DELEGATION OF POWERS TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS vs. THE BOARD OF PUBLIC
UTILITY COMMISSIONERS G.R. No. L-11216 March 6, 1916 Facts:
COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Spain and engaged in business in the Philippine Islands as a common carrier of passengers and merchandise by water: On June 7, 1915, the Board of Public Utility Commissioners issued and caused to be served an order to show cause why they should not be required to present detailed annual reports respecting its finances and operations respecting the vessels owned and operated by it, in the form and containing the matters indicated by the model attached to the petition.
They are ordered to present annually on or before March first of each year a detailed report of finances and operations of such vessels as are operated by it as a common carrier within the Philippine Islands, in the form and containing the matters indicated in the model of annual report which accompanied the order to show cause herein.
COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS denied the authority of the board to require the report asked for on the ground that the provision of Act No. 2307 relied on by said board as authority for such requirement was, if construed as conferring such power, invalid as constituting an unlawful attempt on the part of the Legislature to delegate legislative power to the board. It is cumbersome and unnecessarily prolix and that the preparation of the same
would entail an immense amount of clerical work."
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is constitutional to require COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS to pass a detailed report to the Board of Public Utility Commissioners of the Philippine Islands?
Whether the power to require the detailed report is strictly legislative, or administrative, or merely relates to the execution of the law?
HELD:
The order appealed from is set aside and the cause is returned to the Board of Public Utility Commissioners with instructions to dismiss the proceeding. RULING:
The section of Act No. 2307 under which the Board of Public Utility Commissioners relies for its authority, so far as pertinent to the case at hand, reads as follows:
Sec. 16. The Board shall have power, after hearing, upon notice, by order in writing, to require every public utility as herein defined: (e) To furnish annually a detailed report of finances and operations, in such form and containing such matters as the Board may from time to time by order prescribe.
The statute which authorizes a Board of Public Utility Commissioners to require detailed reports from public utilities, leaving the nature of the report, the contents thereof, the general lines which it shall follow, the principle upon which it shall proceed, indeed, all other matters whatsoever, to the exclusive discretion of the board, is not expressing its own will or the will of the State with respect to the public utilities to which it refers.
Such a provision does not declare, or set out, or indicate what information the State requires, what is valuable to it, what it needs in order to impose correct and just taxation, supervision or control, or the facts which the State must have in order to deal justly and equitably with such public utilities and to require them to deal justly and equitably with the State. The Legislature seems simply to have authorized the Board of Public Utility Commissioners to require what information the board wants. It would seem that the Legislature, by the provision in question, delegated to the Board of Public Utility Commissioners all of its powers over a given subject-matter in a manner almost absolute, and without laying down a rule or even making a suggestion by which that power is to be directed, guided or applied.
The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. The Supreme Court held that there was no delegation of legislative power, it said:
The Congress may not delegate its purely legislative powers to a commission, but, having laid down the general rules of action under which a commission shall proceed, it may require of that commission the application of such rules to particular situations and the investigation of facts, with a view to making orders in a particular matter within the rules laid down by the Congress.
In section 20 (of the Commerce Act), Congress has authorized the commission to require annual reports. The act itself prescribes in detail what those reports shall contain. In other words, Congress
has laid down general rules for the guidance of the Commission, leaving to it merely the carrying out of details in the exercise of the power so conferred. This, we think, is not a delegation of legislative authority.
In the case at bar the provision complained of does not law "down the general rules of action under which the commission shall proceed." nor does it itself prescribe in detail what those reports shall contain. Practically everything is left to the judgment and discretion of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners, which is unrestrained as to when it shall act, why it shall act, how it shall act, to what extent it shall act, or what it shall act upon.
The Legislature, by the provision in question, has abdicated its powers and functions in favor of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners with respect to the matters therein referred to, and that such Act is in violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. The Legislature, by the provision referred to, has not asked for the information which the State wants but has authorized and board to obtain the information which the board wants.
US vs Tang Ho (1922) G.R. 17122 Facts:
At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose".
Section 3 defines what shall constitute a monopoly or hoarding of palay, rice or corn within the meaning of this Act, but does not specify the price of rice or define any basic for fixing the price.
August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be sold. Then, on August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the sale of rice at an excessive price. Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced.
The official records show that the Act was to take effect on its approval; that it was approved July 30, 1919; that the Governor-General issued his proclamation on the 1st of August, 1919; and that the law was first published on the 13th of August, 1919; and that the proclamation itself was first published on the 20th of August, 1919.
Issue:
WON the delegation of legislative power to the Governor General was valid.
Held:
By the Organic Law, all Legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the Governor-General, or anyone else. The Legislature cannot delegate the legislative power to enact any law.
The case of the United States Supreme Court, supra dealt with rules and regulations which were promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture for Government land in the forest reserve. These decisions hold that the legislative only can enact a law, and that it cannot delegate it legislative authority.
The line of cleavage between what is and what is not a delegation of legislative
power is pointed out and clearly defined. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin says:
That no part of the legislative power can be delegated by the legislature to any other department of the government, executive or judicial, is a fundamental principle in constitutional law, essential to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government established by the constitution.
Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is complete in and of itself, it may be provided that it shall become operative only upon some certain act or event, or, in like manner, that its operation shall be suspended.
The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action to depend. It must be conceded that, after the passage of act No. 2868, and before any rules and regulations were promulgated by the Governor-General, a dealer in rice could sell it at any price, even at a peso per "ganta," and that he would not commit a crime, because there would be no law fixing the price of rice, and the sale of it at any price would not be a crime. That is to say, in the absence of a proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice at any price. Hence, it must follow that, if the defendant committed a crime, it was because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. There was no act of the Legislature making it a crime to sell rice at any price, and without the proclamation, the sale of it at any price was to a crime.
When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was
no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what was not "any cause" for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not "an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn," and under certain undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define what was "any cause," or what was "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn," Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. The act or proclamation does not say anything about the different grades or qualities of rice, and the defendant is charged with the sale "of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive order No. 53."
We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorized the Governor-General in his discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void.
ALEGRE v. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS FACTS:
Petitioner is engaged in the production of abaca and its exportation to foreign markets. He applied to the respondent
for a permit to export one hundred bales of abaca to England, but was denied. He was advised by the respondent that he would not be permitted to export the abaca in question without a certificate from the Fiber Standardization Board. So he filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the provisions of the Administrative Code for the grading, inspection and certification of fibers, in particular, sections 1772 and 1244 of that Code, are unconstitutional and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the authority vested in the Fiber Standardization Board is a delegation of legislative power.
HELD: NO.
The Legislature has enacted a law which provides for the inspection, grading and baling of hemp before they can be exported to other countries and the creation of a board for that purpose, vesting it with the power and authority to do the actual work.
Such authority is not a delegation of legislative power and is nothing more than a delegation of administrative power in the Fiber Board to carry out the purpose and intent of the law. In the very nature of things, the Legislature could not inspect, grade and bale the hemp, and from necessity, the power to do that would have to be vested in a board or commission.
The petitioner's contention would leave the law, which provides for the inspection, grading and baling of hemp, without any means of its enforcement. If the law cannot be enforced by such a board or commission, how and by whom could it be enforced? The criticism that there is partiality or even fraud in the
administration of the law is not an argument against its constitutionality.
PEOPLE v. VERA
Calalang vs. Williams [GR 47800, 2 December 1940] Facts:
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of 17 July 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on 18 July 1940, recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act 548, which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads. On 2 August 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street. On 10 August 1940, the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as indicated, for a period of 1 year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted. Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before the Supreme court the petition for a writ of prohibition against A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila
Issues:
Whether or not there is a undue delegation of legislative power?
Ruling:
There is no undue deleagation of legislative power. Commonwealth Act 548 does not confer legislative powers to the Director of Public Works. The authority conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, “to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines” and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic “whenever the condition of the
road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest.”
The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated.
To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly.
It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.
CERVANTES v. AUDITOR GENERAL (G.R. No. L-4043, May 26, 1942) This is a petition to review a decision of Auditor General denying petitioner’s claim for quarters allowance as manager of the National Abaca and other Fibers Corp. (NAFCO).
ISSUES
1. Whether or not Executive Order No. 93 exercising control over Government Owned and Controlled Corporations (GOCC) implemented under R.A. No. 51 is valid or null and void.
2. Whether or not R.A. No. 51 authorizing presidential control over GOCCs is Constitutional.
FACTS
- Petitioner was general manager in 1949 of NAFCO with annual salary of P15,000.00
- NAFCO Board of Directors granted P400/mo. Quarters allowance to petitioner amounting to P1,650 for 1949.
- This allowance was disapproved by the Central Committee of the government enterprise council under Executive Order No. 93 upon recommendation by NAFCO auditor and concurred in by the Auditor general on two grounds
a) It violates the charter of NAFCO limiting manager’s salary to P15,000/year.
b) NAFCO is in precarious financial condition.
DECISION
1. R.A. No. 51 is constitutional. It is not illegal delegation of legislative power to the executive as argued by petitioner but a mandate for the President to streamline GOCC’s operation.
2. Executive Order 93 is valid because it was promulgated within the 1 year period given.
3. Petition for review DISMISSED with costs
PANGASINAN TRANS. CO. v. PUBLIC SERVICE COM
LOVINA v. MORENO
PELAEZ v. AUDITOR GENERAL
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Manila Electric Company v. Pasay Transportation Company, Inc., Facts:
The preliminary and basic question presented by the petition of the Manila Electric Company, requesting the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the Manila Electric Company and the compensation to be paid to the Manila Electric Company by such transportation companies, relates to the validity of section 11 of Act No. 1446 and to the legal right of the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to act on the petition. Act No. 1446 above referred to is entitled. "An Act granting a franchise to Charles M. Swift to construct, maintain, and operate an electric railway, and to construct, maintain, and operate an electric light, heat, and power system from a point in the City of Manila in an easterly direction to the town of Pasig, in the Province of Rizal." Opposition was entered to the petition by a number of public utility operators.
Issue:
Validity of SEC. 11 of ACT No. 1446? Held:
The law calls for arbitration which represents a method of the parties' own choice. A submission to arbitration is a contract. The parties to an arbitration agreement may not oust the courts of jurisdiction of the matters submitted to arbitration. These are familiar rules which find support in articles 1820 and 1821 of the Civil Code.
We can also perceive a distinction between a private contract for submission to arbitration and agreements to arbitrate falling within the terms of a statute enacted for such purpose and affecting others than the parties to a particular franchise. Here, however, whatever else may be said in
extenuation, it remains true that the decision of the board of arbitrators is made final, which if literally enforced would leave a public utility, not a party to the contract authorized by Act No. 1446, without recourse to the courts for a judicial determination of the question in dispute.
We run counter to this dilemma. Either the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, exercise judicial functions, or the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as board of arbitrators, exercise administrative or quasi judicial functions. The first case would appear not to fall within the jurisdiction granted the Supreme Court. Even conceding that it does, it would presuppose the right to bring the matter in dispute before the courts, for any other construction would tend to oust the courts of jurisdiction and render the award a nullity. But if this be the proper construction, we would then have the anomaly of a decision by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, taken therefrom to the courts and eventually coming before the Supreme Court, where the Supreme Court would review the decision of its members acting as arbitrators. taThe present petition also furnishes an apt illustration of another anomaly, for we find the Supreme Court as a court asked to determine if the members of the court may be constituted a board of arbitrators, which is not a court at all.l
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power in our government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic
Act. The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions.
The Organic Act provides that the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by law (sec. 26). When the Organic Act speaks of the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court, it could not only mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court acting as a court, and could hardly mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators. There is an important distinction between the Supreme Court as an entity and the members of the Supreme Court. A board of arbitrators is not a "court" in any proper sense of the term, and possesses none of the jurisdiction which the Organic Act contemplates shall be exercised by the Supreme Court. lawph
aw Confirming the decision to the basic question at issue, the Supreme Court holds that section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a democratic government constitutionally established, and that it would be improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act on the petition of the Manila Electric Company. As a result, the members of the Supreme Court decline to proceed further in the matter.
NOBLEJAS v. TEEHANKEE
PAZ M. GARCIA, vs. HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR.,
Facts:
Administrative complaint filed by one Paz M. Garcia against the Honorable Catalino Macaraig, Jr., formerly Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch VI. Respondent took his oath as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City on June 29, 1970. The court was a newly created CFI branch and it had to be organized from scratch. Under Section 190 of the Revised Administrative Code, space for his courtroom, other items and supplies must be furnished by the provincial government. The provincial officials of Laguna, however, informed the respondent that the province was not in a position to do so. Forces and circumstances beyond his control prevented him from discharging his judicial duties. When respondent realized that it would be sometime before he could actually preside over his court, he applied for an extended leave. Secretary of Justice, however, prevailed upon respondent to forego his leave and instead to assist him, without being extended a formal detail, whenever respondent was not busy attending to the needs of his court.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent should be charged for dishonesty, violation of his oath of office, gross incompetence, and violation of RA 296 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
Ruling:
Court is convinced that the complaint must be dismissed . Complainant's theory is that respondent collected or received salaries as judge when in fact he has never acted as such, since the date he took his oath up to the filing of the complaint. In the sense that respondent has not yet performed any judicial
function, it may be admitted that respondent has not really performed the duties of judge. What is lost sight of, however, is that after taking his oath and formally assuming this position as judge, respondent had a perfect right to earn the salary of a judge even in the extreme supposition that he did not perform any judicial function. In this case, government officials or officers in duty are bound to furnish him the necessary place and facilities for his court and the performance of his functions have failed to provide him therewith without any fault on his part.
Admittedly respondent has not prepared and submitted any of the reports of accomplishments and status of cases in his sala which are usually required of judges under existing laws as well as the corresponding circulars of the Department of Justice for the reason that He has not yet started performing any judicial functions. None of those laws and circulars apply to him for all of them contemplate judges who are actually holding trials and hearings and making decisions and others. On the other hand, respondent could not be blamed for taking his oath as he did, for he had a valid confirmed appointment in his favor. The line between what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the other great departments of the government must always be kept clear and jealously observed, least the principle of separation of powers on which our government rests by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded. It is of grave importance to the judiciary under our present constitutional scheme of government that no judge or even the lowest court in this Republic should place himself in a position where his actuations on matters submitted to him for action or resolution would be subject to review and prior approval and, worst still, reversal,
before they can have legal effect, by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or this Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to say, this Court feels very strongly that, it is best that this practice is discontinued.
Macariola v. Asuncion A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982 FACTS:
A complaint for partition was filed by plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 in CFI against Bernardita R. Macariola concerning the properties left by the deceased Francisco Reyes, their common father. A decision was rendered by respondent Judge Asuncion in said civil case awarding their share on the properties to both the plaintiffs and Macariola
The decision became and subsequently, a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which was approved by the latter notwithstanding the fact that the project of partition was not signed by the parties themselves but only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and defendant. However, both counsels of the respective parties assured that the Project of Partition, had been made after a conference and agreement of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 and Macariola approving the Project of Partition, and that both lawyers had represented to the court that they are given full authority to sign by themselves the Project of Partition.
One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184 or rather one-half thereof which according to the decision was the exclusive property of the deceased Francisco Reyes, was adjudicated in said project of partition to the plaintiffs Luz, Anacorita Ruperto, Adela, and Priscilla all surnamed Reyes in equal shares, and when the
project of partition was approved by the trial court, the adjudicatees caused Lot 1184 to be subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E inclusive.
Lot 1184-D was conveyed to Enriqueta D. Anota, a stenographer in Judge Asuncion's court, while Lot 1184-E was sold to Dr. Arcadio Galapon who was issued transfer certificate of title No. 2338. Thereafter, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife sold a portion of Lot 1184-E to Judge Asuncion and his wife, Victoria S. Asuncion, which particular portion was declared by the latter for taxation purposes.
Spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon then conveyed their respective shares and interest in Lot 1184-E to "The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. At the time of said sale the stockholders of the corporation were Dominador Arigpa Tan, Humilia Jalandoni Tan, Jaime Arigpa Tan, Judge Asuncion, and the latter's wife, Victoria S. Asuncion, with Judge Asuncion as the President and Mrs. Asuncion as the secretary.
Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed the instant complaint alleging four causes of action:
that respondent Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010 decided by him
that he likewise violated Article 14, paragraphs I and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Section 3, paragraph H, of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, by associating himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc., as a stockholder and a ranking officer while he was a judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte;
that respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum by closely fraternizing with a certain Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly advertised himself as a practising attorney when in truth and in fact his name does not appear in the Rolls of Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar; and
that there was a culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard for ethics by respondent Judge.
The case was referred to Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, for investigation, report and recommendation. After hearing, the said Investigating Justice submitted her report recommending that respondent Judge should be reprimanded or warned in connection with the first cause of action alleged in the complaint, and for the second cause of action, respondent should be warned in case of a finding that he is prohibited under the law to engage in business. On the third and fourth causes of action, Justice Palma recommended that respondent Judge be exonerated.
Complainant herein then instituted an action before the Court of First which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4234, seeking the annulment of the project of partition made pursuant to the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and the two orders issued by respondent Judge approving the same, as well as the partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances with damages. The action was dismissed. Hence, this petition
THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY REMINDED TO BE MORE DISCREET IN HIS PRIVATE AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES.
1. There is no merit in the contention of complainant Bernardita R. Macariola, under her first cause of action, that respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010.
In the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. For the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. o respondent judge purchased a portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final, not in litigation anymore.
o Furthermore, respondent judge did not buy the lot in directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased Lot 1184-E from the plaintiffs. o Civil Case No. 4234 is of no
moment. It can no longer alter, change or affect the aforesaid facts that the questioned sale to respondent Judge, now Court of Appeals Justice, was effected and consummated long after the finality of the aforesaid decision or orders.
Macariola contended that the sale of Lot 1184-E to Dr. Arcadio Galapon by Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes and Luz R. Bakunawa was only a mere scheme to conceal the illegal and unethical transfer of said lot to respondent Judge as a consideration for the approval of the project of partition.
o no evidence showing that Dr. Arcadio Galapon acted as a mere "dummy" of respondent in acquiring Lot 1184-E from the Reyeses.
Macariola contended that respondent Judge acted illegally in approving the project of partition although it was not signed by the parties.
o Respondent should have required the signature of the parties more particularly that of Mrs. Macariola on the project of partition submitted to him for approval; however, whatever error was committed by respondent in that respect was done in good faith as according to Judge Asuncion he was assured by Atty. Bonifacio Ramo, the counsel of record of Mrs. Macariola, That he was authorized by his client to submit said project of partition. While it is true that such written authority if there was any, was not presented by respondent in evidence, nor did Atty. Ramo appear to corroborate the statement of respondent, his affidavit being the only one that was presented, certain actuations of Mrs. Macariola lead this investigator to believe that she knew the contents of the project of partition and that she gave her conformity thereto.
While it is. true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his court, it was, however, improper for him to have acquired the same. He should be reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
2. Respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce when he associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, said corporation having been organized to engage in business.
Article 14 — The following cannot engage in commerce, either in person or by proxy, nor can they hold any office or have any direct, administrative, or financial intervention in commercial or industrial companies within the limits of the districts, provinces, or towns in which they discharge their duties:
1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and officials of the department of public prosecution in active service. This provision shall not be applicable to mayors, municipal judges, and municipal prosecuting attorneys nor to those who by chance are temporarily discharging the functions of judge or prosecuting attorney.
xxx xxx xxx
5. Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions may not engage in commerce in a determinate territory.
o The provision partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain public officers and employees, like justices and judges.
o Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation of the governmental organs of the State and define the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its. It may be recalled that political law embraces constitutional law, law of public corporations, administrative law including the law on public officers and elections. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it regulates the conduct of certain public officers and employees with respect to engaging in business: hence, political in essence.
o It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885, with some modifications made by the "Commission de Codificacion de las Provincias de Ultramar," which was extended to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of August 6, 1888, and took effect as law in this jurisdiction on December 1, 1888.
Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated
because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
o No enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and then to the Republic of the Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent.
Respondent Judge didn’t violated paragraph H, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. No showing that respondent
participated or intervened in his official capacity in the business or transactions of the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. The business of the corporation in which respondent participated has obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office
No provision in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions of the Philippines, nor is there an existing law expressly prohibiting members of the Judiciary from engaging or having interest in any lawful business.
We hold that the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil Service Rules promulgated
thereunder, particularly Section 12 of Rule XVIII, do not apply to the members of the Judiciary.
Under Section 67 Judiciary Act of 1948, the power to remove or dismiss judges was then vested in the President of the Philippines, not in the Commissioner of Civil Service, and only on two grounds, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency, and upon the recommendation of the Supreme Court, which alone is authorized, upon its own motion, or upon information of the Secretary (now Minister) of Justice to conduct the corresponding investigation. Clearly, the aforesaid section defines the grounds and prescribes the special procedure for the discipline of judges.
And under Sections 5, 6 and 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, only the Supreme Court can discipline judges of inferior courts as well as other personnel of the Judiciary.
3. The 3rd and 4th causes of action are
not related to the subject.
IN RE: RODULFO MANZANO
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES
A. RULE-MAKING POWER
PHILIPPINE LAWYERS VS AGRAVA G. R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959 This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer’s Association for prohibition and injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.
On May 27, 1957, respondent Agrava issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been holding similar examinations.
Petitioner contends that anyone has passed the bar exams and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law, has good standing, thus duly qualified to practice before the Patent Office, and therefore the act of requiring members of the Bar in good standing to take and pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to be allowed to practice before said office is a clear excess of his jurisdiction and violation of the law.
On the other hand, respondent claimed that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons desiring to practice or to do business before him to submit an examination, even if they are already members of the bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after the United States Patent Law; and of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases prescribes an examination similar to that which he had prescribed and scheduled.
(a) Attorney at law. — Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before any United States Court or the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States who fulfills the requirements and complied with the provisions of these rules may be
admitted to practice before the Patent Office and have his name entered on the register of attorneys.
(c) Requirement for registration. — No person will be admitted to practice and register unless he shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form supplied by the Commissioner and furnish all requested information and material; and shall establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good moral character and of good repute x x x In order that the Commissioner may determine whether a person x x x has the qualifications specified, satisfactory proof of good moral character and repute, x x x an examination which is held from time to time must be taken and passed. The Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself which provides: The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce may prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or other parties before his office, and may require of such persons, agents, or attorneys, before being recognized as representatives of applicants or other persons, that they shall show they are of good moral character and in good repute, are possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them to render to applicants or other persons valuable service, and are likewise to competent to advise and assist applicants or other persons in the presentation or prosecution of their applications or other business before the Office. x x x
Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the provisions of law just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations requiring that persons desiring to
practice before him should submit to and pass an examination. We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of comparison:
SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. — The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office.
Issue/s:
WHETHER OR NOT MEMBERS OF THE BAR SHOULD FIRST TAKE AND PASS AN EXAMINATION GIVEN BY THE PATENT OFFICE BEFORE HE COULD BE ALLOWED TO PRACTICE LAW IS THE SAID OFFICE. whether or not appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitute or is included in the practice of law.
WHETHER OR NOT DIRECTOR OF THE PATENT OFFICE IS AUTHORIZED TO CONDUCT AN EXAMINATION FOR PATENT ATTORNEYS IS CONTRARY TO LAW.
Decision:
The petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is hereby prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass the same before being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office.
Ratio Decidendi:
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice of law in the Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public
that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).
The practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases.
In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.
FRANCISCO PASCUAL v THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS G.R. No. L-10979 June 30,
1959 FACTS:
There are two cases (Seizure Identification Nos. 1899 and 1990) which were brought on appeal to the Supreme Court from the decisions of the respondent Commissioner of customs,
affirming the decisions of the Acting Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila which decreed the forfeiture of two shipments from Hong Kong to Manila, one with 42 and the other with 27 packages of foreign made candies, for illegal violations of Central Bank Circulars Nos. 44 and 45 in relation to section 1363 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code (forfeiture of prohibited merchandise) which requires a license from the Monetary Board or release certificates to be able to receive goods from any foreign country.
Appellant’s Contentions:
1. The imported goods do not involve dollar remittances or the sale of foreign exchange (as was contemplated in circular 44) and that Congress has not authorized the Central Bank to issue regulations governing imports that do not require the sale of foreign exchange, because according to him, it would not have enacted into law Republic Act No. 1410.
2. Circulars Nos. 44 and 45 were promulgated by the Monetary Board without the concurrence of at least five members and without the approval of the President
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sixty-nine (69) packages of candies in question are subject to forfeiture for violation of Central Bank Circulars Nos. 44 and 45 in relation to section 1363 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code (forfeiture of merchandise prohibited by law).
HELD:
The decision of the Commissioner of Customs decreeing the forfeiture of the candies is AFFIRMED. The importations, assumed to involve the sale of foreign exchange, were in violation of circulars
44 and 45 for failure to obtain the corresponding dollar allocation or foreign exchange license from the Central Bank as required by Circular No. 44 of said bank.
Section 74, Republic Act No. 265 authorized the Monetary Board, with the approval of the President, to temporarily suspend or restrict sales of exchange and to subject all transactions in gold and foreign exchange to license during an exchange crisis in order to protect the international reserve and to give the Monetary Board and the Government time in to take constructive measures to combat such a crisis. Circular No. 44, prohibiting the release by the Commissioner of Customs of any item of import without the presentation of a release certificate issued by the Central Bank or any authorized agent bank in a form prescribed by the Monetary Board, and Circular No. 45, requiring "any person or entity who intends to import or receive goods from any foreign country for which no foreign exchange is required or will be required of the banks, to apply for a license from the Monetary Board to authorize such import," are measures taken to check the unregulated flow of foreign exchange from the country and are within the powers of the Monetary Board.
Contention Number 1: The contention that The Monetary Board was not authorized by congress assumes that the importations do not require the sale of foreign exchange, a fact which appellant Francisco Pascual failed to establish. It is a recognized general mercantile practice that importations involve the sale of foreign exchange. This being so, importations that do not involve the sale of foreign exchange must be shown or proved. In default of such showing or proof as in fact the petitioner failed to prove in the instant case, it would be safe to assume that the importations in
question involve the sale of foreign exchange which is covered by Circular No. 44 of said bank (which are measures taken to check the unregulated flow of foreign exchange, the authority of which was conferred to the Monetary Board by Congress by virtue of Section 74, R.A. 265 (see above).
Contention Number 2: . is not supported by evidence. Circular Nos. 44 and 45 have been published in the Official Gazette. As such, presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed, the ordinary course of business followed, and the law complied with.
DOMINGO B. TEOXON vs. MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF
ADMINISTRATORS, PHILIPPINE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION FACTS:
The petitioner sustained physical injuries in line of duty as a former member of a recognized guerilla organization which participated actively in the resistance movement against the enemy, and as a result of which petitioner suffered a permanent, physical disability. For having been permanently incapacitated from work, he filed his claim for disablility pension with the Philippine Veterans Administration under the Veterans' Bill of Rights, Republic Act No. 65. However, respondents in turn would limit the amount of pension received by him in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by them.
Petitioner filed his suit for mandamus before the CFI of Manila alleging that he filed his claim for disability pension under the Veterans' Bill of Rights, Republic Act No. 65, for having been permanently incapacitated from work and that he was first awarded only P25.00 monthly, thereafter increased to P50.00 a month
contrary to the terms of the basic law as thereafter amended. 3 His claim,
therefore, was for a pension effective May 10, 1955 at the rate of P50.00 a month up to June 21, 1957 and at the rate of P100.00 a month, plus P10.00 a month, for each of his unmarried minor children below 18 years of age from June 22, 1957 up to June 30, 1963; and the difference of P50.00 a month, plus P10.00 a month for each of his four unmarried minor children below 18 years of age from July 1, 1963. He would likewise seek for the payment of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees.
Respondent, while admitting, with qualification, the facts as alleged in the petition, would rely primarily in its special and affirmative defenses, on petitioner not having exhausted its administrative remedies and his suit being in effect one against the government, which cannot prosper without its consent.
The CFI found for respondents. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
W.O.N. rules and regulations promulgated by administrative agencies can prevail over a statue.
HELD:
Petition is affirmed. CFI is reversed.
The Court cited the case of Begosa v. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, promulgated just a month before the case at bar, where it categorically held that a veteran suffering from permanent disability is not to be denied what has been granted him specifically by legislative enactment, which certainly is superior to any regulation that may be promulgated by the Philippine Veterans Administration,
presumably in the implementation thereof.
It added that the decision of the CFI where it held that “the respondent Board has authority under the Pension law to process applications for pension, using as guide the rules and regulations that it adopted under the law and their decisions, unless shown clearly to be in error or against the law or against the general policy of the Board, should be maintained" is clearly erroneous.
The Court also cited United States v. Tupasi Molina, which held that "Of course the regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they are valid." As well as its ruling in People v. Santos, wherein it held that an administrative order betrays inconsistency or repugnancy to the provisions of the Act, "the mandate of the Act must prevail and must be followed."
Finally, the Court said there must be strict compliance with the legislative enactment. Its terms must be followed. The statute requires adherence to, not departure from, its provisions. No deviation is allowable. In the terse language of the present Chief Justice, an administrative agency "cannot amend an act of Congress." Respondents can be sustained, therefore, only if it could be shown that the rules and regulations promulgated by them were in accordance with what the Veterans' Bill of Rights provides.
Benito Manuel vs. General Auditing Office
FACTS:
Petitioner Benito C. Manuel applied for retirement, effective December 31, 1967, according to law, 3 after having to his credit more than (20) years of service in the government, included in which were four successive terms as Mayor of Lingayen, Pangasinan from January 1, 1952 to December 31, 1967. Such application was approved on December 5, 1967. He had likewise sought the commutation of his vacation and sick leave, filing with the Municipal Treasurer of Lingayen, Pangasinan on December 22, 1967 a communication to that effect. In his memorandum filed with respondent General Auditing Office to which the matter was referred, he stressed that he was entitled to unused vacation and sick leave earned from May 31, 1957 (date of effectivity Republic Act No. 1616) to December 31, 1967, or a period of 10 years and 7 months, and since his highest salary was P600.00 a month, the total amount which should accrue to him is P6,000.00, (one month for every year). ISSUE:
Whether or not an elective official may be entitled in the event that he voluntarily retires or be separated from the service without fault on his part to the commutation of his vacation and sick leave
HELD:
1. It is expressly provided under Section 286 of the Revised Administrative Code that vacation and sick leave shall be cumulative, any part thereof not taken within the calendar year earned being carried over the succeeding years with the employee voluntarily retiring or being separated from the service without fault on his part, being entitled to the commutation of all such accumulated
vacation or sick leave to his credit provided that it shall in no case exceed ten (10) months.
"Officials and employees retired under this Act shall be entitled to the commutation of the unused vacation and sick leave, based on the highest rate received, which they have to their credit at the time of retirement."
2. Why then did respondent decide otherwise? It may have been due to a misreading of Section 2187 of the Revised Administrative Code. What must have misled respondent was a failure to take due note that this section deals solely with a situation when a municipal mayor is absent from his office because of illness. It does not cover therefore the specific case here presented of the right of the elective official to a commutation of his vacation and sick leave upon his retirement or separation from the service through no fault of his own. Moreover it must have felt justified in view of the endorsement of the Commission of the Civil Service, who applied Section 9 of Civil Service Rule XVI, included in which is the express injunction that the leave is not cumulative. Further reflection ought to have cautioned it that certainly this rule is far from being applicable as on its face it is based on the aforesaid Section 2187, which as noted is not in point. "The recognition of the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of the statute, necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment, may be found in the early case of United States v. Barrias decided in 1908. Then came, in a 1914 decision, United States v. Tupasi Molina, a delineation of the scope of such competence. Thus: 'Of course the regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole
purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions.
3. Nothing can be clearer therefore than that the claim of petitioner to a commutation of his vacation and sick leave not exceeding ten (10) months must be upheld, inasmuch as the facts show that the total amount sought to be paid to him was precisely in accordance with the controlled legal provisions. The ruling now on review must be versed and petitioner's plea granted.
WHEREFORE, the ruling of March 1, 1968 of respondent office refusing to allow in audit the claim of petitioner Benito C. Manuel for commutation of his leave earned as Mayor for the period January 1, 1952 to December 31, 1967 is reversed and the application of petition for such commutation granted. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Lupangco vs Court of Appeals Issue:
Can the Professional Regulation Commission lawfully prohibit the examiness from attending review classes, receiving handout materials, tips, or the like 3 days before the date of the examination?
Facts:
PRC issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examiness," to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy.
Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy, filed with the RTC a complaint for injunction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing
the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional.
Rule:
We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is "to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its constitutional infirmities. On its face, it can be readily seen that it is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like, or receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions. The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and every examinee during the three days before the examination period.
It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid.
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps
