SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION v. PROSPERO ABALLA G.R. No. 149011 June 28, 2005
Ponente: CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
FACTS: Petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) and Sunflower Multi-Purpose Cooperative
(Sunflower) entered into a one-year Contract of Service and such contract is renewed on a monthly basis until terminated. Pursuant to this, respondent Prospero Aballa rendered services to SMC.
After one year of service, Aballa filed a complaint before NLRC praying that they be declared as regular employees of SMC. On the other hand, SMC filed before the DOLE a Notice of Closure due to serious business losses. Hence, the labor arbiter dismissed the complaint and ruled in favor of SMC. Aballa then appealed before the NLRC. The NLRC dismissed the appeal finding that Sunflower is an independent contractor.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed NLRC·s decision on the ground that the agreement between SMC and Sunflower showed a clear intent to abstain from establishing an employer-employee relationship.
ISSUE: Whether or not Aballa and other employees of Sunflower are employees of SMC? HELD: The test to determine the existence of independent contractorship is whether one
claiming to be an independent contractor has contracted to do the work according to his own methods and without being subject to the control of the employer, except only as to the results of the work. In legitimate labor contracting, the law creates an employer-employee relationship for a limited purpose, to ensure that the employees are paid their wages. The principal employer becomes jointly and severally liable with the job contractor, only for the payment of the employees wages whenever the contractor fails to pay the same. Other than that, the principal employer is not responsible for any claim made by the employees. In labor-only contracting, the statute creates an employer-employee relationship for a comprehensive purpose: to prevent a circumvention of labor laws. The contractor is considered merely an agent of the principal employer and the latter is responsible to the employees of the labor-only contractor as if such employees had been directly employed by the principal employer.
The Contract of Services between SMC and Sunflower shows that the parties clearly disavowed the existence of an employer-employee relationship between SMC and private respondents. The language of a contract is not, however, determinative of the parties· relationship; rather it is the totality of the facts and surrounding circumstances of the case. A party cannot dictate, by the mere expedient of a unilateral declaration in a contract, the character of its business, whether as labor-only contractor or job contractor, it being crucial that its character be measured in terms of and determined by the criteria set by statute. What appears is that Sunflower does not have substantial capitalization or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises and other materials to qualify it as an independent contractor. On the other hand, it is gathered that the lot, building, machineries and all other working tools utilized by Aballa et al. in carrying out their tasks were owned and provided by SMC.
And from the job description provided by SMC itself, the work assigned to Aballa et al. was directly related to the aquaculture operations of SMC. As for janitorial and messengerial services, that they are considered directly related to the principal business of the employer has been jurisprudentially recognized. Furthermore, Sunflower did not carry on an independent
business or undertake the performance of its service contract according to its own manner and method, free from the control and supervision of its principal, SMC, its apparent role having been merely to recruit persons to work for SMC.
All the foregoing considerations affirm by more than substantial evidence the existence of an employer- employee relationship between SMC and Aballa. Since Aballa who were engaged in shrimp processing performed tasks usually necessary or desirable in the aquaculture business of SMC, they should be deemed regular employees of the latter and as such are entitled to all the benefits and rights appurtenant to regular employment. They should thus be awarded differential pay corresponding to the difference between the wages and benefits given them and those accorded SMC·s other regular employees.
Philippines Bank of Communications vs. NLRC {G.R. No. L-66598, December 19, 1986
Facts: Petitioner Philippine Bank of Communications and the Corporate Executive Search Inc.
(CESI) entered into a letter agreement dated January 1976 under which (CESI) undertook to provide "Tempo[rary] Services" to petitioner Consisting of the "temporary services" of eleven (11) messengers. The contract period is described as being "from January 1976—." The petitioner in truth undertook to pay a "daily service rate of P18, " on a per person basis.
Attached to the letter agreement was a "List of Messengers assigned at Philippine Bank of Communications" which list included, as item No. 5 thereof, the name of private respondent Ricardo Orpiada.
Ricardo Orpiada was thus assigned to work with the petitioner bank. As such, he rendered services to the bank, within the premises of the bank and alongside other people also rendering services to the bank. There was some question as to when Ricardo Orpiada commenced rendering services to the bank. As noted above, the letter agreement was dated January 1976. However, the position paper submitted by (CESI) to the National Labor Relations Commission stated that (CESI) hired Ricardo Orpiada on 25 June 1975 as a Tempo Service employee, and assigned him to work with the petitioner bank "as evidenced by the appointment memo issued to him on 25 June 1975. " Be that as it may, on or about October 1976, the petitioner requested (CESI) to withdraw Orpiada's assignment because, in the allegation of the bank, Orpiada's services "were no longer needed."
On 29 October 1976, Orpiada instituted a complaint in the Department of Labor (now Ministry of Labor and Employment) against the petitioner for illegal dismissal and failure to pay the 13th month pay provided for in Presidential Decree No. 851. This complaint was docketed as Case No. R04-1010184-76-E. After investigation, the Office of the Regional Director, Regional Office No. IV of the Department of Labor, issued an order dismissing Orpiada's complaint for failure of Mr. Orpiada to show the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the bank and himself.
Accordingly, on 2 April 1984, the bank filed the present petition for certiorari with this Court seeking to annul and set aside (a) the decision of respondent Labor Arbiter Dogelio dated 12 September 1977 in Labor Case No. RB-IV-1118-77 and (b) the decision of the NLRC promulgated on 29 December 1983 affirming with some modifications the decision of the Labor Arbiter. This Court granted a temporary restraining order on 11 April 1984. The main issue as litigated by the parties in this case relates to whether or not an employer-employee relationship existed between the petitioner bank and private respondent Ricardo Orpiada. The petitioner bank maintains that no employer-employee relationship was established between itself and Ricardo Orpiada and that Ricardo Orpiada was an employee of (CESI) and not of the bank.
Issue: Whether or not Orpiada is an employee of the bank or the Agency?
Decision: Turning to the power to control Orpiada's conduct, it should be noted immediately
that Orpiada performed his sections within the bank's premises, and not within the office premises of (CESI) As such, Orpiada must have been subject to at least the same control and supervision that the bank exercises over any other person physically within its premises and rendering services to or for the bank, in other words, any employee or staff member of the bank. It seems unreasonable to suppose that the bank would have allowed Orpiada and the other persons assigned to the bank by CE SI to remain within the bank's premises and there render services to the bank, without subjecting them to a substantial measure of control and
supervision, whether in respect of the manner in which they discharged their functions, or in respect of the end results of their functions or activities, or both.
Under the general rule set out in the first and second paragraphs of Article 106, an employer who enters into a contract with a contractor for the performance of work for the employer, does not thereby create an employer-employes relationship between himself and the employees of the contractor. Thus, the employees of the contractor remain the contractor's employees and his alone. Nonetheless when a contractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in accordance with the Labor Code, the employer who contracted out the job to the contractor becomes jointly and severally liable with his contractor to the employees of the latter "to the extent of the work performed under the contract" as such employer were the employer of the contractor's employees. The law itself, in other words, establishes an employer-employee relationship between the employer and the job contractor's employees for a limited purpose, i.e., in order to ensure that the latter get paid the wages due to them.
The definition of "labor-only" contracting in Rule VIII, Book III of the Implementing Rules must be read in conjunction with the definition of job contracting given in Section 8 of the same Rules. The undertaking given by CESI in favor of the bank was not the performance of a specific — job for instance, the carriage and delivery of documents and parcels to the addresses thereof. There appear to be many companies today which perform this discrete service, companies with their own personnel who pick up documents and packages from the offices of a client or customer, and who deliver such materials utilizing their own delivery vans or motorcycles to the addresses. In the present case, the undertaking of (CESI) was to provide its client-thebank-with a certain number of persons able to carry out the work of messengers. Such undertaking of CESI was complied with when the requisite number of persons were assigned or seconded to the petitioner bank. Orpiada utilized the premises and office equipment of the bank and not those of (CESI) Messengerial work-the delivery of documents to designated persons whether within or without the bank premises — is of course directly related to the day-to-day operations of the bank. Section 9(2) quoted above does not require for its applicability that the petitioner must be engaged in the delivery of items as a distinct and separate line of business.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DENIED and the decision promulgated on 29 December 1983 of the National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 11 April 1984 is hereby lifted. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
Tabas et al VS. California Manufacturing Company G.R. No. L-80680 January 26, 1989
Facts:
Petitioners filed a petition in the NLRC for reinstatement and payment of various benefits against California Manufacturing Company. The respondent company then denied the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the company and the petitioners.
Pursuant to a manpower supply agreement, it appears that the petitioners prior their involvement with California Manufacturing Company were employees of Livi Manpower service, an independent contractor, which assigned them to work as "promotional merchandisers." The agreement provides that:
California "has no control or supervisions whatsoever over [Livi's] workers with respect to how they accomplish their work or perform [Californias] obligation" It was further expressly stipulated that the assignment of workers to California shall be on a "seasonal and contractual basis"; that "[c]ost of living allowance and the 10 legal holidays will be charged directly to [California] at cost "; and that "[p]ayroll for the preceeding [sic] week [shall] be delivered by [Livi] at [California's] premises."
Issue:
Whether the petitioners are California's or Livi's employees?
Held:
There is no doubt that in the case at bar, Livi performs "manpower services", meaning to say, it contracts out labor in favor of clients. We hold that it is one notwithstanding its vehement claims to the contrary, and notwithstanding the provision of the contract that it is "an independent contractor." The nature of one's business is not determined by self-serving appellations one attaches thereto but by the tests provided by statute and prevailing case law. The bare fact that Livi maintains a separate line of business does not extinguish the equal fact that it has provided California with workers to pursue the latter's own business. In this connection, we do not agree that the petitioners had been made to perform activities 'which are not directly related to the general business of manufacturing," California's purported "principal operation activity. " The petitioner's had been charged with "merchandizing [sic] promotion or sale of the products of [California] in the different sales outlets in Metro Manila including task and occational [sic] price tagging," an activity that is doubtless, an integral part of the manufacturing business. It is not, then, as if Livi had served as its (California's) promotions or sales arm or agent, or otherwise, rendered a piece of work it (California) could not have itself done; Livi, as a placement agency, had simply supplied it with the manpower necessary to carry out its (California's) merchandising activities, using its (California's) premises and equipment.
Neither Livi nor California can therefore escape liability, that is, assuming one exists. Petition granted.
Mafinco Trading Corporation vs. Hon Blas F. Ople in his Capacity as Secretary of Labor , The National Labor Relations Commission, Rodrigo Repomanta and Rey
Moralde
G.R. No. L 37790, March 25, 1976 Facts:
Rodrigo Repomanta and Mafinco Trading Corp. sole distributor of Cosmos Soft drinks , executed a peddling Contract whereby Repomanta agreed to buy and sell “ Cosmos Soft drinks, Rey Moralde entered into a similar Contract the Contracts Provide that such were to remain in force for one year unless sooner terminated by either party upon 5 days notice to the other. Pursuant to said Mafinco terminated the Peddling Contract .
Repomanta and Moralde filed a complaint with the NLRC . Mafinco filed a Motion to dismiss on the ground that the NLRC had no jurisdiction because Repomanta and Moralde were not its employees but were independent Contractor.
The NLRC sustained the Motion and dismissed the Complaint on Appeal to the Secretary of Labor the decision was reversed.
Ruling: A Contract whereby one engage to purchase and sell soft drinks on trucks supplied by manufacturer but providing that the other party (peddler) shall have the right to employ his own workers. Shall post a bond to protect the manufacturer against losses, shall be responsible for damages caused to third person, shall obtain the necessary licenses and permits and bear the expenses incurred in the sale of soft drinks is not a contract employment.
Issue:
Whether the work is part of the employer’s general business supplier of soft drinks.
Ruling:
A Contract whereby one engage to purchase and sell soft drinks on trucks supplied by manufacturer but providing that the other party (peddler) shall have the right to employ his own workers. Shall post a bond to protect the manufacturer against losses, shall be responsible for damages caused to third person, shall obtain the necessary licenses and permits and bear the expenses incurred in the sale of soft drinks is not a contract employment.
Decision:
In the Mafinco Trading the court explain that an independent employment and contractor is one who exercise independent employment and contractor to do a price of work according to his methods without being subject to control of his employer except as to the result of work.
INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD. vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and MELECIO BASIAO, G.R. No. 84484 November 15, 1989
FACTS : Petitioner entered contract with Basiao for insurance policies and annuities in accordance with the existing rules and regulations" of the Company; he would receive
"compensation, in the form of commissions ... as provided in the Schedule of Commissions" of the contract to "constitute a part of the consideration of ... (said) agreement;" and the "rules in ... (the Company's) Rate Book and its Agent's Manual, as well as all its circulars ... and those which may from time to time be promulgated by it.
Some four years later, in April 1972, the parties entered into another contract — an Agency Manager's Contract — and to implement his end of it Basiao organized an agency or office to which he gave the name M. Basiao and Associates, while concurrently fulfilling his
commitments under the first contract with the Company.
In May, 1979, the Company terminated the Agency Manager's Contract. After vainly seeking a reconsideration, Basiao sued the Company in a civil action and this, he was later to claim, prompted the latter to terminate also his engagement under the first contract and to stop payment of his commissions starting April 1, 1980.
Basiao thereafter filed with the then Ministry of Labor a complaint against the Company and its president. Without contesting the termination of the first contract, the complaint sought to recover commissions allegedly unpaid there under, plus attorney's fees. The respondents disputed the Ministry's jurisdiction over Basiao's claim, asserting that he was not the Company's employee, but an independent contractor and that the Company had no obligation to him for unpaid commissions under the terms and conditions of his contract.
The Labor Arbiter to whom the case was assigned found for Basiao. He ruled that the
underwriting agreement had established an employer-employee relationship between him and the Company, and this conferred jurisdiction on the Ministry of Labor to adjudicate his claim. Said official's decision directed payment of his unpaid commissions "... equivalent to the balance of the first year's premium remaining unpaid, at the time of his termination, of all the insurance policies solicited by ... (him) in favor of the respondent company ..." plus 10% attorney's fees.
This decision was, on appeal by the Company, affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission. Hence, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition
ISSUE:
Whether, as Basiao asserts, he had become the Company's employee by virtue of the contract invoked by him, thereby placing his claim for unpaid commissions within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter under the provisions of Section 217 of the Labor Code, or, contrarily, as the Company would have it, that under said contract Basiao's status was that of an independent contractor whose claim was thus cognizable, not by the Labor Arbiter in a labor case, but by the regular courts in an ordinary civil action.
HELD:
The Court, therefore, rules that under the contract invoked by him, Basiao was not an employee of the petitioner, but a commission agent, an independent contractor whose claim for unpaid commissions should have been litigated in an ordinary civil action. The Labor Arbiter erred in taking cognizance of, and adjudicating, said claim, being without jurisdiction to do so, as did the respondent NLRC in affirming the Arbiter's decision. This conclusion renders it
WHEREFORE, the appealed Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission is set aside, and that complaint of private respondent Melecio T. Basiao in RAB Case No. VI-0010-83 is dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 80039 April 18, 1989 ERNESTO M. APODACA, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, JOSE M. MIRASOL and INTRANS PHILS., INC., respondents.
FACTS : Petitioner was employed in respondent corporation. On August 28, 1985, respondent Jose M. Mirasol persuaded petitioner to subscribe to 1,500 shares of respondent corporation at P100.00 per share or a total of P150,000.00. He made an initial payment of P37,500.00. On September 1, 1975, petitioner was appointed President and General Manager of the respondent corporation. However, on January 2, 1986, he resigned.
On December 19, 1986, petitioner instituted with the NLRC a complaint against private respondents for the payment of his unpaid wages, his cost of living allowance, the balance of his gasoline and representation expenses and his bonus compensation for 1986. Petitioner and private respondents submitted their position papers to the labor arbiter. Private respondents admitted that there is due to petitioner the amount of P17,060.07 but this was applied to the unpaid balance of his subscription in the amount of P95,439.93. Petitioner questioned the set-off alleging that there was no call or notice for the payment of the unpaid subscription and that, accordingly, the alleged obligation is not enforceable.
In a decision dated April 28, 1987, the labor arbiter sustained the claim of petitioner for P17,060.07 on the ground that the employer has no right to withhold payment of wages already earned under Article 103 of the Labor Code. Upon the appeal of the private respondents to public respondent NLRC, the decision of the labor arbiter was reversed in a decision dated September 18, 1987. The NLRC held that a stockholder who fails to pay his unpaid subscription on call becomes a debtor of the corporation and that the set-off of said obligation against the wages and others due to petitioner is not contrary to law, morals and public policy.
ISSUE : Does the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) have jurisdiction to resolve a claim for non-payment of stock subscriptions to a corporation? Assuming that it has, can an obligation arising therefrom be offset against a money claim of an employee against the employer?
HELD : Firstly, the NLRC has no jurisdiction to determine such intra-corporate dispute between the stockholder and the corporation as in the matter of unpaid subscriptions. This controversy is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission. 1
Secondly, assuming arguendo that the NLRC may exercise jurisdiction over the said subject matter under the circumstances of this case, the unpaid subscriptions are not due and payable until a call is made by the corporation for payment. 2 Private respondents have not presented a resolution of the board of directors of respondent corporation calling for the payment of the unpaid subscriptions. It does not even appear that a notice of such call has been sent to petitioner by the respondent corporation.
What the records show is that the respondent corporation deducted the amount due to petitioner from the amount receivable from him for the unpaid subscriptions. 3 No doubt such set-off was without lawful basis, if not premature. As there was no notice or call for the payment of unpaid subscriptions, the same is not yet due and payable.
Lastly, assuming further that there was a call for payment of the unpaid subscription, the NLRC cannot validly set it off against the wages and other benefits due petitioner. Article 113 of the Labor Code allows such a deduction from the wages of the employees by the employer, only in three instances, to wit:
ART. 113. Wage Deduction. — No employer, in his own behalf or in behalf of any person, shall make any deduction from the wages of his employees, except:
(a) In cases where the worker is insured with his consent by the employer, and the deduction is to recompense the employer for the amount paid by him as premium on the insurance;
(b) For union dues, in cases where the right of the worker or his union to checkoff has been recognized by the employer or authorized in writing by the individual worker concerned; and (c) In cases where the employer is authorized by law or regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor. 4
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the NLRC dated September 18, 1987 is hereby set aside and another judgment is hereby rendered ordering private respondents to pay petitioner the amount of P17,060.07 plus legal interest computed from the time of the filing of the complaint on December 19, 1986, with costs against private respondents.
An obligation arising from non-payment of stock subscriptions to a corporation cannot be offset against a money claim of an EE against an ER
Metrobank Union vs NLRC G.R. No. 102636
VITUG, J.:p
Facts:
Metrobank entered into a CBA with Petitioner, granting a P900 increase in wages. Subsequently, a law was passed increasing the minimum wage. Metrobank classified employees into those receiving less than 100 per day and those receiving more. Those receiving more were not covered by the implementation of the new law but only the increase as agreed upon in the CBA. Petitioners argue that the method of implementation created a wage distortion within the employees of Metrobank because the differences in the salaries of the employee classifications were substantially reduced.
Issue:
Whether or not there was wage distortion? Held:
There was wage distortion. Ratio Decidendi:
Wage Distortion means a situation where an increase in prescribed wage rates results in the elimination or severe contradiction of intentional quantitative differences in wage or salary rates between and among employee groups in an establishment as to effectively obliterate the distinctions embodied in such wage structure based on skills, length of service, or other logical bases of differentiation.
National Federation of Labor vs. NLRC G.R. No. 103586 July 21, 1994 THIRD DIVISION, FELICIANO, J.:
Facts:
Between 1 November 1983 and 1 November 1984, Wage Orders Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 were promulgated increasing the statutory minimum wages of workers with differing increases being specified for agricultural plantation and non-agricultural workers. As a result of the
implementation of such wage orders and the increases brought about by the effectivity of the CBA, there was no more significant differential between regular and non-regular/newly regularized employees.
Meantime, while the above wage developments were unfolding, the Company experienced a work output slow down. The Company directed some 205 workers to explain the reduction in their work output. The workers failed to comply and they were accordingly issued notices of dismissal by the Company. As a response to its decreasing productivity levels, the Company suspended operations on 16 August 1984. Operations were resumed on 14 September 1984; the Company, however, refused to take back the 205 dismissed employees. Petitioner Union then went on strike alleging a lock-out on the part of the Company and demanding rectification of the wage distortion. The case was certified by the Secretary of Labor to the National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC") for compulsory conciliation.
On 19 June 1985, the Union and the Company reached an agreement with respect to the lock-out issue. The agreement, which was approved by the NLRC En Banc, granted the 205 employees "financial assistance" equivalent to thirty (30) days' separation pay. This left unresolved only the wage distortion issue.
On 11 November 1987, the NLRC En Banc rendered a decision which in effect found the existence of wage distortion and required the Company to pay a P1.00 wage increase effective 1 May 1984:
On motion for partial reconsideration filed by the Company, the above quoted portion of the NLRC En Banc's decision was reconsidered and set aside by the NLRC Fifth Division. 3 The
Fifth Division of the NLRC in effect found that while a wage distortion did exist commencing 16 June 1984, the distortion persisted only for a total of fifteen (15) days and accordingly required private respondent company to pay "a wage increase of P2.00 per day to all regular workers effective June 16, 1984 up to June 30, 1984 or a total of fifteen (15) days." 4 The rest of the
decision of 11 November 1987 was left untouched.
Issue:
Whether a wage distortion occur due to the implementation of Wage Orders?
Code). That this re-establishment of a significant differential was the result of collective bargaining negotiations, rather than of a special grievance procedure, is not a legal basis for ignoring it. The NLRC En Banc was in serious error when it disregarded the differential of P3.60 which had been restored by 1 July 1985 upon the ground that such differential "represent[ed] negotiated wage increase[s] which should not be considered covered and in compliance with the Wage Orders." 11 The Wage Orders referred to above had provided for the crediting of
increases in wages or allowances granted or paid by employers within a specified time against the statutorily prescribed increases in minimum wages.
In relation, NLRC in its Resolution dated 11 November 1987, provided some elaboration of the notion of wage distortion:
As used herein, a wage distortion shall mean a situation where an increase in prescribed wage rates results in the elimination or severe contraction of
intentional quantitative differences in wage or salary rates between and among employee groups in an establishment as to effectively obliterate the distinctions embodied in such wage structure based on skills, length of service, or other logical bases of differentiation. 9 (Emphasis supplied)
From the above quoted material, it will be seen that the concept of wage distortion assumes an existing grouping or classification of employees which establishes distinctions among such employees on some relevant or legitimate basis. This classification is reflected in a differing wage rate for each of the existing classes of employees. The wage distortion anticipated in Wage Orders Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 was a "distortion" (or "compression") which ensued from the impact of those Wage Orders upon the different wage rates of the several classes of
employees. Thus distortion ensued where the result of implementation of one or another of the several Wage Orders was the total elimination or the severe reduction of the differential or gap existing between the wage rates of the differing classes of employees.
Decision:
We conclude that petitioner NFL has not shown any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC in rendering its decision (through its Fifth Division) dated 16 December 1991.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 108556 November 19, 1996
MANILA MANDARIN EMPLOYEES UNION, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, Second Division, and the MANILA MANDARIN HOTEL, respondents.
ISSUE:
On October 30, 1986, the Manila Mandarin Employees Union (hereafter UNION), as exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of the Manila Mandarin Hotel, Inc. (hereafter MANDARIN), filed with the NLRC Arbitration Branch a complaint in its members' behalf to compel MANDARIN to pay the salary differentials of the individual employees concerned because of wage distortions in their salary structure allegedly created by the upward revisions of the minimum wage pursuant to various Presidential Decrees and Wage Orders, and the failure of MANDARIN to implement the corresponding increases in the basic salary rate of newly-hired employees.
The relevant Presidential Decrees and Wage Orders were invoked during the said trial.
On January 15, 1987, the UNION filed its Position Paper amplifying the allegations of its complaint and setting forth the legal bases of its demands against MANDARIN; and on March 25, 1987, it filed an Amended Complaint presenting an additional claim for payment of salary differentials to the union members affected, allegedly resulting from underpayment of wages. The Labor Arbiter eventually ruled in favor of the UNION, however it was later reversed by the Commission, Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT WAGE DISTORTION EXIST. HELD:
There was no wage distortion that existed. Wage distortion is a situation where an increase in prescribed wage rates results in the elimination or severe contraction of Intentional quantitative differences in wage or salary rates between and among employee groups in an establishment as to effectively obliterate the distinctions embodied in such wage structure based on skills, length of service, or other logical bases of differentiation.A review of the records convinces this Court that respondent NLRC committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding that no wage distortion was demonstrated by the UNION.
CAGAYAN SUGAR MILLING COMPANY, petitioner vs.
SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, DIRECTOR RICARDO S. MARTINEZ, SR., and CARSUMCO EMPLOYEES UNION, respondents.
G.R. No. 128399 January 15, 1998
PUNO, J.: Facts:
On September 12 and 13, 1994, labor inspectors from the DOLE Regional Office examined the books of petitioner to determine its compliance with the wage order. They found that petitioner violated the wage order as it did not implement an across the board increase in the salary of its employees.
At the hearing at the DOLE Regional Office for the alleged violation, petitioner maintained that it complied with Wage Order No. RO2-02 as it paid the mandated increase in the minimum wage. In an Order dated December 16, 1994, public respondent Regional Director Ricardo S.
Martinez, Sr. ruled that petitioner violated Wage Order RO2-02 by failing to implement an across the board increase in the salary of its employees. He ordered petitioner to pay the deficiency in the salary of its employees in the total amount of P555,133.41.
On January 6, 1995, petitioner appealed to public respondent Labor Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing. On the same date, the Regional Wage Board issued Wage Order No. RO2-02-A, 2 amending the earlier wage order,
On October 8, 1996, the Secretary of Labor dismissed petitioner's appeal and affirmed the Order of Regional Director Martinez, Sr. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. 3
On February 12, 1997, private respondent CARSUMCO EMPLOYEES UNION moved for execution of the December 16, 1994 Order. Regional Director Martinet, Sr. granted the motion and issued the writ of execution. On March 4, 1997, petitioner moved for reconsideration to set aside the writ of execution. On March 5, the DOLE regional sheriff served on petitioner a notice of garnishment of its account with the Far East Bank and Trust Company. On March 10, the sheriff seized petitioner's dump truck and scheduled its public sale on March 20, 1997. Hence, this petition, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO). On April 3, 1997, this Court issued a TRO enjoining respondents from enforcing the writ of execution. 4 On July 16, upon petitioner's motion, we amended the TRO by also enjoining respondents from enforcing the Decision of the Secretary of Labor and conducting further proceedings until further orders from this Court. 5
In the case at bar, petitioner contends that: Issue:
THE PROCEDURE PROVIDED BY LAW AND IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
Art. 123. Wage Order. — Whenever conditions in the region so warrant, the Regional Board shall investigate and study all pertinent facts, and, based on the standards and criteria herein prescribed, shall proceed to determine whether a Wage Order should be issued. Any such Wage Order shall take effect after (15) days from its complete publication in at least one (1) newspaper of general circulation in the region.
The record shows that there was no prior public consultation or hearings and newspaper publication insofar as Wage Order No. RO2-02-A is concerned. In fact, these allegations were not denied by public respondents in their Comment. Public respondents' position is that there was no need to comply with the legal requirements of consultation and newspaper publication as Wage order No. RO2-02-A merely clarified the ambiguous provision of the original wage order.
Public respondents insist that despite the wording of Wage Order RO2-02 providing for a statutory increase in minimum wage, the real intention of the Regional Board was to provide for an across the board increase. Hence, they urge that petitioner is liable for merely providing an increase in the statutory minimum wage rates of its employees.
The contention is absurd. Petitioner clearly complied with Wage Order RO2-02 which provided for an increase in statutory minimum wage rates for employees in Region II. It is not just to expect petitioner to interpret Wage RO2-02 to mean that it granted an across the board increase as such interpretation is not sustained by its text. Indeed, the Regional Wage Board had to amend Wage Order RO2-02 to clarify this alleged intent.
In sum, we hold that RO2-02-A is invalid for lack of public consultations and hearings and non-publication in a newspaper of general circulation, in violation of Article 123 of the Labor Code. We likewise find that public respondent Secretary of Labor committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the findings of Regional Director Ricardo S. Martinez, Sr. that petitioner violated Wage Order RO2-02.
Held:
the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Secretary of Labor, dated October 8, 1996, is set aside for lack of merit.
ECOP vs. NWPC
(G.R. No. 96169 September 24, 1991) Facts :
On October 15, 1990, the Regional Board of the National Capital Region issued Wage Order No. NCR-01, increasing the minimum wage by P17.00 daily in the National Capital Region. The Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP) moved for reconsideration; so did the Personnel Management Association of the Philippines (PMAP). ECOP opposed.
On October 23, 1990, the Board issued Wage Order No. NCR-01-A amending Wage Order No. NCR-01, as follows:
Section 1. Upon the effectivity of this Wage Order, all workers and employees in the private sector in the National Capital Region already receiving wages above the statutory minimum wage rates up to one hundred and twenty-five pesos (P125.00) per day shall also receive an increase of seventeen pesos (P17.00) per day.
ECOP appealed to the National Wages and Productivity Commission. On November 6, 1990, the Commission promulgated an Order, dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. On November 14, 1990, the Commission denied reconsideration.
Issue :
The Employers Confederation of the Philippines (ECOP) is questioning the validity of Wage Order No. NCR-01-A dated October 23, 1990 of the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board, National Capital Region, promulgated pursuant to the authority of Republic Act No. 6727.
Held :
The Commission noted that the increasing trend is toward the salary-cap method, which has reduced disputes arising from wage distortions (brought about, apparently, by the floor-wage method). Precisely, Republic Act No. 6727 was intended to rationalize wages, first, by providing for full-time boards to police wages round-the-clock, and second, by giving the boards enough powers to achieve this objective. The Court is of the opinion that Congress meant the boards to be creative in resolving the annual question of wages without labor and management knocking on the legislature's door at every turn.
MEYCAUAYAN COLLEGE, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment and MEYCAUYAN COLLEGE FACULTY AND PERSONNEL
ASSOCIATION (MCFPA), respondents. FACTS:
Petitioner is a private educational institution duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, and operating in Meycauayan, Bulacan. On January 16, 1987, its board of trustees recognized the Meycauayan College Faculty and Personnel Association as the employees union in the Meycauayan College.
Prior to said recognition or on July 17, 1983, petitioner and the union, then headed by Mrs. Teresita V. Lim, entered into a collective bargaining agreement for 1983-1986. Article IV thereof provides:
SALARY SCALE
IV. 4.0 ANG ANTAS NG PAGPAPASUWELDO SA MGA GURO SA MATAAS NG PAARALAN AY UMAALINSUNOD SA PARAAN NG PAGRARANGGONG KALAKIP NITO BILANG "TAKDA" AT AYON PA RIN SA SUMUSUNOD NA HALAGA NG PAGPAPASUWELDO (IPATUTUPAD SA AÑO-ESCOLAR 1983-1986):
PAGSUBOK A (1-3 TAON) P51.50 KLASE 1 (4-5 TAON) P52.00 (6-8 TAON) P53.00
KLASE II (9-12 TAON) P54.00 KLASE III (13-14 TAON) P57.00 KLASE IV (15-17 TAON) P60.00 KLASE V (18-21 TAON) P63.00 (22 PATAAS) P70.00
When the collective bargaining agreement was entered into, the following presidential decrees were in effect:
(c) P.D. No. 1751 dated May 14, 1980 increasing the statutory daily minimum wage at all levels by P4.00 after integrating the mandatory emergency living allowance under P.D. Nos. 525 and 1123 into the basic pay of all covered workers. Wage Order No. 2 increasing the mandatory basic minimum wage and living allowance was also issued on July 6, 1983 just before the collective bargaining agreement herein involved was entered into.
During the lifetime of the collective bargaining agreement, the following were issued:
(a) Wage Order No. 3 dated November 7, 1983 increasing the minimum daily living allowance in the private sector;
(b) Wage Order No. 4 dated May 1, 1984 integrating as of said date the emergency cost of living allowances under P.D. Nos. 1614, 1634 and 1713 into the basic pay of covered workers in the private sector;
(c) Wage Order No. 5 dated June 11, 1984 increasing the cost of living allowance of workers in the private sector whose basic salary or wage is not more than P1,800 a month; and
(d) Wage Order No. 6 dated October 26, 1984 increasing the daily living allowances.
The union admits herein that its members were paid all these increases in pay mandated by law. It appears, however, that in 1987, shortly after union president Mrs. Teresita V. Lim, who held the managerial position of registrar of the college, had turned over the presidency of the union to Mrs. Fe Villarico, the latter unintentionally got a copy of the collective bargaining agreement and discovered that Article IV thereof had not been implemented by the petitioner. Consequently, on March 27, 1987, the union filed with the Department of Labor and Employment, Regional Office No. III in San Fernando, Pampanga, a notice of strike on the ground of unfair labor practice alleging therein violation of the collective bargaining agreement particularly the provisions of Article IV thereof on salary scale.
ISSUE:
1. Whether increases in employees' salaries resulting from the implementation of presidential decrees and wage orders, which are over and above the agreed salary scale contracted for between the employer and the employees in a collective bargaining agreement, preclude the employees from claiming the difference between their old salaries and those provided for under said salary scale.
RULING:
"Non-compliance with the mandate of a standards law or decree may give rise to an ordinary action for recovery while violation of a collective bargaining agreement may even give rise to a criminal action for unfair labor practice. And while the relief sought for violation of a standards law or decree is primarily for restitution of (an) unpaid benefits, the relief sought for violating a CBA is ordinarily for compliance and desistance. Moreover, there is no provision in the aforecited Presidential Decrees providing that compliance thereto is sufficient compliance with a provision of a collective bargaining agreement and vice-versa." The dispositive portion of the Secretary's order of September 9, 1987 states:
WHEREFORE, the Management of Meycauayan College is hereby ordered to: 1) Strictly effect the payment of salaries of the union members in accordance with the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement;
2) Pay the covered union members salary differential computed by subtracting the salary actually paid and received by them per period provided in the collective bargaining agreement for school years 1983-1984; 1984-1985 and 1985-1986 including the differential for the 13th month pay for the same period. 5
The petition has no merit.
As correctly ruled by public respondent, a collective bargaining agreement is a contractual obligation. It is distinct from an obligation imposed by law. The terms and conditions of a collective bargaining contract constitute the law between the parties. Beneficiaries thereof are therefore, by right, entitled to the fulfillment of the obligation prescribed therein. Consequently, to deny binding force to the collective bargaining agreement would place a premium on a refusal by a party thereto to comply with the terms of the agreement. Such refusal would constitute an unfair labor practice.
Nevertheless, as the key to the interpretation of contracts, including collective bargaining agreements, is the intention of the parties, we examined the record and found the undisputed allegation of private respondent that the collective bargaining agreement herein involved was entered into by the parties to improve the plight of the teachers by increasing their salary. The parties increased the teachers' salary or rate per period, by drafting a salary scale "based on the length of service" of the teachers and eventually came up with Article IV aforequoted.From this unrebutted allegation, it is clear that the parties wanted to attain one goal — increase the salaries of the teachers on the basis of their length of service. Hence, it is immaterial that the means by which said goal is achieved is through the alteration of the salary scale.
On the issue of prescription, Article 291 (now Art. 290) of the Labor Code herein invoked by petitioner, provides:
Offenses. — Offenses penalized under this Code and the rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto shall prescribe in three (3) years.
All unfair labor practices arising from Book V shall be filed with the appropriate agency within one (1) year from accrual of such unfair labor practice; otherwise, they shall be forever barred.
The one-year prescriptive period is inapplicable in this case because of peculiar factual circumstances which petitioner has not denied. Although the collective bargaining agreement covers school years 1983 to 1986, a copy of the agreement was only made available to the union in 1987. Immediately thereafter, the union sought its implementation. The union members might have been aware of the existence of the collective bargaining agreement but that fact that their president was actually a management employee being petitioner's registrar, they must
Article 264(g), now Article 263(g) of the Labor Code is broad enough to give the Secretary of Labor the power to take jurisdiction over what appears at first blush to be an ordinary money claim. Claims for pay differentials may have that character but, as earlier stated, if they arise out of a violation of a collective bargaining agreement, they assume the character of an unfair labor practice and are, therefore, well within the ambit of the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor to decide.the decision of the Secretary of Labor is hereby AFFIRMED and the temporary restraining order of February 15,1989 is LIFTED.
G.R. No. 982767 February 15, 1995
COCOFED (Kalamansig) and/or CRISPIN ROSETE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, Undersecretary of the Department of Labor and Employment and HON. MELENCIO Q. BALANAG, Director IV, DOLE, Regional XII,
Cotabato City, respondents.
Facts: Philippine Coconut Producers Federation operates petitioner COCOFED (Kalamansig),
a coconut plantation utilized as a demonstration farm for replanting and/or training area for coconut farmers, located in Kalamansig, Sultan Kudarat.
On November 15, 1988, a complaint inspection was conducted by the Department of Labor and Employment, Region XII, Cotabato City in response to complaints filed by two of petitioner's employees, Alex Edicto and Delia Pahuwayan. The inspection revealed that petitioner was guilty of underpayment of wages, emergency cost of living allowance (ECOLA) and 13th month pay. Accordingly, notice of inspection results was issued: requiring petitioner to effect restitution or correction within five (5) days from notice.
Summary Petitioner submitted its position paper claiming that it should be classified as an establishment with less than 30 employees and with a paid-up capital of P500,000.00 or less as evidenced by the assessment of the municipal treasurer. Moreover, complainants worked for less than eight hours, a minimum of four and maximum of six.
. . . A three (3) year actual payrolls from March 1985 to February 1989 showing the daily actual payment made by the respondent to involved workers are substantial evidence against the mere memorandum issued by the respondents on the matter. Further, such payrolls submitted by respondents are not mere summaries of daily efforts of workers but these are daily records showing workers actual daily rate.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was justified in paying an amount less than the statutory
minimum wage.
Held: Petitioner would have us overturn the factual finding of public respondents that its
employees are daily paid workers. This we are unable to do for the payrolls submitted by it support the latters' position. Findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but finality. Moreover, there is absolutely nothing in the records which show that petitioner's employees worked for less than eight hours. Finally, there would have been no need for petitioner to make an offer increasing the wage to P45.00 per day if complainants were indeed piece rate workers, as it claimed and if their wages were not underpaid, as found by public respondents.
G.R. No. 82849 August 2, 1989
CEBU OXYGEN & ACETYLENE CO., INC. (COACO) petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY FRANKLIN M. DRILON OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, ASSISTANT REGIONAL DIRECTOR CANDIDO CUMBA OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 7 AND CEBU OXYGEN-ACETYLENE & CENTRAL VISAYAS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (COACVEA)
respondents..
GANCAYCO, J.;
FACTS:
Petitioner and the union of its rank and file employees, Cebu Oxygen, Acetylene and Central Visayas Employees Association (COAVEA) entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) covering the years 1986 to 1988.
1) For the first year which will be paid on January 14, 1986 — P200 to each covered employee.
2) For the second year which will be paid on January 16, 1987-P 200 to each covered employee.
3) 3) For the third year which will be paid on January 16, 1988 — P300 to each covered employee.
On December 14, 1987, Republic Act No. 6640 was passed increasing the minimum wage, in sum, Section 8 of the implementing rules prohibits the employer from crediting anniversary wage increases negotiated under a collective bargaining agreement against such wage increases mandated by Republic Act No. 6640.
On February 22, 1988, a Labor and Employment Development Officer, pursuant to Inspection Authority No. 058-88, commenced a routine inspection of petitioner's establishment. Upon completion of the inspection on March 10, 1988, and based on payrolls and other records, he found that petitioner committed violations of the law as follows:
1. Under payment of Basic Wage per R.A. No. 6640 covering the period of two (2) months representing 208 employees who are not receiving wages above P100/day prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6640 in the aggregate amount of EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND AND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P83,200.00); and 2. Under payment of 13th month pay for the year 1987, representing 208 employees who are not receiving wages above P 100/day prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6640 in the aggregate amount of FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND AND FORTY EIGHT PESOS (P48,048.00).
ISSUE:
The principal issue raised in this petition is whether or not an Implementing Order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) can provide for a prohibition not contemplated by the law it seeks to implement.
As to the issue of the validity of Section 8 of the rules implementing Republic Act No. 6640, which prohibits the employer from crediting the anniversary wage increases provided in collective bargaining agreements, it is a fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot add or detract from the provisions of law it is designed to implement. The provisions of Republic Act No. 6640, do not prohibit the crediting of CBA anniversary wage increases for purposes of compliance with Republic Act No. 6640. The implementing rules cannot provide for such a prohibition not contemplated by the law. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. The law itself cannot be expanded by such regulations. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.
3 Thus petitioner's contention that the salary increases granted by it pursuant to the existing
CBA including anniversary wage increases should be considered in determining compliance with the wage increase mandated by Republic Act No. 6640, is correct. However, the amount that should only be credited to petitioner is the wage increase for 1987 under the CBA when the law took effect. The wage increase for 1986 had already accrued in favor of the employees even before the said law was enacted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Section 8 of the rules implementing Republic 6640, is hereby declared null and void in so far as it excludes the anniversary wage increases negotiated under collective bargaining agreements from being credited to the wage increase provided for under Republic Act No. 6440. This decision is immediately executory.
ODIN SECURITY AGENCY vs. HON. DIONISIO C. DE LA SERNA, G.R. No. 87439 February 21, 1990
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.: FACTS:
On July 8, 1986, a complaint was filed by Sergio Apilado and fifty-five (55) others
charging the petitioner Odin Security Agency (hereafter "OSA"), underpayment of wages, illegal deductions, non-payment of night shift differential, overtime pay, premium pay for holiday work, rest days and Sundays, service incentive leaves, vacation and sick leaves, and 13th-month pay. When conciliation efforts failed, the parties were required to submit their position papers.
Private respondents alleged in their position paper that their latest monthly salary was P1,600; that from this amount, petitioner deducted P100 as administrative cost and P20 as bond; that they were not paid their premium pay and overtime pay for working on the eleven (11) legal holidays per year; and, that since private respondents were relieved or constructively dismissed, they must also be paid backwages.
Petitioner, on the other hand, contended that on July 21, 1986, some 48 security guards threatened mass action against it. Alarmed by a possible abandonment of post by the guards and mindful of its contractual obligations to its clients/principals, petitioner relieved and re-assigned the complaining guards to other posts in Metro Manila. Those relieved were ordered to report to the agency's main office for reassignment. Only few complied, so those who failed to comply were placed on "AWOL" status. Petitioner claimed it complied with the Labor Code provisions, and in support thereof, it submitted the "Quitclaim and Waiver" of thirty-four (34) complainants. It further alleged that complainants who rendered over-time work as shown by their time sheets were paid accordingly; that service incentive leaves not availed of, night shift differential, rest days, and holidays were paid in cash.
Earlier, on October 21, 1986, seventeen (17) complainants repudiated their quitclaim and waiver. They alleged that management pressured them to sign documents which they were not allowed to read and that if such waiver existed, they did not have any intention of waiving their rights under the law.
Petitioner in its reply argued that complainants were estopped from denying their quitclaims on the ground of equity; that being high school graduates, complainants fully understood the document they signed; and that complainant's allegation of coercion or threat was a mere afterthought.
Later, six (6) of the seventeen (17) complainants who repudiated their quitclaims again executed quitclaims and waivers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was denied due process?
HELD:
The petition has no merit.
The petitioner was not denied due process for several hearings were in fact conducted by the hearing officer of the Regional Office of the DOLE and the parties submitted position papers upon which the Regional Director based his decision in the case. There is abundant jurisprudence to the effect that the requirements of due process are satisfied when the parties are given an opportunity to submit position papers Parel, 156 SCRA 768; Adamson & Adamson,
Inc. vs. Amores, 152 SCRA 237). Since petitioner herein participated in the hearings, submitted a position paper, and filed a motion for reconsideration of the March 23, 1988 decision of the Labor Undersecretary, it was not denied due process.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
... Under the present rules, a Regional Director exercises both visitorial and enforcement power over labor standards cases, and is therefore empowered to adjudicate money claims, provided there still exists an employer-employee relationship, and the findings of the regional office is not contested by the employer concerned. (p. 5, Decision.)
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed and the orders dated March 23, 1988 and March 13, 1989 of the Undersecretary of Labor are hereby affirmed. The temporary restraining order earlier issued by this Court is lifted. No costs.
URBANES VS. SEC OF LABOR FACTS:
Petitioner Placido O. Urbanes, Jr., doing business under the name and style of Catalina Security Agency, entered into an agreement1 to provide security services to respondent Social
Security System (SSS).
petitioner, by letter of May 16, 1994, requested the SSS for the upward adjustment of their contract rate in view of Wage Order No. NCR-03 which was issued by the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board-NCR pursuant to Republic Act 6727 otherwise known as the Wage Rationalization Act
On June 24, 1994, petitioner pulled out his agency’s services from the premises of the SSS and another security agency, Jaguar, took over.
On June 29, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint with the DOLE-NCR against the SSS seeking the implementation of Wage Order No. NCR-03.
In its position paper,7 the SSS prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that
petitioner is not the real party in interest and has no legal capacity to file the same. In any event, it argued that if it had any obligation, it was to the security guards.
The SSS moved to reconsider the September 16, 1994 Order of the Regional Director, praying that the computation be revised.
By Order of December 9, 1994, the Regional Director modified his September 16, 1994 Order by reducing the amount payable by the SSS to petitioner.
The Secretary of Labor, by Order of June 22, 1995, set aside the order of the Regional Director and remanded the records of the case "for recomputation of the wage differentials using P 5,281.00 as the basis of the wage adjustment." And the Secretary held petitioner’s security agency "JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY liable for wage differentials, the amount of which should be paid DIRECTLY to the security guards concerned."
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the DOLE Secretary’s Order of June 22, 1995 having been denied by Order of October 10, 1995, the present petition was filed, petitioner contending that the DOLE Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion
Petitioner thus contends that as the appeal of SSS was filed with the wrong forum, it should have been dismissed.
The SSS, on the other hand, contends that Article 128, not Article 129, is applicable to the case. Article 128 provides:
ISSUE:
Whether or not NLRC has jurisdiction over the said case.
We agree with the respondent that the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the present case. It is well settled in law and jurisprudence that where no employer-employee relationship exists between the parties and no issue is involved which may be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes or any collective bargaining agreement, it is the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction. In its complaint, private respondent is not seeking any relief under the Labor Code but seeks payment of a sum of money and damages on account of petitioner's alleged breach of its obligation under their Guard Service Contract. The action is within the realm of civil law hence jurisdiction over the case belongs to the regular courts. While the resolution of the issue involves the application of labor laws, reference to the labor code was only for the determination of the solidary liability of the petitioner to the
ZIALCITA, et al. VS. PAL
Case No. RO4-3-3398-76, February 20, 1977 (Office of the President Decision FACTS:
Complainant Zialcita, an international flight stewardess of respondent, was discharge from the service on account of her marriage.
In separating complainant Zialcita, respondent Philippine Air Lines invoked its policy or regulation as follows:
“D. Flight Attendants.- Flight attendant applicant must be single. Flight attendants will be automatically separated from employment in the event they subsequently get married.. Which is allegedly in conformity with the following provision of law:
“Art. 132. Facilities for women. – The Secretary of Labor shall establish standards that will insure the safety and health of women employees. In appropriate cases, he shall be regulations require any employer to xxx:
“(d) determine appropriate minimum age and other standards for retirement or termination in special occupations such as those of flight attendants and the like.”
On the other hand, complainant questioned her termination on account of her marriage based on the policy above quoted, invoking Article 136 of the Labor Code, which reads: x x
ISSUE:
Whether the termination of the services of complainant on account of marriage is legal.
RULING:
Of first impression is the incompatibility of the respondent’s policy or regulation with the codal provision of law. Respondent is resolute in its contention that Article 136 of the Labor Code applies only to women employed in ordinary occupations, like flight attendants, is fair and reasonable, considering the peculiarities of their chosen profession.
We cannot subscribe to the line of reasoning pursued by respondents. All along, it knew that the converted policy has already met its doom as early as March 13, 1973 when Presidential Decree No. 148, otherwise known as the Women and Child Labor Law, was promulgated. But for the timidity of those affected or their labor in challenging the validity of the policy, the same was able to obtain a momentary reprieve. A close look at section 8 of said decree, which amended paragraph (c ) of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 679, reveals that it is exactly the same provision reproduced verbatim in Article 136 of the Labor Code, which was promulgated on May 1, 1974 to take effect six months later, or on November 1, 1974.
It cannot be gainsaid that, with the reiteration of the same provision in the new Labor Code, all policies and acts against it are deemed illegal and therefore abrogated. True, Article 132 enjoins the Secretary of Labor to establish standards that will ensure the safety and health of women employees and in appropriate cases shall by regulation require employers to determine appropriate minimum standards for termination in special occupations, such as those of flight attendants.
It is logical to presume that, in the absence of said standards or regulations which are as yet to be established, the policy of respondent against marriage is patently illegal.
Olympia Gualberto, et al vs. Marinduque Mining Industrial Corporation CA G.R. No. 52753-R June 28, 1978
Facts: Plaintiff, while still single, was employed in 1971 by defendant as company dentist in its Surigao Nickel Project. In March 1972, she married Gualberto , an electrical engineer in the same project. In the same month, defendant her that it considered her resigned effective April 15, 1972, invoking a policy of the firm to consider ,due lack of facilities for married women ,female employees in the project at Nocnoc Island Surigao as separated the moment they get married. Defendant further claimed that plaintiff was employed in the project with oral
understanding that her services would be terminated when she gets married.
Plaintiff and her husband, who alleges he was forced to resign because of his wife’s illegal dismissal, claims moral , exemplary and other damages.
Ruling: The assignments of error are subsumed in the simple question as to whether the termination of the employment of Olympia Recreo Gualberto by reason of her marriage was valid or not.
The efforts of defendants distinguish between a verbal pre -employment agreement of the project engineer and the plaintiff on the other hand and Company policy on the other do not impress as at all, Whether pre employment agreement or company policy, the same is void. And supposed letter of resignation based on the same considerations as the pre-employment agreement is equally illegal and void.
APEX MINING COMPANY, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and SINCLITICA CANDIDO, respondents. G.R. No. 94951 April 22, 1991
FACTS:
Private respondent Sinclita Candida was employed by petitioner Apex Mining Company, Inc. on May 18, 1973 to perform laundry services at its staff house located at Masara, Maco, Davao del Norte. In the beginning, she was paid on a piece rate basis. However, on January 17, 1982, she was paid on a monthly basis at P250.00 a month which was ultimately increased to P575.00 a month.
On December 18, 1987, while she was attending to her assigned task and she was hanging her laundry, she accidentally slipped and hit her back on a stone. She reported the accident to her immediate supervisor Mila de la Rosa and to the personnel officer, Florendo D. Asirit. As a result of the accident she was not able to continue with her work. She was permitted to go on leave for medication. De la Rosa offered her the amount of P 2,000.00 which was eventually increased to P5,000.00 to persuade her to quit her job, but she refused the offer and preferred to return to work. Petitioner did not allow her to return to work and dismissed her on February 4, 1988.
On March 11, 1988, private respondent filed a request for assistance with the Department of Labor and Employment. After the parties submitted their position papers as required by the labor arbiter assigned to the case on August 24, 1988 the latter rendered a decision, ordering the respondent, Apex Mining Company, Inc., to pay the complainant a total amount of P55,161.42.
Not satisfied therewith, petitioner appealed to NLRC. NLRC dismissed the appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the appealed decision. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Hence, the herein petition for review by certiorari, with the main thrust that private respondent should be treated as a mere househelper or domestic servant and not as a regular employee of petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the househelper in the staff houses of an industrial company a domestic helper or a regular employee of the said firm.
HELD:
The term "househelper" as used herein is synonymous to the term "domestic servant" and shall refer to any person, whether male or female, who renders services in and about the employer's home and which services are usually necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and ministers exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer's family.
The foregoing definition covers family drivers, domestic servants, laundry women, yayas, gardeners, houseboys and other similar househelps. Hence, the definition cannot be interpreted to include househelp or laundrywomen working in staffhouses of a company, like petitioner who attends to the needs of the company's guest and other persons availing of said facilities.
The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the employer in the home of said employer. While it may be true that the nature of the work of a househelper, domestic servant or laundrywoman in a home or in a company staffhouse may be similar in nature, the difference in their circumstances is that in the former instance they are actually serving the family while in the latter case, whether it is a corporation or a single proprietorship engaged in business or industry or any other agricultural or similar pursuit, service is being rendered in the staffhouses or within the premises of the business of the employer. In such instance, they are employees of the company or employer in the business concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular employee.
Private respondent Candida is therefore, entitled to appropriate relief as a regular employee of petitioner. Inasmuch as private respondent appears not to be interested in returning to her work for valid reasons, the payment of separation pay to her is in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the appealed decision and resolution of public respondent NLRC are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
