Tanada vs Tuvera No. L-63915 December 29, 1986
FACTS:
The petitioners Lorenzo Tanada, Abraham Sarmiento and Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI) demand for the disclosure of various presidential decrees from Hon. Juan Tuvera as executive Assistant to the President< Hon. Joaquin Venus, deputy Executive Assistant to the President, Melquiades dela Cruz, et al. because they claim that such presidential decrees had not been published as what Article 2 of the Civil Code has provided.
The government defended that while such publication was necessary, the statement “Otherwise provided” let such decrees too become effective immediately. The decision of the court was affirmative to the necessity of publication before such Law, decree or order will be effective. The petitioners suggest that there should be some clarifications on this rule.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 2 of the Civil Code is absolute that effectivity of the law shall take effect after 15 days from its publication.
RULING:
Article 2 of the Civil Code states “laws shall take effect after 15 day following the completion of their publication in the official gazette or in newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.”
Supreme Court held that all laws shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette or any newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. It becomes effective only after fifteen days from their publication or in any other date specified by the legislature, this is what the proviso ‘unless it is otherwise provided’ means.
Firestone Tire Company vs. Lariosa GR no. 70479
February 27, 1987
FACTS:
Carlos Lariosa work in Firestone as factory worker. When he was about to leave the company premises, he was frisked by security guard because while his personal bag was inspected, there were 16 wool flannel swabs all belonging to the company.
As a result, he was terminated by firestone on the ground of stealing company property and loss of trust. The company also files criminal complaint for attempted theft. Lariosa, on other hand, filed a case for illegal dismissal Labor Arbiter found the dismissal just bust the NLRC reversed the decision.
Firestone contends that NLRC erred in not dismissing Lariosa’s appeal for being late.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appeal filed by Lariosa n NLRC was filed late.
RULING:
Lariosa filed his appeal on June 7, 1984 or after the lapse of 14 days from the notice of the decision of the labor arbiter.
Under the Labor Code, the reglementary period for which an appeal from decision of labor arbiter may be filed to NLRC is within a period of ten days.
The ten-day period has to be interpreted to mean as ten ‘calendar’ days and not ten ‘working’ days.
Gonzaga vs David GR no. L-14858 December 29, 1960
FACTS:
Mariano Gonzales, as owner of a cargo truck and passenger bus, registers the vehicles and pays the first installment for registration fees due on 1957. To cover the second installment for registration fees, he remitted to the provincial treasurer of Cagayan, by registered mail, the amount of P500.00, under postal money orders.
The postal cancellation mark on the envelope containing the remittance bears the date August 31, 1957. The registrar of the Motor Vehicle Office ruled that pursuant to Revised Motor Vehicle Law, the second installment for registration fees was payable on or before the last working day of August. The last working day of August 1957 was Friday, August 30, 1957. And consequently, the remittance of Gonzaga which bears cancellation mark dated August 31, 1957 was made beyond time fixed by law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the remittance for second installment of registration fees was made beyond the time fixed by law.
RULING:
The Motor Vehicle Office in Cagayan had no office on Saturday, August 31, 1957. However, it was immaterial the last working day contemplated in the Revised Motor Vehicle Law should not necessarily mean the last working day of Motor Vehicle Office. The fact that August 31, 1957 was declared a special public holiday did not have the effect of making the preceding day, August 30, the last day for paying registration fees without penalty.
Moreover, under the said law, for payment of registration fees by mail, the date of cancellation of the postage stamps of the envelope containing the remittance is considered the date of application.
Rural Bank of Caloocan vs CA GR no. L-32116
April 21, 1981
FACTS:
Maxima Castro, accompanied by Severino Valencia, went to Rural Bank of Caloocan to apply for industrial loan. The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage on Castor’s house, after that, the bank approved the loan of P3000. Valencia obtained from the bank an equal amount of loan affixing Castro’s signature as co-maker without its knowledge.
The sheriff then sent a notice announcing the property would be sold at public auction to satisfy the obligation. Upon request, the auction sale which was scheduled for March 10, 1961 was postponed for April 10, 1961. But April 10 was subsequently declared a special holiday so the sheriff sold the property on public auction on April 11, 1961 which was the next succeeding business day following the special holiday.
Castro prayed for the annulment of sale alleging that there was fraud on the part of Valencias who induced her to sign as co-maker of a promissory note since she is a 70-year old widow who cannot read and write and it was only when she receive the notice of sheriff, she learned that the encumbrance on her property was P6000 and not for P3000.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the public auction sale was null and void for transferring the date already set by law.
RULING:
The sale is null and void for not having in accordance with Act 3135 which states that that a notice shall be given by posting notices of sale for not less than 20 days in at least 3 public places and if the property is worth more than P400 such notice shall also be published for in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or city once a week for 3 consecutive weeks.
The pretermission of a holiday applies only ‘where the day, or the last day for doing any act required or permitted by law falls on a holiday or when the last day of a given period for doing an act falls on holiday. It does not apply to a day fixed by an office or officer of the government for an act to be done.
Since April 10, 1961 was not the day or the last day set by law for the extrajudicial foreclosure sale, nor the last day of a given period but a date fixed by deputy sheriff, the sale cannot be legally made on the next succeeding business day without the notice of the sale in accordance with Act no. 3135.
People of the Philippines vs Quo Po Lay GR no. L-6791
March 29, 1854
FACTS:
Quo Po lay was in possession of a foreign exchange consisting of US dollars, US checks and S money orders amounting to about $700 but failed to sell it to the central bank as required under Circular no. 20. The said circular was issued in the year 1949 but was published in official gazette only on November 1951 after the act imputed to Que Po Lay.
Quo Po Lay appealed from the decision of the Lower court finding him guilty of violating the Central Bank Circular no. 20 and sentencing him to suffer 6 months imprisonment, pay fine of 1000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication of Central Bank Circular no. 20 is needed for it to become effective.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that as a rule those municipal ordinances, or those interpretative in nature or those internal in nature and the letter of instruction need not to be published in order for them to become effective. But the circulars and regulations that prescribe penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective.
This is based on the theory that before the public is bound by its content as well as penal provisions, law, regulation and circular must first be published for the people to be officially and specifically informed of such provision.
In the case, the fact that Circular no. 20 had not been published, in the eyes of the law, there was no such circular to be violated and appellant Quo Po Lay committed no violation of the circular.
Consunji vs. Court of Appeals GR No. 137873 April 20, 2001
FACTS:
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.
D. M. Consunji then sought the reversal of the CA decision. ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioner is held liable under the grounds of negligence.
Whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions,
RULING:
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or transaction speaks for itself) is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. It has the following requisites: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3)the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s negligence arises. Petitioner does not cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident.
The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed only under the Workmen´s Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. In the course of availing the remedies provided under the Workmen’s Compensation law, the claimants are deemed to have waived theirknown right of the remedies provided by other laws. The Court of Appeals, however, held that the case at bar came under exception because private respondent was unaware of petitioner´s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Had the claimant been aware, she would’ve opted to avail of a better remedy than that of which she already had.
Emetrio Cui v Arellano University GR NO. L15127, May 30, 1961 | 112 Phil 135 FACTS:
Emetrio Cui took his preparatory law course at Arellano University. He then enrolled in its College of Law from first year (SY1948-1949) until first semester of his 4th year. During these years, he was awarded scholarship grants of the said university amounting to a total of P1,033.87. He then transferred and took his last semester as a law student at Abad Santos University. To secure permission to take the bar, he needed his transcript of records from Arellano University. The defendant refused to issue the TOR until he had paid back the P1,033.87 scholarship grant which Emetrio refunded as he could not take the bar without Arellano’s issuance of his TOR.
On August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No. 38 addressing all heads of private schools, colleges and universities. Part of the memorandum states that “the amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a school”.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Emetrio Cui can refund the P1,033.97 payment for the scholarship grant provided by Arellano University.
HELD:
The memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is not a law where the provision set therein was advisory and not mandatory in nature. Moreover, the stipulation in question, asking previous students to pay back the scholarship grant if they transfer before graduation, is contrary to public policy, sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights and hence, null and void.
The court sentenced the defendant to pay Cui the sum of P1,033.87 with interest thereon at the legal rate from Sept.1, 1954, date of the institution of this case as well as the costs and dismissing defendant’s counterclaim.
FLORESCA vs PHILEX MINING CORPORATION 136 SCRA 141
FACTS:
Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Philex), who, while working at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men working underground. Floresca et al moved to claim their benefits pursuant to the Workmen’s Compensation Act before the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. They also petitioned before the regular courts and sue Philex for additional damages. Philex invoked that they can no longer be sued because the petitioners have already claimed benefits under the WCA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Floresca et al can claim benefits and at the same time sue. HELD:
Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed for benefits under the WCA then they will be estopped from proceeding with a civil case before the regular courts. Conversely, if they sued before the civil courts then they would also be estopped from claiming benefits under the WCA. The SC however ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this deficiency due to ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then they may have not availed of such a remedy. However, if in case they’ll win in the lower court whatever award may be granted, the amount given to them under the WCA should be deducted. The SC emphasized that if they would go strictly by the book in this case then the purpose of the law may be defeated. Idolatrous reverence for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures man’s survival and ennobles him. As Shakespeare said, the letter of the law killeth but its spirit giveth life.
Miciano vs Brimo
GR No.22595, November 1, 1927| 50 Phil 867
FACTS:
Juan Miciano, judicial administrator of the estate in question, filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased (Joseph Brimo) opposed Miciano’s participation in the inheritance. Joseph Brimo is a Turkish citizen.
ISSUE:
Whether Turkish law or Philippine law will be the basis on the distribution of Joseph Brimo’s estates.
HELD:
Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that “it be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Island”, this condition, described as impossible conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide. Impossible conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or good morals. Thus, national law of the testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions.
The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.
Bellis vs Bellis 20 SCRA 358 Facts:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas and was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. Hehad two wives, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced and had five legitimate children namely Edward,George,Henry, Alexander and Anna, and Violet Kennedy who survived him and had three legitimatechildren namely Edwin, Walter and Dorothy, and finally he had three illegitimate children: Amos Jr.,Maria and Miriam. On August 5,1952, Amos executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed thatafter all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate shouldbe divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a)$240,000 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b)P120,000 to his three illegitimate children or P40,000 each and (c) after the foregoing two items havebeen satisfied the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives inequal shares. On July 8,1958, Amos died. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15,1958. The People’s Bank and Trust Company, as the executor of the will,paid all the bequests therein released from time to time according as the lower court approved andallowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on accountof their respective legacies. On January 17,1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed theirrespective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of theirlegitimes as illegitimate children and therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased. On the other hand,Amos Bellis Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him
. Issue:
Which law will apply in executing the deceased’s will? Philippine Law or Texas Law? Held:
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., andthat there are no forced heirs or legitimes under the laws of the state of Texas. Accordingly, since theintrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determinedunder Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.Ratio: Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of thedecedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will;and (d) the capacity to succeed.Intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the orderof succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentaryprovisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property maybe found
UNITED AIRLINES vs. Court of Appeals 357 SCRA 99
Facts:
On Mar. 1, 1989, PR Fontanilla purchased tickets from petitioner United Airlines in Manila. The cause of non-boarding of the Fontanillas on United Airlines makes up the bone of contention of this controversy. Aniceto Fontanilla & his son claim that upon arrival at Los Angeles Airport they proceeded at United Airlines counter where they were attended by an employee, Linda; when the flight was called, they proceeded to the plane but the stewardess did not allow them to board because they had no assigned seat numbers; they were directed to go back to the check-in-counter. Linda told them in an arrogant manner, “Who do you think you are? You lousy Flips are good for nothing beggars. You always ask for American aid.” After which she remarked “Don’t worry about your baggage. Anyway there is nothing in there. What are you doing here anyway? I will report you to immigration. You Filipinos should go home.” such rude statement was made infront of other people causing the Fontanillas to suffer shame, humiliation & embarrassment. However, according to United Airlines, Fontanilla’s did not initially go to check-in-counter to get their seat assignment that is why they were not allowed to board. Linda denied the derogatory & resisted words attributed to her by the Fontanilla’s. The incident prompted the Fontanilla’s to file for damages.
Issue:
WON there was a breach of contract in bad faith on the part of the petitioner in not allowing the Fontanilla’s to board United Airlines? WON Fontanilla is entitled to damages? NO
Held:
Aniceto Fontanilla’s assertion that upon arrival at the airport at 9:45 a.m., he immediately proceeded to the check-in counter, and that Linda Allen punched in something into the computer is specious and not supported by the evidence on record. In support of their allegations, private respondents submitted a copy of the boarding pass. Explicitly printed on the boarding pass are the words “Check-In Required.” Curiously, the said pass did not indicate any seat number. If indeed the Fontanillas checked in at the designated time as they claimed, why then were they not assigned seat numbers? Absent any showing that Linda was so motivated, we do not buy into private respondents’ claim that Linda intentionally deceived him, and made him the laughing stock among the passengers. Plaintiffs fail to realize that their failure to check in, as expressly required in their boarding passes, is the very reason why they were not given their respective seat numbers, which resulted in their being denied boarding. Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling passengers concerned to an award of moral damages. What this Court considers as bad faith is the willful and deliberate overbooking on the part of the airline carrier. The above-mentioned law clearly states that when the overbooking does not exceed ten percent (10%), it is not considered as deliberate and therefore does not amount to bad faith. While there may have been overbooking in this case, private respondents were not able to prove that the overbooking on United Airlines Flight 1108 exceeded ten percent. For the plaintiff to be entitled to an award of moral damages arising from a breach of contract of carriage, the carrier must have acted with fraud or bad faith. The private respondents were not able to prove that they were subjected to coarse and harsh treatment by the ground crew of united Airlines. Neither were they able to show that there was bad faith on part of the carrier airline. Hence, the award of moral and exemplary damages by
the Court of Appeals is improper. Corollarily, the award of attorney’s fees is, likewise, denied for lack of any legal and factual basis
ALBENSON vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS:
Albenson Ent. delivered mild steel plates to Guaranteed Industries Inc. A Pacific Banking Corporation Check was paid and drawn against the account of EL Woodworks. Check was later dishonored for the reason “Account Closed.” Company traced source of check and later discovered that the signature belonged to one Eugenio Baltao. Albenson made an extrajudical demand upon Baltao but latter denied that he issued the check or that the signature was his. Company filed a complaint against Baltao for violation of BP 22. It was later discovered that private respondent had son: Eugene Baltao III, who manages the business establishment, EL Woodworks. No effort from the father to inform Albenson of such information. Rather the father filed complaint for damages against Albenson.
ISSUE:
Whether there is indeed cause for the damages against Albenson Enterprise. RULING:
Based on Art 19, 20, 21 of the civil code, petitioners didn’t have the intent to cause damage to the respondent or enrich themselves but just to collect what was due to them. There was no abuse of right on the part of Albenson on accusing Baltao of BP 22. Albenson Corp. honestly believed that it was private respondent who issued check based on ff inquiries:
• SEC records showed that president to Guaranteed was Eugene Baltao
• Bank said signature belonged to EB
• EB did not do his part in clarifying that there were in fact 3 Ebs, Jr., Sr. and the III. There was no malicious prosecution on the part of Albenson: there must be proof that:
• the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person and
• that damages was initiated deliberately by defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless
A person who has not been paid an obligation owed to him will naturally seek ways to compel the debtor to pay him. It was normal for petitioners to find means to make the issuer of the check pay the amount thereof. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 14948 dated May 13, 1989, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent Baltao
Nikko Hotel vs. Reyes GR No. 154259, February 28, 2005 FACTS:
Petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila and Ruby Lim assailed the decision of the Court of Appeals in reversing the decision of RTC of Quezon City. CA held petitioner liable for damages to Roberto Reyes aka “Amang Bisaya”, an entertainment artist.
There are two versions of the story:
Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee at the lobby of Nikko Hotel was approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years back. According to Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart invited him to join a birthday party at the penthouse for the hotel’s former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for him and carried a basket of fruits, the latter’s gift. He He lined up at the buffet table as soon as it was ready but to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotel’s Executive Secretary, asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by the people around them. He was asked to leave the party and a Makati policeman accompanied him to step-out the hotel. All these time, Dr Filart ignored him adding to his shame and humiliation.
Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in the manner claimed by the plaintiff. Ms. Lim approached several people including Dr. Filart’s sister, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, if Dr. Filart did invite him as the captain waiter told Ms. Lim that Mr. Reyes was with Dr. Filart’s group. She wasn’t able to ask it personally with Dr. Filart since the latter was talking over the phone and doesn’t want to interrupt her. She asked Mr. Reyes to leave because the celebrant specifically ordered that the party should be intimate consisting only of those who part of the list. She even asked politely with the plaintiff to finish his food then leave the party.
During the plaintiff’s cross-examination, he was asked how close was Ms. Lim when she approached him at the buffet table. Mr. Reyes answered “very close because we nearly kissed each other”. Considering the close proximity, it was Ms. Lim’s intention to relay the request only be heard by him. It was Mr. Reyes who made a scene causing everybody to know what happened.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. HELD:
Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the part of Ms. Lim who did all the necessary precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be humiliated in requesting him to leave the party. Considering almost 20 years of experience in the hotel industry, Ms. Lim is experienced enough to know how to handle such matters. Hence, petitioners will not be held liable for damages brought under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.
Sps. Quisumbing vs. MERALCO CITATION: GR No. 142943, April 3, 2002 FACTS:
The plaintiff, spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are the owners of a house located at #94 Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City. Around 9AM on March 3, 1995, defendant’s inspectors headed by Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to conduct a routine on the spot inspection of all single phase meters at the house and observed as standard operating procedure to ask permission and was granted by the plaintiff’s secretary. After the inspection, it was found that the meter had been tampered with. The result was relayed to the secretary who conveyed the information to the owners of the house. The inspectors advised that the meter be brought in their laboratory for further verifications. In the event that the meter was indeed tampered, defendant had to temporarily disconnect the electric services of the couple. After an hour, inspectors returned and informed the findings of the laboratory and asked the couple that unless they pay the amount of P178,875.01 representing the differential bill their electric supply will be disconnected. The plaintiff filed complaint for damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction despite the immediate reconnection.
ISSUE: Whether or not MERALCO acted maliciously and malevolent manner done without due process, lack of regard for QUISUMBING’s rights, feelings, social and business reputation and therefore held them accountable and plaintiff be entitled for damages.
HELD:
Supreme Court partly granted the petition and ordered plaintiff to pay respondent the billing differential of P193,332.96 while latter is ordered to pay petitioners moral and exemplary damages including attorney’s fees. Moral damages may be recovered when rights of individuals including right against the deprivation of property without due process of law are violated. Exemplary damages on the other hand are imposed by way of example or correction for public. SC recognized the effort of MERALCO in preventing illegal use of electricity. However, any action must be done in strict observance of the rights of the people. “Under the law, the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) may immediately disconnect electric service on the ground of alleged meter tampering, but only if the discovery of the cause is personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or by a duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board”. During the inspection, no government official or ERB representative was present.
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST VS. ROMEO A. JADER GR No. 132344. February 17, 2000
FACTS:
Romeo Jader, a law student of the University of the East, failed to take his regular examination in Practice Court I in his first semester of his last school year. However, he was able to remove the incomplete mark when the Dean of his college approved his application to take a removal examination.
In the 2nd semester, his name appeared in the tentative list of candidates for graduation for the Decree of Bachelor of Laws and in the invitation for the 35th Investiture and Commencement Ceremonies, the plaintiff’s name appeared. Thus, he attended the investiture ceremonies and graduated.
On April to September 1998, he took a leave of absence from his work and enrolled at the pre-bar review class in Far Eastern University. To his dismay upon knowing that he incurred a deficiency, he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar examinations. He then filed a suit against UE praying for moral and exemplary damages arising from the latter’s negligence. The trial court ruled in his favor and was granted for actual damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification. The CA awarded moral damages. On account of suffering moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights and ultimately for not having to take the bar exam.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Romeo Jader can validly claim for moral damages. RULING:
In view of the foregoing issue, the Supreme Court emphatically enunciated that moral damages cannot be awarded to Romeo Jader. It cannot believe that he suffered shock, trauma, and pain. Along this vein, the Supreme Court held Jader negligent. It opined that as a student, he should have been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs, especially those appertaining to his academics, are in order. If respondent was indeed humiliated by his failure to take the bar, he brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all the requirements. While the Court held the University of the East negligent and therefore liable for actual damages in favor of Jader, the latter was also held liable for negligence thereby no moral damages can be awarded in his favor. The decision was affirmed with modification.
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH VS. CA 219 SCRA 778
FACTS:
This is an appeal by certiorari. On October 27, 1987, without the assistance of counsel, private respondent filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint for damages against petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that she is 20 years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her country; other petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student, before August 20, 1987 the latter courted and proposed to marry her, she accepted his love on the condition that they get married; they therefore agreed to get married. The petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano apartments. She was a virgin at that time; after a week before the filing of complaint, petitioner’s attitude towards her started to change. He maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of the complaint. Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and that the petitioner is already married to someone in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering petitioner to pay her damages. On the other hand, petitioner claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent and denied all allegations against him. After trial on the merits, the lower court ordered petitioner to pay the private respondent damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. HELD:
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. Notwithstanding, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concepts of torts and quasi-delicts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines quasi-delicts thus: “Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.” In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, the court held that where a man’s promise to marry in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and obtain her consent to sexual act could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such breach of promise of marriage but because of the fraud and deceit behind it, and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that
such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.
PE v PE 30 MAY 1962
FACTS:
Defendant Alfonso Pe was treated like a son by the plaintiff Cecilio Pe, as such he was given access to visit to their house. Alfonso got fond of Lolita, one of the daughters of Cecilio. The defendant frequented the house of Lolita because he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Eventually they fell in love with each other; Lolita disappeared from the house so her parents reported the same to the police. They filed a case against Alfonso under Article 21 of the New Civil Code which provides for moral damages. But the case was dismissed by the lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant is liable to Lolita’s family on the ground of moral, good custom and public policy for their illicit affair?
HELD:
There is no doubt that the claim of plaintiffs for damages is based on the fact that defendant, being a married man, carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe thereby causing injury in manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. The defendant took advantage of the trust of Cecilio and even used the praying of rosary as a reason to get close with Lolita.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney’s fees and expenses of litigations. Costs against appellee. So ordered.
WASSMER v VELEZ 26 DECEMBER 1964
FACTS:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love decided to get married on September 4, 1954. Two days before the wedding, Velez left a note for his bride-to-be saying that he wants to postpone the wedding as his mother opposes the same. The following day, Sept. 3, he sent a telegram and told her that nothing is changed and that he apologize and will go back. But Velez did not appear on their wedding, it prompted Wassmer to sue him for damages. Velez was declared in default for failure to answer the complaint. The lower court held in favor of Wassmer for payment of damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a mere breach of promise to marry entitles Wassmer for damages?
HELD:
A mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong but to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized is different. This is palpably and justifiably contrary to good customs for which the defendant must be answerable for.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated, the lower court’s judgment is hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
HERMOSISIMA v CA 30 SEPTEMBER 1960
FACTS:
An appeal by certiorari, on October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas as complainant, filed with the said CFI a complaint for the acknowledgment of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as a natural child of said petitioner, as well as for support of said child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise to marry. Petitioner admitted the paternity of the child and expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry complainant. Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917, since 1950, Soledad then a teacher and petitioner who was almost ten years younger than her used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he made no promise of marriage thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance underwriter where intimacy developed between her and petitioner, since one evening in 1953 when after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board MV Escano to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was pregnant, whereupon he promised to marry her. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez.
ISSUE:
Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our laws for breach of promise to marry?
HELD:
It appears in the case, that because of the defendant-appellant’s seductive powers, plaintiff-appellee was overwhelmed by her love for him yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and self-control. The court is unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten years younger but also because the CFI found that complainant surrendered herself to the petitioner because overwhelmed by her love for him she wanted to bind him by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.
With the elimination of this award for damages, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, therefore, in all other respects, without special pronouncement as to cost in the instance. It is so ordered.
CONSTANTINO v MENDEZ 14 MAY 1992
FACTS:
Michael Constantino, an illegitimate child is represented by Amelita, his mother, asking for support from Ivan Mendez as well as damages. The latter and Amelita met in a restaurant where she worked as a waitress. When Ivan invited her to his hotel, she agreed with a promise of marriage after having sexual intercourse. He even admitted being a married man to her, but despite the confession they continue to have sexual intercourse. When she got pregnant, she had to resign from work. The trial court held in favor of Amelita for actual and moral damages, acknowledging Michael as Ivan’s illegitimate child and giving monthly support to him. Upon appeal, the CA set aside the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Michael as an illegitimate child is entitled for the monthly support?
HELD:
Amelita has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her claim that Ivan is the father of her son Michael. Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the first week of November is the crucial point that was not even established in her testimony. Their repeated sexual intercourse indicated that passion and not alleged promise to marriage was the moving force to submit herself with Ivan.
ST. LOUIS REALTY CORP. v CA 14 NOVEMBER 1984
FACTS:
Dr. Conrado Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and member of the faculty of UE Ramon Magsaysay Medical Center, seek to recover damage for a wrongful advertisement in the Sunday Times where St Louis Realty Corp. misrepresented his house with Mr. Arcadio. St. Louis published an ad on December 15, 1968 with the heading “where the heart is”. This was republished on January 5, 1969. In the advertisement, the house featured was Dr Aramil’s house and not Mr. Arcadio with whom the company asked permission and the intended house to be published. After Dr Aramil noticed the mistake, he wrote a letter to St. Louis demanding an explanation 1 week after such receipt. No rectification or apology was published despite that it was received by Ernesto Magtoto, the officer in charge of the advertisement. This prompted Dr. Aramil’s counsel to demand actual, moral and exemplary damages. On March 18, 1969, St Louis published an ad now with Mr. Arcadio’s real house but nothing on the apology or explanation of the error. Dr Aramil filed a complaint for damages on March 29. The trial court ruled in favor of Dr. Aramil for damages because of the violation of his right to privacy and later on affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not St. Louis is liable to pay damages to Dr. Aramil for violation of his right to privacy?
HELD:
St Louis was grossly negligent in mixing up residences in a widely circulated publication. Furthermore, it never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification". The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as attorney's fees. When St. Louis Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals, CA affirmed the judgement for the reason that “St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code because the questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful house which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally, was annoyed by that contretemps”.
TENCHAVEZ v ESCANO 29 NOVEMBER 1965
FACTS: Vicenta Escano who belongs to a prominent family, got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez. The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicenta’s parents. However Vicenta’s dad disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila. Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce sought by Escano is valid and binding upon the courts in the Philippines?
HELD: Philippine courts cannot give recognition on foreign decree of divorce because it would be in violation of the Civil Code. The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough grounds for legal separation prayed for by Tenchavez. The latter and Escano is still married in the eyes of the Philippine laws.
Vda de Chua vs. CA
GR No. 70909, January 5, 1994 FACTS:
Roberto Lim Chua, during his lifetime, lived out of wedlock with private respondent Florita A. Vallejo from 1970-1981. The couple had two illegitimate children, Roberto Rafson Alonzo and Rudyard Pride Alonzo, all surnamed Chua. Roberto died intestate in Davao City on May 28, 1992. Vallejo filed on July 2, 1992 with RTC-Cotabato a petition for declaration of guardianship of the two child and their properties worth P5,000,000.00.
Antonietta Garcia Vda De Chua, the petitioner, filed a motion alleging that she was the true wife of Roberto. However, according to Vallejo, she is not the surviving spouse of the latter but a pretender to the estate since the deceased never contracted marriage with any woman and died a bachelor.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is indeed the true wife of Roberto Chua. HELD:
The court ruled that petitioner was not able to prove her status as wife of the decedent. She could not produce the original copy or authenticated copy of their marriage certificate. Furthermore, a certification from the Local Civil Registrar was presented that no such marriage contract between petitioner and Roberto Chua was ever registered with them, attested by Judge Augusto Banzali, the alleged person to have solemnized the alleged marriage, that he has not solemnized such alleged marriage.
Hence, it is clear that petitioner failed to establish the truth of her allegation that she was the lawful wife of the decedent. The best evidence is a valid marriage contract which she failed to produce.
Republic vs. CA and Castro
FACTS:
Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin Cardenas. They did not immediately live together and it was only upon Castro found out that she was pregnant that they decided to live together wherein the said cohabitation lasted for only 4 months. Thereafter, they parted ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by her brother with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby was brought in the US and in Castro’s earnest desire to follow her daughter wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving for US. She filed a petition seeking a declaration for the nullity of her marriage. Her lawyer then found out that there was no marriage license issued prior to the celebration of their marriage proven by the certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig.
ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to by Castro is sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued to the parties prior to the solemnization of their marriage.
HELD:
The court affirmed the decision of CA that the certification issued by the Civil Registrar unaccompanied by any circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove that the office did not issue a marriage license to the contracting parties. Albeit the fact that the testimony of Castro is not supported by any other witnesses is not a ground to deny her petition because of the peculiar circumstances of her case. Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with notice of the proceedings, which he chose to ignore.
Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.
Grace J. Garcia-Recio v Rederick A. Recio 366 SCRA 437 GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002 FACTS:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989.
On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.
Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Rederick’s marriage with Editha Samson.
ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.
HELD:
The nullity of Rederick’s marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian. However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner though the former presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country where it will be used.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either:
(1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.
WOLFGANG O. ROEHR vs. MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, G.R. No. 142820 June 20, 2003
Facts:
Petitioner Wolfgang, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent Carmen, a Filipina, on 11 December 1980 in Hamburg, Gemany. Early 1981, the marriage was ratified in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. They had two daughters, Carolyne and Alexandria Kristine.
Private respondent filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Makati on 28 August 1996. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but was denied by trial court. A motion for reconsideration was filed by private respondent but was again denied by the trial court.
In 1997, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese and granting the custody of the children to the father.
It was June 14, 1999 when public respondent issued an order granting the petitioner’s motion to dismiss, but was partially set aside on September 1999 for the purpose of tackling issues regarding property relations of the spouses as well as support and custody of their children. Petitioner assailed for the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction, and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge.
Issue:
Whether or not the Philippine courts can determine the legal effects of a decree of divorce from a foreign country.
Held:
Yes. Our courts can determine the legal effects of a divorce obtained from a foreign country such as those concerning with support and custody of the children.
In this case, the decree did not touch as to who the offending spouse was. The trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and education of the best interests of the children. After all, the child’s welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody.
WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, issued on September 30, 1999 and March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We hereby declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has parental custody, including the care, support and education of the children, namely Carolyne
and Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial court for continuation of appropriate proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Van Dorn vs. Romillo 139 SCRA 139
FACTS:
Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a US citizen, was married in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their residence in the Philippines and had 2 children. They were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with Theodore Van Dorn. A suit against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that petitioner’s business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be declared as the administrator of the said property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.
HELD:
Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before the court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to respondent by virtue of her nationality laws. She should not be discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to be served.
Cang vs Court of Appeals
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married, begot three children. During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couple's relationship was undisturbed. Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her husband's alleged extramarital affair. Anna Marie subsequently filed a petition for legal separation which was granted. They had an agreement for support of the children and that Anna Marie can enter into agreements without the written consent of Herbert. Petitioner left for the US. Meanwhile, the brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie filed for the adoption of the 3 minor Cang children. Upon learning of the adoption, Herbert went back to the Philippines to contest it, but the petition for adoption was granted by the court.
Issue:
Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the ground that the latter has abandoned them?
Held:
Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its retroactivity "insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." As amended by the Family Code, the statutory provision on consent for adoption now reads: Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary: (2) the parents by nature of the child
, the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality. Based on the foregoing, it is thus evident that notwithstanding the amendments to the law, the written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate."In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical estrange mental one, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.
Tenchavez vs. Escano 15 SCRA 355
FACTS:
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker and go-between who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicenta’s
parents. However after translating the said letter to Vicenta’s dad , he disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila.
Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.
ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines.
HELD:
Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
Republic vs. Orbecido
GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005 FACTS:
Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code. HELD:
The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
Hence, the court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.
Ninal vs. Bayadog 328 SCRA 122 FACTS:
Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1
year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage license.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepito’s marriage after his death?
HELD:
The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time of Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can be questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
Manzano vs. Sanchez
AM No. MTJ-001329, March 8, 2001
FACTS:
Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano having been married on May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They had four children. On March 22, 1993, her husband contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. The marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were “separated” thus, respondent Judge ought to know that the marriage was void and bigamous. He claims that when he officiated the marriage of David and Payao, he knew that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years as manifested in their joint affidavit that they both left their families and had never cohabit or communicated with their spouses due to constant quarrels.
ISSUE: Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who both have an existing marriage can contract marriage if they have been cohabitating for 5 years under Article 34 of Family Code.
HELD:
Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other. Considering that both parties has a subsisting marriage, as indicated in their marriage contract that they are both “separated” is an impediment that would make their subsequent marriage null and void. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least 5 years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.
Cosca vs. Palaypayon 237 SCRA 249
FACTS:
The following are the complainants: Juvy N. Cosca (Stenographer 1), Edmundo B. Peralta (Interpreter 1), Ramon C. Sambo (Clerk II) and Apollo Villamora (Process Server). Respondents are Judge Lucio Palaypayon Jr., the presiding judge, and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy, clerk of court II. All work in MTC-Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized marriages even without the requisite of a marriage license. Hence, the following couples were able to get married just by paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy: Alano P. Abellano & Nelly Edralin; Francisco Selpo & Julieta Carrido; Eddie Terrobias & Maria Gacer; Renato Gamay & Maricris Belga; Arsenio Sabater & Margarita Nacario; Sammy Bocaya & Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, the marriage contracts of the following couples did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition, Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization reasoning out that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which happens usually several days after the marriage ceremony. Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code thus exempted from the marriage license requirement. According to him, he gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple copy of the marriage contract and to file the same with the civil registrar but the latter failed to do so. In order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized the marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was then filed with the civil registrar. The other five marriages were not illegally solemnized because Palaypayon did not sign their marriage contracts and the date and place of marriage are not included. It was alleged that copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo. The alleged marriage of Selpo & Carrido, Terrobias & Gacer, Gamay & Belga, Sabater & Nacario were not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license and that the marriage of Bocaya & Bismonte was celebrated even without the requisite license due
