. ,..
NO. 05-11-01512-CR; NO. 05-11-01513-CR
NO. 05-11-01514-CR; NO. 05-11-01515-CR
FILED
NO. 05-11-01516-CR COURT OF APl_N
PEALS IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT DALLAS
RANALDO RAYMONE MORRIS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE .
ON APPEAL FROM THE
203R0 JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
F11-25845-P; F11-25846-P; F11-25847-P F11-25848-P; F11-25850-P APPELLANT'S BRIEF BRUCE ANTON
AP.R 2 0
2012 CLELISA MATz RK, 5th DISTRICTSTATE BAR NO. 01274700
SORRELS, UDASHEN & ANTON 2311 Cedar Springs Rd., Suite 250 Dallas, Texas 75201
(214) 468-8100
(214) 468-8104 - facsimile
INDEX OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL APPELLANT
DEFENSE COUNSEL AT TRIAL
APPELLANT'S ATTORNEY ON APPEAL
STATE'S ATTORNEY AT TRIAL
STATE'S ATTORNEY ON APPEAL
COURT
11
Ranaldo Raymone Morris Nathan Kight
Public Defender's Office 133 N. Riverfront
Dallas, Texas 75207 Bruce Anton
Sorrels, Udashen & Anton 2311 Cedar Springs Rd.,
Ste. 250 Dallas, Texas 75201 A. Novak
Asst. District Attorney Dallas County
133 N. Riverfront Dallas, Texas 75207 Appellate Section Dallas County District Attorney
133 N. Riverfront Dallas, Texas 75207
Honorable Teresa Hawthorne 203rd Judicial District Court
133 N. Riverfront Dallas, Texas 75207
PAGE
INDEX OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ... o • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ... iv-vi STATEMENT OF THE CASE (CHRONOLOGY) . . . .. . . . VII-IX ISSUE PRESENTED . . . 1
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ... 1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ... o • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2 ARGUMENT ... 2
POINT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE ... 2
Relevant Facts . . . 3 Standard of Review ... 4 Preservation ... 4 Analysis ... 5 Conclusion ... 13 PRAYER ... 14 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ... 15 lll
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES PAGE
Alabudi v. State, 2008 WL 541895 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2008)(not designated for publication) ... 10 Alvarez v. State, 63 S.W.3d 578 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.) ... 6-7 Brown v. State, 2010 WL 255959 (Tex. App.- Dallas 2010)(not designated for publication) ... 13 Brumbalow v. State, 933 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. App.-Waco 1996, pet. ref' d) ... 4 Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S.
1200 (1997) ... 4 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991)(Kennedy, J., concurring) ... 6-7 Hughes v. State, 878 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. Crim. App.1993)(op. on reh'g), cert.
denied, 511 U.S. 1152 (1994) ... 5 Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) ... 4-5 Lavern v. State, 48 S.W.3d 356 (Tex. App.-Houston [14 Dist. 2001, pet. ref' d) 9 Machuca v. State, 2009 WL 1423993 (Tex. App.- Austin 2009)(not designated for publication) ... 13 Martinez v. State, 22 S.W.3d 504 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) ... 5
McDowell v. State, 2011 WL 1991941 (Tex. App.- Austin 2011)(not designated for publication) ... 12 McGruder v. Puckett, 954 F.2d 313, 316 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 849 (1992) ... 7, 9
Moore v. State, 54 S.W.3d 529 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref' d) .... 6, 8 Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Crim. App.1998) (op. on reh'g), cert.
denied, 526 U.S. 1070 (1999) ... 4 Nash v. State, 2010 WL 3825865 (Tex. App.- Dallas 2010)(not designated for
publication) ... 12
Nunez v. State, 565 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) ... 5 Pitcher v. State, 2010 WL 3449229 (Tex. App.- Eastland 2010)(not designated for
publication) ... 8
Robinson v. State, 2010 WL 3636130 (Tex. App.- Hous. [14 Dist.] 2010)(not designated for publication) ... 12
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) ... 6-7, 9 Steinberg v. State, 2002 WL 31087262 (Tex. App. - Hous.[1 Dist.] 2002)(not designated for publication) ... 11
Wilson v. State, 2009 WL 485509 (Tex. App.- Fort Worth 2009)(not designated for publication) ... 10
Zavala v. State, 1997 WL 33643201(Tex. App.- Corpus Christi 1997)(not
designated for publication) ... 8
CODES and RULES
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art 1.09 ... 3 TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(2) ... 5
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
U.S. CONST. amend VIII 2-3
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ... 2-3
TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 19 . . . 2-3
(CHRONOLOGY) Fll-25845 CHARGE PLEA TRIAL BY JURY PLEA AGREEMENT VERDICT ON PUNISHMENT JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
NOTICE OF APPEAL
vii
Unauthorized Possession of Firearm/Felon
Offense date: January 20, 2011 Arrest date: January 21, 2011 Indictment: February 22, 2011 (CR1.7) Guilty (CR1.23-26) Waived (CR1.23-26) None 10 years TDCJ October 7, 2011 (CR1.29-30) 10 years TDCJ Filed November 7, 2011 (CR1.33) Overruled by Operation of Law October 14, 2011 (CR1.32)
CHARGE
PLEA
TRIAL BY JURY PLEA AGREEMENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE (CHRONOLOGY)
F11-25846
Possession Controlled Substance PG2 (MDMA) with intent to deliver Offense date: January 20, 2011 Arrest date: January 21, 2011 Indictment: April13, 2011 (CR2.19)
Guilty (CR2.34-37) Waived (CR2.34-37) Open (CR2.34-37)
JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE October 7, 2011 (CR2.40-41) 40 years TDCJ
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL October 14, 2011 (CR2.44)
NOTICE OF APPEAL October 14, 2011 (CR2.43)
CHARGE PLEA TRIAL BY JURY PLEA AGREEMENT (CHRONOLOGY) F11-25847
Possession Controlled Substance PG3 (Alprazolam) with intent to deliver
Offense date: January 20, 2011 Arrest date: January 21, 2011 Indictment: April13, 2011
(CR3.10) Guilty (CR3.26-29) Waived (CR3.26-29) Open (CR3.26-29)
JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE October 7, 2011
20 years TDCJ (CR3.32-33) MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL October 14, 2011 (CR3.36)
NOTICE OF APPEAL October 14, 2011 (CR3.35)
CHARGE
PLEA
TRIAL BY JURY PLEA AGREEMENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE (CHRONOLOGY)
F11-25848
Possession Controlled Substance PG3 (Dihydrocodeinone) with intent to deliver
Offense date: January 20, 2011 Arrest date: January 21, 2011 Indictment: April13, 2011 (CR4.8) Guilty (CR4.20-23)
Waived (CR4.20-23) Open (CR4.20-23)
JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE October 7, 2011
20 years TDCJ (CR4.26-27) MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL October 14, 2011 (CR4.31)
NOTICE OF APPEAL October 14, 2011 (CR4.30)
CHARGE PLEA TRIAL BY JURY PLEA AGREEMENT (CHRONOLOGY) Fll-25850
Possession Marijuana, less than five pounds, more than four ounces Offense date: January 20, 2011 Arrest date: January 21, 2011 Indictment: April13, 2011 (CR5.8) Guilty (CR5.22-25)
Waived (CR5.22-25) Open (CR5.22-25)
JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE October 7, 2011
2 years State Jail (CR5.28-29) MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL October 14, 2011 (CR5.31)
NOTICE OF APPEAL October 14, 2011 (CR5.30)
ISSUE PRESENTED
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ASSESSING MORRIS A MAXIMUM AND/OR EXCESSIVE SENTENCE IN EACH CAUSE.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Ranaldo Raymone Morris ("Morris"), the Appellant, was charged with four counts of possession of controlled substances and one charge of possession of a firearm by a felon, all arising from one arrest. Morris entered a plea of guilty to all charges without the benefit of a plea bargain. (RR9). He waived a jury trial in each case and agreed that they could all be tried together. A pre-sentence report was prepared and a substance abuse evaluation was conducted.
At the plea hearing, Morris stated that he was working, had a family and was requesting probation. (RR12, 13, 16). Morris admitted his involvement in the drug operation at the house where the arrest occurred. (Rl7-19,29-30). He was extensively cross-examined about his prior conviction for murder-a charge for which he received a six-year sentence. (RR14, 20-25).
on the five counts as follows: 40 years, 1 20 years,2 10 years, 3 2 years, 4
all to run concurrently. These appeals are taken therefrom.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
When determining the length of a sentence, the trial court is charged with the duty of ensuring that the sentence is not grossly disproportionate to others who are similarly situated. In the instant matter, the trial court has not ensured proportionate sentences for Morris's offenses. Therefore, Morris's sentences must be vacated.
ARGUMENT
POINT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ASSESSING MORRIS A MAXIMUM AND/OR EXCESSIVE SENTENCE IN EACH CAUSE.
The sentence imposed constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eight Amendment of the United States Constitution, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and article 1, section 19 of the Texas
1
(Case No. Fll-25846)(CR2.40-41).
2
(Case Nos. Fll-25847 (CR3.32-33) and Fll-25848 (CR4.26-27)). \Case No. Fll-25845)(CR1.29-30).
\Case No. Fll-25850)(CR5.28-29).
Constitution.5 See U.S. CONST. amends. VIII, XIV; TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 19. The
sentence further transgresses the Due Process Clause to the United States Constitution and the Due Course ofLaw Clause of the Texas Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 19.
Relevant Facts
Morris was indicted for five offenses ansmg from one transaction: Unauthorized Possession of Firearm by a Felon; Possession of Controlled Substance PG2 (MDMA); Possession of Controlled Substance PG3 (Alprazolam); Possession of Controlled Substance PG3 Dihydrocodeinone; Possession of Marijuana, in an amount greater than four ounces. Morris entered a plea of guilty to each offense. (RR1.9). At sentencing, the judge assessed maximum sentences on the gun charge (ten years), the marijuana charge (two years state jail); the Alprazolam charge (twenty years); the Dihydrocondeineone charge (twenty years) and 40 years on the MDMA charge. The prosecutor's offer was five years in prison on all the charges except the marijuana charge, for which Morris was offered two years. (CR22; RR13).
5 See also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 1.09 ("Cruelty forbidden").
family and aGED. (PSR3).6 Further, he was cooperative with the authorities and
fully accepted responsibility. (RR1.15).
Standard of Review
This Court reviews a sentence imposed by a trial court for an abuse of discretion. Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). When the standard of review is abuse of discretion, the record must contain some evidence to support the decision made by the trial court. Brumbalow v. State, 933 S.W.2d 298, 300 (Tex. App.-Waco 1996, pet. ref' d). The reviewing court should not reverse a trial judge whose ruling was within the "zone of reasonable disagreement." Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1200 (1997); Montgomery v. State, 819 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
Preservation
The normative rule is that to preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion that states the specific grounds for the desired ruling if they are not apparent from the context of the request, objection, or motion. TEX. R .APP. P. 33.1(a)(1); Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249,265 (Tex. Crim. App.1998) (op. on reh'g), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1070
6
PSR - Pre-sentence Report
(1999). Further, the trial court must have ruled on the request, objection, or motion, either expressly or implicitly, or the complaining party must have objected to the trial court's refusal to rule. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(2). Preservation of error is a systemic requirement that this Court should review on its own motion. Martinez v. State, 22 S.W.3d 504, 507 n. 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Hughes v. State, 878 S.W.2d 142, 151 (Tex. Crim. App.1993)(op. on reh'g), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1152 (1994).
Analysis
The range of punishment available for the charged offense of Unauthorized Possession ofFirearm by a Felon is 2-10 years confinement; Possession of Controlled Substance PG2 (MDMA) is 5-99 years or life confinement and a $10,000 fine; Possession of Controlled Substance PG3 (Alprazolam) is 2-20 years confinement; Possession of Controlled Substance PG3 Dihydrocodeinone is 2-20 years confinement; Possession of Marijuana in an amount greater than 4 oz. is 180 days to two years confinement in the state jail. As a general rule, a sentence within the proper range of punishment will not be disturbed on appeal. See Jackson, 680 S.W.2d at 814; Nunez v. State, 565 S.W.2d 536, 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
In the present case, the trial court abused its discretion by assessing maximum punishments in four of the cases and 40 years in the other. While Morris concedes that the sentences are within the respective statutorily authorized ranges, it is apparent
constitutes an abuse of discretion. See Montgomery, 819 S.W.2d at 391. In light of
Morris's record, the trial court should have exercised restraint in sentencing. The trial court sentenced Morris to confinement primarily because of his prior offense of murder, for which he served and discharged a six-year sentence. The record reflects the trial court's overemphasis to this end:
You see, my philosophy since I've been on the bench is to help as many people as I can. I don't like to send people to prison, but here's what I've seen with you, here's what I don't understand. You've got a six-year sentence on a murder case. So, you know, your attorney wants me to ·break the cycle. Well, the cycle I'm going to break is not the cycle he's going to break. I'm going to break the cycle of people getting light sentences and getting out and picking up five cases: one a first-degree case, one a gun case.
(RR1.33-34). This diatribe by the trial court took place after the State had gone well beyond the confines permitted regarding Morris's prior conviction. (RR1.28, 30-31). In light of the explanatory factors, the trial court's sentencing determination is outside the zone of reasonable disagreement even though it falls within the statutory range. A narrow exception to the general rule that a sentence within the statutory limits is not excessive, cruel, or unusual is recognized when the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offense. Alvarez v. State, 63 S.W.3d 578, 580 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.); see Moore v. State, 54 S.W.3d 529, 542 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref d); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1004-05 (199l)(Kennedy, J., concurring); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-92 (1983); McGruderv. Puckett, 954 F.2d 313,316 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 849 (1992). Such is the case here where the trial court has attempted to re-sentence Morris on his previous murder conviction for which he already completed a sentence. In Solem, the Supreme Court identified three criteria to be used to evaluate the proportionality of a particular sentence. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292. They are (1) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the punishment, (2) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, and (3) the sentences imposed for the same offense in other jurisdictions. Also see, Alvarez, 63 S.W.3d at 580-81 (articulating these criteria). In a proportionality analysis, the reviewing court must first make a threshold comparison of the gravity of the offense against the severity of the sentence. !d. The gravity of the offense should be considered in light of the harm caused or threatened to the victim or society and the culpability of the offender. !d.
Following Solem, the Supreme Court again addressed the proportionality analysis in Harmel in v. Michigan, supra. Harmelin somewhat modified the Solem test. However, seven justices still supported an Eighth Amendment prohibition against grossly disproportionate sentences.
v. Puckett, 954 F.2d 313, 316 (5th Cir. 1992). Pursuant to that test, the court initially
makes a threshold comparison of the gravity of the offense against the severity of the sentence, and then asks whether the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offense. Only if gross disproportionality is found does the court then compare the sentence under consideration to sentences received for similar crimes in other jurisdictions.
Comparing the gravity of the offense against the severity of the sentence compels the conclusion that the sentence violated constitutional constraints. When making such a comparison the reviewing court must judge the gravity of the offense in light of the harm caused or threatened to society and the offender's culpability.
Moore v. State, 54 S.W.3d at 542. In the present offense, the circumstances
demonstrate that Morris engaged in no violent or extreme activity. But see e.g.,
Pitcher v. State, 2010 WL 3449229 (Tex. App.- Eastland 2010)(not designated for
publication)(Court found 75-year sentence was not grossly disproportionate stating, "[i]rrespective of the fact that appellant does not have any prior convictions, the gravity of the offense he committed against his four-year-old biological daughter was extreme and heinous."); Zavala v. State, 1997 WL 33643201(Tex. App. -Corpus Christi 1997)(not designated for publication)(Court upheld 45-year sentence where
defendant "beat the victim several times with the handle of a cane and brandished what appeared to be a knife during the course of the robbery.").
Morris was cooperative with the authorities and fully accepted responsibility for his conduct. (RR1.15, 32). Furthermore, Morris shared his culpability with his co-defendants. (RR1.14-15). Such factors raise an inference that Morris's sentences are grossly disproportionate. McGruder, 954 F .2d at 316.
Upon the determination that Morris's sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offense, this Court should go on to consider the remaining Solem factors. !d. In
light of Morris's explanatory factors, the trial court's sentencing determination is surely outside the zone of reasonable disagreement even though it falls within the statutory range.
Moreover, simply comparing the sentence imposed in this case to other sentences imposed for the same or similar offense in this and other intermediate appellate jurisdictions confirms gross disproportionality. Lavern v. State, 48 S.W.3d 356, 358 (Tex. App.-Houston [14 Dist. 2001, pet. ref'd). Morris pleaded guilty to possession of one gram or more but less than four grams of 3,4-methylenedioxy methamphetamine with the intent to deliver, possession of28 grams or more but less than 200 grams of Alprozalam with intent to deliver, possession of28 grams or more but less than 200 grams of Dihydrocodeinone, possession of marijuana and
Morris a40-yearprison sentence for this drug possession and the maximum sentences for the remaining convictions is excessive and disproportionate in light of facts surrounding the offense.
Offenders charged with the same or similar offense have not received 40-year sentences. See e.g., Alabudi v. State, 2008 WL 541895 (Tex. App. -Dallas 2008)(not designated for publication)(appellant "convicted of (i) unlawful possession with intent to deliver two hundred grams or more, but less than four hundred grams of cocaine, (ii) unlawful possession with intent to deliver one gram or more, but less than four grams of methamphetamine, and (iii) unlawful possession of four grams or more, but less than two hundred grams of methylenedioxy methamphetamine. The trial judge sentenced appellant to twelve years' imprisonment and assessed a $1500 fine in each case."); Wilson v. State, 2009 WL 485509 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 2009)(not designated for publication)( appellant entered an open plea of guilty to four indictments charging possession of a "controlled substance (methylenedioxy methamphetamine) of more than four but less than four hundred grams, possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) ofless than one gram, and possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance (cocaine) of more than four but less than two hundred grams. The indictments related to the marijuana and the cocaine ofless than
one gram each contained an enhancement paragraph alleging that appellant had prior convictions that allowed him to be punished for those state jail felonies at a third degree felony level." Appellant received a sentence of "ten years' confinement on each of the charges related to the marijuana and the cocaine under one gram, ...
twenty years' confinement on the other cocaine charge and also on the methylenedioxy methamphetamine offense. The trial court ordered these sentences to run concurrently.").
See also, Ex parte Garcia, 2007 WL 1346506 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)(not
designated for publication)("Applicant was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver in count one, possession of methylenedioxy methamphetamine with intent to deliver in count two, and possession of marihuana in count three. Applicant was sentenced to, respectively, ten years, ten years, and two years state jail years' imprisonment."); Steinbergv. State, 2002 WL 31087262 (Tex. App.- Hous.[1 Dist.] 2002)(not designated for publication)(appellant "pled guilty without an agreed recommendation to one indictment alleging possession with intent to deliver between four and 200 grams of methamphetamine, a second indictment alleging possession with intent to deliver between four and 200 grams of 3,4-methylenedioxy methamphetamine, and a third indictment alleging delivery of between 200 and 400 grams of methamphetamine. The trial court assessed punishment at 25 years in
v. State, 2011 WL 1991941 (Tex. App.- Austin 2011)(not designated for
publication)( appellant pleaded guilty to possessing more than four grams of 3,4-methylenedioxy methamphetamine and sexual assault (for which he was on deferred adjudication community supervision for 10 years) and was sentenced to 11 years for the sexual assault after the violation and 10 years for the possession); Robinson v.
State, 2010 WL 3636130 (Tex. App. - Hous. [14 Dist.] 2010)(not designated for
publication)( appellant received "sixteen years' confinement for possession with intent to deliver over 400 grams of dihydrocodeinone and to ten years' confinement for possession with intent to deliver between 28 to 200 grams of alpazolam."); Nash v.
State, 2010 WL 3825865 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2010)(not designated for
publication)(appellant received "twenty years' imprisonment for the aggravated assault conviction, five years' imprisonment for the possession with intent to deliver cocaine conviction, and two years' confinement in a state jail facility for the possession of marijuana and possession with intent to deliver alprazolam convictions.").
The extensive sentence of 40 years has been reserved for offenders who are not similarly situated. See e.g., Machuca v. State, 2009 WL 1423993 (Tex. App. -Austin 2009)(not designated for publication)( defendant received a 40-year sentence
after being convicted of possessing more than four grams of 3 ,4-methylenedioxy methamphetamine with intent to deliver); but see, Brown v. State, 2010 WL 255959 (Tex. App. -Dallas 201 O)(not designated for publication)( appellant "pleaded guilty to possession with intent to deliver cocaine in an amount of 200 grams or more but less than 400 grams, possession of marijuana in an amount of five pounds or less but more than four ounces, and possession with intent to deliver 3, 4-methylenedioxy methamphetamine in an amount of four grams or more but less than 400 grams ... . the trial court found appellant guilty of the offenses and sentenced appellant to ten years' imprisonment for the cocaine offense, 180 days' confinement in a state jail facility for the marijuana offense, and five years' imprisonment on the 3, 4-methylenedioxy methamphetamine offense.").
Conclusion
At the time of Morris's plea, his co-defendant, Doyal Tyson, had received probation and his other co-defendant, Clayon Turner, was scheduled for trial. (RR1.14-15). Morris stated that he was willing to testify against co-defendant Tyson at trial. (RR1.15, 32). In light of the mitigating circumstances surrounding Morris's alleged crime and the more lenient sentences imposed upon offenders who also were convicted of drug crimes, the trial court's decision to assess a 40- year sentence and four maximum sentences resulted in a sentence that is disproportionate to the gravity
United States and Texas Constitutions. Morris's sentence should be vacated and Morris should be remanded to the trial court for re-sentencing.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Appellant prays that this Court will remand the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.
14
Respectfully submitted,
BRUCE ANTON
STATE BAR NO. 01274700 2311 Cedar Springs Rd., Suite 250 Dallas, Texas 75201
214/468-8100
214/468-8104 - facsimile
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of Appellant's brief was served on the Appellate Section, Dallas County District Attorney's office, 133 N. Riverfront Blvd., Dallas, Texas 75207 via regular mail and electronic filing on the 18th day of April, 2012.
BRUCE ANTON
