Sonja Drobnič Mandy Kusnierz Johannes Huinink

SOCIUM Forschungszentrum Ungleichheit und Sozialpolitik / Research Center on Inequality and Social Policy

SFB 1342 Globale Entwicklungsdynamiken von Sozialpolitik / CRC 1342 Global Dynamics of Social Policy

Postadresse / Postaddress: Postfach 33 04 40, D - 28334 Bremen Websites: https://www.socium.uni-bremen.de https://www.socialpolicydynamics.de [ISSN (Print) 2629-5733] [ISSN (Online) 2629-5741]

Gefördert durch die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) Projektnummer 374666841 – SFB 1342

Sonja Drobnič, Mandy Kusnierz, Johannes Huinink

Cultural underpinning for the development of family policy in a global perspective SOCIUM SFB 1342 WorkingPapers, 10

Sonja Drobnič (sonja.drobnic@uni-bremen.de), Mandy Kusnierz (kusnierz@uni-bremen.de), Johannes Huinink (huinink@uni-bremen.de)

SFB 1342: Globale Entwicklungsdynamiken von Sozialpolitik, SOCIUM, Universität Bremen

Acknowledgements:

Sonja Drobnič

Mandy Kusnierz

Johannes Huinink

Cultural underpinning

for the development

of family policy in

a global perspective

SOCIUM

SFB 1342

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A

bstrAct

Z

usAmmenfAssung

1. Introduction 1. Introduction ...1 2. Family 2. Family ...2 3. Policies 3. Policies ...3 4. Cultural variation and family policy

4. Cultural variation and family policy ...4 5. Data

5. Data ...6 6. Descriptive analysis

6. Descriptive analysis ...6 7. Summary and conclusion

7. Summary and conclusion ...17

References

References ...20

c

ontents

1. I

1. I

Family policies have a profound impact on the functioning of families, and they affect the lives of family members in a myriad of ways. Although the formation and imple-mentation of family policies can be traced from supranational levels, such as the United Nations, to local, organizational, and com-pany levels (Nieuwenhuis & Van Lancker, 2020b), the most consequential and crucial layer continues to be the nation-state, which dominates the policymaking and implemen-tation of various family policy measures, as well as comparative research on family pol-icy. The state has a genuine interest in the functionality of families, as is evident in the establishment of ministries of family affairs or family development in many countries, indi-cating the importance of family as a social institution. But how are family policies in na-tion-states devised? Which goals do states pursue and how do they select from numer-ous policy instruments?

In this paper, we cannot directly trace the decision-making process in policy formation. Rather, we address the diversity of country contexts in which policies for families with children are created, designed, and imple-mented. We are particularly interested in di-verse cultural conditions that can subtly pave the way for the perception and acceptance or dismissal of specific policy measures. Economic development and budgetary con-straints undoubtedly determine the extent to which a state can provide benefits and sup-port to families. This applies to various forms of support: monetary (e.g., child benefits, baby bonuses), time (e.g., maternity, pater-nity, and parental leaves), and infrastructure (e.g., childcare and early education). But the direction in which the state invests in families, whether and how it considers the normative and moral aspects, as well as the roles and behaviors of family members can vary con-siderably across societies even if they are at the same stage of economic development.

Whether the policy concern is to support tra-ditional family forms or the individual well-be-ing of family members regardless of family models, or whether the policies enable and facilitate the employment of all adult fam-ily members and promote gender equality is not primarily the question of financial ca-pacity. Rather, the broader cultural contexts with diverse values and norms, socio-cultural heritage, highly codified marriage systems, ethnic and religious diversity, kinship solidar-ity, societal importance attached to children, filial piety, patriarchy, and gender equality to a large extent shape the formation of family policy and its specific instruments.

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age of marriage”), a deinstitutionalization and diversification of family forms and rela-tionships among family members could be observed over the last 50 years. Accordingly, a shift in the cultural image of the family can be noted. A similar change, although mod-erate, is also apparent in other parts of the world, where traditional family structures are or were the rule, corresponding with a cul-tural image that is often still heavily deter-mined by influential religious belief systems (Furstenberg, 2019; Lesthaeghe, 2020). One reason for the considerable variation of family policy in cross-national comparison is because policy measures are based on dif-ferent conceptions of family and are more or less inclusive of an increasing variety of family forms in contemporary societies.

There is an agreement that family is un-derstood as a relationship between two or more persons tied together by blood, legal bonds, or the joint performance of family functions. But depending on the socio-eco-nomic, political, religious, and cultural frameworks in individual countries, there may be dissent about what or who counts as family and whom the family policy should address. Moreover, the changing cultural no-tion of family leads to changes in the nono-tion of family in vital statistics, demography, or other purposes undertaken by governmental institutions and international organizations (Selzer, 2019; United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 2011).

The prototypical norm of a stable nucle-ar family with a breadwinning husband and caregiving wife, which was used in developed Western countries as a basis for policymak-ing in the twentieth century, is lospolicymak-ing ground even in countries where the idea began, especially in light of the diversity of existing family constellations, such as dual-earner couples, patchwork families, single mothers living with new partners, single parents with children from multiple partners, children of divorced parents living interchangeably in two households, same-sex families, co-par-ents regardless of sexual orientation who the underpinning that supports, strengthens,

or impedes the development of family policy. In the next sections, we will explore the concepts of “family” and “policy” subsumed under “family policy”, before we turn to cul-tural variations in family policy and the em-pirical analysis based on the World Values Survey (WVS) and other data. In general, re-searchers have been more concerned with the question of which “policies” constitute family policy and less with the concept of “family” subsumed under family policy. Even as a consensus is emerging around the defi-nition of family policy, research has not re-solved questions about the definition of fam-ily (Bogenschneider & Corbett, 2010). This is unfortunate, as there is a mutual and bi-directional relationship between the concep-tion of family and family policy. The culturally diverse notion of family and the understand-ing of family relations, includunderstand-ing gender and generational relations, affect the formation and development of family policies in con-temporary societies and is one reason for the fact that large differences in family policy can be observed across countries. However, also family policy itself has an impact on who is considered to be a family member, what are acceptable family models, and how this changes over time. Moreover, policies, once in place, engender societal change and may impact upon their own cultural foundations.

2. F

2. F

However, families had been shaped and af-fected by legal regulations and public poli-cies well before the concept was introduced in policymaking and research. As formulated by Saraceno, “Governments’ intervention in family matters, regulating what constitutes a family and what obligations family members have to each other, dates back to the forma-tion of naforma-tion states… Access to marriage, the conditions of its dissolution, the distinc-tion between what is a family and what are acknowledged family relationships, the dis-tinction between legitimate and illegitimate (later “natural”) filiation, gender and inter-generational obligations, whether and how contraception and abortion are allowed, in-tra-family violence condoned or on the con-trary persecuted – all these became matters of regulation by law” (Saraceno, 2011:2).

An early broad definition of family poli-cy was suggested to encompass “everything that government does to or for the family” (Kamerman & Kahn, 1978). In a similar vein, Zimmermann (1995) put forward the under-standing of family policy as “a perspective for understanding and thinking about poli-cy in relation to families”. Kaufmann (1993) proposed to distinguish between explicit and implicit family policy. While many policy measures are motivated by the labor mar-ket, health, population, or poverty reduction goals, they nevertheless implicitly affect fam-ilies. In this way, family policy is overlain with other specific policy areas, such as popula-tion policy, educapopula-tion, labor policy, health, and long-term care policy. Explicit family policy, however, involves policy measures that are expressly targeted at families and the specific needs of family members. Such measures are planned and implemented by public authorities specifically established for these purposes (Kamerman & Kahn, 1978; Kaufmann, 1993).

Scholars define contemporary family poli-cy as government activities that are intention-ally designed to support families, enhance family members’ well-being, and strengthen family relationships (Bogenschneider, 2006). reject a partnership relationship but

pur-posefully conceive and jointly raise children, multi-generational families, skipped gen-eration families, and co-residing kin mem-bers, just to name a few. Changes to and the development of diverse family types have not been uniform or concurrent, even if only European countries are considered (Huinink, 2010). This diversity becomes much more complex when global perspectives and world regions with very different cultural traditions and structural conditions are considered. Therborn (2004; 2014) distinguishes seven major family systems around the world that, in his view, are not converging and, in some respects, are rather diverging: Christian-Eu-ropean family which includes the New World settlements, Islamic West Asian/North Af-rican, South Asian, Confucian East Asian, sub-Saharan African, Southeast Asian, and Creole family patterns. These major fami-ly systems correspond fairfami-ly well with world regions which we can analyze using survey data in the continuation of this paper.

3. P

3. P

The definition and scope of family policy are not precise and univocal. Thus, family poli-cy has been described as a “fuzzy” concept, with blurry and variable boundaries. Neither the set of policies that qualify as family pol-icies nor the notion of what the family is are clear-cut, particularly in the global perspec-tive that goes beyond the European realm and the countries that are typically included in comparative welfare state research.

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redistribution to reduce inequalities varies significantly between groups of countries. Approval depends not only on individual in-terests or values but also on country-specific conditions (Dallinger, 2008). It is to be ex-pected that the notion or the cultural con-ception of family and gender roles, which are likely to decisively influence support for family policy measures, also vary strongly between societies. This has been found for European countries (Lück & Castrén, 2018; Trommsdorff, 2006; van Vlimmeren et al., 2017), and is also reflected in the social leg-islation of respective societies (Nygren et al., 2018).

We propose that the cultural ideals, be-lief systems, and convictions that influence the actions of individuals and policymakers importantly contribute to which policy areas are given the most attention and which in-struments and configurations of inin-struments are adopted and carried out in a given so-ciety. Along which dimensions do cultural and structural trends most likely affect family policies? We suggest that countries differ in the following dimensions which might affect the level and direction of state involvement in regulating family behaviors and relation-ships.

Familialization and defamilialization

The concept of defamilialization versus familialization was developed in extended discussions of the traditional welfare state ty-pology and is defined as the extent to which the family is expected to absorb social risks relative to the state. Defamilialization refers to the degree of support for an individual’s independence from family relationships. This involves, in particular, the autonomy of wom-en and the reduction of intergwom-enerational de-pendency (Leitner, 2003; Lohmann & Zagel, 2016), while familialistic attitudes and poli-cies oblige the family to meet the care needs of its members and, in this way, enforce the dependence of people in need of care onto their families.

Recent developments aim at broadening the conceptualization and assessing changes that the field of family policy underwent in its historical development (Daly, 2020). Nev-ertheless, even the most recent and encom-passing accounts of research on family poli-cy (Eydal & Rostgaard, 2018; Nieuwenhuis & Van Lancker, 2020a) to a large extent focus on Europe and, less systematically, on other OECD countries. The global perspective is emerging but remains peripheral and under-developed as a focus of intellectual inquiry.

In the next section, we aim at exploring some underlying structural and cultural char-acteristics that shape the national constella-tions and constitute the framework in which family policies are designed. The focus of our analysis lies on state policies related to families with children. Although care for older people may also be subsumed under family policy, and historically this may be an important part of family responsibilities, this is less and less the case. Countries vary greatly in the extent to which informal elder care is supported by public policies; howev-er, among 35 European countries included in the analysis by Spasova et al. (2018), only three have family responsibilities by adult children to their parents enshrined in law, and such regulations are usually part of emerging long-term care policy rather than family policy. Hence, our primary focus is on families with young children.

4. c

4. c

PolIcy

and guide the development of family policy measures.

Openness towards diverse family forms

In many societies, the marriage of oppo-site-sex couples is the traditional vehicle for creating a new family and linking families, that is, providing a legally acceptable unit for bearing and rearing children and creat-ing bonds between two families via in-laws. People differ in their views on the importance of marriage for partnership formation and childbirth, divorce, remarriage, and single parenthood. In particular, attitudes and le-gal regulations of same-sex partnerships and same-sex families vary across countries and world regions. This has important implica-tions for the concept of the family and the inclusiveness of family policy measures.

Stage in the demographic transition and fertility

Although we focus on the cultural factors associated with the four dimensions dis-cussed above, we would like to emphasize that also structural conditions in a country, particularly population size and demograph-ic trends are known to affect family poldemograph-icy strategies.

With increasing longevity worldwide and restrictive migration laws in many countries, fertility rates are perceived as an important element of population regulation and de-velopment. Many countries of the Global South have not yet completed their demo-graphic transitions, while others have joined the developed welfare states in aiming to stabilize or even increase birth rates (Böger et al., 2021). In many countries there is a keen awareness about population growth or decline, expressed as a concern about pop-ulation control in the framework of a sustain-able development agenda, and conversely, as a concern about low fertility rates, aging populations, and a shrinking labor force. Not only individuals, but also governments have an “opinion” on the need to intervene

Secularization and self-realization

Although the relationship between reli-gious beliefs and processes of modernization is more complex than a straightforward neg-ative correlation between religion and mani-fold manifestations of modernization, includ-ing the family structure and family relations, religious beliefs and convictions may have an important impact on family life and the formation of family policy measures. Over-all, the cultural foundation in which family relations and family models evolve can be deeply influenced by religious beliefs. Even in highly secularized societies, many fam-ily-related life course rituals evolve in reli-gious contexts (e.g., weddings, funerals). The impact of specific religious beliefs is particu-larly evident in the socialization of children.

Gender roles

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data contain seven cross-sectional waves, starting with the first wave in 1981/1983 un-til Wave 7, conducted from 2017 to 2021. Subsequent waves are planned for every five years and the territorial coverage is expand-ing continuously. Altogether, 104 countries participated at least once in the seven waves of data collection. However, looking at in-dividual waves, 60 is the largest number of countries involved in a particular year in Wave 6. We use this dataset because it is the only source of individual-level data that taps into world regions that are typically exclud-ed from comparative policy research and cross-country comparison in general.

Other data sources that can shed light on societal conditions conducive to the scope and orientation of family policy measures in-clude the Social Science Survey Programme (ISSP) and various UN and World Bank data sources that also study countries in the Glob-al South. Indicators from the set of Hofstede Indicators (Hofstede, 2011) or the GII (UN’s Gender Inequality Index) and the GGGI (Global Gender Gap Index of the World Economic Forum) can be considered. In the next section, we will compile relevant data from some of these sources with a focus on descriptively documenting attitudes to com-pare across countries.

6. d

6. d

The variables of interest in the World Values Survey relate to the dimensions we identified as those most likely to affect the develop-ment and direction of family policy: famil-ialization and defamilfamil-ialization, seculariza-tion and self-realizaseculariza-tion, gender roles, and openness towards diverse family forms. This distinction is made for analytical purposes, but in reality, many measures overlap. Still, we distinguish these dimensions to provide a more systematic overview of the cultural un-derpinning of policy instruments.

in population development, and family policy can be employed for such interventions. Spe-cific measures of family policy are thus likely to depend on pro- or anti-natalist goals or an indifferent approach to population devel-opment in a specific country. Moreover, one can assume that low fertility coincides with less conservative cultural values concerning the family, both of which favor a progressive family policy.

5. d

5. d

The indicators of cultural dimensions are considerably more difficult to assess than economic indicators, politico-legal frame-works, or demographic indicators, which can also be a challenge from the global perspec-tive. For cultural indicators, we cannot rely on indicators amassed by country statistical offices. Rather, we must examine attitudes and values, which reflect the state of mind, opinions, emotional responses, and evalua-tions towards a specific issue. These data are typically assessed in surveys.

dimension which can be understood as a subset of the Inglehart–Welzel Cultural Map (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005) has been system-atically assessed over the panel waves and indices provided in the WVS database. We gratefully make use of these indices. Apart from that, we had to resort to individual vari-ables as indicators of attitudinal patterns as-sumed to be related to country-specific fam-ily policies. We coded all variables in such a way that they point in the direction of soci-etal trends of modernization: higher values indicate more widespread defamilialization, greater secularization, more egalitarian gen-der roles, and a more widespread accep-tance of diverse family forms.

Familialization and defamilialization

Familialistic attitudes stress the importance of family and call for the family to meet the care needs of its members and, in this way, enforce the dependence of people in need of care onto their families. However, famili-Our analysis of the World Values Survey

includes 89 countries that participated in the latest three panel waves. The values for each country are taken from the most recent panel wave in which the country participat-ed. That is, if the information was not avail-able for Wave 7 (2017-2020), it was taken from Wave 6 (2010-2014), and if both of the last waves were missing, the value was obtained from Wave 5 (2005-2009). We did not incorporate survey waves from the more distant past to ensure that data in different countries do not cover overly disparate his-torical periods.

Unfortunately, data restrictions do not al-low us to create single indices for the dimen-sions of interest. Since not all variables are available in all survey waves and not all par-ticipating countries included in their ques-tionnaires all variables that could be mean-ingfully used for the creation of indices, too many cases would be missing in the analysis. Only the secularization and self-realization Figure 1.

Importance of family in a person’s life (reversed)

Source: WVS. 0 0,02 0,04 0,06 0,08 0,1 0,12 0,14 81 8. Eg yp t 63 4. Qa ta r 50 . Ba ng la de sh 56 6. Ni ge ria 26 8. Ge or gi a 60 8. Ph ilip pi ne s 36 0. In do ne sia 40 0. Jo rdan 86 0. Uz be ki st an 78 8. Tu ni sia 51 . Ar me ni a 36 8. Iraq 42 2. Le ba no n 48 4. Me xico 43 4. Liby a 71 6. Zi mb abw e 45 8. Ma la ys ia 70 4. Vi et na m 76 2. Ta jikistan 88 7. Ye me n 27 5. Pa le s ne 35 6. In di a 28 8. Gh an a 23 1. Et hi op ia 85 4. Bu rkin a Fa so 12 4. Ca na da 36 4. Iran 78 0. Tr in id ad an d To ba go 82 6. Un ited Ki ng do m 30 0. Gr eece 39 8. Ka za khst an 41 7. Kyrgyzst an 68 8. Se rb ia 38 0. Ital y 31 . Azer ba ijan 41 4. Ku wa it 70 2. Si ng ap or e 15 2. Ch ile 63 0. Pu er to Ri co 61 6. Po la nd 39 2. Ja pa n 46 6. Ma li 19 6. Cy pr us 71 0. So ut h Af rica 64 2. Ro ma ni a 58 6. Pa ki stan 32 . Arge n na 79 2. Tu rkey 72 4. Sp ai n 64 6. Rw an da 12 . Algeri a 89 4. Za mb ia 50 4. Mo ro cco 15 8. Ta iw an RO C 57 8. No rw ay 36 . Au stra lia 55 4. Ne w Ze al an d 41 0. So ut h Kore a 20 . An do rr a 70 5. Sl oven ia 10 0. Bu lg ar ia 75 2. Sw eden 21 8. Ec ua do r 60 4. Pe ru 27 6. Ge rm an y 76 4. Th ai la nd 11 2. Bela ru s 84 0. Un ited St at es 85 8. Ur ug ua y 62 0. Po rt ug al 32 0. Gu atem al a 10 4. My an ma r 15 6. Ch in a 80 4. Uk ra in e 24 6. Fi nl an d 44 6. Ma cau SA R 23 3. Es to ni a 75 6. Sw itze rlan d 25 0. Fr an ce 76 . Br az il 52 8. Ne th er la nd s 49 8. Mo ld ov a 64 3. Ru ss ia 34 8. Hu ng ar y 68 . Bo livi a 17 0. Co lo mb ia 55 8. Ni ca ra gu a 34 4. Ho ng Ko ng SA R 33 2. Ha i Colors black: Africa yellow: Asia blue: Europe

red: Lan America

green: North America

violet: Oceania

Variable:: Important in Life: Family (inverse scale) Scale: 0-1 (from 4 to 1 in A001)

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on this variable is presented in Figure 1. The most remarkable outcome of this overview is the overall importance of family around the world. In every single country, the over-whelming majority of respondents consider family to be very important. Cross-country differences are small; the scores lie between 0.00 (Egypt) and 0.10 (Haiti) on the stan-dardized 0–1 defamilialization scale. Within this narrow range, Asian countries, with a few exceptions, tend to be located at the lowest level of defamilialization, and Latin Ameri-can and European countries have somewhat higher scores on the right-hand side of the graph.

The second indicator of defamilializa-tion reveals considerably more cross-coun-try diversity even if the number of countries is, unfortunately, smaller. The WVS question “How would you feel about the following statements? Do you agree or disagree with them? Adult children have the duty to pro-vide long-term care for their parents.” The alization is an elusive concept that, to a large

extent, overlays with the conception of gen-der in the provision of welfare to family mem-bers. In this sense, we agree with Saxonberg that “the terms ‘familialization’ and ‘defamil-ialization’ are… ambiguous… many schol-ars use the terms differently and, therefore, obtain much different results” (Saxonberg, 2013: 27). Nevertheless, we propose to ex-amine the distribution of two variables that can be understood as indicators of country orientation towards defamilialization.

First, we measure the importance of fami-ly in the country, based on the question “For each of the following, indicate how import-ant it is in your life. Would you say it is very important, rather important, not very import-ant, not at all important.” The 4-point scale has been reversed to reveal the stage of defamilialization, and the values were stan-dardized so that the mean for each country is expressed in the range of 0 to 1. Data are not weighted. The position of the countries Figure 2.

Adult children’s responsibility for elderly parents (reversed)

Source: WVS. 0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 818. Egyp t 50. Bangladesh 104. Myanma r 400. Jordan 368. Iraq 762. Tajikistan 788. Tunisi a 156. Chin a 417. Kyrgyz stan 56 6. Nigeri a 586. Pakistan 231. Ethiopia 398. Ka zakhstan 716. Zimbab we 704. Vietna m 422. Lebano n 643. Russia 458. Malaysia 60 4. Peru 360. Indonesi a 558. Nicaragu a 218. Ecuado r 68. Bolivi a 792. Turkey

630. Puerto Rico 608. Philippine

s 804. Ukrain e 170. Colombia 320. Guatema la 764. Thailand 620. Portugal 48 4. Mexico 642. Romani a 446. Macau SA R 158. Taiwan RO C 196. Cyprus 344. Hong Kong SA R 76. Brazil 152. Chil e 300. Greece 41 0. South Kore a 364. Iran 688. Serbia 32. Argenna 20. Andorr a 840. United States 276. German y 392. Ja pa n 36. Australi a 554. New Ze al an d Colors black: Africa yellow: Asia blue: Europe

red: Lan America

green: North America

violet: Oceania

Variable: Adult children have duty to take care of parents Scale 0-1 (from 1 to 5 in D026_05)

grounded intergenerational solidarity. Not-withstanding, intergenerational contracts within the urban Japanese family are shift-ing in response to the growshift-ing availability of public care services for the elderly (Jenike, 2003), which might explain the comparably high score in the WVS. However, many coun-tries in Asia and Africa resort to familialism which reinforces the primacy of familial re-sponsibility, which has a widespread legiti-macy in the population and is seldom ques-tioned.

Secularization and self-realization

A high degree of secularization in society and the propensity towards self-realization and emancipation indicate a move away from traditional values. It can be expected that countries in which the populations have, on average, more progressive and conser-vative values are more likely to have more progressive and conservative family policy models, respectively. An indication of such a relationship has been found in East and Southeast Asian countries, where a discern-5-point scale: agree strongly, agree, neither

agree nor disagree, disagree, and disagree strongly, was rescaled to a range of 0 to 1. All African and a large fraction of Asian countries strongly agree that adult children are responsible for their elderly parents (Fig-ure 2). New Zealand and Australia are the only countries where the mean of standard-ized respondents’ scores slightly exceeds the 0.5 threshold towards disagreeing. Other countries with a relatively high level of dis-agreement are Japan, Germany, and the United States.

Overall, the two indicators of defamilial-ization suggest that particularly Asian and African societies tend to exhibit familialism and intergenerational family solidarity. Ad-mittedly, this is a very general statement. There is considerable variation within world regions and cultural spheres, and important exceptions. For example, Japan is among the countries with the highest disagreements on the obligation of adult children to pro-vide long-term care for the parents, despite prevailing Confucian values and culturally Figure 3.

Secularization

Source: WVS, Welzel’s sub-index DISBELIEF.

0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 63 4. Qa ta r 56 6. Ni ge ria 23 1. Et hi op ia 28 8. Gh an a 50 4. Mo ro cc o 46 6. Ma li 71 6. Zi mb ab we 360 . Indone sia 85 4. Bu rk in a Fa so 50 . Ba ng la de sh 41 4. K uw ai t 58 6. Pa ki st an 60 8. Ph ili pp in es 89 4. Za mb ia 10 4. M ya nm ar 35 6. Indi a 88 7. Ye me n 26 8. Ge or gia 81 8. Eg yp t 64 6. Rw an da 40 0. Jo rd an 43 4. Li bya 12 . Al ge ria 45 8. Ma la ys ia 27 5. Pa les tin e 68 . Bo livi a 78 0. Tr in id ad an d To ba go 36 4. Ir an 71 0. So ut h Af rica 61 6. Po la nd 36 8. Ir aq 51 . Ar me ni a 30 0. Gr ee ce 60 4. Pe ru 380 . It aly 21 8. Ec ua do r 79 2. Tu rk ey 63 0. Pu er to Ri co 76 . B ra zil 17 0. Co lo mb ia 78 8. Tu ni sia 64 2. Ro ma nia 55 8. Ni car ag ua 33 2. Ha iti 32 0. Gu at em al a 48 4. Me xi co 19 6. Cy prus 39 8. Ka za kh st an 42 2. Le ba no n 49 8. Mo ld ov a 41 7. Ky rg yzst an 70 2. Si ng ap ore 62 0. P ortu ga l 76 2. Ta jiki st an 12 4. C an ad a 80 4. Uk ra in e 68 8. Se rb ia 64 3. Ru ss ia 32 . Ar ge nt in a 764 . T hai la nd 112 . Be la ru s 84 0. Un ited St at es 10 0. Bu lg ar ia 86 0. Uz bek is ta n 75 6. Sw itze rlan d 70 5. Sl ove ni a 24 6. Fin la nd 15 2. Chil e 15 8. Ta iw an RO C 34 8. Hung ar y 31. Az er ba ijan 82 6. Un ite d Ki ngd om 27 6. G er ma ny 85 8. U ru gu ay 25 0. Fr an ce 70 4. Vi et nam 57 8. No rw ay 72 4. Spa in 20 . A nd or ra 36 . Au st ra lia 52 8. Ne th er la nd s 23 3. E st on ia 41 0. Sou th Ko re a 55 4. Ne w Ze al an d 75 2. Sw ede n 39 2. Ja pa n 34 4. Hong Ko ng SA R 44 6. M ac au SA R 15 6. Ch ina Colors black: Africa yellow: Asia blue: Europe red: Latin America

green: North America violet: Oceania

Variable: DISBELIEF (Welzel disbelief subindex Scale: 0-1

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scores on DISBELIEF, including China, Ma-cau, Hong Kong, and South Korea (Figure 3). European countries and Oceania are fairly secularized, although Poland, Greece, and Italy are considerably lower on the index, on par with most Latin American countries. In Africa and many Asian countries, particularly Islamic societies, religion and religious prac-tices play a very important role.

To assess the values that are particularly appreciated in various societies, the World Values Survey inquires about the importance of qualities that children can be encour-aged to learn at home. Welzel’s sub-index AUTONOMY combines the importance of independence, imagination, and obedience (reversed) as children’s qualities (Figure 4). Norway, Sweden, South Korea, and Japan, followed by other European and East Asian countries lead the ranking on the autonomy index, although several countries can also be found in the mid- to lower-range. Latin American countries are rather low on the ible affinity between the clustering of family

policies and the cultural fabrics of respective societies was detected (Tonelli et al., 2021).

The World Values Survey features a set of composite indices (Welzel, 2013; see also https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVS Contents.jsp?CMSID=welzelidx&CMSID =welzelidx). We assess the progressivity of a country using Welzel’s indicators of disbelief and autonomy, each of which is constructed using three items of the World Values Sur-vey questionnaire. The scores of the indices are standardized and can assume values be-tween 0 and 1. Larger scores always repre-sent relatively higher values of secularization and autonomy. Secularization is measured by the sub-index DISBELIEF which combines information on the importance of religion in a person’s life, his or her religiosity, and re-ligious practice. The higher value indicates higher secularization. The most striking vari-ation can be found in Asia, from the least secular (Qatar) to countries with the highest Figure 4.

Autonomy as a value to be transmitted to children

Source: WVS, Welzel’s sub-index AUTONOMY.

0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 33 2. Ha iti 81 8. Eg yp t 28 8. Gh an a 88 7. Ye me n 36 8. Ir aq 55 8. Ni ca ra gu a 21 8. Ec ua do r 85 4. Bu rk in a Fa so 71 6. Zi mb ab we 58 6. Pa ki st an 56 6. Ni ge ria 68 . Bo livi a 78 0. Tr in id ad an d To ba go 434 . Li by a 60 4. Pe ru 48 4. Me xi co 40 0. Jo rd an 17 0. Colo mb ia 76 . Br az il 63 4. Q ata r 646 . Rw an da 23 1. Et hi op ia 196 . Cy pr us 12 . Al ge ria 89 4. Za mb ia 51 . Ar me ni a 792 . Tu rk ey 70 4. V ie tn am 27 5. Pa le st in e 41 4. Ku wa it 46 6. Ma li 80 4. Uk ra in e 85 8. Ur ug ua y 11 2. Be la ru s 63 0. Pu er to Ri co 15 2. C hi le 250 . Fr an ce 41 7. Ky rg yz st an 32 . Ar ge nt in a 62 0. Portug al 36 4. Ira n 61 6. Po la nd 60 8. Ph ili ppi nes 233 . Es to ni a 50 . Ba ngl ade sh 10 4. My an ma r 39 8. Ka za kh st an 68 8. Se rb ia 36 0. In do ne sia 64 3. Ru ss ia 30 0. Gr ee ce 78 8. Tu ni sia 72 4. Sp ain 86 0. Uz be ki st an 50 4. Mo ro cc o 100 . Bu lg ar ia 76 2. Ta jiki st an 20 . An do rr a 32 0. Gu at ema la 38 0. Ita ly 76 4. Th ai la nd 49 8. Mo ld ov a 82 6. Un ite d Kin gd om 45 8. Ma la ys ia 268 . Ge or gia 71 0. So uth Af rica 70 2. Si ng ap or e 528 . Ne th er la nd s 42 2. Le ba no n 64 2. Ro ma ni a 12 4. Ca na da 34 4. Hong Ko ng SA R 31 . A zer ba ija n 36. Au str ali a 34 8. Hu ng ar y 35 6. In di a 84 0. Un ited St at es 70 5. Slo ve ni a 55 4. Ne w Ze al an d 24 6. Fi nl an d 27 6. Ger ma ny 446 . Ma ca u SA R 15 8. Tai wa n RO C 15 6. Chin a 75 6. Swi tze rlan d 39 2. Ja pan 41 0. So uth Kore a 752 . Sw ede n 578 . No rwa y Colors black: Africa yellow: Asia blue: Europe red: Latin America

green: North America violet: Oceania

Variable: AUTONOMY (Welzel autonomy subindex) Scale: 0-1

society can undoubtedly guide family policy. Policy instruments can differ substantially if the aim is to support stay-at-home mothers, dual-earner couples, or to deliberately pro-mote the caring role of men in the family. To measure normative factors associated with the care and nurture of children, we examine attitudes towards female employment and its implications for young children in the WVS. We only selected indicators that were includ-ed in many countries. The WVS askinclud-ed the questions “For each of the following state-ments I read out, can you tell me how strong-ly you agree or disagree with each. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree? Being a housewife is just as fulfill-ing as workfulfill-ing for pay” and “When a mother works for pay, the children suffer.” Again, the response categories have been rescaled so that the average country values lie between 0 and 1. Higher values show lower agree-ment with the first stateagree-ment, a higher accep-tance of female employment, and thus, more gender-egalitarian attitudes.

scale, as are African countries, except for South Africa.

Gender Roles

The attitudes towards women’s and men’s roles in the family remain diverse around the world, as well as the attitudes towards the changing position of women in the la-bor market. The increase in the proportion of married women and mothers who are employed outside of the home has often not been accompanied by a corresponding change in societal attitudes and values. Even in countries where the labor force participa-tion of women has increased considerably, results indicate that the attitudes of both men and women reflect a substantial preference for a primary familial role for women, espe-cially when young children are present (Alwin et al., 1992), and “liberal-egalitarian” ideol-ogies co-exist with a highly unequal gender division of labor in families (Abramowski, 2020). Thus, the underlying notion of what a man’s and a woman’s proper place is in Figure 5.

Domestic role of women: Being a housewife is as fulfilling as working for pay (reversed)

Source: WVS. 0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 104. My an ma r 860. Uz beki st an 348. Hu ng ar y 630. Puer to Ri co 233. Es to ni a 112. Be la ru s 634. Qa ta r 818. Eg yp t 417. Ky rgyz st an 887. Ye me n 804. Uk rain e 246. Fi nl an d 368. Ir aq 608. Phi lip pi ne s 124. Ca na da 344. Ho ng Ko ng SA R 400. Jo rdan 788. Tuni sia 12. Algeri a 392. Ja pa n 364. Ir an 31. Az er ba ijan 68. Bo livia 158. Ta iw an RO C 780. Tr in id ad and To ba go 414. Ku wa it 360. In do ne sia 356. In di a 275. Pa le s ne 504. Mo ro cc o 434. Li by a 554. New Ze al an d 840. Un ited St at es 826. Un ited Ki ng do m 586. Pa kistan 558. Ni ca ra gu a 756. Swit zerl an d 762. Ta jikistan 36. Au st ra lia 156. Ch in a 100. Bu lgaria 446. Ma ca u SA R 792. Tu rkey 466. Ma li 50. Ba ng ladesh 702. Si ng ap or e 218. Ec ua do r 170. Co lo mb ia 604 . Peru 458 . Ma la ys ia 300 . Gr eece 484. Mexi co 578 . No rw ay 704 . Viet na m 858 . Urugua y 276 . Ge rman y 196 . Cyprus 320 . Gu at em al a 643. Ru ss ia 32. Ar ge n na 716 . Zimb ab we 152 . Ch ile 268 . Ge or gia 380 . It aly 710 . So ut h Af rica 231. Et hi op ia 250 . Fran ce 398 . Ka za kh st an 51. Ar me ni a 76. Br az il 528 . Ne th erland s 724 . Sp ai n 422 . Le ba no n 410 . So ut h Ko re a 498 . Mo ld ov a 646 . Rw an da 705 . Sl ov en ia 764 . Th ai la nd 20. An do rra 894 . Za mb ia 616 . Po land 854 . Bu rk in a Fa so 752 . Swed en 288 . Gh an a 566 . Ni ge ria 642 . Ro ma ni a 688 . Se rb ia 332 . Ha i Colors black: Africa yellow: Asia blue: Europe

red: Lan America

green: North America

violet: Oceania

Variable: Being a housewife just as fulfilling (inverse scale) Scale 0-1 (from 4 to 1 in D057)

[12]

Algeria, while countries in sub-Saharan Af-rica, particularly Nigeria and Ghana, see paid work as an important accomplishment for women. Latin American countries are spread all over the response spectrum be-tween Puerto Rico which tends to agree and Haiti which shows the greatest disagreement with the statement.

A similar dispersion across world regions is also evident for the second indicator. Again, the belief that children suffer when the moth-er works for pay is the most widespread in Asian countries such as Jordan, Yemen, Pa-kistan, Qatar, and Bangladesh, but Taiwan is at the other end of the opinion spectrum, exceeding the Netherlands, New Zealand, Zimbabwe, and the United States (Figure 6). A more systematic pattern of responses is evident in the results of the question “How would you feel about the following state-ments? Do you agree or disagree with them? If a woman earns more money than her hus-band, it’s almost certain to cause problems.” On a 5-point scale, from strongly agree to Figure 5 shows the level of agreement

(reversed) with the statement that being a housewife is as fulfilling for a woman as working for pay, thus expressing support for the traditional gender division of labor. The dominant impression conveyed in Figure 5 is a large variation of attitudes, huge diversity within world regions, and disparity among countries that are often considered belong-ing to similar cultural settbelong-ings. No discernible patterns can be observed across continents. For example, respondents in Myanmar to a large extent agree with the statement that housewives have a fulfilled life, but neigh-boring Thailand can be found among the countries that largely disagree with that state-ment. Substantial disagreement can also be found in Serbia, Romania, Sweden, and sev-eral other European countries, but Hungary, Estonia, and Belarus are among the coun-tries that exhibit the most traditional gender attitudes in this respect. This traditional view on women’s roles also applies to North Af-rican countries, such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Figure 6.

Domestic role of women: When the mother works for pay, the children suffer (reversed)

Source: WVS. 0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 40 0. Jo rd an 88 7. Ye me n 58 6. Pa kist an 63 4. Qa ta r 50 . Ba ngla de sh 81 8. Eg yp t 27 5. Pa lesne 35 6. Indi a 12 . Al geri a 78 8. Tu nisi a 68 . Bo livi a 43 4. Liby a 70 4. Vi etna m 41 4. Kuwa it 50 4. Mo rocc o 36 8. Iraq 26 8. Geor gi a 23 1. Ethi op ia 61 6. Po land 55 8. Nica ragu a 42 2. Leba no n 32 0. Gu at em al a 41 0. So uth Ko re a 15 6. Ch in a 48 4. Me xico 21 8. Ec ua do r 63 0. Pu erto Rico 80 4. Uk rain e 36 4. Iran 31 . Az er baijan 51 . Ar meni a 10 4. Myanma r 76 . Br azil 71 0. So uth Af rica 76 2. Ta jikist an 17 0. Colo mb ia 79 2. Tu rkey 19 6. Cy pr us 60 8. Ph ilippine s 44 6. Ma ca u SA R 62 0. Po rt ugal 15 2. Ch ile 60 4. Pe ru 70 2. Si ng apor e 64 6. Rwan da 30 0. Gr ee ce 64 3. Russi a 78 0. Tr in id ad and To ba go 33 2. Ha i 76 4. Th ai la nd 39 8. Ka zakhstan 56 6. Nigeri a 85 8. Ur ug ua y 68 8. Se rbia 20 . An dorr a 41 7. Ky rg yzst an 32 . Ar genna 34 4. Ho ng Kong SA R 45 8. Ma laysia 64 2. Romani a 11 2. Belaru s 28 8. Gh an a 72 4. Sp ai n 86 0. Uz bekist an 75 2. Sw eden 70 5. Sl ov enia 27 6. Germ an y 23 3. Esto ni a 36 0. Indo ne sia 36 . Au st ra lia 39 2. Ja pa n 84 0. Un ited States 71 6. Zimb abwe 55 4. New Zealan d 52 8. Netherlands 15 8. Ta iw an RO C Colors black: Africa yellow: Asia blue: Europe

red: Lan America green: North America violet: Oceania

Variable: Children suffer with working mother (inverse scale) Scale: 0-1 (from 4 to 1 in D061)

Figure 7.

Perception of gendered income inequality

Source: WVS. 0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1 58 6. Pa kist an 56 6. Nigeri a 71 6. Zimb abwe 50 . Ba ngla de sh 33 2. Ha i 86 0. Uz bekist an 81 8. Eg yp t 41 7. Ky rg yzst an 40 0. Jo rd an 88 7. Ye me n 48 4. Me xico 78 8. Tunisi a 28 8. Gh an a 36 4. Iran 10 4. M yan ma r 68 . Bo livi a 36 8. Iraq 79 2. Tu rkey 12 . Al geri a 76 2. Ta jikist an 50 4. Mo rocc o 43 4. Liby a 27 5. Pa lesne 70 4. Vi etna m 32 0. Gu at em al a 31 . A zer baijan 78 0. Tr in id ad and To ba go 35 6. Indi a 71 0. So uth Af rica 19 6. Cy pr us 15 2. Ch ile 64 3. Russi a 41 0. So uth Ko re a 55 8. Nica ragu a 42 2. Leba no n 64 6. Rwan da 23 1. Ethi op ia 21 8. Ec ua do r 44 6. Ma ca u SA R 51 . Ar meni a 41 4. Kuwa it 76 4. Th ai la nd 63 0. Pu erto Rico 39 8. Ka za khstan 80 4. Uk rain e 45 8. Ma laysia 17 0. Colo mb ia 76 . Br azil 23 3. Esto ni a 70 2. Sing apor e 30 0. Gr ee ce 11 2. Belaru s 36 0. Indo ne sia 63 4. Qa ta r 39 2. Ja pa n 34 4. Ho ng Kong SA R 60 4. Pe ru 68 8. Se rbia 26 8. Geor gia 60 8. Ph ilippine s 64 2. Romani a 85 8. Ur ug ua y 32 . Ar genna 15 6. Ch in a 70 5. Slov enia 15 8. Ta iw an RO C 61 6. Po land 20 . An dorr a 27 6. German y 84 0. Un ited States 724. Sp ai n 75 2. Sw eden 36 . Au st ra lia 55 4. New Zealan d 52 8. Netherlands Colors black: Africa yellow: Asia blue: Europe red: Lan America

green: North America violet: Oceania

Variable: Problem if a woman has more income than husband (inverse scale) Scale: 0-1 (from 3 to 1 in D066_B)

Wave: 6 and 7

Figure 8.

Gender inequality in employment, education, and politics

Source: WVS, Welzel’s sub-index EQUALITY.

0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1 58 6. P ak ista n 88 7. Ye me n 10 4. My an ma r 46 6. Ma li 81 8. Eg yp t 63 4. Qa ta r 43 4. Li by a 86 0. Uz be kist an 41 7. Ky rg yz st an 41 4. Ku wa it 36 8. Ir aq 31 . Az erb ai jan 76 2. Ta jik ist an 12. A lge ria 40 0. Jo rd an 27 5. Pa le stin e 50 . Ba ng lade sh 360 . In don es ia 56 6. Ni ge ria 36 4. Ir an 60 8. Ph ilippi ne s 35 6. Indi a 78 8. Tu ni sia 854 . B ur kina F aso 50 4. Mo roc co 28 8. Gh an a 45 8. Ma lay sia 39 8. Ka zak hs tan 41 0. So uth Kore a 33 2. Ha iti 704 . Vi et na m 51 . A rm en ia 79 2. Tur ke y 64 3. Ru ss ia 64 6. Rw an da 15 6. Ch in a 76 4. Th aila nd 268 . G eor gia 49 8. Mo ldov a 11 2. Be la ru s 42 2. Le ba no n 71 0. So ut h Af ric a 70 2. Si ng ap ore 80 4. U kr ai ne 716 . Zi mb ab w e 89 4. Za mb ia 44 6. Ma ca u SA R 231 . Et hi op ia 55 8. N ica ra gu a 34 4. Hong Ko ng SA R 39 2. Ja pa n 21 8. Ec ua do r 19 6. Cy pr us 68 . B oli vi a 64 2. Ro ma ni a 15 2. Ch ile 616 . P ol and 15 8. Ta iw an RO C 10 0. Bu lg ar ia 17 0. Col om bi a 48 4. Me xico 30 0. Gr ee ce 23 3. Es to ni a 60 4. Pe ru 76 . Br az il 32 0. Gu at em al a 38 0. It al y 68 8. Se rb ia 34 8. Hung ar y 62 0. P or tu ga l 32 . Ar ge nt in a 780 . Tr in id ad an d To ba go 82 6. Un ited Ki ng do m 84 0. Un ite d St at es 70 5. Sl ove ni a 85 8. Ur ug ua y 75 6. Sw itze rlan d 72 4. Sp ai n 24 6. Fin la nd 12 4. Ca na da 52 8. Ne th er land s 25 0. Fra nc e 27 6. Ge rm an y 55 4. N ew Ze al an d 36. A us tra lia 63 0. Pu er to Ri co 20 . A ndorr a 75 2. Sw ed en 57 8. No rw ay Colors black: Africa yellow: Asia blue: Europe red: Latin America

green: North America violet: Oceania

Variable: EQUALITY (Welzel equality subindex) Scale: 0-1