2014 BAR EXAMINATIONS
REMEDIAL LAW NOTES Part III
By:
ELEUTERIO L. BATHAN
Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 92, (NCJR) Quezon City Acting Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 5, Lemery, Batangas Judge Designate, RTC, Br. 39, Calapan City, Or. Mindoro Judge Designate, RTC, Br. 40, Calapan City, Or. Mindoro Former Executive/Presiding Judge, MTCC, Br. 2, Batangas City
Former Acting Judge: MTCC, Br. 1, Batangas City; MTC, Lian, Batangas; Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro;
Former Judge Designate, MTC, Romblon, Romblon Law Professor, Remedial Law Review and Political Law University of Batangas (U.B.) (Batangas & Lipa City Campuses)
MCLE Lecturer
Author, Handbook on Local Governance (Rex Book Store, Inc.) Awardee, Judicial Excellence (2014), Rotary Club of Sta. Mesa
District 3780, Quezon City
Outstanding Graduate (2014), SSC-R, College of Law Awardee, Quezon City RTCJA 2012 Outstanding Judge Former Member, Sangguniang Bayan, San Jose, Batangas
Former Law Practitioner
A.B.; Ll.B., San Sebastian College-R (Manila)
REMEDY OF PLAINTIFF IF DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT
IS GRANTED
If defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted, the remedy of the plaintiff is to appeal the order of dismissal by way of filing a notice of appeal, because an order of dismissal is a final order (See Rules 40 and
41, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure).
An order of dismissal, whether correct or not, is a final order. It is not interlocutory because the proceedings were terminated; it leaves nothing more to be done by the lower court. Therefore, the remedy of the plaintiff is to appeal the order (Dael vs. Spouses Beltran, 4).
The plaintiff may resort first to the filing of a motion for reconsideration before filing a notice of appeal. In situation like this, filing a motion for reconsideration is optional. It is discretionary on the part of the aggrieved party or plaintiff.
If he chooses to file answer, he may avail of an extension of time to file one (See above-discussions; See also Virata vs. Sandiganbayan).
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REMEDY OF DEFENDANT IF HIS
MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT IS DENIED
If the defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied, the following are the remedies available to the defendant:1. upon denial of the motion for reconsideration to the order
of denial, he may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65; or to
Though filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the most dangerous option, but still, defendant can avail of this remedy. The danger or the risk is that instead of focusing on the alternative mode which is the filing of an answer, defendant, upon plaintiff’s motion might be declared by the court in default for failure to file an answer. So, if he chooses to resort to the filing of certiorari under Rule 65, and in order to avoid the possibility of declaring him in default later on, he shall see to it that his petition should be accompanied with an application for ancillary relief of temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, but also take note of the limitations provided under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC dated December 4, 2007 [effective December 27, 2007] amending Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure).
As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot be subject of appeal until final judgment or order is rendered (Newsweek, Inc vs. IAC,).
It is interlocutory in the sense that it does not finally dispose of the case, and, in effect, directs the case to proceed until final adjudication by the court (Marmo et al., vs. Anacay,).
The ordinary procedure to be followed in such a case is to file an answer, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment, but this may be subject to certain exceptions (Newsweek, Inc vs. IAC,).
EXCEPTIONS:
Only when the court issues an order outside or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, will certiorari be considered an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order (Heirs of
Hinog vs. Melicor,).
If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendant to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, or is not the court of proper venue, or if the denial of the motion to dismiss is made with grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate. The following are a few examples of the exceptions to the general rule
(Newsweek, Inc vs. IAC,).
In De Jesus vs. Garcia, , upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the High Court granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition against the City Court of Manila and directed the respondent court to dismiss the case.
However, in Bank of America vs. CA, , it was held that the remedy of the defendant is to file an answer to the complaint, proceed to trial and await judgment before making an appeal instead of petition of certiorari under Rule 65.
The High Court in Bank of America:
“It is a well-settled rule that the order denying the motion to dismiss cannot be the subject of petition for certiorari. Petitioners should have filed an answer to the complaint, proceed to trial and await judgment before making an appeal. As repeatedly held by this Court:
“An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and cannot be the subject of the extraordinary petition for certiorari or mandamus. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file an answer and to interpose as defenses the objections raised in his motion to dismiss, proceed to trial, and in case of an adverse decision, to elevate the entire case by appeal in due course. xxx Under certain situations, recourse to certiorari or mandamus is considered appropriate, i.e., (a) when the trial court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction; (b) where there is patent grave abuse of discretion by the trial court; or (c)
appeal would not prove to be a speedy and adequate remedy as when an appeal would not promptly relieve a defendant from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken order maintaining the plaintiff’s baseless action and compelling the defendant needlessly to go through a protracted trial and clogging the court dockets by another futile case.”
Records show that the trial court acted within its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss. Does the denial of the motion to dismiss constitute a patent grave abuse of discretion? Would appeal, under the circumstances, not prove to be a speedy and adequate remedy? We will resolve said questions in conjunction with the issues raised by the parties.
First issue. Did the trial court commit grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs have no cause of action against defendants since plaintiffs are merely stockholders of the corporations which are the registered owners of the vessels and the borrowers of petitioners?
No. Petitioners’ argument that private respondents, being mere stockholders of the foreign corporations, have no personalities to sue, and therefore, the complaint should be dismissed, is untenable. A case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest. Lack of personality to sue can be used as a ground for a Motion to Dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no cause of action. In San Lorenzo Village Association, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, this Court clarified that a complaint states a cause of action where it contains three essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of
said legal right. If these elements are absent, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. To emphasize, it is not the lack or absence of cause of action that is a ground for dismissal of the complaint but rather the fact that the complaint states no cause of action. “Failure to state a cause of action” refers to the insufficiency of allegation in the pleading, unlike “lack of cause of action” which refers to the insufficiency of factual basis for the action. “Failure to state a cause of action” may be raised at the earliest stages of an action through a motion to dismiss the complaint, while “lack of cause of action” may be raised any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented.
In the case at bar, the complaint contains the three elements of a cause of action. It alleges that: (1) plaintiffs, herein private respondents, have the right to demand for an accounting from defendants (herein petitioners), as trustees by reason of the fiduciary relationship that was created between the parties involving the vessels in question; (2) petitioners have the obligation, as trustees, to render such an accounting; and (3) petitioners failed to do the same.
Petitioners insist that they do not have any obligation to the private respondents as they are mere stockholders of the corporation; that the corporate entities have juridical personalities separate and distinct from those of the private respondents. Private respondents maintain that the corporations are wholly owned by them and prior to the incorporation of such entities, they were clients of petitioners which induced them to acquire loans from said petitioners to invest on the additional ships.
We agree with private respondents. As held in the San Lorenzo case,
“xxx assuming that the allegation of facts constituting plaintiffs’ cause of action is not as
clear and categorical as would otherwise be desired, any uncertainty thereby arising should be so resolved as to enable a full inquiry into the merits of the action.”
As this Court has explained in the San Lorenzo case, such a course, would preclude multiplicity of suits which the law abhors, and conduce to the definitive determination and termination of the dispute. To do otherwise, that is, to abort the action on account of the alleged fatal flaws of the complaint would obviously be indecisive and would not end the controversy, since the institution of another action upon a revised complaint would not be foreclosed.”
In Enriquez vs. Macadaeg, , upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on improper venue, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent judge from taking cognizance of the case except to dismiss the same.
In Manalo vs. Mariano, , upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on bar by prior judgment, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and directed the respondent judge to dismiss the case.
In Yuviengco vs. Dacuycuy, , upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the Statute of Frauds, the High Court granted the petition for certiorari and dismissed the amended complaint.
Take note however, that in Marmo et al., vs. Anacay, , the High Court ruled that the trial court did not grave abuse its discretion when it denied the motion to dismiss the complaint for failure of the plaintiff to implead indispensable parties.
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IF MOTION TO DISMISS IS GRANTED
If the dismissal is based on the grounds that: (1) the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations (Paragraph
(f), Section 1, Rule 16, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure); (2) the
claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished (Paragraph (h), Section 1, Rule 16,
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure); and(3)the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds; and (Paragraph (i), Section 1, Rule 16, 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure)
, s
ubject to the right of appeal, shall bar the refiling of the same action or claim (Section 5, Rule 16, 1997 Revised Rules of CivilProcedure). The dismissal is with prejudice.
Strongworld Construction Corporation vs. Judge Perello, said:
“Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure enumerates the grounds for which a Motion to Dismiss may be filed, viz.:
SECTION 1. Grounds. – Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:
(a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party;
(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;
(c) That venue is improperly laid;That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue; (d) That there is another action pending
between the same parties for the same cause;
(e) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations;
(f) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;
(g) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished; (h) That the claim on which the action is
founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds; and (i) That a condition precedent for filing the
claim has not been complied with.
Section 5 of the same Rule, recites the effect of a dismissal under Sections 1(f), (h), and (i), thereof, thus:
SEC. 5. Effect of dismissal. – Subject to the right of appeal, an order granting a motion to dismiss based on paragraphs (f), (h), and (i) of section 1 hereof shall bar the refiling of the same action or claim.
Briefly stated, dismissals that are based on the following grounds, to wit: (1) that the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations; (2) that the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished; and (3) that the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds, bar the refiling of the same action or claim. Logically, the nature of the dismissal founded on any of the preceding grounds is “with prejudice” because the dismissal prevents the refiling of the same action or claim. Ergo, dismissals based on the rest of the grounds enumerated are without prejudice because they do not preclude the refiling of the same action.
Verily, the dismissal of petitioners’ Complaint by the court a quo was not based on any of the grounds specified in Section 5, Rule 16 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure; rather, it was grounded on what was
encapsulated in Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. As the trial court ratiocinated in its 9 January 1998 Order, the Complaint is not prosecuted by the proper party in interest. Considering the heretofore discussion, we can say that the order of dismissal was based on the ground that the Complaint states no cause of action. For this reason, the dismissal of petitioners’ Complaint cannot be said to be a dismissal with prejudice which bars the refiling of the same action.
As has been earlier quoted, Section 1(h), Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that no appeal may be taken from an order dismissing an action without prejudice. The same section provides that in such an instant where the final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.”
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DISMISSAL ON VARIOUS GROUNDS AND ITS EFFECT (WITH PREJUDICE AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE)
On filing of initiatory pleading, If act of lawyer or counsel
constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, shall be a ground for the
summary dismissal of the case with prejudice (Section 5, Rule 7, 1997
Rules of Court).
Regular Procedure (1997 Rules of Court): plaintiff’s failure to
appear at the pre-trial conference, the dismissal is with prejudice, unless
otherwise ordered by the court (Section 5, Rule 18). General Rule:
dismissal is always with prejudice, unless the order says that dismissal is without prejudice. If the order is silent, the dismissal is with prejudice;
PLAINTIFF’S failed – defendant may be allowed to present evidence on
his counter-claim, if any; DEFENDANT’S failed – plaintiff’s presentation of ex-parte evidence, and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.
Summary Procedure: plaintiff’s failure to appear at the
preliminary conference can cause the dismissal of the action. The dismissal is with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court (Apply
Section 5, Rule 18, 1997 Rules of Court, suppletory application). General
Rule: dismissal is always with prejudice, unless the order says that dismissal is without prejudice. If the order is silent, the dismissal is with prejudice.
Plaintiff’s failure to file pre-trial brief (in ordinary cases) has the same effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial conference (See: Section 6,
Rule 18, 1997 Rules of Court).
Plaintiff’s failure to file preliminary conference brief (pre-trial brief under summary procedure) has the same effect with failure to appear at the preliminary conference (See: Rule 18, 1997 Rules of Court
suppletory application).
Rule on Small Claims: Failure of plaintiff to appear at the trial can
cause the dismissal of the claim. Take note: The dismissal is always without prejudice (Section 18, Rule on Small Claim).
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases – repeated and
unjustified failure of plaintiff to appear at the pre-trial conference, or to file pre-trial brief, the court shall dismiss the case. The dismissal shall be without prejudice (Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rule).
Lack of certification against forum shopping under Section 5,
Rule 7, 1997 Rules, shall be cause for the dismissal of the case – dismissal is without prejudice, unless otherwise provided.
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DEFENDANT MAY FILE MOTION
FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO ANSWER
This discussion is confined only to all (civil) cases governed by the rules on regular procedure, excluding the cases governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure (See separate discussion on the matter).
If after plaintiff has complied with the order of the court requiring him to submit a bill of particulars, and/or defendant’s motion to dismiss (and/or the motion for reconsideration thereto) is denied, the defendant has three (3) more remaining remedial options. The defendant may either:
(1) may still ask for extension of time to file answer; or (2) file an answer; or
(3) he may deliberately disregard the complaint by inaction.
The defendant may still ask for an extension of time to file answer or motion to dismiss. This is a non-litigious motion which can be done and filed ex-parte. Some trial courts do not anymore rule or resolve the motion for extension of time, and that is, equivalent to allowance. If that is the case, it is incumbent upon the movant to file the intended pleading on or before the expiration of the period prayed for within which to file the same.
The rule says:
1. Upon motion and on such terms as may be just, the court may
extend the time to plead provided in these Rules (Section 11, Rule 11,
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure).
2. The court may also, upon like terms, allow an answer or other
pleading to be filed after the time fixed by the Rules (Paragraph 2,
Section 11, Rule 11, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure).
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If the defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied his other remedial option aside from filing a certiorari petition (under Rule 65) is to file answer.
A. When to file answer
The defendant shall file his answer to the complaint within fifteen (15) days after service of summons, unless a different period is fixed by the court (Section 1, Rule 11, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure).
Where the defendant is a foreign private juridical entity and service of summons is made on the government official designated by law to receive the same, the answer shall be filed within thirty (30) days after receipt of summons by such entity (Section 2, Rule 11, 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure).
When the plaintiff files an amended complaint as a matter of right, the defendant shall answer the same within fifteen (15) days after being served with a copy thereof (Section 3, Rule 11, 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure).
Where its filing is not a matter of right, the defendant shall answer the amended complaint within ten (l0) days from notice of the order admitting the same. An answer earlier filed may serve as the answer to the amended complaint if no new answer is filed (Paragraph 2, Section 3,
Rule 11, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure).
B. Defenses and objections not pleaded waived
Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived (Section 1, Rule 9, 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure).
An answer shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the defendant relies for his defense, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts
(Section 1, Rule 8, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure). If a defense
relied on is based on law, the pertinent provisions thereof and their applicability to him shall be clearly and concisely stated (Paragraph 2,
Section 1, Rule 8, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure).
A defendant may set forth two or more statements of defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in one defense or in separate defenses (Section 2, Rule 8, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure).
Facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of person that is made a party, must be averred. A party desiring to raise an issue as to the legal existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity, shall do so by specific denial, which shall include such supporting particulars as are peculiarly within the pleader's knowledge (Section 4, Rule 8, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure).
In all averments of fraud or mistake the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, or other condition of the mind of a person may be averred generally (Section 5, Rule 8, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure).
Whenever a defense is based upon a written instrument or document, the substance of such instrument or document shall be set forth in the answer, and the original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the answer as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a part of the answer, or said copy may with like effect be set forth in the pleading (Section 7, Rule
8, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure).
When a defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts, but the requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a
party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused (Section 8, Rule 8, 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure). In pleading an official document or official act,
it is sufficient to aver that the document was issued or the act done in compliance with law (Section 9, Rule 8, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure).
A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny only the remainder. Where a defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made to the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a denial (Section 10, Rule 8,
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure).
Material averment in the complaint, other than those as to the amount of unliquidated damages, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Allegations of usury in a complaint to recover usurious interest are deemed admitted if not denied under oath (Section
11, Rule 8, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure).
DENIAL AND CONTESTING THE GENUINENESS AND DUE EXECTION OF ACTIONABLE DOCUMENT
A. How to deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document?
The defendant is required to make an effective specific denial. This means that the defendant must declare under oath that he did not sign the document or that it is otherwise false or fabricated. Neither does the statement of the answer to the effect that the instrument was procured by fraudulent representation raise any issue as to its genuineness or due execution. On the contrary such a plea is an admission both of the genuineness and due execution thereof, since it seeks to avoid the instrument upon a ground not affecting either (Songco vs. Sellner,).
B. Case No. 1
Plaintiff alleged in the complaint that defendant is indebted to the former in the amount of P1M attaching in the complaint several annexes including the photocopy of the promissory note. In his answer, he alleged that he has never signed the promissory note attached to the complaint in his personal and/or individual capacity, thus ineffective, unenforceable and void for lack of valid consideration. In his verification, he stated that: (1) that the defendant, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law, hereby depose and declare that she is the named defendant in the above-entitled case; he has cause the preparation of the answer upon facts and figures supplied by his to his retained counsel; have read each and every allegations contained therein and hereby certify that the same are true and correct of her own knowledge and information.
At the pre-trial, plaintiff was able to prove that the defendant received the amount of P1M as loan after signing the Promissory Note (Annex A), that defendant, upon receipt of the demand letter made a reply seeking an extension to pay her obligation. On the Formal Offer of Exhibits Plaintiff sought the admission of the duplicate original of the PN on the ground that the original copy could no longer be found. The trial court initially admitted into evidence the duplicate original of the PN, and allowed Defendant to amend her answer to conform with this new evidence. Upon Defendant’s motion for reconsideration arguing that the duplicate Original PN was not properly identified and there were markings in the photocopy which were not contained in duplicate original, the trial court granted the MR and dismissed the case on the ground that Plaintiff had no longer possessed any proof of Defendant’s alleged indebtedness. The trial court found that there can be no dispute to the fact that the allegations in the answer of defendant, she denied generally and specifically under oath the genuineness and due execution of the promissory note and by way of special and affirmative defenses herein states that she never signed the promissory note attached to the complaint in his personal and/or individual capacity. She also deny generally and specifically the rest of the allegations. It would be considered that there is a sufficient compliance of the requirement of the law for specific denial.
Solidbank vs. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc., said defendant’s
denial is not specific. Section 8, Rule 8, 1997 Rules of Court provides that when an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically
denies them and sets forth what he claims to be the facts.
Is secondary evidence still needed?
Since Defendant failed to deny specifically the execution of the promissory note, there was no need for the Plaintiff to present the original of the promissory note in question. Defendant’s judicial admission with respect to the genuineness and execution of the promissory note sufficiently established her liability to Plaintiff regardless of the fact that Plaintiff failed to present the original of said note. Therefore, there is thus no need of proof of execution and authenticity with respect to the loan document because of Defendant’s implied admission of loan transaction. There is no need to comply with what Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which requires that before a private documents can be received in evidence, presentation and examination of witnesses to testify to prove its due execution and authenticity (Solidbank vs. Del Monte Motor Works,
Inc.,).
C. Case No. 2
Defendant’s answer contained the following:
1. The allegations in par. 2, Complaint, on the existence of the alleged loan of P2-M, and the purported documents evidencing the same, only the signature appearing at the back of the promissory note, Annex “A” seems to be that of herein defendant. However, as to any liability arising therefrom, the receipt of the said amount of P2-M shows that the amount was received by another person, not the herein defendant. Hence, no liability
attaches and as further stated in the special and affirmative defenses that, assuming the promissory note exists, it does not bind much less is there the intention by the parties to bind the herein defendant. In other words, the documents relative to the loan do not express the true intention of the parties.
2. (Verification) “I, Defendant, of age, am the defendant in this case, that I caused the preparation of the complaint and that all the allegations thereat are true and correct; that the promissory note sued upon, assuming that it exists and bears the genuine signature of herein defendant, the same does not bind him and that it did not truly express the real intention of the parties as stated in the defenses”
Is this an effective specific denial as contemplated by law?
No. A reading of Defendant’s Answer, shows that he did not specifically deny that he signed the loan documents. What he merely stated in his Answer was that the signature appearing at the back of the promissory note seemed to be his. Defendant also denied any liability on the promissory note as he allegedly did not receive the amount stated therein, and the loan documents do not express the true intention of the parties. Defendant reiterated these allegations in his “denial under oath,” stating that “the promissory note sued upon, assuming that it exists and bears the genuine signature of herein defendant, the same does not bind him and that it did not truly express the real intention of the parties as stated in the defenses.
His answer amounts to an implied admission of the due execution and genuineness of the promissory note. The admission of the genuineness and due execution of a document means that the party whose signature it bears admits that he voluntarily signed the document or it was signed by another for him and with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any formalities required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it
lacks, are waived by him. Also, it effectively eliminated any defense relating to the authenticity and due execution of the document, e.g., that the document was spurious, counterfeit, or of different import on its face as the one executed by the parties; or that the signatures appearing thereon were forgeries; or that the signatures were unauthorized.
Therefore, Defendant is deemed to have admitted the loan documents and acknowledged his obligation with Plaintiff; and with Defendant’s implied admission, it was not necessary for Plaintiff to present further evidence to establish the due execution and authenticity of the loan documents sued upon (Permanent Savings and Loan Bank vs.
Mariano Velarde,).
D. Adoptive admission concept and meaning
A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily adopt or ratify another's statement. Where it appears that a party clearly and unambiguously assented to or adopted the statements of another, evidence of those statements is admissible against him. This is the essence of the principle of adoptive admission (Republic vs. Kenrick Development
Corporation,).
An adoptive admission is a party's reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the party's reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other person. By adoptive admission, a third person's statement becomes the admission of the party embracing or espousing it (Republic vs. Kenrick Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 149576, August 8, 2006).
E. Adoptive admission concept and meaning
Adoptive admission may occur when a party:
(a) expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made
by another;
(c) utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertion of
another;
(d) replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised
by another but ignores further points which he or she has heard the other make or
(e) reads and signs a written statement made by another (Republic vs. Kenrick Development Corporation,).
F. Answer must be signed
An unsigned answer is invalid and produces no legal effect. Defendant may be declared in default and allow plaintiff to present evidence ex-parte (Republic vs. Kenrick Development Corporation,).
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COUNTERCLAIM
A. What is a counterclaim?
A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party (Section 6, Rule 6, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure). This may be a claim for money or other relief (See Sapugay vs. CA,).
B. Kinds, Principles and its Limitations
Counterclaim may be compulsory or permissive.
Counterclaims are generally allowed in order to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to facilitate the disposition of the whole controversy in a single action, such that the defendant’s demand may be
adjudged by a counterclaim rather than by an independent suit (Lafarge
Cement Philippines, Inc., et al, vs. Continental Cement Corporation, et al,).
The only limitations to this principle are (1) that the court should have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the counterclaim, and (2) that it could acquire jurisdiction over third parties whose presence is essential for its adjudication suit (Lafarge Cement Philippines, Inc., et al, vs.
Continental Cement Corporation,).
COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM
A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of the court both as to the amount and the nature thereof, except that in an original action before the Regional Trial Court, the counter-claim may be considered compulsory regardless of the amount
(Section 7, Rule 6, 1997 Revised rules of Civil Procedure).
It is compulsory in the sense that it is within the jurisdiction of the court. It does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and will be barred in the future if not set up in the answer to the complaint in the same case. Any other counterclaim is permissive (Cruz-Agana vs. Judge
Santiago-Lagman,).
A compulsory counterclaim set up in the answer is not an “initiatory” or similar pleading. The initiatory pleading is the plaintiff’s complaint. A defendant has no choice but to raise a compulsory counterclaim the moment the plaintiff files the complaint, otherwise defendant waives the compulsory counterclaim. In short, the compulsory counterclaim is a reaction or response, mandatory upon pain of waiver, to an initiatory pleading which is the complaint (Cruz-Agana vs. Judge
A. Criteria or Tests of Compulsoriness
The following criteria to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive:
(1) Are issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the
counterclaim largely the same?
(2) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claim,
absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
(3) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute
plaintiff’s claim as well as defendant’s counterclaim?
(4) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the
counterclaim? A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory (NAMARCO vs. Federation of United
Namarco Distributors,).
In short, if (1) the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same; (2) res judicata will bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claim absent the compulsory counterclaim rule; (3) the same evidence will substantially support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well as the defendant’s counterclaim; and (4) there is any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim, the claim is compulsory.
A counterclaim to be considered as compulsory it must passed the so-called “compelling test of compulsoriness”, and that is, the test of
“logical relationship” between the main claim and the counterclaim must
exist. There exists such a relationship when conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail substantial duplication of time and effort by the parties and the court; when the multiple claims involve the same factual and legal issues; or when the claims are offshoots of the same basic controversy between the parties (Quintanilla vs. CA).
If for example, X moves to intervene as party defendant in a suit between Plaintiff and Defendant, and in his answer he asks plaintiff for attorney’s fees, moral and exemplary damages as counterclaim for, it is humbly opines that his counterclaim is permissive, because, he voluntarily participated in the case without waiting first to be impeladed as party defendant. It would have been different had Plaintiff later on amends his complaint by impleading X as party defendant (indispensable or necessary) and X files his answer pursuant to summons served upon him, this time, it is humbly opines that counter claim for attorney’s fees, moral and exemplary damages pleaded in his answer is compulsory. Therefore, if the attorney’s fees, moral and exemplary damges is permissive, then he is obliged to pay docket fees because, payment of correct docket fees is jurisdictional.
C. Compulsory Counterclaim not set up on time is barred
A compulsory counterclaims not set up shall be barred (Section 2,
Rule 9, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure). The same should be set
up in the same action, otherwise, they would be barred forever (Lafarge
Cement Philippines, Inc., et al, vs. Continental Cement Corporation,).
If it is not set up shall be barred if not raised on time and the party in error is precluded from setting it up in a subsequent litigation on the ground of res judicata, the theory being that what are barred by prior judgment are not only the matters actually raised and litigated upon, but also such matters as could have been raised but were not (Metals
Engineering Resources Corporation vs. CA,).
It cannot be made the subject of a separate action but should be asserted in the same suit involving the same transaction or occurrence giving rise to it (Metals Engineering Resources Corp. vs. Court of
Appeals). This is because it is an auxiliary to the proceeding in the original
suit and derives its jurisdictional support therefrom, inasmuch as it arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the complaint (Metals Engineering Resources Corp.
vs. Court of Appeals.), and if made the subject of a separate suit, it may be
dismissed on the ground of res judicata (Visayan Packing Corporation
vs. Reparations Commission,).
D. Compulsory Counterclaim is not an initiatory pleading
A compulsory counterclaim does not require a certificate of non-forum shopping because a compulsory counterclaim is not an initiatory pleading. Lack of certificate of non-forum shopping is immaterial
(Cruz-Agana vs. Judge Santiago-Lagman,).
E. Effect of Dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint
The dismissal of the complaint due to the fault of plaintiff does not necessarily carry with it the dismissal of the counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise. In fact, the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the right of defendants to prosecute the counterclaim (Pinga vs. Heirs of
Santiago,).
In short, the defendant’s counterclaims must be disposed of based on the merit of the counterclaim itself and not on the survival of the main complaint; if the counterclaim is palpably without merit or suffers jurisdictional flaws which stand independent of the complaint, the trial court is not precluded from dismissing it under the amended rules, provided that the judgment or order dismissing the counterclaim is premised on those defects; and if the counterclaim is justified, counterclaim is protected by the rules from peremptory dismissal by reason of the dismissal of the complaint (Pinga vs. Heirs of Santiago,).
It is worthy to note that what was given emphasis in Pinga is dismissal of actions under Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint by reason of defendant’s motion to dismiss is not touched in Pinga. So, by analogy application of the ruling in Pinga, if the complaint is dismissed by reason of defendant’s motion (to dismiss), the defendant’s compulsory counterclaim survives, as complaint’s dismissal does not result in the automatic dismissal of the counterclaim.
Pinga case abandoned the ruling in Financial Building Corporation vs. Forbes Park Association,) that dismissal of the main
action results in the dismissal of the counterclaim already filed. Therefore, the rationale that “it stands to reason that the filing of a motion to dismiss the complaint is an implied waiver of the compulsory counterclaim because the grant of the motion ultimately results in the dismissal of the counterclaim” in Financial Building Corporation case is no longer controlling.
It also abandoned the ruling in Metals Engineering Resources
Corp. vs. CA). In that case the complaint was dismissed through
defendant’s motion on the ground of lack of jurisdiction for non-payment of docket fees which dismissal was affirmed by the High Court holding that that by reason of said dismissal, it is as if no claim was filed against the defendant, hence the counterclaim has no leg to stand on. The doctrinal pronouncement in Metals that “if the court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the main action of the case and dismisses the same, the compulsory counterclaim, being ancillary to the principal controversy, must likewise be dismissed since no jurisdiction remained for any grant of relief under the counterclaim” is also no longer controlling.
Now, it is no longer tree that dismissal of the complaint necessarily carries the dismissal of the compulsory counterclaim.
F. Remedy to file by defendant if he has a compulsory counterclaim against the Plaintiff: Either Answer or Motion to Dismiss
The filing of a motion to dismiss and the setting up of a compulsory counterclaim are incompatible remedies (Financial Building
Corporation vs. Forbes Park Association).
In the event that a defending party has a ground for dismissal and a compulsory counterclaim at the same time, he must choose only one remedy. If he decides to file a motion to dismiss, he will lose his compulsory counterclaim. But if he opts to set up his compulsory counterclaim, he may still plead his ground for dismissal as an affirmative
defense in his answer (Financial Building Corporation vs. Forbes Park
Association, Inc.,).
In short, the defendant may either file a motion to dismiss or file an answer and asserts therein his motion to dismiss as an affirmative defense. This of course, goes without saying that in the event that if defendant opts to file a motion to dismiss, he may still file an answer with compulsory counterclaim if his motion to dismiss will be denied.
G. Effects of plaintiff’s failure to appear during pre-trial conference to defendant’s compulsory counterclaim
The defendant’s compulsory counterclaim is not dismissible by reason of dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint for plaintiff’s failure to appear during the pre-trial. According to Spouses Corpuz vs. Citibank,
N.A,), plaintiff’s failure to appear during the pre-trial conference pursuant
to Section 3, Rule 17, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure amounts to failure to comply with the Rules or any Order of the Court.
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PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIM
A counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of or is not necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim (Lopez v. Gloria,). It is essentially an independent claim that may be filed separately in another case (Lafarge Cement Philippines, Inc., et
al, vs. Continental Cement Corporation,), or is capable of proceeding
independently of the main case (Bungcayao, Sr. vs. Fort Ilocandia
Property Holdings and Development Corporation,).
A set-off and recoupment can be a subject of counterclaims (Korea
Exchange Bank vs. Judge Gonzales,) provided that the following must
concur: (1) the same be essentially a genuine action of the defendant against the plaintiff; (2) the same should have as its object to neutralize, wholly or partially, that which the plaintiff is trying to obtain; (3) the same does not have for its object to destroy directly the action of the plaintiff; and (4) the same ought not to pray for a positive remedy distinct from the payment of money (Lopez vs. Gloria).
B. Set-off (Compensacion) and recoupment (reconvencion) distinguished
A set-off (compensacion) is a money demand by the defendant against the plaintiff arising upon contract and constituting a debt independent of and unconnected with the cause of actions set forth in the complaint, and may be used to offset a plaintiff’s claim but not to recover affirmatively (Lopez vs. Gloria).
A recoupment (reconvencion) differs from a counterclaim (contrarreclamacion) in that, under a counterclaim, the defendant may have an affirmative judgment where he is able to prove a demand in excess of the plaintiff’s demand, whereas in the case of recoupment, whatever the damages proved by the defendant, they can go only to reduce or extinguish the claim against him. Recoupment must arise out of the contract or transaction upon which the plaintiff’s claim is founded. Recoupment is of French origin and means the “cutting back of the plaintiff’s claim by the defendant.” It thus implies an admission of the plaintiff’s claim (Lopez vs. Gloria).
C. Payment of docket fees for permissive counterclaim is jurisdictional
The counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees
(Sandejas v. Ignacio, Jr.,).
A permissive counterclaim also requires payment of the prescribed docket fees, because it is not only the filing of the complaint or
appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fees that vests the court with jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action (Tan vs. Planters Products,).
The non-payment of which is a ground for the dismissal of the permissive counterclaim on ground of lack of jurisdiction over it, and the court by authority of Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure may dismiss it motu proprio or sans motion to dismiss (Tan vs.
Planters Products, Inc,).
Any decision rendered without jurisdiction with respect to permissive counterclaim is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on appeal before this Court (Sandejas v. Ignacio, Jr.,).
In Sapugay vs. CA , it was held that payment of docket fees is specifically applicable to permissive counterclaims only. Compulsory counterclaim is excluded from its purview.
D. Counterclaimant should be ordered to pay the prescribed docket fees
If the trial court made a mistake by saying that the counterclaim is compulsory and on appeal it found out that the counterclaim is permissive, the counterclaim is not dismissible, the counterclaimant should be given a reasonable period of time, but in no case beyond the reglementary period, within which to pay the prescribed docket fees because the counterclaimant should not be made to suffer due to the mistake of the trial court (Calibre Traders, Inc. vs. Bayer Philippines,).
E. Permissive Counterclaim requires a certificate of non-forum shopping
A permissive counterclaim requires a certificate of non-forum shopping because it is an initiatory pleading. Lack of it is fatal
(Cruz-Agana vs. Judge Santiago-Lagman,), and shall be cause for the dismissal
otherwise provided (See Section 5(2) Rule 7, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure).
F. Summons is not required to file answer in counterclaim
Well settled is the rule that the purpose of summons is to enable the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. But as regards counterclaim, the Rules of Court does not require that summons should first be served on the defendant before an answer to counterclaim must be made. Although a counterclaim is treated as an entirely distinct and independent action, the defendant in the counterclaim, being the plaintiff in the original complaint, has already submitted to the jurisdiction of the court (Francisco Motors Corporation vs. CA,).
G. Rule on default in counterclaim
If the defendant (plaintiff in the complaint) fails within the reglementary period, that is, ten (10) days from service (Section 4, Rule 11, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure) within which to file an answer, he, upon motion of the counterclaimant (or the plaintiff in the counterclaim) may be declared in default (Section 3, Rule 9, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) (Francisco Motors Corporation vs. CA,).
H. Moral, actual and exemplary damages can either be compulsory or permissive
Counterclaim for moral, actual and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees on account of plaintiff’s malicious and unfounded complaint is compulsory (Tiu Po vs. Bautista,), but in Korea Exchange
Bank vs. Judge Gonzales), a counterclaim for moral and exemplary
damages is considered permissive. Therefore, not all claims for moral and exemplary damages is always compulsory, because this may also be in the nature of permissive counterclaim. It can be compulsory or permissive depending upon the circumstances by which the same is claimed.
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PARTIES’ REMEDIES AFTER
ANSWER IS FILED
The following are the remedies available to the parties after an answer is filed:
1. File a Motion for Judgment Based on Pleadings;
2. File a Motion for Summary Judgment; or
3. (Defendant) to file Motion for Preliminary Hearing on his
affirmative defense asserted in the answer (under Section 6, Rule 16, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure).
I. FILE A MOTION FOR JUDGMENT BASED ON PLEADINGS
A. The rule
Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. xxx xxx xxx
(Section 1, Rule 34, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure). B. Concept
Judgment on the pleadings is improper when the answer to the complaint tenders several issues. It is proper when the answer admits all the material averments of the complaint. But where several issues are properly
tendered by the answer, a trial on the merits must be resorted to in order to afford each party his day in court (Municipality of Tiwi, vs. Betito, ).
Where a motion for judgment on the pleadings is filed, the essential question is whether there are issues generated by the pleadings. In a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there is no ostensible issue at all because of the failure of the defending party’s answer to raise an issue. The answer would fail to tender an issue, of course, if it does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or admits said material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings by confessing the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all (Tan v. De la Vega,).
When what is left are not genuinely issues requiring trial but questions concerning the proper interpretation of the provisions of some written contract attached to the pleadings, judgment on the pleadings is proper (Philippine National Bank vs. Utility Assurance & Surety Co.,
Inc.,).
A motion for judgment on the pleadings admits the truth of all the material and relevant allegations of the opposing party and the judgment must rest on those allegations taken together with such other allegations as are admitted in the pleadings. It is proper when an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading. However, when it appears that not all the material allegations of the complaint were admitted in the answer for some of them were either denied or disputed, and the defendant has set up certain special defenses which, if proven, would have the effect of nullifying plaintiff’s main cause of action, judgment on the pleadings cannot be rendered (Municipality of Tiwi, vs. Betito,).
The trial court has the discretion to grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by a party if there is no controverted matter in the case after the answer is filed. A judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded, and is based exclusively upon the allegations appearing in the pleadings of the parties and the accompanying annexes (Sunbanun
vs. Go,).
If it is the defendant who moves for a judgment on the pleadings without offering proof as to the truth of her own allegations and without giving plaintiff the opportunity to introduce evidence, defendant is deemed
to have admitted the material and relevant averments of the complaint, and to rest her motion for judgment based on the pleadings of the parties
(Rodriguez vs. Llorente,).
If the plaintiff asks the court for judgment on the pleadings and defendant has consented to it, and if judgment is not favorable to the defendant, he can no longer question the validity of the judgment. In
Tropical Homes, Inc. vs. CA, , the High Court said:
“As to the amount of damages awarded as a consequence of this violation of plaintiff’s rights, the lower court based its award from the allegations and prayer contained in the complaint. The defendant, however, questions this award for the reason that, according to the defendant, the plaintiff, in moving for judgment on the pleadings, did not offer proof as to the truth of his own allegations with respect to the damages claimed by him, and gave no opportunity for the appellant to introduce evidence to refute his claims. We find this objection without merit. It appears that when the plaintiff moved to have the case decided on the pleadings, the defendant interposed no objection and has practically assented thereto. The defendant, therefore, is deemed to have admitted the allegations of fact of the complaint, so that there was no necessity for plaintiff to submit evidence of his claim.”
If the court can resolve the issues presented by the complaint and the answer can be resolved within the four corners of said pleadings without need to conduct further hearings, and what remains to be done is the proper interpretation of the contracts or documents attached to the pleadings, then judgment on the pleadings is proper (Pacific Rehouse
Corporation vs. EIB Securities, Inc.,).
In an action for sum of money and defendants have admitted that they obtained the loan; have admitted the due execution of the loan documents and their receipt of the demand letter made by the plaintiff, and only issue is whether the obligation is matured or not, the High Court held that the case can be decided summarily, because when plaintiff made its
demand, the obligation matured. The matter proferred as a defense could be resolved judiciously by plain resort to the stipulations in the promissory note (Wood Technology vs. Equitable Bank,).
II. FILE A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A. The rules
A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof (Section 1, Rule 35, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure).
A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof(Section 2, Rule 35, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure).
The motion shall be served at least ten (10) days before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits, depositions, or admissions at least three (3) days before the hearing. After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law (Section 3, Rule 35, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure).
If on motion under this Rule, judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the reliefs sought and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel shall ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts
that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. The facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted on the controverted facts accordingly(Section 4, Rule 35, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure).
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Certified true copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in the affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith
(Section 5, Rule 35, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure).
Should it appear to its satisfaction at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this Rule are presented in bad faith, or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the offending party or counsel to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to incur including attorney's fees, it may, after hearing further adjudge the offending party or counsel guilty of contempt (Section 6, Rule 35, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure).
B. Concept and purpose
A summary judgment is granted to settle expeditiously a case if, on motion of either party, there appears from the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits that no important issues of fact are involved, except the amount of damages. In such event, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact ().
In Calubaquib vs. Republic, , the High Court explained the concept of summary judgment, thus:
“Summary judgments are proper when, upon motion of the plaintiff or the defendant, the court finds that the answer filed
by the defendant does not tender a genuine issue as to any material fact and that one party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A deeper understanding of summary judgments is found in Viajar v. Estenzo:
Relief by summary judgment is intended to expedite or promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits. But if there be a doubt as to such facts and there be an issue or issues of fact joined by the parties, neither one of them can pray for a judgment. Where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a judgment cannot take the place of a trial.
An examination of the Rules will readily show that a judgment is by no means a hasty one. It assumes a scrutiny of facts in a summary hearing after the filing of a motion for judgment by one party supported by affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documents, with notice upon the adverse party who may file an opposition to the motion supported also by affidavits, depositions, or other documents x x x. In spite of its expediting character, relief by judgment can only be allowed after compliance with the minimum requirement of vigilance by the court in a summary hearing considering that this remedy is in derogation of a party's right to a plenary trial of his case. At any rate, a party who moves for judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is so patently unsubstantial as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial, and any doubt as to the existence of such an issue is resolved against the movant.
“A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and [the] moving party is
