JOHN STUART MILL
AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
A thesis submitted to the University of London
in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)
by
Kevin Charles O’Rourke
Bentham Project, Department of History
University College London
ProQuest Number: U641898
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ABSTRACT
This thesis challenges traditional interpretations of John Stuart M ill’s theory of freedom
of expression, as exemplified in On Liberty (1859), by way of an examination of his
other publications and correspondence. The first section outlines the evidence for the
influences exerted on him during his youth, and examines his writings prior to 1859. His
father’s writings on the liberty of the press provide a framework within which to
interpret M ill’s earliest work on the same topic. Charges that Mill subsequently
abandoned support for this perspective are examined and dismissed, while the
importance of the influence of Samuel Taylor Coleridge is highlighted. The role of
M ill’s wife in the formation and articulation of his mature ideas on individuality and
liberty is emphasised.
On Liberty itself is the subject of the second section. Mill’s knowledge of criticisms by
reviewers is used as a base from which to examine his defence of freedom of thought
and discussion. The priority of the right to hear over the right to express opinions is
clarified, and the essential anti-paternalism of Mill’s defence is identified. The
importance afforded to James Fitzjames Stephen’s refutation of Mill is questioned, and
historical and conceptual inaccuracies in some of the more prominent contemporary
interpretations are pointed out. A refutation of the idea that M ill’s defence of freedom of
thought and discussion does not rely on his principle of liberty is attempted, and a
reinterpretation of that principle is offered. Exceptions to freedom of expression are
investigated in this light.
The final section looks at Mill’s writings after On Liberty, outlining how in his role as
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgements... 6
Introduction... 7
Section I Chapter 1 A worthy successor... 19
1.1 James Mill and the liberty o f the press... 20
1.2 John Stuart M ill’s early writings ... 30
1.3 The Westminster Review...38
1.4 Conclusion... 45
Chapter 2 The aftermath of the ‘mental crisis’...46
2.1 The gradual change... 48
2.2 ‘The Spirit o f the A ge’... 52
2.3 Growing individualism^... 64
2.4 Conclusion^...77
Chapter 3 Coleridgian agendas...78
3.1 Coleridge on liberty...79
3.2 Mill as Coleridgian... 86
3.3 ‘Bentham’ and ‘Coleridge’... 92
3.4 Conclusion... 107
Chapter 4 Joint productions?... 109
4.1 Harriet on toleration... 110
4.2 Joint progress... 114
4.3 Education and liberty^... 121
4.4 Towards On Liberty... 131
Section II
Chapter 5 On Liberty: the 1859 response... 136
5.1 Setting the scene... 137
5.2 The right to hear: understanding infallibility^... 142
5.3 The necessity o f intellectual challenge ... 155
5.4 Truths and half-truths... 165
5.5 Conclusion...171
Chapter 6 James Fitzjames Stephen and Liberty, Equality, Fraternity 173 6.1 Self-regarding acts and infallibility... 175
6.2 Liberty versus control... 182
6.3 Conclusion... 185
6.4 Appendix: three ‘new ’ letters from Mill to Stephen... 187
Chapter 7 On Liberty: recent interpretations... 196
7.1 One principle or two?...197
7.2 Gray’s defence o f M ill... 204
7.3 Mill and interest...209
7.4 Progress through intellect... 218
7.5 Conclusion...227
Chapter 8 Exceptions to freedom of thought and discussion...230
8.1 The com-dealer example... 231
8.2 Forms o f incitement...236
8.3 Indecency and censorship... 248
Section III
Chapter 9 After On Liberty: from theory to reality...260
9.1 Liberty in practice... 261
9.2 The Inaugural Address...267
9.3 Mill in parliament... 270
9.4 After Westminster... 279
9.5Conclusion... 283
Chapter 10 Conclusion... 285
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The origin of this thesis lies in ideas which first occurred to me during 1988-89 while I
was completing a minor dissertation for an M.A. degree in philosophy at University
College Dublin. Under the supervision of John Baker in the Department of Politics
there, I first began to take John Stuart Mill seriously as a thinker and to believe that his
defence of freedom of thought and discussion offered more than I had previously been
led to perceive. My introduction to Professor Fred Rosen at the Bentham Project in the
Department of History at University College London came about through Ted
Honderich, who helped me with my original proposal for this thesis. Professor Rosen
has proved to be an inspirational critic at all times, whose patient attention to my work
has brought a reasoned balance to my writing and ideas. Largely due to his enthusiasm I
have managed to produce this thesis in just over four years, while registered as a part-
time student: my sincere thanks, Fred. Above all however, my gratitude is due to
Deirdre, my wife, whose encouragement, support and patience over the past ten years
have inspired me to believe in my ability to complete this project: inadequate as it may
be, the thesis is dedicated to you. Dee.
INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines critically the development of John Stuart Mill’s writings on
freedom of thought and expression. Although his theory is best known from the
argument in the second chapter of On Liberty, which has become a source for practically
every subsequent discussion of freedom of speech, the thesis represents the first attempt
to understand the evolution of M ill’s ideas concerning freedom of thought and
discussion throughout his life, drawing not only from On Liberty but from his many
other writings on the subject.^ It is argued that, under the influence of various figures.
Mill moved from the Radicals’ notion of freedom of the press as a security against
corruption in government, to a deeper appreciation of the necessity of intellectual
freedom for individuals in order to promote their own happiness and thereby contribute
to the good of society. The thesis also challenges the view that Mill cannot be regarded
as consistent throughout his career in his support for freedom of expression.^
In addition to considering the evolution of Mill’s thought, the thesis offers an
interpretation of On Liberty itself which challenges many of the traditional and
contemporary readings of the essay. For almost a century On Liberty was regarded as a
self-contained philosophical tract, and was read in isolation from M ill’s other writings.
Recent philosophers such as John Rees, John Gray and John Skorupski have done much
to correct the imbalance of such interpretations, examining the ideas of On Liberty in
^ On Liberty, in The Collected Works o f John Stuart Mill, vol. XVTU, ed. John M. Robson (London and Toronto, 1963-91), pp. 213-310. All subsequent references to the
Collected Works will here be designated by CW, followed by volume and page numbers. Alan Haworth has recently referred to M ill’s argument as ‘the classic version of the classic defence’ - see Alan Haworth, Free Speech (London, 1998), p. 3.
the context of other writings, especially the System o f Logic and Utilitarianism? Yet,
largely as a result of the efforts of such thinkers, it has become commonplace to regard
M ill’s defence of freedom of thought and discussion as incompatible with the rest of the
essay: most commentators now agree that the second chapter of On Liberty is based on a
principle other than M ill’s principle of liberty/ This thesis argues that M ill’s defence of
freedom of thought and discussion in On Liberty is consistent with the principle of
liberty, and attempts to introduce a clearer understanding of that principle, consistent
with the manner in which Mill himself defended it.
For convenience. Mill’s writings have been divided into three chronological periods,
which are discussed in the three sections of the work. The first section covers M ill’s
many influences and writings on the freedom of the press which preceded the
appearance of On Liberty. The second section looks at On Liberty itself and the many
direct responses to that work, from nineteenth-century reviews to current commentary.
The third and final section examines M ill’s writings on intellectual freedom during the
remaining years of his life, following the appearance of On Liberty. In discussing this
material, the practical application of M ill’s ideas regarding freedom of expression is
emphasised.^
Freedom of the press was an extremely topical issue in early nineteenth-century Britain,
not least in the circles into which Mill was bom. While successive governments
^ John C. Rees, John Stuart M ill’s On Liberty, ed. G.L. Williams (Oxford, 1985); John Gray, Mill On Liberty: A Defence, 2nd edn (London, 1996); John Skompski, John Stuart Mill (London, 1991). A System o f Logic (CW VU, VIII); Utilitarianism (CWX).
^ See Rees, op. cit., p. 98; Skorupski, op. cit., p. 376; Himmelfarb, op. cit., p. 24; Ted Honderich, Punishment: The Supposed Justifications (London, 1989), p. 194; Roger Crisp, Mill on Utilitarianism (London, 1997), p. 190.
regarded restrictions on the press as essential to the preservation of law and order, the
Radicals advocated liberalisation as essential to progress and democracy.*^ In Chapter 1,
the intellectual legacy of James Mill, Jeremy Bentham and others is examined. In the
elder M ill’s Common Place Book, ‘Foremost of all the topics is the subject of the
Liberty of the Press’.^ His best-known defence of press freedom appeared in the
Encyclopaedia Britannica, written as a companion piece to his famous essay on
government.^ Less well appreciated is the fact that James Mill had also defended the
freedom of the press on more than one occasion in articles which appeared in the
Edinburgh Review, possibly as early as 1807. John Stuart Mill was unquestionably
familiar with and influenced by such writings.^
While still quite young, Mill was made familiar with the implications of freedom of
thought for religious and political belief. His earliest press writings reflect this
awareness, not least his 1825 Westminster Review article on the liberty of the press.
Although he later chose not to republish this article, it undoubtedly can be regarded as a
milestone in his intellectual development as it represents a first attempt to discover ‘to
what extent restraints upon the freedom of the press can be considered as warranted by
sound principles of political philosophy’.” Although John Stuart Mill believed that he
did not find his own voice until after his ‘mental crisis’ of 1826-27, that voice never
entirely abandoned the ideas of James Mill.
^ See W.H. Wickwar, The Struggle fo r the Freedom o f the Press, 1819-1832 (London, 1928).
^ Alexander Bain, James Mill: A Biography (London, 1882; repr. New York, 1967), p. 464.
^ See James Mill, Political Writings, ed. Terence Ball (Cambridge, 1992). ^ S&t Autobiography, CWI, p. 95.
Ibid. p. 11, where the Reformation is described as ‘the great and decisive contest against priestly tyranny for liberty of thought’.
Chapter 2 challenges the notion (expounded by Gertrude Himmelfarb, John Robson and
others) that Mill abandoned his support for freedom of the press during his reaction
against his u p b rin g in g A fte r his mental crisis, under the influence of Romanticism
and Idealism, Mill began to appreciate the value of viewpoints from outside the Radical
entourage of Bentham. Influenced by the scientific, positivist approach which he
discovered in the writings of Auguste Comte, he applied new ideas concerning progress
and history, to contemporary events in the run-up to the Reform Act of 1832.^^ These
influences are evident in his 1831 series of essays for the Examiner entitled ‘The Spirit
of the Age’.^'^ There, the importance of leadership is stressed and the value of discussion
in an era of upheaval and uncertainty is emphasised. However, this thesis argues that to
read such ideas in the manner of Himmelfarb, who argues that they undermine freedom
of thought and discussion as defended in On Liberty, is incorrect. M ill’s mature ideas
regarding individuality and intellectual freedom had not developed at this stage: he still
regarded freedom of the press as a political rather than a social necessity. Yet, in his
own words, he was in ‘an intermediate state - a state of reaction from logical-utilitarian
narrowness of the very narrowest kind, out of which after much unhappiness and inward
struggling I had emerged, and had taken temporary refuge in its extreme opposite’. B u t
nowhere is it consistently evident that he lost his commitment to the idea of freedom of
the press. Himmelfarb’s conclusions, it is argued, are often based on selective and
incomplete readings of the texts. Similarly, the evidence from Mill’s published writings
See note 2 above.
Unused pages of the early draft of \h& Autobiography, CWI, Appendix G, p. 615. CW XXn, pp. 227ff.
and private correspondence alike contradicts the idea that at this time Mill developed a
life-long, covert commitment to elitism/^
In 1834, Mill confided in a private letter that ‘Few persons have exercised more influence
over my thoughts and character than Coleridge has’.^^ Chapter 3 investigates this often
under-appreciated influence of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, especially in relation to the
idea of individuality and the importance of intellectual freedom/^ Coleridge’s
commitment to freedom of the press differed from that of Bentham and James Mill,
focusing as it did on the importance of the individual rather than on the necessity of
political dissent: in fact, Coleridge supported the traditional dictum of English law,
much ridiculed by the Radicals, that a libel is all the worse for being true.^^ Emphasising
the importance of the individual mind in the discovery of truth, Coleridge also stressed
the importance of not mistaking half-truths for the whole, of keeping truth alive in the
individual mind, and the necessity of guarding against the dangers of intellectual
stagnation, all ideas which later found their way into On Liberty?^ An examination of
Mill’s assessments of Bentham and Coleridge in his famous essays on these two
‘seminal minds’ demonstrates the importance which Mill began to attach in the 1830s to
An idea put forward by, among others, Joseph Hamburger. See his Intellectuals in Politics: John Stuart Mill and the Philosophic Radicals (New Haven, Connecticut and London, 1965); How Liberal was John Stuart Mill? (Austin, Texas, 1991); ‘Individuality and Moral Reform: The Rhetoric of Liberalism and the Reality of Restraint in M ill’s On Liberty", Political Science Reviewer, vol. 24, 1995.
C W X a, pp. 220-23.
Autobiography, CW I, p. 161; see Christopher Turk, Coleridge and Mill: A Study o f Influence (Aldershot, 1988).
The Friend, in The Collected Works o f Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. Barbara E. Rooke (Princeton, 1969-), vol. 4, part I, pp. 93-94.
intellectual freedom for the sake of the individual/^ Much of this change, it is argued, can
be traced to the influence of Coleridge and his followers.
However, to Mill, the person who wielded the most profound influence over him was
undoubtedly Harriet Taylor, who became his wife in 1851.^^ As far as Mill was
concerned, she was co-author of works subsequent to the System o f Logic, and On
Liberty was especially representative of her thinking.^^ Yet the extent of her intellectual
influence remains a moot point among Mill scholars.^"^ She had committed her thoughts
on toleration and individuality to paper in an untitled essay, probably dating from the
early 1830s.^^ As Mill felt that his views had fully matured by the year 1840, his
growing commitment to individuality during the 1830s must be seen as complementing
Harriet’s ideas, if not actually deriving substance from them.^^ His writings throughout
the 1840s and in the 1850s demonstrate a growing fear of the power of public opinion
and conformity, and a belief in the importance of individuality. The belief that
intellectual progress must precede all other forms of social progress became fully
articulated at this time. Moreover, a firm commitment to freedom of the press and
intellectual freedom in society became prominent, and at one point Mill even indicates a
willingness to condone violent revolution where such freedom is denied.^^
‘Bentham’, London and Westminster Review, August 1838; ‘Coleridge’, ibid. March 1840, CWX, pp. 75-115 and 116-63.
^^Autobiography, CWI, pp. 192ff.
23
Ibid. pp. 258, 259.
See the (unattributed) introduction to CWI, p. xvii.
^ The undated manuscript is in the British Library of Political and Economic Science at the London School of Economics, Mill-Taylor Collection, Box m . No. 78. The paper is watermarked 1832.
^^Autobiography, CWI, p. 229.
Section two deals with On Liberty. From the very beginning, it was recognised as an
important work, and its defence of freedom of thought and discussion was hailed as a
worthy successor to Milton’s Areopagitica. Yet, it also provoked controversy, not least
because of its pronouncements on Christianity in the context of that defence. Discussing
the work in his private correspondence, rarely referred to by interpreters of On Liberty,
Mill said that he had deliberately wanted to kindle such controversy, and explicitly
mentioned the reviews which had appeared in the Dublin University Magazine and The
English Churchman?^ Chapter 5 uses these reviews as a basis from which to examine
On Liberty itself, as many of the arguments voiced in these early pieces continue to be
used by critics today. At the outset the priority which On Liberty's arguments place on
the right to hear all opinions over the right to express all opinions is identified, a priority
previously unrecognised and certainly important. The claim that all silencing of
discussion is an assumption of infallibility is explained in this manner by Mill himself,
and the second chapter of On Liberty is shown to take its cue from this starting point.
The right to hear is grounded in the notion of individuality, which is consequently
shown to lie at the heart of Mill’s arguments for freedom of thought and discussion.
That Mill was anxious to rebut charges of elitism which could be brought against the
doctrine of On Liberty is shown by reference to his correspondence where he denies
outright that his intention lay in this direction.^^
The criticisms levelled by James Fitzjames Stephen in Liberty, Equality, Fraternity have
influenced almost all subsequent discussions of On Liberty?^ Yet, when examined
closely in Chapter 6 of this thesis, Stephen’s interpretation is shown to do Mill less than
justice. While appreciating the fact that freedom of thought and discussion is at the heart
of the principle of liberty, Stephen proceeds to misconstrue M ill’s defence. His basic
argument is that government can interfere in the life of the individual for the sake of the
larger good of society, and his overall perspective is at odds with Mill’s fundamental
standpoint. He attempts to show that discussion cannot play the role in society which
Mill attributes to it and that liberty can be pernicious to the majority of people. His
elitist utilitarianism serves as a contrast to Mill’s position, and demonstrates the integral
part played by intellectual freedom in the principle of liberty. (This chapter, in addition,
carries an appendix in which three previously unknown letters from Mill to Stephen,
discovered in the course of my research, are outlined and analysed.)
Chapter 7 looks at more recent and contemporary commentary on On Liberty. Here, the
idea that Mill’s defence of freedom of thought and discussion is not based on the
principle of liberty - an idea popular among recent interpreters - is examined, and an
attempt is made to demonstrate that such an idea is unnecessary to a proper
interpretation of the ideas of Chapter 2 of On Liberty. The importance attached to the
notion of ‘interests’ in these current interpretations is examined.^^ Moreover, the
influential interpretations of John Gray and John Skorupski of the notion of interests are
questioned, as is the validity of Gray’s recent criticism of M ill’s ideas concerning
p ro g re s s .A new approach to reading On Liberty is then posited, based on the evidence
of the actual text and M ill’s other writings. Heretofore, the principle of liberty has been
interpreted in terms of harm to others: I suggest that the emphasis should instead be
placed primarily on the idea of harm to self. Such a reading views the principle of
liberty as anti-patemalist at its core, rather than regarding anti-patemalism as an
James Fitzjames Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity (London, 1873).
See, for example, John Rees, ‘A Re-reading of Mill on Liberty’, Political Studies, vol. 8, 1960.
implication or by-product of that principle. This reading of the principle of liberty is
shown to fit with M ill’s defence of freedom of thought and discussion in a manner
which is more than merely coincidental. Mill’s other published writings as well as his
private correspondence support such an interpretation. On Liberty, based on utilitarian
concerns, holds that liberty should have priority wherever it is acknowledged that all
people are fundamentally distinct as individuals. When individuals achieve their own
happiness, the maximum happiness can thereby be achieved. It is argued that this
position is similar to that held by Mill in his later essay. Utilitarianism?^
The connection between the expression of opinion and the performance of actions
harmful to others forms the starting point of Chapter 8, which examines the exceptions
to freedom of thought and discussion admitted by On Liberty. The famous com-dealer
passage and Mill’s example of incitement to tyrannicide are examined in the light of the
revised interpretation presented, and are shown to be consistent with that
interpretation.^"^ The distinction between speech acts and other actions is brought into
focus. That On Liberty sets down no precise criteria by which the difference between
harmful incitement and innocent debate can be established is noted, and the
interpretations of H.J. McCloskey, D.H. Monro, Gray and others are examined.^^ Mill’s
attitude to racist speech is assessed, the importance of individuality to his overall
scheme is again emphasised, and the role of truth in his arguments is again examined.
In private correspondence. Mill explained utilitarianism as the sum total of individual happiness - see his letter to Henry Jones, 13 June 1868, CWXVI, p. 1414.
On Liberty, CW XVIII, pp. 260, 228n.
H.J. McCloskey, ‘Liberty of Expression - Its Grounds and Limits (I)’, Inquiry, vol. 13, 1970; D.H. Monro, ‘Liberty of Expression: Its Grounds and Limits (II)’, Inquiry,
The issue of indecency, usually discussed by commentators in the context of M ill’s
exceptions to freedom of thought and discussion, is also addressed in this chapter.^^
The third section of the thesis examines M ill’s writings after On Liberty. The
publication of the essay in 1859 brought with it a popular notoriety which Mill had not
previously enjoyed. His fame extended far beyond Britain, and his subsequent election
as Member of Parliament for Westminster added to the impact of his ideas on his
contemporaries. During this period of public life, he was regularly called upon to
express his views and to explain his positions on various topics, not least on the issue of
freedom of speech. A study of these writings, as well as other more formal writings,
provides the basis for Chapter 9. Together they serve to demonstrate that Mill regarded
his theories as practical in their application to society rather than mere intellectual
deliberations which had little or no bearing on real life.^^ The importance of active and
informed intellects to progress and improvement (and through the intellectual to the
moral nature of the individual) is one of the central issues of On Liberty which
continues into M ill’s other works, such as his Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform
(which also first appeared in 1859), Considerations on Representative Government and
Utilitarianism (both 1861), dîtià Auguste Comte and Positivism (1865). M ill’s defence of
utilitarianism is shown to be consistent with the interpretation of On Liberty expounded
in this thesis.
The issue of intellectual freedom, especially as regards morality and religion, is again
broached through Mill’s Inaugural Address as Rector of St Andrew’s University,
delivered in February 1867.^^ Yet again, the central role played by the intellect in
developing one’s individuality is emphasised by Mill. His many speeches to the House
of Commons and to public meetings similarly emphasised the importance of freedom of
thought and discussion to the well-being of the individual and the progress of society.
Moreover, his appreciation of the benefits of freedom of speech when employed as
demonstration rather than merely as discussion was evident in his reactions to events
such as the Hyde Park riots of 1866 and their aftermath.^^ Thus he emphasised the
absolute value of freedom of speech in a democratic society, while he also demonstrated
the practical application of his ideas regarding in c ite m e n t.T o the end of his life. Mill
continued to maintain that liberty held the key to human happiness, and that intellectual
freedom was the first and most important part of such liberty.
In the concluding chapter, I again attempt to sum up and demonstrate the overall
consistency in the development of Mill’s work. It is argued that Mill’s theory is richer
than interpreters and critics generally allow. It is again emphasised that it is not abstract
truth for its own sake that Mill defends but, rather, the discovery of truth for the sake of
individuality. This thesis ultimately contends that On Liberty can be fully understood
only in the context of M ill’s other writings. Attempts to treat as a rigorous philosophical
tract what Mill himself described as ‘a kind of philosophic text-book of a single truth’
are therefore bound to fail, not least because interpreters often mistake what that single
truth actually is."^^ Freedom of thought and discussion play a primary role in encouraging
In addition to Haworth, op. cit., this charge is made by, among others, Francis Canavan in his ‘J.S. Mill on Freedom of Expression’, M odem Age, vol. 23, Fall 1979, p. 369.
CIV XXI, pp. 215-57. CWXXVin.p. 103.
See, for example, his attitude to the Fenian movement, as expressed in a letter to G.W. Sharpe, 1 June 1867, CIFXVI, p. 1275.
diversity and individuality, regarded by Mill as essential if society is to progress and
achieve the greatest possible happiness for the individuals who are its members. In this
manner Mill believed himself to be continuing but developing the tradition of utilitarian
SECTION I
CHAPTER 1
A WORTHY SUCCESSOR
In January 1807, when John Stuart Mill was less than one year old, the Edinburgh
Review published an article which held that ‘The liberty of the press is, indeed, the most
inestimable security of... a people, because it gives that tone to the public feelings, on
which all liberty must ultimately rest’.^ Such words could have been used to describe the
position subsequently defended by Mill throughout his life. After his death in 1873, c
wrote of him in the Fortnightly Review that: ‘The value of [his] wise and virtuous
mixture of boldness with tolerance, of courageous speech with courageous reserve, has
been enormous’; and that this disposition, in conjunction with the famous second
chapter of On Liberty in support of freedom of expression, ‘has been the chief source of
that liberty of expressing unpopular opinions in this country without social persecution,
which is now so nearly complete, that he himself was at last astonished by it’.^
Unquestionably, Mill’s influence on the issue of freedom of expression in nineteenth-
century Britain (and further afield) was enormous. Yet, in the course of his life, the
platform from which he addressed the question changed: initially emphasising the
political importance of the freedom of the press for good government, he later stressed
the social importance of freedom of thought and discussion for individual development.
Moreover, he held that both viewpoints could be defended within a utilitarian
framework. The route which he followed from the issues of his youth to the issues of his
^ ‘The Science of Legislation, from the Italian of Gaetano Filangieri’, Edinburgh Review, vol. 9, January 1807, p. 365.
later life involved contact with a wide variety of thinkers. To trace that route and to
examine the influence of those thinkers on his approach to freedom of expression is the
goal of the present work.
1.1 James M ill and the liberty o f the press
The author of the 1807 Edinburgh Review article on press freedom cited above
bemoaned the fact that ‘the liberty of the press does not exist, nor ever did exist in
England, but by connivance’.^ In 1811 James Mill, also writing in the Edinburgh,
quoted the earlier article with approval to demonstrate that ‘the opinions which we now
deliver have not been hastily adopted, and are not the immediate suggestion of any
particular occurrence to which the public attention may have been recently attracted
The elder Mill questioned the wisdom of the undefined nature of the law of libel as it
then existed in Britain, and defended the notion that ‘If men would only employ a little
patient consideration in forming their notions, we should not despair of getting all but a
few, to join with us in opinion, that, so far from the freedom of the press being the cause
of the French revolution, had a free press existed in France, the French revolution never
^ ‘The Science of Legislation, from the Italian of Gaetano Filangieri’, lac. cit.
^ ‘Mémoires de Candide sur la liberté de la presse’, Edinburgh Review, vol. 18, May 1811, p. 101. Press prosecutions had achieved particular notoriety in 1809 through a libel case involving the Duke of York. (Jeremy Bentham’s The Elements o f the Art o f Packing, as Applied to Special Juries: Particularly in Cases o f Libel Law was produced at this time as an attack on the system whereby juries in such libel cases were selected by ministers and judges, who could thereby ensure the outcome of the trial. Somewhat ironically, that work was itself not publicly circulated until 1821.) The Wellesley Index to Victorian Periodicals on CD-ROM, ed. W.B. Houghton (London, 1999) identifies James Mill as the author of the 1811 article using evidence from the Brougham Manuscript Lists in the Ogden Papers, University College London Library. It does not identify the author of the 1807 article, but suggests ‘Henry Hallam’ as a possible candidate. However, the cited passage suggests that James Mill may have been the author of the earlier article: Henry Brougham’s Autobiography claims that Mill began contributing to the Edinburgh in 1807 - see Alexander Bain, James Mill: A Biography
would have taken p la c e '/ This radical position on the question of press freedom and
libel law became a regular and favourite idea of James M ill/
That the importance of freedom of thought was impressed by James Mill on his eldest
son in this early period is related by John Stuart Mill in the posthumously published
Autobiography? It should come as no surprise, therefore, that this topic constitutes the
subject of some of John Stuart M ill’s earliest published writings, along with tracts
against religious persecution and the law of libel as it was enforced in England in the
opening decades of the nineteenth century. We can be in no doubt that he perceived a
connection between the practice of religion and the right to freedom of expression: in
the Autobiography he explicitly defines the Reformation as ‘the great and decisive
contest against priestly tyranny for liberty of thought’.*
The topic of freedom of expression remained close to the heart of James Mill
throughout his eldest son’s formative years: subsequent to the 1811 article, he appears to
^ ‘Mémoires de Candide sur la liberté de la presse’, p. 121.
^ See Bain, op. cit., pp. 98ff.; Joseph Hamburger, James Mill and the Art o f Revolution
(New Haven, Connecticut and London, 1963), pp. 27ff. In addition to James M ill’s published writings on the issue of freedom of the press, his Common Place Book (four volumes, presented by John Stuart Mill to the London Library in January 1872) shows extensive research into all aspects of the topic, including newspaper cuttings and personal notes. Bain, in his biography of James Mill, comments on the contents of that book: ‘Foremost of all the topics is the subject of the Liberty of the Press. On this he had accumulated opinions and illustrations from the wide compass of ancient and modem literature. The general drift is, of course, in favour of Liberty, with practical refutations of the various subterfuges for evading the application of the principle’ (Bain, op. cit..
Appendix B, p. 464).
^ Autobiography, CWI, p. 45.
have taken on the subject in the Edinburgh Review yet again in 1815/ and in 1821 he
proposed that he himself should undertake the entry on liberty of the press for Macvey
Napier’s fifth edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica}^ The piece, in addition to his
articles on government and jurisprudence, was soon acknowledged as a classic defence
of the radical cause and was reprinted subsequently as a pamphlet. Jeremy Bentham’s
interest in libel and press freedom also continued after The Elements o f the Art o f
Packing: he wrote a series of letters to the Spanish people on this very topic in October
1820, urging them to resist any imposition made upon the liberty of their press by laws
being drafted at that time, on the grounds that ‘whatsoever evil can result from this
liberty, is everywhere, and at all times, greatly outweighed by the good’.^^ For Bentham
and James Mill alike, the freedom to discuss ideas in public and to criticise government
and its institutions was an essential element in the struggle against corruption among the
ruling classes, a topic at the heart of the agenda of the group of radical thinkers which
centred around Bentham. Their ideas reflected the growing discontent with traditional
models of government and society.
In the aftermath of the French Revolution, the young Mill was stimulated by the debates
concerning reform of the British constitution. Throughout the country, the possibility of
a similar revolution was widely feared: ‘Many persons felt that society was resting on
^ ‘Liberty of the Continental Press’, Edinburgh Review, vol. 25, June 1815, pp. 112-34. The Wellesley Index identifies Mill as author of this article on the basis of letters from Francis Place and David Ricardo.
A letter to Napier, dated 3 January 1821, says: ‘1 believe 1 have now fulfilled all the obligations, in the way of articles, which 1 am under to you. There is one article more, however, which, if you have not otherwise provided for it, 1 shall be very glad to undertake. That is. Liberty of the Press, or Libel Law, whichever title you choose to range it under. 1 think on that subject 1 could throw a good deal of light’ - cited in Bain,
op. cit., p. 193, who also records a letter from James Mill dated 21 August 1821 informing Napier that he was not pleased with the finished article. See Hamburger, op. cit., p. 27, n. 18.
crumbling foundations, and this made every expression of discontent... appear
ominous’.O p in io n s which supported the need for reform were viewed with suspicion
by those in power, while any opinion which attempted to undermine Christianity -
regarded as being at the very heart of law and order - was met with alarm. Yet, long-
held ideas concerning religion, government and the status quo were being questioned
openly. That the lower classes - now becoming more literate and consequently
susceptible to influences from a far broader spectrum of ideas than their forefathers -
should begin to question religious principles, or have a right to question their own status
or the status of their ‘betters’, was considered especially dangerous. In 1821, one
newspaper observed that:
The libels of former times were only read by the higher classes, which possessed
the means of detecting their falsehood - those of the present times are exclusively
read by the lower orders, who are destitute of all means of arriving at the truth....
Former libels attacked only measures of policy and men - present ones attack laws
and institutions. Former libels were only intended to drive a ministry from office -
the object of the present ones is to dethrone the King and overthrow the
Constitution. Moreover, to render their effects still more destructive, the poison of
a great number of them is spewed forth on the Sabbath.^^
In the years of John Stuart M ill’s youth, a person could be found guilty of libel by
instilling dissatisfaction with the government or the constitution: freedom of the press
was freedom within the confines of the law, and was certainly not unrestricted. In 1811
James M ill’s article in the Edinburgh Review had cited a legal case where it had been
pointed out that ‘if a publication be calculated to alienate the affections of the pec^le, by
bringing the government into disesteem, whether the expression be ridicule or obloquy,
the person so conducting himself is exposed to the inflictions of the law: - It is a
c r i m e 'T h e elder Mill commented: ‘Now, to point out any fault in the government
undoubtedly tends to bring, so far, the government into disesteem. Therefore, to point
out any fault in government, is a liberty not allowed to the press by the law of
England’.
The term ‘libel’ at this time was used in relation to any expression of opinion in the
press, including the publication of facts: truthful utterances could be libellous if they
were considered disagreeable by a judge, thought liable to disturb the peace or otherwise
to cause widespread dissatisfaction. Truth or falsity were irrelevant: in fact, ‘the greater
the truth, the greater the libel’ was a common idiom of the time.^^ From the very
beginning of his career as a writer and thinker, at the time of what he later called his
‘youthful propagandism’, John Stuart Mill clearly placed himself on the side of those
who held and professed opinions which sought to overthrow the old political order and
to replace it with an order based on reason and consensus, where rational debate won the
New Times, 5 January 1821, quoted in W.H. Wickwar, The Struggle fo r the Freedom o f the Press, 1819-1832 (London, 1928), p. 183.
‘Mémoires de Candide sur la liberté de la press’, p. 100. Mill was citing Lord Bllenborough in The King versus Gobbet, 24 May 1804.
Ibid. pp. 100-1. Note also that James Mill, in a letter dated 10 September 1819, was quick to reassure the publisher of the Encyclopaedia that ‘You need be under no alarm about my article Government. I shall say nothing capable of alarming even a Whig, and he is more terrified at the principles of good government than the worst of Tories’ (cited in Bain, op. cit., p. 188).
day and intellect triumphed over the blind acceptance of tradition/^ Looking back on
that period fifty years later, Mill commented:
Freedom of discussion even in politics, much more in religion, was at that time far
from being, even in theory, the conceded point which it at least seems to be now;
and the holders of obnoxious opinions had to be always ready to argue and reargue
for the liberty of expressing them/^
Mill specifically mentioned Richard Carlisle, whose position at the forefront of the
movement to establish a free press at the time was notorious, and who doggedly defied
all attempts to silence him. In 1817, Carlisle began deliberately to provoke the
government by publishing works considered immoral. Imprisoned initially for
publishing political parodies which mocked the Church of England, upon his release he
used Sherwin ’s Weekly Political Register to serialise the works of Thomas Paine. (Paine
had been tried and prosecuted for publishing his unorthodox ideas concerning religion
and politics almost thirty years previously.) Encouraged by the lack of government
response, Carlisle next reprinted Paine’s political writings in two volumes.
Subsequently in 1818 he published Paine’s Age o f Reason, a work which challenged
Christianity and the nature of revealed r e lig io n .T h e radical press was, in turn,
encouraged by the success of men such as Carlisle and started to become more
outspoken.^^ Growing discontent with the prevailing political situation also manifested
Autobiography, Chapter 4 is named ‘Youthful Propagandism. The Westminster Review’ {CWl, pp. 88ff.).
Ibid. p. 89.
This work had previously been condemned as blasphemous, its publishers convicted in 1797 and 1812. The American edition of this work (1794) carried a message from Paine to his readers: ‘He who denies to another this right, makes a slave of himself to his present opinion, because he precludes himself the right of changing it’ - cf. On Liberty, CWXVIII, pp. 229ff.
itself in meetings and public gatherings convened to address the problems discussed in
the press. In August 1819, such a meeting was called at St Peter’s Fields in Manchester
to consider the most appropriate means of pressing reform on parliament. As Henry
Hunt (a radical for whom a warrant had been issued) was about to address the meeting,
armed constabulary attempted to arrest him. The crowd was charged, resulting in the
death of eleven people and the injury of over four hundred. Carlisle had been in
attendance and subsequently published an eyewitness account of the ‘Peterloo’
massacre. Outrage at the actions of the yeomanry was echoed in newspapers and
journals up and down the country, and calls to arms became the demand of the day.^^
The official response to the widespread unrest came in December with the passing of the
‘Six Acts’, two of which related directly to the freedom of the press. One allowed for
the confiscation of all copies of a published work deemed libellous and, in the event of a
second offence, banishment of the author. Another attempted to enforce a strict code of
practice on newspapers by introducing criteria regulating subject matter, frequency of
publication, and size and amount of paper used, imposing a minimum price of 6d
(excluding the 4d stamp duty). To sell unstamped publications was to be an offence
punishable by fine. Moreover, printers and publishers of newspapers covered by the new
laws were obliged to pay a pre-determined security in advance of publication against
any possible libel fines which they might subsequently incur. These measures were
explicitly intended to crush the growing circulation of radical newspapers and, in
(p. X X X , n. 15) estimates that a circulation of 3,000-5,000 was typical in the 1820s; see
also Wickwar, op. cit., pp. 29-30. However, readership was high, and public houses and reading rooms were the gathering points for people to read or to hear read aloud publications which actively criticised the government, the Church and the Crown.
consequence, to reduce demands for reform. As Lord Ellenborough explained to the
House, having stressed that the Bill was being introduced because of the ‘pauper press’:
‘The mischief arising from them in the deception and delusion practised upon the lowest
classes by means of the grossest and most malignant falsehoods, was such that it
threatened the most material injury to the best interests of the country, unless some
means were devised of stemming its torrent’. A g a i n s t the background of an
overbearing regime which regarded the silencing of controversy as necessary to the
well-being of society, James Mill’s Encyclopaedia Britannica article on the liberty of
the press was a radical and brave stance. This article, although composed subsequent to
- but not independently of - his articles on government and jurisprudence, provided the
theoretical basis for most of John Stuart’s thought and early writings on the subject of
freedom of expression.^^
The piece begins with the admission that ‘The offences capable of being committed by
the press are indeed nearly co-extensive with the whole field of delinquency’; it
proceeds to investigate the role of the press, briefly in relation to individuals and, for the
main, in relation to government; and it closes with an examination of the possible
limitations which can be imposed on freedom of discussion in general.^"^ James Mill
assumes that when a published libel upon a private individual is proved in court, that
individual should receive appropriate reparation. If the general public continues to
believe the libel after such a ruling, it must be because people are aware of additional
facts which were not available to the judge, or else because the general public is unable
Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 29 December 1819.
In the first paragraph of James M ill’s ‘Liberty of the Press’, reference is made to the articles ‘Government’ and ‘Jurisprudence’. All three are included in James Mill,
Political Writings, ed. Terence Ball (Cambridge, 1992) - page references are to this edition.
to form correct opinions based on factual evidence. If the latter is the case, then ‘it is the
fault of the legislature; and for the rectification of this evil, the best course undoubtedly
is, to take effectual measures for the instruction of the people, which instruction would
soon place them beyond the danger of such delusions’.H o w e v e r , such a course of
action would not prove attractive to a government wishing to keep society in a servile
state of mind and which therefore maintained an interest in keeping education and truth
from the majority. It would not be until the interests of the rulers and the interests of its
citizens were at one that good government could be achieved. This was the central thesis
of the article ‘Government’ and one of the main themes famously attacked by Thomas
Babington Macaulay in the Edinburgh Review?^ Among the many criticisms raised by
Macaulay was the vague and indeterminate nature of such ‘interests’ - a criticism
echoed in recent interpretation of On Liberty^ where the notion of interests has again
become prominent.^^
For James Mill, the liberty of the press provides a means whereby resistance to
corruption in government becomes possible. Such a possibility must always be left open
or the people are inevitably left in misery and degradation. In matters of government
‘The real point of importance is, to establish correct opinions in the minds of the
Ibid. p. 103. The stamp duties imposed on publications were popularly known as ‘taxes on knowledge’. The phrase ‘knowledge is power’ was popularised by Richard Carlisle - on 28 April 1822, for example, he wrote in The Republican: ‘Let us then endeavour to progress in knowledge, since knowledge is demonstratively proved to be power’.
‘M ill’s Essay on Government: Utilitarian Logic and Politics’, Edinburgh Review, vol. 49, March 1829, pp. 159-89; repr. in Ball, op. cit. For the debate which ensued, see George L. Nesbitt, Benthamite Reviewing: The First Twelve Years o f the Westminster Review, 1824-1836 (New York, 1934), pp. 139-44. For John Stuart Mill’s own assessment of the debate, see his Autobiography, CWI, pp. 165-66.
people’. T h u s the distinction between factual evidence and subjective opinion is subtly
introduced, a distinction which has a precedent in Plato’s Republic}^ Freedom of
discussion - where all opinions are presented equally and no advantage or obstruction is
placed in the way of any single opinion - he lauded as the sole method whereby most
people can arrive at true opinions based on the evidence presented to them.^° Liberty of
the press plays a central role in this process:
Every subject has the best chance of becoming thoroughly understood, when, by
the delivery of all opinions, it is presented in all points of view; when all the
evidence upon both sides is brought forward, and all those who are most interested
in showing the weakness of what is weak in it, and the strength of what is strong,
are, by the freedom of the press, permitted... to devote to it the keenest application
of their faculties. False opinions will then be delivered. True; but when are we
most secure against the influence of false opinions? Most assuredly when the
grounds of these opinions are the most thoroughly searched.^^
If a government makes itself responsible for choosing what the public should hear, that
government is acting in a despotic manner. Against the notion that the press must be
restricted in order to stop the spread of unrest, James Mill argues that calls to arms by
the press, if they result in open rebellion, are not the first but the final stage of resistance
- there must be some pre-existing consensus towards the taking up of arms, or any
exhortation will mean nothing: ‘we think it may be satisfactorily shown, that no
James Mill, ‘Liberty of the Press’, in Ball, op. cit., p. 123.
Plato’s Republic (v. 477-78) distinguishes between knowledge and belief. John Stuart Mill had read and made an abstract of the Republic as early as 1819, and later held that, like James Mill before him, there was no author to whom he owed a greater debt for
‘mental culture’ {Autobiography, CW l, p. 25).
operation of the press, however directly exhorting to this species of resistance, ought to
be treated as an offence’.H o w e v e r, regarding incitement, he subsequently explains in
a passage remarkably similar to the famous ‘com-dealer’ example used at the start of
Chapter 3 of On Liberty that: ‘A hand-bill, for example, distributed at a critical moment,
and operating upon an inflamed state of mind, in a narrow district, may excite a mob to
disturb the proceedings of a court of justice, to obstruct police officers in the execution
of their duties, or even to disturb, on this or that occasion, the deliberations of the
legislature itself However, there is always a problem with distinguishing between
passionate and dispassionate language, because ‘A word which may excite strains of
emotion in one breast, will excite none in another’
7.2 John Stuart MiWs early writings
James M ill’s Encyclopaedia article on the liberty of the press concludes with an
assertion that people ought especially to have the power to choose their own opinions on
religious matters.^^ And it is precisely on the point of liberty of discussion and religious
freedom that the sixteen-year-old John Stuart Mill made his debut in the Morning
Chronicle on 1 January 1823. Described in M ill’s own bibliography as a letter ‘on Free
Discussion, signed. An Enemy to Religious Persecution’, it challenges the notion that
" Ibid. p. 127. Ibid. p. 112.
Ibid. p. 113 - cf. On Liberty, CW XVIH, p. 260. James Mill comments that acts such as these ‘are clearly hurtful acts; they may be very accurately defined; and penalties, of moderate severity, would be sufficient to deter from the performance of them’.
James Mill, in Ball, op. cit., p. 134.
‘Christianity is part and parcel of the law of England’. T h i s widely endorsed notion -
which purportedly demonstrated that any opinions which undermined Christianity were,
in fact, a veiled attack on the civil law - was traditionally used in debates and law courts
against religious dissenters. Indeed, such were the prevailing attitudes that ‘Those who
were not of the Anglican faith could not be regarded as completely English’. M i l l ’s
letter attempts to show that these arguments are not worthy of serious consideration. He
proceeds in a quasi-legal manner not unlike that employed by his father.^^ It cannot be
Christian morality which is meant when people use such phrases, he maintains, or all of
the Christian precepts would have to be a part of the law. Such a scheme would be
impossible to enforce. Neither can it be the doctrines and truths of Christianity which
are meant - what Mill, following his father, is careful to label the opinions of the
religion - because precepts and opinions are logically distinct. The law protects
Christianity by persecuting those who express contrary opinions, but it cannot offer a
basis as to why it should do this, other than to maintain rather lamely that such
persecution is part of the law. This reasoning, the young Mill concludes, is totally
absurd.
The tone of the letter is precocious and the content is very much in keeping with the
opinions of James Mill. Yet, the piece anticipates John Stuart Mill the logician. Its
importance, however, lies not so much in the techniques used but in the evidence it
provides of the young Mill taking a public stance for intellectual and religious freedom
at such an early stage in his publishing career. Moreover, the idea of ‘opinion’ holding
c w x x n , pp. 6-8.
Bernard Wishy (ed.). Prefaces to Liberty: Selected Writings o f John Stuart Mill
(Boston, 1959), ‘Introduction’, p. 35.
the central part in debate on most issues was to be very important for Mill, playing an
essential role of his defence of freedom of expression throughout his life. The upshot of
the letter’s argument is that because debates concerning religion are dealing not with
matters of empirical fact but with matters of speculative opinion, the truth cannot be
ascertained in the same manner as in mathematics or logic, a position which John Stuart
Mill held throughout his life.
This first published piece was a brave (although probably supervised) stand for the
cause of intellectual and religious freedom, using a line of argument that was considered
blasphemous at this time. The connection between Christianity and the law had similarly
been questioned as part of the defence used by Susannah Wright, one of Richard
Carlisle’s supporters. Carlisle’s role in the spread of dissent in the wake of Peterloo had
prompted the Lord Mayor to issue a warrant for his arrest on charges of seditious libel.
Already facing other charges of blasphemous libel for the publication of Paine’s works,
a conviction was soon secured, and Carlisle remained in prison for six years. His work
was continued on the outside by his wife and sister, who in turn were arrested and
imprisoned. Their fight was taken up by Susannah Wright who, having been arrested on
charges brought against her by the self-styled Society for the Suppression of Vice, in her
defence had questioned the connection between Christianity and the law. However, it
was Carlisle himself who had written the defence used in court, subsequently publishing
the supposedly blasphemous arguments in the Republican, which he continued to edit
from behind bars.^^
These events are explicitly mentioned in the Autobiography in connection with a series
of letters written by John Stuart Mill which were published in the Morning Chronicle in
January and February 1823. ‘The prosecutions of Richard Carlisle and his wife and
sister for publications hostile to Christianity,’ he tells us, ‘were then exciting much
attention, and nowhere more than among the people I frequented.... I wrote a series of
five letters under the signature of Wickliffe going over the whole question of free
publication of all opinions on r e l i g i o n T h e s e letters draw extensively on the writings
of both James Mill and Bentham, and mention the Encyclopaedia Brittanica article on
the liberty of the press as a ‘most satisfactory’ exposition of the topic. Yet the arguments
are very narrow in focus, and while they can be said to achieve their purpose, it is
questionable whether they really come to grips with the issue of freedom of speech at
all. The first letter challenges those who believe that free discussion contributes to the
discovery of truth on most subjects to show why it should not equally contribute to the
truth on religious matters. If people are not allowed to choose their own opinions, then
the government must be choosing their opinions for them: ‘But if the Government is
allowed to chuse opinions for the people, the government is d e s p o t i c T h i s line of
argument, borrowed almost verbatim from James Mill, was to be resurrected by John
Stuart Mill again and again in various forms: because opinion with regard to religion
does not deal with matters of fact but with subjective feelings regarding what is true,
people should be allowed to make up their own minds by weighing the evidence on all
sides. To decide for others which opinions are worthy of their consideration is to have
ultimate power over them. It may be generally felt that atheism is false, but this is not a
valid reason for preventing discussion on the topic ‘since before discussion, if their
CW I, p. 89. The letters {CW XXII, pp. 9ff.) were, in fact, signed ‘W ickliff (without the final ‘e ’) after the fourteenth-century religious reformer.
opinions are true it is only by accident, whereas after it they hold them with a complete
conviction, and perfect knowledge of the proofs on which they are grounded'/^ There is
an appreciation in this letter of the dignity of possessing knowledge and of the necessity
of individual choice, both notions to which Mill maintained a lifelong commitment and
which appear to be derived directly from James Mill. This commitment in turn was
fuelled by a belief in progress and individual development which was to be used as the
intellectual driving force behind On Liberty.
In the second letter of the series. Mill examines the notion that to allow the spread of
‘infidel doctrines’ leads to private morality being undermined, thereby leading to the
demise of what was widely held to be the only security of ‘good judicature’.^ The letter
proceeds to show that although Christianity may appear to be at the heart of maintaining
law and order, public opinion regarding what is acceptable is more fundamental than
Christianity and is that which primarily influences people’s actions. In the courts, for
example, swearing on a Christian Bible ostensibly guarantees truth in the judicial
system, but this guarantee can be demonstrated as a sham: jurists at a trial, for example,
swear to judge on the evidence given but will sometimes find criminals guilty of lesser
offences than the evidence warrants if a statutory punishment is thought excessive for a
Morning Chronicle, 28 January 1823, CW XXU, too. cit.: cf. James Mill, in Ball, op. cit., p. 129: ‘...it is not safe for the people to let any body choose opinions for them. If it be said, that the people themselves might be the authors of this preference, what is this but to say, that the people can choose better before discussion than after; before they have obtained information than after it? No, if the people choose before discussion, before information, they cannot choose for themselves. They must follow blindly the impulse of certain individuals, who, therefore, choose for them’.
On Liberty'^ phrase ‘man as a progressive being’ is also found in James M ill’s writings on education: see Geraint Williams, ‘The Greek Origins of J.S. Mill’s Happiness’, Utilitas, vol. 8, 1996, pp. 8ff.
particular instance of the c r i m e S i m i l ^ l y public opinion accepts ‘duelling and
fornication’ although both are forbidden by Christianity. The letter concludes that the
argument regarding the necessity of Christianity to the preservation of society is
essentially without foundation in practice.
The third letter of the series aims ‘to prove that persecution [of infidels] is not necessary
for the preservation of Christianity’."^^ To persecute non-believers, Mill contends, is to
assume ‘the utter incapacity and incorrigible imbecility of the people’ insofar as it
assumes that the Christian populace is so easily swayed that it is unable to distinguish
truth from falsehood."^^ Yet, through their Christian upbringing and education, the
people are already favourably predisposed towards opinions which support Christianity,
and consequently the persecution of infidels cannot be justified on the grounds that these
opinions will mislead Christians. Moreover, as it is generally believed that people prefer
the comfort of faith to the insecurity of doubt, persecution seems unjustified unless it is
also believed that the Christian public at large is in danger of embracing non-belief. If
anything, opposition to blasphemies serves mainly to advertise and give life to opinions
which would otherwise die out of their own accord."^^ Such opposition usually amounts
to little more than abuse which is ‘far easier and requires less time and application than
argument’. In England, Christians would fare far better. Mill implies, by trying to offer
His other examples include import-export merchants who regularly falsely swear regarding the quality and amount of their goods, and entrants to Oxford University who swear to obey the outdated statutes of the university. The argument here draws on Bentham’s writings on oaths - see the introduction to the letter at CWXXU, p. 12.
Morning Chronicle, 12 February 1823, ibid. p. 15. Ibid. p. 16.
