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FINAL. Internal Audit Report. Data Centre Operations and Security

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This report is not for reproduction publication or disclosure by any means to unauthorised persons. Page 1

FINAL

Internal Audit

Report

Data Centre

Operations and

Security

Document Details:

Reference:

Report nos from monitoring spreadsheet/2013.14

Senior Manager, Internal Audit & Assurance:

ext. 6567

Engagement Manager:

Auditor:

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Internal Audit Report – Data Centre Operations and Security

Page 2

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1

INTRODUCTION

As part of the 2014/15 Internal Audit Plan an audit of the ‘Data centre operations and

security’ was carried out.

The objective of this review is to evaluate the security of the data centre, in particular

the following areas:

data centre policies and procedures are defined, documented, and

communicated for all key functions;

Council systems are secured to prevent unauthorised access (including 3rd

party access);

access to the data centre is monitored and reviewed, and access rights are

periodically reviewed;

data is backed up from servers held at the civic data centre;

data transferred off site is secured at all times and appropriate controls are in

place to monitor the location of the data;

environmental controls are present to protect the servers from fire, electrical and

water damage;

capacity for the data centre is adequate for the server rooms equipment and

storage needs;

environmental equipment is routinely maintained in line with manufacturer

recommended schedules; and

backup electricity supplies are in place to ensure systems and services are not

affected in the event of a power outage.

1.2

OVERALL OPINION

The overall opinion of this review is ‘significant assurance’.

There are some areas that are appropriately managed and in line with acceptable good

practice, including:

A computer room policy has been developed and is reviewed on an annual

basis;

Backup schedules are in place and failed backups are monitored and actioned

by ICT staff;

An offsite location is used for storage of backup tapes; and

Storage capacity for the data centre is considered adequate based on the plans

of ICT.

However, we also identified a number of areas that require improvement, and have

thus led to the ‘limited assurance’ rating:

Failure to test restores of critical applications regularly;

Lack of documented back up policy and procedures;

Excessive computer room access;

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Internal Audit Report – Data Centre Operations and Security

Page 3

Lack of formalised computer room training as required by the computer room

policy;

Lack of a visitors register in the computer room, as required by the computer

room policy;

Lack of a fire suppression system; and

The backup process is inefficient due to the increase of data over the last five

years.

Recommendations 7 and 8 are included for completeness. Management have agreed a

response to these recommendations in the Disaster Recovery audit report. These

recommendations have not influence the overall opinion.

Overall Audit Opinion

Full assurance

Full assurance that the system of internal control meets

the organisation’s objectives and controls are

consistently applied.

Significant

assurance

Significant assurance that there is a generally sound

system of control designed to meet the organisation’s

objectives. However, some weaknesses in the design or

inconsistent application of controls put the achievement

of some objectives at some risk.

Limited

assurance

Limited assurance as weaknesses in the design or

inconsistent application of controls put the achievement

of the organisation’s objectives at risk in some of the

areas reviewed.

No assurance

No assurance can be given on the system of internal

control as weaknesses in the design and/or operation of

key control could result or have resulted in failure(s) to

achieve the organisation’s objectives in the area(s)

reviewed.

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Internal Audit Report – Data Centre Operations and Security

Page 4

2. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

2.1

The conclusion for each control objective evaluated as part of this audit was as follows:

Control Objective

Assurance

Full Significant Limited None

CO1: data centre policies and procedures are

defined, documented, and communicated for all key

functions;



CO2: Council systems are secured to prevent

unauthorised access (including 3rd party access);

CO3: access to the data centre is monitored and

reviewed, and access rights are periodically

reviewed;

CO4: data is backed up from servers held at the

data centre;

CO5: data transferred off site is secured at all times

and appropriate controls are in place to monitor the

location of the data;

CO6: environmental controls are present to protect

the servers from fire, electrical and water damage;

CO7: capacity for the data centre is adequate for

the server rooms equipment and storage needs

CO8: environmental equipment is routinely

maintained in line with manufacturer recommended

schedules

CO9: backup electricity supplies are in place to

ensure systems and services are not affected in the

event of a power outage

2.2

The recommendations arising from the review are ranked according to their level of

priority as detailed at the end of the report within the detailed audit findings.

Recommendations are also colour coded according to their level of priority with the

highest priorities highlighted in red, medium priorities in amber and lower priorities in

green. In addition, the detailed audit findings include columns for the management

response, the responsible officer and the time scale for implementation of all agreed

recommendations.

2.3

Where high recommendations are made within this report it would be expected that

they should be implemented within three months from the date of the report to ensure

that the major areas of risk have either been resolved or that mitigating controls have

been put in place and that medium and low recommendations will be implemented

within six and nine months respectively.

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Internal Audit Report – Data Centre Operations and Security

Page 5

3. LIMITATIONS REGARDING THE SCOPE OF THE AUDIT

The scope of our work will be limited to those areas outlined above.

4. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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Internal Audit Report – Data Centre Operations and Security

5. DETAILED AUDIT FINDINGS

Ref. Priority Findings Risk Arising/

Consequence

Recommendation Management Response Responsibility and Timescale

Recommendation Implemented (Officer & Date) CO1: Policies and Procedures

1 Low Lack of Backup Policy and Procedures

On inspection of the Computer room policy, it was noted that the document does not contain any details on the backup policy and procedure. We accept that the off-site backup storage arrangements are detailed in the IT Disaster Recovery document.

In the absence of a documented backup policy and procedure, there is an increased risk that backups are not performed in line with ICT’s

requirements. This may result in the loss of data, interruption of ICT services and operational difficulties.

We recommend that the Computer Room policy is expanded to include the backup cycle, backup transit and storage arrangements.

The Computer Room Policy and description of the data back-up and restore service are given in two separate documents. These can be combined, giving the back-up and restore weight by placing it into policy. Service Operations Manager, End November 2014.

CO2: Access to the data centre

2 High Excessive access to Computer Room

On inspection of the access list dated 14 August 2014, we noted that there are a total of 65 access cards that provide staff access to the County Hall computer room.

Examples of these include the following:

 20 temporary passes held by Reception;

 Senior Internal Auditor;

Unauthorised/inappro priate physical access to the computer room may result in accidental or malicious damage to ICT equipment resulting in loss of data, interruption of ICT services and operational difficulties.

The access to all computer rooms should be restricted to and other who require access to perform their responsibilities.

The access list should be reviewed by management on a regular basis to ensure that the access granted is valid. Proof of the review should be maintained.

The current security group used within the Door Access Control System (Net2) to cover the computer rooms is also shared with other duty staff requiring access 'all hours, all doors'. This is inappropriate, as some staff will require open access to most areas, but not the computer areas. S&CA have already arranged with Facilities to create a

Technical Services manager, end November 2014.

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Internal Audit Report – Data Centre Operations and Security

Ref. Priority Findings Risk Arising/

Consequence

Recommendation Management Response Responsibility and Timescale

Recommendation Implemented (Officer & Date)

 Audit assistant

 Two members of the applications team;

 One staff member from Adult Services & Health;

 One staff member from Children’s Services;

 Six temporary contractors; and

 One leaver who has not yet been removed. We accept that part of the issues arises due to Reception issuing an ‘all hours all doors’ pass, that is out of the control of ICT.

dedicated access group for Computer rooms. This will be used for appropriate staff who require access to the computer rooms only. Access to the computer rooms will be removed from the 'all hours, all doors' group.

3 Medium Computer Room Access Logging

The computer room policy states that ‘access to the central computer rooms must be logged. For regular staff this can be via the automated Access Control System, for other staff, this must be via an electronic or manual booking system administered centrally. The 'booking system' should

Unauthorised/inappro priate physical access to the computer room may result in accidental or malicious damage to ICT equipment resulting in loss of data, interruption of ICT services and operational difficulties.

Where non authorised staff require access to the computer room, they should be accompanied by a member of the ICT team and their access logged (utilising an access log form).

The log should be reviewed by Management on a regular basis (monthly), to identify any unauthorised access.

Agreed, S&CA will create a manual logging process that can be used to record access for individuals that do not have access right to the computer room within their own responsibility. Will record

 Date/time

 Who requires access Reason for access

Technical Services manager, end November 2014.

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Internal Audit Report – Data Centre Operations and Security

Ref. Priority Findings Risk Arising/

Consequence

Recommendation Management Response Responsibility and Timescale

Recommendation Implemented (Officer & Date)

show name of the person accessing the computer room, data and time from and until, reason for access and detail of work to be carried out’. We noted that there is no ‘booking system’ in place for visitors. 4 Low Computer Room Training

The computer room policy states that ‘access is granted once users have received training’. There is currently no proof of the training.

We understand that the training is currently verbal and there is an intention for ICT to

implement an online training course going forward.

A lack of training may result in staff not understanding the controls appropriate for the computer room. This may result in accidental or malicious damage to ICT equipment resulting in loss of data, interruption of ICT services and operational difficulties.

A formalised training programme should be developed, that includes details of the policies and procedures staff must follow, guidance on escalation and roles and responsibilities.

Evidence of a formal training record should be maintained.

S&CA are working in conjunction with

Development and Training to derive an on-line Computer Room Access course to be completed by staff before being allowed access to the computer rooms. Service Operations Manager, and Development and Training End December 2014.

CO3: Management review of data centre access

5 Medium Access List Reviews

Access list reviews are

performed on an ad-hoc basis. The last review was performed in February 2014.

We noted that there are many users on the access list that should not have access to the computer room. See CO2

Unauthorised/inappro priate physical access to the computer room may result in accidental or malicious damage to IT equipment resulting in loss of data, interruption of IT services and operational difficulties. We recommend that computer room access lists are reviewed more formally on a regular basis, and proof of review is retained. As a minimum the

recommended guidance is every 3 months.

Agreed, this is good practice and will be scheduled within the team. Service Operations Manager, End November 2014.

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Internal Audit Report – Data Centre Operations and Security

Ref. Priority Findings Risk Arising/

Consequence

Recommendation Management Response Responsibility and Timescale

Recommendation Implemented (Officer & Date)

above for details.

In addition there is no evidence of the access review.

CO4: Data is backed up

6 Medium New Backup System

Netbackup, the backup system currently in use by the Council, was implemented five years ago. Since the implementation, there has been a 12% annual growth of the data that requires backup. The backup process has thus become very slow and inefficient.

We understand that a budget for the implementation of a new backup system has already been approved and will form part of the commissioning process.

In the event that a disaster occurs and data is not

appropriately backed up, inability to recover the data may result in critical business functions not being recovered in a timely, accurate and

controlled fashion. This could result in the loss of data, interruption of ICT services and

operational difficulties

Implement a backup system that is scalable and

therefore can cope with the level of data growth within the Council.

This system should cope with the demands of Council and projected changes to occur.

The review of the back-up process will be done by HP as the new Service Provider, in conjunction with S&CA, to achieve a solution that will be strategic for the needs of the Council and in line with HP support model going forward

Service Operations Manager, September 2015.

7 High Key System restores

We noted that restores for key systems (SAP and Framework i) are not performed on a regular basis, and no restore documentation is retained. Refer to IT Disaster Recovery

Refer to IT Disaster Recovery report

Management should develop a policy on how often restores will be performed and retain all supporting documentation Refer to IT Disaster Recovery report Refer to IT Disaster Recovery report Refer to IT Disaster Recovery report

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Internal Audit Report – Data Centre Operations and Security

Ref. Priority Findings Risk Arising/

Consequence

Recommendation Management Response Responsibility and Timescale

Recommendation Implemented (Officer & Date)

report, section ‘CO4: What testing is performed to validate IT Disaster Recovery, how the outcomes are reported and corrective actions

implemented’, issue 5.

CO6: Environmental controls are present to protect the servers

8 High Fire suppression system

There is no fire suppression system in place.

For more details, refer to IT Disaster Recovery report, section ‘CO3: Whether inclusion of end-to-end recovery processes and the identification of interfaces between dependent and feeder systems are understood within the ITDR Plan(s)’, issue 3.

Refer to IT Disaster Recovery report Refer to IT Disaster Recovery report Refer to IT Disaster Recovery report Refer to IT Disaster Recovery report Refer to IT Disaster Recovery report Key to Priorities:

High This is essential to provide satisfactory control of serious risk(s)

Medium This is important to provide satisfactory control of risk

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Internal Audit Report – Data Centre Operations and Security

Limitations relating to the Internal Auditor's work

The matters raised in this report are limited to those that came to our attention, from the relevant sample selected, during the course of our audit and to the

extent that every system is subject to inherent weaknesses such as human error or the deliberate circumvention of controls. Our assessment of the controls

which are developed and maintained by management is also limited to the time of the audit work and cannot take account of future changes in the control

environment.

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