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ch03 Non repudiation

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(1)

Non-repudiation

(2)

Midterm scores

Ave: 69

Std. dev: 23

Median: 75

Max: 100

(3)

Approximate grade

Mid 80s and up: As

High 60s and to mid80s: Bs

50s to 60s: Cs

(4)

Midterm

(5)

Law and Business

Legal systems make business possible

 (sorry libertarians)

Law establishes

 conditions for contract validity

 venues for disinterested mediation and

dispute resolution

(6)

Law and E-Commerce

E-Commerce also needs legal

systems

Complexities

global scope / jurisdiction

evolving technology landscape

(7)

Evidence

Legal systems require evidence

evidentiary statutes predate digital era

slowly catching up

Non-repudiation

maintaining digital evidence for

(8)

Legal structures

Common law

 long-established precedents in US and UK

Concepts

 writing  signing  notary

(9)

Problems for e-commerce

Is a digital contract "written"?

 digital media impermanent

Is a digital signature a "signature"?

 must be qualified with respect to key

purpose, policy, etc.

Who bears liability?

 private key compromise  service disruption

Who will archive and how?

 digital media volatile

(10)

Example

Financial services law

banks must retain canceled checks

or facsimiles thereof (microfilm)

pre-dates digital era

If we define "digital representation"

as equivalent to physical facsimile

then banks can store electronic scans

(11)

Example

Jurisdiction

location where suit can be brought

party must have "minimum contacts"

with a jurisdiction to be summoned

there

• US Constitutional law

(12)

Legal framework

US Federal

Federal law

Federal E-Sign act

provisions

• Technology-neutral

• Electronic signatures have same status as written ones

• limits

(13)

Legal Framework

US State Law

 Uniform Electronic Transactions Act

 More specific than Federal law  Enacted by 43 states

 Still technology-neutral

• Doesn't mention certificates, PKI, etc.

 Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act

 Extremely controversial

 Enacted by 3 states: Maryland, Virginia, Iowa  Major concern

(14)

UETA Provisions

Electronic Signature

"an electronic sound, symbol. or process attached to or logically associated with

a record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record."

Effect of Electronic Signature: A

"signature may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in

electronic form."

"If a law requires a signature, an electronic signature satisfies the law."

Electronic Record

"Means a record created, generated, sent, communicated, received, or stored by

electronic means."

Effect of Electronic Record

A record "may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in

electronic form."

If a law requires a record to be in writing, an electronic record satisfies the law."A contract may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because an

electronic record was used in its formation."

Effect of Electronic Agents

"The actions of machines ("electronic agents") programmed and used by people

(15)

Digital Signature Law

Utah Digital Signature Act (1995)

 Very specific

• Mentions public key cryptography, certificates, CRLs, etc.

• Licensing and regulation of CAs

• Liabilities of users and CAs

 Not widely emulated

"Digital Signature Guidelines" (1999)

 American Bar Association

 Guidelines for the deployment of PKI

(16)

International Laws

UN Model Law on Electronic

Commerce

similar to UETA

EU Directive on Digital Signatures

similar to Utah law

(17)

State of law

Complex and unsettled

Different laws in different states /

countries

Catch-22

Slow adoption of PKI is tied to legal

uncertainties

Lack of legal precedents / guidelines

(18)

Non-repudiation

(19)

Non-repudiation

Strong and substantial evidence of

the identity of the signer of a

message and of message integrity,

sufficient to prevent a party from

successfully denying the origin,

submission or delivery of the

message and the integrity

of its

contents.

(20)

Disputes

"I never said that."

origin

"I never got your message."

reception

"Check's in the mail."

(21)

Types needed

Non-repudiation of origin

NRO

Non-repudiation of delivery

NRD

(22)

Non-repudiation of Origin

Evidence needed

Identity of originator

Contents of message

Time of generation

• this may matter for establishing a negotiation sequence

Techniques

two party

(23)

Originator Digital Signature

Alice

 creates message M  dates it T

 and signs it S

Alice sends M + T + S to Bob

Bob uses Alice's public key certificate to

verify signature

Bob archives

 M + T + S

 Alice's public key certificate and CRL used to

(24)

Features

Identity and contents are protected

Timestamping depends on the

accuracy of Alice's clock

(25)

TTP Signature

 Trusted third-party (Vicky)

 Receives Alice's transaction M

 message

 Generates time stamp T

 Signs M + T

 creating S'

 Returns to Alice

 Bob gets M + T + S'

(26)

Features

Alice doesn't need to sign

 she can review message before sending  Alice doesn't need a key pair

• lower PKI overhead

Timestamp

 Vicky's timestamp will be more reliable than

Alice's

Identity less secure

 no digital signature from Alice

(27)

TTP Digest Signature

 Alice doesn't want to disclose M

 Same operation with hash of M using key k

 creates hash H

 Sends H to Vicky

 gets back H + T + S'

 Attaches M

 encrypts M + k + H + T + S'

 Bob receives message

 verifies that H is a true hash of M  verifies Vicky's signature

(28)

Features

Alice needs encryption / hashing

capability

(29)

In-line TTP

Receives Alice's transaction M

 message

Generates time stamp T

 Signs M + T  creating S'

Archives M + T + S'

Forwards M to Bob

 perhaps with transaction id

(30)

Features

Vicky does archiving

Alice and Bob don't need encryption

capability

(31)

TTP Token

Receives Alice's transaction M

Generates time stamp T

Creates a secure hash H of M + T using a

cryptographic key k

Returns to Alice M + T + H

Bob gets M + T + H

 Bob can contact Vicky with H

(32)

Features

Content secure

No PKI

Ordinary symmetric encryption

sufficient

(33)

Combination of methods

Originator Signature + TTP Digest

Signature

 if we care about disclosure  and recipient can archive

Originator Signature + In-line TTP

if we don't care about disclosure  and we want 3rd party archiving

In-line TTP could

 archive encrypted message

 Bob would need private key to access

(34)

Non-repudiation of delivery

Same information needed

Identity of recipient

Content of message

Timestamp

Think of NRO

but the origin message is the

(35)

Signed receipt

Alice sends Bob M

Bob

 generates a timestamp T  computes a hash of M = H  signs H + T = S'

 sends Alice a receipt message H + T + S'

Alice

 checks H against her original message  validates Bob's signature

(36)

Features

Like digital signature NRO, but in reverse

 message = acknowledgement

Standardized part of S/MIME

 secure receipt of email  available in MS Outlook

Other variants

 TTP Signature, In-Line etc.

(37)

Problem

Requires that the recipient generate

the receipt

What about the "reluctant recipient"?

(38)

Trusted Delivery Agent

Alice sends message of Vicky

Bob must contact Vicky to access

message

(39)

Non-repudiation of

submission

Useful when what matters is

submitting something

a bid

acceptance

Like NDD

but with the mail system

• or the bidding engine

(40)

Basic idea

Parties agree to non-repudiation

mechanism

Evidence is generated during transaction

Evidence is transmitted

Evidence is verified

Evidence is archived

If necessary

 Evidence is retrieved

(41)

Digital evidence

Evidence will be strong if

secure chain of custody from creation

to presentation

properties of authenticity and integrity

(42)

Secure bidding

Suppose Alice doesn't want Bob to know

the contents of her message

 a bid to be unsealed later

Additional safeguards

 Alice shouldn't be able to change her mind  Bob shouldn't be able to read her bid

"Commitment protocol"

 Alice commits to an answer but doesn't

(43)

Commitment protocol

Alice encrypts M with symmetric key k

 produces ciphertext C

 generates the transaction based on C

Bob gets Alice's bid C

 he can verify identity and timestamp  gets copy of C

When bids are revealed

(44)

Homework

Use secure email

 digital signature  encryption

Get certificate from www.thawte.com

 cannot use web mail

 if necessary, open a new hotmail account  Use Outlook Express or Netscape

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