I. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS A. In General
B. Pre-Spanish Times
b. 1 The Sumakwel Code
In 1212, after fleeing from the oppressive regime of Datu Makatunaw in Borneo, 10 datus set up their own tribal colonies in the Visayan Islands. One of them, Datu Sumakwel, established on the Island of Panay the Confederation of Madiaas and its constitution, the Code of Maragtas or the Code of Sumakwel. The Code of Sumakwel was considered among the first Filipino laws enacted before the Pre-Hispanic times. It consisted of 10 articles, mainly focusing on punishment for laziness.
An American historian, Paul Morrow debunks the Sumakwel Code as nothing more than the product of Guillermo Cuino’s imagination. Cuino was the first person to write about the Code Sumakwel in an essay in 1858 wherein he claimed to have translated the Code from an ancient Filipino document. However, Cuino presented no other proof other than his dubious essay. Nevertheless, Paul Morrow laments, much of the Filipino education system to this day still preaches the Sumakwel Code as gospel historical truth.
b. 2 The Code of Kalantiaw
Datu Kalantiaw was among the ancient Visayans who built a kingdom with its own tribal code known as the Code of Kalantiaw, supposedly around 1150. It contains 18 articles, which consists mainly of punishment for criminal acts ranging from the traditional ones such as homicide, theft and nonpayment of debts to the bizarre and superstitious such as disrespect for revered trees or killing black cats during the new moon. The Code of Kalantiaw also has feudalistic overtones such as obligating those with the beautiful daughters to give them up to the sons of chiefs as well as providing special punishment for those who commit particular crimes against the tribal headmen as stated in the Code.
Punishments for the crimes stated in the Code are cruel by today’s standards; for example, those who sing while traveling by night are beaten for two days while those who commit homicide and theft are condemned to death by being drowned in the river or in boiling water.
In 1968, William Henry Scott, another American historian revealed the Code of Kalantiaw as an outright hoax perpetuated by forger Jose Marco. Marco gave the Philippine Library and Museum as ancient document claiming to be the Code of Kalantiaw in 1912. The supposed Code and Marco’s claims on how he obtained the ancient document had too many discrepancies and anomalous reference to historical facts that could not have existed during the time of the Code’s supposed existence. Only recently have a few historians such as Sonia M. Zaide regarded the Code as a fraud but, as Paul Morrow says, the lie still lives on.
C. The Spanish Era
c. 1 Harty v. Mun of Victoria 13 Phil. 152
Facts: Monsignor Harty, an archbishop of the Roman Catholic Church based in Manila, claims that his parish owns the plaza located in the municipality of Victoria, Tarlac, claiming to be in peaceful possession of it for more than 60 years up to 1901. The defendant municipality replied that Victoria was constituted into a town in 1855 and that the parish of Tarlac was established many years afterwards; therefore the latter cannot claim title to the plaza. Evidence seemed to show that the original owner, Casimiro Tanedo, of the land wherein the plaza is located, donated said land to the church in general and not to the town curate, since a permanent curate was not appointed in Victoria until 1867. However, from the moment the town was created, both the town curate and the townspeople have enjoyed free access of the plaza. Still, Monsignor Harty claims the parish of Tarlac owns the plaza on the grounds of 1) prescription and 2) that the act of the curates and the gobernadorcillos of planting fruit trees and plants on the plaza constituted private ownership.
Held: Monsignor Harty’s contentions are incorrect. Reasons:
1. It was a Philippine custom then that upon the establishment of a new town, a large tract of land is always reserved in its center for the creation of a plaza. Before Victoria became a town it was a mere barrio. It must be assumed that the principal residents of Victoria wanted to have a public plaza should their barrio be converted into a town. Therefore, even before Victoria became a town, the land now in dispute was always intended to be a public plaza.
2. There was no sufficient proof that the late Casimiro Tanedo intended to donate the portion of the land intended to be a public plaza to the church in general
3. It has been fully proven that the plaza has always been used by the people of Victoria from the moment the town was created
4. Plazas destined for public use are not subject to prescription (Art. 1936, the Old Civil Code)
5. Planting of fruit trees by the curates, etc. do not constitute an act of private ownership but either evidence of public use or as embellishments for the benefit of the townspeople.
c. 2 Rubi v. Provincial board of Mindoro 39 Phil. 660
Facts: Rubi and his fellow Manguianes filed an application for habeas corpus on the ground that they were being deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of Mindoro. Rubi claimed they were being held against their will at a reservation in Tigbao, Mindoro while one Dabalos was imprisoned for having run away from the reservation. The provincial officials of Mindoro however, countered that they were authorized under section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 to implement measures for the advancement of the non-Christian people of Mindoro by obliging them to live in one place in order to educate them.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the provincial officials of Mindoro on the grounds that:
1. They were merely exercising the police power of the state for a lawful purpose and through lawful means, which can validly limit the exercise of Civil liberty. The Supreme Court cited past legislation implemented in the Philippines which justified the placing in a reservation of the Manguianes such as:
a. Book 6, Title 3 – A compilation of laws implemented during the Spanish forcing the Indios to leave poblaciones (communities) or reducciones in order to instruct them to the Catholic faith and enable them to live in a civilized manner.
b. Decree of the Governor-General of January 14, 1881- Decree ordering the Indios to be governed by the common law and not allowing them, unless with absolute necessity, to change their residence.
c. Letter of Instructions by President McKinley – Uncivilized tribes are allowed to keep their tribal governments, subject to regulation by the Americans.
d. The Philippine Bill of 1902 – The Philippine Commission (which composed ½ of the Philippine Legislature, the other being the Philippine Assembly) was given exclusive jurisdiction over the territory inhabited by the Moros and other non-Christian tribes of the Philippines
e. The Jones Law
2. Although the Maguianes were labeled as “non-Christian,” the intent of the law was not to refer to any particular religions or geographical discrimination but is predicated on the lack of civilization by them, which the measure implemented by the provincial officials of Mindoro intended to correct.
3. The measure implemented was a valid delegation of legislative power by the Philippine legislature as it was done in accordance with Administrative Code of 1917
c.3 The Maura Law
Queen Regent Maria Cristina of Spain, upon the recommendation of Colonial Minister Antonio Maura, promulgated the Royal Decree of May 19, 1893 which provided for an autonomous local government in the Philippines. Under the Maura Law there was constituted a Municipal Tribunal of five, the captain and 4 lieutenants. It was given charge of the active work of governing the municipality, such as administration of public works, etc. and the details of taxation. In addition, each of its members was required to have special qualifications. These positions were honorary. The term of office was 4 years. The officers, together with 2 substitutes, were elected by 12 delegates of the principalia. The principalia was composed of all persons who has held certain offices (such as cabeza de barangay or former captains) or who has paid a land tax of P50. The Governor General and the provincial governor retained disciplinary jurisdiction over the council and its individual members, the Provincial Board also had supervision of the municipal council (Malcolm, Gov’t. of the Philippines Islands, pp. 69-71, Document 362, The Maura Law of 1893)
c. 4 The Treaty of Paris
The Treaty of Paris officially ended the Spanish-American War of 1898. It was ratified by Spain and the United States on December 10, 1898. It contained 17 articles, important provisions including:
Art. 1 – Relinquishment by Spain of its claim of sovereignty and title to Cuba. Art. 2 – Cession to the U.S. of the islands of Puerto Rico and Marianas. Art. 3 – Cession to the U.S. of the Philippines for the sum of $20 million. Art. 9 – Allowing Spanish subjects which are natives of the Philippines to remain in the Philippines if they so desire. The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the U.S. shall be determined by Congress. Art. 11 – Relinquishment of all civil and criminal jurisdictions over all territories ceded. Art. 12 – Provides for rules on deciding judicial proceedings pending at the time of the ratification of the treaty.
D. The American Period d.1 The Jones Law
The Jones Law of 1893 was virtually an American-made constitution providing for a complete form of semi-autonomous government in the Philippines. It defined government functions into an executive to be appointed by the U.S. President with the consent of the Senate, who was called the American Governor-General in the Philippines. The legislative power was vested in an elective bicameral/legislature – a Senate and a House of Representatives. The judicial power was exercised by the Supreme-Court and other lower courts, with Filipino and American justices. The Jones Law also extended the Bill of Rights, defined Filipino citizenship and provided for other safeguards and restrictions.
The bulk of the Jones Law comprised mainly of defining the executive, legislative and judicial powers of the government.
E. The Japanese Occupation
e.1 Topacio Nueno Angeles, 76 Phil. 12
Facts: Jose Topacio Nueno and 3 other petitioners ran for and eventually obtained seats in the Municipal Board of Manila in 1940. World War II and the subsequent Japanese occupation however took place. After the war, 6 new board members were appointed by the President. Nueno, et. al. claimed that the appointment was null and void because 1) their term of office had not expired due to the world war and 2) even if 1) were not true, they still had the right to hold over their officers until their new successors were elected and qualified.
Held: Nueno and his goons were incorrect. Reasons: 1) The word “term” is different from “tenure.” There is no law which allows the extension of terms of office by reason of war. 2) As for tenure, the same may be shortened or extended for various reasons, such as the death of the incumbent or as otherwise provided by law. The principle of the right to hold over may validly extend the tenure of office. However, Nueno, et. al. cannot invoke this right because under 16 (a) of the Commonwealth Act, the President has the discretion of appointing temporary board members until duly elected board members can be qualified.
F. The Post War Years
f. 1 R.A. 2264, as amended – The Local Autonomy Act
Entitled, “An Act Amending the Laws governing Local Governments by Increasing their Autonomy and Reorganizing the Provincial Governments,” the Act provides for, among other things: Procedure in establishing the provincial, city, municipal and regularly organized municipal district budgets for each fiscal year, taxation sources; appropriation of funds for the general welfare of the public; grant of the power of eminent domain; composition of the provincial board; qualifications of members of the provincial board, governors, vice-governors, mayors and vice-mayor; appointment power of provincial governor, city mayor and municipal mayor; and assignment of other powers to the provincial board, municipal board or city councils. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the interpretation of the Local Autonomy Act shall be resolved in favor of the local government and shall be presumed to exist.
f. 2 R.A. 2370 – The Barrio Charter Act
“Barrios” are units of municipalities or municipal districts in which they are located. They are quasi-municipal corporations endowed with such powers as herein provided in said Act for the performance of particular government functions to be exercised by and through their respective barrio governments in conformity with law.
Barrios may be created or its name changed by a petition of the majority of voters in the areas affected. They may sue and be sued and may be deal with any real or personal property in the manner provided by law.
No barrio may be created if its population is less than 500 people or out of chartered cities, or poblaciones of municipalities.
The Act also provides for the barrio council headed by the barrio lieutenant. The barrio council shall meet with the qualified voters of the barrio at least once a year in a barrio assembly to discuss, among others, election of new officers, raising of funds and adopt measures for the welfare of the barrio. The Act also provides for the qualifications of the barrio council members and their powers and responsibilities, such as the taxation power and its sources.
f. 3 R.A. 3590 – Revised Barrio Charter Act
This Act is essentially the same as its predecessor, with the following pertinent amendments;
1)
A plebiscite may be called to decide on the recall of any member of the barrio council member or approve any budgetary, supplement appropriations or special tax ordinances.2) Renaming the barrio lieutenant as barrio captain
3)
Right of succession in case of vacancy in the barrio captain position (there is no vice-barrio captain in both Acts).4)
The municipal mayor shall have power of supervision over barrio officials\5) Procedure in barrio council, such as holding of meetings every month
6) Effectively of barrio ordinances (unless otherwise, after 60 days after its passage or 15 days after its confirmation in a plebiscite)
f. 4 R.A. 5185 – The Decentralization Act of 1967
This Act further strengthens the autonomous powers of local governments by providing for the following pertinent provisions:
1) Provincial and city governments are empowered to undertake field agricultural work and rural health work whenever deemed to be necessary to assist in national programs or services.
2) Appointment of heads, assistant heads of local officers and their subordinates 3) Suspension and removal of elective local officials (grounds: disloyalty to RP, dishonesty, oppression and misconduct in the office)
4) Restriction in practice of law by members of provincial, city or municipal board 5) Succession to office of vice-governor and vice-mayor.
6) Filling of special vacancies in local legislative bodies.
7) Filling of elective officers in newly created and newly classified provinces, cities, municipalities or municipal districts
8) List of actions of provincial, city and municipal officials and provincial boards declared immediately effective. 9) Certain duties and powers of local chief executives not to be subject to direction and review of any national official
10) Release and apportionment of certain government funds 11) Creation of following positions: provincial engineer, city public works official, provincial attorney and city legal officer
12) Creation of Joint Local Government Reform Commission (for continuing studies on local autonomy of Local Government and prepare local government code)
G. The Martial Law Epoch g. 1 P.D. 145
This decree amended Section 2 of R.A. 2264 or Local Autonomy Act because the said section was ineffective in carrying out the Secretary of Finance’s power to suspend the effectively of any local tax ordinance which in his opinion is
unjust, excessive or oppressive or contrary to national policy. Said decree improves this situation by giving the local legislative body either 30 days to modify the tax ordinance or appeal the suspension order of the Secretary of Finance in a court of competent jurisdiction; otherwise, the tax ordinance or its part of parts in question is considered revoked
g. 2 B.P. 337 – The Local Government Code of 1983 This Code provides for the pertinent following provision: 1) General powers and attributes of local government units.
2) Powers and restrictions of Local Government Units to: Create sources of revenue; eminent domain; closure of roads; suability; enter into contracts; convey property; limited non-liability for damages.
3) National supervision over local governments
4) Relationship between Province-city, province-municipality; city-barangay, municipality-barangay; city-barangay; public officials-LGUs
5) Fiscal matters; Expenditure of government funds; preparation of budget 6) Requirement and prohibitions of local gov’t. officials; vacancy and succession 7) Qualification and election of local gov’t. officials; vacancy and succession 8) Recall, suspension and removal of elective officials
9) Creation of local school boards 10) Personnel Administration
11) Settlement of municipal and barangay boundary disputes
12) Details on barangay and barangay officials; municipal and municipal officials; city and city officials; province and province officials
H. The Present
h. 1 R.A. 7160 – The Local Government Code of 1991. From the LGC of 1983, the following pertinent provisions were added:
1) Operative principles of decentralization
2) Authority by Congress or any political subdivision to create, divide, merge, abolish or alter boundaries 3) Emphasis on general welfare and imposition of basic services and facilities on political subdivisions 4) Reclassification of lands
5) Authority of LGUs to secure and negotiate grants
6) Creation of Local Prequalification, Bids and Awards Committee 7) Other procedural and technical changes
II. PRIMARY LAW AND GENERAL PROVISIONS
a.1 Article X, Section 10 – No province, city, municipality or barangay may be created, divided, merged abolished or its boundaries substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
NOTE: Read the whole of Article X of the 1987 Constitution as well, as it refers to local, governments in general. It contains 21 sectors. Also Prof. Ulep must have meant Season 10 and not 5 in his outline.
a. 2 Article XVIII, Sec. 8 - Unless otherwise provided by Congress, the President may constitute the Metropolitan Authority to be composed of the heads of all local government units comprising the Metropolitan Manila Area.
Article XVIII, Sec. 9 – A sub-province shall continue to exist and operate until it is converted into a regular province or its component municipalities are reverted to the mother province.
NOTE: There’s no point in reading all other sections of Article XVIII. See for yourself.
B. Read R.A. 7924(Metropolitan Manila Development Authority)
This Act states the policy of the State to treat Metro Manila as a special development and administrative region and certain basic services affecting or involving Metro Manila as metro wide services more efficiently and effectively planned, supervised and coordinated by a development authority as created herein, without prejudice to the autonomy of the affected LGU. Among its pertinent provisions are:
1) Scope of MMDA (metro-wide) services: Development planning; transport and traffic management; solid waste disposal and management; Flood control; Urban renewal; zoning and land use planning; health sanitation; Urban protection and pollution control; pu8blic safety;
2) Creation of Metro Manila Council (MMC) consisting of all mayors in Metro Manila
3) Powers and Functions of MMDA, mainly to formulate, coordinate, and regulate implementation of above metro-wide services
4) Functions of MMC, mainly to approve projects of MMDA
5)
Function of MMDA chairman: Execute policies of MMC and manage operations of MMDA; appointment power; prepare budget of MMDA; disciplinary power on subordinates; ex officio board member (or his representative) of departments related to activities of MMDA such as DOTC, DOH, etc.6)
Institutional linkages of MMDA: NEDA, NGOs , accredited people’s organizations b. 1 Lopez, Jr. v. COMELEC, 136 SCRA 633Facts: Mel Lopez, et. Al. questioned the validity of P, D. 824 which provides for the creation of Metro Manila Commission which shall hold sway over 4 cities (Manila, Quezon, Caloocan, and Pasay) and 13 municipalities. P.D. He says it runs counter to Art. 11, Sec. 3 of the 1973 Constitution which states that: “No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, abolished, merged or its boundaries substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code and subject to the approval of the majority of votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.” No plebiscite was conducted to vote for the creation of Metro Manila. He also claims the P.D. is a denial of the equal protection clause as other cities and municipalities were not similarly organized into such. Also the President cannot exercise direct supervision and control over the Metropolitan Manila Commission as it runs counter to the autonomy of local governments.
Held: Mel Lopez is incorrect. Reasons:
1.
Although a plebiscite was not conducted, a referendum was held Feb. 27, 1975 wherein the residents of the Greater Manila area authorized the President to reorganize the cities and municipalities under the Metro Manila Commission. The requirements for a plebiscite were therefore deemed satisfied. Besides, at the time of the referendum, there was no Local Government Code in existence then which provided the need for a plebiscite. By virtue of martial law and the absence of an interim Batasang Pambansa at that time, the President had authority to enact said P.D.2. There is reasonable classification in organizing said 4 cities and 13 municipalities into a metropolitan area 3. Article 8, Sec. 2 of the 1973 Constitution expressly recognizes the juridical entity known as Metropolitan Manila 4. There is presumption of constitutionality in the President’s power of direct supervision and control over the
Metropolitan Manila Commission. The presidential power of control can and should be constructed to mean that said control is limited to those that may be considered national in character.
b. 2 MMDA v. Bel-Air Assn, Inc., 328 SCRA 836
Facts: Pursuant to R.A. 7924 which created the MMDA, MMDA issued a notice to the Bel-Air Village Assoc. (BAVA) that the former will open Neptune Street owned by the latter in Bel-Air Village, as well as tear down a perimeter wall owned by said village. Both actions, the MMDA said, is necessary for the decongestion of traffic along the said areas.
BAVA petitioned the trail court and later on the Court of Appeals to enjoin the implementation of MMDA’s proposed actions. BAVA’s petition was granted. The MMDA thus now seeks recourse with the Supreme Court, claiming among others that its proposed actions were in the exercise of the police power.
Held: MMDA is wrong. The reason is that R.A. 7924 did not expressly or impliedly delegate any police power to the MMDA, most notably the power to enact ordinances necessary for the implementation of its plans, programs and projects aimed at the delivery of metro-wide services in Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of the LGUs concerning purely local matters (See. 2, R.A. 7924) MMDA’s proposed actions were not under the authority of any ordinance (What’s funny is that the MMC, the governing board of the MMDA, is composed of the different mayors of Metro Manila, and these guys, as mayors per se, have the power or at least, the political will to enact ordinances)
C. Read R.A. 6732 (Organic Act for ARMM [Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao])
Mindanao, encompassing 13 provinces and 9 cities, through a plebiscite for that purpose. This government shall operate within the framework of the Regional Government. The executive power is conferred on the Regional Governor. The legislative power is conferred in the Regional Assembly. The Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the lower courts shall continue to exercise their power as mandated in the Constitution; however, there shall be a Shari’ah Appellate Court which shall also be learned in Islamic law and jurisprudence. The Shari’ah Court’s decisions shall be final and executory subject to the original and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Tribal Appellate Courts for cases dealing with tribal codes shall also be established.
The Regional Government shall have fiscal autonomy or the power to create its own sources of revenue, subject to the limitations of the Constitution and this Organic Act. The Organic Act also provides for: Protection of ancestral lands, ancestral domain and indigenous cultural communities; urban and rural planning and development; power to enact laws pertaining to the national economy and patrimony responsive to the needs of the Regional Government; public order and security; education, science and technology and sports development; social justice and services; and power to amend or revise the Organic Act, either by Congress or by the Regional Assembly, the latter being subject to approval by Congress.
c. 1 Abbas v. COMELEC, 179 SCRA 287
Facts: Datu Firdausi Abbas, et.al. challenged the constitutionality of R.A. 6734 on the following grounds: 1) R. A. 6734 conflicts with the Tripoli Agreement (what conflicts the case doesn’t say)
2) R. A. 6734 provides for the unconditional creation of the ARMM and not through the mode of a plebiscite as provided in the Constitution
3)
The Constitution provides that ARMM shall be approved by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite by all voters residing in the provinces and cities affected, but R.A. 6734 says “by a majority or votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite and only those provinces and cities where a majority of votes cast in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the Autonomous Region. R.A. 6734 thus conflicts the Constitution4) R. A. 6734 includes provinces and cities which do not have the same cultural and historical heritage and other relevant characteristics needed for admission to the ARMM
5) R. A. 6734 violates constitutional guarantee on freedom of exercise of religion as some its provisions run counter to the Koran
6) The creation of an Oversight Committee to supervise the transfer of power to the ARMM is contrary to the constitutional mandate that the creation of the autonomous region hinges solely on the result of the plebiscite
7)
R. A. 6734 says “…that only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included inthe ARMM. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions: Provided however, that the President may, by administrative determination, merge the existing regions. This provision, Abbas claims, is contrary to the Constitutional mandate that, “No province city, municipality or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established with the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the units directly affected.” (Art. 10, Sec. 10, 1987 Constitution)
Held: Abbas is wrong. Reasons:
1) R. A. 6734 as an enactment of Congress, is superior to the Tripoli Agreement, being a subsequent law to the Tripoli Agreement (though in my opinion it wouldn’t matter if R. A. 6734 was prior to the Tripoli Agreement) 2) The transitory provisions of R. A. 6734 does provide for a plebiscite (1 guess nobody reads the transitory
provisions)
3)
The framers of the Constitution must have intended that the majority of votes must come from each of the constituent units and not all the votes of the provinces and cities (I couldn’t understand how the justices arrived at this conclusion)4) It is not for the Court to decide on the wisdom of the law concerning the inclusion of provinces and cities which Abbas claims should not be included in a plebiscite
6) The creation of an Oversight Committee is merely procedural and in fact will aid in the timely creation of the ARMM
7) The power of the President to merge administrative regions is inherent in his power of general supervision over local governments. Besides, administrative regions are not territorial or political regions. Examples of administrative regions are Regions I to XII and the NCR
c. 2 Chiongbian v. Orbos, 245 SCRA 253
Facts: In 1990, President Aquino issued E. O. No. 439 wherein she picked certain provinces and cities, some of which did not participate in the inclusion to the ARMM, to the reorganized to new regions (e.g. Misamis Occidental, which did not participate in the ARMM plebiscite, was transferred from Region X to Region XI). Aquino issued said E. O. pursuant ant R. A. 6734, which says: “…That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in suitable plebiscites shall be included in the ARMM. The provinces and cities which plebiscite no vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions. Provided however, that the President may, by administrative determination, merge existing regions. James Chiongbian, a Sultan Kudarat congressman, filed a certiorari prohibition to protest the E. O., claiming that President Aquino had no power to reorganize administrative regions because said provision in R. A. 6734 1) also states that provinces, cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain the existing administrative regions 2) the Constitution does not expressly provide the President the power to merge administrative regions; in fact Art. 10, Sec. 10 of the Constitution (see II of your outline) prohibits this and 3) even granting that the President is allowed to merge administrative regions, there is law setting standard on how it is to be done.
Held: Chiongbian is wrong. Reasons:
1) The sentence “…shall remain in the existing administrative regions, is further qualify by the phrase, “Provided however that the President may, by administration determination merge the existing regions.”
2) Past legislation, particularly R. A. 5345 issued in 1968, authorized the President the help of a Commission on Reorganization, to reorganize the different example departments including administrative regions. This shows that traditional power to reorganize administrative regions has always been lodged in the President
3)
The standard is found in R. A. 5345 which states “to promote simplicity, economic efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs consistent with no goals for accelerated social and economic development and to improve service transaction of the public business.”D. Read R. A. 6766 (Organic Act for Cordillera Autonomous Region of 1989)
This Act provides for creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) shall consist of the cities and provinces that shall vote favorable in a plebiscite pursuant ant 10, Sec. 18 of the Constitution. Those cities and provinces are Benguet, Ifugao, Muslim Province, Abra, Kalinga-Apayao and Baguio
The Act consists of the following pertinent articles:
1) Guiding principles and policies similar to that of Art. 2 of the 1987 Constitution
2) Vesting of legislative power in the Cordillera Assembly; executive power Cordillera governor with a deputy governor as well; creation of indigenous special courts whose decisions are final and executory but subject to the original and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
3) Creation of a Regional Commission on Appointments
4) Measures to protect and develop the ancestral lands and ancestral domains of indigenous cultural communities as well as the national economy and patrimony
The rest of its provisions are roughly similar to the Organic Act for ARMM (see11-c) CAR never came to existence. Only Ifugao province voted in favor of CAR, so the Supreme Court in Ordillo v. COMELEC ruled that Ifugao could no constitute itself into the CAR>
d. 1 Ordillo v. COMELEC, 192 SCRA 100
Facts: CAR Regional Assembly member Alexander Ordillo raised the question in his petition on whether the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the CAR, can alone legally and validly constitute such region.
Held: Ordillo’s petition is meritorious. Reasons:
1) Statutory construction of Art. X, Sec. 15 of the 1987 Constitution shows that the word “region” is to be made up of more than one constituent unit
2) Section 2 or R. A. 6766 says “The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary for the proper governance and development of all provinces, cities, barangays and municipalities within the CAR.” Therefore, Congress could not have intended that only a single province would constitute CAR
3) It would be illogical for Ifugao to have 2 sets of officials, one for Ifugao and one for the CAR, when Ifugao is the only member of the CAR
Facts: Pending the convening of Congress after President Aquino was swept into power in 1986, she issued E. O. 220 which petitioner Cordillera Board Coalitions claimed created the CAR, thus preempting the constitutional mandate that Congress shall be the one to pass an Organic Act providing for the creation of CAR. Petitioner also questions the constitutionality of the CAR as it runs contrary to Article 10, Sec. 10 of the 1987 Constitution (See 11-1). Finally petitioner claims the CAR will interfere with the local autonomy of individual cities and provinces in general.
Held: Cordillera Board Coalition is wrong. Reasons:
1. The presumption of constitutionality of laws shall be applied in the case. E. O. 220 was actually envisioned to consolidate and coordinate the delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the National Government in the areas covered by the CAR as a step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the Cordillera. It was not intended to preempt Congress
2. CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial or political subdivision. It is in the same genre as an administrative region for the purpose of coordinating the planning and implementation of program and services in the covered areas. Thus no new territorial or political subdivision was created or merged with another.
3. Local autonomy is administrative autonomy. In the case of CAR and Muslim Mindanao, they are granted both administrative and political autonomy. Petitioner has failed to show specifically how the creation of administrative regions will interfere with local autonomy.
d. 3 E.O. 459 dated May 17, 1991
This E. O. is entitled “Devolving to the Autonomous Region” Government of the Autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao Certain Powers of the DECS, the Control and Supervision Over Its Offices in the Region and for other Offices.
The E. O. aims to implement Sec. 1, Article XV of R. A. 6734 which states that, “The Autonomous Region shall establish, maintain and support a complete and integrated system of quality education and adopt an educational framework that is meaningful, relevant and responsive to the needs, aspirations and ideals of the people in the region.”
To this end, the Regional Government is made responsible for the regional educational framework of the ARMM, such as formulating and implementing programs to improve education in general in the region.
E. Read R. A. 7901, dated Feb. 23, 1995 (Creating the CARAGA Administrative Region)
This Act is entitled “An Act Creating Region 13 to be known as the CARAGA Administrative Region, and For Other Purposes.” It consists of the provinces of Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Surigao del Norte, Surigao del Sur and the cities of Butuan and Surigao. The Act also transfers Sultan Kudarat to Region 11.
F. Local Government Unit Defined
Definition: A political subdivision of the state constituted by law and possessed a substantial control over its own affairs.
Supporting Definition: The LGU is autonomous in the sense that it is given more power authority, responsibilities and resources remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of a sovereign nation, but no intended to be an imperium in imperia state within a state
f. 1 Alvarez v. Guingona, Jr. 252 SCRA 695
Facts: Senator Heherson Alvarez, et. al. filed a petition for prohibition with prayer TRO and preliminary prohibitory injunction assailing R. A. 7720, Said R. A. provides for a conversion of the municipality of Santiago, Isabela into a City. Alvarez said the municipality of Santiago failed to meet the requirement of Sec. 450 of the LGC that, for a municipality to become a component city, it must have an annual income of P20M. The reason is that in the computation of the average annual income, the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRA) should have been deducted from the total income. Instead, the IRAs were added to the total income.
Held: Alvarez is wrong. IRAs are the local government unit’s rightful share to the national taxes. Section 450(c) of the LGC provides that “the average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and any recurring income.” IRAs are a regular, recurring source of income; they are not special funding transfers since Sec. 17(g) of the LGC gives a technical description for the IRA for purposes of the LGC
G. Local Autonomy explained
1. Autonomy – either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power (Limbona v. Mangelin)
2. Decentralization of Administration – Occurs when the central government delegate administrative powers to political subdivision in order to broaden the basic government power and in the process to make local government more responsive accountable” and “Ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and progress.” At the same time, it relieves the central government of the bureau managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate or national concerns (Supra)
3. Decentralization of power – An abdication of political power in favor of local government units declared to be autonomous. In that case the local government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central government authorities. According to a constitution author (Father Bernas) decentralization of
power amounts to “self-immolation” since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its own constituency (Supra)
4. Local Autonomy, Philippine Concept – The national government does not completely relinquish all its power over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and social developments at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic growth and development. But to enable the country to develop as whole the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinate towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress. In Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp. Inc., municipal governments are still agents of the national government (Pimentel v. Aguirre)
5. Fiscal autonomy – Local government have the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national taxes released by the national government, as well as the power to the allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities.
g. 1 Malonzo, et, al v. Zamora, et, al 311 SCRA 224 NOTE: Dates and peso figures are crucial to this case.
Facts: In 1994, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan City issued Ordinance No. 0168, authorizing Caloocan City mayor Macario Asistio Jr. to initiate expropriation proceedings for lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate owned by the CLT Realty Development Corp. An amount of P39, 352,047.75 was appropriated for this purpose. CLT however countered with an interpleaded and prayer for TRO on August 6, 1997, on the ground that Maysilo estate actually straddled both Caloocan City and the municipality of Malabon; therefore the Caloocan City and Malabon municipal governments should be restrained and CLT must interplead and litigate among themselves their conflicting rights to claim such taxes.
In the meantime, the voluntary sale of the CLT property failed to push through so the city government field a suit for eminent domain against CLT on March 23, 1998.
Some months afterwards, Rey Malonzo became mayor of Caloocan City. The expropriation of the CLT property was then declared discontinued, thus the appropriation of P50M for the budgetary item “Expropriation of properties” could now be reverted for use in supplement budget. Ordinance No. 0254 was then passed appropriating an amount of P39, 343,028.00 for the immediate repair of offices and hiring of additional personnel.
Because of this, the office of the President (OP), acting on an administrative complaint filed against Malonzo et. al., were adjudged guilty of misconduct and meted the penalty of suspension. Malonzo’s refuted the decision, claiming that 1) the interpleader filed by CLT was an unavoidable discontinuance of the expropriation project; thus the amount of P39, 352,047.00 could be reverted into savings and 2) said amount was could be denominated as “Expropriation of Properties” and classified under “Current Operating Expenditures. The OP countered that the amount of P39, 352,047.75 was a capital outlay that must be spent for the project it is intended for, thus under Sec. 322 of the LGC it could not be reverted into savings for another use 2) the filling of the interpleader could not be considered as an unavoidable discontinuance since months after the interpleader, the Caloocan City government even filed an expropriation case for the CLT property 3) The Sangguniang Panlungsod, at the time of passing Ordinance No. 0254 did not adopt new or updated rules of procedure for the current year; this was shown by the hurried passage in one day of the said ordinance and 4) the appropriation of P50M for “Expropriation of Properties” actually did not exist this was merely a subterfuge by Malonzo to dip his hands into the P39, 352. 017.75 intended for the CLT property expropriation project.
Held: Malonzo is correct. Reasons:
1) During the oral arguments and pleadings, it was clear that the amount of
P39, 352, 017.75 and whether it was a capital outlay or continuing appropriation was not the issue; rather the issue was the budgetary item “Expropriation of Properties” wherein the amount of P50M was appropriated for said use but was later discontinued, and later on, an amount of P39, 313, 028.00 from the P50M was appropriated for office repair and other miscellaneous expenses. Malonzo’s explanation that the P50M was not intended for the purchase of CLT property but for expenses incidental to expropriation, such as relocation of squatters, appraisal fee, etc. was believed by the Court. (So what happened to the P39, 352, 047.75, if Malonzo’s explanation is to be believed? Justice Kapunan and 2 others dissented, believing the OP’s argument that there was actually no P50M existing to fund the “Expropriation of Properties item. In fact, Malonzo used the nonexistent P50M appropriation as a cover-up to illegally spend the P32, 352, 047.75 for repair of offices and hiring of personnel. Can you say kickback?)
2) The failure to adopt new or updated rules of procedure of the Sangguniang Panlungsod as mandated by Sec. 50 and 52 of the LGC is not intended to paralyze said Sanggunian from doing its job. An interpretation of Sec. 50 and 52 of the LGC that will avoid inconvenience and absurdity must be adopted, thus the OP’s contention is mistaken.
g. 2 Sec. 1, Chapter 1, Title XII, E. O. 292
“Declaration of policy. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments. For this purpose, it shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization. The allocation of powers and resources to loose government units shall be promoted and inter-local government grouping, consolidation a coordination of resources shall be encouraged. The state shall guarantee the local government units their
just share in national taxes and their equitable shares in proceeds from the use natural resources, and afford them wider latitude for resource generation.”
g. 3 Pimentel v. Aguirre, G. R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000
Facts: In 1997, President Ramos issued A. O. No. 372 which caught the ire of Senator Aquilino Pimentel because of certain 2 provisions which state 1) All government departments and agencies, including state universities and colleges, government-owned and controlled corporation and local government units will identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the year by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriation for non-personal service items, along the following suggested areas… and 2) Pending of assessment and evaluation of the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emergency fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) to LGUs shall be withheld. Pimentel claims that both provisions do not comply with Section 284 of LGC, which provides for the 4 requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal matters 1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government 2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of various local leagues 3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the DOF, DILG and DBM and 4) any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than 30% of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one. Specially, Pimentel claims that there was no showing that there was actually an unmanaged public sector deficit and that there was no consultations conducted with the different leagues of local governments.
Held: Pimentel is partly correct. Reasons:
1. The Supreme Court is prepared to believe the Solicitor General’s assurance that the first provision above stated is merely an advisory or guiding policy for local executives to follow, thus local autonomy is not interfered upon.
2. The second provision is violative of local fiscal autonomy because its basic feature, the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue, is missing. This is mandated in Article 10, Sec. 6 of the Constitution. Furthermore, Section 286 of the LGC provides that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within 5 days after every quarter of the year and shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose. The withholding of 10% of the IRA is definitely a holdback.
H. Public Corporation defined
Definition 1: Those formed or organized for the government of a portion of the State (Act 1459, Sec.2)
Definition 2: Those corporations created by the State as its own device and agency for the accomplishment of parts of its own public works (Eliot, Mun. Corp. p. 1)
I. Essential Elements of a Municipal Corporation 1) A legal creation or incorporation
2. A corporate name by which the artificial personality or legal entity is known and in which all corporation acts are done.
3) Inhabitants constituting the population who are invested with the political and corporate powers which are executed through duly constituted officers and agents;
4) a place or territory within which the local civil government and corporate functions are exercised (Martin, Pub. Corp., 1971)
J. Two fold character of a municipal corporation; its significance
1) Government – the municipal corporation is an agent of the State for the government of the territory and the inhabitants within the municipal limits. The municipal corporation exercises by delegation a part of the sovereignty of the State.
2) Private – the MC acts in a similar category as a business corporation, performing functions not strictly government or political. The MC stands for the community in the administration of local affairs w/c is wholly beyond the sphere of the public purposes for which its governmental powers are conferred
K. What is Federalism?
Definition: A system in which political power is divided between a central (national) government and smaller government units.
Supporting Definition: The central government is often called the federal government and the smaller units, states or provinces. In a true federal system, citizens owe their loyalty directly to
the central government, even though they live in states or provinces. The central government has direct authority over the people concerning powers granted to it in the constitution.
Sec. 6, LGC: Authority to create Local Government Units. A local government unit may be created divided, merged, abolished or its boundaries substantially altered either by law enacted by Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality or any other political subdivision of by ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang Panlungsod concerned in the case of a barangay located within its territorial jurisdiction, subject to such limitations and requirements prescribed in this Code.
A. Requisites for creation of Local Government Units
1. Income. It must be sufficient based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government facilities and services and special functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of the LGU concerned.
2. Population. It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants of the within the territorial jurisdiction of the LGU concerned.
3. Land Area. It must be contiguous unless it comprises 2 or more islands or is separated by an LGU independent of the other properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions and sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.
Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be arrested by the Department of Finance, the NSO and the Land Management Bureau of the DENR.
B. Decided cases:
b. 1 Pelaez V. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569
Facts: In 1964, President Macapagal issued several EOs creating 33 new municipalities, mainly in Northern Luzon and Mindanao. The President based his power from Sec. 68 of the Revised Penal Code of 1917. Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a petition for writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, restraining him from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive order and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
Pelaez contends that: 1) Sec 68 of the Revised Administration Code has been impliedly repealed by R.A 2370, the Barrio Charter Act. 2) Sec. 68 is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and 3) Sec. 68 can allow the president to interfere in local government affairs.
Held: Pelaez is correct. Reasons:
1. The Barrio Charter Act states that “barrios may not be created nor their boundaries altered or their names changed except by act of Congress of the corresponding municipal board upon petition of the majority of voters in the areas affected and the recommendation of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated” This implies that if the President cannot create barrios, what more municipalities? (But I think this is not a very good argument coz it’s implying way too much).
2. A law must be: a) Complete in itself so that there is nothing left for the delegate to do but to implement the statute and b) Fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinable The standard set by Sec. 68 is “as the public welfare may require” This standard, in relation to the law in question, is so broad that is virtually unfettered.
3. The creation of Municipal Corporation is essentially legislative in character. If the president can create municipalities, situations may arise where he can submit local officials to his dictation by creating a new municipality and including therein the barrio wherein the officials preside, thus said officials’ positions would suddenly becomes vacant. The power of control by the president over local government is denied by the 1935 Constitution
b. 2 Tan v. COMELEC 142 SCRA 727
Facts: B.P. No. 885 was passed allowing for the creation of the province of Negros del Norte on the Island of Negros. Petitioner Patricio Tan claimed that B.P. no 885 violated Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution which states: “No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected”. Specifically, the remaining areas in the province of Negros Occidental were not allowed to participate in the plebiscite for the creation of Negros del Norte. Petitioner also claims the proposed province of Negros del Norte failed to meet the requirements of Sec. 197 of the LGC of 1983, specially that a future province must have at least an area of 3,500 sq. km. Negros del Norte, Petitioner avers, is actually only 2,856.56 sq km. Respondent claims the issue was already rendered moot and academic as the new province of Negros del Norte was already proclaimed. Moreover, the area of Negros del Norte is really 4,019.95 sq km, since the waters falling under the jurisdiction and control of Negros del Norte must be included in the total area of the province.
Held: Tan is correct. The plebiscite is declared null and void Reasons:
1) The phrase “subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected” must be construed to mean that the remaining areas in the province of Negros Occidental should have been allowed to participate in the said plebiscite. The reason is that cities belonging to Negros Occidental will be added to Negros del Norte, thus Negros Occidental’s land area will be dismembered. Certainly, the
people of Negros Occidental should have been allowed to vote in the plebiscite as they are directly affected by the diminution in land size of their province.
2) A reading of the last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 LGC of 1983 says. “The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises 2 or more islands”. The use of the word ‘territory” clearly reflects that the law refers only to the land mass and excludes the waters over which the political unit has control. In other words, Negros del Norte failed to meet the required land area of 3,500 sq. km for it to become a province. b. 3 Paredes v. Executive Secretary 128 SCRA 6
Facts: By virtue of B.P. Blg 56, certain barangays in the municipality of Mayoyao, Ifugao held a plebiscite to determine whether they want to constitute themselves into the new municipality of Aguinaldo. Governor Zosimo Paredes et. al. however claimed that the rest of the barangays on Mayoyao should be allowed to participate in the plebiscite by virtue of Art. XI, Sec of the 1973 Constitution as the other barangays are also affected by the creation of the municipality of Aguinaldo.
Held: Paredes is wrong. Presumption of constitutionality should be applied in this case. B.P. Blg. 56 is a reflection of local autonomy on the part of the barangay wanting to constituent themselves into a new municipality. Said barangays should be given leeway in becoming self-reliant communities. Moreover, the people in said barangays are the ones who will constitute the new municipality of Aguinaldo, not the other barangays of Mayoyao excluded from B.P. Blg. 56
b.
4 Mun. of Candijay, Bohol v. Ca 251 SCRA 182Facts: The municipality of Candijay petitioned the RTC of Tagbilaran, Bohol, claiming that its boundary line actually covered barrio Pagahat, since the municipality of Alicia claims to have current territorial jurisdiction over said barrio. The RTC awarded Pagahat to Candijay Alicia appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA ruled in favor of Alicia on the grounds that 1) applying the rule of equiponderance of evidence (a principle in Civil Procedure) with Candijay as plaintiff and Alicia as defendant in the lower court, the court must rule in favor of the defendant. The equiponderance of evidence rule states: “Where the scale shall stand upon equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence which shall incline it to one side or the other, the court will find for the defendant. Under said principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of defendant’s claim. Even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence on his side if such evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action.” In this case, both municipalities failed to satisfactorily back their claims that they owned barrio Pagahat: and 2) if Candijay’s boundary line claim was true, then not only would they claim Pagahat but also other certain barrios as well, which would as a result, certainly expand Candijay’s territory far beyond than what the law allows her, Candijay petitioned is review on certiorari with the SC, claiming that 1) the CA misapplied the equiponderance of evidence rule and 2) the municipality of Alicia had no juridical personality, having been created under avoid E.O. ( E.O. No.265) since Sec. 68 of the RAC of 1917 from which the said E.O. derived its authority, was declared unconstitutional in Pelaez v. Audition General (See III-b 1).
Held: The Municipality of Candijay is incorrect Reasons:
1. The SC sees no need in reviewing the equiponderance rule as it was not arrived whimsically or capriciously by the CA
2. The Municipality of Alicia was created by virtue of E.O. 265 in 1949. 16 years late when Pelaez v. Auditor General was promulgated. And yet even after, various government acts, most notably the recognition by the 1987 Constitution of Alicia as one of the 20 municipalities of the Third District of Bohol, indicate the State’s recognition and acknowledgement of the existence thereof. Alicia therefore, can claim the benefits of Sec. 442 (d) of the LGC of 1991 which states “Municipal District organized pursuant to presidential issuances and E.O. and which have their respective set of municipal officials holding officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. Sec. 442 (d) is therefore a curative law in favor of Alicia. The objection against it being a municipal corporation should have been done before the LGC was enacted in 1991.
b. 5 Municipality of Jimenez v. Baz, Jr. 265 SCRA 182
NOTE: Dates in this case are important because essentially Jimenez lost on account of the slow wheels of justice Facts: In 1949, President Quirino issued E.O. 258, creating the municipality of Sinacaban in the Province of Misamis Occidental. In 1988 by virtue of said E.O. Sinacaban filed a claim with the provincial Board of Misamis Occidental against the municipality of Jimenez territorial possession of about 5 barrios. Jimenez in its reply with the provincial Board that same year and later on with the RTC in 1990, said that Sinacaban had no juridical personality to file a suit because it was created under a void E.O. as promulgated in Pelaez Auditor General and 2) the disputed barrios belong to Jimenez since in 1950 the municipalities entered into an agreement duly approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental back then which recognized Jimenez’s jurisdiction over the disputed barrio in 1992, the RTC ruled in favor of Sinacaban using as its basis the curative benefits of Sec. 2 of the LGC of 1991. Angrily, Jimenez added in its petition with the Supreme Court the RTC’s decision was null and void because it failed to decide the case within one year mandated by the LGC of 1983 and the Constitution.
Held: Jimenez is incorrect Reasons:
1. Sinacaban can claim the benefits of Sec.442 (d) of the LGC of 1991, since various government acts through the years after the Pelaez case of 1965 indicate the recognition by the years after the Pelaez case 1965 indicate the recognition by the state of the municipality of Sinacaban, most notably when the 1987 Constitution recognized Sinacaban as part of the 2nd District of Misamis Occidental.
2. Whatever agreement Sinacaban and Jimenez entered into 1950 must still conform with the territorial metes and bounds set forth in E.O. 258, otherwise the agreement in void (A relocation survey was ordered but the results of the survey was not stated in the case)
3. Even granting that the RTC was deliberately slow, its decision is not rendered void. The only remedy left would be to file administrative sanctions against it.
b. 6 Mendenilla v. Onandia 5 SCRA 536
Facts: In 1954, the mayor of the municipality of Legaspi appointed Emilio Mendenilla as Chief of Police. Then, in 1959, Congress passed R.A. 2234 converting the municipality of Legaspi into the City of Legaspi R.A. 2234 provides that the position of Chief of Police of the city of Legaspi is to be appointed by the President. Therefore, when Jose Manuel Onandia was appointed by the President City Chief of Police, Mendenilla assailed the legality of such a move, claiming that his position as chief of police was not abolished when Legaspi was converted from a city to a municipality 2) Under R.A. 557 his employment status as Chief of Police may not be abolished except in the manner specified in R.A. 557 and 3) The Civil Service Law guarantees his security of tenure.
Held: Mendenilla is incorrect Reasons:
1. The position of Chief of Police of a municipality is totally different from the position of the Chief of Police of a city. Therefore, R.A. 2234 abolished the position of municipality Chief of Police and replaced it with a city Chief of police. In support of this contention, the Supreme Court cited Sec. 96, Article XVII of the charter which provides that the City Mayor the Vice Mayor, etc. are allowed to continue in office upon the effectivity of the charter until the expiration of their terms in office. Nowhere does it mention the Chief of Police in the said list of officials. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
2. Notwithstanding both R.A. 557 and the Civil Service Law, it is within the legal competence of Congress to enact R.A. 2234. Congress has the plenary power to make laws, meaning its power to make any kind of law is, in theory, unlimited. Quiz: If the municipality of a municipal judge is converted into a city, can the judge continue to serve in the new city? Answer: Yes. A judge is not a municipal official. He does not derive his power or his appointment from a city charter; he derives them from the Constitution and other Laws.
b. 7 Mathay v. CA 320 SCRA 703 NOTE: Don’t confuse CSU with CSC
Facts: During his term, Mayor Brigido Simon appointed 16 people to positions in the Civil Service Unit (CSU) of the local government of Quezon City. Simon’s authority to appoint was based upon P.D. 51. The Secretary of Justice rendered an Opinion, stating that P.D. 51 was never published in the Gazette, therefore, conformably with the Tanada v. Tuvera ruling P.D. 51 never became law at all. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) thus ordered the revocation of all appointments in the CSU. However, the effects of such revocation were temporarily cushioned when the city council issued an ordinance creating the Department of Public Order and Safety (DPOS). All present personnel of the CSU, the said ordinance stated are to be absorbed into the DPOS.
However, the regular positions in the DPOS never got filled due to insufficient number of said positions and lack of funds.
Simon and later on his successor, Mayor Ismael Mathay, remedied the situation by offering the CSU personnel contractual appointment. When Mathay refused to renew their appointments, the CSU personnel complained to the CSC. The CSC replied by issuing resolutions ordering the CSU personnel reinstated. Mathay now asserts that the CSC cannot order him to reinstate the said personnel as it is. In effect, giving the appointing power he possesses, as city Mayor to the CSC.
Held: Mathay is correct. Reasons:
1) First of all, the law applicable is B.P. 337 or the old LGC and not the LGC of 1991 since the material events of the case took place during the time of the old LGC.
2) Under B.P. 337, the power to appoint rests in the local chief executive in the case the Mayor. When the city council issued the ordinance allowing for the absorption of CSU personnel into the DPOS, it specifically made use of the wordings “Present Personnel” and not positions, thus the city council arrogated upon itself the appointing power by dictating who shall occupy the DPOS positions. Even in the local government level, the separation of powers must be respected.
3) The reasoning in no. 2 also applies to the CSC. The CSC claims that by virtue of the ordinance enacted by the city council, the CSU personnel became regular employees and such they have gained the protection of the Civil Service Law. Such reasoning is wrong because in the first place the CSU never existed at all, thus they were
never part of the Civil Service to begin with. Thus when Simon and later on Mathay offered them contractual appointments, they were at the mercy of the appointing power of the said mayors, as they have the option not to renew their appointments
b. 8 Samson v. Aguirre, 315 SCRA 53
Facts: R.A. 8535 was signed into law creating the City of Novaliches out of 15 barangays in Quezon City. Quezon City councilor Moises Samson questioned the constitutionality of said R.A. claiming that 1) certifications as to income, land area and population of Novaliches were not presented during the deliberations that led to the passage of R.A. 8535 2) a certification attesting to the fact that the mother LGU, Quezon City, would not be adversely affected by the creation of Novaliches city in terms of income, land area and population, was also not presented 3) a copy of the petition of concerned barangays calling or the creation of City of Novaliches was not presented to the Quezon City Council, as mandated by the Implementing Rules of the LGC, 1991 and 4) R.A. 8535 failed to specify the seat of government of the proposed City of Novaliches as mandated by Sec. 11 (a) of the LGC, 1991.
Held: Samson is wrong. Reasons:
1. The presumption of constitutionally of laws shall be applied in this case, meaning that Samson has burden of proof to show that R.A. 8535 was unconstitutional. Samson did not present any proof that no certifications were presented during the deliberations. And even granting that no certifications were indeed presented, the representatives of the DOF, NSO, DENR and even Quezon City mayor Ismael Mathay were present during the deliberations. The official statements attesting to the income, land area and population of Novaliches could serve the certifications contemplated by law
2. Mathay was present during the deliberation. If Quezon City would object to the creation of the City of Novaliches, he would be the first representative to do so. But he didn’t.
3. The failure to provide the QC council a petition of concerned barangays calling for the creation of the City of Novaliches is not fatal as such petition is meant only to inform the QC council of such creation. With the mass media publicizing the creation of the city of Novaliches, Samson could not claim he was not informed of the proposed creation
4. The failure of R.A.8535 to provide a seat of government for Novaliches is not fatal. Sec. 12 of the LGC provides that a government center shall be established by the LGU as far as practicable. Government centers can also serve as seats of government.
5. The fact that the City of Novaliches was not included among the 17 cities and municipalities listed in the ordinance attached to the 1987 constitution does not mean that a constitutional amendment is necessary in order for Novaliches to become a city. The ordinance attached to the Constitution merely apportions the seat of the House of Representatives to the different legislative districts in the country. Nowhere, does it provide that Metro Manila shall be forever composed of 17 cities and municipalities.
NOTE: the proposed City of Novaliches was later voted down in a plebiscite held for that purpose C. How are existing sub-provinces converted to provinces?
* Sec. 10 LGC: Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUs shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the voted cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC within 120 days from the date of effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless the law or ordinance fixes another date.
* Sec. 462 LGC: Existing Sub-provinces Existing sub-provinces are hereby converted into regular provinces upon approval of the voters cast in a plebiscite to be held in the said sub provinces and the original provinces directly affected. The plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC simultaneously with the national elections following the effectivity of this code.
The new legislative district created as a result of such conversion shall continue to be represented in Congress by the duly elected representatives of the original districts out of which said new province or districts were created unit their own representative shall have been elected in the next regular congressional elections and qualified
The incumbent elected officials of the said sub-provinces converted into regular provinces shall continue to hold office until June 30, 1992. Any vacancy occurring in the offices occupied by said incumbent elected officials, or resulting from expiration of resulting from expiration of their terms of office in case of negative votes in the plebiscite results, shall be filled by appointment by the President. The appointees shall hold office until their successors shall have been elected in the regular local elections following the plebiscite mentioned herein and qualified. After effectivity of such conversion, the President shall fill up the position of governor of the newly created province through appointment if none has yet been appointed to the same as hereinbefore provided, and shall also appoint a vice governor and other members of the Sanggunian Panlalawigan, all of whom shall likewise hold office unit their successors shall have been elected in the next local election and qualified.
All qualified appointive officials and employees in the career service of the said sub-provinces at the time of their conversion into regular provinces shall continue in accordance with civil service law, rules and regulation.
