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INTRODUCTION TO LAND OWNERSHIP

AND REGISTRATION IN THE PHILIPPINES

Atty. Pedro Jose F. Bernardo

This text is for limited and exclusive use, and is intended only for the class in Land Titles and Deeds taught by Atty. Bernardo at the FEU – La Salle Joint MBA-JD Program. It is still a work-in-progress. Unauthorized copying and distribution is strictly prohibited.

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PART I

INTRODUCTION TO LAND OWNERSHIP IN THE PHILIPPINES

I. The Regalian Doctrine and the Constitution

THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE

The Regalian Doctrine is the foremost legal principle introduced in the political system upon the Spanish Conquest of the Philippine Islands in 1521. This doctrine assumes that the King, as the Head of State, has the supreme power over the land, waters, and of the country under jurisdiction. Thus, by virtue of discovery and conquest of the Philippine Islands, the King of Spain acquired exclusive dominion over the Islands.

As adopted in our republican system of government, however, this medieval concept of jura regalia has been stripped of its royal overtones: ownership is vested in the State. Such ownership, according to the case of Lee Hong Hok v. David, reflects the capacity of state to own or acquire property and is understood under the concept of dominium. Thus, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides: “All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or time, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State.”

Lee Hong Hok v. David G.R. No. L-30389, December 27, 1972

DOCTRINE: Imperium distinguished from dominum. The government authority possessed by the state which is appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty comes under the heading of imperium; and its capacity to own or acquire property under dominium. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands held by the state in its proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution.

FACTS: Petitioners Lee Hong Hok et al. claim that the Torrens Title of Respondent David over the disputed land (which is part of the Naga Cadastre) should be declared null and void. The CA found no legal justification for nullifying the right of David over the disputed land arising from the grant made in his favor by appropriate public officials. David had acquired lawful title over said land. The Director of Lands awarded him an order for issuance of a sales patent pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application. Subsequently, on the basis of such order, the Undersecretary of Agricultural and Natural Resources issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent and an OCT was issued by the Register of Deeds of Naga City in favor of the respondent.

ISSUE: WON the State can dispose of lands which have not passed into private ownership.

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HELD: In this case the land in question is not private property as the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have always sustained the public character thereof for having been formed by reclamation.

It is well-settled "that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government." It is indispensable then that there be a showing of a title from the state or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law.

In the case at bar, a Miscellaneous Sales Patent and OCT was issued in favor of respondent David by competent public officials. He had acquired the grant and title legally. The notices regarding the auction sale of the land were published, the actual sale and award thereof to David were not clandestine but open and public official acts of an officer of the Government. The application was merely a renewal of his deceased wife's application, and the said deceased occupied the land since 1938.

(The first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII says that “all lands of the public domain x x x and other natural resources are owned by the state,”)

A grant by the government through duly competent public officials cannot be disregarded on the premise that land not passing into private ownership may not be disposed of by the state.

In discussing the concept of jura regalia, the Supreme Court said:

“2. As there are overtones indicative of skepticism, if not of outright rejection, of the well-known distinction in public law between the government authority possessed by the state which is appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty, and its capacity to own or acquire property, it is not inappropriate to pursue the matter further. The former comes under the heading of imperium and the latter of dominium. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands held by the state in its proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution. Dean Pound did speak of the confusion that existed during the medieval era between such two concepts, but did note the existence of res publicae as a corollary to dominium. As far as the Philippines was concerned, there was a recognition by Justice Holmes in Cariño v.

Insular Government, a case of Philippine origin, that "Spain in its earlier

decrees embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were held from the Crown . . ." That was a manifestation of the concept of jura

regalia, which was adopted by the present Constitution, ownership

however being vested in the state as such rather than the head thereof. What was stated by Holmes served to confirm a much more extensive discussion of the matter in the leading case of Valenton v. Murciano, decided in 1904. One of the royal decrees cited was incorporated in the

Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias in these words: "We having acquired

in sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands, territories, and possessions not heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that

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all lands which are held without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us according as they belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys, audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures, and commons in those places which are peopled, taking into consideration not only their present condition, but also their future and their probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what they now have and giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish."

It could therefore be affirmed in Montano v. Insular Government that "as to the unappropriated public lands constituting the public domain the sole power of legislation is vested in Congress, . . ." They continue to possess that character until severed therefrom by state grant. Where, as in this case, it was found by the Court of Appeals that the disputed lot was the result of reclamation, its being correctly categorized as public land is undeniable. What was held in Heirs of Datu Pendatun v. Director of Lands finds application. Thus: "There being no evidence whatever that the property in question was ever acquired by the applicants or their ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title or by any other means for the acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be public domain." For it is well-settled "that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government." It is indispensable then that there be a showing of a title from the state or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. The most recent restatement of the doctrine, found in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, follows: "The applicant, having failed to establish his right or title over the northern portion of Lot No. 463 involved in the present controversy, and there being no showing that the same has been acquired by any private person from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, the property is and remains part of the public domain." To repeat, the second assignment of error is devoid of merit.”

The application of Regalian Doctrine on the ownership by the State of the public domain therefore implies that any person claiming ownership of a portion of the public domain must be able to show title from the state according to any of the recognized modes of acquisition of title. Thus, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.

Collado v. Court of Appeals 390 SCRA 343

DOCTRINE: All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.

FACTS: Petitioner filed with the land registration court an application for registration of a parcel of land, alleging that they had occupied the land since time immemorial and that their possession had been open, public, notorious and in the concept of owners. The court rendered a decision

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confirming the imperfect title of petitioners, holding that petitioners had adduced sufficient evidence to establish their registrable rights over the Lot. On appeal, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and declared the decision of the trial court null and void. It cited the Regalian Doctrine, enshrined in the 1935 (Art. XIII, Sec. 1), 1973 (Art. XIV, Sec. 8), and 1987 Constitution (Art. XII, Sec. 2), which states that all lands of the public domain belong to the State. An applicant, like the private respondents herein, bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.In the case at bar, private respondents failed to present any evidence whatsoever that the land applied for has been segregated from the bulk of the public domain and declared by competent authority to be alienable and disposable. Worse, the technical description signed by the officer in charge of the survey division in the Bureau of Lands categorically stated that the survey was inside “Marikina Watershed”. The main thrust of petitioners’ claim over the Lot is that “all Presidential proclamations like the proclamation setting aside the Marikina Watershed Reservation are subject to private rights.” They claim that the presumption of law then prevailing under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926 was that the land possessed and claimed by individuals as their own are agricultural lands and therefore alienable and disposable.

HELD: The Court finds the petition bereft of merit. It was erroneous for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable. The term “public land” referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands.” The 1987 Constitution prohibits the alienation of all natural resources except agricultural lands of the public domain. Watershed Reservation is a Natural Resource.

It can therefore be concluded that petitioners did not acquire private rights over the parcel of land prior to the issuance of EO 33 segregating the same as a watershed reservation. An imperfect title may be derived from old Spanish grants or a continuous, open and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty years preceding the filing of his application as provided by Section 48 (b) CA 141. The petitioners were unable to acquire a valid and enforceable right or title because of the failure to complete the required period of possession, whether under the original Section 48 (b) of CA 141 prior to the issuance of EO 33, or under the amendment by RA 1942 and PD 1073.

At the same time, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a watershed. Since then, the Lot became non-disposable and inalienable public land. The period of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 in 1904 could no longer be counted because as a watershed reservation, the Lot was no longer susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance or alienation. Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended, applies exclusively to alienable and disposable public agricultural land.

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A positive act of the Executive Department is needed to declassify land which had been earlier classified as a watershed reservation and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. Once a parcel of land is included within a watershed reservation duly established by Executive Proclamation, as in the instant case, a presumption arises that the land continues to be part of such Reservation until clear and convincing evidence of subsequent declassification is shown.

Evidence on record thus appears unsatisfactory and insufficient to show clearly and positively that the Lot had been officially released from the Marikina Watershed Reservation to form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Thus, neither petitioners nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the Lot for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title.

Pangkatipuran v. Court of Appeals 379 SCRA 621

DOCTRINE: Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. This same doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.

FACTS: Petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance an application for judicial confirmation and registration of title to certain lots. The Court of First Instance promulgated a decision confirming petitioners’ title to the property. The Official Certificate Title was issued in the name of the petitioners. Republic of the Philippines filed with the Intermediate Appellate Court an action to declare the proceedings and titles derived therefrom as null and void, to direct the register of deeds to annul said certificates of title, and to confirm the subject land as part of the public domain. The Court of Appeals set aside the June 15, 1967 decision of the court a quo and ordered that the subject lot be reverted back to the public domain.

HELD: The petition is bereft of merit. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.

Evidence on record showed that at the time of filing of the application for land registration and issuance of the certificate of title over the disputed land in the name of petitioners, the same was timberland and formed part of the public domain. Based on a wrong concept of what is forest land, the court a quo found registrable title in favor of petitioners based on the Republic’s failure to show that the land is more valuable as forest land than for agricultural purposes.

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There was no evidence showing that the land has been reclassified as disposable or alienable. Before any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act from the government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain. Declassification of forest land is an express and positive act of Government. It cannot be presumed. Neither should it be ignored nor deemed waived.

Since the land in question is unregistrable, the land registration court did not acquire jurisdiction over the same. Any proceedings had or judgment rendered therein is void and is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid judgment.

(Petitioners’ contention that the Republic is now barred from questioning the validity of the certificate of title issued to them considering that it took the government almost eighteen (18) years to assail the same is erroneous. It is a basic precept that prescription does not run against the State. The lengthy occupation of the disputed land by petitioners cannot be counted in their favor, as it remained part of the patrimonial property of the State, which property, as stated earlier, is inalienable and indisposable.)

LIMITATIONSONTHE REGALIAN DOCTRINE

By virtue of the State’s power of ownership over the public domain, it could thereby exercise its rights of ownership, which include the power to exploit, develop and alienate such natural resources. The Constitution, however, provides for specific limitations to such power. These are enumerated in Sections 2 and 3 of Article XII.

Because we are now only concerned with the Constitutional limitations on the power of the State to dispose of lands of the public domain, we note the following specific provisions:

“SECTION 2. All lands of the public domain . . . are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. . .”

“SECTION 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant.

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Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor.”

Thus, with reference to the Regalian Doctrine, these provisions provide that while no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government, only alienable and disposable lands of the public domain may nonetheless be subject of such grant. Furthermore, the grantees of such land, even if alienable, must similarly comply with the citizenship requirements prescribed by the Constitution.

It must also be noted that notwithstanding the application of the Regalian Doctrine, the colonizers applying the doctrine did not intend to strip the natives of their ownership of lands already belonging to them. This was the ruling in the landmark case of Cariño v. Insular Government, 41 Phil. 935 (1909), where the Supreme Court said: “when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest and never have been public land.” Consequently, such land, if not owned by the State at the time of the Spanish conquest, could not have been ceded by Spain to the United States through the Treaty of Paris, and later, to the Philippine Government by the time of the Commonwealth.

The doctrine of immemorial possession set forth in Cariño was also recognized in the opinion defending the constitutionality Republic Act No. 8371 or Indigenous People’s Rights Act (IPRA). In the case of Cruz v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 135385, 6 December 2000, Republic Act No. 8371 said was assailed as unconstitutional on the ground that it deprived the state of ownership over lands of public domain and natural resources contained therein. The votes were deadlocked at 7-7 which meant that the validity of the IPRA was upheld. The opinion defending the validity of the IPRA held that ancestral domain and ancestral lands are private and belong to the indigenous people.

Cariño v. Insular Government 41 Phil. 936

FACTS: An Igorot applied to the Philippine court for registration of a certain parcel of land. The plaintiff and his ancestors held the land since time immemorial. The Philippine government opposed such application saying that there is no prescription against the crown, and even if there was, the land is not registered therefore it is public land by virtue of the Decree of June 25, 1880 which required registration for good title; and because of such the U.S. is the owner of the property by succeeding Spain by virtue of the Treaty of Paris.

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HELD: It is not public. In this case, every presumption must be in favor of the individual and against the government. Therefore, it can be “proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.” With this, it can be inferred that immemorial possession is an exception from the Regalian Doctrine because it is considered private land even before the Spaniards came, “when the regalia doctrine was introduced into the Philippines by colonizers, the colonizers did not intend to strip the natives of their ownership of lands already belonging to them.”

With regards to the Decree of June 25, 1880, it intended to correct the wrongful occupation by Filipinos of land belonging to the crown. There is no evidence that the possession of the petitioner is wrongful.

Cruz v. Executive Secretary 347 SCRA 128

FACTS: RA 8371 was assailed as unconstitutional on the ground that it deprived the State of its ownership over lands of the public domain and the natural resources in them. RA 8371 defined what are ancestral domains and ancestral lands.

HELD: The vote was 7-7 which meant that validity was upheld. The opinion defending constitutionality held the following: (1) ancestral domain and ancestral lands are not part of lands of the public domain. They are private and belong to indigenous people. Section 5 commands the state to protect the rights of indigenous people. Cariño v. Insular

Government recognized native title held by Filipinos from time

immemorial and excluded them from the coverage of jura regalia. (2) The right of ownership granted does not include natural resources. The right to negotiate terms and conditions over natural resources covers only exploration to ensure environmental protection. It is not a grant of exploration rights. (3) The limited right of management refers to utilization as expressly allowed in Section 2, Article XII. (4) What is given is priority right, not exclusive right. It does not preclude the State from entering into co-production, joint venture, or production sharing agreements with private entities.

The opinion assailing the constitutionality of the law held the following: (1) the law amounts to an abdication of state authority over a significant area of the country’s patrimony; (2) it relinquishes full control of natural resources in favor of indigenous people; (3) the law contravenes the provision which says that all natural resources belong to the state.

In addition, Philippine jurisprudence has also recognized that aside from lands held by person through immemorial possession, properties of the State, even if administered by the Spanish colonizers, are also not considered public land. It was not the King of Spain who was the owner of ecclesiastical property during the time of the Spanish occupation; these lands were owned by the Roman Catholic Church. Therefore ecclesiastical property was never public land and could not have been transferred to the United States by virtue of the Treaty of Paris.

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Barlin v. Ramirez 7 Phil. 41

FACTS: Barlin appointed Ramirez to administer Church property. When the former asked the latter to return the said property, the latter refused. He said that the property belongs to the State, and the same is granted to him by the State.

ISSUE: WON Barlin should return the said property?

HELD: Yes, he should return the said property. First, he is stopped by recognizing that the said property was only entrusted to him. Second the land belongs to the Roman Catholic Church. Since it belonged to the Roman Catholic Church, it was never public and therefore it was not included to the property ceded by Spain to the U.S. by virtue of the Treaty of Paris.

Roman Catholic Church v. Municipal of Tarlac 9 Phil. 450

FACTS: Prior to the Revolution, the Church and cemetery is controlled and administered by the Roman Catholic Church. The said properties where destroyed during the revolution. On January 10, 1903, by virtue of the circular, the Insular Government conveyed the land to the Independent Filipino Church for the purpose of administration in favor of the Municipality of Tarlac. The Roman Catholic Church seeks to get the property back. The respondent said that the RCC only administered the property but does not own it because it belongs to the State.

ISSUE: WON the property involved belonged to the State.

HELD: No, it belongs to the Church. As it was held in Barlin v. Ramirez, even though the property is administered by the Spanish government it belonged to the RCC and therefore private property. It could not have been part of the lands ceded to the U.S. by Spain. And because it is not part of the property ceded, it is not a property of the State and cannot by conveyed by it.

Friar lands were also an exception to the Regalian Doctrine because they are private lands at the time Spain ceded to the United States the Philippine Islands and by the time they were purchased by the government they were patrimonial property.1

II. Lands of the Public Domain

The term “public lands” refer to such lands of the public domain as are subject to alienation and disposal by the State in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 141, of the Public Land Act. It does not include all lands of government ownership, but only so much of said lands as are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement. Accordingly, “government land” and “public

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land” are not synonymous terms; the first is more extensive and embraces not only the second by also other lands of the government already reserved to public use or subject to private right.2

GENERAL CLASSIFICATIONOF LANDSOFTHE PUBLIC DOMAIN

As already set forth above, Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public domain as (1) agricultural, (2) forest or timber, (3) mineral and (4) national parks. The classification is descriptive of the legal nature of the land and not of what it looks like. Furthermore, under Section 2, Article XII, alienable lands of the public domain under the Constitution are limited only to agricultural lands.

This is reflected in Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the Public Land Act. While the Public Land Act generally deals only with alienable lands of the public domain,3 it nonetheless provides the following specific provision:

SECTION 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into —

(a) Alienable or disposable, (b) Timber, and

(c) Mineral lands,

and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition.

Notably, the power to classify lands of the public domain is vested in the President. In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,4 the Supreme Court, applying the foregoing provision, ruled that “the classification of public land is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the Government and not of the Courts. In the absence of such classification, the lands remain as unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. This should be so under time honored Constitutional precepts. This is also in consonance with the Regalian Doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in the land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.”

Such classifications, however, must be categorical: that is, land is either completely agricultural or completely mineral or completely forest or park.5 A land cannot have a mixed classification. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,6 “the Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself

2 N

ARCISO PEÑA, PHILIPPINE LAW ON NATURAL RESOURCES 17 (1997). [hereinafter PEÑA, NATURAL

RESOURCES].

3 See Section 2 of the Public Land Act. 4 129 SCRA 689

5 B

ERNAS, COMMENTARY supra note 13, at 1145. 6 160 SCRA 228 (1988).

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cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical: the land must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural.”

Furthermore, the Court ruled in Director of Lands v. Judge Aquino,7 that the classification of land does not change when the nature of the land changes. A positive act of the executive is nonetheless needed. Anyone who claims that the classification has been changed must be able to show the positive act of the President indicating such positive act.

Director of Lands v. Aquino 192 SCRA 296

FACTS: Abra industrial Corporation sought to register a “limestone-rich 70 hectar land in Bucay, Abra 66 hectars of which allegedly belongs to the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve. The lower court gave due course to the application. It ruled that although part of the land is within the forest reserve the Bureau of Forestry “offered no objection to exclude the same area from the forest reserve.” The Director Lands contends such ruling as incorrect.

ISSUE: WON the Lower Court is correct in granting the application for registration.

HELD: No, The lack of objection on the part of the Bureau of Forestry is of no moment because the classification of lands is privilege given only to the President. Without any positive act from him, a land cannot be classified nor re-classified.In the present case, there was no positive act whatsoever from the executive department classifying such land an alienable or disposable. Therefore, the application for registration must be denied because the land involved cannot be alienated because it is Forest Land.

Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals 211 SCRA 869

FACTS: Respondents tried to register a certain parcel of land. They have used the said land for raising livestock for many years. The government opposed stating the land is classified as a forest land.

ISSUE: WON the registration proper.

HELD: No. The power to classify lands of public domain resides in the executive department. And if there is proof the executive department that such land is classified as a forest land therefore the burden of proof is upon the applicant to show that the involved land is already classified as alienable. In the present case, the applicant failed to show such proof. The Court also held that the word “timber” land in the Public Land Act is the same as “forest” land in the Constitution. And even if the land

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does not look like a forest it is still forest land as long as it is classified as such.

It should also be stressed, however, that, by virtue of the Regalian Doctrine, the power of the executive to classify lands of the public domain is only a delegated power by the Philippine legislature. Thus, under Section 6 of the Public Land Act, both the President and Congress are empowered to declare what public lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act.

In addition to the power to classify lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timer, mineral lands and, through the Nipas Act, national parks, the President also has the power to declare otherwise alienable or disposable lands as reservations, for town sites and for other public and semi-public purposes.8 The effect of such reservation is that such land, while alienable, cannot be transferred to public individuals, and must be held by the State, either through the national government or a corresponding local government unit.

THE PUBLIC LAND ACTANDTHE CLASSIFICATIONOF ALIENABLE LANDS OFTHE PUBLIC DOMAIN

Public lands, or those lands of the public domain which are open to disposition and alienation, are governed by Commonwealth Act No. 141, or the Public Land Act. Passed into law in 1983, the Act sought to codify all laws relating to public lands then existing at the time of its enactment. Thus, Section 2 of the Public Land Act provides for the law’s coverage:

SECTION 2. The provisions of this Act shall apply to the lands of the public domain; but timber and mineral lands shall be governed by special laws and nothing in this Act provided shall be understood or construed to change or modify the administration and disposition of the lands commonly called "friar lands" and those which, being privately owned, have reverted to or become the property of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, which administration and disposition shall be governed by the laws at present in force or which may hereafter be enacted.

Excepted from the Act were timber and mineral lands, which were to be governed by special laws, as well as “friar lands”9 and those which, being privately owned, have reverted back to the government.

Friar lands, which are different from lands owned by the Church, are those lands of certain haciendas which were acquired by the government from religious orders/corporations or organizations in 1902. However, even though

8 See Title V of the Public Land Act.

9 Friar lands, which are different from lands owned by the Church, are those lands of

certain haciendas which were acquired by the government from religious orders/corporations or organizations in 1902. However, even though they were bought by the Philippine Government they are not considered public lands (Act 1120).

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they were bought by the Philippine Government they are not considered public lands.10

Notably, once public lands acquired under any of the methods provided by the Public Land Act, these are no longer to be governed by the provisions of the said Act. Thus, it was held that where part of the public lands has been legally appropriated or acquired by a private individual, the same shall be deemed segregated from the mass of the public lands and no law or proclamation thereafter made or issued relating to public lands shall operate upon it inasmuch as the subject of such free-hold or private land is not embraced in nor covered by the title of said Act.11

Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are further classified as (a) Agricultural, (b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and (d) Reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public uses.

SECTION 9. For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition shall be classified, according to the use or purposes to which such lands are destined, as follows:

(a) Agricultural;

(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes;

(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes;

(d) Reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public uses. The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time make the classifications provided for in this section, and may, at any time and in a similar manner, transfer lands from one class to another.

It should be stressed that while Section 9 classifies agricultural land separate from residential, commercial, educational, reservations, etc., all lands enumerated under the said provision all correspond to agricultural land as understood within Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution as open to alienation or disposition. The classification under Section 9, therefore, is for purposes of administration and disposition, according to the purpose to which said lands are especially adapted. But notwithstanding this classification, all of said lands are essentially agricultural lands which may be alienated.

MODESOF DISPOSITIONOF PUBLIC LANDS

10 WHEREAS, the said lands are not "public lands" in the sense in which those words are

used in the Public Land Act, Number Nine Hundred and twenty-six, and cannot be acquired or leased under the provisions thereof, and it is necessary to provide proper agencies for carrying out the terms of said contracts of purchase and the requirements of said Act of Congress with preference to the leasing and selling of said lands and the creation of a sinking fund to secure the payment of the bonds so issued (Act 1120).

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As we have learned under the Regalian Doctrine, no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied from the government. In other words, it is indispensable that there be a showing of a title form the state. One claiming “private rights” must prove that he has complied with the Public Land Act which prescribes the substantive as well as the procedural requirements for acquisition of public lands.12

Furthermore, only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public uses, nor appropriated by the government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized by the Act or any valid law may be claimed or which, having been reserved or appropriated have ceased to be so. In the absence of such classification, the land remains as unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.13 In Menguito v. Republic,14 it was held that unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.

A. Agricultural Lands

Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise:15

(1) For homestead settlement; (2) By sale;

(3) By lease;

(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles: (a) By judicial legalization;

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent). Homestead Settlement

By homestead is meant the home, the house and the adjoining land where the head of the family dwells; the home farm; the fixed residence of the head of a family, with the land and buildings surrounding the main house.16 Technically, and under the modern homestead laws, it is an artificial estate in land, devised to protect the possession and enjoyment of the owner against the claims of his creditors, by withdrawing the property from execution and forced sale, so long as the land is occupied as a home.17

12 A

GCAOILI, NATURAL RESOURCES supra note 15, at 19. 13 AGCAOILI, NATURAL RESOURCES supra note 15, at 20. 14 348 SCRA 128 (2000).

15 Section 11, Public Land Act.

16 Oliver v. Snowden, 18 Fla. 825, 43 Am. Rep. 388. 17 Buckingham v. Buckingham, 8 Mich. 89, 45 N.W. 504.

(16)

To qualify for a homestead settlement, the applicant must show that he is a citizen of the Philippines over the age of eighteen years, or is the head of a family, and does not own, or has not received by gratuitous allotment from the government, more than twenty-four hectares of land in the Philippines. Such homestead settlement must not exceed twenty-four hectares of agricultural land of the public domain.18 In order to be entitled to a land grant, the applicant is required to cultivate and improve at least 1/5 of the land continuously since the approval of the application and has resided therein for at least one year in the municipality in which the land is located, or in a municipality adjacent to the same.19

Should the applicant comply with the foregoing obligations, he shall acquire a vested right to the land, and will be entitled to receive a final deed of conveyance called a homestead patent. The execution and delivery of the patent, after the right to a particular parcel of land has become complete, are the mere ministerial acts of the officer charged with that duty. Even without a patent, a perfected homestead is a property right in the fullest sense, unaffected by the fact that the paramount title to the land is still in the government. Such land may be conveyed or inherited. No subsequent law can deprive him of that vested right.20

The Supreme Court has held that once a homestead applicant has complied with all the conditions essential to a government grant, he acquires not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the government. Thus, where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through actual physical possession openly, continuously, and publicly, with a right to a certificate of title to said land, the possessor is deemed to have already acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title to be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts – an application therefore being sufficient under the Public Land Act.21

As explained in Lahora v. Dayanghirang,22 where disposable public land is granted by the government by virtue of a public land patent (like homestead, sales or free patent), the patent is recorded and the corresponding certificate of title is issued to the grantee; thereafter, the land is automatically brought within the operation of the Property Registration Decree, entitled to all the safeguards of a veritable Torrens title. In other words, upon expiration of one year from its issuance, the certificate of title shall become irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate issued in a registration proceeding.

18 Section 12, Public Land Act. Note, however, that under Section 3, Article XII of the

Constitution, “Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead or grant.”

19 Section 14, Id.

20 AGCAOILI, NATURAL RESOURCES, supra note 15, at 21-22.

21 Mesina v. Sonza, G.R. No. L-14722, May 25, 1960, 108 Phil. 251. 22 37 SCRA 346 (1971).

(17)

In Pajomayo v. Manipon,23 it was held that once a homestead patent granted in accordance with the Public Land Act is registered, the certificate of title issued by virtue of said patent has the force and effect of a Torrens title issued through judicial registration proceedings. This principle is applicable to certificates of title issued by virtue of other land patents under the Public Land Act.

Sale

Agricultural lands may also be disposed of through sale in favor of any citizen of the Philippines over 18 years of age or the head of a family, but not to exceed twelve hectares.24 The sale is required to be made through seal public bidding whereby the land sought to be purchased shall be awarded to the highest bidder, but the applicant may equal the highest bid.25 The purchase price may be paid in full upon the making of the award or in not more than ten equal annual installments from the date of the award. It is required that the purchaser shall have not less than one-fifth of the land cultivated within five years from the date of the award, and before any patent is issued, he must show actual occupancy, cultivation and improvement of at least one-fifth of the land until the date of final payment.26

In addition to the foregoing obligations, the grantee is also not permitted to convey or encumber any of his rights over the land to any person, corporation, or association without the approval of the Secretary of Environment and National Resources. This limitation shall subsist for a period of ten (10) years from the title is granted to the patentee. Notably, any sale or encumbrance made in violation of the provisions of this section shall be null and void, and shall procedure the effect of annulling the acquisition and reverting the property and all rights thereto to the State, and all payments on the purchase price made to the government shall be forfeited.27

Lease

Any citizen of lawful age of the Philippines, and any corporation or association of which at least sixty per centum of the capital stock or of any interest in said capital stock belongs wholly to citizens of the Philippines, may lease any tract of agricultural public land available for lease under Chapter VI (Lease) of the Act.28 Pursuant to Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, private corporations may lease alienable lands of the public domain for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years, and not to exceed 1,000 hectares. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than 500 hectares, or acquire no more than 12 hectares thereof by purchase, homestead or grant.29

23 39 SCRA 676 (1971). 24 Supra note 137. 25

26 Sections 22, 26 and 28, Public Land Act. 27 Section 29, Id.

28 Sec. 33, Ibid.

(18)

It shall be an inherent and essential condition of the lease that the lessee shall have not less than one-third of the land broken and cultivated within five years after the date of the approval of the lease. However, in case the land leased is to be devoted to pasture, it shall be sufficient compliance with this condition if the lessee shall graze on the land as many heads of cattle as will occupy at least one-half of the entire area at the rate of one head per hectare.30

Judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title

Under the Public Land Act, persons already in possession of alienable lands of the public domain may, by the mere passage of time or failure to obtain title through no fault of their own, be constituted owners of the said parcels of land, subject to the qualifications and limitations set forth therein.

Thus, when an applicant conforms to all the requisites of confirmation prescribed under the Public Land Act, he obtains the right to a grant without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The application for confirmation becomes a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.31

Susi v. Razon 48 Phil. 424 (1925)

Petitioner Susi has been in open, continuous, adverse and public possession, personally and through his predecessors, of a certain parcel of land since 1880. Then the Director of Lands sold the said land to the respondent by virtue of an application for purchase filed on August 15, 1914. The court ruled that by the time the respondent filed his application for purchase the petitioner has already possessed the land for thirty-four years, the petitioner already had a right over the land. By that time ,the land ceased to be public and therefore removing it from the disposition of the Director of Lands therefore making the sale between the Director of Lands and Razon invalid.

Confirmation of imperfect title over alienable lands of the public domain may be achieved judicially, or through administrative confirmation via the issuance of free patents.

i. Judicial confirmation of imperfect title

The Public Land Act, and subsequent amendments thereto,32 enumerate the following requirements necessary for the judicial confirmation of imperfect title:

(1) The land sought to be registered must form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.

30 Sec. 39, Commonwealth Act No. 141. 31 Herico v. DAR, 95 SCRA 437 (1980).

(19)

The current state of law requires that the land sought to be registered must be alienable and disposable land of the public domain. As provided in Presidential Decree No. 1073, which amends Section 48(b) and (c) of the Act:

“Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and (c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the application himself or thru his predessessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.

Thus, lands classified as forest or timber lands, mineral lands and lands within national parks are excluded. This is due to the rule in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, limiting alienable and disposable public lands only to agricultural lands. The rule on confirmation of imperfect title does not apply unless and until the land classified as, say, a forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.33 There must be a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or statute.34 Hence, the applicant must secure a certification from the government that the land applied for by the applicant is alienable and disposable.35

It must be noted, however, that Republic Act No. 3872, which amended Section 48 of the Public Land Act on 18 June 1964, added a new sub-section thereto which recognized the right of cultural minorities to seek judicial confirmation even over lands which were not considered alienable or disposable. This right was limited by Presidential Decree No. 1073 which, as earlier mentioned, reiterated that only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain may be the subject of judicial confirmation. Notwithstanding the enactment of Presidential Decree No. 1073, however, the Supreme Court affirmed in Republic v. Court of Appeals36 that members of cultural minorities were entitled to apply for judicial confirmation between 18 June 1964 through the enactment of Republic Act No. 3872, until 25 January 1977 when Presidential Decree No. 1073 was issued.

While the present state of the law requires that only alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be the subject of judicial confirmation proceedings, there is authority to hold that the land subject of the claim of ownership must be alienable and disposable at the time of the filing of the application for registration of title, and not for the entire period of possession. Republic v. Court of Appeals and Naguit:37

33 Bracewell v. Court of Appeals, 323 SCRA 193 (2000).

34 Republic v. Court of Appeals and Ceniza, 392 SCRA 190 (2002). 35 Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 (1991).

36 Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 48327, August 21, 1991. 37 G.R. No. 144057, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 442

(20)

“… the phrase “since June 12, 1945” qualifies its antecedent phrase “under a bona fide claim of ownership.” Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located. Hence, what the law merely requires is that the property sought to be registered is “already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed.” In other words, it is not necessary that the land be first classified as bona fide claim of ownership could start. “If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.”38

(2) The applicant must be a Filipino citizen, who must have, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, possessed and occupied the land in the concept of an owner since 12 June 1945

Aliens are barred from applying for the benefits of Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act 141 for they are barred by the Constitution from owning alienable lands of the public domain. In Oh Cho v. Director of Lands,39 a Chinese national was denied from applying for judicial confirmation because he was a foreign national.

Similarly, the constitution limits ownership of lands of the public domain to individuals and not corporation, even if they be Filipino corporations. Thus, corporations are also prohibited from applying for judicial confirmation of imperfect title over public lands. The exception to this rule, however, is found in the case of Susi v. Razo,40 where the Supreme Court allowed a Filipino corporation to apply for judicial confirmation. The reason is because compliance with all the requirements for a Government grant, i.e., possession in the manner and for the period required by law, the land ipso jure ceased to be public land and became private property. Thus, provided that the Filipino corporation’s predecessor-in-interest had been in possession and occupation thereof in the manner and for the period prescribed by law as to entitle him to registration in his name, the ban against corporations acquiring lands of the public domain does not apply.41

38 A

GCAOILI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE supra note 121, at 72. 39 75 Phil. 890 (1946).

40 48 Phil. 424 (1925).

41 Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court and Acme Veneer & Plywood co.,

(21)

It must also be underscored that acquisition of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain through judicial confirmation of imperfect title may be considered an exception to the general rule about prescription running against properties of the State provided in Article 1113 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 1113. All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.

(3) The application must be filed before 31 December 2020.

Under the original provisions of the Public Land Act, actions for judicial confirmation were only allowed until 31 December 1938. Subsequent enacts extended this period until the most recent legislation, which sets the deadline at 21 December 2020 (Republic Act No. 9176). The filing of the application within the foregoing time period, however, is not a jurisdictional requirement, only a time limitation. Thus, an application filed beyond the foregoing period, but not objected to by the State either in a Motion to Dismiss or Answer, does not prevent the Court from granting such application.42

ii. administrative confirmation of imperfect title: Free Patents

Under Section 44 of the Public Land Act, any natural born citizen of the Philippines who does not yet own more than 12 hectares of agricultural land may apply for a free patent, provided that he, by himself, or by his predecessors-in-interest, has continuously occupied and cultivated agricultural land of the public domain for at least thirty (30) years since 4 July 1945. In lieu of continuous cultivation, it may be sufficient for the applicant to show that he has paid real estate taxes on the property for the same period and that the same has not been occupied by any other person.43 The land grant, conformably with the Constitution, cannot exceed 12 hectares.

If the applicant is a member of a national cultural minority and has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of land whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, he shall also be entitled to a free patent not exceeding 12 hectares..44

Similar to applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, all application for free patents must be filed before 31 December 2020, in accordance with Republic Act No. 9176. Also, the land subject of possession must, at least at the time of the application, be classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

Special patents

42 Director of Lands v. Danao, 96 SCRA 161 (1980). 43 C.A. No. 141, as amended by R.A. No. 782, Sec. 44. 44 C.A. No. 141, as amended by R.A. No. 3872, Sec. 44.

(22)

Aside from the foregoing land patents enumerated under the Public Land Act, special patents may also be issued over lands formerly reserved or considered inalienable. These patents are generally issued upon the “promulgation of a special law or act of Congress or by the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources as authorized by an Executive Order of the President” and, in themselves, already provide for the reclassification of the land.45

Special patents may be granted to Non-Christian Filipinos46 so long as the Secretary of Local Government has certified that “the majority of the non-Christian inhabitants of any given reservation have advanced sufficiently in civilization.” After which, “the President may order that the lands of the public domain within such reservation be granted to them” pursuant to the provisions of the Public Land Act.47 Special patents involving lands sold under the provisions of Article 60 and 70 of the Public Land Act may likewise be issued to authorize concession of lands of the public domain for educational, charitable or any of the like purposes.48 Furthermore, they also may be issued in favor of the owner of the landed estate acquired by the Government. Republic Act No. 926 authorizes the President to convey public lands and other properties of a public nature as payment for the acquisition of such estates.49

Emancipation patents

Emancipation patents are patents issued pursuant to Presidential Decree Nos. 27 and 266 in furtherance of the government’s policy of agrarian reform. Unlike the land patents enumerated under the Public Land Act, emancipation patents do not cover lands of the public domain, but instead, private agricultural lands. However, with the enactment of Republic Act No. 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the provisions of Presidential Decree Nos. 27 and 266 have generally been superseded.50

B. Sale or Lease of Public Lands for Residential, Commercial or Industrial Purposes.

Under Chapter IX of the Public Land Act, lands intended for residential, commercial, industrial and similar productive purposes may be disposed of by sale or lease thru public bidding, generally following the procedure prescribed for agricultural lands. The land or the right to lease is acquired also in a public auction thru bidding. The difference, however, lies in the fact that where in agricultural sales, the auction sale is thru sealed bidding with the applicant enjoying the right to equal the highest bid, the auction sale of residential, commercial and industrial lands is thru oral bidding – where the applicant has

45 A

GCAOILI, NATURAL RESOURCES, supra note 15, at 55.

46 A

MADO D. AQUINO( LAND REGISTRATIONAND RELATED PROCEEDINGS 149 (200). [hereinafter AQUINK, LAND

REGISTRATION]

47 C.A. 141, Sec. 84. 48 Supra note 193. 49 AL

UINO, LAND REGISTRATION, supra 193, at 150. 50 Supra note 200.

(23)

to outbid the other bidders in order to be successful bidder. In other words, the applicant does not have preferential right, unless he is an applicant who has introduced improvements on the land by virtue of a permit issued to him by the Bureau of Lands, in which case he has the right to a sealed bidding.

Lands disposable for residential, commercial or industrial purposes are classified as:

a. Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filing, or other means

b. Foreshore

c. Marshy land or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers.

The conditions of the sale are as follows:

a. The purchaser shall enter the land and introduce suitable improvements thereon within six (6) months, and complete such improvements not later than 18 months from the date of the award.

b. The purchaser shall pay the purchase price of the land in ten (10) equal annual installments.

In case of lease, the rental shall be 3% of the value of the land plus 1% of the value of the improvements. Every ten (10) years, the land and improvements shall be reappraised but the rental shall not be increased by more than 100% every ten years.

The duration of the lease is 25 years renewable for another 25 years at the government’s option.

Under R.A. No. 730 direct or negotiated sale of public land may be resorted to if: (a) the applicant has occupied the same and has in good faith built a residential house thereon where he lives, (b) he is not the owner of any residential lot, and (c) the land is not needed by the government for any public purpose.

Development of the laws governing foreshore/reclaimed areas

The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 is the first statutory law governing the ownership and disposition of reclaimed lands in the Philippines. Under this law, the shores, bays, coves, inlets and all waters within the maritime zone of the Spanish territory belonged to the public domain for public use. This law allowed the reclamation of the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or by the provinces, pueblos or private persons.51 It also provided that the reclaimed land from the sea belonged to the party undertaking the reclamation, provided the government issues the necessary permit and did not reserve ownership over such land.

(24)

Act No. 1654 was enacted by the Philippine Commission on May 18, 1907, which provided for the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individuals. This act mandated that the government should retain title to, and exercise control and disposition of, all reclaimed lands. Private parties could lease these lands only if they were no longer needed for public use. Public bidding for the lease of these lands was also prescribed.

Act No. 2874 also known as the Public Land Act, was approved by the Philippine Legislature in Nov. 29, 1919. It authorized the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of government to corporations and individuals. Under this law, the Governor-General was authorized to: (1) classify lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable lands (2) declare what lands are open to disposition or concession and (3) to classify further such lands into government, reclaimed, foreshore, marshy, and other classes of lands. It also limited alienable lands to those which have been officially delimited and classified. The land must first be declared not necessary for public use before allowing lease to private parties.52

Commonwealth Act No. 141 also known as the Public Land Act, was passed by the National Assembly which also authorized the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individuals. C.A. No. 141 continues to be the general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. Under this law, the President had the same powers as those of the Governor-General under Act No. 2874 except that the President is not authorized, under this law, to reclassify reclaimed lands into non –agricultural lands. The sale of lands of public domain was likewise prohibited, only lease was allowed subject to the same conditions prescribed in Act No. 2874. The government could sell to private parties only those agricultural lands for non-agricultural purposes not classified as disposable lands of the public domain.

State policy prohibits the sale of these lands, as they are part of public dominion intended for public use. This state policy has been embodied in the 1935 , 1973 as well as in the 1987 Constitution. Since then and until now, the only way the government could sell government reclaimed areas to private properties is through a legislative enactment allowing such sale. The reason behind this requirement is that government units and entities should not just turn around and sell these lands to private properties in violation of constitutional or statutory limitations.

C. Disposition of Public Lands for Educational, Charitable and Similar Purposes

Lands under this category may be disposed of by the Government in favor of a province, city, municipality or other branches of the Government in the form of donation, sale, lease, exchange, or any form.

52

(25)

Such lands may also be sold or leased to qualified private persons for the purpose of founding a cemetery, church, college, school, university or other educational institutions for educational, charitable or philantrophical purposes or scientific research. The Secretary of the DENR has the discretion to sell the land without auction and to waive the condition requiring cultivation.

D. Townsite Reservations

The President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, may, if public interest so requires, issue a proclamation reserving lands for townsite purposes to found a new town.

Procedure:

a. Survey of the exterior boundaries of the site b. Drafting the proclamation

c. Signing of the proclamation

d. Transmittal of copies of the proclamation to the Director of Lands and the Register of Deeds

e. Filing of compulsory registration proceedings to settle and adjudicate private claims within the townsite

f. Subdivision of the land according to development plans g. Sale of residential lots by oral bidding to the highest bidder Reservations of Public and Quasi-Public Purposes

The President also has the power to designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the use of the Republic of the Philippines or any of its branches or of the inhabitants thereof, of for quasi-public uses or purposes when public interest requires it, including reservations for highways, rights-of-way for railroads, hydraulic power sites, irrigation systems, communal pasture or legua communales, public parks, public quarries, public fishponds, workingmen’s village and other improvements for public benefit.

Preferential Rights of Actual Occupants

If, before the delimitation and survey of a tract of public land and before its classification as alienable and disposable, such land shall be actually occupied by a person other than the applicant, the Director of Lands shall inform the occupant of his preferential right to apply for the land and shall give him 120 days’ time in which to file the application or apply for the concession by any of the forms of disposition authorized by this Act, if such occupant is qualified to receive a concession under this Act.

Legal Restrictions and Encumbrances

References

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