DIGESTED CASES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TITLE OF THE CASE
MA. IMELDA M. MANOTOC, vs. HON. C. A. &
AGAPITA TRAJANO on behalf of the Estate of ARCHIMEDES TRAJANO,
G.R. No. 130974 August 16, 2006 - - - - - - - 1
MANCHESTER DEV. CORP., ET AL., vs. C.A. CITY LAND DEV. CORP., STEPHEN ROXAS, ANDREW LUISON, GRACE LUISON and JOSE DE MAISIP,
G.R. No. 75919 May 7, 1987 - - - - - - - - 1
ASS. OF PHIL. COCONUT DESICCATORS, VS PHIL COCONUT AUTHORITY,.
G.R. No. 110526 February 10, 1998 - - - - - - - 2
AYALA CORP., LAS PIÑAS VENTURES, INC., and FIL. LIFE ASS. COM., INC., vs. HON. JOB B. MADAYAG, PRES. JUDGE, RTC, NAT. CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BR. 145 and SPOUSES CAMILO AND MA. MARLENE SABIO.
G.R. No. 88421 January 30, 1990 - - - - - - - 2
SPS ROLANDO M. ZOSA and LUISA Y. ZOSA, vs.HON. SANTIAGO ESTRELLA, Pres Judge, R T C of Pasig City, Br. 67, CHINATRUST (PHILS.) COMMERCIAL BANK CORP,
NOTARY PUBLIC JAIME P. PORTUGAL, REG. OF DEEDS FOR PASIG CITY, CHAILEASE FINANCE CORPORATION, G.R. No. 149984 November 28, 2008
x - - - -x
SPS ROLANDO M. ZOSA and LUISA Y. ZOSA, vs. C.A., HON. SANTIAGO ESTRELLA, PreS Judge, R T C of Pasig City, Br. 67, CHINATRUST (PHILS.) COMMERCIAL BANK CORP.,
NOTARY PUBLIC JAIME P. PORTUGAL , CHAILEASE FINANCE CORPORATION,
G.R. No. 154991 November 28, 2008 - - - - - - 3
DOLORES MONTEFALCON & LAURENCE MONTEFALCON, vs. RONNIE S. VASQUEZ, .
G.R. No. 165016 June 17, 2008 - - - - - - - 4
GUIGUINTO CREDIT COOP., INC. (GUCCI), vs. AIDA TORRES, NONILO TORRES and SHERYL ANN TORRES-HOLGADO.
G.R. No. 170926 September 15, 2006 - - - - - - 4
AUGUSTO A. CAMARA AND FELICIANA CAMARA, vs. HON. C. A. AND CELINA R. HERNAEZ,.
G.R. No. 100789 July 20, 1999 - - - - - - - 5
PROV. OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, rep by GOV. ISAGANI S. AMATONG,
MELODY PAULINO LOPEZ, vs. NAT. LABOR REL. COMMISSION, LETRAN COLLEGE-MANILA, FR. ROGELIO ALARCON, O.P., FR. EDWIN LAO, O.P. and MS. PERLY NAVARRO,
G.R. No. 124548 October 8, 1998 - - - - - - - 6
PEDRO SEPULVEDA, SR., subs. by SOCORRO S. LAWAS, Admin. of His Estate, , vs. ATTY. PACIFICO S. PELAEZ, .
G.R. No. 152195 January 31, 2005 - - - - - - 7
RADIO COMMS. OF THE PHILS, INC. VS. C. A.
386 SCRA 67. August 1, 2002 - - - - - - - - 7
NG SOON, vs. HON. ALOYSIUS ALDAY, RTC, QUEZON CITY, BILLIE GAN AND CHINA BANKING CORPORATION,
G.R. No. 85879 September 29, 1989 - - - - - - - 8
MODESTA CALIMLIM AND LAMBERTO MAGALI
IN HIS CAP. AS ADMIN. OF THE ESTATE OF DOMINGO MAGALI, vs. HON. PEDRO A. RAMIREZ
G.R. No. L-34362 November 19, 1982 - - - - - - - 9
LA NAVAL DRUG CORP., vs. C A and WILSON C. YAO.
G.R. No. 103200 August 31, 1994 - - - - - - - 10
BRGY. SAN ROQUE, TALISAY, CEBU, vs. Heirs of FRANCISCO PASTOR namely: EUGENIO SYLIANCO, TEODORO SYLIANCO, TEODORO SYLIANCO, ISABEL SYLIANCO, EUGENIA S. ONG, LAWRENCE SYLIANCO, LAWSON SYLIANCO, LAWINA S. NOTARIO, LEONARDO SYLIANCO JR. and LAWFORD SYLIANCO.
G.R. No. 138896 June 20, 2000 - - - - - - - 11
MIGUELITO LIMACO, ET AL. VS.
SHONAN GAKUEN CHILDREN'S HOUSE PHILIPPINES, INC.
G.R. No. 158245. June 30, 2005 - - - - - - - 12
FILOMENA DOMAGAS, vs. VIVIAN LAYNO JENSEN.
G.R. No. 158407 January 17, 2005 - - - - - - 13
ROXAS & CO., INC., vs. C.A., DEP. OF AGR. REFORM, SEC. OF AGR. REFORM, DAR REG. DIR. FOR REG. IV, MUN. AGR.REFORM OFFICER OF NASUGBU, BATANGAS DEP. OF AGR. REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD,.
G.R. No. 127876. December 17, 1999 - - - - - - - 14
SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS and D.J. WARBY, vs. HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Pres. Judge, Br 104, R T C, Quezon City and MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG.
G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989 - - - - - - 15
3 VS. SPOUSES HELEN AND ROMEO BOYON
G.R. No. 147369. October 23, 2003 - - - - - - - 16
FRANCISCO S. HERNANDEZ and JOSEFA U. ATIENZA, vs. RURAL BANK OF LUCENA, INC., CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, and JOSE S. MARTINEZ in his capacity
as Receiver of Rural Bank of Lucena,
G.R. No. L-29791 January 10, 1978 - - - - - - - 17
NILO H. RAYMUNDO, vs .C A, HON. APOLINARIO B. SANTOS, Pres. Judge, RTC, Br. 67, Pasig City, and JUAN MARCOS ARELLANO.
G.R. No. 137793. September 29, 1999 - - - - - - - 18
LAFARGE CEMENT PHILIPPINES, INC., (formerly Lafarge Philippines, Inc.), LUZON CONTINENTAL LAND CORP, CONTINENTAL OPERATING CORP. and PHILIP ROSEBERG, vs. CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORPORATION, GREGORY T. LIM and ANTHONY A. MARIANO,
G.R. No. 155173 November 23, 2004 - - - - - - 20
ABRAHAM GEGARE, vs. C.A, and SPS. MELENCIO and SOTERA C. LAVARES,
G.R. No. 132264. October 8, 1998 - - - - - - - 21
COLUMBIA PICTURES ENT., INC., MGM ENT. CO., ORION PICTURES CORP, PARAMOUNT PICTURES CORP., UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC.,
THE WALT DISNEY COMP and WARNER BROTHERS, INC., vs. C. A., and JOSE B. JINGCO of SHOWTIME ENTERPRISES., INC.,
G.R. No. 111267. September 20, 1996 - - - - - - 21
DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO., INC., Vs C. A., HON. RODOLFO M. BELLAFLOR, PreS. Judge of Branch 11, RTC-Cebu and FRANCISCO TESORERO,.
G.R. No. 111685. August 20, 2001 - - - - - - - 22
ROMEO C. GARCIA, vs. DIONISIO V. LLAMAS,
G.R. No. 154127. December 8, 2003 - - - - - - - 23
ASIAN CONST. & DEV. CORP. vs. C. A and MONARK EQUIPMENT CORP.,
G.R. No. 160242 May 17, 2005 - - - - - - - 25
WOOD TECH. CORP. (WTC), CHI TIM CORDOVA AND ROBERT TIONG KING YOUNG, vs. EQUITABLE BANKING CORP.
G.R. No. 153867 February 17, 2005 - - - - - - 26
ASSOCIATED BANK, vs. SPS JUSTINIANO S. MONTANO, SR., LIGAYA MONTANO and TRES CRUCES AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORP.
G.R. No. 166383 October 16, 2009 - - - - - - 27
PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE PTE LTD., versus DAKILA TRADING CORP.,
MIGUELITO B. LIMACO, ROGELIO LIMACO, JR., and ISIDRO LIMACO, vs. SHONAN GAKUEN CHILDREN'S HOUSE PHILS, INC.,
G.R. No. 158245 June 30, 2005 - - - - - - 29
LAGRIMAS PACAÑA-GONZALES, one of the heirs of Luciano Pacaña, vs. C.AP. and MANUEL CARBONELL PHUA,
G.R. No. 150908 January 21, 2005 - - - - - - 30
PEDRO T. SANTOS, JR., VS. PNOC EXPLORATION CORPORATION,
G.R. No. 170943, September 23, 2008 - - - - - - - 31
NICASIO P. RODRIGUEZ JR., ANTONIO P. EREÑETA, JUANITO A. MAGNO,
VICTOR C. PINEDA, BITUIN V. SALCEDO, CESAR R. SAN DIEGO, VICTOR V. TANTOCO and AMADOR C. DE LA MERCED, vs. ANTONIO L. AGUILAR SR..
G.R. No. 159482. August 30, 2005 - - - - - - - 32
EDWIN N. TRIBIANA, vs. LOURDES M. TRIBIANA,
G.R. No. 137359 September 13, 2004 - - - - - - 32
LEONARDO ARCENAS, rep. by his attorney-in-fact
CARMELITA ARCENAS VILLANUEVA, vs. C.A., Hon. ARMIE E. ELMA, Pres. Judge of Br. 153, RTC of Pasig City, and JOSE DELA RIVA,
G.R. No. 130401 December 4, 1998 - - - - - - - 33
JOSEPHINE B. NG and JESSE NG, vs. SPOUSES MARCELO and MARIA FE SOCO, and MARVIN J. SOCO,
G.R. No. 149132 May 9, 2002 - - - - - - - 34
AYALA LAND, INC., vs. HON. LUCENITO N. TAGLE, in his capacity as Pres. Judge, RTC-Imus, Br. 20,
ASB REALTY CORP., and E. M. RAMOS & SONS, INC., - - - - - 34
SALVADOR D. BRIBONERIA, vs. C. A, GERTRUDES B. MAG-ISA, married to and assisted by PEDRO MAG-ISA,
G.R. No. 101682 December 14, 1992 - - - - - - - 35
LUDWIG H. ADAZA, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (the First DIVISION composed of Justices GREGORIO S. ONG, CATALINO R. CASTANEDA, JR.
and FRANCISCO H. VILLARUZ, JR. and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICE,
G.R. No. 154886. July 28, 2005 - - - - - - - 36
CALIFORNIA AND HAWAIIAN SUGAR COM; PACIFIC GULF MARINE, INC.;
and C.F. SHARP & COMPANY, vs. PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY CORPORATION, - - 37
5 JONATHAN LANDOIL INTERNATIONAL CO., INC.,
vs. Sps. SUHARTO MANGUDADATU and MIRIAM SANGKI MANGUDADATU,
G.R. No. 155010 August 16, 2004 - - - - - - 38 45.
LUCIANO ELLO and GAUDIOSA ELLO, vs. CA, SPRINGFIELD DEV. CORP. and CONSTANTINO G. JARAULA,
G.R. No. 141255 June 21, 2005 - - - - - - 40
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY VS. ALA INDUSTRIES CORPORATION
G.R. No. 147349. February 13, 2004 - - - - - - - 41
BAILINANG MAROHOMBSAR VS. JUDGE SANTOS ADIONG
G.R. No. RTJ-02-1674. January 22, 2004 - - - - - - 42
MARIO SIASOCO, ANGELITA E. SIASOCO, MA. BELLA SIASOCO, ESTER SIASOCO-LAMUG, MA. LOURDES SIASOCO LAMUG-BARRIOS, MA. RAMONA SIASOCO-LAMUG,
MA. VICTORIA SIASOCO LAMUG-DOMINGUEZ, BELEN SIASOCO-JOSE, RAFAEL SIASOCO JOSE, CYNTHIA SIASOCO JOSE, CRISTINA SIASOCO JOSE, ROBERTO SIASOCO JOSE, CARIDAD SIASOCO JOSE, RAMON SIASOCO JOSE,
OSCAR SIASOCO, RUBEN SIASOCO, SALOME SIASOCO-PAZ, MEDARDO PAZ SIASOCO, ROLANDO PAZ SIASOCO, JESUS PAZ SIASOCO, NELLY STO. DOMINGO NARIO, MARY GRACE STO. DOMINGO NARIO and MARY ANNE STO. DOMINGO NARIO, vs. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. MARCELINO BAUTISTA JR., Pres. Judge,
Br. 215, R T C, Quezon City; and the IGLESIA NI CRISTO,
G.R. No. 132753 February 15, 1999 - - - - - - - 43
NORA A. BITONG, vs. C.A (FIFTH DIVISION), EUGENIA D. APOSTOL, JOSE A. APOSTOL, MR. & MS. PUBLISHING CO., LETTY J. MAGSANOC, AND ADORACION G. NUYDA,
NORA A. BITONG, vs. C.A. (FIFTH DIVISION) and EDGARDO B. ESPIRITU,
G.R. No. 123553. July 13, 1998 - - - - - - - 44
MARCIANA SERDONCILLO, vs. SPS. FIDEL and EVELYN BENOLIRAO, MELITON CARISIMA, and COURT OF APPEALS,.
G.R. No. 118328 October 8, 1998 - - - - - - - 45
ALLIED AGRI-BUSINESS DEV. CO., INC., vs. C. A. and CHERRY VALLEY FARMS LIMITED,
G.R. No. 118438 December 4, 1998 - - - - - - - 46.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ROMEO HILLADO,
G.R. No. 122838. May 24, 1999 - - - - - - - 46
ASIAVEST LIMITED, vs. C. A and ANTONIO HERAS,
G.R. No. 128803 September 25, 1998 - - - - - - - 47
G.R. No. 130974 August 16, 2006
MA. IMELDA M. MANOTOC, Petitioner, vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and AGAPITA TRAJANO on behalf of the Estate of ARCHIMEDES TRAJANO, Respondents.
In the case of Trajano vs. Manotoc for wrongful death of the deceased Archimedes Trajano committed by Military Intelligence under the command of Ma. Imelda M. Manotoc. Based upon the complaint the Regional Trial Court issued a summons at the house of Manotoc. The said Mackey dela Cruz (caretaker) received the summons. Manotoc was declared in default for failure to answer.
Whether or not the RTC acquire a valid jurisdiction for the service of summons over the petitioner.
The Regional Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petitioner, because the substituted service of summons was defective in nature or invalid at the first place. The main fact that the summons was not sent in the petitioner’s dwelling, The said caretaker was not a person of suitable age and discretion and was not resided in the said address. Hence the requisites of
substituted summons was not followed, therefore the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petitioner at the first place.
G.R. No. 75919 May 7, 1987
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL., petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS, ANDREW LUISON, GRACE LUISON and JOSE DE MAISIP, respondents.
This was originally a case of an action for torts and damages and specific performance with a prayer for temporary restraining order. The damages were not specifically stated in the prayer but the body of the complaint assessed a P 78.75 M. damages suffered by the petitioner. The amount of docket fee paid was only P410.00. The petitioner then amended the complaint and reduced the damages to P10 M only.
When does a court acquire jurisdiction?
Does an amended complaint vest jurisdiction in the court?
The court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not vest jurisdiction in the court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. All complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for. Damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case.
G.R. No. 110526 February 10, 1998
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS, petitioner, VS
Petitioner alleged that the issuance of licenses to the applicants would violate PCA's Administrative Order, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order and, writ of preliminary injunction, while the case was pending in the Regional Trial Court, the Governing Board of the PCA issued a Resolution for the withdrawal of the Philippine Coconut Authority from all regulation of the coconut product processing industry. While it continues the registration of coconut product processors, the registration would be limited to the "monitoring" of their volumes of production and administration of quality standards.
The PCA issue "certificates of registration" to those wishing to operate desiccated coconut processing plants, prompting petitioner to appeal to the Office of the President of the Philippines for not to approve the resolution in question. Despite follow-up letters sent petitioner received no reply from the Office of the President. The "certificates of registration" issued in the meantime by the PCA has enabled a number of new coconut mills to operate.
At issue in this case is the validity of a resolution, of the Philippine Coconut Authority in which it declares that it will no longer require those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply to it for a license or permit as a condition for engaging in such business.
The petition is GRANTED. PCA Resolution and all certificates of registration issued under it are hereby declared NULL and VOID for having been issued in excess of the power of the Philippine Coconut Authority to adopt or issue. The PCA cannot rely on the memorandum of then President Aquino for authority to adopt the resolution in question. The President Aquino approved the establishment and operation of new DCN plants subject to the guidelines to be drawn by the PCA.In the first place, it could not have intended to amend the several laws already mentioned, which set up the regulatory system, by a mere memoranda to the PCA. In the second place, even if that had been her intention, her act would be without effect considering that, when she issued the
memorandum in question on February 11, 1988, she was no longer vested with legislative authority.
G.R. No. 88421 January 30, 1990
AYALA CORPORATION, LAS PIÑAS VENTURES, INC., and FILIPINAS LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, INC., petitioners
THE HONORABLE JOB B. MADAYAG, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 145 and THE SPOUSES CAMILO AND MA. MARLENE SABIO, respondents.
Private respondents filed against petitioners an action for specific performance with damages in the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the lower court has not acquired jurisdiction over the case as private respondents failed to pay the prescribed docket fee and to specify the amount of exemplary damages both in the body and prayer of the amended and supplemental complaint. The trial court denied the motion. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was likewise denied.
The main thrust of the petition is that private respondent paid only the total amount of P l,616.00 as docket fees instead of the amount of P13,061.35 based on the assessed value of the real properties involved as evidenced by its tax declaration. Further, petitioners contend that private respondents failed to specify the amount of exemplary damages sought both in the body and the prayer of the amended and supplemental complaint.
Whether or not the RTC acquire jurisdiction for not specifying the correct amount of docket fees.
The trial court may either order said claim to be expunged from the record as it did not acquire jurisdiction over the same or on motion, it may allow, within a reasonable time, the amendment of the amended and supplemental complaint so as to state the precise amount of the exemplary damages sought and require the payment of the requisite fees therefore within the relevant prescriptive period.
The trial court is directed either to expunge from the record the claim for exemplary damages in the amended and supplemental complaint, the amount of which is not specified, or it may otherwise, upon motion, give reasonable time to private respondents to amend their pleading by specifying its amount and paying the corresponding docketing fees within the appropriate reglementary or prescriptive period.
G.R. No. 149984 November 28, 2008
SPOUSES ROLANDO M. ZOSA and LUISA Y. ZOSA,petitioners, vs.
HON. SANTIAGO ESTRELLA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 67, CHINATRUST (PHILS.) COMMERCIAL BANK CORPORATION, NOTARY PUBLIC JAIME P. PORTUGAL, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR PASIG CITY, and CHAILEASE FINANCE CORPORATION,respondents. x - - - -x
G.R. No. 154991 November 28, 2008
SPOUSES ROLANDO M. ZOSA and LUISA Y. ZOSA,petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SANTIAGO ESTRELLA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 67, CHINATRUST (PHILS.) COMMERCIAL BANK CORPORATION, NOTARY PUBLIC JAIME P. PORTUGAL FOR PASIG CITY, and CHAILEASE FINANCE CORPORATION, respondents.
This is the two (2) cases, involved by the same parties, for the same cause of action, which is filed successively for the same purpose of obtaining a favorable relief.
Whether or not the trial court’s dismissal order for non suit constitutes forum shopping.
The appeal for the dismissal order for non suit constitutes forum shopping and it is proper to dismiss because it would constitute different and unfavorable result, to avoid the resultant confusion the court strictly against forum shopping and my violation constitutes dismissal of the case.
G.R. No. 165016 June 17, 2008
DOLORES MONTEFALCON & LAURENCE MONTEFALCON, petitioners, vs.
RONNIE S. VASQUEZ, respondent.
Dolores filed a complaint complaint for acknowledgment and support against respondent Ronnie Vasquez for his son Laurence Montefalcon.
1. Was there a valid substituted service of summons on Vasquez? 2. Was the respondent obliged to give support to Laurence?
1. There was a valid substituted service of summons because it was sent to his last known address and it was received by Raquel Bejer a caretaker of his resident. A person who is of suitable age and discretion and is also residing at Vasquez’s dwelling. All of the requisites for substituted service were followed by the petitioner.
2. Ronnie Vasquez was obliged to give support because it was recognized by him. The fact itself that the respondent knows that the said Laurence Montefalcon was his son and that he was previously gave support to Laurence before he went abroad.
G.R. No. 170926 September 15, 2006
GUIGUINTO CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC. (GUCCI), petitioner, vs.
AIDA TORRES, NONILO TORRES and SHERYL ANN TORRES-HOLGADO, respondents.
Respondents availed loan from the cooperative but were unable to pay on due dates specified. The cooperative filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court for sum of money and damages. The respondents were given summons and it is received by Benita Paglawanan, the said to be the secretary of the defendants.
Whether or not the summons was validly served on the respondents
If the personal service of summons cannot be resorted then the substituted service of summons may follow. It is effected by leaving copies of summons at the defendant’s dwelling with some person suitable of age and discretion residing therein, or by leaving the copies in defendants office or business with a competent person in charge. A competent person must have a trust and confidence relationship with the respondent.
Benita Pagtalunan who received the summons and who is alleged to be the secretary of the three (3) respondents did not have any relationship of Trust and confidence with the said
respondents. Therefore such service of summons is not binding and is not valid.
G.R. No. 100789 July 20, 1999
AUGUSTO A. CAMARA AND FELICIANA CAMARA, petitioners, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND CELINA R. HERNAEZ, respondents.
Zulueta sold a parcel of land in favor of Camara. After the execution of the deed of sale, the latter found out that the title was burdened with two encumbrances. He then filed an action for specific performance against Zulueta to remove the encumbrances. The trial court ordered Zulueta to cancel the mortgages or return the purchase price of P15,000. When Zulueta died, Camara availed of the alternative remedy by presenting a money claim as creditor in the intestate estate of the former. He was granted partial execution of P10,000.
Hernaez, the mortgagee of the lot appearing on the title, filed an action for judicial foreclosure of the contract of mortgage against the former’s heirs. The trial court ruled in favor of Hernaez. The property involved was sold in a public auction and a corresponding certificate of sale was awarded to Hernaez as the highest bidder and a judicial confirmation of ownership was issued.
Camara then instituted a case for quieting of title against Hernaez before the Makati RTC which dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal and ruled that Camara has no cause of action against Hernaez.
Whether or not the action for quieting of title should be dismissed on the ground of lack of cause of action.
A cause of action is defined as an act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. Camara’s cause of action arose from the contract of sale executed by Zulueta in his favor. The act of the vendor Zulueta of selling a property burdened with encumbrances, in violation of the warranty that it was free from liens and encumbrances, was already atoned when Camara obtained a decision in the action for specific performance where Camara opted to present a money claim against the estate of Zulueta and was granted partial execution. Consequently, Camara cannot again rely on the same violation of warranty as a cause of action for quieting of title.
PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, represented by GOV. ISAGANI S. AMATONG, petitioner,
COURT OF APPEALS and ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., respondents.
Petitioner Province of Zamboanga del Norte (represented by Gov. Isagani S. Amatong) filed with the Regional Trial Court, a complaint against Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative (ZANECO) for “Illegal Collection Of Power Bills And Preliminary Injunction With Restraining Order.” Petitioner alleged that as per electric bills issued by ZANECO increased the Fuel Compensating Charge (FCC) Petitioner claimed that the increase was arbitrary and illegal, and that the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) did not sanction the collections. Petitioner also alleged that ZANECO cannot increase the bills since the power rate increase from the National Power Corporation (NPC) was not implemented yet due to a restraining order issued by the Supreme Court. The trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent to desist from imposing, charging, billing and collecting the FCC and other additional charges upon its end-users in Zamboanga del Norte and to refrain from cutting off the electric lines of those who refused to pay the questioned charges, pending determination of the litigation.
Petitioner submits that jurisdiction is vested with the Energy Regulatory Board or the regular trial courts, while respondents position is that jurisdiction lies with the National Electrification Administration. What is before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals, that reversed the orders of the Regional Trial Court, Zamboanga del Norte denying petitioner’s motion for dismissal of the complaint.
Which government agency has jurisdiction over a complaint for illegal collection of power bills by an electric cooperative?
The regulation and fixing of power rates to be charged by electric cooperatives remain within the jurisdiction of the National Electrification Administration, despite the enactment of Executive Order No. 172, creating the Energy Regulatory Board. The issue raised in the complaint is the legality of the imposition of the FCC or ICC. Despite the fact that diesel fuel was used to run its machinery, the fact is that respondent charged its consumers to compensate for the increase in the price of fuel. Petitioner did not question the price of diesel fuel. Rather, it questioned the charges passed on to its end users as a result of increase in the price of fuel. And the body with the technical expertise to determine whether or not the charges are legal is the NEA.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence. In fact, a party with an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief, but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention. The underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the presumption that when the administrative body, or grievance machinery, is afforded a chance to pass upon the matter, it will decide the same correctly. The premature invocation of the jurisdiction of the trial court warrants the dismissal of the case. It AFFIRM in toto with the decision of the Court of Appeals.
G.R. No. 124548 October 8, 1998
MELODY PAULINO LOPEZ, petitioner, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LETRAN COLLEGE-MANILA, FR. ROGELIO ALARCON, O.P., FR. EDWIN LAO, O.P. and MS. PERLY NAVARRO, respondents.
For allegedly uttering indecent and obscene remarks against a member of administration, Melody Lopez was placed under preventive suspension for thirty (30) days. She later found out that employment file contained several unsavory reports without her being given the chance to defend her side. Thereafter, she was dismissed from her employment based on that incident and other past misconducts appearing in employment file. She filed a case for illegal dismissal.
Whether or not the dismissal is warranted based on the evidence presented.
The dismissal was illegal. The past infractions cannot be collectively taken as a justification for her dismissal from the service. The petitioner is not required to prove her innocence on the charges leveled against her but the burden rests upon the respondent to establish the valid cause of termination. Where there is absence of clear, valid and legal cause of termination, the law considers it a case of illegal dismissal. In termination cases, the burden of proving the just cause of dismissing an employee rests on the employer, and his failure to do so would result in a finding that the dismissal is not justified. Having failed to establish by concrete and direct evidence, no
substantial basis exists for petitioner’s dismissal.
G.R. No. 152195 January 31, 2005
PEDRO SEPULVEDA, SR., substituted by SOCORRO S. LAWAS, Administratrix of His Estate, petitioner,
Atty. Pacifico Pelaez filed a complaint against his granduncle, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr., for the recovery of possession and ownership of his share of several parcels of land; and for the partition thereof among the co-owners. In his complaint, the private respondent alleged that his mother Dulce died intestate and aside from himself, was survived by her husband Rodolfo Pelaez and her mother Carlota Sepulveda. Dulce’s grandfather Vicente Sepulveda died intestate and Dulce was then only about four years old. The private respondent alleged that he himself demanded the delivery of his mother’s share in the subject properties on so many occasions, the last of which was in 1972, to no avail.
The private respondent further narrated that his granduncle executed an affidavitstating that he was the sole heir of Dionisia when in fact, the latter was survived by her three sons,
Santiago, Pedro and Vicente. Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. also executed a Deed of Absolute Salein favor of the City of Danao for P7,492.00. According to the private respondent, his granduncle received this amount without his (private respondent’s) knowledge. The trial court ruled that the private
respondent’s action for reconveyance based on constructive trust had not yet prescribed when the complaint was filed; that he was entitled to a share in the proceeds of the sale of the property to Danao City; and that the partition of the subject property among the adjudicatees thereof was in order.
The petitioner appealed the decision to the CA, which rendered judgment on January 31, 2002, affirming the appealed decision with modification. The petitioner now comes to the Court via a petition for review on certiorari, contending that the appellate court erred:
Whether or not the RTC’S judgment was validly rendered
Rodolfo Pelaez is an indispensable party he being entitled to a share in usufruct, equal to the share of the respondent in the subject properties. The plaintiff is mandated to implead all the indispensable parties, considering that the absence of one such party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. Without the presence of all the other heirs as plaintiffs, the trial court could not validly render judgment and grant relief in favor of the private respondent. The failure of the private respondent to implead the other heirs as parties-plaintiffs constituted a legal obstacle to the trial court and the appellate court’s exercise of judicial power over the said case, and rendered any orders or judgments rendered therein a nullity.
To reiterate, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.Hence, the trial court should have ordered the dismissal of the complaint.
386 SCRA 67. August 1, 2002
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. VS.
COURT OF APPEALS
Private respondent Manuel Dulawon filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for breach of contract of lease with damages against petitioner Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI). Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction contending that it is the Municipal Trial Court which has jurisdiction as the
complaint is basically one for collection of unpaid rentals.
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by private respondent.
RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint. The averments in the complaint reveal that the suit filed by private respondent was primarily one for specific performance as it was aimed to enforce their three-year lease contract which would incidentally entitle him to monetary awards if the court should find that the subject contract of lease was breached. As alleged therein, petitioner’s failure to pay rentals due for the period from January to March 1997, constituted a violation of their contract which had the effect of accelerating the payment of monthly rentals for the years 1997 and 1998. Clearly, the action for specific performance, irrespective of the amount of the rentals and damages sought to be recovered, is incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence, cognizable
exclusively by the RTC.
G.R. No. 85879 September 29, 1989
NG SOON, petitioner, vs.
HON. ALOYSIUS ALDAY, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, QUEZON CITY, BILLIE GAN AND CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, respondents.
A savings account was allegedly maintained with the China Banking Corporation (CBC) by Gan Bun Yaw, both of whom are respondents herein. Petitioner, Ng Soon, claims to be the latter's widow. For the filing of the Complaint, petitioner paid the sum of P3,600.00 as docket fees. Respondent Billie Gan and the Bank, respectively, moved for the dismissal of the Complaint. Subsequently, respondent Gan, joined by the Bank, moved to expunge the said Complaint from the record for alleged non-payment of the required docket fees. During the pendency of this case, respondent Gan filed a Manifestation alleging, among others, that petitioner is an impostor and not the real Ng Soon, wife of Gan Bun Yaw, since the real Mrs. Gan Bun Yaw (Ng Soon) died. This allegation was, however, denied by petitioner. The respondent Judge issued the questioned Order granting the "Motion to Expunge Complaint
Petitioner's Motion for the reconsideration of the said Order having been denied, she asks for its review, more properly for a Writ of Certiorari.
1. Whether or not the doctrine laid down in the Manchester case was incorrectly applied by respondent Judge;
2. Whether or not the Respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he ordered the Complaint expunged from the record although petitioner had paid the necessary filing fees.
1. It is true that Manchester laid down the rule that all Complaints should specify the amount of damages prayed for not only in the body of the complaint but also in the prayer; that said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case; and that any pleading that fails to comply with such requirement shall not be accepted nor
admitted, or shall, otherwise, be expunged from the record. The pattern in Manchester to defraud the Government of the docket fee due, the intent not to pay the same having been obvious not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint, is patently absent in this case. Petitioner demonstrated her
willingness to abide by the Rules by paying the assessed docket fee of P 3,600.00. She had also asked the lower Court to inform her of the deficiency, if any, but said Court did not heed her plea.
2. A final determination is still to be made by the Court, and the fees ultimately found to be payable will either be additionally paid by the party concerned or refunded to him, as the case may be.The respondent Judge, hereby directed to reinstate Civil Case No. Q-52489 for determination and proper disposition of the respective claims and rights of the parties, including the controversy as to the real identity of petitioner.
G.R. No. L-34362 November 19, 1982
MODESTA CALIMLIM AND LAMBERTO MAGALI IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF DOMINGO MAGALI, petitioners,
HON. PEDRO A. RAMIREZ IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PANGASINAN, BRANCH I, and FRANCISCO RAMOS, respondents.
Judgment for a sum of money and a writ of execution was rendered in favor of
Independent Mercantile Corporation against a certain Manuel Magali by the Municipal Court of Manila, The Notice of Levy made on a parcel of land registered in the name of "Domingo Magali, married to Modesta Calimlim", specified that the said levy was only against "all rights, title, action, interest and participation of the defendant Manuel Magali over the parcel of land described in this title." However, when the Sheriff issued the final Deed of Sale, it was erroneously stated therein that the sale was with respect to "the parcel of land described in this title" (referring to TCT No. 9138) and not only over the rights and interest of Manuel Magali in the same. The execution of the said final Deed of Sale was annotated at the back of said title.
Petitioner Modesta Calimlim, surviving spouse of Domingo Magali, filed a petition with the respondent Court, sitting as a cadastral court, praying for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568. An opposition to the said petition was filed by Independent Mercantile Corporation. After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the respondent Court issued an Order dismissing the petition. The herein petitioners did not appeal the dismissal of the petition they filed in LRC Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568. Instead, they filed the complaint in Civil Case No. SCC-180 praying for the cancellation of the conveyances and sales that had been made with respect to the property, covered by TCT No. 9138 previously registered in the name of Domingo Magali, herein private respondent Francisco Ramos who claimed to have bought the property from Independent Mercantile Corporation. Private respondent Francisco Ramos, however, failed to obtain a title over the property in his name in view of the existence of an adverse claim annotated on the title thereof at the instance of the herein petitioners.
Private respondent Francisco Ramos filed a Motion To Dismiss on the ground that the same is barred by prior judgement or by statute of limitations. Resolving the said Motion, the respondent Court, dismissed Civil Case No. SCC- 180 on the ground of estoppel by prior judgment. A Motion For Reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied by the respondent Judge. A second Motion For Reconsideration was similarly denied.
The dismissal of Civil Case No. SCC-180 filed by the herein petitioners in the respondent Court against the private respondent is sought to be annulled and set aside by this Petition For Review On Certiorari.
It is neither fair nor legal to bind a party by the result of a suit or proceeding which was taken cognizance of in a court which lacks jurisdiction over the same irrespective of the attendant circumstances. The equitable defense of estoppel requires knowledge or consciousness of the facts upon which it is based. The same thing is true with estoppel by conduct which may be asserted only when it is shown, among others, that the representation must have been made with knowledge of the facts and that the party to whom it was made is ignorant of the truth of the matter.
The inequity of barring the petitioners from vindicating their right over their property in Civil Case No. SCC-180 is rendered more acute in the face of the undisputed fact that the property in question admittedly belonged to the petitioners, and that the title in the name of the private respondent was the result of an error committed by the Provincial Sheriff in issuing the deed of sale in the execution proceeding. The Motion To Dismiss filed by the private respondent in Civil Case No. SCC-180 shall be deemed denied and the respondent Court is ordered to conduct further
proceedings in the case.
G.R. No. 103200 August 31, 1994
LA NAVAL DRUG CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and WILSON C. YAO, respondents.
Respondent Yao, owner of a commercial building which is leased to petitioner under a contract of lease executed. But later the petitioner and respondent Yao disagreed on the rental rate, their disagreement were submitted to arbitration, respondent Yao appointed Domingo Alamarez, Jr. as his arbitrator, while petitioner chose Atty. Casiano Sabile as its arbitrator. The confirmation of the appointment of Aurelio Tupang, as third arbitrator, was held in abeyance because petitioner instructed Atty. Sabile to defer the same until its Board of Directors could convene and approve Tupang's appointment. Respondent Yao prayed that after summary hearing to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with Contract of Lease and the applicable provisions of the Arbitration law, by appointing and confirming the appointment of the Third Arbitrator; and that the Board of Three Arbitrators be ordered to immediately convene and resolve the
controversy before it.
The respondent court announced that the two arbitrators chose Mrs. Eloisa R. Narciso as the third arbitrator. And ordered the parties to submit their position papers on the issue as to whether or not respondent Yao's claim for damages may be litigated upon in the summary proceeding for enforcement of arbitration agreement. In moving for reconsideration of the said Order, petitioner argued that in Special Case No. 6024, the respondent court sits as a special court exercising limited jurisdiction and is not competent to act on respondent Yao's claim for damages, which poses an issue litigable in an ordinary civil action. But the respondent court was not
persuaded by petitioner's submission. It denied the motion for reconsideration.
While the appellate court has agreed with petitioner that, under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 876, a court, acting within the limits of its special jurisdiction, may in this case solely determine the issue of whether the litigants should proceed or not to arbitration, it, however, considered petitioner in estoppel from questioning the competence of the court to additionally hear and decide in the summary proceedings private respondent's claim for damages, it (petitioner) having itself filed similarly its own counterclaim with the court a quo.
1. Whether or not the court it has jurisdiction over the person
2. Whether or not the court a quo has jurisdiction over the subject matter.
(1) Jurisdiction over the person must be seasonably raised, i.e., that it is pleaded in a motion to dismiss or by way of an affirmative defense in an answer. Voluntary appearance shall be deemed a waiver of this defense. The assertion, however, of affirmative defenses shall not be constructed as an estoppel or as a waiver of such defense.
(2) Where the court itself clearly has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the action, the invocation of this defense may be done at any time. It is neither for the courts nor the parties to violate or disregard that rule, let alone to confer that jurisdiction, this matter being legislative in character. Barring highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances, such as hereinbefore exemplified, neither estoppel nor waiver shall apply. The court must then refrain from taking up the claims of the contending parties for damages, which, upon the other hand, may be ventilated in separate regular proceedings at an opportune time and venue.
G.R. No. 138896 June 20, 2000
BARANGAY SAN ROQUE, TALISAY, CEBU, petitioner, vs.
Heirs of FRANCISCO PASTOR namely: EUGENIO SYLIANCO, TEODORO SYLIANCO, TEODORO SYLIANCO, ISABEL SYLIANCO, EUGENIA S. ONG, LAWRENCE SYLIANCO, LAWSON SYLIANCO, LAWINA S. NOTARIO, LEONARDO SYLIANCO JR. and LAWFORD SYLIANCO, respondents.
Petitioner filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) a Complaint to expropriate a
property of the respondents. In an Order the MTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that "eminent domain is an exercise of the power to take private property for public use after payment of just compensation. The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it, holding that an action for eminent domain affected title to real property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated, Concluding that the action should have been filed before the MTC since the value of the subject property was less than P20,000.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed directly to this Court, raising a pure question of law.In a Resolution, the Court denied the Petition for Review "for being posted out of time on July 2, 1999, the due date being June 2, 1999, as the motion for extension of time to file petition was denied in the resolution of July 14, 1999." 7 In a subsequent Resolution dated October 6, 1999, the Court reinstated the Petition.
Which court, MTC or RTC, has jurisdiction over cases for eminent domain or expropriation where the assessed value of the subject property is below Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos?
Jurisdiction over an Expropriation Suit
In support of its appeal, petitioner cites Section 19 (1) of BP 129, which provides that RTCs
17 is incapable of pecuniary estimation; . . . . ." It argues that the present action involves the exercise
of the right to eminent domain, and that such right is incapable of pecuniary estimation. We agree with the petitioner that an expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. An expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take private property for public use.
True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the court is duty-bound to determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental to the expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the expropriation. In addition, The government does not dispute respondents' title to or possession of the same. Indeed, it is not a question of who has a better title or right, for the government does not even claim that it has a title to the property. It merely asserts its inherent sovereign power to "appropriate and control individual property for the public benefit, as the public necessity, convenience or welfare may demand." The Regional Trial Court is directed to HEAR the case.
G.R. No. 158245. June 30, 2005
MIGUELITO LIMACO, ET AL. VS.
SHONAN GAKUEN CHILDREN'S HOUSE PHILIPPINES, INC.
Petitioners are the registered owners of three parcels of agricultural land. They entered into a Contract of Sale with respondent and agreed that "in the event that the parties herein are unable to effect the transfer and sale of the said properties in whole or in part in favor of the vendees, all the paid-in amounts shall be applied to another similar property also owned by the vendors in substitution of the above-described properties." Pursuant to the contract, respondent corporation paid the down payment however; it refused to remit any monthly installment due to petitioners' failure to obtain a clearance and/or approval of the sale of the subject land from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Respondent demanded that petitioners either solve the problem with the land tenants or substitute the lots with another acceptable, suitable and untenanted land, pursuant to their agreement.
Petitioners informed respondent that they were ready to finalize the transaction in
accordance with the legal opinion of the DAR. In a letter, respondent informed petitioners that the scheme proposed in the DAR Opinion was "far from acceptable." Respondent offered to purchase the property on a direct sale basis. Petitioners did not respond to respondent hence, the latter, through counsel, requested the return of its down payment. As petitioners did not acquiesce, respondent filed a complaint for rescission with damages with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. As a countermove, petitioners filed the instant case for specific performance with the RTC of Laguna. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia. Petitioners opposed contending that the instant complaint for specific performance was served on respondent ahead of the service of the complaint for rescission on petitioners. Later, however, respondent withdrew its motion to dismiss in view of the order of the RTC of Makati dismissing the complaint for rescission. In its Answer with Counterclaim, respondent alleged by way of affirmative defense that "specific performance is not possible because the respondent had already bought another property which is untenanted, devoid of any legal complications and now converted from agricultural to non-agricultural purpose
in accordance with DAR Administrative Order.
Thereafter, petitioners filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint considering respondent's special defense that specific performance was no longer possible. They prayed that their complaint
and respondent's counterclaim be ordered withdrawn or dismissed, arguing that respondent's counterclaim would have no leg to stand on as it was
compulsory in nature.
Whether respondent's counterclaim should be dismissed.
There are two ways by which an action may be dismissed upon the instance of the plaintiff. First, dismissal is a matter of right when a notice of dismissal is filed by the plaintiff before an answer or a motion for summary judgment has been served on him by the defendant. Second, dismissal is discretionary on the court when the motion for the dismissal of the action is filed by the plaintiff at any stage of the proceedings other than before service of an answer or a motion for summary judgment. While the dismissal in the first mode takes effect upon the mere notice of plaintiff without need of a judicial order, the second mode requires the authority of the court before dismissal of the case may be effected. This is so because in the dismissal of an action, the effect of the dismissal upon the rights of the defendant should always be taken into consideration.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that petitioners filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint after respondent already filed its answer with counterclaim. In fact, the reason for their motion for withdrawal was the special defense of respondent in its answer that substitution was no longer possible as it already bought another property in lieu of the subject lots under the contract. It is, therefore, inexplicable how petitioners could argue that their complaint was successfully
withdrawn upon the mere filing of a Motion to Withdraw Complaint when they themselves alleged in this petition that "private respondent objected to the withdrawal and the Trial Court sustained the objection."
G.R. No. 158407 January 17, 2005
FILOMENA DOMAGAS, petitioner, vs.
VIVIAN LAYNO JENSEN, respondent.
Filomena Domagas filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondent Vivian Jensen before the MTC of Calasiao, Pangasinan. The petitioner alleged that she was the registered owner of a parcel of land and the respondent, by means of force, strategy and stealth, gained entry into the petitioner’s property by excavating and constructing a fence. As such, the petitioner was deprived of a portion of her property along the boundary line. The petitioner prayed that, judgment be rendered in her favor and she further prays for other reliefs and remedies just and equitable in the premises.
The summons and the complaint were not served on the respondent because the latter was apparently out of the country. This was relayed to the Sheriff by her (the respondent’s) brother, Oscar Layno, who was then in the respondent’s house. The Sheriff left the summons and complaint with Oscar Layno, who received the same. The court rendered judgment ordering the respondent and all persons occupying the property for and in the latter’s behalf to vacate the disputed area and to pay monthly rentals therefore, including actual damages, attorney’s fees, and exemplary damages. The respondent failed to appeal the decision. Consequently, a writ of
execution was issued.
The respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner before the RTC of Dagupan City for the annulment of the decision of the MTC on the ground that the Sheriff’s failure to serve the complaint and summons on her because she was in Oslo, Norway, the MTC never acquired
jurisdiction over her person. The respondent alleged therein that the service of the complaint and summons through substituted service on her brother, Oscar Layno, was improper. Judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff Vivian Layno Jensen and against defendant Filomena Domagas. The trial court declared that there was no valid service of the complaint.
The petitioner appealed the decision to the CA which, rendered judgment affirming the appealed decision with modifications. The CA ruled that the complaint in Civil Case No. 879 was one for ejectment, which is an action quasi in rem. The summons and the complaint should have been served via extraterritorial service under Section 15 in relation to Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
Whether or not there was a valid service of the summons and complaint in Civil Case No. 879 on the respondent herein who was the defendant in the said case. The resolution of the matter is anchored on the issue of whether or not the action of the petitioner in the MTC against the respondent herein is an action in personam or quasi in rem.
The respondent was not validly served with summons and the complaint in Civil Case No. 879 on April 5, 1999, by substituted service. Hence, the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent; as such, the decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 879 is null and void.
G.R. No. 127876. December 17, 1999
ROXAS & CO., INC., petitioner,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, DAR REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR REGION IV, MUNICIPAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER OF NASUGBU, BATANGAS and DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, respondents.
Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas, namely, Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. The events of this case occurred during the incumbency of then President Corazon C. Aquino who issued Proclamation No. 3 promulgating a Provisional Constitution. Before the law’s effectivity, petitioner filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by respondent DAR in accordance with the Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988(CARL).
In a letter, respondent DAR Secretary informed petitioner that a reclassification of the land would not exempt it from agrarian reform. Respondent Secretary also denied petitioner’s
withdrawal of the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) on the ground that withdrawal could only be based on specific grounds such as unsuitability of the soil for agriculture, or if the slope of the land is over 18 degrees and that the land is undeveloped. Despite the denial of the VOS withdrawal of Hacienda Caylaway, petitioner filed its application for conversion of both Haciendas Palico and Banilad. petitioner, through its President, Eduardo Roxas, reiterated its request to withdraw the VOS over Hacienda Caylaway
Petitioner instituted Case with respondent DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) praying for the cancellation of the CLOA’s issued by respondent DAR in the name of several persons. Petitioner alleged that the haciendas had been declared a tourist zone, is not suitable for agricultural production. DARAB held that the case involved the prejudicial question of whether the property was subject to agrarian reform, hence, this question should be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform for determination. Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals. It
questioned the expropriation of its properties under the CARL and the denial of due process in the acquisition of its landholdings.
Meanwhile, the petition for conversion of the three haciendas was denied by the MARO. Petitioner’s petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by court of Appeals.
Whether or not the DAR observes due process of the proceedings over the three haciendas
The acquisition proceedings over the three haciendas are nullified for respondent DAR's failure to observe due process therein. In accordance with the guidelines set forth in this decision and the applicable administrative procedure, the case is hereby remanded to respondent DAR for proper acquisition proceedings and determination of petitioner's application for conversion. failure of respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of due process in the acquisition proceedings does not give this Court the power to nullify the CLOA’s already issued to the farmer beneficiaries. To assume the power is to short-circuit the administrative process, which has yet to run its regular course. Respondent DAR must be given the chance to correct its procedural lapses in the
acquisition proceedings. In Hacienda Palico alone, CLOA's were issued to 177 farmer beneficiaries in 1993. Since then until the present, these farmers have been cultivating their lands. It goes against the basic precepts of justice, fairness and equity to deprive these people, through no fault of their own, of the land they till.
G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989
SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS and D.J. WARBY, petitioners, vs.
HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City and MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG, respondents.
Petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL for brevity) filed a complaint with the RTC of Makati, for the consignation of a premium refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent as declared in default for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary period. On the other hand, private respondent filed a complaint in the RTC of Quezon City for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against petitioner SIOL, and
including E.B. Philipps and D.J. Warby as additional defendants. The complaint sought, the payment of actual, compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and costs of the suit.
Although the prayer in the complaint did not quantify the amount of damages sought said amount may be inferred from the body of the complaint to be about Fifty Million Pesos
(P50,000,000.00). Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as docket fee which prompted petitioners' counsel to raise his objection. Said objection was disregarded by respondent Judge Jose P. Castro who was then presiding over said case. The Court thereafter returned the said records to the trial court with the directive that they be re-raffled to the other judges to the exclusion of Judge Castro. Case was re-raffled to Branch 104, a sala which was then vacant.
The Court en banc issued a Resolution in Administrative Case directing the judges to reassess the docket fees and requires all clerks of court to issue certificates of re-assessment of docket fees. All litigants were likewise required to specify in their pleadings the amount sought to be recovered in their complaints. Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, to whom Civil Case No. Q41177
was thereafter assigned, after his assumption, issued a Supplemental Order requiring the parties in the case to comment on the Clerk of Court's letter-report signifying her difficulty in complying with the Resolution of this Court since the pleadings filed by private respondent did not indicate the exact amount sought to be recovered.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the said order of Judge Asuncion. Court of Appeals rendered a decision ruling, among others, Denying due course to the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 1, 09715 insofar as it seeks annulment of the order
Whether or not a court acquires jurisdiction over a case when the correct and proper docket fee has not been paid.
It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee. The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The Clerk of Court of the court a quo is instructed to reassess and determine the additional filing fee that should be paid by private respondent considering the total amount of the claim sought in the original complaint and the supplemental complaint as may be gleaned from the allegations and the prayer thereof and to require private respondent to pay the deficiency.
G.R. No. 147369. October 23, 2003
SPOUSES PATRICK AND RAFAELA JOSE VS.
SPOUSES HELEN AND ROMEO BOYON
Petitioners lodged a complaint for specific performance against respondents to compel them to facilitate the transfer of ownership of a parcel of land subject of a controverted sale. The RTC issued a summons to respondents. As per return of the summons, substituted service was resorted to by the process server allegedly because efforts to serve personally to re respondents failed. Meanwhile, petitioners filed before the RTC an ex parte motion for leave of court to effect summons by publication and the judge issued an order granting the same. The respondents were declared in default and as a consequence of the declaration of default, petitioners were allowed to submit their evidence exparte.
Helen Boyon, who was then in United Sates, was surprised to learn from her sister of the resolution issued by the court. Respondents filed an Ad Cautelam motion questioning, among others, the validity of the service of summons effected by the court a quo. The court issued an order denying the said motion on the basis of the defaulted respondent supposed loss of standing in court. Once again, the respondents raised the issue of the jurisdiction of the trial court via a
motion for reconsideration and the same was denied. The petitioners moved for the execution of the controverted judgment which the judge granted. Thereafter, respondents filed before the CA a petition for certiorari which held that the trial court had no authority to issue the questioned resolution and orders.
Whether or not summons by publication can validly serve in the instant case.
In general, courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by the service of summons, such service may be done personal or substituted service, where the action is in
personam and the defendant is in the Philippines. However, extraterritorial service of summons or summons by publication applies only when the action is in rem or quasi in rem. That is, the action against the thing itself instead of against the defendant’s person if the action is in rem or an
individual is named as defendant and the purpose is to subject the individual’s interest in a piece of property to the obligation or loan burdening it
if quasi in rem.
In the instant case, what was filed before the trial court was an action for specific
performance directed against respondents. While the suit incidentally involved a piece of land, the ownership or possession thereof was not put in issue. Moreover, court has consistently declared that an action for specific performance is an action in personam.
Hence, summons by publication cannot be validly served.
G.R. No. L-29791 January 10, 1978
FRANCISCO S. HERNANDEZ and JOSEFA U. ATIENZA, plaintiffs-appellees, vs.
RURAL BANK OF LUCENA, INC., CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, in its capacity as Liquidator of Rural Bank of Lucena, and JOSE S. MARTINEZ in his capacity as Receiver of Rural Bank of Lucena, defendants-appellants.
This case is about the propriety of a separate action to compel a distress rural bank which is under Judicial liquidation, to accept a check in payment of a mortgage debt. Francisco S. Hernandez and Josefa U. Atienza obtained from the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. a loan of P6,000 the loan was cured by a mortgage on their two lots situated in Cubao, Quezon City. The interest for one year was paid in advance. Three months after that loan was obtained, the Lucena Bank became a distress bank, its officers, directors and employees had committed certain anomalies or had resorted to unsound and unsafe banking practices which were prejudicial to the government, its depositors and creditors.
Before the expiration of the one-year term of the loan, Hernandez went to the Lucena bank and offered to pay the loan by means of a check for P6,000 which was drawn against the bank by a depositor, the San Pablo Colleges, and which was payable to Fernandez As the bank's executive vice president was not available, the payment was not consummated. The executive vice-president wrote to Hernandez and informed him that the check could not be honored for the time being because of adverse events that had disrupted the bank's operations.
Hernandez and his wife filed an action in the Court of First Instance at Lipa City to compel the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., the Central Bank as liquidator, and Jose S. Martinez as receiver, to accept the check and to execute the cancellation of the real estate mortgage. The Hernandez spouses also asked for moral damages in the amount of P10.000 and attorney's fees of P3,000 the