The Manhattan Project
-Personalities and Problems
Fromm Institute Fall 2020 [email protected] Lecture 3
submitted questions/comments
from lecture 2
1. Note: The Bohr-Heisenberg dialog in the Copenhagen film clip is speculation
2. Note: The Pu239 creation sequence on the Seaborg slide is not the one that he
used
3. What about the “holes” in that periodic table you showed?
4. What was Churchill’s response to the Roosevelt letter? - After Pearl Harbor, “I need not assure you of our readiness to collaborate in this matter” - (more later) 5. Why is plutonium warm?
6. What is the difference between a theoretical physicist and an experimental physicist?
caveat - timelines
• To this point, events have been covered fairlychronologically
• But now, so many events branch into a sequence of actions and so many things are starting to happen in parallel and overlap
• International, Washington, Chicago, etc. - can’t bounce back and forth with “Meanwhile in…”
• Could be confusing, but good opportunity for questions and comments…
we have to back up a little (1/2)
•Conant did not receive the MAUD Report until October 3, 1941 (Briggs had not distributed it)
•There was the October 9, 1941 meeting with FDR, Bush, and Henry Wallace where FDR unofficially gave approval and ordered intensive research
•FDR set up a committee (Bush, Conant, VP Wallace, Secretary of War Stimson, and the Army Chief of Staff) to manage a bomb project
•Arthur Compton would be its consultant
•Compton called for a meeting of his committee on October 21, 1941 in Schenectady, NY
we have to back up a little (2/2)
•
Within a month, Oppenheimer went from knowing nothing to “being
in the thick of it”
“the met lab”
•Remember the reactor work that Fermi and Szilárd were doing at Columbia University?
•Remember Compton got $618,000 from the S-1 Section on December 18, 1941?
•The reactor work was now under Compton who wanted to move it to the University of Chicago. (Lawrence, of course, argued for Berkeley - “the whole tempo of the University of Chicago is too slow” “Chicago is too expensive a place to live”)
•In February 1942, Compton founded the Metallurgical Laboratory (the “Met Lab”)
•The charter of the lab was to support
•Plutonium research - Seaborg moved from Berkeley to Chicago
•Completion of a reactor - Fermi and Szilárd moved to Chicago from New York
•Bush’s schedule had them with an operating reactor in July…
•Bomb design
•Oppenheimer was made a consultant
oppenheimer workshops
•In June 1942, Oppenheimer hosted a series of workshops at “the Met Lab”•It was repeated at Berkeley in July - attendees included [Hans Bethe, Edward Teller, Robert Serber, Emilio Segrè, Felix Bloch, Edwin McMillan]!and others
•These workshops tentatively confirmed that a fission bomb was possible and included brainstorming about designs
•Oppie’s handling of the workshops impressed his colleagues with his ability to handle this group of “divas” and his knowledge of the breadth of skills that would be required
•These workshops convinced Oppie that an open environment where participants could freely discuss ideas would be best but would require an isolated location
building a nuclear reactor
•The work of Fermi and Szilárd at Columbia was originally intended to explore powergeneration
•They had hoped to have an operable reactor while at Columbia but were unsuccessful
•Disassembling the Columbia operation and moving it to Chicago was no easy task (tons of uranium dioxide and graphite) - likely responsible for “pushing” Bush’s July due date
•Upon the control of the “Met Lab” focus shifted towards using the fission reactor for the production of plutonium
•Fermi preferred to refer to a reactor as a “pile”
“I thought for a while that this term was used to
refer to a source of nuclear energy in analogy with
Volta’s use of the Italian term pila to denote his own
great invention as a source of electrical energy. I
was disillusioned by Fermi himself, who told me
that he simply used the common English word pile
as synonomous with heap. To my surprise, Fermi
never seemed to have thought of the relationship
between his pile and Volta’s.”
-Emilio Segrè
•
In June 1942, the OSRD leased 1,025 acres from Cook County
(called the Argonne Forest) about 25 miles from Chicago to build a
pilot plutonium production plant with the new reactor/pile
•
Construction timelines and coordination with shipments from
Columbia University became too confusing
•
Fermi asked Compton to find a place on the University of Chicago
campus
the story of cp-1 (carbon pile 1)
is the stuff of legend
• Built under the grandstands (a old squash court) of Stagg Field
(named after Coach Alonzo Stagg)
• The football field had been abandoned after the University
of Chicago discontinued its football program in 1939
Ma:, _1 7, 1955 7 ite11herma I C-el wm n C anmt Is an i'n s D Vc.• E. F E R M I E T AL NEUTRONIC REACTOR Filed Dw!G. 19, 1944 Irids• Tbes n• Lovdi,9 CJ!lannJ1 Thmugh S!hrl lei . -loading El1valv. _;.,; """""""'-"'"'"'"""""""'....;....!!!!!!!!I!!!!!!"""""""'"""""""'"""""""' -Airflow Barff ::-..J-i- ---i-- ---,-- - - -I• pt1imantal
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december 2, 1942 - cp-1 went
live!
Compton: “The Italian navigator has landed in the New World” Conant: “How were the natives?” Compton: “Very friendly”
birth certificate of “the atomic
in washington, the s-1 section becomes
the s-1 executive committee (1/2)
•
By May 1942, Conant decided that the S-1 Section was too unwieldy
when he needed expert advice
•
Bush agreed and got permission from FDR and disbanded the S-1
Section
•
June 19, 1942 - Conant (chair), Briggs, Lawrence, Urey, Compton,
and Murphree
V. Bush
E. Lawrence
J. Conant
H. Urey E. Murphree* A. Compton
Prog. Chief for Electromagnetic Separation Prog. Chief for Gaseous Diffusion Prog. Chief for Engineering and Centrifuge Prog. Chief for Bomb Design *Research Director, Standard Oil L. Briggs
june 17, 1942 - bush and conant
status report to FDR
• Run past VP Henry Wallace, Sec. of War Henry Stimson, and Chief of Staff Gen. George Marshall for comment on June 13
A. Kilograms of U235and/or Pu could provide an unprecedented explosion
B. Multiple methods for producing U235and Pu239with none preferable to
the other
C. Production facilities of considerable size could be designed and built D. Granted adequate funds and priorities, full-scale plant operation could
be started soon enough to be of military significance
.
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the s-1 executive committee (2/2)
• June 25, 1942 - meeting guests included Bush, Styer, Marshall (MED), and Col. Kenneth Nichols (a colleague of Marshall)
• Agenda included a proposal for the purchase of land for a production facility
• Styer, Marshall, and Nichols recommended an area in East Tennessee with close access to the resources of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
• TVA is a federally owned corporation
• The Boston firm of Stone & Webster were recommended for principal contractors
• “The Met Lab scientists would advise Stone & Webster on design, but the company’s personnel, not the scientists, would be in charge of building and operating the plants”
No Oak Ridge
why east tennessee? (bear creek
valley)
•A low profile, rural, low-population density location with ample TVA water and power and very good highway and rail access
•Tennessee is a landlocked state away from the coast therefore a reduced chance of bombing by the Germans and Japanese
•Minimal family displacement would be required
•Knoxville (>100,000 population) was a ripe location for labor recruitment - people looking for non-agricultural jobs
•Affordable real estate - $50-$60 per acre on average
•Would be a great place to build large facilities for plutonium production (i.e., reactors), electromagnetic separation, gaseous diffusion separation, and centrifuge separation
there was a local legend
In 1900, “Prophet” John Hendrix was an ordinary farmer when he started having visions about the future of Bear Creek Valley. According to legend, he slept in the woods for 40 days and nights before visioning “big engines will dig big ditches, and thousands of people will be running to and fro. They will be building things, and there will be great noise and confusion, and the earth will shake.”tennessee land grab
• 28 September, 1942 - a project office established inHarriman, TN
• 6 October, 1942 - a petition in condemnation of 56,200 acres
• 15 November, 1942 - first landowners were asked to evacuate
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the s-1 executive committee acts
•June 30, 1942 - meeting focussed on progress of centrifuge and gaseous diffusion separationtechnologies
•August 26, 1942 - meeting focussed on Lawrence’s electromagnetic separation and the expansion of the program to include heavy water production
•September 13-14, 1942 - meeting attended by Oppenheimer (as consultant); Bush and Conant decided it was time to turn the project over to the Army (i.e., MED)
•Formation of the Military Policy Committee (MPC) consisting of members from OSRD and each branch of the military: Gen. Wilhelm Styer (USA), Bush (with Conant as his alternate), and Rear Admiral William Purnell (USN)
•Decided that James Marshall would remain as District Engineer but not direct the entire project (by now being informally referred to as The Manhattan Project )
s-1 executive committee meeting
- September 13-14, 1942
they did a lot at this meeting! Local Angle?
B
“the place where the masters of the
universe play” ??
let’s meet col. leslie groves!
•Known as “Dick” to his friends
•4th in his class at West Point
•Served in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
•Was included in a December 1940 LIFE magazine article on 90 leaders in the war
mobilization effort
•In August 1941 he was appointed to supervise the construction of the Pentagon
•By Spring 1942, Groves’ enemies were pushing Gen. Wilhelm Styer to get rid of him
•Styer offered him any choice of District Engineer Command in the U.S. away from
Washington (suggesting San Francisco!)
•Groves refused, “I’m hoping to get to go to a war theater so I could find a little
peace” - but his application was rejected
“Groves is the biggest S.O.B. I have ever worked for.
He is most demanding. He is most critical. He is
always a driver, never a praiser. He is abrasive and
sarcastic. He disregards all normal organizational
channels. He is extremely intelligent. He has the
guts to make timely, difficult decisions. He is the
most egotistical man I know. He knows he is right
and so sticks by his decision. He abounds with
energy and expects everyone to work as hard, or
even harder, than he does.”
-Col. Kenneth Nichols, District Engineer, MED
“Groves hated the weather, and the weathermen;
they represented chaos and the messengers of
chaos. Weather violated boundaries, ignored walls
and gates, failed to adhere to deadlines, disobeyed
orders. Weather caused delays. Groves saw it as a
matter of insubordination when the weather
forecasters refuse to forecast [desired weather].”
-Peter Bacon Hales, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
. , •
'
-. -,... '4 : I .. J. "' " ◄- '. ·- -•, .. . ,i•.•• ; ·-,. . . .·.. =--.- - -·•
According to legend, Groves was outside a congressional hearing room
just after testifying about military housing
•
Lt. Gen. Brehon Somervell told him, “The Secretary of War has selected
you for a very important assignment, and the President has approved it.
If you do the job right, it will win the war.”
•
Groves knew about MED, so it was easy to guess what Sommervell was
talking about
•
If Groves accepted, he would keep working on the Pentagon “as a cover”
•
Ever aware of rank “OK, if I get promoted to Brigadier General”
-would give more clout with scientists
•September 17, 1942 - Groves appointed as director of MED - 4 days after Bohemian Grove S-1 Executive Committee meeting
•Waited to start (officially) until September 23 when his promotion went through •Upon meeting Groves, Bush sent a memo to Conant, “I fear we are in the soup” •But Groves “hit the road running”
•Immediately started a tour of the labs
•September 19, 1942 - Groves made the decision on East Tennessee •Decides that gaseous diffusion was the best method for isotope separation with
electromagnetic method as a backup; centrifuge separation needs to be seriously re-considered
•October 5, 1942 - Groves visits “The Met Lab”
•October 8, 1942 - Groves visits Berkeley, tours calutrons (not micrograms but pounds!), receives a report on fission from Oppenheimer
•Recommended that the sites for separation (East Tennessee), plutonium production, and weapon design and testing should be separate and far apart (for security, reduced vulnerability, and data compartmentalization)
•Lawrence argued against separate bomb site - “the immediate task, to be addressed without any distractions, is developing techniques for amassing sufficient fissile material. Once that has been accomplished, it would take only about six weeks to fashion a practical weapon.” (Supposedly one of the few occasions that rendered Groves speechless)
•19 October, 1942 - Groves approves the establishment of a separate bomb laboratory
two major items on “groves’
plate”
• Site selections for the decentralized facilities
• East Tennessee was set (Project X or “Clinton Engineer Works”)
• Plutonium production? (Project W)
• In December 1942, Groves charged his assistant Col. Franklin Matthias and engineers from DuPont to check out potential sites (more later)
• Bomb fabrication and testing? (Project Y)
• A Project Director for Project Y
the beginning of an “odd
couple” relationship
•Oppenheimer recalls meeting Groves for the first time at the home of UCB President Robert Sproul during the Berkeley visit
•Groves and Oppenheimer could not have been more different (more later)
•They quickly established a relationship based on personal respect and trust
•On a train ride from Chicago to Washington they found the separate labs idea to be something that they shared except for the “data compartmentalization”
•Oppie’s workshop experience suggested this would not work
•Groves (almost out of character), relented
the search for a project y site
(1/4)
•Project Y had to be the most secret and secure of all sites
•East Tennessee and Chicago were eliminated
•Requirements were strict
•A climate that would allow year-round construction
•Safety from possible enemy attack
•Ready transportation; access to power, fuel, and water
•An adequate testing ground; sparse population
•Easy property to acquire; already have sufficient buildings so staff could get started as soon as possible
the search for a project y site
(2/4)
• A site near Los Angeles was rejected for security reasons
• A site near the California-Nevada border, on the east side of the
Sierra Nevada in the vicinity of Reno (the Black Rock desert) was rejected because of accessibility, heavy snows in winter, dust (think Burning Man), and lack of facilities
the search for a project y site
(3/4)
•
Oppie suggested New Mexico
•
Isolated but close enough to excellent air and rail service in Albuquerque
•
Moderate climate year round
•
On November 16, 1942, Groves, Oppenheimer, Edwin McMillan, and
Maj. John Dudley visited Jemez Springs, New Mexico (50 miles from
Albuquerque)
•
In Jemez Springs, terrain was too rough and land difficult to acquire
the search for a project y site
(4/4)
•They drove east and slightly north and came upon the tiny settlement of Los Alamos
•Sitting atop a high mesa, it was virtually uninhabited except for the Los Alamos Ranch School for Boys
•The nearest town (Pojoaque) was 17 miles away
•Returning to Washington, Groves “set the wheels in motion” with the Albuquerque District
•November 23, 1942 - Oppenheimer, Lawrence, and McMillan again visited the site
•Oppie reported to Groves, “Lawrence was pleased by the site and so, again, were we”
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-_.,.--_ ,.,..._._ . ...,. r • _ ._•• • • • • • • • . ... .• -r-....--.....111!-WII , ....-- --- -Isolation and Securitysearch for a project y director
(1/2)
• Conventional wisdom suggested someone who
• Is American (born or naturalized)
• Has a total knowledge of the science (physics, chemistry, etc.)
• Has leadership and administrative skills and would accept authority (his)
• Has the respect of and could inspire the scientific staff
• Has proven experimental skills
• Is willing to completely upset their life for an indeterminate period of time
search for a project y director
(2/2)
• Who was the pool?
• Someone who was not a current Program Chief (e.g., Lawrence, Urey,
Compton, Murphree)
• Nobel Prize winners?
• Laboratory group leaders or directors?
• Military officers?
• Professional Program Managers?
edwin mcmillan
!
•Pros:
•American
•Nobel Prize winner
•Had led research teams
•Recommended by Lawrence (their wives were sisters)
•Had attended Oppie’s Berkeley workshop
•Cons:
• Had left Berkeley in 1940 to work on radar
• Was known as a real “family man”
“Not the right man” - Groves
wolfgang k.h. “pief” panofsky
!
•Pros:
•Born in Germany but naturalized (April 1942)
•Strong experimental experience (and a “theoretical leaning” with Lawrence’s cyclotron team - had a special “skill”
•Recommended by Oppenheimer since he was not already committed to war research; Oppie and Pief had the Caltech connection
•Cons:
•No Nobel Prize
•Limited recognition in the research community
•
Pief did work on the Manhattan Project (more later)
•
Later became a major advocate of nuclear arms control
•
Founding Director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center
(SLAC), now the SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory
•
Personal note: believer in Oppie’s “open lab” concept
•
One of my “one degrees of separation” with the Manhattan Project
“Dr. Panofsky may be the brightest man in the
world…He is 5’ 2” tall, weighs 150 pounds, neither
smokes nor drinks and is, manifestly, painfully
indifferent to clothes. Not that he’s a nudist; just
that his mind is on higher things.”
-Playboy interview, 1977
j. robert oppenheimer (oppie)
!
•Pros:
•American
•Internationally respected theoretical physicist and professor
•Proven expert on fission physics
•Had advised and researched project work already
•Supported by Arthur Compton
•Cons:
•No Nobel Prize
•Theoretician not experimentalist
•No proven administrative/management skills
•Questionable political leanings (more later)
“Groves decided to go with ‘the devil he knew’”
November 26, 1942
• Groves announces• Section Y will be located in Los Alamos, New Mexico
• Robert Oppenheimer will be the Project Y Scientific Director
• Backlash came quickly
•Bush and Conant were alarmed
•Conant wrote to Groves that he refused to proceed with recruiting the people that Oppenheimer wanted until “we have a chance of talking again. Both Dr. Bush and I are worried concerning certain aspects of this whole scheme and would like to talk with you concerning it. We are wondering whether we have found the right man to be leader.” - Were they talking about Groves or Oppenheimer?
•They were certainly concerned about Oppie’s grasp of how to organize a laboratory
•Oppenheimer had still not been granted a security clearance
•Groves appears to have taken the attitude that “I and the U.S. Army are now in charge” even though technically he reported to the MPC (of which Bush was a member)
•Bush’s and Conant’s attitude apparently changed…
o·ffice1forEmergencyManagem1ent
o·f f i ce of Scientific Research andDevelopment 1.530 P Street NW. Washington, D C. Vannevar Bush Director February 25, 1943 Dr. J.R. Oppenheimer Ulniversity of C:alifornia Berkeley, California Dear Dr. 0 ppenheimer:
We are addressing this. letter to you as the Scientific Director of the special laboratory in New Mexico in order to confirm ourmanyconversations on the matters.of organization and responsibiliit y. You are atlibertyto s.how this letterto thosewith·whom1 you are discus.sing thedes.irability of their joining the project with you; they of cours.e realizing their responsibility as to secrecy, including the details of organization andpers.onnel.
I.The laboratory will be concerned wiit h the development and final manufacture of an instrument of war, which we may designate as.ProjectileS-1-T. To this end, the laboratory will be concerned with::
A. Certain experimental studies in science, engineering and ordnance; and
B. At a later date large-scale experiments involving difficult ordnance procedures and the handling of highly dangerousmaterial.,
The work of the laboratory will be divided into tw o periods in time: one, corresponding to the work mentioned in section A; the other, that m1entionedin section B. During the first period, the laboratory will be on a strictly civilli an basis, the personnel, procurement and other arrangements being carried on under a contract arranged between the War Department and the University of Callif ornia. The conditions of this contract will be essentially similar to that of the usual OSRD contract. In such matters as draft deferment, the poliic y of the WarDepartmentand OSRD inregard tothe personnel workingunderthis contract will be practicallyidentiicalWhen the second division of the work is entered upon (mentioned in B), which will not be earlier than January 1, 1944, the scientific and engineering staff will be composed of commissioned officers. This is necessary because of the dangerous nature of the work and the need for speciial conditions of security It iis expected that many of those employed as civilians during the first period (A) willl be offered commissions and become members of the commissioned staff during the second period (B), but there is no obligation on the part of anyone employed during period A toaccepta commission attheend ofthat time.
Ill. The laboratoryis part ofa largerproject which has been placed in a specia!l category and assigned thehighestpriiority by the President of the Unit ed States.By hisorder, the
Secretary of War and certain other high officials have arranged that the control of this project shall be in the hands of a Military Policy Committee, composed of Dr. Vannevar
Bus.h, Diir ector of OSRD, as Chairman, Major General W. D.. Styer, Chief of Staff, SOS, Rear Admiral W. R. Purnelll, Ass.i stant Chief of Staff to Admiral King; Dr. James B.. Conant
servesasDr. Bush's deputy and alternate onthisCom m1it t ee,but attends au meetings and enters into all discussions..Brigadier General L. R.. Groves of the C orps of Engineers has been given over-all executive responsibility for this project, working under the direction of the Millitary Polic,y c om m ittee. He works in close cooperation with Dr. Conant, whoisChairman of the group of scientiists who wereincharge of the earllier phases of s.ome aspects oftheinvestigation..
111. Responsibilities of the Scientific Director. 1.He will be responsible for.
A. The conduct of the scientific work sothatthe desired goals as outllined by the MilitaryPolicyCommittee are achieved at the earliestpossibledates.,
B. Themaintenanceof secrecy by the ci vilian personnel underhiscontrolaswell astheirfamilies. 2.Hewill of course be guidedinhisdetermination of policiesandcoursesof action bythe advice of his scientific staff.
3.Hewillkeep Dr.JamesB.Conant and GeneralGrovesinformed to such an extent asisnecessaryforthemtocarry on the work which falls intheirrespective spheres. Dr..
,Conant will be available atanytime for consultation on general scientific problems as well as toassistin the determi nation of definiite scientific policiesandresearch programs. Through Dr.. Conant complete access to the scientific world is guaranteed.
IV.. Responsibilities of the Commanding Officer..
1. The Commanding Officer will report directly to General Groves. 2.He will be responsible for.
A.Theworkandconduct ofallmillit arypersonnel. B.The maintenance of suitable living condit i ons for civilian personnel. C.Thepreventiion of trespassing onthesite
D. The performance of duty by such guards as may be established within thereservationfor the purpose of maintaining the secrecy precautions deemed necessary by the Scientiifi cDirector.
V,. c ooperation.
Theclosest cooperation is of coursenecessarybetweentheCommanding Officer and the Scientific Directorifeach is to perform his function to the maximum benefit of the work. Such a cooperative attitude now exists on the part of Dr. Conant and General Groves andhasso existed since GeneralGroves first entered the project.
Very sin.cerely yours, James B. Conant
Leslie R. Groves Bush, Conant, Groves
the road to trinity goes
through “the cottonwoods”
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