Admin Law Notes.pdf

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NOTES: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PAGE 1

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

NATURE AND SCOPE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DEFINITION

! Embraces all the law that controls, or is intended to control, the administrative operations of the government ! It includes the law that governs the structure of the

government and prescribes the procedure but not the substantive law which administration is supposed to apply ! Part of the public law which fixes the organization and

determines the competence of the administrative authorities, and indicates to the individual the remedies for the violation of his rights

! Branch of the modern law which the executive department of the government, acting in a judicial or quasi-legislative capacity, interferes with the conduct of the individual for the purpose of promoting the well-being of the community

! Study of the exercise of administrative power ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT

! Origin of administrative law is in legislation and it proceeds from the increased functions of government

! It became customary to delegate to the particular administrative agencies the power to formulate their regulations in implementing the statute enacted3 SUBJECT MATTER

1. The body of statutes which sets up administrative agencies and endows them with powers and duties

2. The body of rules, regulations, and orders issued by administrative agencies

3. The body of determinations, decisions, and orders of such administrative authorities made in the settlement of controversies arising in their respective fields

4. The body of doctrines and decisions dealing with the creation, operation and effect of determinations, and regulations of such administrative agencies

CLASSIFICATION

1. Statutes setting up administrative authorities either by creating boards and commissions or administrative offices or by confiding the powers and duties to existing boards, commissions, or officers, to amplify, apply, execute, and supervise the operation of and determine controversies arising under particular laws in the enactment of which the legislature decided for matters of convenience or for quicker or more efficient administration to withhold the controversies, at least in the first instance, from the courts of law

2. Rules, regulations, or orders of such administrative authorities enacted and promulgated in pursuance of the purposes for which they were created or endowed 3. The determinations, decisions, and orders of such

administrative authorities made in the settlement of controversies arising in their particular fields

4. The body of doctrines and decisions dealing with the creation, operation and effect of determinations and regulations of such administrative authorities

DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER BRANCHES OF LAW

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-! Where the emphasis is on the different branches of the government and on their relations, this pertains to public administration

! Where the emphasis is shifted to the problems of administrative regulation rather than those of administrative management, then this is the field of administrative law

Constitutional law—

! Constitutional law lays down the general rules of government which are fundamental and without which no governmental organization can hope to stand on its feet ! Administrative law on the other hand lays down secondary

rules which limit and equalify, expand and amplify the general precepts of governmental organization Penal laws—

! Penal laws consist really of a body of penal sanctions which are applied to all the branches of the law

! Bu a rule of law protected or enforced by a penal sanction may be really administrative in character for indeed one of the most common and efficient means of enforcing a rule of administrative law is to give it a penal sanction and the mere fixing of a penalty to a violation of a rule of administrative law doesn't deprive such rule of its administrative character

International law—

! This law cannot be regarded as binding upon the officers of any government considered in their relation to their own government except insofar as it has been adopted into the administrative law of the state

1 REPUBLIC V. CA

200 SCRA 226 FACTS:

Republic Planters Bank together with other sugar producers instituted an action for collection of sum of money and preliminary injunction against the Philippine Sugar Commission. Before an answer was filed, a compromise agreement was filed but to the move of its execution, petitioners were opposed. The CA ruled in this case that the SRA doesn't have the authority to represent the government in any suit against and for it.

HELD:

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that petitioner Sugar Regulatory Administration may not lawfully bring an action on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines and that the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel does not have the authority to represent said petitioner in this case.

Executive Order No. 18, enacted on 28 May 1986 and which took effect immediately, abolished the Philippine Sugar Commission (PHILSUCOM) and created the Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA) which shall be under the Office of the President. However, under the third paragraph of Section 13 thereof, the PHILSUCOM was allowed to continue as a juridical entity for three (3) years for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits by or against it and enabling it to settle and close its affairs, to dispose of and convey its property and to distribute its assets, but not for the purpose of continuing the functions for which it was established, under the supervision of the SRA.

Section 3 of said Executive Order enumerates the powers and functions of the SRA; but it does not specifically include the power to represent the Republic of the Philippines in suits filed by or against it, nor the power to sue and be sued although it has the

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-power to "enter, make and execute routinary contracts as may be necessary for or incidental to the attainment of its purposes between any persons, firms, public or private, and the Government of the Philippines" and "[t]o do all such other things, transact such other businesses and perform such functions directly or indirectly incidental or conducive to the attainment of the purposes of the Sugar Regulatory Administration."

It is apparent that its charter does not grant the SRA the power to represent the Republic of the Philippines in suits filed by or against the latter.

It is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law and those that are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof.

The SRA no doubt, is an administrative agency or body. An administrative agency is defined as "[a] government body charged with administering and implementing par ticular legislation.

CREATION, ORGANIZATION AND ABOLITION OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

LEGAL BASES FOR CREATION 1. Constitutional provisions 2. Legislative enactments 3. Authority of law FORMS AND PURPOSES

1. To dispense certain privileges accorded by the government 2. To carry on governmental business or functions 3. To carry on or undertake some business service for the

public

4. To regulate certain public callings or business affected with public interest

5. To promote the general welfare through police regulations 6. To determine rights of individuals in certain cases where a

strong social policy is involved

METHODS OF RE-ORGANIZATION AND ABOLITION ! Experimentation is frequent in the field of administration ! The powers of departments, boards, and administrative

agencies are subject to expansion, contraction, or abolition at the will of the legislative and executive branches of the government

! With respect to administrative agencies created by constitutional provisions, they cannot be abolished by statute

!_{But with respect to those created by legislative enactments,} or authority of the same, the legislature may validly abolish and reorganize them

2 CARIÑO V. CHR 204 SCRA 483 FACTS:

This is the classic case of the public school teachers being dismissed from service after concerting mass actions during a school day. They instituted a complaint before the Commission on Human Rights against petitioner among others. The Commission contends to adjudicate the matter.

HELD:

The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, 19 or even a quasi-judicial agency, 20 it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the

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-power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.

The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations in volving civil and political righ ts. But fact find ing is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any

investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings. 26 But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymou s with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters.

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An administrative agency must be created by law—either by the Constitution or by statute.

The organic act is important because it is the basis of the importance of the agency. For example, if it is the Constitution that sets forth the creation of the agency, then only the amendment or revision of the Constitution can affect the creation of the agency. The powers of the agency must be set forth in the organic act or the Constitution.

In the case of Cariño, the powers of the agency are defined in the organic act. The reading of the powers of CHR show that it doesn't have the power to adjudicate but only to investigate or recommendatory in nature.

How would we recognize the administrative agency? The name usually gives off the idea if the office is an administrative agency or not.

3 PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-DOLLAR V. CA 171 SCRA 348

(DEFINITION OF QUASI-JUDICIAL BODY) FACTS:

State Prosecutor Jose B. Rosales, who is assigned with the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force hereinafter referred to as PADS Task Force for purposes of convenience, issued search warrants against many companies allegedly engaged in the dollar salting industry. The application for the issuance of said search warrants was filed by Atty. Napoleon Gatmaytan of the Bureau of Customs who is a deputized member of the PADS Task Force. The companies then sought to declare the warrants null and void.

HELD:

The question is whether or not the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is, in the first place, a quasi-judicial body, and one whose decisions may not be challenged before the regular courts, other than the higher tribunals the Court of Appeals and this Court.

A quasi-judicial body has been defined as"an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule making." The most

common types of such bodies have been listed as follows: (1) Agencies created to function in situations wherein the government is offering some gratuity, grant, or special privilege, like the defunct Philippine Veterans Board, Board on Pensions for Veterans, and NARRA, and Philippine Veterans Administration.

(2) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to carry on certain government functions, like the Bureau of Immigration, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Board of Special Inquiry and Board of Commissioners, the Civil Service Commission, the Central Bank of the Philippines.

(3) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is performing some business service for the public, like the Bureau of Posts, the Postal Savings Bank, Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage Authority, Philippine National Railways, the Civil Aeronautics Admin istration.

(4) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to regulate business affected with public interest , like the Fiber Inspections Board, the Philippine Patent Office, Office of the Insurance Commissioner.

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-(5) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking under the police power to regulate private business and individuals, like the Securities & Exchange Commission, Board of Food Inspectors, the Board of Review for Moving Pictures, and the Professional Regulation Commission.

(6) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to adjust individual controversies because of some strong social policy involved , such as the National Labor Relations Commission, the Court of Agrarian Relations, the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor, the Social Security Commission, Bureau of Labor Standards, Women and Minors Bureau.

As may be seen, it is the basic function of these bodies to adjudicate claims and/or to determine rights, and unless its decision are seasonably appealed to the proper reviewing authorities, the same attain finality and become executory. A perusal of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's organic act, Presidential Decree No. 1936, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, convinces the Court that the Task Force was not meant to exercise quasi-judicial functions, that is, to try and decide claims and execute its judgments. As the President's arm called upon to combat the vice of "dollar salting" or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign exchange, it is tasked alone by the Decree to handle the prosecution of such activities, but nothing more. 4 PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION V. PSC

70 PHIL. 221

FACTS:

Petitioner has been engaged in the transportation business using what is kno wn to b e TPU b uses, in a ccordance to the ce rtificates of public convenience issued to it. It later applied for authorization to

operate additional buses. When it was authorized given new conditions, it wasn't amenable to the same, prompting it to file an action against the Commission and to declare the pertinent provision of CA 454 unconstitutiona l. It averred that the said provision is an unlawful abdication of the legislature of its power to the Commission, giving it unbridled discretion in implementing the law. The subject provision says that no public service shall operate in the Philippines without possessing a valid and subsisting certificate of public convenience from the Public Service Commission, to the effect that the operation of said service and the authorization to do business will promote the public interests in a proper and suitable manner. There is an additional condition that the government may acquire the business upon payment of proper costs as well as amend the certifications, etc.

HELD:

There was a valid delegation of powers to the Commission in inserting conditions in the issuance of certificates of public convenience and necessity. The standards set forth in the law giving it authority has expressly allowed for such discretion. However, the imposition of the condition upon petitioner should be remanded back to the Commiss ion. The act of the Commission to outright impose the condition without affording due process to petitioner is uncalled for. The Commission took advantage of the need to augment petitioner’s equipment in its business to impose the 25-year limitation.

5 PEO. V. MACEREN 79 SCRA 450 FACTS:

Accused were charged of violating a Fisheries Administrative Order, specifically on violating provisions on electro fishing. The trial court dismissed the complaint and this was affirmed by the

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-CFI on the ground that there electro fishing cannot be penalized as electric current is not one of those contemplated as obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in the old Fisheries law. HELD:

The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute as an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing their Administrative Orders, providing for the punishment for those who practice electro fishing. There is nothing provided in the Fisheries law that defines and punishes electro fishing. To declare what shall constitute a crime and how it shall be punished is a power vested exclusively in the legislature, and it may not be delegated to any other body or agency.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS SEPARATION OF POWERS

! In general, administrative law may be divided into three broad segments—

o The transfer of power from the legislature to administrative agencies

o The exercise of such delegated powers by these agencies

o The review of such administrative actions by the courts

! Laws enacted prescribing the powers and functions of administrative agencies should respect constitutional limitations

! The most common of the constitutional limitations is the separation of powers, with the concomitant non-delegation of powers

6 US V. BARRIAS 11 PHIL. 327 FACTS:

The defendant has been charged of violating the circular duly published in the Official Gazette of the Insular Collector of Customs, for being the captain of the boat Maude, and moving and directing her movement, when heavily laden, in the Pasig river, by bamboo poles in the hands of the crew and without steam, sail, or other external power. A paragraph in the said circular prohibits the movement of any craft in the Pasig river without being towed by steam or moved by other adequate power.

HELD:

By certain sections of Act 1136, the Collector of Customs is authorized to license craft engaged in the lighterage (loading, carrying or unloading in a lighter or barge for cargo) or other exclusively harbor business of the ports of the islands, and with certain exceptions, all vessels engaged in lightering are required to be so licensed. The Act also provides that any violation of the law or any rule and regulation promulgated by the Collector shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and be punished upon conviction of imprisonment and a fine.

Pertaining to the abovementioned law, the regulation of the Collector should be sustained as coming within the terms of the Act. Furthermore, the complaint in this instance was framed in accordance also with the Philippine Customs Administrative Act. The collector is not only authorized to promulgate regulations but also fix penalties for the violation thereof.

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-The power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by the department to any other body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has located the authority, there is must remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed. This is based on the ethical principle that a delegated power constitutes not only a right but also a duty to be performed by the delegate in the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another.

7 SUNVILLE TIMBER V. ABAD 206 SCRA 482

FACTS:

Petitioner was granted a TLA for the cutting of timber in Zamboanga del Sur. Private respondents then filed a complaint for injunction against it. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the case for allegedly violating the doctrine on exhaustion of administrative agencies. This was denied by the judge, averring such doctrine admits of exemptions and the present case comes within the purview of the same.

HELD:

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. Non-observance of the doctrine results in lack of a cause of action, which is o ne of the grounds allowed in the Rules of Court for the dismissal of the complaint. The deficiency is not jurisdictional. Failure to invoke it operates as a waiver of the objection as a

ground for a motion to dismiss and the court may then proceed with the case as if the do ctrine had been o bserved.

One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the other departments. The theory is that the administrative authorities are in a better position to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a chance to do so. A no less important consideration is that administrative decisions are usually questioned in the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, which are allowed only when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner. It may be added that strict enforcement of the rule could also relieve the courts of a considerable number of avoidable cases which otherwise would burden their heavily loaded d ockets.

There are a number of instances when the doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial action validly resorted to immediately. Among these exceptional cases are: 1) when the question raised is purely legal; 2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; 4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 5) when the claim involved is small; 6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; 7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 8) when strong public interest is involved; 9) when the subject of the controversy is private land; and 10) in quo warranto proceedings.

The court rules in favor of the petitioner.

Even if it be assumed that the forestry laws do not expressly require prior resort to administrative remedies, the reasons for the doctrine

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-above given, if nothing else, would suffice to still require its observance. Even if such reasons were disregarded, there would still be the explicit language of pertinent laws vesting in the DENR the power and function "to regulate the development, disposition, extraction, exploration and use of the country's forests" and "to exercise exclusive jurisdiction" in the "management and disposition of all lands of the public domain," and in the Forest Management Bureau (formerly the Bureau of Forest Development) the responsibility for the enforcement of the forestry laws aid regulations here claimed to have been violated. This comprehensive conferment clearly implies at the very least that the DENR should be allowed to rule in the first instance on any controversy coming under its express powers before the courts of justice may intervene.

The argument that the questions raised in the petition are purely legal is also not acceptable. The private respondents have charged, both in the administrative case before the DENR and in the civil case before the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City, that the petitioner has violated the terms and conditions of the TLA and the provisions of forestry laws and regulations. The charge involves factual issues calling for the presentation of supporting evidence. Such evidence is best evaluated first by the administrative authorities, employing their specialized knowledge of the agreement and the rules allegedly violated, before the courts may step in to exercise their powers of review.

8 NOBLEJAS V. TEEHANKEE 23 SCRA 405

FACTS:

Noblejas was appointed as the Commissioner of Land Registration. He enjoyed the same rank and privileges of a district judge. During his tenure as Commissioner, a letter was sent to him by Teehankee,

asking him to explain himself for the alleged approval of subdivision plans among others. He then apprised Teehankee that he enjoyed the privileges as of a district judge and thus, could only be suspended and investigated in the same manner as a Judge of the Courts of First Instance, and, therefore, the papers relative to his case should be submitted to the Supreme Court, for action thereon conformably to section 67 of the Judiciary Act (R. A. No. 296) and Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

He then was suspended by order of the President upon finding of a prima case against him.

HELD:

The petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of First Instance" includes by implication the right to be investigated only by the Supreme Court and to be suspended or removed upon its recommendation, would necessarily result in the same right being possessed by a variety of executive officials upon whom the Legislature had indiscriminately conferred the same privileges. To adopt petitioner's theory, therefore, would mean placing upon the Supreme Court the duty of investigating and disciplining all these officials, whose functions are plainly executive, and the consequent curtailment by mere implication from the Legislative grant, of the President's power to discipline and remove administrative officials who are presidential appointees, and which the Constitution expressly placed under the President's supervision and control (Constitution, Art. VII, sec. 10[i]).

Incidentally, petitioner's stand would also lead to the conclusion that the Solicitor General, another appointee of the President, could not be removed by the latter, since the Appropriation Acts confer upon the Solicitor General the rank and privileges of a

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-Justice of the Court of Appeals, and these -Justices are only removable by the Legislature, through the process of impeachment. The more fundamental objection to the stand of petitioner Noblejas is that, if the Legislature had really intended to include in the general grant of "privileges" or "rank and privileges of Judges of the Court of First Instance" the right to be investigated by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, by charging this court with the administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, and simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive over such officials.

Petitioner seeks to be differentiated with the other executive officials by averring that he exercises a judicial function, that is, resolution of a consulta by the Register of Deeds. Serious doubt may well be entertained as to whether the resolution of a consulta by a Register of Deeds is a judicial function, as contrasted with administrative process. It will be noted that by specific provision of the section, the decision of the Land Registration Commissioner "shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds" alone, and not upon other parties. This limitation in effect identifies the resolutions of the Land Registration Commissioner with those of any other bureau director, whose resolutions or orders bind his subordinates alone. That the Commissioner's resolutions are appealable does not prove that they are not administrative; any bureau director's ruling is likewise appealable to the corresponding department head.

But even granting that the resolution of consultas by the Register of Deeds should constitute a judicial (or more properly quasi judicial) function, analysis of the powers and duties of the Land Registration

Commissioner under Republic Act No. 1151, sections 3 and 4, will show that the resolution of consultas are but a minimal portion of his administrative or executive functions and merely incidental to the latter.

NON-DELEGATION OF POWERS

! No department of the government, except when authorized by the constitution, can abdicate authority or escape responsibility by delegating any of its power to another body

! Any attempt at such delegation of power is void under the maxim potestas delegari no n potest delegari

! This principle rests on the ethical principle that a delegated power constitutes not only a right but also a duty to be performed by the delegated body and through the intervening mind of another

! While the rule of non-delegation is applicable to all three departments of the government, the doctrine has found greater and persistent application to the prohibition against the delegation of legislative power

! Take note however that this rule isn’t absolute—any power not legislative in character, which the legislature may exercise, it may delegate.

! What the rule precludes is the delegation of those powers which are strictly or inherently and exclusively legislative and the abdication of the legislation of its own power and conferring such power upon an administrative agency to be exercised in its uncontrolled discretion

9 US V. ANG TANG HO 43 PHIL. 1

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-The Philippine legislature enacted a law entitled “An Act penalizing the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefore, and making an appropriation for this purpose”. Under the said law, the governor-general is authorized whenever, for any cause, conditions arise resulting in the extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate, with the consent of the Council of State, temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act.

The governor-general, in pursuance of this law, fixed the price at which rice should be sold. A few days after, the accused is charged for violation of such proclamation, charging him of selling rice at a higher price. He was found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment and payment of a fine.

HELD:

By looking at the first section of the subject law, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is left at the discretion of the governor-gen eral. The legislature doesn’t undertake to specify or define under what conditions or for what reasons the governor-general shall issue the proclamation, but says it may be issued “for any cause” and leaves the question as to what is “any cause” to the discretion of the governor-gen eral. There is also no definition to what the phrase “extraordinary rise” means. It doesn’t specify what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure or how long these shall remain in force and effect and when they shall be in effect.

Although the Congress may delegate to another branch of government the power to fill in the details in the execution,

enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of p owers, that said law:

1. Be complete in itself—it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate

2. Fix a standard—the limits of which are sufficiently determined or determinable—to which the delegate must conform in performance of his functions. Without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in

effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and without the appropriate standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. 10 PANAMA REFINING CO. V. RYAN_{293 U.S. 288 (1935)}

FACTS:

One of the economic problems caused by the Great Depression was faltering oil prices. This was due to overproduction and a general economic slowdown. The oil industry sought Congressional intervention to control the situation. The President issued Executive Order 6199 on July 11, 1933, banning interstate oil shipments if the oil was produced in excess of state quotas. Basis for this EO was section 9(c) of title 1 of the National Industrial Recovery Act, which authorizes the President to prohibit transportation of excess oil and prescribes punishment of a fine, imprisonment, or both. President then issued Executive Order 6204 on July 14, 1933, authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to exercise authority as vested in the President in enforcing section 9(c) and EO 6199.

Secretary of the Interior issuedregulations to carry out EO 6199 and 6204 on July 15, 1933.

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-! Regulation IV: Every producer of petroleum should file a monthly statement giving information on the company and oil production.

! Regulation V: Every purchaser/shipper/refiner of petroleum should file a monthly statement giving information on the company and oil production.

! Regulation VII: Aforementioned should keep adequate books and records of all transactions involving the production and transportation of petroleum and petroleum products.

Further EOs were issued:

! President issued “ Petroleum Code” (Code of Fair Competition for the Petroleum Industry) on August 19, 1933 regulating the production of petroleum as deemed necessary by each state’s requirement.

! President issued an EO on August 28, 1933 designating the Sec. of the Interior as the Administrator and the Department of the Interior as the federal agency, to exercise on behalf of the President all powers vested in him under that Act and Code.

The Panama Refining Co. and the Amazon Petroleum Corp. pressed suits on October 1933 to restrain the defendants (federal officials) from enforcing the restrictions on the production and disposition of oil.

HELD:

EO 6199, 6204 and the regulations issued by the Sec. of the Interior are without constitutional authority.

In trying to regulate the transportation of oil production in excess of state permission, “the Congress has declared no policy, has established no standard, has laid down no rule. There is no

requirement, no definition of circumstances and conditions in which the transpo rtation is to be allowed o r prohibited.”

Congress had failed to provide a “primary standard” to guide the executive branch. This oversight allowed the president to act as he pleased rather than within an administrative role.

This gives the President “unlimited authority to determine the policy… as he may see fit. And disobedience to his order is made a crime punishable by fine and imprisonment.”

This “hot oil” provision was seen as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers to the executive branch, thus violating the doctrine of separation of powers.

11 YNOT V. IAC_{148 SCRA 659}

FACTS:

An Execu tive Order was issued by the then Pre sident Marcos. The said Executive Order prohibited the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of another Executive Order. Violation of said EO is punished by confiscation. Petitioner was found guilty of violating said order when he transported his carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo, and his carabaos were subsequently confiscated.

HELD:

It is marked that the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through

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-dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly

profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers. EXCEPTIONS: PERMISSIBLE DELEGATION

1. When permitted by the Constitution itself

a. Example is the emergency powers granted to the President

2. In case of delegation of legislative power to local governments

a. Creation of municipalities exercising local self-government

b. Following are usually delegated to the local governments—police power, eminent domain, and taxation

3. Delegation of power to fill in the details

a. Matters of detail may be left by the legislature to the discretion of the administrative agencies by filling it with rules and regulations

4. Delegation of rule-making and adjudicatory powers to administrative bodies, provided ascertainable standards are set

a. The legislature is not always in session and its members can agree only on general policies but not matters of detail. Even if they could agree on details, there is the danger of being too detailed control and regulation may hamper the efficiency of the administrative agencies

5. Delegation of the power to ascertain facts, contingencies or events upon which the applicability or non-applicability of a law is made to depend

a. Congress may enact a law the taking effect of which is made to depend upon the happening of future specified contingencies to be determined by the executive or administrative agencies or officers 6. Delegation of power to people at large, when such has been

reserved by the Constitution a. Referendum is an example

7. Delegation of power to the executive in the field of international and diplomatic relations

ADVANTAGES OF DELEGATION OF POWER TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

1. It relieves the legislature of great burden of work in respect to which it has no special competence, and thus, enables it more largely to direct its attention to matters of general import

2. It entrusts the drafting of detailed provisions, which are usually of highly technical character to the agencies most familiar with the conditions to be met and which will have responsibility for its enforcement

3. It permits great flexibility in adopting the regulations to the different classes of individuals or interests affected 4. It makes possible the prompt modification of a provision as

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-12 EDU V. ERICTA 35 SCRA 481

FACTS:

Edu is the Land Transportation Commissioner. He issued an Administrative Order to implement the Reflector Law. Galo filed for preliminary injunction for the execution of said law and challenged its constitutionality. The judge issued the injunction against the execution of the Administrative Order and the subject law.

Such administrative order, which took effect on April 17, 1970, has a provision on reflectors in effect reproducing what was set forth in the Act. Thus: "No motor vehicles of whatever style, kind, make, class or denomination shall be registered if not equipped with reflectors. Such reflectors shall either be factory built-in-reflector commercial glass reflectors, reflection tape or luminous paint. The luminosity shall have an intensity to be maintained visible and clean at all times such that if struck by a beam of light shall be visible 100 meters away at night." Then came a section on dimensions, placement and color. As to dimensions the following is provided for: "Glass reflectors Not less than 3 inches in diameter or not less than 3 inches square; Reflectorized Tape At least 3 inches wide an d 1 2 inches long. T he painted or ta ped area may b e big ger at the discretion of the vehicle owner." Provision is then made as to how such reflectors are to be "placed, installed, pasted or painted." There is the further requirement that in addition to such reflectors there shall be installed, pasted or painted four reflectors on each side of the motor vehicle parallel to those installed, pasted or painted in front and those in the rear end of the body thereof. The color required of each reflectors, whether built-in, commercial glass, reflectorized tape or reflectorized paint placed in the front part of any motor vehicle shall be amber or yellow and those placed

on the sides and in the rear shall all be red. Penalties resulting from a violation thereof could be imposed.

HELD:

It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception that local governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job mu st be done , who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make the laws which ne cessarily involv es a d iscretion as to what it shall b e, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection call be made. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability. To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the ver y least that the legislature itse lf determin es matters of principle and lay down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, its maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be

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-carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.

The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety. This is to adhere to the recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not long after the Constitution came into force and effect that the principle of non-delegation "has been made to adapt itself the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments." He continued: "Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the courts."45

Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is authority non-legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed.

Our later decisions speak to the same effect. Thus from, Justice J. B. L. Reyes in People vs. Exconde:46_{"It is well establish in this}

jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegab le activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless the latter may constitutionally delegate authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it

impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and proved for the multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law in effect. All that is required is that the regulation should germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it; but conform to the standards that the law prescribes ... "

It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land Transportation Code. Republic Act No. 4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety which is the prime consideration in statutes of this character. There is likewise a categorical affirmation Of the power of petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations to give life to and translate into actuality such fundamental purpose. His power is clear. There has been no abuse. His Administrative Order No. 2 can easily survive the attack, far-from-formidable, launched against it by respondent Galo.

13 CRUZ V. YOUNGBERG 56 PHIL. 234 FACTS:

An action was brought against Youngbe rg who was then the Director of Bureau of Animal Industry. The action was against the refusal of Youngberg to issue a permit for the landing and subsequent slaughtering of large cattle imported by Cruz. Cruz averred that the law on which Youngberg was basing his refusal is unconstitutiona l. The subject law’s purpose was to prevent the spread of cattle diseases in the country.

HELD:

In his third assignment of error the petitioner claims that "The lower court erred in not holding that the power given by Act No.

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-3155 to the Governor-General to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition provided in the act constitutes an unlawful delegation of the legislative powers."

This contention is bereft of any merit.

The true distinction, therefore, is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. 14 SOLICITOR GENENRAL V. MMA

204 SCRA 837

FACTS:

In an earlier case, it was held that the confiscation of license plates and driver’s licenses were not part of the sanctions to be imposed in case of traffic violations. But subsequen t developments occurred, wherein there were many incidents of confiscation. An ordinance was then enacted for the confiscation of license plates in case of violations. The court acted on such ordinance. MMA defends itself by saying that the ordinance it promulgated was in pursuance of an executive order. The solicitor general on the other hand contended that the ordinance was null and void for being an unlawful delegation of legislative power.

HELD:

The problem before us is not the validity of the delegation of legislative power. The question we must resolve is the validity of theexercise of such delegated power.

The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the national legislature. Necessarily, the

acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of their principal. To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now before us, we apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing municipal corporations.

According to Elliot, a municipal ordinan ce, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive;

3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;

5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy.

The measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the following provisions of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission (and now the Metropolitan Manila Authority) to impose such sanctions.

In fact, the above provisions prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was allowed to "impose fines and otherwise discipline" traffic violators only "in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed," that is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or at least allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that "in case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated."

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-The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself).They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in question, which are merely local in srcin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.

The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits. In so doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in effect partially repeal the law.

15 ALLEGRE V. COLLECTOR 53 PHILS. 394

FACTS:

The petitioner for a number of years has been and is now engaged in the production ofabaca and its exportation to foreign markets. He applied to the respondent for a permit to export one hundred bales ofabaca to England, which was denied, and advised that he would not be permitted to export theabaca in question without a

certificate of the Fiber Standardization Board.

It be noted that the purpose and intent of the srcinal law, wherein the respondent based his denial, was to provide in detail for the inspection grading and baling ofabaca, maguey, sisal and other fibers, and for a uniform scale for grading, and to issue official certificates as to the kind and quality of the hemp, so that an

intending purchaser from an examination of the certificates might be assured and know the grade and quality of the hemp offered for sale.

HELD:

The question here is whether or not the law in question delegates to the Fiber Board legislative powers or administrative functions to carry out the purpose and intent of the law for its more efficient administration. It must be conceded that the details, spirit and intent of the law could only be carried into effect through a board of commission.

It will be noted that section 1772 of the Administrative Code, as amended, provides:

The Fiber Standardization Board shall determine the official standards for the various commercial grades of Philippine fibers that are or may hereafter be produced in the Philippine Islands for shipment abroad. Each grade shall have its proper name and designation which, together with the basis upon which the several grades are determined, shall be defined by the said Board in a general order. Such order shall have the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and for the dissemination of information, copies of the same shall be supplied gratis to the foreign markets, provincial governors, municipal presidents, and to such other persons and agencies as shall make request therefor. If it is considered expedient to change these standards at any time, notice shall be given in the local and foreign markets for a period of at least six months before the new standard shall go into effect. That is to say, the Legislature has specifically provided for the creation of "official standards for commercial grades of fibers," and that "the Fiber Standardization Board shall determine the official

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-standards for the various commercial grades of Philippine fibers," and that:

All fibers within the purview of this law which are intended for export shall be pressed in uniform bales. The approximate volume and net weight of each bale, together with the manner of binding, marking, wrapping, and stamping of the same, shall be defined in a general order by the Fiber Standardization Board.

And section 1788, as amended, provides that no fiber shall be exported in quality greater than the amount sufficient to make one bale, without being graded, baled, inspected, and certified as in this law provided. That is to say, the law provides in detail for the inspection, grading and bailing of hemp the Fiber Board with the power and authority to devise ways and means for its execution. In legal effect, the Legislature has said that before any hemp is exported from the Philippine Islands it must be inspected, graded and baled, and has created a board or that purpose and vested it with the power and authority to do the actual work. That is not a delegation o legislative power. It is nothing more than a delegation of administrative power in the Fiber Board, to carry out the purpose and intent of the law. In the very nature of things, the Legislature could not inspect, grade and bale the hemp, and from necessity, the power to do that would have to be vested in a board of commission.

The petitioner's contention would leave the law, which provides for the inspection, grading and baling of hemp, without any means of its enforcement. If the law cannot be enforced by such a board or commission, how and by whom could it be enforced? The criticism that there is partiality or even fraud in the administration of the law is not an argument against its constitutionality.

16 MUN. OF CARDONA V. MUN. OF BINANGONAN

36 PHIL. 547 FACTS:

The plaintiff still insists with great vigor that section 1 of Act No. 1748; entitled "An Act authorizing the adjustment of provincial and municipal boundaries and authorizing the change of capitals of provinces and subprovinces, as may be necessary from time to time to serve the public convenience and interest," is in violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in that it delegates legislative powers to the Governor-General, whereas the Act of Congress referred to lodges those powers in the Philippine Legislature. Section 1 of the Act referred to provides in substance that, whenever in the judgment of the Governor-Gene ral the public welfare requires, he may, by executive order, enlarge, contract, or otherwise change the boundary of any province, subprovince, municipality, or township or other political subdivision, or separate any such subdivision into such portions as may be requires, merge any of such subdivisions with another, divide, any province into one or more subdivisions as may be required, name any new subdivision so created, change the seat of government within any subdivision existing or created thereunder, to such place therein as the public interests require, and shall fix in such executive order the date when the change, merger, separation or other action shall take effect. The section also provides that whenever the Governor-General creates a new political subdivision he shall appoint such officers for the new subdivision with such powers and duties as may be required by the existing provisions of law applicable to the case and fix their salaries; and that such appointees shall hold office until their successors are appointed or elected and qualify. Successors to the elective offices shall be elected at the next general election following such appointment.

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-The contention of the plaintiff is not well founded. -The delegation of the power referred to on the Governor-General does not involve an abdication of legislative functions on the part of the legislature with regard to the pa rticular subject-matter with which it authorizes the Governor-General to deal. It is simply a transference of certain details with respect to provinces, municipalities, and townships, many of them newly created, and all of them subject to more or less rapid change both in development and centers of population, the proper regulation of which might require not only prompt action but action of such a detailed character as not to permit the legislative body, as such, to take it efficiently.

17 CALALANG V. WILLIAMS 70 PHIL. 726

FACTS:

Calalang filed an action against Williams and several others for prohibiting animal-drawn vehicles from passing particular roads. He alleged that the law granting the Director of Public Works from implementing rules and regulations is unconstitutional as it an undue delegation of legislative power.

HELD: This is untenable.

The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as follows: “SECTION 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the

National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines, the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets. Such rules and regulations, with the approval of the President, may contain provisions controlling or regulating the construction of buildings or other structures within a reasonable distance from along the national roads. Such roads may be temporarily closed to any or all classes of traffic by the Director of Public Works and his duly authorized representatives whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest, or for a specified period, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.” The above provisions of law do not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, “to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines” and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic “whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest.” The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated.

18 EASTERN SHIPPING V. POEA 166 SCRA 533

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-FACTS:

Victoriano Saco was the employee of a vessel wh o wa s killed in an accident. Pursuant to a Memorandum Circular, his widow filed with the POEA an action against the vessel owner for the burial and funeral expenses of her deceased husband. The vessel owner averred that the husband wasn't an overseas contract worker and thus, the claim must have been filed somewhere else. Nonetheless, the POEA acted on the action and ordered that damages be paid to the widow.

Part of what was appealed was that the Memorandum Circular by the POEA was an undue delegation of legislative power. HELD:

The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797, reading as follows: ... The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).

Similar authorization had been granted the National Seamen Board, which, as earlier observed, had itself prescribed a standard shipping contract substantially the same as the format adopted by the POEA.

The second challenge is more serious as it is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the

legislature to the delegate. Thus, in Ynot v. Intermediate Apellate Court12_{which annulled Executive Order No. 626, this Court held:} We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the

disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit , in the case of carabaos.' (Italics supplied.) The phrase " may see fit " is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a 'roving commission a wide and sweeping authority that is not canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing,' in short a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid d elegation of legislativ e powe r,viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.