George
George L. L. Borja Borja ConstitutionaConstitutional l Law Law IIII Case: MIGUEL BELUSO VS. THE MUNICIPALITY OF PANAY (CAPIZ),
Case: MIGUEL BELUSO VS. THE MUNICIPALITY OF PANAY (CAPIZ), G.R. no. 153974 August 7, 2006
G.R. no. 153974 August 7, 2006 Facts:
Facts: TheThe Sangguniang BayanSangguniang Bayan of of the Municipalitythe Municipality of of Panay issued ResPanay issued Resoolutilutioon Nn No.o. 95-29 auth95-29 author or izing theizing the municipal g
municipal govoveer r nment thnment throrough the mayugh the mayor or ttoo initiate expinitiate exproroppr r iatiiatioon pn proroceedingsceedings.. A petitiA petitioonn for for expexproroppr r iatiiatioonn was the
was ther r eaeaf f teter r f f ilediled oon Apn Apr r il 14, 1997 by theil 14, 1997 by the r r espespoondent Municipalityndent Municipality of of Panay bePanay befor for e the Regie the Regioonal Tnal Tr r ialial C
Coouur r t (RTC), Bt (RTC), Br r anch 18anch 18 of of RRooxas Cityxas City.. PetitiPetitioonener r ss f f iled a Miled a Mootitioon tn too Dismiss alleging that the taking is nDismiss alleging that the taking is noott for
for public use butpublic use but oonlynly for for the benethe benef f itit of of cecer r tain inditain indivviduals; that it is piduals; that it is poolitically mlitically mootitivvated becauseated because petiti
petitioonener r ss vovoted against the incumbent mayted against the incumbent mayor or andand vvice-mayice-mayor or ; and that s; and that soomeme of of the suppthe suppoosedsed bene
benef f iciaiciar r iesies of of the land sthe land soought tught too be expbe exproroppr r iated haiated havve e nnoot actually signed a petitit actually signed a petitioon askingn asking for for thethe p
proropeper r ty but theity but their r signatusignatur r es wees wer r ee for for gedged or or they wethey wer r e misled inte misled intoo signing the samesigning the same.. The tThe tr r ial cial coouur r t deniedt denied petiti
petitioonener r s¶ Ms¶ Mootitioon tn too Dismiss and declaDismiss and declar r ed that the exped that the exproroppr r iatiiatioon in this case isn in this case is for for "public use" and the"public use" and the r
r espespoondent has the lawndent has the lawf f ulul r r ight tight too take the ptake the proropeper r ty upty upoon paymentn payment of of just cjust coompensatimpensatioonn.. Petiti
Petitioonener r s thens then f f iled iled a a PetitiPetitioonn for for Certiorari Certiorari bebefor for e the CA claiming that they wee the CA claiming that they wer r e denied due pe denied due prorocesscess when the t
when the tr r ial cial coouur r t declat declar r ed that the taking wased that the taking was for for public pupublic pur r ppoose withse withooutut r r eceieceivving eing evvidenceidence oonn petiti
petitioonener r s¶ claim that the Mays¶ claim that the Mayor or of of Panay was mPanay was mootitivvated by pated by poolitics in explitics in exproroppr r iating theiiating their r pproropeper r ty and inty and in denying thei
denying their r MMootitioon n ttoo HHoold in Abeyance the Heald in Abeyance the Hear r inging of of the Cthe Coouur r t Appt Appoointed Cinted Coommissimmissioonener r s; and thats; and that the t
the tr r ial cial coouur r t alst alsoo ccoommitted gmmitted gr r aavve abusee abuse of of discdiscr r etietioon when it disn when it disr r egaegar r ded the aded the aff ff idaidavvitsits of of peper r ssoonsns denying that they signed a petiti
denying that they signed a petitioon addn addr r essed tessed too the municipal gthe municipal govoveer r nmentnment of of PanayPanay.. Then CAThen CA r r endeender r eded its Decisi
its Decisioon dismissing the Petitin dismissing the Petitioonn for for Certiorari Certiorari .. It held that the petitiIt held that the petitioonener r s wes wer r e ne noot denied due pt denied due prorocesscess as they we
as they wer r e able te able too f f ile an answeile an answer r ttoo the cthe coomplaint and wemplaint and wer r e able te able too adduce theiadduce their r dedef f enses theenses ther r ein; andein; and that the pu
that the pur r ppoosese of of the taking in this case cthe taking in this case coonstitutes "public use"nstitutes "public use".. Issue:
Issue: WhetheWhether r the Municipal Gthe Municipal Govoveer r nmentnment of of Panay exePanay exer r cise the pcise the poowewer r of of Eminent DEminent Doomain is beingmain is being exe
exer r cised in acccised in accor or dance with the delegating law undedance with the delegating law under r the existencethe existence of of legislatilegislativve ge gr r ant inant in f f aavor vor of of lloocalcal g
govoveer r nmentsnments.. Decision:
Decision: The petitiThe petitioon is gn is gr r antedanted.. Rationale:
Rationale: The CThe Coouur r t in nt in noo unceuncer r tain tetain ter r ms hams havve e pproronnoounced that a lunced that a loocal gcal govoveer r nment unit cannnment unit cannoott auth
author or ize an expize an exproroppr r iatiiatioonn of of ppr r iivvate pate proropeper r ty thty throrough a meugh a mer r ee r r esesoolutilutioonn of of its lawmaking bits lawmaking boodydy.. RR.. A A.. NNo.o. 7160
7160 oothether r wise knwise knoown as the Lwn as the Loocal Gcal Govoveer r nment Cnment Coode expde expr r esslyessly r r equiequir r es anes an or or dinancedinance for for the puthe pur r ppoosese and a
and a r r esesoolutilutioon that men that mer r ely expely expr r esses the sentimentesses the sentiment of of the municipal cthe municipal coouncil will nuncil will noot sut suff ff iceice.. A
A r r esesoolutilutioon will nn will noot sut suff ff iceice for for an LGU tan LGU too be able tbe able too expexproroppr r iate piate pr r iivvate pate proropeper r ty; and thety; and the r r easeasoonn for for this isthis is settled: A municipal
settled: A municipal or or dinance is didinance is diff ff eer r entent frofrom m aa r r esesoolutilutioonn.. AnAn or or dinance is a law, but adinance is a law, but a r r esesoolutilutioon n isis me
mer r ely a declaely a declar r atiatioonn of of the sentimentthe sentiment or or oopinipinioonn of of a lawmaking ba lawmaking boodydy oon a specin a specif f ic matteic matter.r. AnAn or or dinancedinance p
poossesses a genessesses a gener r al and peal and per r manent chamanent char r acteacter r , but a, but a r r esesoolutilutioon is tempn is tempor or aar r y in natuy in natur r ee.. AdditiAdditioonally, thenally, the tw
twoo aar r e enacted die enacted diff ff eer r ently -- a thiently -- a thir r dd r r eading is necessaeading is necessar r yy for for anan or or dinance, but ndinance, but noott for for aa r r esesoolutilutioon, unlessn, unless decided
decided oothether r wise by a majwise by a major or ityity of of all theall the SanggunianSanggunian membemember r ss..
IIf f CCoongngr r ess intended tess intended too allalloow LGUs tw LGUs too exeexer r cise eminent dcise eminent doomain thmain throrough a meugh a mer r ee r r esesoolutilutioon, it wn, it woould hauld havvee simply ad
simply adoopted the languagepted the language of of the pthe pr r eevviioous Lus Loocal Gcal Govoveer r nment Cnment Coodede.. But CBut Coongngr r ess did ness did noott.. In a cleaIn a clear r di
divveer r gencegence frofrom the pm the pr r eevviioous Lus Loocal Gcal Govoveer r nment Cnment Coode, Secde, Sec.. 1919 of of RR.. A A.. [N[No.]o.] 7160 categ7160 categor or icallyically r r equiequir r eses that the l
that the loocal chiecal chief f executiexecutivve act pue act pur r suant tsuant too anan or or dinancedinance.. As
As r r espespoondent¶s expndent¶s exproroppr r iatiiatioon in this case was based men in this case was based mer r elyely oon an a r r esesoolutilutioon, such expn, such exproroppr r iatiiatioon is clean is clear r lyly de
def f ectiectivvee.. While the CWhile the Coouur r t is awat is awar r ee of of the cthe coonstitutinstitutioonal pnal poolicy plicy prorommooting lting loocal autcal autoonnoomy, the cmy, the coouur r t cannt cannoott g
gr r ant judicial sanctiant judicial sanctioon tn too an LGU¶s exean LGU¶s exer r cisecise of of its delegated pits delegated poowewer r of of eminent deminent doomain in cmain in coontntr r aavventientioonn of of the
Case: JULITA P. TAN vs. THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. no 170740 May 25, 2007
Facts: Julita P. Tan, petitioner her ein, is the r egister ed owner of a par cel of land consisting of 7,161 squar e meter s located at the souther n bank of the Zapote River in Sitio Wawa, Pulang Lupa, Las Piñas City. She acquir ed this proper ty from the San Antonio Development Cor por ation (SADC). Pr ior to the tr ansf er of the proper ty to petitioner by SADC, or on Mar ch 29, 1985, PEA wrote SADC r equesting per mission to enter the latter ¶s proper ty, for the pur pose of constr uction of road. PEA also proposed to SADC to star t their negotiation for its acquisition of the latter ¶s proper ty. The Public Estates Author ity (PEA) is a gover nment-owned and controlled cor por ation, or ganized and existing pur suant to Pr esidential Decr ee (P.D.) No. 1084. SADC r eplied author izing PEA to enter the proper ty, subject to the condition that the latter should pay a monthly r ental of P10,000.00. PEA then dir ected its contr actor , the Philippine National Constr uction Cor por ation, to enter the proper ty and begin the necessar y engineer ing wor ks on the Coastal Road. Then PEA r equested SADC either to donate or sell the proper ty to the gover nment. SADC r eplied by off er ing to sell the proper ty to PEA. SADC¶s asking pr ice was P1,288,980.00 plus P400,000.00 as compensation for the house and other improvements ther eon that wer e destroyed dur ing the constr uction of the Coastal Road. PEA infor med SADC it has no plan to buy the whole lot, but only the 1,131 squar e meter por tion above sea level. PEA then asked SADC to submit proof s of owner ship and costs of the improvements which wer e demolished. Negotiations then ensued between the par ties. However , for the past twenty (20) year s, they f ailed to r each an agr eement. Petitioner in her desper ation, wrote PEA expr essing her willingness to be compensated through a land swapping arr angement. She proposed that PEA¶s Fisher man¶s Wharf be given to her in exchange for her proper ty. The PEA Boar d approved the exchange of a por tion of petitioner ¶s lot. The par ties enter ed into a Memor andum of Agr eement wher ein PEA agr eed to execute a Deed of Exchange by way of compensation for petitioner ¶s
proper ty aff ected by the Coastal Road but withdr aw later on then f ile a complaint of expropr iation to the cour t. petitioner f iled with the RTC a motion to or der PEA to immediately pay her just compensation based on the zonal valuation of the BIR. Then the tr ial cour t gr anted the petition. Then PEA f iled for cer tior ar i to the Cour t of Appeals, and it was gr anted.
Issue: Whether the just compensation of the taking of the proper ty is proper ly applied. Decision: The decision of CA is r ever sed and the RTC decision Aff ir med.
Rationale: While PEA has been ear ning huge toll f ees, it has r ef used to pay petitioner any compensation for the use of her proper ty in violation of her r ight as an owner.
The above cir cumstances clear ly show that when PEA enter ed petitioner ¶s land in 1985, it was not for the pur pose of expropr iating it. We str ess that af ter its entr y, PEA wrote SADC r equesting to donate or sell the land to the gover nment. Indeed, ther e was no intention on the par t of PEA to expropr iate the subject proper ty. Why did it ask per mission from SADC to enter the proper ty? Ther eaf ter , why did it r equest SADC to donate or sell the land to the gover nment? It could have simply exer cised its power of eminent domain.
Section 2, Rule 67 (on Expropr iation) of the same Rules provides, among other s, that upon the f iling of the complaint or at any time ther eaf ter and af ter due notice to the def endant, the plaintiff shall have the r ight to take or enter upon the possession of the r eal proper ty involved if he deposits with the author ized gover nment depositar y an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the proper ty. It bear s r eiter ating that in R epublic v. Vda. de Castellvi , we r uled that just compensation is deter mined as of the date of the taking of the proper ty or the f iling of the complaint, whichever came f ir st.
We have made it clear that ther e was no taking of the proper ty in 1985 by PEA for pur poses of expropr iation. As shown by the r ecor ds, PEA f iled with the RTC its petiti on for expropr iation on September 22, 2003. The tr ial cour t, ther efor e, was corr ect in or der ing r espondent, through PEA, upon the f iling of its complaint for expropr iation, to pay petitioner just compensation on the basis of the BIR zonal valuation of the subject proper ty at P20,000.00 per squar e meter.
George L. Borja Constitutional Law II Case: CHEVRON PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY G.R. no 173863 September 15, 2010
Facts: Clar k Development Cor por ation (CDC) issued and approved Policy Guidelines on the Movement of Petroleum Fuel to and from the Clar k Special Economic Zone (CSEZ) which the petitioner protest the assessment for royalty f ees claiming that nothing in the law author izes CDC to impose royalty f ees or any f ees based on a per unit measur ement of any commodity sold within the special economic zone. Petitioner elevated its protest befor e r espondent Bases Conver sion Development Author ity (BCDA) ar guing that the royalty f ees imposed had no r easonable r elation to the probable expenses of r egulation and that the imposition on a per unit measur ement of f uel sales was for a r evenue gener ating pur pose, thus, akin to a "tax". The protest was however denied by BCDA. Petitioner appealed to the Off ice of the Pr esident which dismissed the appeal for lack of mer it and denied motion for r econsider ation ther eof. The petitioner elevated the case to the CA which likewise dismissed the appeal for lack of mer it and denied the motion for r econsider ation.The CA held that in imposing the challenged royalty f ees, r espondent CDC was exer cising its r ight to r egulate the f low of f uel into CSEZ, which is bolster ed by the f act that it possesses exclusive r ight to distr ibute f uel within CSEZ pur suant to its Joint Ventur e Agr eement (JVA) with Subic Bay Metropolitan Author ity (SBMA) and Coastal Subic Bay Ter minal, Inc. (CSBTI). The appellate cour t also found that royalty f ees wer e assessed on f uel deliver ed, not on the sale, by petitioner and that the basis of such imposition was petitioner ¶s deliver y r eceipts to Nanox Philippines. The f act that r evenue is incidentally also obtained does not make the imposition a tax as long as the pr imar y pur pose of such imposition is r egulation.
Issue:
a. Whether the royalty f ee imposed by CDC r egulator y in natur e.
b. Whether the Policy Guidelines of Clar k Development Cor por ation is valid gover nmental r egulation Decision: The petition is DENIED for lack of mer it and the Decision of the Cour t of Appeals is her eby AFFIRMED.
Rationale: In distinguishing tax and r egulation as a for m of police power , the deter mining f actor is the pur pose of the implemented measur e. If the pur pose is pr imar ily to r aise r evenue, then it will be deemed a tax even though the measur e r esults in some for m of r egulation. On the other hand, if the pur pose is pr imar ily to r egulate, then it is deemed a r egulation and an exer cise of the police power of the state, even though incidentally, r evenue is gener ated. Thus, in Gerochi v. Depar tment of Ener gy, the Cour t stated: The conservative and pivotal distinction between these two (2) power s r ests in the pur pose for which the char ge is made. If gener ation of r evenue is the pr imar y pur pose and r egulation is mer ely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if r egulation is the pr imar y pur pose, the f act that r evenue is incidentally r aised does not make the imposition a tax.
In the case at bar , we hold that the subject royalty f ee was imposed pr imar ily for r egulator y pur poses, and not for the gener ation of income or prof its as petitioner claims.
The need for r egulation is mor e evident in the light of the 9/11 tr agedy consider ing that what is being moved from one location to another ar e highly combustible f uel products that could cause loss of lives and damage to proper ties, hence, a set of guidelines was promulgated on 28 June 2002. It must be emphasized also that gr eater secur ity measur e must be observed in the CSEZ because of the pr esence of the air por t which is a vital public infr astr uctur e.
Administr ative issuances have the for ce and eff ect of law. They benef it from the same pr esumption of validity and constitutionality enjoyed by statutes. These two pr ecepts place a heavy bur den upon any par ty assailing gover nmental r egulations. Petitioner ¶s plain allegations ar e simply not enough to over come the pr esumption of validity and r easonableness of the subject imposition.
Law II
Case: CITY OF ILOILO vs. REMEDIOS SIAN VILLANUEVA and EUSEBIO VILLANUEVA, G.R. No. L-12695, March 23, 1959
Facts: The Municipal Boar d of Iloilo City enacted Or dinance No. 86, amending Or dinance No. 33, wher ein the following was provide: (1) tenement house (casa de vecindad), P25 annually; (2) tenement house par tly or wholly engaged in or dedicated to business in the str eets of J.M. Basa, Iznar t and Aldeguer , P24 per apar tment; (3) tenement house par tly or wholly engaged in business in any other
str eets, P12.00 per apar tment. Remedios Sian Villanueva and Eusebio Villanueva, spouses, ar e the owner s of four apar tment houses for r ent situated in Iloilo City, to which the city sought to collect from the spouses an annual license tax f ee of P24 for each of their 34 apar tments, or the total sum of P1,610 allegedly due dur ing the per iod from the four th quar ter of 1946 to the thir d quar ter of 1948, plus the sum of P332 r epr esenting 20% penalty. The spouses having r ef used to pay the same, the City of Iloilo f iled in the municipal cour t action to r ecover the tax and penalty.
Def endant spouses answer ed the complaint contending that the or dinance under which the tax is sought to be collected infr inges the power s gr anted to the city by its Char ter and that said or dinance is violative of the constitutional provisions r equir ing unifor mity of taxation upon the theor y that it is oppr essive, unr easonable and discr iminator y. Because of the issue of constitutionality r aised, the case was elevated to the Cour t of Fir st Instance of Iloilo. The CFI r ender ed judgment upholding the legality of the or dinance and or der ing def endants to pay the taxes claimed, with inter est and costs. Def endants appealed from this decision to the Cour t of Appeals, but this case was elevated to this Cour t because it involves only questions of law.
Issue: Whether the Or dinance no. 86 is unconstitutional.
Decision: The decision appealed from is r ever sed. The complaint is dismissed.
Rationale: It is well-settled that a municipal cor por ation, unlike a sover eign state, is clothed with no inher ent power of taxation. "The char ter or statute must plainly show an intent to conf er that power or the municipality cannot assume it. And the power when gr anted is to be constr ued strictissimi juris. Any doubt or ambiguity ar ising out of the ter m used in gr anting that power must be r esolved against the municipality. Inf er ences, implications, deductions ² all these ² have no place in the inter pr etation of the taxing power of a municipal cor por ation." And it not appear ing that the power to tax owner s of tenement houses is one among those clear ly and expr essly gr anted to the City of Iloilo by its Char ter , the exer cise of such power cannot be assumed and hence the or dinance in question is ultra vires insof ar as its taxes a tenement house such as those belonging to def endants.
George L. Borja Constitutional Law II Case: HON. JEJOMAR C. BINAY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI VS. HON. EUFEMIO
DOMINGO and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT G.R. No. 92389 September 11, 1991
Facts: Petitioner Municipality, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which to conf ir m or to r atif y the ongoing Bur ial Assistance Progr am Qualif ied benef iciar ies, under the Bur ial Assistance Progr am, ar e ber eaved f amilies of Makati whose gross f amily income does not exceed two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) a month. The benef iciar ies, upon f ulf illment of other r equir ements, would r eceive the amount of f ive hundr ed pesos (P500.00) cash r elief from the Municipality of Makati. Metro Manila Commission approved the r esolution. Ther eaf ter , the municipal secr etar y cer tif ied a disbur sement f ir ed of four hundr ed thousand pesos (P400,000.00) for the implementation of the Bur ial Assistance Progr am. The r esolution was r ef err ed to r espondent Commission on Audit (COA) for its expected allowance in audit. Based on its pr eliminar y f indings, r espondent COA disapproved the r esolution and disallowed in audit the disbur sement of f inds for the implementation ther eof. Petitioner , through its Mayor , was constr ained to f ile this special civil action of cer tior ar i pr aying that COA Decision be set aside as null and void.
Issue: Whether or not Resolution No. 60, of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exer cise of police power under the gener al welf ar e clause.
Decision: Petition is her eby GRANTED and the Commission on Audit's Decision No. 1159 is her eby SET ASIDE.
Rationale: COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public pur pose is not unconstitutional mer ely because it incidentally benef its a limited number of per sons. As corr ectly pointed out by the Off ice of the Solicitor Gener al, "the dr if t is towar ds social welf ar e legislation gear ed towar ds state policies to provide adequate social services, the promotion of the gener al welf ar e , social justice, as well as human dignity and r espect for human r ights.
The car e for the poor is gener ally r ecognized as a public duty. The suppor t for the poor has long been an accepted exer cise of police power in the promotion of the common good.
Ther e is no violation of the equal protection clause in classif ying pauper s as subject of legislation. Pauper s may be r easonably classif ied. Diff er ent groups may r eceive var ying tr eatment. Pr ecious to the hear ts of our legislator s, down to our local councilor s, is the welf ar e of the pauper s. Thus, statutes have been passed giving r ights and benef its to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-f ar mer from the bondage of the soil, housing the ur ban poor , etc.
Resolution No. 60, r e-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a par agon of the continuing progr am of our gover nment towar ds social justice. The Bur ial Assistance Progr am is a r elief of pauper ism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a f amily is a painf ul exper ience, and it is mor e painf ul for the poor to be f inancially bur dened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivif ies the ver y wor ds of the late Pr esident Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in lif e, should have mor e in law." This decision, however must not be taken as a pr ecedent, or as an off icial go-signal for municipal gover nments to embar k on a philanthropic or gy of inor dinate dole-outs for motives political or other wise.
Case: HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and VICENTE A. RUFINO, VS. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF THE CITY OF MANILA, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-23979 August 30, 1968
Facts: This is an action, against the Municipal Boar d and the Mayor of the City of Manila, for a declar ator y r elief. It was brought by the Homeowner s' Association of the Philippines, Inc. and its Pr esident, Vicente A. Ruf ino, to nullif y Municipal Or dinance No. 4841 of the City of Manila, approved on December 31, 1963, to take eff ect on Januar y 1, 1964. Which is an or dinance r egulating r entals of lots and building for r esidential pur poses. Af ter appropr iate proceedings, the Cour t of Fir st Instance of Manila r ender ed judgment declar ing said or dinance "ultra vires, unconstitutional, illegal and void ab initio without pronouncement as to costs. The lower cour t str uck down the questioned or dinance upon the ground that the power to "declar e a state of emer gency ... exclusively per tains to Congr ess"; that "ther e is no longer any state of emer gency" which may justif y the r egulation of house r entals; that said or dinance disconstitutes an unr easonable and unjustif ied limitation on the use of pr ivate proper ties and ar bitr ar ily encroaches on the constitutional r ights of proper ty owner s"; that the power of the City of Manila to "r egulate the business of ... letting or subletting of lands and buildings" does not include the author ity to prohibit what is for bidden in said or dinance; and that the same cannot be deemed sanctioned by the gener al welf ar e clause in the City Char ter. Hence, this appeal by the Mayor of Manila Said Or dinance. Issue: Whether or not or dinance 4841 is unconstitutional
Decision: the decision appealed from should be as it is her eby aff ir med, with costs against the appellant. Rationale: The pr actical r eason for the r equir ement that a statute passed to meet a given emer gency, should limit the per iod of its eff ectivity, is that, other wise, a new and diff er ent law would be necessar y to r epeal it, and said per iod would, accor dingly, be "unlimited, indef inite, negative and uncer tain", so that "that which was intended to meet a tempor ar y emer gency may become a per manent law",9 because "Congr ess might not enact the r epeal, and, even if it would, the r epeal might not meet with the approval of the Pr esident, and the Congr ess might not be able to overr ide the veto". In line with the basic philosophy under lying the author ity to aff ect individual r ights, this Cour t f elt that Commonwealth Act No. 671, other wise known as the Emer gency Power s Act, was meant to be and "became inoper ative when Congr ess met in r egular session on May 25, 1946," and that Executive Or der s Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 ² promulgated subsequently ther eto ² "wer e issued without author ity of law", because, other wise, said emer gency r egulations would pur por t to be in for ce for an indefinite and unlimited period of time, and, hence, would be unconstitutional .
The same consider ations impelled the Cour t to invalidate Executive Or der Nos. 545 and 546, issued on November 10, 1952. Indeed, other wise "the r esult would be obvious unconstitutionality", by making permanent a law intended to affor d a r elief for a temporary emer gency, the length of which should be "fixed in the law itself and not dependent upon the ar bitr ar y or elastic will of either Congr ess or the Pr esident".
We have not over looked the f act that the cases adver ted to r ef er par ticular ly to the constitutional provision author izing Congr ess, "in times of war or other national emer gency", to delegate to the Pr esident, "for a limited per iod", and subject to specif ied "r estr ictions", the power "to promulgate r ules and r egulations to carr y out a declar ed national policy". We ar e inclined to believe, however , that in providing that the lif etime of the author ity given must be "for a limited per iod", the fr amer s of our Char ter wer e inf luenced by the f act that power s wer e being delegated to the Executive, as much as by the cir cumstance that, since the cause for the gr ant of power was tempor ar y, so should the gr ant be, for the eff ect cannot r emain in existence upon the r emoval of its cause. In f act, Congr ess has, in actual pr actice, accepted this limitation upon its exer cise of police power to meet a condition of emer gency. Thus, Commonwealth Act No. 499 r egulated the tr ansf er of vessels and of shipping f acilities, eff ective until adjour nment of the next r egular session of the National Assembly. This was followed by Commonwealth Act No. 689 which penalized speculation on r ents of buildings destined for dwelling pur poses, but only "for a per iod of two (2) year s af ter its approval." This Act was amended by Republic Act No. 66 which, inter alia, extended its per iod of eff ectivity to "four (4) year s af ter it approval."
Needless to say, the power s of municipal cor por ations delegated ther eto by the National Gover nment cannot escape the inher ent limitations to which the latter ² as the sour ce of said power s ² is subject. Then, again, since our law on municipal cor por ations is, in pr inciple, patter ned af ter that of the United States, the r ule ther ein, to the eff ect that "in a proper case, emer gency legislation, limited in time, may be enacted under the police power " of a municipal cor por ation, should be consider ed a par t of our legal system.