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Software Defined Perimeter: Securing the Cloud to the Internet of Things

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Software Defined Perimeter:

Securing the Cloud to the Internet of

Things

Jim Reavis

Chief Executive Officer Cloud Security Alliance

@cloudsa

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About Cloud Security Alliance

 Global, not-for-profit organization

 Building security best practices for next generation IT

 Research and Educational Programs

 Cloud Provider Certification – CSA STAR

 User Certification - CCSK

 The globally authoritative source for Trust in the Cloud

“To promote the use of best practices for providing security assurance within Cloud Computing, and provide education on the uses of Cloud

Computing to help secure all other forms of computing.”

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Cloud Security Alliance Fast Facts

 Founded in 2009

 Membership stats as of July 2014

 57,000 individual members, 75 chapters globally  250 corporate members

 Offices in Seattle USA, Singapore, Greece, Beijing (2014)  Over 30 research projects in 25 working groups

 Strategic partnerships with governments, research

institutions, professional associations and industry

 www.cloudsecurityalliance.org

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Software Defined Perimeter

Architecture for creating highly secure and

trusted end-to-end networks

BYOD and Internet of Things

Secure virtual private clouds

Make network “dark” until entity is authenticated

Create dynamic perimeters around clients, applications

and hosts

Complementary to Software Defined Networks

(SDN)

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What's different?

 Standardization of "Need-to-know" access model

 Deployed with Classified, “Top Secret” networks for many years

but rarely seen in the commercial world

 Substantial portions of Internet must be made “Dark”  Integrates latest ideas from NIST & other experts

 Mutual TLS DHE, Device attestation, identity-based access

 Public domain project

 Integrates existing standards & best practices into an industry

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What’s different?

 We have separated Control communications from Data

communications

 Servers do not accept inbound connections by default –

effectively making them invisible

6 Initiating Host SDP Controller Accepting Host Data  Controller maintains authorized clients Initiating Host Accepting Host Data/Control Internet of Today

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SDP Applications

 Enterprise Application Isolation

 Infrastructure as a Service (Virtual Private Cloud)  Software as a Service  Platform as a Service  Cloud-based VDI  BYOD, Mobile  Internet-of-Things 7 Initiating Host SDP Controller Accepting Host Data

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Five Layers of Security Controls

 Single Packet Authorization (SPA)

 Mutual Transport Layer Security (mTLS)  Device Validation  Dynamic Firewalls  Application Binding 8 Initiating Host SDP Controller Accepting Host Data

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Single Packet Authorization (SPA)

 Single Packet Authorization One-Time Password

 Makes server invisible

 Mitigates DoS attacks, simplifies attack detection

 Based on RFC 4226 (HMAC-Based One-Time Password Algorithm)

 Seed: secret 32 bit signed integer for communication pairs

 Counter: 64 bit unsigned integer for synchronizing communications between

pairs

 Password: generated by the RFC 4226 algorithm

 After receiving the packet, the server must enable the client to

connect via mutual TLS on port 443

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Mutual Transport Layer Security (mTLS)

TLS typically only authenticates servers, not

clients

Mutual TLS is bi-directional authenticates clients

Validates both entities as part of the SDP

Root certificate must be known valid root

Avoid “Root CA explosion” in common browsers

How root certificate is installed outside of SDP

specification

 Cloud orchestration tools may be used

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Device Validation

 Validates that the proper device holds the private key  Proves that the key is not stolen

 Not included in version 1.0 specification

 Common endpoints have many of elements of

uniqueness

 Many methods of device validation in the market

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Dynamic Firewalls / SDP Gateways

 SDP Gateway: special

version of Accepting Host that protects servers

 One initial rule: Deny All  Dynamically adds a

“Permit” rule for Initiating Host to Protected Server as instructed by SDP Controller 12 Initiating Host SDP Controller Accepting Host / SDP Gateway

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Application Binding

 After authenticating and authorizing both the device

and the user, the software defined perimeter creates encrypted TLS tunnels to the protected applications

 Application binding constrains authorized applications

so they can only communicate through those encrypted tunnels

 SDP simultaneously blocks all other applications from

using those tunnels

 Malware resident on device cannot access encrypted

tunnel

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Basic Workflow

14 IdP AD Location Service Fingerprint Service PKI Software Attestation

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SDP Virtual Private Cloud Use Case

 One or more Accepting

Host(s) acting as SDP Gateway

 Locked Down Virtual

Machine template

 Dynamic expansion via

common cloud

orchestration tools

 Dark cloud inside of a

public cloud 15 Initiating Host SDP Controller Accepting Host / SDP Gateway

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SDP Internet of Things Use Case

 Smart Power Meter with SDP client

acts as an Initiating Host

 Metering S/W bound to Dynamic VPN according to SDP Controller policy

 SDP client can be quite small - 50k or less

 SDP Controller provides authorized

Power Meter list to Power Company’s Servers or Cloud VMs

 Can use multiple of the Authentication sources, including geolocation

 Power Meter sends data only to

intended destination 16 Initiating Host: Meter w/ SDP Client SW SDP Controller Accepting Host / Power Company Cloud/Server

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SDP Activities

 SDP Hackathon @ RSA Conference 2014 Whitepaper

 Conducted in popular public IaaS

 10 billion packets – no one got past SPA

 SDP Specification 1.0

 Complete protocol specification

 Foundation for cloud-based applications

 Download both at

https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/research/sdp/#_downloads

 Pilots/prototypes at large enterprises

 Next hacking contest & workshop at CSA Congress US

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References

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