G.R. Nos. L-21528 and L-21529 March 28, 1969 ROSAURO REYES, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
This case is before us on appeal by certiorari, from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that a the municipal court of Cavite City, convicting Rosauro Reyes of the crimes of grave threats and grave oral defamation, and sentencing him, in the first case (Criminal Case No. 2594), to four (4) months and ten (10) days of arresto mayor and to pay a fine of P300, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and in the second case (Criminal Case No. 2595), to an indeterminate penalty of from four (4) months of arresto mayor to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prison correccionaland to pay Agustin Hallare the sum of P800 as moral damages, with costs in both cases.
The petitioner herein, Rosauro Reyes, was a former civilian employee of the Navy Exchange, Sangley Point, Cavite City, whose services were terminated on May 6, 1961. In the afternoon of June 6, 1961, he led a group of about 20 to 30 persons in a
demonstration staged in front of the main gate of the United States Naval Station at Sangley Point. They carried placards bearing statements such as, "Agustin, mamatayka;" "To, alla boss con Nolan;" "Frank do not be a common funk;" "Agustin,
mamamataykarin"; "Agustin, Nolan for you;" "Agustin allabos con Nolan;" "Agustin, dillega, el dia di quidarinbochiquiting;" and others. The base commander, Capt. McAllister, called up Col. Patricia Monzon, who as Philippine Military Liaison Officer at Sangley Point was in charge of preserving harmonious relations between personnel of the naval station and the civilian population of Cavite City. Capt. McAllister requested Col. Monzon to join him at the main gate of the base to meet the demonstrators. Col. Monzon went to the place and talked to Rosauro Reyes and one Luis Buenaventura upon learning that the demonstration was not directed against the naval station but against Agustin Hallare and a certain Frank Nolan for their having allegedly caused the dismissal of Rosauro Reyes from the Navy Exchange, Col. Monzon suggested to them to
demonstrate in front of Hallare's residence, but they told him that they would like the people in the station to know how they felt about Hallare and Nolan. They assured him, however, that they did not intend to use violence, as "they just wanted to blow off steam."
At that time Agustin Hallare was in his office inside the naval station. When he learned about the demonstration he became apprehensive about his safety, so he sought Col. Monzon's protection. The colonel thereupon escorted Hallare, his brother, and another person in going out of the station, using his (Monzon's) car for the purpose. Once outside, Col. Monzon purpose slowed down to accommodate the request of Reyes. He told Hallare to take a good look at the demonstrators and at the placards they were carrying. When the demonstrators saw Hallare they shouted, "Mabuhay si Agustin." Then they boarded their jeeps and followed the car. One jeep overtook passed the car while
the other to led behind. After Hallare and his companions had alighted in front of his residence at 967 Burgos St., Cavite City, Col. Monzon sped away.
The three jeeps carrying the demonstrators parked in front of Hallare's residence after having gone by it twice Rosauro Reyes got off his jeep and posted himself at the gate, and with his right hand inside his pocket and his left holding the gate-door, he shouted repeatedly, "Agustin, putangina mo. Agustin, mawawalaka. Agustin lumabaska,
papatayinkita." Thereafter, he boarded his jeep and the motorcade left the premises. Meanwhile, Hallare, frightened by the demeanor of Reyes and the other demonstrators, stayed inside the house.lâwphi1.ñet
On the basis of the foregoing events Rosauro Reyes was charged on July 24 and 25, 1961 with grave threats and grave oral defamation, respectively (Criminal Cases Nos. 2594 and 2595, Municipal Court of Cavite City), as follows;
The undersigned City Fiscal of the City of Cavite accuses Rosauro Reyes of the crime of Grave Threats, as defined by Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized by paragraph 2 of the same Article, committed as follows:
That on or about June 6, 1961, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, orally threaten to kill, one Agustin Hallare.
Contrary to law.
Cavite City, July 24, 1961.
DEOGRACIAS S. SOLIS City Fiscal BY: (SGD.) BUEN N. GUTIERREZ Special Counsel The undersigned complainant, after being duly sworn to an oath in accordance with law, accuses Rosauro Reyes of the crime of Grave Oral Defamation, as defined and penalized by Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about June 6, 1961, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, without any justifiable motive but with the intention to cause dishonor, discredit and contempt to the undersigned complainant, in the presence of and within hearing of several persons, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
utter to the undersigned complainant the following insulting and serious
defamatory remarks, to wit: "AGUSIN, PUTANG INA MO". which if translated into English are as follows: "Agustin, Your mother is a whore."
Contrary to law.
Cavite City, July 25, 1961.
(SGD.) AGUSTIN HALLARE Complainant Subscribed and sworn to before me this. 25th day of July, 1961, in the City of Cavite, Philippines.
(SGD.) BUEN N. GUTIERREZ Special Counsel Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to both charges and the cases were set for joint trial. On the day of the hearing the prosecution moved to amend the
information in Criminal Case No. 2594 for grave threats by deleting therefrom the word "orally". The defense counsel objected to the motion on the ground that the accused had already been arraigned on the original information and that the amendment "would affect materially the interest of the accused." Nevertheless, the amendment was allowed and the joint trial proceeded.
From the judgment of conviction the accused appeal to the Court of Appeals, which returned a verdict of affirmance. A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the accused brought this appeal by certiorari.
Petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in affirming the proceedings in the lower court allowing the substantial amendment of the information for grave threats after petitioner had been arraigned on the original information; (2) in proceeding with the trial of the case of grave threats without first requiring petitioner to enter his plea on the amended information; (3) in convicting petitioner of both offenses when he could legally be convicted of only one offense, thereby putting him in jeopardy of being penalized twice for the same offense; (4) in convicting petitioner of grave threats when the evidence adduced and considered by the court tend to establish the offense of light threats only; and (5) in convicting petitioner of grave oral defamation when the evidence tend to establish that of simple slander only.
On the first error assigned, the rule is that after the accused has pleaded the information may be amended as to all matters of form by leave and at the discretion of the court when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant (Section 13,
Rule 110, New Rules of Court). Amendments that touch upon matters of substance cannot be permitted after the plea is entered.
After a careful consideration of the original information, we find that all the elements of the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 1 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized by its paragraph 2 were alleged therein namely: (1) that the offender
threatened another person with the infliction upon his person of a wrong; (2) that such wrong amounted to a crime; and (3) that the threat was not subject to a condition. Hence, petitioner could have been convicted thereunder. It is to be noted that under the aforementioned provision the particular manner in which the threat is made not a qualifying ingredient of the offense, such that the deletion of the word "orally" did not affect the nature and essence of the crime as charged originally. Neither did it change the basic theory of the prosecution that the accused threatened to kill Rosauro Reyes so as to require the petitioner to undergo any material change or modification in his
defense. Contrary to his claim, made with the concurrence of the Solicitor General, petitioner was not exposed after the amendment to the danger of conviction under paragraph 1 of Article 282, which provides for a different penalty, since there was no allegation in the amended information that the threat was made subject to a condition. In our view the deletion of the word "orally" was effected in order to make the
information conformable to the evidence to be presented during the trial. It was merely a formal amendment which in no way prejudiced petitioner's rights.
Petitioner next contends that even assuming that the amendment was properly allowed, the trial court committed a reversible error in proceeding with the trial on the merits without first requiring him to enter his plea to the amended information. Considering, however, that the amendment was not substantial, no second plea was necessary at all. The third and fourth issues are related and will be discussed together. Petitioner avers that the appellate court erred in affirming the decision of the trial court erred in affirming him of grave threats and of grave oral defamation when he could legally be convicted of only one offense, and in convicting him of grave threats at all when the evidence
adduced and considered by the court indicates the commission of light threats only. The demonstration led by petitioner Agustin Hallare in front of the main gate of the naval station; the fact that placards with threatening statements were carried by the
demonstrators; their persistence in trailing Hallare in a motorcade up to his residence; and the demonstration conducted in front thereof, culminating in repeated threats flung by petitioner in a loud voice, give rise to only one conclusion: that the threats were made "with the deliberate purpose of creating in the mind of the person threatened the belief that the threat would be carried into effect." 2 Indeed, Hallare became so apprehensive of his safety that he sought the protection of Col. Monzon, who had to escort him home, wherein he stayed while the demonstration was going on. It cannot be denied that the threats were made deliberately and not merely in a temporary fit of anger, motivated as they were by the dismissal of petitioner one month before the incident. We, therefore,
hold that the appellate court was correct in upholding petitioner's conviction for the offense of grave threats.
The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of the words, "Agustin, putanginamo". This is a common enough expression in the dialect that is often
employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother. In the instant case, it should be viewed as part of the threats voiced by appellant against Agustin Hallare, evidently to make the same more emphatic. In the case of Yebra, G.R. No. L-14348, Sept. 30, 1960, this Court said:
The letter containing the allegedly libelous remarks is more threatening than libelous and the intent to threaten is the principal aim and object to the letter. The libelous remarks contained in the letter, if so they be considered, are merely preparatory remarks culminating in the final threat. In other words, the libelous remarks express the beat of passion which engulfs the writer of the letter, which heat of passion in the latter part of the letter culminates into a threat. This is the more important and serious offense committed by the accused. Under the circumstances the Court believes, after the study of the whole letter, that the offense committed therein is clearly and principally that of threats and that the statements therein derogatory to the person named do not constitute an independent crime of libel, for which the writer maybe prosecuted separately from the threats and which should be considered as part of the more important offense of threats.
The foregoing ruling applies with equal force to the facts of the present case.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and petitioner is acquitted, with costs de oficio, insofar as Criminal Case No. 2595 of the Court a quo (for oral
defamation) is concerned; and affirmed with respect to Criminal Case No. 2594, for grave threats, with costs against petitioner.
G.R. No. L-62050 November 25, 1983 JOSE "PEPITO" TIMONER, petitioner, vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IV DIVISION, respondents.
Petition for review of the affirmance in totoby the Court of Appeals, now the Intermediate Appellate Court, of the judgment of conviction handed down by the then Municipal Court of Daet, CamarinesNorte, in Criminal Case No. 4281, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Jose Timoner, finding petitioner guilty of the crime of grave coercion, as follows: têñ. £îhqwâ£
WHEREFORE this Court finds the accused JOSE 'PEPITO' TIMONER guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Grave Coercion as penalized under Art. 286 in the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences the said accused pursuant to the provision of Rule 64, Par. 3, to suffer SIX MONTHS OF IMPRISONMENT OF ARRESTO MAYOR IN ITS MAXIMUM PERIOD, to pay a fine of P300.00 and to pay the offended party in the amount of P5,000.00 as damages, without subsidiary liability in case of insolvency. The other accused SAMUEL MORENA and ERNESTO QUIBRAL are hereby ordered ACQUITTED.
The salient facts are not disputed. At about 10:00 in the evening of December 13, 1971, petitioner, then Mayor of Daet, CamarinesNorte, accompanied by two uniformed
policemen, Samuel Morena and Ernesto Quibral, and six laborers, arrived in front of the stalls along Maharlika highway, the main thoroughfare of the same town. Upon orders of petitioner, these laborers proceeded to nail together rough lumber slabs to fence off the stalls which protruded into the sidewalk of the Maharlika highway. Among the structures thus barricaded were the barbershop of PascualDayaon, the complaining witness and the store belonging to one Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos. These establishments had been
recommended for closure by the Municipal Health Officer, Dra. Alegre, for non-compliance with certain health and sanitation requirements.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of CamarinesNorte against Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos and others for judicial abatement of their stalls. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 2257, alleged that these stalls constituted public nuisances as well as nuisances per se. Dayaon was never able to reopen his barbershop business.
Subsequently, petitioner and the two policemen, Morena and Quibral, were charged with the offense of grave coercion before the Municipal Court of Daet. As already noted, the said court exonerated the two policemen, but convicted petitioner of the crime charged as principal by inducement.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in full the judgment of the trial court. Hence, the present recourse.
Petitioner contends that the sealing off of complainant Dayaon's barbershop was done in abatement of a public nuisance and, therefore, under lawful authority.
We find merit in this contention. Unquestionably, the barbershop in question did
constitute a public nuisance as defined under Article Nos. 694 and 695 of the Civil Code, to wit: têñ.£îhqwâ£
ART. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which:
(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or (2) Annoys or offends the senses; or
(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or
(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or
(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.
ART. 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal A private nuisance is one that is not included in the foregoing definition.
The barbershop occupied a portion of the sidewalk of the poblacion's main thoroughfare and had been recommended for closure by the Municipal Health Officer. In fact, the Court of First Instance of CamarinesNorte, in its decision in Civil Case No. 2257, declared said barbershop as a nuisance per-se. Thus: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Under the facts of the case, as well as the law in point, there is no
semblance of any legality or right that exists in favor of the defendants to build a stall and conduct their business in a sidewalk, especially in a highway where it does not only constitute a menace to the health of the general public passing through the street and also of the unsanitary condition that is bred therein as well as the unsightly and ugly structures in the said place. Moreover, even if it is claimed and pretended that there was a license, permit or toleration of the defendants' makeshift store and living quarters for a number of years does not lend legality to an act which is a nuisance per se. Such nuisance affects the community or
neighborhood or any considerable number of persons and the general public which posed a danger to the people in general passing and using that place, for in addition, this is an annoyance to the public by the invasion of its rights — the fact that it is in a public place and annoying to all who come within its sphere [Baltazar vs. Carolina Midland, Ry, Co., 54 S.C. 242, 32 SB 258, cited in 11 Tolentino's Civil Code of the Philippines, p. 375; KapisananLingkodng Bayan, Inc. vs. Lacson, CA-G.R. No. 27260R, March 25, 1964; 61 O.G. 2487].
xxx xxxxxx
... IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby declares that the structures subject of this complaint as well as those occupied by the impleaded defendants are nuisances per se and therefore orders the defendants to demolish the stall and vacate the premises immediately ... But even without this judicial pronouncement, petitioner could not have been faulted for having fenced off said barbershop. Paragraph 3, Article 699 of the Civil Code authorizes the abatement of a public nuisance without judicial proceedings. têñ.£îhqwâ£
ART. 699. The remedies against a public nuisance are:
[l] A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance; or [2] A civil action; or
[3] Abatement, without judicial proceedings.
In the case at bar, petitioner, as mayor of the town, merely implemented the aforesaid recommendation of the Municipal Health Officer. Having then acted in good faith in the performance of his duty, petitioner incurred no criminal liability.
Grave coercion is committed when "a person who, without authority of law, shall by means of violence, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law or compel to do something against his will, either it be right or wrong." 1 The three
elements of grave coercion are: [1] that any person be prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his will, be it right or wrong; [2] that the prevention or compulsion be effected by violence, either by material force or such display of it as would produce intimidation and control the will of the offended party, and [3] that the person who restrained the will and liberty of another had no right to do so, or, in other words, that the restraint was not made under authority of law or in the exercise of a lawful right. 2
The third element being absent in the case at bar, petitioner cannot be held guilty of grave coercion.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 19534-CR, is hereby set aside and petitioner is acquitted of the crime charged. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët
FRANCIS LEE, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND PELAGIA PANLINO DE CHIN, respondents.
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 29, 1989 which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 129 at Caloocan City, Metro Manila, and
reinstated as well as affirmed in toto the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 2, same city. The RTC decision found the petitioner guilty of the crime of light coercion, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby modified. The accused Francis Lee is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of light coercion, as penalized under paragraph 2 of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code and he is hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of TWENTY (20) DAYS of ARRESTO MENOR and to pay one-third (1/3) of the costs. (p. 40, Rollo)
On the other hand, the MTC decision convicted the petitioner of the offense of grave coercion, the pertinent portion of the same is hereby quoted as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Francis Lee, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Grave Coercion, as charged, defined and penalized under Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, and is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of THREE (3) MONTHS, of arresto mayor, medium, and to pay a fine of P250.00, with cost.
The accused is further ordered to indemnify the offended party,
PelagiaPaulino de Chin, by way of civil liability the sum of P5,000.00 as moral damages and the sum of P2,000.00 as exemplary damages. ... (p. 33, Rollo)
The facts as stated by the respondent Court of Appeals are undisputed, thus:
At about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of June 20, 1984, the complainant Maria PelagiaPaulino de Chin, 23 years old, was fetched from her house at 112 BLISS Site, 8th Avenue, Caloocan City by AtanacioLumba, a bank employee, upon the instruction of the petitioner Branch Manager Francis Lee of Pacific Banking Corporation (hereinafter referred to as bank). Upon arriving at the office of Pacific Banking Corporation located at Caloocan City, petitioner Francis Lee did not attend to her immediately. After an hour later, the petitioner confronted the complainant about a forged
Midland National Bank Cashier Check No. 3526794, which the latter allegedly deposited in the account of HonorioCarpio. During the said confrontation, the petitioner Francis Lee was shouting at her with piercing looks and threatened to file charges against her unless and until she returned all the money equivalent of the subject cashier check.
Accordingly, the complainant was caused to sign a prepared withdrawal slip, and later, an affidavit prepared by the bank's lawyer, where she was made to admit that she had swindled the bank and had return the money equivalent of the spurious check. During her stay at the said bank, the complainant, who was five (5) months in the family way, was watched by the bank's employees and security guards. It was about six o'clock in the afternoon of the same day when the complainant was able to leave the bank premises.
Upon the other hand, the petitioner, 37 years old, presented his version, basically a denial of the charges, to wit: he was the Branch Bank Manager of Pacific Banking Corporation. After having been informed that Midland National Bank Cashier Check No. 3526794 was dishonored for being spurious, he examined the relevant bank records and discovered that complainant Maria PelagiaPaulino de Chin was instrumental in inducing their bank to accept the subject dollar check and was also the one who withdrew the proceeds thereof, by utilizing a withdrawal slip purportedly signed by HonorioCarpio. Petitioner, thru AtanacioLumba, invited the complainant to his office. Responding to his invitation, the complainant arrived at the bank before noon of June 20, 1984, but was not attended to immediately as the petitioner had to attend to other bank clients. The complainant was merely informed about the subject fake dollar check that was deposited with said bank upon her assurance that it was genuine. The complainant was not compelled into signing the withdrawal slip, but she acted freely and voluntarily in executing her affidavit and in returning the money equivalent of the subject check. There was nothing unusual during her lengthy stay in the bank. (pp. 44-45, Rollo)
The sole issue posed in this petition is whether or not the acts of petitioner in simply "shouting at the complainant with piercing looks" and "threats to file charges against her" are sufficient to convict him of the crime of grave coercion (p. 6, Rollo).
Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 286. Grave coercions. — The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, without authority of law, shall, by means of violence, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong.
If the coercion be committed for the purpose of compelling another to perform any religious act or to prevent him from so doing, the penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed.
Considering that the present case does not involve violence but intimidation, the provisions of Article 1335 of the New Civil Code on intimidation are relevant. It states:
Art. 1335. ...
There is intimidation when one of the contracting parties is compelled by a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon the person or property of his spouse,
descendants or ascendants, to give his consent.
To determine the degree of the intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person shall be borne in mind.
A threat to enforce once's claim through competent authority, if the claim is just or legal, does not vitiate consent.
As a general rule, the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals command utmost respect. However, such findings are disregarded if there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted that, if considered, would affect the result of the case (see San Sebastian College v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 84401, May 15, 1991). While the appellate court emphasized the pregnancy and feminine gender of the
complainant, it overlooked other significant personal circumstances which are material in determining the presence of coercion in this case.
The records show that complainant is a highly educated person who is familiar with banking procedures. She is a graduate of Business Administration major in Banking and Finance from NCBA. She also finished one semester of MA in graduate school. In 1983, complainant worked with the Insular Bank of Asia and America as a bank teller (TSN, November 20, 1984, pp. 5-7; Records, pp. 96-98).
Likewise, it appears that complainant actively participated in the deposit and withdrawal of the proceeds of the controversial check. We find that she told HonorioCarpio (Carpio, for short), a relative and payee of the check; to open a savings account with the Pacific Banking Corporation (Bank, for short) and accompanied him; that subsequently, she presented a Midland National Bank Cashier's check payable to Carpio in the sum of $5,200.00 to Mr.Lamberto R. Cruz (Cruz, for short), PRO Manager, Foreign Department; that she claimed that she was requested by her uncle to deposit the check for collection; that she was a bank depositor and she "knew somebody downstairs"; that she assured
Cruz that the check would be honored between banks (TSN, April 15, 1985, pp. 89-92; Records, 180-183); that on June 11, 1984, the bank, after the usual clearing period, sent out a notice to Carpio that the proceeds of the check were already credited to his
account but the same was returned to the bank because the address was false or not true; that the total amount of the check in pesos was P92,557.44; that the total deposit of Carpio was P92,607.44, his initial deposit of P50.00 being added to the amount of the check; that on the same day, complainant personally inquired from the bank whether the proceeds of the check have already been credited to Carpio's account (TSN, June 11, 1985, p. 163, records, p. 163); that upon an affirmative answer, the bank records show that on that day, the complainant withdrew the sum of P12,607.00 thru a withdrawal slip purportedly signed by Carpio; that in the interim, Carpio allegedly left abroad (Annex C, p. 17, Records); that on June 13, 1984, she withdrew the sum of P80,000.44 from
Carpio's account by means of a withdrawal slip allegedly signed by Carpio and then, she closed his account; that out of the said amount, she redeposited the sum of P50,000.00 to her own savings account and received in cash the remaining balance of P30,000.44; and on June 15 and 18, 1984, complainant withdrew the amounts of P2,000.00 and P18,000.00, respectively from her savings account (Exh. "3", Records, p. 15, in relation to TSN, October 8, 1985, pp. 194-195, Records, pp. 286-287).
In the light of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner's demand that the private respondent return the proceeds of the check accompanied by a threat to file criminal charges was not improper. There is nothing unlawful on the threat to sue. In the case of Berg v. National City Bank of New York (102 Phil. 309, 316), We ruled that:
... It is a practice followed not only by banks but even by individuals to demand payment of their accounts with the threat that upon failure to do so an action would be instituted in court. Such a threat is proper within the realm of the law as a means to enforce collection. Such a threat cannot constitute duress even if the claim proves to be unfounded so long as the creditor believes that it was his right to do so.
The Solicitor General argues that the complainant was intimidated and compelled into disclosing her time deposit, signing the typewritten withdrawal slip and the affidavit by the petitioner's threat to detain her at the bank.
At this point, there is a need to make a distinction between a case where a person gives his consent reluctantly and against his good sense and judgment and where he gives no consent at all, as where he acts against his will under a pressure he cannot resist. Thus, in Vales v. Villa (35 Phil. 769, 789), We ruled:
... It is clear that one acts as voluntarily and independently in the eye of the law when he acts reluctantly and with hesitation as when he acts spontaneously and joyously. Legally speaking he acts as voluntarily and freely when he acts wholly against his better sense and judgment as when he acts in conformity with them. Between the two acts there is no
difference in law. But when his sense, judgment, and his will rebel and he refuses absolutely to act as requested, but is nevertheless overcome by force or intimidation to such an extent that he becomes a mere automaton and acts mechanically only, a new element enters, namely, a
disappearance of the personality of the actor. He ceases to exist as an independent entity with faculties and judgment, and in his place is substituted another — the one exercising the force or making use of the intimidation. While his hand signs, the will which moves it is another's. While a contract is made, it has, in reality and in law, only one party to it; and, there being only one party, the one using the force or the
intimidation, it is unenforceable for lack of a second party. From these considerations it is clear that every case of alleged
intimidation must be examined to determine within which class it falls. If it is within the first class it is not duress in law, if it falls in the second, it is. The circumstances of this case reveal that the complainant, despite her protestations, indeed voluntarily, albeit reluctantly, consented to do all the aforesaid acts.
Bearing in mind her involvement in the deposit and encashment of the check, the
complainant admitted to being nervous upon being informed that the check was spurious (TSN, November 20, 1984, p. 15; Record, p. 106)
We find that complainant's lengthy stay at the bank was not due to the petitioner's threat. It was rather due to her desire to prove her innocence. Her testimony on this point is a revelation:
Atty. Dizon: (counsel for petitioner)
You are always talking of signing the withdrawal slip by force, is it not that earlier you admitted that no actual force was employed upon you in connection with the signing of this document and the force that you are claiming was the alleged shouting against you coupled with the statement that you could not leave?
A Yes, sir.
Q When Mr. Lee was requiring you to sign the withdrawal slip did it not occur to you to leave the bank?
Atty. Pangilinan:
The question has already been answered she said she cannot leave because she is being threatened.
Atty. Dizon:
That was during the time when she first met Mr. Lee. Court:
Witness may answer.
A When I was about to sign the withdrawal slip I inquired from him If I signed it I can leave already but he insisted that I should not leave, Sir.
Q When he told you that did it not occur to you to stand up and go out of the bank?
A No, Sir. Q Why?
A He was insisting that I return the amount I have withdrawn especially on June 18 when I withdrew P18,000.00, Sir.
COURT:
The question is why did you not leave and disregarded him? A Because I cannot just leave him that way, Your Honor. Atty. Dizon:
Why? What was the reason that you cannot leave him? A Because he is insisting that the responsibility of one person be my responsibility and at that time I was feeling nervous and he did not tell me to stand up and leave, Sir. (ibid, pp. 18-20, Records, pp. 109-111)
In her insistence to clear up her name, it is not farfetched for Us to think that the complainant voluntarily but grudgingly returned the money to show good faith. Thus, it
was she who informed the petitioner about the existence of the RCBC Time Deposit Certificate (Exh. "A", pp. 4-5, Records). The allegation that she did so because of
petitioner's threats came from the complainant herself. She has not been able to present any other witness to buttress her claim.
Further, We find that contrary to complainant's allegations in her affidavit (ibid, p. 5) it was not the petitioner who suggested the encashment of the RCBC Time Deposit Certificate but her sister; and that again, it was not the petitioner who agreed to the sister's suggestion but Cruz, the PRO Manager, Foreign Department of the bank (TSN, January 8, 1985, pp. 40-41, Records, pp. 131-132).
Moreover, while complainant claimed that her freedom of movement was restrained, she, however, was able to move about freely unguarded from the office of the petitioner situated at the ground floor to the office of Cruz at the mezzanine floor where her sister found her (ibid, pp. 39- 40, Records, pp. 130-131). Undoubtedly, during that time, there were many bank clients who transacted business with the bank (TSN, November 20, 1984, p. 21; Records, p. 112). The bank security guards then were at their posts. Complainant herself admitted that they manifested no overt acts to prevent her from leaving despite the alleged loud threats of the petitioner (ibid, pp. 20- 21, Records, pp. 111-112) which could be heard considering that the door to petitioner's office was kept open (TSN, October 8, 1985, p. 184, Records, p. 276). Given such atmosphere, the complainant still did not leave the bank.
The respondent court cited the prepared typewritten withdrawal slip and the non-presentation of the complainant's passbook as indicators of her involuntary acts.
We disagree. The petitioner testified that the general rule was that the bank requires the presentation of the passbook whenever withdrawals are made. However, there was an exception to this rule, i.e. when the depositor is a regular customer in depositing or withdrawing money in the bank (TSN, October 8, 1985, pp. 189-190, Records, pp. 281-282). The prosecution failed to submit evidence to rebut his contentions. Besides, the trial court's conclusion that the withdrawal slip was typewritten was without basis considering that the complainant merely averred that the withdrawal slip was already prepared when she signed it (Exh. "A", Records, p. 4).
We also take exception to the following ruling of the appellate court:
It must be noted that the position of a bank manager is one of prestige and dignity and when the said bank was cheated or swindled it certainly reflects on the capability and efficiency of the manager and one can just imagine the kind of mental attitude and feeling of anger the latter would have towards the alleged swindler. Shouting, raising of voice and dagger looks are common characteristics of an angry man and that was what accused Lee exhibited to a fragile weaker sex and pregnant offended party. It would be natural to get angry with someone who had victimized
you. Naturalness, however is not always righteous. It is like taking the law into your hands and that was what the accused Lee did. (CA Decision, pp. 11-12, Rollo, pp. 52-53)
This pronouncement creates an impression that the petitioner had made a personal case out of the situation. However, the evidence does not support this view. We find that at the time the check was deposited and encashed, the petitioner was then on leave (TSN, June 11, 1985, p. 156; Records, p. 248). Under this circumstance, it is not fair to consider the bank's mistake in accepting and paying the check as the petitioner's mistake which could militate against his efficiency. The petitioner attributed the mistake in the payment of the forged check to the usual risks in banking business. He stated:
Atty. Pangilinan, Private prosecutor (authorized by the Fiscal to prosecute the case in the latter's stead)
Q So you no longer consider him (Carpio) as entitled in (sic) the proceeds of the chek (sic) and therefore at that point of (sic) time you will now concede that the payment made by you to him was a big mistake?
A When we were asking for the respondent and we were locating HonorioCarpio and we cannot locate him, I consider that a mistake, Sir.
Q It was a big mistake as a matter of fact?
A When it comes to the falling of the business considering the big amount I would say big mistake but only a mistake, it was a usual risk in banking business, Sir.
Q But of course Mr. Lee, being a mistake that mistake will harm and tense your personality as a Bank Manager? A It is up to our Manager to decide but when it comes to other transactions I am handling Three Million plus and considering that check I don't think with all modesty it will affect me, Sir.
Q But you are called upon to try to recover any money which was in your judgment was unlawfully taken from you by anybody
A When it comes to procedure I don't think it was unlawfully taken, as a matter of fact it was our bank who credited this account, Sir.
Q So it is your bounded (sic) duty to recover money which was paid to someonelse (sic) which payment is not due to him, am I correct?
A It is the duty of our lawyer to recover it, Sir.
Q Is it not a fact that your lawyer is only your agent? Atty. Dizon:
I think we are going too far, it has nothing to do with the particular incident subject matter of the criminal offense. Court:
I see the point of the defense but the witness is very intelligent, I can see the point of counsel, because in order not to effect his integrity he resorted to this, for example in case of a bank employee who stole P500.00 and the other one is P200.00, it could have the same mistake which is supposed to be admonished by removal. You answer. A Yes that is the same case whether it is small or big but when it comes to the Manager the Head Office is very
understanding when it comes to bogus checks and of course my work is a supervisory. Sir. (ibid, pp. 170-171; Records, pp. 263-264)
The most telling proof of the absence of intimidation was the fact that the complainant refused to sign the promissory note in spite of the alleged threats of the petitioner (TSN, January 8, 1985, p. 48; Records, p. 139). American authorities have declared that "(t)he force which is claimed to have compelled criminal conduct against the will of the actor must be immediate and continuous and threaten grave danger to his person during all of the time the act is being committed. That is, it must be a dangerous force threatened 'in praesenti.' It must be a force threatening great bodily harm that remains constant in controlling the will of the unwilling participant while the act is being performed and from which he cannot then withdraw in safety." (State v. Hood, 165 NE 2d, 28, 31-32,
Emphasis ours).
The complainant proferred excuses for her action. For one, she claimed that her sister's presence helped her recover her composure (TSN, November 20, 1984, p. 29, Records, p. 120).
We are not persuaded. If indeed she had recovered her composure because of her sister's presence, she could have just left the premises in a huff without encashing the RCBC Time Deposit Certificate or if they (complainant and sister) were already at the RCBC, they could have desisted from encashing the check and then could have left for home notwithstanding the alleged presence of Mr.Lumba who was no longer in his own bank but among the RCBC clients or she could have refused to sign the affidavit which was handed to her first before the promissory note. Yet, she did neither of these logical possibilities.
Secondly, she averred that she refused to sign the promissory note because she was able to read its contents unlike the affidavit and she realized that she would have a great responsibility to return the amount taken by Carpio (ibid, pp. 27-28, Records, pp. 118-119).
Such an excuse is flimsy and weak. It is strange that complainant's sister, who was with her, failed to corroborate her statement that she was denied the opportunity to read the affidavit. Her bare assertion simply confirms the voluntariness of her actions. All her disputed acts were geared towards proving her good faith. Complainant was willing to return the sum of P48,000.00 she took since it was only up to this amount where her involvement lies. However, as soon as she realized that she would have the enormous task of reimbursing the bank the balance of the proceeds of the forged check allegedly taken by Carpio, she refused to cooperate any further. Notwithstanding the alleged threats of petitioner, she did not budge. Thus, We find it as a logical consequence that she merely asked for the receipt of the P18,000.00 she deposited rather than the cancellation of her earlier withdrawal. On this point, complainant claimed that after her refusal to sign the document, she no longer insisted on the return of the money because she felt that it was the only way she could leave the bank premises (TSN, November 20, 1984, p. 31, Records, p. 120). This pretense, however, was belied by her subsequent actuations. We find that she and her sister left the bank unescorted to eat their snack; that they were required by the petitioner to come back; and that they decided not to eat but instead went home (TSN, November 20, 1984, pp. 31-32, Records, pp. 122-123 and January 8, 1965, pp. 49-50, Records, pp. 140-141). With such behavior, We are at a loss to understand how coercion could attach in this case. Obviously, the complainant has not been cowed into submission.
Against this backdrop, We hold that coercion did not exist in this case. Consequently, the petitioner should be acquitted.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and a new one hereby entered ACQUITTING the accused of the crime of grave coercion.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 102070 July 23, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
HON. DAVID A. ALFECHE, JR., Presiding Judge, Branch 15, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Capiz, respondent.
Which court has jurisdiction over cases involving a violation of Article 312 of the Revised Penal Code where the intimidation employed by the accused consists of a threat to kill? This is the issue in this case.
Upon a complaint for Grave Threats and Usurpation of Real Property filed against RupertoDimalata and Norberto Fuentes, and after the appropriate preliminary
investigation wherein Dimalata presented evidence showing that he is a successor-in-interest of the alleged original owner of the land, and that the threat was established to have been directed against the complainants' tenant-encargado, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Juliana C. Azarraga of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Capiz handed down a Resolution, duly approved by the Provincial Prosecutor, finding prima facie evidence of guilt for the crime charged. 1The complainants are co-owners of the parcel of land allegedly usurped.
On 5 July 1991, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Azarraga filed the corresponding Information 2 for "Usurpation of Real Rights In Property defined and penalized under Article 312 in relation to Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code" with the Regional Trial Court of Capiz. It was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3386 and was raffled to Branch 15 thereof. The Information reads as follows:
The undersigned, with the prior authority and approval of the Provincial Prosecutor, accuses RUPERTO DIMALATA and NORBERTO FUENTES of the crime of Usurpation of Real Rights in Property defined and penalized under Article 312 in relation to Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That sometime in the month of November, 1990, at Brgy. Cabugao, Municipality of Panitan, Province of Capiz, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter, possess and occupy a portion of Lot No. 3000, Panitan Cadastre,
belonging to and owned in common by Teresita Silva and the latter's brothers and sisters, after threatening to kill the tenant-encargado if the latter would resist their taking of the portion of the land, and thereafter, plowed, cultivated and planted palay on said portion of land to the exclusion of the above-named owners thereof who, therefore, were
prevented from appropriating the property's produce or earning profits therefrom from the time of the said
usurpation by accused up to the present to the damage and prejudice of the said Teresita Silva and her co-owners. CONTRARY TO LAW.
On 17 July 1991, respondent Judge, as Presiding Judge of Branch 15 of the court below, dismissed the case motuproprioon the ground of lack of jurisdiction considering that "the crime committed by the accused falls under Article 312 of the Revised Penal Code and the violence or intimidation by the accused is (sic) a means to commit it or a mere incident in its commission, hence, the threat is absorbed by the crime charged," and considering that "the impossable (sic) fine as penalty is from P200.00 to P500.00" because the value of the gain cannot be ascertained. The order of dismissals 3 reads as follows:
Upon personal examination and evaluation of the affidavit of the
complainant, annexes and the resolution in support of the information, the crime committed by the accused falls under Article 312 of the Revised Penal Code and the violence or intimidation by the accused is (sic) a means to commit it or a mere incident in its commission, hence, the threat is absorbed by the crime charged.
Under above (sic) facts, an (sic) act of the accused was not a means to commit the other or by their single act, it resulted to (sic) two or more offenses thereby making paragraph 1 of Article 282 the basis in imposing the penalty. In fine, the act of the accused as alleged could not be a complex crime under Article 312 in relation to Article 282. One is a distinct crime from the other with separate elements to prove in case of
prosecution.
On the basis of the allegations of the information the value of the gain incurred for the act of violence or intimidation executed by the accused cannot be ascertained, hence the impossable (sic) fine as penalty is from P200 to P500 which is below the jurisdiction of this court.
Assistant Prosecutor Azarraga filed a motion to reconsider the above order 4 alleging therein that it is true that the crime charged is not a complex crime and if mention is made of Article 282, it is because "the penalty of the crime defined under Article 312 is dependent on Article 282. Article 312 'borrows' the pertinent provision on penalty from Article 282, because Article 312 does not provide a penalty" as "Article 312 expressly provides that the penalty for the violence shall likewise be imposed in addition to the fine." In the instant case, the intimidation consists of the threat to kill the encargado, penalized under Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code; considering that the accused attained their purpose, the penalty imposable thereunder is that which is one degree lower than that prescribed by law for the crime they had threatened to commit — homicide. In his Order of 24 July 1991, 5 respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration. The order reads:
This refers to the motion for reconsideration on (sic) the order of this court dated July 17, 1991, dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction over the case as charged in the information.
The legal basis of the dismissal is founded on the fact that paragraph 1 of Article 282, and Article 312, of the Revised Penal Code, are separate and distinct offenses. They could not be made a complex crime. Both are simple crimes where only one juridical right or interest is violated. Neither is Article 312 a special complex crime. The mere circumstance that the two crimes may be so related does not make them a special complex crime or be treated (sic) like one for the purpose of imposing the penalty. Seemingly, the information charges two (2) separate and distinct crimes, one under paragraph 1, Article 282 and the other under Article 312, of the Revised Penal Code. Close examination reveals that the violence or
intimidation by the accused as alleged therein is a means to commit the crime under Article 312 or a mere incident, in its commission. Under the premises, the test of jurisdiction of the court over the case is the
impossable (sic) penalty under Article 312.
Above premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is denied. SO ORDERED
Hence, this petition was filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Azarraga for and in behalf of the People of the Philippines against respondent Judge to whom is imputed the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction for dismissing the criminal case. In support thereof, it is argued that: (a) respondent Judge erred in not considering the penalty prescribed under Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code as the basis for the imposable penalty in the crime defined in Article 312 thereof, and (b) the crime charged in the information is not complexed with Article 282 by the mere
allegation in the caption of the information that it is a prosecution under said Article 312 in relation to Article 282.
Before acting on the petition, this Court required the Office of the Solicitor General to comment on the petition filed by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. 6
In its Comment 7filed on 13 November 1991, the Office of the Solicitor General, while observing that the Assistant Provincial Fiscal lacks the authority to file the instant petition as only the Solicitor General is authorized by law to represent the People of the Philippines in cases this nature, declares, nevertheless, that the petition is impressed with merit and, consequently, it ratifies the same and prays that it be admitted, given due course and the questioned orders of the respondent Judge be reversed. It, however, urges that the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor be advised to be more circumspect in filing cases of this nature with this Court without the intervention of, or prior authorization from, the Solicitor General.
In sustaining the position of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that "in prosecution for Usurpation of Real Property as provided for in Art. 312 of the Revised Penal Code, the over-all penalty, imposable on the accused is determined not only by the penalty provided therein but also by the penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by him . . . ." The accused in Crim. Case No. 3386
committed acts of violence an the complainant's tenant. The violent acts with which the accused were charged in attaining their wishes constituted threats to kill
InocencioBorreros, if the latter prevented or prohibited both accused in (sic) taking possession of the lot in question. Hence, accused's threats on the life of Borreros may be considered as the 'violence or intimidation of persons' mentioned in Art. 312, supra, as the means by which accused took possession of the lot in question. And, under Art. 282, the imposable penalty for the threatening act of both accused — to kill Borreros — is one (1) degree lower than that prescribed by law for the crime accused threatened to commit — homicide; hence, that additional penalty imposable on both accused isprision mayor minimum toprision mayor maximum, which is well within the jurisdiction of (sic) Regional Trial Court.
Acting on the Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General, this Court admitted the petition and required respondent Judge to file his Comment thereon, which he complied with on 9 December 1991. 8 Defending his challenged orders, respondent Judge argues that: (a) only the crime of usurpation of real property is charged in the information; the violence against or intimidation of persons alleged therein is an element of the crime charged; it cannot constitute a distinct crime of grave threats or give rise to the complex crime of usurpation of real property with gave threats as basis for determining the jurisdiction of the court; (b) the clause "in addition to the penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by him" does not refer to Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code; both Articles 312 and 282 are distinct offenses where only one juridical interest is violated; if ever there are resultant offenses arising from the acts of violence of the accused in their occupation of the real property or usurpation of real rights over the same, they shall be
subject to other criminal prosecutions not necessarily under Article 282. He further claims that although not dwelt upon in his order of dismissal, there is another ground for the dismissal of the case; this ground is the failure to allege intent to gain in the
information, an essential element of Article 312.
On 29 January 1992, this Court required the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to file a Reply to the respondent's Comment. Considering the appearance of the Office of the Solicitor General, she moved to be excused from complying with the sale. The Office of the Solicitor General subsequently filed the Reply.
This Court thereafter resolved to give due course to the petition. Article 312 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 312. Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in
property. — Any person who, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, shall take possession of any real property or shall usurp any real rights in property belonging to another, in addition to the penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by him, shall be punished by a fine of from 50 to 100 per centum of the gain which he shall have
obtained, but not less than 75 pesos.
If the value of the gain cannot be ascertained, a fine of from 200 to 500 pesos shall be imposed.
The Article is not as simple as it appears to be. What is meant by the phrase "by means of violence against or intimidation of persons" and the clause "in addition to the penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by him"? What penalty should be made the basis for determining which court shall acquired jurisdiction over a case involving a violation of the said Article?
An inquiry into the nature of the crime may yield the desired answers.
The offense defined in this Article is one of the crimes against property found under Title Ten, Book Two of the Revised Penal Code, and is committed in the same manner as the crime of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons defined and penalized in Article 294 of the same Code. The main difference between these two (2) crimes is that the former involves real property or real rights in property, while the latter involves personal property. 9In short, Article 312 would have been denominated as robbery if the object taken is personal property.
Accordingly, the phrase "by means of violence against or intimidation of persons" in Article 312 must be construed to refer to the same phrase used in Article 294. There are five (5) classes of robbery under the latter, namely: (a) robbery with homicide (par. 1);
(b) robbery with rape, intentional mutilation, or the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 1 of Article 263 (par. 2); (c) robbery with the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 2 of Article 268
(par. 3); (d) robbery committed with unnecessary violence or with physical injuries covered by subdivisions 3 and 4 of Article 263 (par. 4); and (e) robbery in other cases, or simple robbery (par. 5), where the violence against or intimidation of persons cannot be subsumed by, or where it is not sufficiently specified so as to fall under, the first four paragraphs. 10
Paragraphs one to four of Article 294 indisputably involve the use of violence against persons. The actual physical force inflicted results in death, rape, mutilation or the physical injuries therein enumerated. The simple robbery under paragraph five may cover physical injuries not included in paragraphs two to four. Thus, when less serious physical injuries or slight physical injuries are inflicted upon the offended party on the occasion of a robbery, the accused may be prosecuted for and convicted of robbery under paragraph five. 11
It seems obvious that intimidation is not encompassed under paragraphs one to four since no actual physical violence is inflicted; evidence then, it can only fall under paragraph five.
But what is meant by the word intimidation? It is defined in Black's Law Dictionary 12as "unlawful coercion; extortion; duress; putting in fear". To take, or attempt to take, by intimidation means "willfully to take, or attempt to take, by putting in fear of bodily harm". As shown in United States vs. Osorio, 13material violence is not indispensable for there to be intimidation; intense fear produced in the mind of the victim which restricts or hinders the exercise of the will is sufficient. In an appropriate case, the offender may be liable for either (a) robbery under paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code if the subject matter is personal property and there is intent to gain or animus furandi, or (b) grave coercion under Article 286 of said Code if such intent does not exist. 14
In the crime of grave coercion, violence through force or such display of force that would produce intimidation and control the will of the offended party is an essential ingredient. 15
In the crime of Grave Threats punished under Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code, intimidation is also present. However, this intimidation, as contra-distinguished from the intimidation in paragraph 5, Article 294 or Article 286 — which is actual, immediate and personal — is conditional and not necessarily personal because it may be caused by an intermediary. 16
Paragraphs one to five of Article 294 are single, special and indivisible felonies, not complex crimes as defined under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. 17 The penalties
imposed do not take into account the value of the personal property taken, but the gravity of the effect or consequence of the violence or intimidation.
Article 312 may also be considered as defining and penalizing the single, special and indivisible crime of occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property by means of violence against or intimidation of persons. It is likewise not a complex crime as defined under Article 48. However, while Article 294 provides a single penalty for each class of crime therein defined, Article 312 provides a single, albeit two-tiered, penalty consisting of a principal penalty, which is that incurred for the acts of violence, and an additional penalty of fine based on the value of the gain obtained by the accused. This is clear from the clause "in addition to the penalty incurred for the acts of violence
executed by him." For want of a better term, the additional penalty may be designated as an incremental penalty.
What Article 312 means then is that when the occupation of real property is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, the accused may be prosecuted under an information for the violation thereof, and not for a separate crime involving violence or intimidation. But, whenever, appropriate, he may be sentenced to suffer the penalty for the acts of violence and to pay a fine based on the value of the gain
obtained. Thus, if by reason or on the occasion of such occupation or usurpation, the crime of homicide, or any of the physical injuries penalized in either subdivisions 1 or 2 of Article 263 is committed; or when the same shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation; or when, in the course of its execution, the offender shall have inflicted upon any person not responsible for its commission any of the physical injuries covered by subdivisions 3 and 4 of Article 263; or when it is committed through
intimidation or through the infliction of physical injuries not covered by subdivisions 1 to 4 of Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., physical injuries penalized under Articles 265 and 266 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused may be convicted for the violation of Article 312. However, he shall be sentenced: (a) to suffer the penalty for homicide, rape, intentional mutilation and physical injuries provided under subdivisions 1 to 4 of Article 263, other physical injuries 18 or for the intimidation, which may fall under Article 282 (Grave Threats) or Article 286 (Grave Coercion) of the Revised Penal Code, as the case may be, and (b) to pay a fine based on the value of the gain obtained by him, which shall be an amount equivalent to 50 to 100 per centum of such gain, but in no case less than seventy-five (P75.000) pesos, provided, however, that if such value cannot be ascertained, the fine shall be from 200 to 500 (P200.00 to P500.00) pesos.
Respondent Judge then was wrong in his two (2) inconsistent propositions.
This Court cannot agree with the first which postulates that the threat was the means employed to occupy the land and is therefore absorbed in the crime defined and penalized in Article 312. If that were the case, the clause "in addition to the penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by him "would be meaningless. As earlier explained, intimidation is a form of violence which may come in the guise of threats or coercion. Besides, the peculiar theory of absorption would result in an absurdity whereby
a grave or less grave felony defined in paragraph 1 of Article 282 and punished by an afflictive correctional penalty 19 consisting of the deprivation of liberty, would be
absorbed by a crime (Article 312) penalized only by a fine. Neither can this Court accept his second proposition that Article 282 and Article 312 refer to two (2) separate crimes, both of which "are simple crimes where only one juridical right or interest is violated." As already stated, the crime of occupation of real right in property is a single, special and indivisible crime upon which is imposed a two-tiered penalty. Also, such a proposition obfuscates the first proposition and ignores the distinction between the two Articles. Article 286 is a crime against personal security while Article 312 is a crime against real property or real rights thereon.
It does not, however, necessarily follow that just because the respondent Judge is wrong, the petitioner is correct. This Court finds the proposition of petitioner similarly erroneous and untenable. As earlier stated, the complainants in the case are the co-owners of the lot and not the tenant-encargado who was the person threatened. The latter was in actual physical possession of the property for, as found by the investigating prosecutor:
. . . This lot was tenanted by InocencioBorreros after the latter was installed thereat by Teresita Silva herself. Lot No. 3000 is an agricultural land devoted to palay. 20
Accepting this to be a fact and without necessarily inquiring into the effects of P.D. No. 27 and R.A. No. 6657 on such tenancy, the tenant has, at the very least, a real right over the property — that of possession — which both accused were alleged to have usurped through the threat to kill. Borreros is, therefore, the offended party who was directly threatened by the accused; while the information expressly states this fact, Borreros is not, most unfortunately, made the offended party. The information does not even suggest that the accused threatened
complainants or their families with the infliction upon their persons, honor or property of any wrong amounting to a crime so as to bring the former within the purview of Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code. At most, the liability of the accused to the complainants would only be civil in nature. Hence, to the extent that it limits the offended parties to just the co-owners of the property who were not even possession thereof, the information in question does not charge an offense. 21 It may, therefore, in dismissed in accordance with Section 3 (a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. Considering, however, that both accused have not yet been arraigned, the information may be accordingly amended to include the tenant as the offended party. This of course is on the assumption that the
accused usurped the tenant's real right with intent to gain or with animus furandi; for without such intent, he could only be charged with coercion. 22In so holding, this Court does not preclude the owner of a piece of property from being the offended party in the crime of occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property by means of intimidation consisting of a threat, under Article 282, provided, however, that all the elements thereof are present. In such a case, the penalty imposable upon the accused would be the penalty prescribed therein
plus a fine based on the value of the gain obtained by the accused. As stated earlier, intimidation as found in Article 312 could result in either the crime of grave threats under Article 282 or grave coercion under Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, if complainants were in fact the parties threatened and
paragraph 1 of Article 282 is applicable, 23the Regional Trial Court would have exclusive original jurisdiction over the offense charged because the
corresponding penalty for the crime would beprision mayor, which is the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed for the offense threatened to be
committed homicide — which is reclusion temporal, 24and a fine based on the value of the gain obtained by the accused. 25
WHEREFORE, the Orders of respondent Judge of 17 July 1991 and 24 July 1991 in Criminal Case No. 3386 are hereby SET ASIDE. The petitioner may amend the
information as suggested above; otherwise, it should be dismissed not for the reason relied upon by the respondent Judge, but because it does not charge an offense. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-40577 August 23, 1934
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
PROCOPIO REYES, POLICARPIO NACANA, FLORENTINO CLEMENTE,
HERMOGENES MALLARI, MARCELINO MALLARI, CASTOR ALIPIO, and RUFINO MATIAS, defendants-appellants.
Appellants were convicted in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac of a violation of article 133 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:
ART. 133. Offending the religious feelings.—The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period toprisioncorreccionalin its minimum period shall be imposed upon anyone who, in a place devoted to religious ceremony, shall perform acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful.
In the barrio of Macalong, municipality of La Paz, Province of Tarlac, there is a chapel where it is customary to hold what is known in local parlance as apabasa. As stated by the lower court, "the termpabasais applied to the act of the people, professing the Roman Catholic faith," of assembling, during Lent, "at a certain designated place, for the purpose of reading and the life, passion and death of Jesus Christ. A book known as the 'Vida, Pasion y Muerte de Jesucristo', which contains a fun account in verse of the life,
passion and death of Jesus Christ, is used in this celebration." Thepabasain Macalong used to begin on Palm Sunday and continue day and night, without any interruption whatsoever, until Good Friday. As usual, refreshment and food were served in the yard adjoining the chapel, and the expenses incidental thereto were defrayed by different persons.
While thepabasa was going on the evening of April 10, 1933, between 11 and 12 o'clock, the defendants Procopio Reyes, PolicarpioNacana, Florentino Clemente,
HermogenesMallari, MarcelinoMallari, Castor Alipio, and RufinoMatias arrived at the place, carrying bolos and crowbars, and started to construct a barbed wire fence in front of the chapel. Alfonso Castillo, who was chairman of the committee in charge of
thepabasa, tried to persuade them to refrain from carrying out their plan, by reminding them of the fact that it was Holy Week and that it was highly improper to construct a fence at that time of the evening. A verbal altercation ensued.
When the people attending thepabasa in the chapel and those who were eating in the yard thereof noticed what was happening, they became excited and left the place hurriedly and in such confusion that dishes and saucers were broken and benches toppled over. Thepabasa was discontinued and it was not resumed until after an investigation conducted by the chief of police on the following morning, which
investigation led to the filing of the complaint appearing on pages 1 and 2 of the record. Many years ago the Clemente family by informal donation gave the land on which the old chapel was erected. When it was destroyed, the present chapel was erected, and there is now a dispute as to whether the new chapel is not now impinging on the land that
belongs to the Clemente family. The appellants are partisans of he Clemente family. It is to be noted that article 133 of the Revises Penal Code punishes acts "notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful." The construction of a fence, even though irritating and vexatious under the circumstances to those present, is not such an act as can be designated as "notoriously offensive to the faithful", as normally such an act would be a matter of complete indifference to those not present, no matter how religious a turn of mind they might be.
The disturbance or interruption of any ceremony of a religious character under the old Penal Code was denounced by article 571 and was punished by arrest from one to ten days and a fine of from 15 to 125 pesetas. But this article was omitted from the Revised Penal Code and the offense, if any was committed by the appellants, is denounced in article 287 as an "unjust vexation" and punished by arrestomenoror a fine ranging from 5 to 200 pesos or both.
It is urged upon us that the act of building a fence was innocent and was simply to protect private property rights. The fact that this argument is a pretense only is clearly shown by the circumstances under which the fence was constructed, namely, late at night and in such a way as to vex and annoy the parties who had gathered to celebrate
