of way of necessity constitutes a deprivation but not an expropriation of property, since in South African law there is no authority for expropriation in the absence of legislative authority.

1 3 Chapter outline and methodology

This study consists of five chapters, including the current introductory chapter. Chapter two sets out a brief overview of the law concerning the right of way of necessity as it has been developed in South African case law. Following the overview, the chapter discusses the general principles regulating the right of way of necessity, focusing specifically on the principles regarding the creation of this servitude, the requirements for the creation of the right of way of necessity, the conditions for the creation of the right of way of necessity, the principles regarding the registration of limited real rights in land, and the principles concerning termination of the right of way of necessity. To achieve the purpose of this chapter, Chapter two mainly relies on analysis of case law and academic literature.

Chapter three investigates and analyses the justifications for the right of way of necessity. This chapter investigates both the justifications for recognising the right of way of necessity in general and the justifications for allowing courts to enforce this servitude against the will of the servient landowner. In this regard, this chapter considers public policy arguments, jurisprudential arguments, and law and

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economics theory relied on in the academic literature22 and case law. Regarding the jurisprudential arguments, this study distinguishes between the individualistic approach and the social approach. It shows the implications of these approaches for the concept of ownership. Furthermore, this study shows the relevance of these approaches for current South African case law.

Chapter four assesses the constitutional validity of the right of way of necessity in relation to section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. The constitutional aspects concern firstly, whether the granting and the enforcement of the right of way of necessity amounts to an arbitrary deprivation of the servient owner’s property rights in conflict with section 25(1) of the Constitution; secondly, whether the creation of this servitude could also amount to an expropriation of property rights and, if so, whether the deprivation or expropriation involved is in line with section 25 of the Constitution. The chapter relies on the methodology set out in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance (“FNB decision”)23

for resolving constitutional property disputes. The chapter considers the justifications identified in chapter three to come to a conclusion regarding the possible arbitrariness of the deprivation caused by the imposition of a servitude of right of way of necessity.

The concluding chapter provides an overview of the conclusions drawn from all the substantive chapters, and proposes a final conclusion on the question whether

22

Most of the sources cited in this chapter discuss foreign law, specifically the US law regarding the public policy arguments on the the right of way of necessity, and also the Dutch law perspective concerning the right of way of necessity. The reason for this is that these sources are insightful on the justifications for the right of way of necessity, whereas there are relatively few South African academic sources that discuss this issue.

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the right of way of necessity constitutes an arbitrary deprivation or even expropriation of the affected servient landowner’s rights.

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Chapter 2: The law relating to the right of way of necessity

2 1 Introduction

This chapter aims to provide an overview on the law relating to the right of way of necessity in South African law. The chapter briefly traces the origin of the right of way of necessity and discusses the general principles regulating this servitude, focusing specifically on the principles regarding praedial servitudes (the place of the right of way of necessity in servitude law), principles regarding the establishment (the creation) of the right of way of necessity, the requirements for the creation of the servitude, the conditions precedent to the establishment of the right of way of necessity, the principles regarding the registration of limited real rights in land, and the principles concerning termination of the right of way of necessity. For purposes of this chapter the landlocked land and the neighbouring land are referred to as the dominant tenement and the servient tenement respectively, and their respective owners as the dominant owner and the servient owner. Case law and the academic literature often refer to this servitude as a ““way of necessity’’ or a “via ex necessitate”, however, for purpose of this chapter and the rest of the study it is referred to as a “right of way of necessity”.

2 2 The origins of the right of way of necessity

The origins of the right of way of necessity in South African law can be traced back to Wilhelm v Norton.1 This servitude comes from two distinct legal systems and

1

1935 EDL 143. See also CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes (3rd ed 1973) 76. For a detailed discussion on the right of way of necessity, see CG van der Merwe & GF Lubbe “Noodweg” (1977) 40

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constitutes a hybrid of Roman and Germanic law.2 It originates from Roman law,3 which acknowledged a right of way to a family grave (iter ad sepulchrum).4 The right to a family grave was granted on account of necessity to a person who had a grave on his land but no approach to that grave.5 Pomponius is regarded as authority for the principle that whenever land on which graves were built had been sold, access to such graves as well as to the surrounding spaces must be given to the former owners for purposes of funeral processions and the performance of sacrificial rites.6 Van der Merwe7 shows that Roman law did not only recognise the right to a family grave, but, earlier Roman law, also recognised the right of way of necessity for the public over private property in cases where the via publica became impassable as a result of flooding, and the private right of way of necessity in cases where the dominant tenement would otherwise remain undeveloped.8 Germanic law, on the

Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 111-125; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed

1989) 484-492. See also Van Rensburg v Coetzee 1979 (4) SA 655 (A).

2_{CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right to forced passage compared with the South African way of}

necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1366, 1367-1368. See also CG van der Merwe

Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 484.

3

CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes (3rd ed 1973) 76; MD Southwood The compulsory acquisition of

rights (2000) 95; CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right to forced passage compared with the South

African way of necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1366. See also CG van der

Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 484-485.

4

MD Southwood The compulsory acquisition of rights (2000) 95. See also CG van der Merwe

Sakereg (2nd ed 1989); CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right to forced passage compared with the

South African way of necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1366-1367.

5

6

necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1367.

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other hand, recognised a road of egress (uitweg).9 Roman-Dutch law adopted the Roman law rule of iter ad sepulchrum together with the Germanic rule of uitweg and developed them into a general right of way of necessity.10 It was then extended to all lands which had no way out or did not abut on a high road.11 These lands became entitled to the right of way of necessity over the servient tenement to enable the dominant owner access to the high road by the shortest route and with the least damage to the servient tenement.12 The right of way of necessity was received into South African law from Roman-Dutch law where it has since been developed to a modern legal rule, entitling the owner of an inaccessible piece of land to a right of way providing access to a public road over neighbouring land.13

In the late eighteenth century the Natal government granted the Roads Board the power to create ways of necessity over land regardless of the servient owner’s consent.14 The power was granted through statutes that were in force at the time and this power was finally replaced by the Road Ordinance 40 of 1978.15 Apart from

necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1367; CG van der Merwe & GF Lubbe

“Noodweg” (1977) 40 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 111-125 111; CG van der

Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 484.

necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1368. See also MD Southwood The compulsory

acquisition of rights (2000) 95.

11

12

necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1367. See also CG van der Merwe “Servitudes

and other real rights” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law (9th ed 2007) 591-629

598; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 484; WM Gordon & MJ De Waal “Servitudes and real

burdens” in R Zimmermann, D Visser & K Reid (eds) Mixed legal systems in comparative perspective

(2004) 735-757 747; MD Southwood The compulsory acquisition of rights (2000) 95.

14

MD Southwood The compulsory acquisition of rights (2000) 96.

15

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these statutory developments, case law has since played an important role in the development of the law relating to the right of way of necessity.16

2 3 General principles relating to the right of way of necessity

2 3 1 The place of the right of way of necessity in servitude law

The right of way of necessity forms part of servitude law. Servitudes are divided into two categories, namely personal and praedial servitudes.17 Personal servitudes are limited real rights in the movable or immovable property of another, which grant entitlements of use and enjoyment over the servient tenement to the servitude holders in their personal capacity and not in their capacity as owners of dominant tenements.18 Furthermore, personal servitudes cannot exist beyond the life time of

16

The 1979 decision of Van Rensburg v Coetzee1979 (4) SA 655 (A) is a good example of this development. The case covered almost all the important aspects of the right of way of necessity. See in general the following textbooks where the decision is referred to and discussed: CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 485-491; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed 2006) 328-330; H Mostert, A Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM

Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 247; MD Southwood

The compulsory acquisition of rights (2000) 99.

17

PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed

2006) 321; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 459; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal

“Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 (2nd ed 2010) para 541; CG van der Merwe “Servitudes and other real rights” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law (9th ed 2007) 591-629 592; H Mostert, A Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 237.

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2006) 338; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 506; H Mostert, A Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W

Freedman, JM Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 237;

CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 (2nd ed 2010) para 579; CG van der Merwe “Servitudes and other real rights” in F du

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the servitude holders.19 Praedial servitudes, by contrast, are defined as limited real rights in the land of someone else, which grant the holders of the servitudes certain entitlements of use and enjoyment over the servient tenement in their capacity as owners of the dominant tenements.20 In other words, the dominant owner does not merely benefit in his personal capacity but as the owner of the dominant tenement.21 The right of way of necessity forms part of praedial servitudes, also referred to as “land-servitudes”22 _{or “real servitudes”.}23

Praedial servitudes are further divided into either rural or urban servitudes.24 Rural and urban servitudes are distinguished

19

2006) 322; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 460; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal

“Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 (2nd ed 2010) para 579; CG van der Merwe “Servitudes and other real rights” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law (9th ed 2007) 591-629 592; H Mostert, A Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM Pienaar

& J van Wyk The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 239. See also Lorentz v Melle

and Others 1978 (3) SA 1044 (T) 1049D: “[a personal servitude,] [n]ormally … terminates (at the latest) on the death of the beneficiary (in the case of a natural person).”

20_{CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds)}

The law of South Africa vol 24 (2nd ed 2010) para 545; CG van der Merwe “Servitudes and other real rights” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law (9th ed 2007) 591-629 593; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 467; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed 2006) 322; H Mostert, A Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM Pienaar & J

van Wyk The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 237.

21

2006) 322; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 459; H Mostert, A Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W

Freedman, JM Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 240.

22

U Huber Heedendaagse rechtsgeleertheyt (translated by P Gane The jurisprudence of my time vol

1 1939) 323. Huber distinguishes between servitudes over land (rural servitudes) and servitudes over a house (urban servitudes). According to him, rural servitudes consist of servitudes of footpath, driving cattle, driving vehicles, leading water, discharging water, drawing water, watering cattle or grazing them, burning lime, digging sand, gathering and storing fruits, cutting or gathering stone and pilling it up, chopping wood, planting huts, boating and fishing on another man’s land.

23

M Nathan The common law of South Africa vol 1 (1904) 445.

24

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from each other by the use which they serve on the land and not on the locality of the land.25 Urban servitudes relate to land situated in town or country, with buildings primarily used for habitation, commercial, industrial or other related purposes.26 Rural servitudes, on the contrary, concern those tenements situated in town or country and used for agricultural or pastoral purposes.27 Rural servitudes are mainly confined to rights of way, servitudes of water and grazing or pasturage servitudes.28 Although a right of way of necessity falls under rights of way, which generally belongs to rural servitudes, a right of way of way of necessity may still fall under urban servitudes. The reason for this argument is that the purpose for which the South Africa vol 24 (2nd ed 2010) para 554; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 479; CG van

der Merwe “Servitudes and other real rights” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law

(9th ed 2007) 591-629 597; AFS Maasdorp The institutes of Cape law: The law of things (4th ed 1923)

186-187; DP de Bruyn The opinions of Grotius as contained in the Hollandsche consultatien en

advijsen (1894)423; M Nathan The common law of South Africa vol 1 (1904) 445-457; H Mostert, A

Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the law of property in

South Africa (2010) 246.

25

2006) 326; M Nathan The common law of South Africa vol 1 (1904) 446; AFS Maasdorp The institutes

of Cape law: The law of things (4th ed 1923) 186.

26

2006) 326; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of

South Africa vol 24 (2nd ed 2010) para 554; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 479; AFS

Maasdorp The institutes of Cape law: The law of things (4th ed 1923) 186; M Nathan The common law

of South Africa vol 1 (1904) 445.

27

South Africa vol 24 (2nd ed 2010) para 554; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 479; M Nathan The common law of South Africa vol 1 (1904) 445-446; AFS Maasdorp The institutes of Cape law: The law of things (4th ed 1923) 186.

28

2006) 326-327; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The

law of South Africa vol 24 (2nd ed 2010) para 557; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 479; DP de Bruyn The opinions of Grotius as contained in the Hollandsche consultatien en advijsen (1894) 423.

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landlocked dominant tenement is used for is irrelevant; the land can be used for agricultural, habitation purposes.29 Therefore, depending on the use which the dominant tenement is subjected to, a right of way of necessity can either be a rural or urban servitude. Like all other praedial servitudes, the right of way of necessity must comply with certain requirements necessary for the establishment of valid praedial servitudes. What follows is a discussion of the most important requirements necessary for the establishment of valid praedial servitudes.

The right of way of necessity as a praedial servitude must be established in respect of two pieces of land, namely, the dominant tenement and the servient tenement.30 Both tenements must be owned by different persons, which is in accordance with the principle “nemini res sua servit”31

prohibiting an owner from having a servitude over his own land.32 Praedial servitudes only exist in respect of

The law of South Africa vol 24 (2nd ed 2010) para 560.

30

South Africa vol 24 (2nd ed 2010) para 546; CG van der Merwe “Servitudes and other real rights” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South African law (9th ed 2007) 591-629 593; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 469; H Mostert, A Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 239, 240.

31

This means that nobody can constitute a servitude over his or her own land. See PJ Badenhorst,

JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed 2006) 323; H Mostert,

A Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the law of property

in South Africa (2010) 24; CG van der Merwe “Servitudes and other real rights” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law (9th ed 2007) 591-629 592. This principle was also confirmed in Lewis v S D Turner Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others 1993 (3) SA 738 (W) 740F, where the court held that it was not only the issue of “no practical need”, but it was also not legally possible to register a servitude of way in favour of the lot (dominant tenement) against the adjacent properties belonging to one and the same person.

32

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immovable properties and cannot be established in anything else except in land.33 The court in Mienie h/a M and J Scrap Metal v Heidebaai Vakansieprojek (Edms) Bpk34 refused to recognize a stranded shipwreck as a tenement for purposes of allowing a right of way over two adjoining properties to the wreck. The dominant and the servient tenement must be neighbouring. This is in accordance to the vicinitas principle.35 In terms of this principle, the dominant and servient tenement must be situated in the vicinity of each other.36 However, this does not necessarily mean that du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law (9th ed 2007) 591-629 593; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 468-469; WM Gordon & MJ de Waal “Servitudes and real burdens” in R

Zimmermann, D Visser & K Reid (eds) Mixed legal systems in comparative perspective (2004)

735-757 738; AFS Maasdorp The institutes of Cape law: The law of things (4th ed 1923) 161; H Mostert, A

Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the law of property in

South Africa (2010) 239, 240. See also Lewis v S D Turner Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others 1993 (3) SA 738 (W) 740D.

33_{CG van der Merwe “Servitudes and other real rights” in F du Bois (ed)}_{Wille’s Principles of South}

African law (9th ed 2007) 591-629 592; H Mostert, A Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM Pienaar

& J van Wyk The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 239. See also City Deep v

Mccalgan 1924 WLD 276 279.

34 _{[1996] 1 All SA 110 (SE) 112: “[T]he Applicant [a scrap metal dealer] had bought the wreck of a}

stranded ship with the intention of cutting it up into pieces and selling the pieces as scrap metal. The wreck was lodged in the rocks in such a position that the Applicant had to transport the pieces across the farms of the Respondents for part of the way. The Respondents refused to grant permission to the Applicant to do this. The Applicant then applied for an order compelling the Respondents to grant him a right of way across the relevant portions of their farms”. The court therefore “rejected the Applicant’s argument that the wreck could be seen as a landlocked property to which he had no access through circumstances beyond his control and therefore needed a right of way thereto”.

35 _{For more on this principle, see JL Neels “Naburigheid as vereiste vir erfdiensbaarhede” (1990)}

Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 254-263; JL Neels “Naburigheid as vereiste vir erfdiensbaarhede” (1990) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 447-464; MJ De Waal “Vicinitas of

nabuurskap as vestigingsvereiste vir grondserwitute” (1990) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg

186-206. See also CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law

of South Africa vol 24 (2nd ed 2010) para 547; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 471.

36

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they must be contiguous or adjoining, but it is required that they be situated so closely together that there is a possibility of the servitude affording some benefit to the dominant tenement.37 It follows that the right of way of necessity may even be established in circumstances where the dominant tenement and the servient tenement are separated by intervening properties.38 However, in such a case the intervening properties should first be subjected to some kind of servitude or other right in order to connect the dominant tenement and the servient tenement,39 which need not necessarily be the same servitude to which the servient tenement is subjected to.40

The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 240. See also J Scott “The difficult process of applying easy principles: Three recent judgments on via ex necessitate’’ (2008) 41 De Jure 164-174 171.

The law of South Africa vol 24 (2nd ed 2010) para 547; CG van der Merwe “Servitudes and other real rights” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law (9th ed 2007) 591-629 594; AFS Maasdorp The institutes of Cape law: The law of things (4th ed 1923) 184; H Mostert, A Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W

Freedman, JM Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 240; J

Scott “The difficult process of applying easy principles: Three recent judgments on via ex necessitate’’

(2008) 41 De Jure 164-174 171; U Huber Heedendaagse rechtsgeleertheyt (translated by P Gane

The jurisprudence of my time vol 1 1939) 330: “In country [rural] servitudes the rule [that tenements must be neighbouring or contiguous] is not so strict...”. See also J Scott “The difficult process of

applying easy principles: Three recent judgments on via ex necessitate’’ (2008) 41 De Jure 164-174

171, who seems to be of the view that the landlocked and the servient tenement does not necessarily have to be close to each other for the right of way of necessity to be established.

38

AFS Maasdorp The institutes of Cape law: The law of things (4th ed 1923) 184-185. See also CG

van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol

24 (2nd ed 2010) para 547; H Mostert, A Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM Pienaar & J van Wyk

The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 240.

39

AFS Maasdorp The institutes of Cape law: The law of things (4th ed 1923) 185. See also CG van

der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24

(2nd ed 2010) para 547; H Mostert, A Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM Pienaar & J van Wyk

The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 240.

40

AFS Maasdorp The institutes of Cape law: The law of things (4th ed 1923) 185; also CG van der

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The purpose of having the dominant and servient tenement close to each other is to enable the servient tenement to afford some benefit to the dominant tenement, which is in accordance with the utility (utilitas) requirement.41 In terms of the utility requirement, a praedial servitude must offer some permanent benefit to the dominant tenement,42 but not just a mere personal benefit to the dominant owner.43 This means that a praedial servitude (including a right of way of necessity) must be capable of increasing the agricultural, economic, industrial or professional utility of the dominant tenement.44 The utility must be capable of being passed from one owner to the next upon transfer of the dominant tenement because praedial

ed 2010) para 547; CG van der Merwe “Servitudes and other real rights” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law (9th ed 2007) 591-629 594: “As long as a further servitude is established over the intervening tenement.”

The law of South Africa vol 24 (2nd ed 2010) para 547; H Mostert, A Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 240. See also MJ De Waal “Vicinitas of nabuurskap as vestigingsvereiste vir grondserwitute” (1990) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 186-206 206, who argues that the vicinity requirement is closely related to the utility

requirement. On this point, see further CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 471.

42

De Kock v Hänel and Others 1999 (1) SA 994 (C) 998G. See also CG van der Merwe & MJ de

Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 (2nd ed 2010) para

549; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed

2006) 323.

43

De Kock v Hänel and Others 1999 (1) SA 994 (C) 998G. See also CG van der Merwe & MJ de

Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 (2nd ed 2010) para

549; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 469-471; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed 2006) 323; H Mostert, A Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 241; J Scott “The difficult process of applying easy principles: Three recent judgments on via ex necessitate’’ (2008) 41 De Jure 164-174 171 and the cited authorities.

The law of South Africa vol 24 (2nd ed 2010) para 547; H Mostert, A Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 241; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 469-471.

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servitudes attach to the land and not to the owner in his personal capacity.45 Furthermore, just like a benefit offered by any praedial servitude, the benefit offered by the right of way of necessity must be permanent in nature, which is in accordance to the perpetua causa (permanant cause) principle.46 In terms of this principle, the use made of the servient tenement must be based on some permanent feature or attribute of the servient tenement.47 Therefore, the servient tenement must always be capable of continuously satisfying the needs of the dominant tenement (landlocked tenement).48 In sum, the right of way of necessity forms part of servitude law and specifically belongs under praedial servitudes. The above discussed requirements regarding the establishment of praedial servitudes apply in respect of the right of way of necessity.

45

2006) 322; CG van der Merwe “Servitudes and other real rights” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of

South African law (9th ed 2007) 591-629 592; H Mostert, A Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 239. See J Scott “The difficult process of applying easy principles: Three recent judgments on via ex necessitate’’

(2008) 41 De Jure 164-174 172, who analyses the decisions of Jackson NO and Others v Aventura

Ltd and Others [2005] 2 All SA 518 (C); Aventura Ltd v Jackson NO and Others 2007 (5) SA 497 (SCA) and observes that the court did not adhere to the utility principle in the process of granting the right of way of necessity.

46 _{J Scott “The difficult process of applying easy principles: Three recent judgments on}

via ex necessitate’’ (2008) 41 De Jure 164-174 171, analysing the decisions of Jackson NO and Others v Aventura Ltd and Others [2005] 2 All SA 518 (C); Aventura Ltd v Jackson NO and Others 2007 (5) SA 497 (SCA).

47

CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South

Africa vol 24 (2nd ed 2010) para 557; H Mostert, A Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 241; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 469-471.

The law of South Africa vol 24 (2nd ed 2010) para 548; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 471; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed 2006) 323 and the cited authorities at fn 18; H Mostert, A Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 241.

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2 3 2 Types of right of ways of necessity

Depending on the nature and the extent of necessity, the dominant owner can claim either a permanent right of way (ius via plenum) or a temporary right of way (ius viae precario).49 The two differ from one another in that the temporary right of way is claimed in emergency situations only or occasionally when necessity requires,50 for example in cases of fire, poaching, stock theft or illness of stock51 or during harvesting season when existing exits are insufficient to accommodate the urgent need of transporting produce to the markets.52 The temporary right of way gives to the dominant owner a right to a “short cut” across the servient tenement, whenever the existing means of access would not permit him to deal effectively with the

49

CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes (3rd ed 1973) 76; see also JE Scholtens “Law of property

(including mortgage and pledge); unjust enrichment” (1956) Annual Survey of South African Law

125-153 144. On the distinction between a permanent and temporary right of way of necessity, see in

general PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5th

ed 2006) 328-329; CG van der Merwe & GF Lubbe “Noodweg” (1977) 40 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse

Romeins-Hollandse Reg 111-125 114-115; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA

Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 (2nd ed 2010) para 563; CG van der Merwe

Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 484-485; CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right to forced passage compared

with the South African way of necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1375-1377; CG

Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes (3rd ed 1973) 76; H Mostert, A Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM

Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 247. See also Van

Rensburg v Coetzee 1979 (4) SA 655 (A) 671-672.

50

PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed 2006) 328; CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes (3rd ed 1973) 76; CG van der Merwe & GF Lubbe

“Noodweg” (1977) 40 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 111-125 114; CG van der

Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 485; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert &

JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 (2nd ed 2010) para 563; H Mostert, A Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 247. See also Van Rensburg v Coetzee 1979 (4) SA 655 (A) 671-672.

51

English v C J M Harmse Investments and Another 2007 (3) SA 415 (N) 420I-J, 421A.

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emergency in the interest of his farming operations.53 However, this servitude is very limited in that the owner of the adjoining property is entitled to close up the road, provided he opens it up and allows it to be used when requested in cases of emergency.54 The precarious right of way is granted without any monetary consideration (compensation).55 On the contrary, a permanent right of way of necessity is a permanent and regular means of access over the servient tenement and it is granted against payment of reasonable compensation to the servient owner.56

However, this distinction may in the near future fall into disuse because the court in Van Rensburg v Coetzee57 questioned the distinction between these two

53

English v C J M Harmse Investments and Another 2007 (3) SA 415 (N) 421A.

54

S van Leeuwen Het Roomsch Hollandsch recht (1783 edited and translated by CW Decker & JG

Kotzé Commentaries on Roman-Dutch law 2nd ed 1921) 296 para 8; CG Hall & EA Kellaway

Servitudes (3rd ed 1973) 80. See also Wilhelm v Norton 1935 EDL 143 177.

55

Wilhelm v Norton 1935 EDL 143 177-178; Van Rensburg v Coetzee 1979 (4) SA 655 (A) 671-672.

See also CG van der Merwe & GF Lubbe “Noodweg” (1977) 40 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse

Romeins-Hollandse Reg 111-125 114; CG van der Merwe “Law of property (including mortgage and pledge)”

1979 Annual Survey of South African Law 217-257 246; CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right to

forced passage compared with the South African way of necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review

1363-1413 1376; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The

law of South Africa vol 24 (2nd ed 2010) para 563; H Mostert, A Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W Freedman,

JM Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 247.

56

Wilhelm v Norton 1935 EDL 143 177-178; Van Rensburg v Coetzee 1979 (4) SA 655 (A) 671-672.

See also CG van der Merwe & GF Lubbe “Noodweg” (1977) 40 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse

Romeins-Hollandse Reg 111-125 114; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 491-492; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 (2nd ed

2010) para 563; CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes (3rd ed 1973) 76; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H

Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed 2006) 328-329; H Mostert, A Pope, PJ

Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 247.

57

1979 (4) SA 655 (A) 697C. See also PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed 2006) 329; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 (2nd ed 2010) para 563; H Mostert, A

The right of way of necessity : a constitutional analysis