CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
DIGESTS
BAYAN MUNA VS. ALBERTO ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS:
1. The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court (ICC) with "the power to exercise its jurisdiction over
persons for the most serious crimes (including genocide) of international concern x x x and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions." The RP is already a
signatory but pending ratification by Senate.
2. The RP entered into a Non-Surrender Agreement with the US which provides that before a “person” (current or former Government official, employee, or military personnel or national of one party) is surrendered or transferred to any international tribunal, express consent of the other party is required.
3. Petitioner assails the validity of the Agreement because it, among other things, (1) contravenes the Rome Statute; and (2) amends and is repugnant to Sec. 17 of RA 9851 ("Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity").
ISSUE: W/n the Agreement is valid. HELD/RATIO: YES.
ROME STATUTE
Art. 1 of the Rome Statute pertinently provides that the
ICC x x x shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of
international concern, as referred to in this Statute, and shall be complementary to national criminal
jurisdictions. The jurisdiction and functioning of the
Court shall be governed by the provisions of this Statute. Under par. 3 of Art. 20, Rome Statute, which again underscores the primacy of the jurisdiction of a state vis-a-vis that of the ICC. As far as relevant, the provis-a-vision states that "no person who has been tried by another court for conduct x x x [constituting crimes within its jurisdiction] shall be tried by the [International Criminal] Court with respect to the same conduct x x x."
The foregoing provisions of the Rome Statute, taken collectively, show that the Rome Statute expressly recognizes the primary jurisdiction of states, like the RP, over serious crimes committed within their respective borders, the complementary jurisdiction of the ICC coming into play only when the signatory states are unwilling or unable to prosecute.
Given the above consideration, petitioner's suggestion--that the RP, by entering into the Agreement, violated its duty required by the imperatives of good faith and breached its commitment under the Vienna Convention to refrain from performing any act tending to
impair the value of a treaty, e.g., the Rome Statute--has to be rejected outright. For nothing in the provisions of the Agreement, in relation to the Rome Statute, tends to diminish the efficacy of the Statute, let alone defeats the purpose of the ICC. Lest it be overlooked, the Rome
Statute contains a proviso that enjoins the ICC from seeking the surrender of an erring person, should the process require the requested state to perform an act that would violate some international agreement it has entered into. We refer to Art. 98(2) of the Rome Statute,
which reads:
“2. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.”
RA 9851
Sec. 17 of RA 9851 provides: In the interest of justice, the relevant Philippine authorities may dispense with the investigation or prosecution of a crime punishable under this Act if another court or international tribunal is already conducting the investigation or undertaking the prosecution of such crime. Instead, the authorities may surrender or extradite suspected or accused persons in the Philippines to the appropriate international court, if any, or to another State pursuant to the applicable extradition laws and treaties.
Petitioner’s view (na mali naman):
- That the Agreement amends existing municipal laws on the State's obligation in relation to grave crimes against the law of nations, i.e., genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.
- That the Philippines is required to surrender to the proper international tribunal those persons accused of the grave crimes defined under RA 9851, if it does not exercise its primary jurisdiction to prosecute them.
- That the Philippines has only two options, to wit: (1) surrender the accused to the proper international tribunal; or (2) surrender the accused to another State if such surrender is "pursuant to the applicable extradition laws and treaties." But the Philippines may exercise these options only in cases where "another court or international tribunal is already conducting the investigation or undertaking the prosecution of such crime;" otherwise, the Philippines must prosecute the crime before its own courts pursuant to RA 9851.
- That the Agreement prevents the Philippines without the consent of the US from surrendering to any international tribunal US nationals accused of crimes covered by RA 9851, and, thus, in effect amends Sec. 17 of RA 9851.
According to the SC:
- The Agreement merely reinforces the primacy of the national jurisdiction of the US and the Philippines in prosecuting criminal offenses committed by their respective citizens and military personnel, among others. The jurisdiction of the ICC pursuant to the Rome Statute over high crimes indicated thereat is clearly and unmistakably complementary to the national criminal jurisdiction of the signatory states.
- RA 9851 clearly: (1) defines and establishes the crimes against international humanitarian law, genocide and other crimes against humanity; (2) provides penal sanctions and criminal liability for their commission; and (3) establishes special courts for the prosecution of these crimes and for the State to exercise primary criminal jurisdiction. Nowhere in RA 9851 is there a proviso that goes against the tenor of the Agreement.
HON. SEC. PEREZ (AS DOE SECRETARY) V. LPG REFILLERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILS.
Facts: B.P. Blg. 33 penalizes illegal trading, hoarding,
overpricing, adulteration, underdelivery, and underfilling of petroleum products, as well as possession for trade of adulterated petroleum products and of underfilled LPG cylinders. The law set the monetary penalty for violators to a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000.
To implement the law the DOE issued Circular No. 2000-06-010. Respondent LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, Inc. (LPG Refillers) asked the DOE to set aside the Circular for being contrary to law. DOE denied the request.
LPG Refillers then filed a petition for prohibition and annulment of the Circular with the RTC. RTC nullified the Circular on the ground that it introduced new offenses not included in the law (per RTC: the Circular, in providing penalties on a per cylinder basis for each violation, might exceed the maximum penalty under the law).
DOE argued: penalties for the acts and omissions enumerated in the Circular are sanctioned by B.P. Blg. 33 and R.A. No. 8479. LPG Refillers countered: enabling laws do not expressly penalize the acts and omissions enumerated in the Circular. Neither is the
Circular supported by R.A. No. 7638 since the said law does not pertain to LPG traders.
RTC denied MR. Hence this petition for review on certiorari to SC.
Issue: W/N the DOE Circular is void on the ground that it
introduced new offences not punished under B.P. Blg. 33?
Held & Ratio: DOE Circular is valid.
For an administrative regulation to have the force of penal law (1) the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the delegating statute itself; and (2) the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself.
The Circular satisfies the first requirement. B.P. Blg. 33, criminalizes illegal trading, adulteration, underfilling, hoarding, and overpricing of petroleum products. Under this general description of what constitutes criminal acts involving petroleum products, the
Circular merely lists the various modes by which the said criminal acts may be perpetrated, namely: no price display
board, no weighing scale, no tare weight or incorrect tare weight markings, no authorized LPG seal, no trade name, unbranded LPG cylinders, no serial number, no distinguishing color, no embossed identifying markings on cylinder, underfilling LPG cylinders, tampering LPG cylinders, and unauthorized decanting of LPG cylinders. These specific acts and omissions are
obviously within the contemplation of the law, which seeks
to curb the pernicious practices of some petroleum merchants.
As for the second requirement: B.P. Blg. 33, provides that the monetary penalty for any person who commits any of the acts aforestated is limited to a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000. Under the Circular, the maximum pecuniary penalty for retail outlets is P20,000, an amount within the range allowed by law. However, the Circular is silent as to any maximum penalty for the refillers, marketers, and dealers. This mere silence, does not amount to violation of the statutory maximum limit. The mere fact that the Circular provides penalties on a
per cylinder basis does not in itself run counter to the law
since all that B.P. Blg. 33 prescribes are the minimum and
the maximum limits of penalties.
It is B.P. Blg. 33, which defines what constitute punishable acts involving petroleum products and which set the minimum and maximum limits for the corresponding penalties. The Circular merely implements the said law, albeit it is silent on the maximum pecuniary penalty for refillers, marketers, and dealers.
Noteworthy, the enabling laws on which the Circular is based were specifically intended to provide the DOE with increased administrative and penal measures
with which to effectively curtail rampant adulteration and shortselling, as well as other acts involving petroleum products, which are inimical to public interest. To nullify the Circular would be to render inutile government efforts to protect the general consuming public against the nefarious practices of some unscrupulous LPG traders. Note: LPG Refillers filed an MR with the SC on Aug. 28, 2007 (G.R. NO. 159149) contending that the Circular, in providing penalties on a per cylinder basis, is no longer regulatory, but already confiscatory in nature. MR denied. Circular is not confiscatory. The penalties do not exceed the ceiling prescribed in B.P. Blg. 33, which penalizes “any person who commits any act [t]herein prohibited.” Violation on a per cylinder basis falls within the phrase “any act.” To provide the same penalty for one who violates a prohibited act in B.P. Blg. 33, regardless of the number of
cylinders involved would result in an indiscriminate,
oppressive and impractical operation of B.P. Blg. 33. The equal protection clause demands that “all persons subject to such legislation shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions, both in the privileges
conferred and in the liabilities imposed.”
© DE JOYA V. JAIL WARDEN
Doctrine: Positivist Theory of Criminal Law
Facts: Norma de Joya was charged with two counts of BP 22 or the bouncing checks law in a Batangas MTC.
Crim Case 25484 was for issuing a Solid Bank check to Flor catapang de Tenorio worth 150,000 which was dishonoured because the account was closed.
Crim Case 25773 was for issuing a Scurity Bank and Trust Company check to Resurreccion Castillo for 225,000 which was also dishonoured because the account was closed.
De Joya pleaded not guilty and then jumped bail during trial. She was unable to present evidence and she lost both cases. Both decisions were promulgated without her being there despite due notice. Aside from being ordered to pay the amounts, she was also given the penalty of one year imprisonment.
In the meantime SC Admin Circular 12-2000 was passed concerning punishments for BP 22 violations. Two years later, de Joya was apprehended while applying for an NBI clearance. She was jailed in Batangas and then she asked to be released by virtue of the circular. She thought that it could be applied retroactively and that it meant imprisonment was no longer a punishment for bp 22 violations.
The RTC denied her motion hence this habeas corpus petition.
Issues:
1. Should the Writ for Habeas Corpus be granted? 2. Is the SC Admin. Circular 12-2000 a penal law?
What does it really order?
3. What is the positivist theory of criminal law? Held: 1. No!
2. No!
3. See Doctrine Doctrine:
1. Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that the writ of habeas corpus is not allowed if the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record. In this case De Joya was imprisoned by virtue of a court judgment.
2. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law; hence, Article 22 of the RPC is not applicable. The circular applies only to those cases pending as of the date of its effectivity and not to cases already terminated by final judgment. Also, it did not abolish imprisonment. It merely lays down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It says that when imposing a fine would better serve the interest of justice, the guilty party may just be fined instead of being imprisoned.
3. In imposing penalties for crimes, the courts must bear in mind that Philippine penal law is based on the Spanish penal code and has adopted features of the positivist
theory of criminal law. The positivist theory states that the
basis for criminal liability is the sum total of the social and economic phenomena to which the offense is expressed. The adoption of the aspects of the theory is exemplified by the indeterminate sentence law.
Philippine penal law looks at the convict as a member of society. Among the important factors to be considered in determining the penalty to be imposed on him are (1) his relationship towards his dependents, family and their relationship with him; and (2) his relationship towards society at large and the State. The State is concerned not only in the imperative necessity of protecting the social organization against the criminal acts of destructive individuals but also in redeeming the individual for economic usefulness and other social ends.
The purpose of penalties is to secure justice. The penalties imposed must not only be retributive but must also be reformative, to give the convict an opportunity to live a new life and rejoin society as a productive and civic-spirited member of the community.
LIANG VS. PEOPLE
FACTS: Jeffrey Liang is an economist working in the
Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, he was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal. Because of this, he was arrested, but then, he was able to post bail, and so he was released from custody.
The next day, the MTC judge received an “office of protocol” from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that Liang is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government. Because of this, the MTC judge dismissed the two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution.
The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. It then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. The latter set aside the MTC ruling and ordered for an enforcement of a warrant of arrest. Liang filed a MR but it was denied. Hence, this Petition for Review.
ISSUE: Whether or not Liang is covered by immunity
under the Agreement??? – NO.
HELD: The immunity mentioned in Section 45 of the
Agreement is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the act was done in an “official capacity.” Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty. It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions. The commission of a crime is not part of an official duty.
CONCURRING OPINION, PUNO, J:
The phrase “immunity from every form of legal process” as used in the UN General Convention has been interpreted to mean absolute immunity from a state’s jurisdiction to adjudicate or enforce its law by legal process, and it is said that states have not sought to restrict that immunity of the United Nations by interpretation or amendment. Similar provisions are contained in the
Special Agencies Convention as well as in the ADB Charter and Headquarters Agreement. These organizations were accorded privileges and immunities in their charters by language similar to that applicable to the United Nations. It is clear therefore that these organizations were intended to have similar privileges and immunities. From this, it can be easily deduced that international organizations enjoy absolute immunity similar to the diplomatic prerogatives granted to diplomatic envoys.
On the other hand, international officials are governed by a different rule. Section 18(a) of the General Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations states that officials of the United Nations shall be immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity. The Convention on Specialized Agencies carries exactly the same provision. The Charter of the ADB provides under Article 55(i) that officers and employees of the bank shall be immune from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except when the Bank waives immunity. Section 45 (a) of the ADB Headquarters Agreement accords the same immunity to the officers and staff of the bank. There can be no dispute that international officials are entitled to immunity only with respect to acts performed in their official capacity, unlike international organizations which enjoy absolute immunity. Clearly, the most important immunity to an international official, in the discharge of his international functions, is immunity from local jurisdiction. There is no argument in doctrine or practice with the principle that an international official is independent of the jurisdiction of the local authorities for his official acts. Those acts are not his, but are imputed to the organization, and without waiver the local courts cannot hold him liable for them. In strict law, it would seem that even the organization itself could have no right to waive an official’s immunity for his official acts. This permits local authorities to assume jurisdiction over and individual for an act which is not, in the wider sense of the term, his act at all. It is the organization itself, as a juristic person, which should waive its own immunity and appear in court, not the individual, except insofar as he appears in the name of the organization. Provisions for immunity from jurisdiction for official acts appear, aside from the aforementioned treatises, in the constitution of most modern international organizations. The acceptance of the principle is sufficiently widespread to be regarded as declaratory of international law.
KHOSROW MINUCHER v. CA and ARTHUR SCALZO
Facts: Khosrow Minucher is an Iranian national who came to study in the RP in 1974 and was appointed Labor
Attaché for the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo, Japan and Manila. When the Shah (monarch title) of Iran was deposed, he became a refugee and continued to stay as head of the Iranian National Resistance Movement. Scalzo, on the other hand, was a special agent of the US Drugs Enforcement Agency. He conducts surveillance operations on suspected drug dealers in the Philippines believed to be the source of prohibited drugs shipped to the US and make the actual arrest.
In May 1986, Minucher (and one Abbas Torabian) was charged with for the violation of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). The criminal charge was followed by a “buy-bust operation” conducted by the Philippine police narcotic agents in his house where a quantity of heroin was said to have been seized. The narcotic agents were accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo who became one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution. They were acquitted.
On 03 August 1988, Minucher filed a case before the RTC for damages on account of what he claimed to have been trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. According to Minucher, he and Scalzo conducted some business. Minucher expressed his desire to obtain a US Visa for him and his Abbas’s wife. Scalzo told him that he could help him for a $2,000 fee per visa. After a series of business transactions between the two, when Scalzo came to deliver the visas to Minucher’s house, he told the latter that he would be leaving the Philippines soon and requested him to come out of the house so he can introduce him to his cousin waiting in the cab. To his surprise, 30-40 armed Filipino soldiers came to arrest him.
In his defense, Scalzo asserted his diplomatic immunity as evidenced by a Diplomatic Note. He contended that the US Government, pursuant to the Vienna Convention, recognized it on Diplomatic Relations and the Philippine government itself thru its Executive Department and DFA.The courts ruled in favor of Scalzo on the ground that as a special agent of the US Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity.
RTC: decision in favor of plaintiff.
CA: Reversed. Scalzo was sufficiently clothed with diplomatic immunity pursuant to the terms of the Vienna Convention.
Issue: WON Scalzo is entitled to diplomatic immunity - Yes.
Ratio: The Vienna Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions to include: (a) ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the heads of state, (b) envoys, ministers or internuncios accredited to the heads of states; and (c) charges d' affairs accredited to the ministers of foreign affairs. Comprising the "staff of the (diplomatic)
mission" are the diplomatic staff, the administrative staff and the technical and service staff. Only the heads of missions, as well as members of the diplomatic staff, excluding the members of the administrative, technical and service staff of the mission, are accorded diplomatic rank.
Scalzo was an Assistant Attaché of the US diplomatic mission. Attaches assist a chief of mission in his duties and are administratively under him, but their main function is to observe, analyze and interpret trends and developments in their respective fields in the host country and submit reports to their own ministries or departments in the home government. These officials are not generally regarded as members of the diplomatic mission, nor are they normally designated as having diplomatic rank.
While the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo might thus remain contentious, it was sufficiently established that, indeed, he worked for the United States Drug Enforcement Agency and was tasked to conduct surveillance of suspected drugactivities within the country on the dates pertinent to this case. If it should be ascertained that Arthur Scalzo was acting well within his assigned functions when he committed the acts alleged in the complaint, the present controversy could then be resolved under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit.
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international law. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim – par in parem, non habet imperium – that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The implication is that if the judgment against an official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded.
A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns. The “buy-bust operation” and other such acts are indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within
Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.
SUZETTE NICOLAS v. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs
Facts: Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel Smith
is a member of the US Armed Forces. He was charged (along with 3 others) with the crime of rape committed against a Filipina, Suzette Nicolas, inside the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Olongapo City (inside a Starex Van). Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Philippines and the US, the US, at its request, was granted custody of defendant Smith pending the proceedings. During the trial, the US Government faithfully complied with its undertaking to bring defendant Smith to the trial court every time his presence was required. The RTC of Makati found Smith guilty (others were acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence) and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Pending agreement of the parties as to where Smith shall be detained, he was temporarily committed to the Makati City Jail. However, defendant Smith was taken out of the Makati jail and brought to a facility for detention under the control of the US government due to new agreements between the Philippines and the US, referred to as the Romulo-Kenney Agreement. Under such agreement, the DFA of the Philippines and the Embassy of the US agreed that, in accordance with the VFA, Smith shall be detained in a room at the U.S. Embassy Compound and guarded by U.S. military personnel. The matter was brought before the CA which dismissed the motion for having become moot.
Issue: Does the US have custody over Smith from the commission of the offense until completion of all judicial proceedings? YES!
The VFA provides that in cases of offenses committed by the members of the US Armed Forces in the Philippines, the custody of any US personnel over whom the Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction shall immediately reside with US military authorities, if they so request, from the commission of the offense until completion of all judicial proceedings. US military authorities shall make such personnel available to those authorities in time for any investigative or judicial proceedings relating to the offense with which the person has been charged.
Nothing in the Constitution prohibits such agreements recognizing immunity from jurisdiction or some aspects of jurisdiction (such as custody), in relation to long-recognized subjects of such immunity like Heads of State, diplomats and members of the armed forces contingents of a foreign State allowed to enter another State’s territory. The receiving State can exercise jurisdiction over the forces of the sending State only to the extent agreed upon by the parties. This is due to the recognition of extraterritorial immunity given to bodies such as visiting foreign armed forces.
Who has custody of Smith after conviction?
Applying the provisions of VFA, the Court finds that there is a different treatment when it comes to detention as against custody. The moment the accused has to be detained after conviction, the rule that governs is that: the confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of US personnel shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by appropriate Philippines and US authorities.
It is clear that the parties to the VFA recognized the difference between CUSTODY DURING TRIAL and
DETENTION AFTER CONVICTION, because they
provided for a specific arrangement to cover detention. And this specific arrangement clearly states that the detention shall be carried out in facilities AGREED ON by authorities of both parties AND that the detention shall be “by Philippine authorities.”
Therefore, the Romulo-Kenney Agreements, which are agreements on the detention of the accused in the US Embassy, are not in accord with the VFA itself because such detention is not “by Philippine authorities.”
The petitions were partly granted.
Side issue: WON the VFA was constitutional -YES!
It is constitutional as ruled by the court in the case of Bayan v. Zamora. The VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of the United States government.
NAVALES V ABAYA
Facts: Last July 27, 2003 more than 300 junior officers
and enlisted men – mostly from the elite units of the AFP quietly entered the premises of the Ayala Center in Makati City. They disarmed the security guards and took over the Oakwood Premier Apartments (Oakwood). The soldiers then made a statement through ABS-CBN News network that they went to Oakwood to air their grievances against the administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo such as graft and corruption in the military, sale of arms
and ammunition to the ‘enemies’ of the State, etc. They declared the withdrawal of support from the chain of command and demanded the resignation of key civilian and military leaders of the Arroyo administration.
After a series of negotiations between the soldiers and the Government team led by Ambassador Cimatu an agreement was forged between the two groups. Subsequently DOJ charged the 3221 soldiers who took part in the “Oakwood incident” with violation of Article 134-A coup d’ etat of the RPC.
Thereafter several of the accused filed in the RTC (branch 61) an Omnibus Motion praying that the RTC assume jurisdiction over all charges filed before the military tribunal.
While such motion was pending, DOJ issued a Resolution finding probable cause for coup d’ etat against only 31 of the original 321 accused and the charges against them were dismissed.
RTC (branch 61) admitted the Amended Information charging only 31 of the original accused with the crime of coup d’ etat defined under Article 134-A of the RPC.
However, 1Lt. Navales, et. al who were earlier dropped as accused in the crime of coup d’ etat were charged before the General Court Martial with violations of the Articles of War.
At this point the RTC acted on the Omnibus Motion filed by the 243 of the original accused declaring the petition for the court assume jurisdiction over all charges filed before the military court and requiring the prosecution to produce evidence to establish probable cause as MOOT AND ACADEMIC. Furthermore, it declared that all the charges before the court-martial against the accused are hereby declared NOT SERVICE CONNECTED BUT IS ABSORBED AND IN FURTHERANCE TO THE ALLEGED CRIME OF COUP D’ ETAT.
March 1, 2004, the General Court-martial has set the arraignment/trial of those charged with violations of the Articles of War.
Petitions for the issuance of temporary restraining order were filed and the court directed that parties to observe the status quo prevail before the filing of the petition.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the
writs of prohibition and habeas corpus.
Ruling: No. The Order of the RTC declaring that all the
charges before the court-martial against accused were not service-connected but absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup d’ etat, cannot be given effect.
When RTC resolved the Omnibus Motion to assume jurisdiction over all the charges filed before the military tribunal had already been rendered moot and
academic when the RTC accepted the Amended Information under which only 31 of the accused were charged and dismissing the case as against the other 290. It has become moot against those charges that were dismissed.
However in said order it further declared that “all the charges before the court-martial against the accused and former accused are not service-connected”, believing that the crimes defined in and penalized by the Articles of War were committed in furtherance of coup d’etat and thus absorbed by the said crime.
Thus, insofar as those whose case against them was dismissed, there was nothing left to be resolved after the Omnibus Motion was considered moot and academic. This dismissal made the petitioners no longer parties to the case and no further relief could be granted to them.
1Lt Navales, et al. since they are strangers to the proceedings in the criminal case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court, thus they cannot find solace in the declaration of the RTC that the charges filed against them before the General Court-Martial were not service connected.
In view of the clear mandate of RA 7055 that military courts have jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92 and Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles of War as these are considered “service connected” crimes. It even mandates that it should be tried by the court martial. The RTC thus has
no legal basis to rule that the violation of the following Articles of War were committed in furtherance of coup d’ etat and as such absorbed by the latter crime. In making such a declaration the RTC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and is NULL AND VOID.
The writs of prohibition and habeas corpus prayed for by the petitioners must fail.
As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in custody of an officer under a process issued by a court with jurisdiction and that the writ should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court or quasi-judicial body.
Thus, the rules apply to petitioners who were detained under Commitment Order issued by the Chief of Staff of the AFP.
On the other hand, the office of the writ of prohibition is to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been vested by law.
In this case, the General Court Martial has jurisdiction over the charges filed against 1Lt. Navales, et. al under RA 7055. A writ of prohibition cannot be issued to prevent it from exercising its jurisdiction.
© GONZALES v. ABAYA
*READ: concurring opinion of Justice Callejo
FACTS: This is about the Oakwood Mutiny (July 26, 2003) where members of the AFP aimed to destabilize the government with use of high-powered weapons and explosive devices. Navy Lt. Trillanes IV & the troops sported red armbands with the emblem “Magdalo.” They broadcasted their grievances against GMA, such as the graft and corruption in the military, the illegal sale of arms & ammunition to the "enemies" of the State, and the bombings in Davao City intended to acquire more military assistance from the US government. They declared withdrawal of support from the GMA & demanded her resignation.
After several hours of negotiation, they eventually surrendered. DOJ charged them with coup d’etat (defined
under Art. 134-A of the RPC) in RTC. Respondent Gen. Narciso Abaya, then Chief of Staff, filed with the military
tribunal for violations of the Articles of War (Art. 63:
disrespect toward the Pres., Art. 64: disrespect toward a superior officer, Art. 67: mutiny/sedition, Art. 96: for
conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman and
Art. 97: conduct prejudicial to good order & military discipline).
Following the doctrine of absorption, Gen. Abaya recommended that those charged with coup d’etat with RTC should not be charged before the military tribunal for violations of Articles of War. The RTC decided that “all charges before the court martial against the accused…are hereby declared not service-connected, but rather absorbed & in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup.”
However, Judge Advocate General’s Office of the AFP (JAGO)’s Colonel recommended that 29 of the officers (out of 321 coz DOJ dropped the case against the others) be prosecuted before a general court martial for violation of Art. 96. The AFP Judge Advocate General then directed accused to answer the charge. Instead of complying, they filed with the SC a Petition for Prohibition praying that the respondents (JAGO) be ordered to desist from charging them with violation of Art. 96.
Gonzales et al maintain that since the RTC has made a determination in its Order of February 11, 2004 that the offense for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War is not service-connected, but is absorbed in the crime
of coup d’etat, the military tribunal cannot compel them to
submit to its jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioners (rebels) are entitled to the writ of prohibition.
HELD: NO. There is no dispute that Gonzales et al, being officers of the AFP, are subject to military law according to Commonwealth Act 408 (AKA Articles of War). Section 1 of R.A. 7055 provides that as a general rule, members of the AFP and other persons subject to military law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code (like coup
d’etat), other special penal laws, or local ordinances shall
be tried by the proper civil court. It also provides the exception to the general rule, i.e., where the civil court, before arraignment, has determined the offense to be service-connected, then the offending soldier shall be tried by a court martial. Lastly, the law states an exception to the exception, i.e., where the President of the Philippines, in the interest of justice, directs before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil court.
The same provision also identifies "service-connected crimes or offenses" as "limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97" of the Articles of War. Violations of these Articles are within the jurisdiction of the court martial.
SC held that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected. This is expressly provided in Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. The charge against Gonzales et al concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the "service-connected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same – dismissal from the service – imposable only by the military court. Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military discipline.
There is no merit in Gonzales et al’s argument that they can no longer be charged before the court martial because the same has been declared by the RTC as "not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d’etat," hence, triable by said court (RTC). The RTC, in making such declaration, practically amended the law which expressly vests in the court martial the jurisdiction over "service-connected crimes or offenses." What the law has conferred the court should not take away. Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void.
The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that the charge of Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman is ‘absorbed and
in furtherance to the alleged crime of coup d’etat.’ Firstly, the doctrine of ‘absorption of crimes’ is peculiar to criminal law and generally applies to crimes punished by the same statute, unlike here where different statutes are involved. Secondly, the doctrine applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not applicable to this case.
Military law is sui generis, applicable only to military personnel because the military constitutes an armed organization requiring a system of discipline separate from that of civilians.
Clearly, the instant petition for prohibition must fail. The office of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of authority and is directed against proceedings that are done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Stated differently, prohibition is the remedy to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been vested by law.
In fine, SC holds that herein respondents have the authority in convening a court martial and in charging petitioners with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War.
PEOPLE VS. LOL-LO
While a boat of Dutch possession was in the high seas, Moros surrounded it with small boats. They robbed them of food and cargo, attacked some of the men on board, and brutally violated 2 women. Lo-lo and Saraw were two of the moros responsible. Lo-lo and Saraw later returned to Tawi-tawi where they were arrested and charged with the crime of mutiny. They were claiming that the Philippine courts does not have jurisdiction since the incident happened in the high seas. CFI still found them guilty.
Issue: Can a piracy committed outside of the PH triable here? – YES.
Held: YES.
- All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.
- Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the
competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy, unlike all other crimes, has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all.
© PEOPLE V. ROGER TULIN
MT Tabangao is a cargo vessel owned by PNOC. It was sailing near the coast of Mindoro loaded with barrels of kerosene, gasoline, and diesel oil with a total value of 40.4M. The vessel was suddenly boarded by 7 fully armed pirates (accused in the case – Emilio Changco, Cecilio Changco, Tulin, Loyola, Infante, etc.). they detained and took control of the vessel. The name MT Tabangao and the PNOC logo were painted over with black. Then it was painted with the name Galilee. The ship crew was forced to sail to Singapore.
In Singapore, the ship was awaiting another vessel that did not arrive. Instead, the ship went back to Batangas Philippines and remained at sea. Days later, it went back to Singapore. This time, another vessel called the Navi Pride anchored beside it. Another accused, Cheong San Hiong, supervised the Navi’s crew and received the cargo on board MT Tabangao/Galilee.
After the transfer of goods were completed, MT Tabangao/Galilee went back to the Philippines and the original crew members were released by the pirates in batches. The crew was ordered not to tell authorities of what happened.
The chief engineer of the crew, however, reported the incident to the coast guard. Afterwards, a series of arrests were effected in different places. An information charging the accused with qualified piracy or violation of the PD 532 – Piracy in the Philippine Waters – was filed against the accused.
As it turns out, Navi Pride captain, Hiong, was employed with Navi Marine Services ( a Singaporean firm, I think). Before the seizure of the MT Tabangon, Navi Marine was dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a Singaporean broker who offered to sell bunker oil to the former. When the transaction pushed through, Hiong was assigned to supervise a ship to ship transfer. He was told that the Galilee would be making the transfer, so Navi Pride ship-sided with Galilee and the transfer was effected. Paul Gan received the payment. Upon arrival in Singapore, Hiong was asked again to transact another transfer of oil. The same procedure was followed. Hiong then went to the Philippines to arrange another transfer with Changco – the pirates head. This was how Hiong was arrested by the NBI agents.
All the accused put up denials and alibis. The trial court, with ROMEO CALLEJO deciding, ruled that the accused were all guilty.
ISSUE: w/n the accused are guilty of qualified piracy – YES!
RULING: [only the important part for crim]
Hiong argues that he can not be convicted under PD 534 or Art 122 of the RPC as amended, since both laws punish piracy committed in Philippine waters. Hiong also contends that the court never acquired jurisdiction over him since the crime was committed outside Philippine waters.
Art. 122 of the RPC (piracy in general and mutiny in the high seas) provided that piracy must be committed in the high seas by any person not a member of its complement nor a passenger thereof. It was amended by RA 7659, which broadened the law to include offenses committed in Philippine waters. PD 532 on the other hand, embraces any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in the Philippine waters. Passenger or not, member of the complement or not, any person is covered by the law. No conflict exists among the mentioned laws, they exist harmoniously as separate laws.
The attack on and the seizure of MT Tabangao and its cargo were committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore, where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred and sold. Such transfer was done under Hiong’s supervision. Although the disposition by the
pirates of the vessel and its cargo was not done in Philippine waters, it is still deemed part of the same act. Piracy falls under Title 1 of Book 2 of the RPC. It is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies to the case, even if Hiong is charged with violation of a special penal law, instead of the RPC. Regardless of the law penalizing piracy, it remains to be a reprehensible crime against the whole world.
GUEVARRA V. ALMODOVAR
Facts: John Philip Guevarra, an 11 year old, was playing
with his best friend Teodoro Almine, Jr. and three other children in their backyard. They were target-shooting a tansan using an air rifle borrowed from a neighbor. In the course of their game, Almine was hit by a pellet on his left collar bone which caused his unfortunate death.
After the preliminary investigation, the examining Fiscal exculpated Guevarra due to his age and because the unfortunate occurrence appeared to be an accident. Almine’s parents appealed to the Ministry of Justice, which
ordered the Fiscal to file a case against Guevarra for Homicide through reckless Imprudence.
Guevarra filed a motion to quash stating that the information contains averments which if true would constitute an excuse or justification. His primary argument was that the term “discernment” connotes “intent” under the exempting circumstance found under Art. 12 sec. 3 of the RPC (9<x<15 exempting except if acting with discernment). If this were true, then no minor between the age of 9 to 15 may be convicted of a quasi offense under Art. 365 (Criminal Negligence).
Issue: Is discernment the same as intent? – NO.
Held: Intent is defined as a determination to do certain
things. On the other hand, discernment is the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong. They convey two distinct thoughts. It is therefore incorrect to say that since a minor above nine but below fifteen years of age acted with discernment, then he intended such act to be done.
The second element of dolo (deceit) is intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist. That’s why we have article 12.
In evaluating felonies committed by means of culpa (fault), three (3) elements are indispensable, namely, intelligence, freedom of action, and negligence. Obviously, intent is wanting in such felonies. However, intelligence remains as an essential element, hence, it is necessary that a minor above nine but below fifteen years of age be possessed with intelligence in committing a negligent act which results in a quasi-offense. For him to be criminally liable, he must discern the rightness or wrongness of the effects of his negligent act.
As such, Guevarra was not exempted and the case was remanded to the lower court.
PEOPLE vs OJEDA
PONENTE: Corona
FACTS: This is a case for estafa and violation of BP 22. Cora Ojeda used to buy fabrics from Ruby Chua. All in all Ojeda 228,306 pesos using 22 postdated checks. When the checks were presented for payment, they were dishonored due to “account closed”. Criminal charges were lodged against Ojeda.
In defense Ojeda claims good faith, absence of deceit, lack of notice of dishonor and full payment of the amount of the checks. Also, Ojeda claims she advised Chua not to cash the checks because they were not yet sufficiently funded. Finally, she claims she made partial
payments worth 50,000 pesos in the form of finished garments.
The trial court convicted her but only for 14 counts out of 22 bouncing checks issued. This was because some checks were not covered by the indictment and others were not signed by her but by her husband. ISSUE: whether or not the defense of Ojeda for absence of deceit is tenable. – YES.
HELD: Under Art. 315 of the RPC the following are the requisites for estafa: first, a check is postdated or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the time it is issued; second, lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; third, damage to the payee thereof. Deceit and damage are essential elements of the offense and must be established by satisfactory proof to warrant conviction. Deceit was not proven by the prosecution. In fact, Ojeda not only made arrangements for the payment of the debts but in fact paid (because during the pendency of the appeal an affidavit of desistance was introduced by Ojeda). This is a sign of good faith and absence of malice – an essential element of estafa and crimes under the RPC which are mala in se.
Minor ruling: there was also lack of notice of dishonor. Prosecution merely presented a copy of the demand letter and the registry receipt. However, the registry receipt does not prove itself. It needs to be authenticated and identified. In this case, it was not.
UNITED STATES vs. AH CHONG
Ah Chong was employed as a cook at Officers' quarters No. 27 at Fort Mc Kinley and at the same place Pascual Gualberto was employed as a house boy or muchacho. No one slept in the house except the two servants, ocuppying a small room toward the rear of the building. The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair.
Ah Chong was suddenly awakened by someone who was forcing to open the door. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, Ah Chong leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you."
At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed
against the door. In the darkness and confusion Ah Chong thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, Ah Chong struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual.
Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, Ah Chong called to his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
The deceased and the accused had an understanding to knock at the door and acquaint his companion with his identity.
Ah Chong alleged that it was because of repeated robberies that he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection. He admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" (burglar) because he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite warnings.
TC: Ah Chong was guilty of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances. Ah Chong admitted that he killed his roommate but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.
ISSUE: WON one can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act
RULING: there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith. Ah Chong acquiited.
There can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to complete exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his warnings defendant would have been wholly justified in using any available weapon to defend himself from such an assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the first blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the defendant nor his property nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger at the time when he struck the fatal blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling and resisting, and that there was no real "necessity" for the use of the knife to defend his person or his property or the property under his charge.
ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from that which he intended to commit.
Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in
point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse").
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; That is to say, the question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the mistake was made, and the effect which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent, criminal or other wise, upon which he acted.
Ah Chong struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property and the property under his charge.
TORRES, J., dissenting:
the crime of homicide by reckless negligence, defined and punishes in article 568 of the Penal Code, was committed, inasmuch as the victim was wilfully killed, and while the act was done without malice or criminal intent it was, however, executed with real negligence, for the acts committed by the deceased could not warrant the aggression by the defendant under the erroneous belief on the part of the accused that the person who assaulted him was a malefactor; the defendant therefore incurred responsibility in attacking with a knife the person who was accustomed to enter said room, without any justifiable motive.
© PEOPLE V. DELIM
FACTS: Marlon, Manuel and Robert Delim are brothers.
They are the uncles of Leon and Ronald Delim. Modesto Delim, the victim (deceased), was adopted by the father of the brothers.
On January 23, 1999, Modesto, Rita (wife), Randy (son) and their 2 grandchildren were about to eat their dinner when Marlon, Robert and Ronald barged into the house. They were armed with a short handgun. Marlon poked his gun at Modesto while Robert and Ronald simultaneously grabbed and hog-tied the victim. A piece of cloth was placed in the mouth of Modesto. They then herded Modesto out of the house on their way towards the direction of Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan. Leon and Manuel, also armed with short handguns, stayed put by the door to the house of Modesto and ordered Rita and Randy to stay where they were. Leon and Manuel left the house at around 7am the following day.
On January 27, 1999, Randy, in the company of his relatives, found Modesto under thick bushes in a grassy area. He was already dead. The cadaver was bloated and in the state of decomposition. It exuded a bad odor. Tiny white worms swarmed over and feasted on the cadaver. Randy and his relatives immediately rushed to the police station to report the incident and to seek assistance.
According to the autopsy, the cause of death was a gunshot wound at the head and the stab wounds sustained by the victim on his left and forearm were defensive wounds. The investigators confirmed that the accused had no licenses for their firearms.
Only Marlon, Ronald and Leon were arrested. Manuel and Robert were not found.
To exculpate themselves, Marlon, Ronald and Leon interposed denial and alibi.
The trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellants guilty of aggravated murder (The trial court appreciated treachery as a qualifying circumstance
and of taking advantage of superior strength, nighttime and use of unlicensed firearms as separate of aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime) and sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. The amount of P75,000 for moral damages and P25,000 for exemplary damages was awarded.
ISSUE:
1) WON the crime charged in the information is murder or kidnapping – Murder
2) WON the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove that accused are guilty of murder 3) WON the qualifying circumstances should be considered
HELD/ RATIO:
1) The crime charged is murder.
In determining what crime is charged in an information, the material inculpatory facts recited therein describing the crime charged in relation to the penal law violated are controlling. Where the specific intent of the malefactor is
determinative of the crime charged such specific intent must be alleged in the information and proved by the prosecution. A decade ago, this Court held in People v. Isabelo Puno, et al., that for kidnapping to exist, there
must be indubitable proof that the actual specific intent of the malefactor is to deprive the offended party of his liberty and not where such restraint of his freedom of action is merely an incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended by the malefactor.
If the primary and ultimate purpose of the accused is to kill the victim, the incidental deprivation of the victim's liberty does not constitute the felony of kidnapping but is merely a preparatory act to the killing, and hence, is merged into, or absorbed by, the killing of the victim.The crime committed would either be homicide or murder.
What is primordial then is the specific intent of the malefactors as disclosed in the information or criminal complaint that is determinative of what crime the accused is charged with — that of murder or kidnapping.
Specific intent is used to describe a state of mind which exists where circumstances indicate that an offender actively desired certain criminal consequences or objectively desired a specific result to follow his act or failure to act. Specific intent must be alleged in the Information and proved by the state in a prosecution for a crime requiring specific intent. Kidnapping and murder are specific intent crimes.
Specific intent may be proved by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. It may be inferred from the circumstances of the actions of the accused as established by the evidence on record.
Specific intent is not synonymous with motive. Motive generally is referred to as the reason which
prompts the accused to engage in a particular criminal activity. Motive is not an essential element of a crime and hence the prosecution need not prove the same. As a general rule, proof of motive for the commission of the offense charged does not show guilt and absence of proof of such motive does not establish the innocence of accused for the crime charged such as murder. The history of crimes shows that murders are generally committed from motives comparatively trivial. Crime is rarely rational. In murder, the specific intent is to kill the victim. In kidnapping, the specific intent is to deprive the victim of his/her liberty. If there is no motive for the crime, the accused cannot be convicted for kidnapping. In kidnapping for ransom, the motive is ransom. Where accused kills the victim to avenge the death of a loved one, the motive is revenge.
In this case, it is evident on the face of the Information that the specific intent of the malefactors in barging into the house of Modesto was to kill him and that he was seized precisely to kill him with the attendant modifying circumstances. The act of the malefactors of abducting Modesto was merely incidental to their primary purpose of killing him. Moreover, there is no specific
allegation in the information that the primary intent of the malefactors was to deprive Modesto of his freedom or liberty and that killing him was merely incidental to kidnapping. Irrefragably then, the crime charged in the Information is Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and not Kidnapping under Article 268 thereof. 2) YES
In this case, the prosecution was burdened to prove the
corpus delicti which consists of two things: 1) the criminal
act and 2) defendant's agency in the commission of the act.Wharton says that corpus delicti includes two things: 1) the objective; 2) the subjective element of crimes. In homicide (by dolo) and in murder cases, the prosecution is burdened to prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by the criminal act of some other than the deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c) that defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for the act which produced the death.To prove the felony of homicide or murder, there must be incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately killed (with malice); in other words, that there was intent to kill. Such evidence may consist
inter alia in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the
nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or immediately after the killing of the victim. If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively presumed.
In the case at bar, the prosecution adduced the requisite quantum of proof of corpus delicti. Modesto