1 Third Party Mediation in the Arab-Israeli Conflict
Abstract
This article investigates the links between mediation determinants and mediation outcomes in the Arab-Israeli conflict between 1948 and 2008. We identify the most substantive and most researched cases of mediation in the conflict, as well as the most pertinent theoretical determinants of mediation as they appear in the literature, to present several hypotheses about the significance of such factors to mediation outcome. Using bivariate correlation analysis and various multiple regression models, we find that in the context of this conflict, Arab-Israeli mediation has been most successful when used by high-status third parties who employed manipulative strategies and focused on limited objectives, as opposed to pursuing a comprehensive settlement to the conflict or tackling its core issues.
Dr. Asaf Siniver
Dept. of Political Science and International Studies University of Birmingham
a.siniver@bham.ac.uk Dr. Peter Thomas
School of Law and Social Science University of East London
2 Introduction
Mediation is one of the oldest forms of conflict resolution and has been used extensively worldwide by individuals, states and organisations to bring about peaceful resolution to interstate and intrastate conflicts. While definitions of, and approaches to mediation vary, it is commonly understood as the intervention of a third party in the dispute of two or more parties, for the purpose of improving the nature of interaction between the disputants (Kressel and Pruitt, 1989). Mediation is a distinct form of third party intervention. It is initiated and performed on a voluntary and non-violent basis, and its proposals or recommendations are non-binding. As a conflict resolution tool, mediation has proved to be the most popular form of contemporary conflict resolution, present in nearly 60 percent of international and intrastate disputes between (Bercovitch and Fretter, 2004: 29), while nearly half of all post Cold War crisis were mediated by third parties (Beardsley et. al., 2006: 59). However, despite the prevalence of mediation in contemporary conflicts, the academic literature is surprisingly modest in its attempts to provide tangible hypotheses about the linkage between certain mediation characteristics and the likelihood of a successful outcome. Whereas some studies of mediation tend to be overly generic and lack rigorous testing of their propositions, others are insufficiently driven by systematic case-study analysis, thus reducing the treatment of cases to descriptive footnotes.
The Arab-Israeli conflict (AIC) is perhaps the world‘s most protracted conflict and has been visited by dozens of mediators since its inception in 1948. However despite the diversity of third parties and their strategies, as well the as changes in global/regional contexts and the nature of relationships between the disputants, very few studies of
3 mediation have attempted to hypothesise about the relationship between contextual and procedural factors of mediation and mediation outcomes in the Arab-Israeli conflict (see for example Kriesberg, 2001; Siniver, 2006; Stein and Lewis, 1996). In its various forms, the conflict includes a diverse yet comparable population of enduring rivalries (Greig, 2005). These represent the high end of interaction in the international system, and as they are the most likely to escalate into protracted conflicts, they invariably necessitate the intervention of third parties. We know that enduring conflicts (that is, repeated military confrontations between two states over time) represent only 13 per cent of all international conflicts, yet they account for more than half of all mediation efforts since 1945, and that they are ten times more likely to attract third party mediation. On average such conflicts last for nearly 38 years and they attract at least 14 attempts at managing them by third parties, though few of them succeed (Goertz and Diehl, 1993; Bercovitch and Diehl, 1997). As a prime example of an enduring and intractable conflict then, we can learn a lot from the experience of the Arab-Israeli conflict about possible links between mediation determinants and mediation outcomes.
In recent years the literature on mediation and conflict resolution more broadly has seen a large number of normative studies which use formal models and game-theory approaches to suggest when and how rational actors can mediate most effectively with regards to the use of information and resources vis-à-vis the disputing parties (Kydd 2003, 2005; Rauchhaus 2006; Greig and Regan 2008). The reality of conflict however, is that often mediators and disputants alike do not enjoy the degree of rationality, logic and perfect information which is assumed by such normative studies. At the same time empirical approaches and large-N studies are particularly under-represented in the
4 literature. Such studies can be scrutinised for imperfect data gathering or possible bias selection, but they offer a useful platform to study the conditions for mediation success and failure as part of a systematic, inductive framework which can offer generalised observations about effective mediation with real policy relevance (Bercovitch 2005). Whilst the AIC represents a single case of inquiry, its development over time in terms of actors, mediation processes and the international context, provides in effect a larger population of relevant observations which allows us to test theories on the possible relationships between factors and conditions of mediation and mediation outcomes, with empirical resonance which goes beyond this particular conflict (Rubin 1981; Bercovitch 1997).
Ever since the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948, dozens of third parties have offered their services to the disputants, in the hope of bringing a successful resolution to arguably the most protracted conflict in contemporary history. These third parties have entered the conflict at its various stages, brandishing a wide range of mediation expertise and capabilities. Some sought to achieve a lasting comprehensive peace between Israel and its Arab neighbours, while others concentrated their efforts on more limited objectives, such as the disengagement of forces or interim political agreements. Even a cursory survey of the history of third party mediation in the Arab-Israeli conflict points to a ‗dismal record‘ (Eisenberg and Caplan, 1998: 1). If success is judged by the longevity of the agreement, then this record stands at just five long-term successes: Ralph Bunche‘s mediation of the 1949 armistice agreements which delineated the conflict‘s borders (the Green Line) and remains a reference point to this day; Henry Kissinger‘s separation of Egyptian and Israeli forces in the immediate aftermath of the 1973 October War, and further
5 disengagement between Israeli, Egyptian and Syrian forces in 1974-5; Jimmy Carter‘s mediation at Camp David which led to the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty; and the secret Oslo channel which produced a historic and irreversible agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which, despite subsequent failures of implementation of some of its terms remains the cornerstone of two decades of Israeli-Palestinian dialogue (Siniver, 2006). However, if we accept that mediation success is to be measured simply by the mutual and formal signing of an agreement, rather than by the ability of the disputants and external actors to maintain it over a long period of time, then we can add four more cases of successful mediation in the Arab-Israeli conflict. These include the 1970 Rogers plan, the 1983 Israel-Lebanon peace treaty, and the 1997 Hebron agreement and the 1998 Wye River memorandum between Israel and the PLO.
Defining mediation success
Despite mediation being the most common method of conflict resolution in the post-Cold war era, the literature lacks an authoritative empirically-tested and theory-based conceptualisation of mediation success. Whilst the nature of the relationship between mediation attributes and success is regularly debated by mediation scholars, there is still no consensus as to why some mediation cases are successful when others are not. As Kleiboer correctly observed, ‗the issue of assessing outcomes of international conflict management is a tricky one‘ (1996: 361). Some scholars see the listing of general conditions for success as an exercise in futility given the importance of contextual, political and cultural idiosyncrasies (Meyer, 1960; Simkin, 1971), while others adopt a
6 more prescriptive approach by suggesting which conditions are more conducive to successful mediation (Mitchell, 1981; Bercovitch, 1997; Berridge, 2002).
Before presenting our criteria to evaluate mediation outcomes, it is important to consider the conditions under which mediation may be accepted in the first place. In their study of mediation acceptance in civil wars, Greig and Regan claim that, ‗[o]ne way to think about the acceptance of mediation is that both sides implicitly agree to make concessions, or at least that they have some concessions to give under certain circumstances‘ (2008: 760). However whereas the acceptance of mediation is necessary for its ultimate success, it is of course not sufficient, and whilst many studies explore why and when third parties choose to mediate, they cannot tell us why or when mediation is likely to succeed (Regan, 1998; Greig, 2004; Terris and Maoz, 2005). As demonstrated repeatedly in the Arab-Israeli conflict, in protracted conflicts which experience variation in intensity and the nature of the disputed issues, the disputants‘ decision to accept the offer of third party mediation has sometimes more to do with saving face domestically or gaining favour with the international community, than with a genuine desire to achieve a settlement (Beardsley, 2010). This also applies to the mediator‘s decision to offer his/her services based on a cost-benefit analysis. Despite the obvious costs, such as damage to reputation in the event of failure, in some instances third parties will seek to mediate in the first place or continue to do so knowing that the chances of success are slim, as means to maintain a regional or global role or in order to keep the parties talking simply to avoid the resumption of violence. Third parties are also more likely to offer their services if they have established relations with at least one of the parties, or they have strategic/regional interests in the resolution of the conflict, or they possess appropriate
7 expertise or resources to offer effective mediation (Smith and Stam, 2003; Greig, 2005; Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006).
Finally, any discussion of mediation success must distinguish between mediation as process and mediation as outcome. Whilst they represent consecutive phases under the broad umbrella of ‗mediation‘, the factors determining them are somewhat different. The process of mediation may be determined by factors such as leverage, timing, and impartiality, whereas studies of the outcome of mediated agreements have highlighted the importance of external security guarantees, peace dividends, etc., in ensuring the successful implementation and durability of the agreement (Stedman, Rothchild and Cousens, 2002; Walter, 2002). The question of why successfully mediated agreements sometime fail to produce durable peace is important because of the implicit assumption that a failed mediated outcome is necessarily attributed to a failed mediated process, whereas in reality this may not be the case. In a prolonged and intractable conflict conditions are rarely auspicious to dialogue and compromise, and even the conclusion of an agreement with the good will of the disputants and the expert assistance of the mediator does not guarantee its durability in a volatile and violent environment – note for example the successful mediation and subsequent collapse of the 1983 Israel-Lebanon peace treaty and the 1993 Oslo accords between Israel and the PLO. This empirical evidence is supported by Gartner and Bercovitch (2006), whose International Conflict Management dataset suggests that high intensity and protracted conflicts are unlikely to end in a full-scale agreement, mediated or not, and that any agreement reached is likely to be limited and short-lived (see also Carment et. al., 2009). In such a hostile environment,
8 achieving a limited ceasefire can be a huge success for the mediator and disputants alike given the inhospitable conditions for political settlement.
The distinction between mediation process and outcome can be explained with reference to two contending conceptualisations of success and failure in international mediation. The first approach offers seemingly objective criteria which look at the ultimate consequences of the mediation effort. These criteria are often defined broadly to compensate for the idiosyncratic nature of specific events. This allows the observer significant latitude for interpretation, and to retain a certain amount of freedom in analysing patterns of mediation while ignoring the motives of the disputants and the mediator. This approach is closely linked to the structuralist paradigm of mediation and rational choice theories, which explain the occurrence and outcomes of mediation by important signposts such as timing and power (Haass, 1990; Princen, 1992). Accordingly success here is measured by the occurrence of objective and observable events, such as a cease-fire, a peace treaty or other tangible political settlements (Touval, 1982; Kriesberg, 1991; Bercovitch and Houston, 1996). This approach of defining success in terms of political settlements may fail to account, however, for the degree of effectiveness of mediation in producing a durable agreement (Bercovitch and Simpson, 2010). This is where the second approach comes in, attempting to bridge the gap between results and perceptions. While the first approach eschews any discussion of the subjective interpretations of the disputants or the mediator to the bargaining process, this approach explains mediation success by focussing on the process of communication as a means of changing attitudes, largely outside the structures of formal negotiation. This approach is linked to the social-psychological paradigm of mediation, and accordingly successful
9 mediation is defined here in terms of the (subjective) perceptions of the disputants and the mediator of their respective efforts to accomplish their aims as they were outlined at the initiation of the process (Smith, 1985; Hopmann, 1995). In addition to effectiveness, other criteria to evaluate success here may include fairness, efficiency and satisfaction (Katz 1999), and while these intangible abstractions are not without their merit, it is clear that the very personal and subjective nature of such criteria cannot, on its own, provide an accurate indication of mediation outcomes.
Research design
We adopt the first approach to evaluate mediation success, that is, we take the conclusion of objective signposts as success regardless of durability, thus keeping the analytical distinction between process and outcome. We find that out of 24 cases of mediation in the Arab-Israeli conflict, nine were concluded with some kind of a formal agreement, ranging from a cease-fire to a peace treaty. As international mediation is not a uniform practice it would be erroneous to treat the outcome in such a manner, and particularly in a protracted, high intensity conflict such as the one between Israel and its Arab neighbours. Limited agreements or even short-lived settlements should not be disregarded as abject failures of mediation. Our nine cases of successful mediation are not equal in their historic significance or indeed in their longevity – some have collapsed fairly rapidly whereas others are still honoured by the parties several decades later. For this reason we treat mediation success/failure not as a dichotomous outcome but rather across a dynamic spectrum which takes into account issues such as significance, longevity, the international context, and the objectives of the disputants and mediator at the initiation of
10 the process. Specifically, we borrow the typology used by Beardsley et. al. (2006) to code mediation outcomes in our study as follows: 1= complete failure; 2= short-term post-mediation tension reduction (up to 12 months); 3= sustained post-post-mediation tension reduction (lasting more than 12 months); 4= formal agreement but resumption of violence over previously agreed issues within 5 years; 5= enduring formal agreement, lasting more than 5 years.
The long history of mediation efforts to bring an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict in all its form requires us to develop a systematic framework to identify which mediation factors are consistently linked to a successful outcome. We proceed in three stages:
First, we surveyed the entire population of third party mediation in the conflict between 1948-2008 and identified the most significant and most researched cases for our analysis – we found 24 such cases. While individual case studies are notorious for their lack of conceptual comparability, this meta-analysis of multiple case studies allows us to arrive at comparable data for all 24 cases. Of course, any systematic analysis of 24 cases, using potential explanatory variables will necessarily have to be somewhat tentative. The number of cases is sufficiently large to detect very strong relationships, but insufficient to determine whether or not weaker (and even moderate) associations are reflecting real empirical regularities. The risk of Type-1 errors (incorrectly concluding that a relationship exists) is as real as that of Type-2 errors (incorrectly concluding that there is no relationship between variables), although the latter is mitigated by the fact that we are predominantly interested in whether any factors have strong effects on outcomes. The only solution for this problem consists of increasing the number of cases for analysis, but this is not feasible as we have covered all substantive mediation efforts in this conflict.
11 We do not include every case of diplomatic activity in this period for methodological and epistemological reasons. Some cases are not as well researched as others, and as such could not offer substantial contribution to knowledge or be compared effectively to other cases. Touval, for example, cites at least five failed cases of mediation from the early 1950s (1982: 106), however their relative obscurity and inconsequential impact on the progression of the conflict meant that they were not followed in subsequent by multiple and authoritative accounts, on par with the cases selected here. Furthermore, some periods in the conflict have seen an influx of mediators in a relatively short period of time, representing a broader strategy of mediation rather than individual efforts with discernible characteristics, such as the long list of American special envoys who visited the region in the run up to the 1983 Israel-Lebanon peace treaty, or the various officials who have come to facilitate Israeli-Palestinian talks in the past decade under the terms of reference of the Road Map framework. In essence then, our population of cases is comprised of mediation efforts, rather than mediators; naming every diplomat who ever shuttled between Israeli and Arab capitals will do little to further our understanding of the linkage between certain mediation determinants and mediation outcomes. We are concerned here with important chapters in the diplomatic history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, rather than its anecdotal footnotes.
Second, each of our 24 cases was broken into its constituent elements in relation to three distinct categories: context, mediator’s capacity and process. Taken together, there are 24 such independent variables which cover the range of mediation experience in the AIC. Our contextual factors include the scope of mediated issues (e.g. Jerusalem, refugees, water, etc.), the degree of power asymmetry between the parties and point in
12 time in the conflict cycle in which mediation took place. As for the mediator‘s capacity to mediate the process, we measured various permutations of power (leverage), impartiality and status/rank. The procedural variables covered a range of issues such as mediation strategies, degrees of visibility of the process as well as its objectives as identified by the mediator.
The analysis will use bivariate correlation and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression in order to fit models that best describe the data involving our independent variables and the dependent variable, Outcome of Mediation. To allow for interceding reliability we used a group of independent researchers to measure the potency of these variables in every one of our cases of Arab-Israeli mediation. All of our variables, including the outcome of every mediation effort are treated as continuous rather than dichotomous factors. Coding our variables and indeed the outcome as either present/absent or success/failure would have been a too blunt instrument which would not account for degrees of success, longevity, significance, etc. Treating all our variables as continuous allows for a more accurate survey of factors and a more nuanced analysis of results. Given that we are dealing with events data such as the ranking of issues in terms of complexity and historical significance, the status ranking of mediators and so on - which requires coding or ‗translating‘ of qualitative categories into quantitative values (sometimes with limited sets of categories) – we subject all of our data to inter-coder reliability (Ruggeri et. al. 2009).
13 Determinants of mediation
There have been several attempts by academics to capture the range of the mediation experience, and specifically the desired attributes of the ideal mediator (Wall and Lynn, 1993; Wall, Stark and Standifer, 2001). Some of these determinants do not require rigorous academic scrutiny to be of logical relevance to mediation success. It is self-evident, for example, that the mediator‘s intelligence, tact, tenacity, and other interpersonal skills are conducive (though not sufficient) to successful mediation. Other factors, however, require a more scrupulous examination. As noted above, we identified 24 variables which we believe capture the essence of mediation in the AIC in the past six decades, divided into the following categories: contextual, mediator’s capacity and
procedural. Similar typologies are common in the literature (Frei, 1976; Touval, 1982; Bercovitch and Langley, 1993; Kleiboer, 1996), and they all share the assumption that the outcome of any instance of mediation can be understood in terms of the combination of the context of the conflict, the qualities of the mediator and the process of mediation.
i. Contextual factors
The literature is rather vague on the effect of contextual variables on the outcome of mediation. Some suggest that protracted and intense disputes are more difficult to resolve by mediation (Frei, 1976; Bercovitch, 1991), while others contend that the disputants will be more likely to accept outside mediation in the face of spiralling violence (Young, 1967; Beardsley et. al., 2005). The context of mediation refers to systemic variables which mostly determine the degree of manoeuvrability of the mediator before the process has even begun. Thus in the context of the AIC for example, the nature of the dispute and
14 the issues to be resolved are independent to the identity of the mediator. Moreover, past relations between the disputants, their balance of power or the historical, political, religious and ideological idiosyncrasies of the disputed issues may often invite certain types of mediators while excluding others. In this context, a cursory review of the diplomatic history of the AIC reveals the predominance of U.S.-led mediation efforts since the late 1960s and the marginal role of other external actors, such as the United Nations.
The nature of conflict/disputed issues is considered in the literature to have significant bearing on the success or failure of mediation. The importance the parties attach to a disputed issue will have a bearing on the identity of the mediator, the mediator‘s choice of strategies, and ultimately the likelihood of success. Ott (1972: 616) for example, argues that the ‗absence of vital national security interests, particularly questions of territorial control‘ is no less than a necessary condition for mediation success. In a similar fashion, Randle (1973: 49) suggests that ‗should a dispute affect vital security interests of the parties, no amount of mediation by a third party is likely to prevent the outbreak of hostilities.‘ Historically, the AIC has revolved around the following core issues: Jerusalem, security/borders, refugees and settlements. The entire range of issues cannot be treated dichotomously however, with these core issues situated directly opposite ‗softer‘ issues such as redeployment of forces or economic cooperation. For example, it can be argued that control of water resources in the Arab-Israeli conflict is just as urgent as the core issues, however over the years it has been seen as being of secondary importance by mediators and disputants alike, though in the long-term its resolution is as imperative as that of the core issues. To reflect this complexity in terms of
15 our operationalisation and analysis of the data, as a first step we identify the issues that existed at the time of a particular mediation event. As a second step, we rate each issue contained within a specific mediation event on the basis of its complexity and historical significance, using a scale rating of 0 – 100 (100 representing maximum complexity and maximum historical significance). Thirdly, to provide an additional layer of context, we calculate total (mean average) issues score for each specific mediation event. Our hypothesis will test the notion that mediation success is dependent on how ‗hard‘ or ‗soft‘ the disputed issues are perceived to be by the parties.
Hypothesis A1: Mediations that address the core issues of the AIC (Jerusalem, security/borders, refugees and settlements) are less likely to be successful than those addressing issues perceived as ‘softer’ by the parties
The issue of balance of power (or power symmetry) between the disputants is less contested in the literature, with most observers agree that as long as one party feels that it has the upper hand, it will not be inclined to engage productively with mediation, and therefore rough parity is crucial for achieving compromise (Young, 1967; Kressel, 1981; Touval, 1982). By asymmetrical conflict we mean a conflict where one party has a territorial or military advantage, or that its history of previous relationship with the mediator makes its position at the negotiation table more powerful (see for example the blatant asymmetry in power between Israel and the PLO during the Clinton years). Asymmetry in power is therefore expected to have a bearing on the process, and perhaps even the outcome, of mediation (Aggestam 2002; Quinn et. al. 2006).
Hypothesis A2: Mediations where rough power symmetry exists between the parties are more likely to be successful than those where there is clear power asymmetry between the parties
16 The contextual variable of timing in mediation is perhaps more difficult to conceptualise. It is not static like the nature of the conflict or the issues at hand – these rarely change in essence. Here, however, the initiation of the mediation process is determined by the disputants and the mediator. This creates endless opportunities during the life of the conflict, leading to the assumption that choosing the right entry point can sometimes make the difference between success and failure in mediation (Stein and Lewis, 1996). However there is no consensus in the literature regarding the most opportune time for mediators to enter the conflict, and how to distinguish points in time as more or less ‗ripe‘ for mediation (Crocker, Hampson and Aall, 2003). Whilst it has been suggested that ‗knowing when to use mediation may be more important than how often it is used‘ (Bercovitch, 1997: 145), assessing when is the most propitious time for mediation is a difficult task, and various studies have attempted to identify the ripe moment for mediation (Kleiboer, 1994; Zartman, 1985, 2001; Rubin, 1992; Haass, 1990; Lyons and Khadiagala, 2008). Much like Abba Eban‘s famous quip, that men and nations behave wisely once they have exhausted all other alternatives, we argue that mediation is more likely to succeed when both disputants have decided that the continuing costs of the status quo are no longer tolerable, or in other words, when the disputants have come to the conclusion that they will be better off with a settlement than without one. Some contend that this realisation only comes late in the conflict, and therefore mediators should enter after perceptions of crisis or emergency have increased disputants‘ incentives to accept mediation (Rubin, 1981). Others propose that mediation needs to be firmly initiated before such threshold of violence is reached and perceptions of the other side have hardened (Edmead, 1971). A ripe moment opens for the mediator a window of
17 time which provides the best opportunity to succeed. To assess ripeness, the notions of conflict cycle and hurting stalemate are often used in the literature. A conflict cycle suggests that most conflicts are characterised by sequential phases, namely rising of tensions, confrontation, and the outbreak of hostilities, followed by military clashes. The de-escalatory phases may include a cease-fire, settlement, rapprochement, and reconciliation (Bercovitch and Langley, 1993; Crocker et. al., 1999). In the AIC the notion of (phases of) a conflict cycle is difficult to employ, as reversals in the conflict cycle, or ‗leaps‘ between escalatory and de-escalatory phases are common. For example, the 1990s saw the signing of several Israeli-Palestinian agreements, accompanied almost simultaneously by unprecedented levels of violence and hostility on both sides. This leaves us with the concept of a hurting stalemate as perhaps the best benchmark to gauge when mediation should be initiated and when it is likely to succeed. Military defeats, changes in power relations or the threat of a deadline may convince the disputants that mediation is the best way out of a worsening situation. Linked to the concept of conflict ripeness is a process of ‗softening up‘ by the disputants, that is to say that parties have shifted from intransigence to willingness. This process can follow the introduction of contextual conflict factors which are more amenable to settlement, or the successful application of appropriate strategies by the mediator (Greig and Diehl, 2006). The softening up of the parties on its own however, is an insufficient condition for ripening of the conflict as a whole, as it is exogenous to factors such as structural constraints or the willingness of the mediator itself to mediate. In our data, ‗timing‘ refers to the mediator‘s point of entry into the conflict, namely during an escalatory phase (coded 1-4, 4
18 indicating the highest level of escalation) or de-escalatory phase (coded -1 to -4, -4 representing the reconciliation phase).
Hypothesis A3: Mediations that occur during an escalatory phase in the conflict cycle are more likely to be successful than those occurring during a de-escalatory phase
ii. Mediator’s capacity
As noted above, the mediator may assume numerous behaviours, roles and functions during the mediation process. Wall alone identifies more than a hundred specific mediator traits (Wall, 1981), while Stulberg (1987) provides a more modest list of nine mediator‘s roles, ranging from a ‗catalyst‘ to a ‗scapegoat‘. Others provide useful typologies of mediator roles and strategies (Zartman and Touval, 1985). Whatever the method used to evaluate these qualities, it is generally understood that the mediator‘s power (leverage) and perceived impartiality are of utmost relevance to its chances of success. The vast majority of definitions of mediation include either the mediator‘s active use of leverage, or its perceived impartiality on the disputed issue. Furthermore, power and impartiality are intractably linked — impartiality being a potential source of leverage, while power deriving from other sources may lessen the need for impartiality (Smith, 1994). Finally, there is some agreement in the literature that the mediator‘s status has significant bearing on the chances of success.
Power, or leverage in mediation refers to the mediator‘s ability to move a party in
its intended direction (Zartman and Touval, 1996: 455). However by its voluntary, non-binding and non-violent nature, the mediation process ensures that the ultimate power lies with the disputants – they have the power to initiate the process, and they hold the right to terminate it. Explicitly then, a first prerequisite for the initiation, let alone success, of any
19 mediation effort is that the mediator is accepted by the disputing parties. Therefore the ability to satisfy the expectations of both parties through the use of various mediation techniques and strategies is paramount. The more powerful the mediator is, the more resources it can employ to change the disputants‘ attitudes and perceptions. The literature also suggests that powerful mediators who use active strategies and enjoy a wide range of resources are more effective at managing intense conflicts, whereas mediators with lower profile who offer more passive engagement and have limited access to resources can do better at managing less intractable conflicts (Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006). Whilst some see the use of manipulative strategies as sitting outside the spectrum of mediation (Kydd, 2006; Skjelsbaek, 1991), in reality the use of deprivation or gratification strategies is accepted and even expected by the disputants, especially when the third party is a major power with an interest in the conflict. Moreover, even manipulative mediators often engage with some sort of consultation and facilitation, and as such their activities should be viewed across a wide spectrum of options rather than dichotomously (Schrodt and Gerner, 2004). Great powers can be particularly effective in mediating conflicts, as they are ‗uniquely positioned to manipulate the bargaining range in a way that ensures both disputants can be reasonably satisfied with the outcome‘ (Favretto, 2009: 259). On the other hand, Quinn and his colleagues find that power as an independent variable has little effect on the successful outcome of mediated crises, but rather acts indirectly through the identity and status of the mediator (Quinn et. al., 2006). In any case, as mediation is a voluntary and non-violent process, the use of force by such powers – for example by joining sides with one of the disputants as means to bring about a settlement – needs then to be analysed as a more coercive form of third party intervention. While the advantages
20 of a powerful mediator who maintains leverage in the disputed issue are evident, this is not to suggest that less powerful mediators cannot be successful. Power is essential only to powerful mediators; less powerful mediators such as individuals or NGOs cannot offer the disputants material incentives or to deprive them of certain resources, but their perceived impartiality on the disputed issue is the decisive factor that makes them acceptable to the disputants.
In considering the power of the mediator, we assess how much leverage over the disputants the mediator had coming into the process. In cases where mediators are principally associated with a particular national government then it is likely that the mediator may have more power over one disputant and not the other, for example. Our variable seeks to examine the extent to which this discrepancy is important. Accordingly, we distinguish mediators in terms of possessing power over all disputants, over Israel only, over Arab disputants only or over none of the disputants.
Hypothesis B1: Mediations where the mediator has leverage over all the disputants are more likely to be successful than those where the mediator has leverage over some of the disputants or none of the disputants
Impartiality is perhaps the most contentious aspect of mediation. In essence impartiality (or bias) is a matter of perception, rather than reality. Whereas some studies argue that mediation, by definition, requires the mediator to be impartial (Burton & Dukes, 1990; Skjelsbaek, 1991), others maintain that impartiality is not a necessary prerequisite for successful mediation and in some cases can even get in the way (Touval, 1982; Bercovitch, 1986; Princen, 1992; Savun, 2008). Smith and Stam (2003) find that biased mediators (defined as biased towards war, peace, or one of the disputants) cannot relay information effectively to the warring parties and are not perceived as honest brokers,
21 whereas Kydd (2003) finds that biased mediators can perform this task effectively. Rauchhaus (2006), however, contends that both biased mediators and impartial mediators are expected to serve as effective mediators, though impartial mediators are expected to perform their task better. Whereas the vast majority of mediation studies tend to treat bias dichotomously – the mediator is either biased or not towards the conflict and/or the disputants, Savun (2008) makes the important distinction between a mediator‘s absolute and relative bias, the latter is derived from the mediator‘s relationship with one disputant in relative terms to its history or relations with the other disputant. In our study we go one step further and treat bias as a continuous variable, as it is conceivable that on some issues the mediator‘s attitudes may change over time or indeed when multi-party mediation is involved, a more nuanced manifestation of bias collectively may be exhibited. As noted earlier, the mediator‘s tasks of eliciting information and exercising influence are often best achieved not when a mediator is impartial, but when it possesses certain resources that are valued by the disputants (Zartman and Touval, 1985). Perceived impartiality is thus more crucial in the cases of less powerful mediators. Their mandate to mediate rests upon the assumption – and expectation – that they will not favour one party during the process. Conversely, in cases where the mediator is more powerful, impartiality is not expected by the disputants; as Smith concludes, ‗the relevant characteristic for power mediators is their power, not their impartiality‘ (1994: 447).
To measure bias, we contend that a biased mediator is one who has closer ties with one party than the other and the greater the discrepancy in its relations with the parties, the greater the bias. We measure this variable using a scale of 0-100, with 100 being maximum discrepancy.
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Hypothesis B2: Mediations where the mediator has a perceived bias towards one of the disputants is more likely to be successful than those where the mediator is perceived to be unbiased towards all the disputants
Finally, the status of the mediator may have a considerable impact on the process and the chances of success. The status of the mediator includes important issues such as knowledge of the conflict and understanding of its political and historical roots; expertise in negotiation; the formal rank of the individual mediator in his or her home state or organisation; and the credibility which derives from these factors (Pruitt, 2002; Svensson, 2009). At least implicitly, mediator‘s high status is linked to issues of credibility and trust, and thus has bearing not only on the disputants‘ decision to accept the mediator in the first place, but also on their incentives to cooperate with the mediator (Kleiboer, 1996; Maoz and Terris 2006).
In terms of conceptualising status as an operational variable we can distinguish two key facets of status: experience and positional status rank. By experience, we mean the years of diplomatic experience a mediator has and the number of mediations a mediator has been involved in. In the AIC it is safe to assume that the office of the president of the United States garners the highest status rank irrespective of previous diplomatic experience or mediation expertise. For example Bill Clinton would receive a positional status rank score higher than that of Dennis Ross, his special envoy, even though Ross had considerably more experience in dealing with the Israelis and Palestinians. We will score status on a scale of 0 – 100, with 100 representing maximum status (US Presidents). For experience, we will use a composite measure comprising years of previous diplomatic experience and number of previous mediations.
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Hypothesis B3a: Mediations where the mediator has a high status rank are more likely to be successful than those where the mediator has a lower status rank Hypothesis B3b: Mediations where the mediator/ mediation team has a high level experience are more likely to be successful than those where the mediator/
mediation team has limited experience
iii.Procedural variables
What strategies are available to the mediator? Should the objectives of mediation be limited to specific issues which are relatively easy to negotiate, or be ambitious and comprehensive in order to tackle the root causes of the conflict? Can we expect secret negotiations to be more effective than a process conducted in front of the watchful eyes of the public and the media? Evidently these are important issues, and scholars of mediation are split over the significance of these variables to a successful outcome.
The choice of mediation strategies/tactics is linked to the mediator‘s resources, and thus powerful mediators enjoy a wider arsenal of strategies and tactics than weak mediators. Carnevale‘s (2002) distinction between strategic and tactical strength in mediation is useful here. The first refers to the ‗social power that relates to the resources and relationships that the mediator brings to the conflict‘ (p. 28), whereas the latter ‗refers to what the mediator does at the negotiating table; this involves adroit manoeuvring, technique, and procedure. (2002, p. 30). We argue that a mediator who is more strategically equipped will also have more tactical manoeuvrability at the negotiation table. The literature on mediation offers several typologies of mediation strategies which in essence offer similar insights into the strategic choices mediators face at various stages of the process. Perhaps the most widely used typology is the one offered by Zartman and Touval (1985), who suggest three discrete strategies of mediation: a)
24 communication-facilitation, b) formulation, c) manipulation. As the mediator offers the parties something they cannot achieve themselves, each strategy aims to overcome a particular obstacle during the mediation process. Communication strategies are comparatively passive and procedural in nature, such as the opening of channels of communication and carrying messages. Formulation strategies invite a more active role for the mediator in putting forward its own ideas and drafting parameters for reference. Lastly, the manipulative mediator may change the bargaining process by offering or denying the disputants certain incentives. However the risk here is that by its sheer power to push the disputants towards a settlement, the mediator becomes a party to the solution, or even to the conflict itself. As Kleiboer correctly observes, the distinction between communicator and formulator is more notional than real, as these roles may overlap (1996: 375). Beardsley et al (2006) find that the use of a manipulative strategy by the mediator is more likely to result in a formal agreement, and we build on this assumption to develop three hypotheses. First, we assign (approximate) percentages to the three strategies (communicative, formulative and manipulative) for each of the particular mediation events, to see if a dominant strategy (or the absence of a particular strategy) is significant. This latter point indicates that not all three strategies will necessarily be used at every mediation event. Second, in what we term the chess test, we propose that the opening strategy of the mediator might have a significant effect on the outcome. Finally, it is likely that mediators alternate between strategies throughout the mediation process, and we suggest that this may have an impact on the outcome.
Hypothesis C1a: Mediations which involve a manipulative strategy are more likely to be successful than those where other strategies are used
25
Hypothesis C1b: The opening mediation strategy will be significant as to the likelihood of achieving success
Hypothesis C1c: The sequence of strategies employed by the mediator will be significant as to the likelihood of achieving success
Choosing a mediation strategy is often determined by the objectives of the mediation process. According to Bercovitch (2002) the three underlying objectives of the mediator include the changing of the physical environment, the changing of perceptions on both sides of what is at stake, and the changing of the disputants‘ motivation to reach a settlement. The first two are closely associated with communicative/formulative strategies of mediation, as these objectives entail issues such as secrecy, agenda setting, redefinition of issues, etc. However in order to change disputants‘ motivation, the mediator must have the capacity and willpower to actively manipulate the disputants and to restructure the dynamics of the bargaining process. In practical terms, the mediator may opt for a comprehensive settlement, or pursue a more limited objective upon initiating the mediation process. Although both types of strategies can be applied to achieve either comprehensive or limited objectives, it is not readily evident whether limited objectives, for example, are best achieved when communicative/formulative strategies are used, or whether manipulative strategies are more effective in this instance. In their study of mediation in the Middle East, Stein and Lewis suggest that ‗comprehensive approaches to mediating this conflict have ultimately failed‘ (1996: 471). A comprehensive approach is understood here as the attempt to bring about a lasting peace treaty which officially ends the state of hostility between Israel and the Arab world, whereas a limited approach may either be of a more gradualist nature (‗step-by-step‘) or concentrate on a specific issue (water, redeployment of forces, etc).
26
Hypothesis C2: Mediations where the objectives are limited are more likely to be successful than those where the objectives are comprehensive.
Finally, the complex nature of the mediation process and the disputants‘ desire to save face may call for secrecy, or ‗sidebar‘ negotiations (Rubin, Pruitt and Kim 1994:
188-189). Secret or private negotiations offer the mediator and the disputants greater manoeuvrability and in the event of failure, the option of deniability. However this is not to suggest that secret negotiations are necessarily more effective than public ones. According to Zartman and Berman, the answer is somewhere in the middle: ―‘Too great‘ publicity for the negotiations is inefficient, for it draws negotiators to the windows to address the public rather than each other, and makes for inflexible positions‖, whereas ―‘too little‘ publicity is considered undemocratic, may lead to shady deals, and in the end is probably inefficient too, since at some point in the process of ratification the press and other media will comment on the agreement and bring it under scrutiny‖ (1982: 215- 216). The unavoidable conclusion, then, is that ‘the argument in favour of secrecy in negotiation is right, even if that does not make the argument in favour of informing the public wrong‘ (1982: 217).
Hypothesis C3: Mediations where the process is secret are more likely to be successful than those which are public knowledge.
Findings and analysis
An inspection of the Pearson correlations in Table 1 reveals that six variables have a correlation with mediation outcome ranging from strong in strength (significant at the 0.01 level) to modest in strength (significant at the 0.10 level). In order, beginning with the strongest correlation these are: C1 Manipulation Strategy; A1 Forces redeployment;
27 B3 Main Mediator Status; C2 Objectives of mediation; B1 Mediator Power coming into the mediation; and C1 Opening Strategy.
Table 1: Correlation Analysis of Mediation Outcome
Dependent Variable: Mediation Outcome A: Contextual Factors Pearson’s
R B: Interpersonal Factors Pearson’s R C: Procedural Factors Pearson’s R A1 Territory 0.060 B1 Mediator Power coming in 0.355* C1 Strategy Communication -0.011 A1 refugees -0.063 B2 Mediator Bias -0.022 C1 Strategy
Formulation
-0.274 A1 Holy Sites -0.113 B3 Main
Mediator Status
0.405** C1 Strategy Manipulation
0.566*** A1 water -0.004 B3 Experience 0.073 C1 Opening
Strategy
-0.352* A1 ceasefire 0.148 B3 Mediations 0.316 C1 Strategy
Sequence
-.221 A1 Forces
re-deployment
0.531*** B3 days mediating -0.009 C2 Objectives of Mediation
0.404* A1 settlements 0.138 B3 Team Status 0.305 C3 Visibility -0.259 A1 complex-history
average
0.283 A2 Balance of power -0.233 A3 Timing -0.163
* Significant at a .10 level; ** Significant at a .05 level; *** Significant at a .01 level
Pictorially, we can see a fairly tight fit between the mediation outcome, strategy of manipulation and main mediator status in Chart 1 and again a reasonably tight fit between mediation outcome and objectives of mediation in Chart 2. It appears, therefore, that there is initial support for at least one hypothesis in each of our categories. In the contextual category there is initial support for Hypothesis A1 (nature of the conflict), as it is abundantly clear that none of the ‗core‘ issues of the AIC is, statistically speaking, positively associated with successful mediation outcomes. In the mediator‘s capacity category there is initial support for Hypothesis B1 (mediator power coming into the mediation) and B3a (status rank of the main mediator). In the procedural category there is
28 initial support for C1a (mediator employment of a manipulative strategy), C1b (opening strategy) and C2 (limited objectives for the mediation event).
29 We begin our OLS regression analysis by testing all six of our statistically significant factors identified above. We find that the two most significant independent variables in our correlation analysis – strategy of manipulation and forces redeployment - remain the most important variables within the multiple regression analysis, and are joined by the variable C2 Objectives of mediation. The multiple regression model comprising these three variables (Regression Model 1, see Table 2) is statistically significant. The value of adjusted R² in this model is 0.459, which tells us that the overall model accounts for 45.9 per cent of the variation in mediation outcome. The model‘s F-ratio is 7.501, which is significant at p < 0.001. The F-ratio is a measure of how much our model has improved the prediction of the outcome compared to the level of inaccuracy in the model. If a model is good, then we expect the improvement in the prediction to be large and the difference between the model and the observed data to be small. A good model should have a large F-ratio (greater than one at least). Our result tells us that there is less than a 0.1% chance that an F-ratio this large would happen by chance alone. Therefore, we can conclude that the regression model results in a significantly better prediction of mediation outcome than if we used the mean value of mediation outcome. Succinctly, the overall regression model predicts outcome of mediation significantly well.
The Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) tells us whether the overall model is a good predictor of the dependent variable, but cannot tell us about the individual contribution of independent variables in the model. For this we turn to the standardised Beta scores in Table 3. An examination of the Beta scores reveals that C1 Strategy of Manipulation is the most significant individual independent variable (standardised beta score 0.411**). This confirms Hypothesis C1a which contends that mediations which involve a
30 manipulative strategy are more likely to be successful than those where other strategies are used.
Second in terms of individual statistical significance is A1 Forces re-deployment. The presence of this issue, but not any of the AIC core issues – Jerusalem, borders, settlements and refugees – gives support to the claim that greater success in mediation is more likely when the parties are dealing with issues perceived as being ‗softer‘. The issue of forces redeployment is present in every single successful mediation outcome ranked here as a mediation outcome 4 or mediation outcome 5. Finally, C2 Objectives of mediation is statistically significant. Greater success in terms of mediation outcome is clearly linked with limited objectives, which supports Hypothesis C2.
Table 2: Regression Model 1
Dependent Variable: Mediation Outcome Beta (Standardised) t-scores
(Constant) (-0.430) C1 Strategy of Manipulation 0.411** 2.532 A1 Forces re-deployment 0.345** 2.104 C2 Objectives of Mediation 0.291* 1.863 Adjusted R square 0.459 Number of cases 24
* Significant at a .10 level; ** Significant at a .05 level; *** Significant at a .01 level
From this we are now in position to formulate the least squares regression model in terms of an equation. The equation is derived whereby each independent variable has its own co-efficient, and the dependent variable has its own co-efficient. The dependent variable is then predicted from a combination of all the variables multiplied by their respective coefficients plus a residual term, where Y is the dependent variable, β1 is the coefficient
31 of the first independent variable (X1), β2 is the coefficient of the of the second independent variable (X2), βn is the coefficient of the of the nth independent variable (Xn) and εi is the difference between the predicted and observed value of Y for the ith subject.
Y = β0 +
β
1X1 +β
2X2 +....+β
nXn+
ε
iTable 2 indicates that the constant (β0) is -0.430, which is the Y intercept. Therefore our equation for the regression model is:
Mediation Outcome = -0.430 + 2.532 Manipulation + 2.104 A1Forces +1.863 C2Objectives +
ε
iSo, to summarise, Regression model 1 is a statistically significant predictor of mediation outcome from which three independent variables – C1 Strategy of Manipulation, A1 Forces Re-deployment and C2 Objectives of Mediation – are shown to be statistically significant independent predictors of mediation outcome. This allows us to claim that the following hypotheses are supported by the regression model:
Hypothesis A1: Mediations that address the core issues of the AIC (Jerusalem, security/borders, refugees and settlements) are less likely to be successful than those addressing issues perceived as ‘softer’ by the parties
Hypothesis C1a: Mediations which involve a manipulative strategy are more likely to be successful than those where other strategies are used.
Hypothesis C2: Mediations where the objectives are limited are more likely to be successful than those where the objectives are comprehensive.
Perhaps the one slightly surprising result of the multiple regression analysis is the non-significance of B3 Main Mediator Status, when the initial correlation results indicated statistical significance at the 0.05 level. Undoubtedly, this is due to the issue of
32 multicollinearity, which increases the probability that a good predictor of the dependent variable is found to be non-significant and rejected from the model (a type II error). As is indicated by Chart 2, C1 Strategy of Manipulation is strongly correlated with B3 Main Mediator Status (r =0.595***).
It is likely that the variance accounted for by main mediator status is, to a considerable degree, the same variance that is accounted for by manipulative strategy. This is a logical deduction, given that it is clear from Chart 2 that in all cases where a strategy of manipulation is employed the status of the main mediator is ranked at a minimum of 50 per cent, and in all but one of those cases the main mediator status is ranked at a minimum of 75 per cent. It is clear, too, that causation in this case is one-way. That is to say, it is high status ranking mediators who possess the capacity to employ a manipulative strategy when they deem necessary; it is not the strategy of manipulation
33 that results in mediators having a high status rank. In all seven cases where we have ranked mediation outcome as 4 or 5, a strategy of manipulation has been used.
We thus run a second Regression model where we create a composite variable comprising B3 Main Mediator Status and C1 Strategy of Manipulation to capture the fact that the higher the status rank of the mediator the greater the probability they will employ a manipulative strategy. We call this new variable StatusManipulation. Correlation analysis indicates that there is a statistical association with our dependent variable Mediation Outcome, significant at the 0.01 level (r = 0.548***).
When running an OLS regression analysis using the other statistically significant factors identified in Regression Model 1, we find that Regression Model 2 is statistically significant. The value of adjusted R² is 0.439, meaning that the overall model accounts for 43.9 per cent of the variation in mediation outcome. The model‘s F-ratio is 6.994, which is significant at p < 0.001. So once again we can conclude that Regression Model 2 results in a significantly better prediction of mediation outcome than if we used the mean value of mediation outcome. An examination of the Beta scores in Table 4 reveals that
StatusManipulation is the most significant individual independent variable (standardised beta score 0.383**). This indicates that the higher positional status rank of the main mediator the higher the likelihood they will employ a strategy of manipulation and the greater the probability of a successful mediation outcome resulting in a formal agreement. Second in terms of individual importance is A1Forces (0.360**), again confirming support for hypothesis A1. Finally, C2Objectivies of Mediation remains statistically significant (0.318*). Greater success in terms of mediation outcome remains
34 clearly linked with limited objectives, which again confirms support for Hypothesis C2. The regression equation is as follows:
Mediation Outcome = -0.598 + 2.338 StatusManipulation + 2.167 A1Forces + 1.998 C2Objectives +
ε
iWhilst this second regression model is of interest and is a statistically significant predictor of the outcome of mediation it is not a strong a predictor of mediation outcome as Regression Model 1, and explains less of the variance of mediation outcome than Regression Model 1.
Table 3: Regression model 2
Dependent Variable: Mediation Outcome
Beta (Standardised) t-scores
(Constant) (-0.598) Status Manipulation 0.382** 2.338 A1 Forces 0.360** 2.167 C2 Objectives of Mediation 0.318* 1.998 Adjusted R square 0.439 Number of cases 24
* Significant at a .10 level; ** Significant at a .05 level; *** Significant at a .01 level
Conclusion
The most important finding from our bivariate correlation analysis and the various multiple regression models is that successful mediation outcomes are more probable when mediators are able to employ a strategy of manipulation, thus supporting the findings in previous studies (Beardsley et. al. 2006). Our claim that a strategy of
35 manipulation is more likely to be employed if the main mediator is of higher status rank is also borne out by the statistical analysis. More pertinently to current efforts at mediating Israeli-Palestinian peace, we found significant support for the claim that mediations addressing the core issues of the conflict (Jerusalem, borders, refugees and settlements) are less likely to be successful than those addressing issues perceived as ‗softer‘ by the parties. Similarly, our finding that mediation success is evidently associated with limited objectives can provide important contextualisation to recent (failed) efforts at ending the conflict via comprehensive plans, such as the 2002 Arab League initiative.
These important findings notwithstanding, there remains the caveat that due to the relatively small number of cases that exist in this conflict, identifying potential explanatory variables must be regarded as provisional. However given the empirical validity of some of our hypotheses in the face of the idiosyncratic nature of mediation over six decades of conflict between several actors and numerous mediators, we nevertheless maintain that the use of quantitative methodology to explain social interaction offers important insight which is rarely observable in single-case study analysis or purely historical studies.
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