TrumanBombDBQ2

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Truman’s Decision to Drop the Bomb

DBQ (Document Based Question)

Objective: Students will use primary source documents to create a thesis statement and categories of

analysis.

Prompt

: Analyze the factors that led to Harry Truman’s decision to use the atomic bomb.

Step 1. Read and summarize the assigned document.

Step 2. Get in “Expert” groups to discuss your summaries.

Step 3. Return to “Home” Groups and look for common themes shared between the documents. These

are your categories.

Step 4. Create a categories chart on your poster and paste your documents on it.

Step 5. Draft a thesis statement. Edit. Draft. Edit. Draft. Edit. Draft.

Step 6. Then, write the final draft of your thesis statement on the poster.

Step 7. Turn it in.

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Prompt

Document A

Summary of document: _____________________________________________________________________________________________

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Possible factors that led to his decision:

J. Gordon Arneson’s Notes of Committee Meeting, May 31, 1945

(From Stoff, Fanton, and Williams, eds., The Manhattan project: A Documentary Introduction to the Atomic Age. New York: McGraw Hill, 1991, pp. 117-‐118.)

VIII. EFFECT OF THE BOMBING ON THE JAPANESE AND THEIR WILL TO FIGHT:

It was pointed out that one atomic bomb on an arsenal would not be much different from the effect caused by any Air Corps strike of present dimensions. However, Dr. [Robert] Oppenheimer [lead scientist on the atomic bomb project] stated that the visual effect of an atomic bombing would be tremendous. It would be accompanied by a brilliant luminescence which would rise to a height of 10,000 to 20,000 feet. The neutron effect of the explosion would be dangerous to life for a radius of at least two-‐thirds of a mile.

After much discussion concerning various types of targets and the effects to be produced, the Secretary [i.e., Secretary of War Henry Stimson] expressed the conclusion, on which there was general agreement, that we could not give the Japanese any warning; that we could not concentrate on a civilian area; but that we should seek to make a profound psychological impression on as many of the inhabitants as possible. At the suggestion of Dr. [James B.] Conant [Director of the National Defense Research Committee] the Secretary agreed that the most desirable target would be a vital war plant employing a large number of workers and closely surrounded by workers’ houses.

There was some discussion of the desirability of attempting several strikes at the same time. Dr. Oppenheimer’s judgment was that several strikes would be feasible. General [Leslie R.] Groves [military director of the project], however, expressed doubt about this proposal and pointed out the following objections: (1) We would lose the advantage of gaining additional knowledge concerning the weapon at each successive bombing; (2) such a program would require a rush job on the part of those assembling the bombs and might, therefore, be ineffective; (3) the effect would not be sufficiently distinct from our regular Air Force bombing program.

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Prompt

Document B

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Source: Henry L. Stimson, The Decision to Use the Bomb. Harpers. February, 1947.

The principal political, social, and military objective of the United States in the summer of 1945 was the prompt and complete surrender of Japan. Only the complete destruction of her military power could open the way to lasting peace.

Japan, in July 1945, has been seriously weakened by our increasingly violent attacks. . .There was as yet no indication of Japan to accept unconditional surrender. If she should persist in her fight to the end, she has still a great military force.

In the middle of July 1945, the intelligence section of the War Department General Staff estimated Japanese military strength as follows: in the home islands, slightly over 2,000,000; in Korea, Manchuria, China proper, and Formosa, slightly over 2,000,000. The total strength of the Japanese army was estimated at about 5,000,000 men.

Two great nations were approaching contact in a fight to a finish, which would begin on November 1, 1945. Our enemy, Japan, commanded forces of somewhat over 5,000,000 armed men. As long as the Japanese Government refused to surrender, we should be forced to take and hold the ground.

In order to end the war in the shortest possible time and to avoid the enormous losses of human life, I felt that we must use the Emperor as our instrument to command and compel his people to cease fighting.

The bomb seemed to me to furnish a unique instrument for that purpose.

My chief purpose was to end the war in victory with the least possible cost in the lives of the men in the armies which I had helped to raise.

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Prompt

Document C

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Source: Harry S Truman, Memoirs of Harry S Truman, Doubleday, 1955.

My own knowledge of these [atomic] developments had come about only after I became President, when Secretary [of War] Stimson had given me the full story. He had told me at that time that the project was nearing completion, and that a bomb could be expected within another four months . . . It was [the committee’s] recommendation that the bomb be used against the enemy as soon as it could be done. They recommended further that it should be used without specific warning, and against a target that would clearly show its devastating strength. I had realized, of course, that an atomic bomb explosion would inflict damage and casualties beyond imagination. . .

The final decision of where and when to use the atomic bomb was up to me. Let there be no mistake about it. I regarded the bomb as a military weapon, and never had any doubt that it should be used. The top military advisers to the President recommended its use, and when I talked to Churchill, he unhesitatingly told me that he favored the use of the atomic bomb if it might aid to end the war.

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Prompt

Document D

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Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade In Europe. (New York: Doubleday, 1948).

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Prompt

Document E

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Diary of President Harry S. Truman, July 1945

(As Found in Robert Ferrell, ed., Harry S. Truman and the Bomb; A Documentary History. Worland, WY: High Plains Publishing, 1996, pp. 29-‐31)

July 17

Just spent a couple of hours with Stalin. . . .

After the usual polite remarks we got down to business. I told Stalin that I am no diplomat but usually said yes or no to questions after hearing all the argument. It pleased him. I asked him if he had the agenda for the meeting. He said he had some more questions to present. I told him to fire away. He did and it is dynamite-‐-‐but I have some dynamite too which I'm not exploding now. He wants to fire Fianco, to which I wouldn't object and divide up the Italian colonies and other mandates, some no doubt that the British have Then he got on the Chinese situation told us what agreements had been reached and what was in abeyance. Most of the big points are settled. He'll be in the Jap War on August 15th. Fini Japs when that comes about. . . .

July 18

. . . Went to lunch with P.M., at 1:30 walked around to British Hqrs. Met at the gate by Mr. Churchill. . . . Discussed Manhattan (it is a success). Decided to tell Stalin about it. Stalin had told P.M. of telegram from Jap Emperor asking for peace. Stalin also read his answer to me. It was satisfactory. Believe Japs will fold up before Russia comes in. I am sure they will when Manhattan appears over their homeland. I shall inform Stalin about it at an opportune time.

Stalin's luncheon was a most satisfactory meeting. I invited him to come to the U.S. . . . Said he was grossly misunderstood in U.S. and I was misunderstood in Russia. I told him that we each could help to remedy that situation in our home countries and that I intended to try with all I had to do my part at home. He gave me a most cordial smile and said he would do as much in Russia. . . .

July 25

We met at 11 A.M. today. That is Stalin, Churchill, and the U.S. President. But I had a most important session with Lord Mountbatten and General Marshall before that. We have discovered the most terrible bomb in the history of the world. It may be the fire distruction [destruction] prophesied in the Euphrates Valley Era, after Noah and his fabulous Ark. Anyway we think we have found the way to cause a disintegration of the atom. An experiment in the New Mexican desert was startling-‐-‐to put it mildly. Thirteen pounds of the explosive caused the complete disintegration of a steel tower 60 feet high, created a crater 6 feet deep and 1200 feet in diameter, knocked over a steel tower 1/2 mile away and knocked men down 10,000 yards away. The explosion was visible for more than 200 miles and audible for 40 miles and more.

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Prompt

Document F

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Source: Herbert Feis. The Atomic Bomb and the End of the War in the Pacific. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1961)

Some of those men who concurred in the decision to use the bomb discerned other advantages and justifications. It may be also, but this is only conjecture, that Churchill and Truman and some of their colleagues conceived that besides bringing the war to a quick end, it would improve the chances of arranging a satisfactory peace. For would not the same dramatic proof of western power that shocked Japan into surrender impress the Russians also? Might it not influence them to be more restrained? Might it not make more effective the resistance of the western allies to excessive Soviet pretensions and ventures, such as the Soviet bids for a military base in the Black Sea Straits, and a part of the occupation and control of Japan akin to that which it had in Germany? If these conjectures have any basis in actuality, they would provide another justification for using the bomb as a military weapon. We were not only subduing Japanese aggressors; we were perhaps monitoring the emergent Russian aggression.

Recognition of this tendency must not be distorted into an accusation that the American government engaged in what Soviet propagandists and historians have called "atomic blackmail." To the contrary, the American government remained intently desirous of preserving the friendly connection with the Soviet Union. It had rejected Churchill's proposal to face down the Soviet government in some climactic

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Prompt

Document G

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Source: Memoirs of Secretary of War Henry Stimson, 1947

In the middle of July, 1945, the intelligence section of the War Department General Staff estimated Japanese military strength as follows: in home islands, slightly under 2,000,000; in Korea, Manchuria, China proper, and Formosa, slightly over 2,000,000; in French Indo-China, Thailand, and Burma, over 200,000; in the East India area, including the Philippines, over 500,000; in the bypassed Pacific islands, over 100,000. The total strength of the Japanese Army was estimated at about 5,000,000 men. These estimates later proved to be in very close agreement with official Japanese figures....

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Prompt

Document H

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Truman’s memoirs (Extract)

(From Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Vol. 1: Year of Decisions. New York: Doubleday and Company, 1955, pp. 415-‐419.)

The historic message of the first explosion of an atomic bomb was flashed to me in a message from Secretary of War Stimson on the morning of July 16. . . . We were now in possession of a weapon that would not only revolutionize war but could alter the course of history and civilization. . . . On July 24 I casually mentioned to Stalin that we had a new weapon of unusual destructive force. The Russian Premier showed no special interest. All he said was that he was glad to hear and hoped we would make “good use of it against the Japanese.” . . . If the test of the bomb was successful, I wanted to afford Japan a clear chance to end the fighting before we made use of this newly gained power. . . . General Marshall told me it might cost half a million American lives to force the enemy’s surrender on his home grounds.

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Prompt

Document I

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STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, August 6, 1945

Sixteen hours ago an American airplane dropped one bomb on Hiroshima, an important Japanese Army base. That bomb had more power than 20,000 tons of T.N.T. It had more than two thousand times the blast power of the British "Grand Slam" which is the largest bomb ever yet used in the history of warfare.

The Japanese began the war from the air at Pearl Harbor. They have been repaid many fold. And the end is not yet. With this bomb we have now added a new and revolutionary increase in destruction to supplement the growing power of our armed forces. In their present form these bombs are now in production and even more powerful forms are in development.

It is an atomic bomb. It is a harnessing of the basic power of the universe. The force from which the sun draws its power has been loosed against those who brought war to the Far East.

Before 1939, it was the accepted belief of scientists that it was theoretically possible to release atomic energy. But no one knew any practical method of doing it. By 1942, however, we knew that the Germans were working feverishly to find a way to add atomic energy to the other engines of war with which they hoped to enslave the world. But they failed. We may be grateful to Providence that the Germans got the V-‐1's and the V-‐2's late and in limited quantities and even more grateful that they did not get the atomic bomb at all.

The battle of the laboratories held fateful risks for us as well as the battles of the air, land, and sea, and we have now won the battle of the laboratories as we have won the other battles. . . .

We have spent two billion dollars on the greatest scientific gamble in history -‐ and won. . . .

We are now prepared to obliterate more rapidly and completely every productive enterprise the Japanese have above ground in any city. We shall destroy their docks, their factories, and their communications. Let there be no mistake; we shall completely destroy Japan's power to make war.

It was to spare the Japanese people from utter destruction that the ultimatum of July 26 was issued at Potsdam. Their leaders promptly rejected that ultimatum. If they do not now accept our terms they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth. Behind this air attack will follow sea and land forces in such numbers and power as they have not yet seen and with the fighting skill of which they are already well aware. . . .

It has never been the habit of the scientists of this country or the policy of this Government to withhold from the world scientific knowledge. Normally, therefore, everything about the work with atomic energy would be made public.

But under present circumstances it is not intended to divulge the technical processes of production or all the military applications, pending further examination of possible methods of protecting us and the rest of the world from the danger of sudden destruction.

I shall recommend that the Congress of the United States consider promptly the establishment of an appropriate commission to control the production and use of atomic power within the United States. I shall give further consideration and make further recommendations to the Congress as to how atomic power can become a powerful and forceful influence towards the maintenance of world peace.

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Prompt

Document J

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PROCLAMATION DEFINING TERMS FOR JAPANESE SURRENDER

(Signed at Potsdam and Issued by the President of the United States [Truman] and the Prim Minister of the United Kingdom [Attlee] and Concurred in by the President of the National Government of China [Chiang], July 26, 1945)

(1) We -‐ the President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war.

(2) The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west, are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied Nations to prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist.

(3) The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, WILL mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter destruction of the Japanese homeland.

(4) The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-‐willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason.

(5) Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.

(6) There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

(7) Until such a new order is established AND until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-‐making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.

(8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands as we determine.

(9) The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

(10) We don not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights, shall be established.

(11) Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to rearm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.

(12) The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established, in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people, a peacefully inclined and responsible Government.

(13) We call upon the Government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.