The thoughts and opinions expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily of the U.S. Government,
the U.S. Department of the Navy or the Naval War College.
International Law Studies—Volume 3
INTRODUCTORY.
THE
PREPARATION OF
THE
CODE.The
publication of a code to determine the course of action inmaritime
war
isinitselfan
act significant of the progress that has beenmade
inrecent years in theconduct
of hostilities.The
issue ofsuch
a codeby
theUnited
States in 1900 is in accordwith
theprecedent set in the publication in 1863 of rules prepared
by
Dr.Lieberforthe
government
of armies in thefield. This codification of rules for the regulation of land warfareby
Dr. Lieberwas
fol-lowed
by
such regulations as those of theGeneva
Convention
ofOctober 30, 1868, the Declaration of Brussels of 1874, the
Oxford
Resolutions of 1880,
and
otherlater rulespertaining totheconduct
of
war
upon
land.These
rules for warfareupon
the seawere
preparedby
Capt.Charles
H.
Stockton,U.
S. N., in accordancewith
an
order of the Secretary of theNavy,
made
in 1899, while Captain Stocktonwas
president of theNaval
War
College.He
was
requested todraw
up
a set of ruleswhich
should serve for theNavy
the purposewhich
the rulesdrawn up by
Dr. Lieber servedin theArmy.
Cap-tain Stocktonconsulted
with
various officersof theNavy
and
alsowith severalcivilians
who
were
interested inmaritime
international law.The
preliminarydraft of thecodepreparedinthemain
by
CaptainStockton
was
sentoutwith
the followingmemorandum:
The
regulations respecting the lawsand
usages ofwar
at sea, a preliminary draft ofwhich
is herewith forwarded, are proposed, primarily,tobeput
inforcefortheNavy
oftheUnited
States.For
that reason,
and on
account of our existing laws in regard to pri-vateersand
the capture ofenemy
merchant
vessels, the articles relating toprivateersand
letters ofmarque, and
tothe captureand
destruction of privateproperty atsea, areincluded in thecode. If the code should be presented to other countries as
an
inter-national projet, it ispresumed
that these articleswould
be omittedor modified, in
view
of our adherence to the Declaration of Parisduring the late
war
and
of the stand, as to the capture of privateproperty at sea, taken
by
the President of theUnited
Stat<> in a recentmessage
and
in his instructions to ourrepresentatives atThe
Hague
Conference.The
regulations for the laws ofwar
upon
land, adopted atThe
Hague
Conference, cover anumber
of subjects that are applicable to thenavalservice afloatand
ashore, such as those "bearingupon
6
matters of prisoners, spies, military occupation, etc.,
and hence
thesematters are not included intheNaval
Code,which
extends,by
Article 55, the authority of thelaws
ofwar
to the naval service,when
applicableand
when
not in conflictwith
the proposedNaval
Code.These
regulations forland warfare,asadoptedatThe
Hague,
accompany
thismemorandum
and have been adhered
toby
theUnited
States,but
are notyet in force for theArmy
of theUnited
States,
though
it ispresumed
that,aftersubmissiontoand
confirma-tion
by
the Senate, theywill be dulypromulgated
and
authorized. Iam
informed
unofficiallyby
theJudge-Advocate
General of theArmy
that the present, or"Lieber
Code"
(GeneralOrder No.
100),now
in force,willinall probabilitybe incorporatedoramalgamated,
where
possible,with
The
Hague
Regulations.1The Geneva-Hague
additional articles for the amelioration ofwarfare
at sea,on
the lines of theGeneva
Convention,have been
incorporated in theNaval
Code,with
the exception of Article 3,which
isomitted,and
ofArticle 6,which
ismodified.The
presenceof these
two
articles prevented the adoption of the additional articles, asa whole,by
the representatives of theUnited
States. Itis believed that the possibilities of the
South
Africanwar
have
justified Captain
Mahan's
views as to Article 3.2 If ithad been
amaritime
war
we
might
have
seen sympathetic neutral hospital ships of different countriesarrayedon
opposite sides,and
even hos-pital ships of thesame
neutral country so opposed, in accordancewith
the sympathiesofthecontributors.Probably
from
theUnited
States
would
have
come two
ormore
antagonistic hospital ships, fittedoutby
sympathizershaving
opposing opinions as to themeritsof thewar. It
can
readilybeimagined
what
confusionand
compli-cations
might
follow—
all the articleswould
have been
discredited. Itisbelieved also,by
the proposed modification of Article6, thatthe
danger
of arepetition of theDeerhound
affair,intheKearsarge-Alabama
fight,would
be avoided in the future.The
phraseologyof these articles given in the
two
official translations (Englishand
American)
is retainedwherever
the translationsdo
notconflict.In addition to the manifest advantagesof a formulation
and
crys-tallization of thelaws and
usages of navalwar
(awork
that has never beforebeen
attempted, it is believed,by any
other nation),it isalsohoped
thatthis codewilltendtoward
the amelioration of thehardships ofnaval
warfare
in general,and
more
particularly in thefollowingrespects:
1.
By
the adoption of all that is of practical valueto befound
in the additionalarticles proposedatThe
Hague
to extend the articles oftheGeneva
Convention
tomaritime
warfare.2.
By
restricting tonarrow
limits thebombardment
of unfortifiedand undefended
towns.3.
By
forbiddingbombardment
as ameans
of levying aransom
upon
undefended
towns.4.
By
forbidding the use offalse colors.5.
By
forbiddingreprisalsinexcessofthe offense calling forthem. 6.By
exempting
coast fishing vesselsfrom
capture,where
inno-cently employed.7.
By
incorporatingtheliberal allowancesfor vesselsof theenemy
at the outbreak of war,and
for blockaded vessels, given in theGeneral
Order No.
492, of 1898, of theNavy
Department.
8.By
providing definitely thatfree shipsmake
freegoods.9.
By
giving all theexemption
possible to mail steamers in timeof war.
1Lawsand CustomsofWarou Land proclaimedbyPresident,April11, 1902.
10.
By
exempting
neutral convoysfrom
the rightof search. 11.By
promulgating
the general classification ofcontraband
ofwar
in such amanner
as tomake
an
internationaladoption of the general principles possible.12.
By
authorizing the use of the regulations for land warfare,whenever
applicable, to the naval service of theUnited
States.This has not been officially
done
heretofore. Iam,
veryrespectfully,C. H.
STOCKTON,
Captain, U. S.
Navy,
President
Naval
War
College.These points
and
many
otherswere
consideredand
several tenta-tive drafts of the codewere made.
These
were
subjected to the criticism ofvarious officersoftheNavy
and
to severalotherpersonsoutsidethe
Navy.
Captain Stockton'suntiring labor in the prepara-tionof this valuable compilation deserves high recognition.The
codewas
finallyissuedinaccordwith
General OrdersNo.
551,Navy
Department, Washington,
June
27, 1900,which
states:"
The
following code ofnaval warfare, prepared forthe guidanceand
use of the naval serviceby
Capt. Charles H. Stockton,United
States
Navy, under
direction of the Secretary of theNavy, having
beenapproved
by
the President of theUnited
States,is publishedforthe use of the
Navy
and
forthe informationofall concerned."John
D.Long,
Secretary."OPINIONS
UPON THE
CODE.The
issue of the code very quickly called forth expressions ofopinion
from
foreign sources,though
not especially widelymen-tioned in the
United
States. It has been translated several timesand
hasbeen
made
the subject of bothpracticaland academic
dis-cussion.The
following are examples of expression of opinionfrom
English sources:(FromLondonTimes, Friday, April5,1901.)
A NAVAL
WAR
CODE.From
aNaval Correspondent.There
hasbeen
recentlyissued to the officers of theUnited
StatesNavy
acompact
handbook
oftwenty-seven pagesand
fifty-five arti-cles comprisinglaws
and
usages ofwar
atsea.As
thework
is quiteunknown
inEngland,and
asitincludesagreat deal of matter thatmust
affectthe policy of other nations, it is proposed tosummarize
briefly inthis article
some
of itsmost
salient features. In thefirstplace,
we
areconcernedastotheofficialsanctiontolaws givenin the general order prefacingthehandbook,
informing usthat it is "Pre-pared fortheguidanceand
use of thenaval service,by
Capt.CharlesH.
Stockton,under
the direction of the Secretary of theNavy, having
been approved
by
thePresident oftheUnited
States."There
hasof late beensome
discussion as to themeasures
that8
to;
and
itmay
be of interest ifwe
quotefrom
thishandbook
afew
passages dealingwith
this question. Articles 3, 4, 8,and
12 setforth that:
Military necessity permits
measures
that are indispensable forsecuring theendsof the
war
and
thatareinaccordancewith
modern
laws
and
usages ofwar.Itdoes not permit
wanton
devastation,use of poison, or the doingof
any
hostileact thatwould
make
the returnofpeace unnecessarily difficult.Noncombatants
are to be spared in personand
property duringhostilities,as
much
as the necessitiesofwar
and
theconduct
ofsuchnoncombatants
will permit. * * *The bombardment by
a navalforce of unfortifiedand undefended
towns, villages, or buildings is forbidden,exceptwhen
such
bom-bardment
isincidental to the destruction of military ornaval estab-lishments, public depots of munitions of war, or vessels ofwar
in port, or unless reasonable requisitions for provisionsand
supplies, essential at the time tosuch
naval vessel, or vessels, are forciblywithheld, in
which
casedue
notice ofbombardment
shall be given.The
bombardment
of unfortified orundefended towns and
places forthenonpayment
ofransom
isforbidden.In the event of
an
enemy
failing to observe the lawsand
usagesofwar,ifthe offenderis
beyond
reach, resortmay
behad
to reprisalsif
such
actionshould be considered anecessity;but
due
regardmust
always
behad
to the duties ofhumanity.
Reprisals should not exceed in severity the offense committed,and
must
not be resorted towhen
the injurycomplained
ofhasbeen
repaired.If the offenderis withinthe
power
of theUnited
Stateshe can
be punished, afterdue
trial,by
a properlyconstitutedmilitary ornavaltribunal.
Such
offenders are liable to thepunishments
specifiedby
the criminal law.
The
United
States ofAmerica
acknowledge
and
protect,in hostile countriesoccupiedby
their forces, religionand
morality; the persons ofthe inhabitants, especially those ofwomen;
and
the sacredness ofdomestic relations. Offenses to the contrary shall be rigorously
punished.
In the
columns
of theTimes
during the Spanish-American War,
there occurredan
interesting controversy concerningthe position ofsubmarine
cables in war. Professor Holland's views that a cablegoing
from
a belligerent's territory to a neutralwas
only liableunder
international usage to be cut within the belligerent's terri-torial waters,were
regardedat thetime as rather academic.They
are reenforcedby
Article 5 of theAmerican
War
Code,which
laysdown
that—
The
followingrules are to be followedwith
regard tosubmarine
telegraphic cables in time ofwar, irrespective of theirownership:(a)
Submarine
telegraphic cablesbetween
points in the territory ofan enemy,
orbetween
the territory oftheUnited
Statesand
that ofan enemy,
are subject to such treatment as the necessities ofwar
may
require.(b)
Submarine
telegraphic cablesbetween
the territory ofan
enemy
and
neutral territorymay
be interrupted within the terri-torialjurisdiction of theenemy.
(c)
Submarine
telegraphic cablesbetween
two
neutral territories shall be inviolableand
freefrom
interruption.There
is a point of controversyas towhat
iscontraband
of war.The
Naval
War
Code
dividescontraband
ofwar
intowhat
is abso-lutelycontraband
and
what
is conditionally contraband.The
first9
no
use in repeating the list.The
"conditionallycontraband"
includes:
(a) Coal,
when
destined for a naval station, a port of call, or a ship or ships of theenemy.
(6) Materials for the constructionof railwaysor telegraph.
(c)
Money,
when
such material ormoney
are destined for theenemy's
forces.(d) Provisions,
when
actuallydestined fortheenemy's
military ornaval forces.
Itisinterestingtonote that the inoffensivemule,
which
hasprovedso useful to us in
South
Africa,figureslastof the longlistof " abso-lutelycontraband,"and
that the list is bindingon
American
navalofficers "until otherwise
announced."
In anotherparagraph
we
areinformed
that "in case ofwar,thearticles^hat are conditionallyand
unconditionally contraband,when
not specificallymentioned
in treaties previouslymade
and
in force, will be dulyannounced
in apublic
manner."
A
number
ofminor
points are dealt with, such as use of false colors being forbiddenand
the rule that national colorsmust
bedisplayed before firinga gun. Article 14 lays
down
that "all mer-chant vessels of theenemy,
except coast-fishing vessels innocently employed, are subject to capture, unlessexempt by
previous stipula-tions."The
merchant
vesselsmay
be destroyed ifthought
fit, thepassengersbeinglandedata convenientport at thefirstopportunity. It is curious to note that,
though
constant reference ismade
to neutral vessels, thecode givesno
indexastohow
theUnited
Statesis prepared to recognize transfers of shippingto neutralflags. Section
V
dealswith
the exercise of the right of search,which
isconfined to properly
commissioned
and
authorized vessels of war, convoysof neutrals beingexempt on
thecommander
of thecon-voys being able to give proper assurances.
The
right of searchisuniversallyrecognized as necessary to a belligerent toenable it to ascertain the nationality of a vessel for the purpose of preventing breaches of blockade,
and
in other circumstances to seize vesselsemployed
inany
capacity for theenemy
except that of carrying goodswhich
arenotcontraband
of war.Further
actions justifying seizureare:1. Atteihpt to avoid search
by
escape;but
thismust
be clearly evident.2. Resisting search
with
violence.3. Presenting fraudulentpapers.
4. Vesselsnot beingsupplied
with
the necessarypapersto establishthe object of search.
5. If papers are destroyed, defaced, or concealed.
How
farour
own
naval officersor the foreignoffice could justify the seizure of theGerman
shipsforwhich
we
had
topay
compensa-tion,
under
any
of theabove
heads,isamatter
of pure conjecture. Itmay,
however,
beconfidently predictedthat their taskisnotren-dered easier
by
leaving somuch
tocommon
sensewhich
it isunwise
to
assume
too confidently will befound
in the right place at the right time. In the absence ofany
teachingon
international law,exceptfora
few
lecturestosome
fortunate captainsand
commanders
at theRoyal
Naval
College, theleast thatmight
bedone
isto affordthem
such aid as theAmerican
Navy
Department
does to itsown
officers. This little code oflaws
deserves to be noted as another product of theUnited
StatesNaval
War
College, towhich
we
owe
Captain
Mahan's
work
on
sea power; while incomparison Great
Britain is content to spend £200 per
annum
on
a naval strategy course,which
includes alectureon
navalhistory, fee of £5 alecture.10
and
the official representative of theAdmiralty
informs theHouse
that his sympathies arewith
the hostile critics of the navaleduca-tionalsystem
on
this question of the highertraining oftheNavy.
A
few
days later there appearedfrom
the distinguished Britishauthority
on
international law, Professor Holland, the followingletter:
(From LondonTimes, Wednesday,April10, 1901.)
THE UNITED STATES NAVAL
WAR
CODE.To
theEditor
of
the
Times:Sir:
The
"Naval
War
Code
"of theUnited
States,upon which
an
interesting article appeared in the
Times
ofFriday
last, is so welldeservingof attentionin this countrythat I
may
perhaps be allowedto
supplement
theremarks
ofyour
correspondentfrom
theresultsofa
somewhat
minute
examination of the codemade
shortlyafter itspublication.
One
notes, in the first place, that theGovernment
of theUnited
Statesdoes notshirkresponsibility. Itputsthe codeinto the
hands
ofitsofficers'
'forthe
government
ofallpersonsattachedtothenavalservice,"
and
isdoubtlesspreparedtostandby
the rulescontainedinit, asbeingin accordance
with
international law.These
rulesdeal boldlywith even
so disagreeable a topic as "Reprisals" (Art. 8),upon which
the Brussels,and
after itThe
Hague,
Conference pre-ferred tokeep
silence;and
they take adefinite lineon
many
questionsupon which
there arewide
differences of opinion.On
most
debata-blepoints the rulesare inaccordancewith
theviewsof thiscountry,e. g., as tothe right ofsearch (Art.22), asto thetwofold listof
con-traband
(Art.34-36), as themoment
atwhich
theliabilityofablock-ade
runner
commences
(Art. 44),and
as to the capture of privateproperty (Art. 14),although theprohibition of
such
capturehas longbeen
favoredby
the Executive of theUnited
States,and
was
advo-catedby
theAmerican
delegates atThe
Hague
Conference.So
also Articles 34—36,by
apparently taking forgranted the correctness of the rulings oftheSupreme
Court
inthecivil-war
cases of the Spring-bokand
the Peterhoffwith
reference towhat
may
be described as"continuous
carriage," are inharmony
with
the viewswhich Lord
Salisbury recently
had
occasion to express as to the trade of theBiuidesrath
and
otherGerman
vesselswith
Lourenco Marques.
Itmust
be observed,on
the otherhand, that Article 30flatly contra-dictsthe British rule astoconvoy; whileArticle 3setsoutThe
Hague
Declaration as to projectiles
dropped
from
balloons, towhich
thiscountryisnot aparty. Article7departs
from
receivedviewsby
pro-hibiting altogetherthe use offalse colors,and
Article 14 (doubtless inpursuance
of the recent decision of theSupreme
Court
in thePa-quete
Habana) by
affirming the absoluteimmunity
of coastfishing vessels, as such,from
capture.On
novel questions the code isequally readywith
a solution. Itspeaks
with
no
uncertainvoiceon
thetreatmentofmail steamersand
mailbags
(Art. 20).On
cable-cuttingit adoptsinArticle5,asyour
correspondentpoints out,the views
which
Iventuredtomaintaininyour
columns
when
the questionwas
raised duringthewar
of1898. Imay
also,by
theway,
claim the supportof the code for theview
takenby
me,
in a correspondence also carriedon
inyour
columns
during the navalmaneuvers
of 1888, of thebombardment
ofopen
'coasttowns. Article 4setsoutsubstantiallythe rules
upon
this sub-ject,forwhich
Isecuredtheimprimatur
oftheInstitutde Droit Inter-national in 1896.11
onlyin
September
last, forapplying tomaritime
warfare the prin-ciples oftheConvention
ofGeneva.
Article10 ofThe
Hague
Con-ventionhasbeen
reproduced inthecode in forgetfulness, perhaps, of the fact that thatarticlehas notbeen
ratified.Thirdly, the code containsvery properly
some
general provisions applicable equally towarfareupon
land (Arts. 1, 3,8,12,and
54).Fourthly, it is clearly expressed,
and
it is brief,consisting ofonly54 articles, occupying 22 pages.
Fifthly, it deals
with
two
very distinct topics, viz, themode
ofconductinghostilities against the forces of the
enemy, and
the prin-ciples applicable tothemaking
prize ofmerchant
vessels,which
as often asnotmay
be the property of neutrals.These
topicsareby
no
means
kept apartas theymight
be, articleson
prize appearing unexpectedly inthe sectionavowedly
devoted to hostilities.Itis
worth
consideringwmether something
resembling theUnited
States
Code
would
not befound
useful in the BritishNavy.
Our
code
might
be betterarrangedthan itspredecessor,and
would
differfrom
iton
certain questions,but
should resembleitin clearness of expression, in brevity, and,above
all things, in frank acceptance of responsibility.What
navalmen
most
want
is definite guidance,in categoricallanguage,
upon
those points ofmaritime
internationallaw
upon which
thegovernment
hasmade
up
itsown
mind.
I
am,
sir,your
obedient servant,T. E.
HOLLAND.
Oxford,
April 8.NATURE
OF
THE
DISCUSSIONSFOR
1903.While
it is true that theNaval
War
Code
of theUnited
Stateswas
issued onlythree years ago, yet the nature of the subjectand
the
development
ofmaritime
internationallaw
and
practicemake
it a tcpic
worthy
of themost
careful consideration at the present time,when
somuch
thought
isgiven tonaval affairsintheir inter-national relations. Ithasbeen
consideredadvisable that theNaval
War
Code
of 1900 bemade
the basis of the conferences in inter-nationallaw
forthe session oftheUnited
StatesNaval
War
Col1forthe
summer
of 1903.In the original preparation of the code, certain debatable points
were
submittedand
opinionsupon
them
asked. Thesewere
asfollows:
1. Prohibition of
bombardment
ofopen
or unfortifiedtowns
onseacoast.
2.
Adoption
of additional articles ofGeneva
Convention
asfor-mulated
atThe
Hague, with
the exception of Article 6and
the addi-tion of a proviso toNo.
3, that all neutral hospital ships shall, beforeand
duringaction, attachthemselvestoone belligerent orthe otherand
be subjectto its regulationsand
fly its flag at the main,with
redcross underneath.3. Prohibition ofuse of false colors
by men-of-war
atany
time.4.
The
abolition of thejus angariae or seizure of neutralvessels or property forwar
purposes, except in the case of overpoweringmilitarynecessity.
5.
Exemption
offishingboatsand
fishermen: fish In be paid forif12
6.
The
exercise of the right of inquiryupon
neutralmen-of-war
approaching a blockade or investment. If false colorswere
uni-versally prohibited thiswould
not be necessary.7.
Ransom
of unfortifiedtowns: If refused, the penalty.Should
it be forbidden?8.
Should such
a status aswar
rebel be furtherrecognized?Vide
Lieber's G. O. 100, Inst, toArmies, etc.
9. Is a collier attending afleet of
an
enemy
guilty of unneutralserviceor onlyofcarriage of
contraband
ofwar?
Should
vesseland
cargo beboth
seized?10.
Should
a continuous-voyage liability be applied to vesselscarrying
goods
that arecontraband
orpresumably
for the violation of blockade?11.
Should
multiplied retaliation beseverely prohibited, i. e., theshooting or
hanging
ofmore
than
one forone, etc.?The
codehas notbeen
testedby
actualwar;
therefore,precedentswhich
itmight
be desirabletomaintain
forthe sake ofstrenghten-ing the codeitself
have
notbeen
established.The
codecan
there-fore be consideredwithout
prejudicewhich
might
be favorable toa rule that
had
alreadybecome
strengthenedthrough
action inaccordance
with
it, orfound
unsatisfactory or insufficientwhen
tried inaction.The
points for discussionwhich
have been
raised are basedupon
material furnished
by
officers of theNavy,
by
students of interna-tionallaw,by
criticsand
writerswho
have
given attention to thecode in
America
and
inEurope.The
English, French,and
Italianshave
thus far paidmost
atten-tion to the code.
So
far as possible their queriesand
criticisms areembodied
inthe discussions.The
changes
which
may
be desirable in consequence ofdevelopment
and changes
naturallycoming
with
thepassage oftime are also to be considered.