CONFLICTING IMAGES OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY
A critical discourse analysis of civil society participation in
European development governance
Sanni Maria Isometsä University of Helsinki Faculty of Social Sciences World Politics
Master’s thesis April 2017
Tiedekunta/Osasto – Fakultet/Sektion – Faculty
Faculty of Social Sciences
Laitos – Institution – Department
Department of Political and Economic Studies
Tekijä – Författare – Author
Sanni Maria Isometsä
Työn nimi – Arbetets titel – Title
Conflicting images of civil society. A critical discourse analysis of civil society participation in European development governance.
Oppiaine – Läroämne – Subject
World Politics
Työn laji – Arbetets art – Level
Master’s thesis
Aika – Datum – Month and year
April 2017
Sivumäärä – Sidoantal – Number of pages
80 pp.+ appendices 5 pp.
Tiivistelmä – Referat – Abstract
This Master’s thesis examines civil society participation in European development governance. Traditionally civil society has been described according to its relation to states and markets. The story becomes more puzzling when one moves outside the territory of nation states. Common for divergent theories of global civil society is that they cherish a great faith in citizen participation and its beneficial consequences in global governance. It has been claimed that over-optimism and lack of a critical perspective have obscured the meaning of the concept, and more empirical research is needed. At the same time, the discussion of global governance is based on an idea of coordination and collaboration of different actors; thus neglecting the existence of power. By absorbing a critical approach to global governance, this paper aims to provide a better understanding of civil society at the transnational level.
Civil society was examined from the perspective of the actors themselves by studying the language they used. The primary data was based on the reactions of civil society actors during the European Commission’s consultation period regarding the new Consensus on Development. The data was collected directly from the Commission’s Your voice in Europe web page, which manages the open consultations. These reactions were analysed by using Norman Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis. A specific focus was placed on social roles and identities, which were named as images of civil society. The core idea was that the way one speaks also tells who one is.
The analysis showed that at least three divergent images can be drawn upon the texts: a normative actor defending civic spaces, a governance image demanding stronger leadership from the EU and a professionalized expert using knowledge claims. These images are interconnected but also partly contrasting; thus blurring the conceptualization of global civil society. As the existing literature on European civil society indicated, none of the images form a clear resistance or counter-hegemony for the EU, and they more or less match the
conceptualizations of a collaborator. The images differ in their subject positioning and how they justify their being. It can be concluded that self-criticism of civil society actors is needed, and civil society groups should more deeply evaluate their ways of argumentation and relations to states, intergovernmental organizations and the private sector. While establishing conflicting images, civil society is losing some of its transformative possibilities and maintaining existing power structures.
Avainsanat – Nyckelord – Keywords
Civil society Global governance EU politics
Development politics Critical discourse analysis
Tiedekunta/Osasto – Fakultet/Sektion – Faculty
Valtiotieteellinen tiedekunta
Laitos – Institution – Department
Politiikan ja talouden tutkimuksen laitos
Tekijä – Författare – Author
Sanni Maria Isometsä
Työn nimi – Arbetets titel – Title
Conflicting images of civil society. A critical discourse analysis of civil society participation in European development governance.
Oppiaine – Läroämne – Subject
Yleinen valtio-oppi, maailmanpolitiikan tutkimus
Työn laji – Arbetets art – Level
Pro gradu
Aika – Datum – Month and year
Huhtikuu 2017
Sivumäärä – Sidoantal – Number of pages
80 s.+ liitteet 5 s.
Tiivistelmä – Referat – Abstract
Tämä pro gradu -tutkielma tarkastelee kansalaisyhteiskunnan osallistumista eurooppalaiseen kehityshallintaan. Perinteisesti kansalaisyhteiskunta on määritelty suhteessa valtioon ja yksityiseen sektoriin. Globaali politiikassa kansalaisyhteiskunnan roolin määritteleminen on haastavaa. Monet globaalia kansalaisyhteiskuntaa
käsittelevistä teorioista kuitenkin painottavat sen erityistä merkitystä ja demokratisoivaa vaikutusta. Toisaalta juuri ylioptimistisuus ja kriittisen tarkastelun puute ovat vaikeuttaneet käsitteen määrittelemistä ja uutta empiiristä tietoa tarvitaan. Samaan aikaan keskustelu globaalista hallinnasta on keskittynyt kuvaamaan koordinaation ja yhteistyön tehostamista, eikä erilaisia vallankäytönmuotoja huomioida riittävästi. Kriittinen näkökulma globaaliin hallintaan antaa mahdollisuuden uudelleen arvioida myös valtioiden rajat ylittävän kansalaisyhteiskunnan asemaa.
Tässä tutkielmassa kansalaisyhteiskuntaa tarkastellaan tutkimalla toimijoiden käyttämää kieltä.
Tutkimusaineistona käytettiin kansalaisyhteiskuntatoimijoiden kannanottoja koskien Euroopan unionin uutta kehityspoliittista julkilausumaa. Aineisto kerättiin Euroopan komission avoimia konsultaatioita hallinnoivalta Sinun äänesi Euroopassa -sivustolta. Reaktioita analysoitiin Norman Fairclough'n kriittisen diskurssianalyysin avulla. Erityisesti tarkasteltiin sosiaalisten roolien ja identiteetin rakenteita. Ydinajatuksena on, että se kuinka toimijat puhuvat kertoo siitä keitä he ovat.
Analyysin pohjalta kansalaisyhteiskunnalle voitiin muodostaa kolme erillistä toimijuuskäsitystä: kansalaisyhteiskunnan tiloja puolustava normatiivinen toimija, vahvempaa hallintoa vaativa toimija sekä asiantuntijuuteen ja tietoon pohjaava ammattimainen toimija. Nämä kolme toimijuuskäsitystä ovat osittain päällekkäisiä ja toisiaan täydentäviä, mutta myös ristiriitaisia. Kuten aiemmat tutkimukset ovat osoittaneet, yksikään kuvauksista ei muodosta selkeää vastavoimaa eurooppalaiselle hallinnolle. Toimijuuskäsitykset kuitenkin eroavat sosiaalisissa rooleissaan ja toimintansa oikeuttamisessa. Ristiriitaiset käsitykset
hankaloittavat globaalin kansalaisyhteiskunnan määrittelemistä. Tutkielman johtopäätöksenä voidaan todeta, että kansalaisyhteiskuntatoimijoiden on tarkasteltava omaa argumentointiaan ja suhdettaan valtioon,
kansainvälisiin organisaatioihin ja yksityiseen sektoriin entistä kriittisemmin. Toistamalla ristiriitaisia toimijuuskäsityksiä kansalaisyhteiskunta menettää osan vaikutusvaltaansa ja vain ylläpitää olemassa olevia valtarakenteita.
Avainsanat – Nyckelord – Keywords
Kansalaisyhteiskunta Globaali hallinta EU-politiikka Kehityspolitiikka
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This Master’s thesis has received a research grant from Finnish People’s Education Foundation (Kansan sivistysrahasto).
CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION ... 1 2 CONCEPTUALIZING CIVIL SOCIETY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE ... 5 2.1 CONTESTED DEFINITIONS OF POWER AND GOVERNANCE ... 5 2.2 IN SEARCH OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY ... 9 2.3 NGOS AS DOMINANT CIVIC ACTORS ... 15 3 CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT GOVERNANCE ... 17 3.1 NORMATIVE BASIS OF EU DEVELOPMENT POLITICS ... 17 3.2 DECISION-MAKING AND PARTICIPATION ... 19 3.3 SUMMARY OF THE THEORETICAL CHAPTERS ... 23 4 METHODOLOGICAL ORIENTATION ... 25 4.1 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK ... 25
4.2 APPLYING NORMAN FAIRCLOUGH’S CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS ... 29
4.3 DATA ... 32 4.4 LIMITATIONS OF THIS THESIS ... 35 5 THE IMAGES OF CIVIL SOCIETY ... 37 5.1 ANALYSING THE ONLINE PUBLIC CONSULTATION CONTRIBUTIONS ... 37 5.2 CONCORD’S REACTIONS DURING THE CONSULTATION PERIOD ... 42 5.2.1 A normative actor defending civic spaces ... 44 5.2.2 A governance image ... 49 5.2.3 A professionalized expert image ... 53 5.3 SYNTHESIS ... 56 6 CONCLUSIONS ... 63 REFERENCES ... 67 APPENDICES ... 76
1 INTRODUCTION
The concepts of global civil society and global governance have gained remarkable popularity among political science academics and International Relation (IR) studies during the past decades. While these concepts are central for the theory and practice of international politics, they also remain widely contested and debated. Thus, in this thesis I aim to provide a better understanding of the role of civil society at the transnational level. To be precise, the focus is on European development governance and a particular process of formulating a new European Consensus on Development. Instead of evaluating the role from the perspective of the EU policies or effects caused by civil society groups, I will concentrate on the language used by civil society actors. The cornerstone of this paper is that theoretical illustrations are relevant from the perspective of real practices since 'concepts are not conceived apart from activities carried out in their name' (Buckley 2013a, 204).
Studying civil society is highly timely and the motivation to analyse the topic aroused from the increasing discussion of a shrinking civic space. During the past couple of years civil society organizations have expressed concerns on serious threats to civic freedoms in more than 100 countries (Civicus 2016). It has been claimed that an increasing number of states is adopting models of law that restrict the space for non-governmental organizations to operate (Amnesty 2015; KIOS 2015) while the importance of other development actors such as private companies has been emphasized in development policies (see for example Gronow 2016). However, intergovernmental organizations such as the EU have made commitments to foster 'a dynamic, pluralistic and independent civil society' and 'meaningful and structured engagement' with it (European Council 2012, 1). Therefore, it could be asked: why are there signs of a shrinking civic space even though the civic participation seems to be valued and supported at the transnational level? For many reasons, it is a perfect time to analyse this puzzle. At the beginning of 2016 a new 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) was launched by the United Nations (SDGs 2016). This new agenda is aiming
to shift the whole development paradigm by its universal approach. Simultaneously, the EU is formulating guidelines for its development politics as the new European Consensus on Development is being drafted by the European Commission (EC). This new agreement will replace the previous Consensus made in 2005 and guide the directions of development politics of the EU and its member states for the following years. The process of formulating the new Consensus is also an opportunity for civil society actors to highlight their interests and influence on the policy-making.
Traditionally, civil society has been described according to its relation to states and markets. Many of these illustrations are based on the local narratives and they concentrate on civil society actors working in national or regional contexts. The story gets more puzzling when one moves outside the territory of nation states. What is the role of civil society in global governance? Conceptualizations of global civil society (also referred as GCS) vary at least as much as the illustrations of its local cousin. Common for many divergent theories is that they cherish a great faith in citizen participation and its beneficial consequences in global governance. Theories suggest that global civil society increases accountability, plurality and democracy, and thereby the whole legitimacy of global governance (McKeon 2009; Patomäki & Teivainen 2004; Scholte 2011a). Many theories explicitly emphasize the normative value of the GCS and its ability to create a global harmony (Kaldor 2003; Keane 2003). However, critical voices have also appeared in the academic level and European civil society groups have been accused of lacking accountability, representativeness and inclusiveness (Kutay 2012). In consequence some question the whole being of global civil society (Chandler 2007; Chandler 2009). However, my aim is not to further argue whether there is a global civil society or not, but to examine what it is. It has been claimed that it is due to the over-optimistic beliefs of transformative possibilities and lack of critical perspective in general, that the meaning of the concept has been obscured (Buckley 2013b; Lipschutz 2007, 304). Thus, in Global
Civil Society and Transversal Hegemony Karen Buckley (2013b, 64) claims that there is
'a significant lacuna in research between the philosophical promise and empirical reality of global civil society' and a re-conceptualization of the phenomenon should be made. Ronnie Lipschutz (2007, 304) then argues that despite the wide range of studies on GCS,
they rarely ask the important questions of why does it exist or what social role does it have. Many have agreed that more empirical evidence and systematic research on civil society participation on the global level is needed (e.g. Bergesen 2007; Buckley 2013b; Heidbreder 2012; Patomäki 2007).
This thesis aims to contribute to filling this research gap with a critical approach on global civil society; and hence examine its conceptualizations in European development governance. Many of the theories of global governance are based on the idea of coordination and collaboration of different actors at the global sphere (see for example Commission on global governance 1995; Karns & Mingst 2010; Thakur &Weiss 2010). Yet, these approaches leave little space for the existence of power. Therefore, this thesis is based on a multifaceted nature of power and governance which is well captured in
Power in Global Governance by Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (2005a).
According to the authors (Barnett & Duvall 2005a, 3) 'to understand how global outcomes are produced and how actors are differentially enabled and constrained requires a consideration of different forms of power in international politics'; thus, they identify four types of power: compulsory, institutional, structural and productive power. From this perspective, global civil society is also part of the wide web of power relations and 'enmeshed with practices of governmentality' (Lipschutz 2005a, 247). Thus, I suggest that the roles of civil society actors in European development governance are rather in line with the neoliberal order than opposing it. Yet, how do the traditional conceptualizations of global civil society match the empirical evidence and how civil society actors position themselves in the governance structures?
Instead of looking for the answers solely from external factors such as restrictions of states and rising nationalism, this thesis focuses on the internal characteristics of civil society groups and the language they use. The primary data is based on the reactions of civil society actors during the European Commission’s open consultation regarding the new Consensus on Development. This consultation process was centred around an online public consultation, held between 30 May and 21 August 2016. The data was collected directly from the Commission’s Your voice in Europe web page, which manages the open consultations. Since the method for analysis chosen for this thesis is better suited to
smaller units, I will concentrate on the reactions of one specific NGO network, the European confederation of Relief and Development NGOs (Concord). To form a profound understanding of how the network took part in the Consensus process, other key reactions from the consultation period are also included in the data set. This material was gathered from Concord’s official web page.
The language is examined with a social constructivist approach and analysed with critical discourse analysis (CDA). The social constructivist approach acknowledges that knowledge, concepts and the whole reality is socially constructed (see for example Wendt 1999) which goes hand in hand with the presuppositions of discourse analysis. In general, discourse analysis presumes that the reality is built on social interaction, where language has a special significance and by studying it, we can also explore the surrounding society. Also Barnett and Duvall (2005a, 3) argue that analysis of power and governance should include a consideration of the normative structures and discourses that generate social identities and capacities. Furthermore, according to Norman Fairclough (2003, 207) discourses illustrate our world as it is seen, as well as the imaginaries of how it could or should be. Thus, in his thesis the empirical analysis will be conducted by Fairclough’s (see for example Fairclough 1992; 2003) three-dimensional framework, which combines textual analysis, analysis of a discursive practise and analysis of a wider social practice. On the grounds of the above discussion, the study is guided by the following research question: how do civil society actors participate in European development governance? To be able to answer the question, I need to perform certain tasks. Thus Chapter 2 conceptualizes civil society in global governance and highlights the leading role of non-governmental organizations. Chapter 3 presents the context of EU development governance and the modes of civic participation within. Chapter 4 frames the methodological orientation by describing the method, data and limitations of this thesis. Chapter 5 firstly maps the reactions of civil society actors in online consultation in order to see what kind of actors participated in this process. Secondly, the reactions of Concord will be analysed by using Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis. Thirdly, the findings will be interpreted in the light of existing studies. Finally, chapter 6 concludes the key findings of the thesis and discusses their relevance.
2 CONCEPTUALIZING CIVIL SOCIETY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
In this chapter I will structure the theoretical framework of civil society in global governance. Firstly, I will briefly present both traditional and more critical approaches to global governance. In this thesis governance is seen as inherently linked to the notion of power, and thereby the critical perspective is stressed. Secondly, I will turn into the concept of global civil society (referred also as GCS) and the characteristics of non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
2.1 Contested definitions of power and governance
Global governance is not the same as having global government. It has also been stated that governance is not the same as politics, although the concepts are closely related; whereas politics is about competition in the pursuit of particular interests, governance is about producing public goods (Thakur &Weiss 2010, xv). Thus, Thakur and Weiss (2010, 5) insightfully ask '[w]hy are there nonetheless elements of predictability, stability, and order despite the absence of a world government?'
Along with globalization the concept of global governance has become a popular phenomenon in political science and a topic of a considerable amount of academic papers and studies. However, the concept of global governance is not free of contestation, and there are diverse ways of defining it. Yet when used with 'precision and vigilance' it can be a highly relevant for contemporary politics (Scholte 2011a, 10). It is generally agreed that the end of the Cold War in 1990s increased the involvement of diverse actors in global affairs and deepened the integration between them. In consequence, the world is more interconnected and interdependent than ever before. Thus, it is a result of neoliberal paradigm shift in international political and economic relations that by 'privileging of capital and market mechanisms over state authority created governance gaps that have encouraged actors from private and civil society sectors to assume authoritative roles previously considered the purview of the State' (Jang, McSparren & Rashchupkina 2016,1). It has also been claimed that it is the complex reality and growing global
problems that are demanding global governance (Karns & Mingst 2010).
The report Our Common Neighbourhood by the Commission on global governance (1995, 2) represents the traditional view of global governance by defining that global governance is 'the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affair’s' and 'a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action taken'. Global governance is compared to the governance at the local level, and the need for pursuing “collective will” is stressed. (Commission on global governance 1995.) In similar vein, Karns and Mingst (2010, 4) state that global governance is not a single entity, world order, or a simple hierarchy but 'a multi-level collection of governance-related activities, rules and mechanism, formal and informal, public and private' which they named as pieces of global governance. These descriptions give a neutral and almost power-free illustration of the state of world politics, as it would be a purely rational order of things composed by several actors of the sphere.
More critical approaches to global governance recognize the defaults of these traditional views. From critical point of view, it could be asked who is governing and what? Who is benefitting from the created rules and structures, and who are the losers of the game? And most importantly, what is the relation between power and governance? This thesis is engaged with these critical approaches to governance, and has absorbed the plural notion of power. Therefore, it is necessary to briefly define what is meant by power. However, this is not a simple task, since in political science power is an essentially contested concept and there are disagreements of what power is, how it operates, and how it changes (Gallie 1956 cited in Barnett & Duvall 2005b, 41). Thus, there is no single answer to what power is. Nevertheless, the way we understand the concept, matters greatly since many theories of power are at the same time theories of society and they portray a surrounding reality in very different ways. Guzzini (2005, 513–515) states that defining power is already a way of using it.
And indeed, in political science the versions of power have varied from the Dahlian-realist one (see for example Dahl 1957), to more nuanced illustrations (see for example
Bachrach & Baratz 1962; Hardy & Leiba-O'Sullivan 1998; Lukes 2005). These versions vary from direct and visible forms to more invisible and diffused impressions. In line with the latter conception, French philosopher Michel Foucault (see for example 1982; 1995; 2007) believed that power is multidimensional and that governance can be defined as a systematic and persevering usage of power. According to Foucault this notion of governmentality forms the basis of all political thinking and operation, and should not be seen in simplified terms only as methods of certain institutions (Miller & Rose 2010, 44– 45). He also decentralizes power and in his view power is part of a wide network of discourses where knowledge and power are closely interweaved with each other (Hardy & Leiba-O'Sullivan 1998.) Thus, knowledge is not a neutral description of the truth, but another form of exercising power.
Also Barnett and Duvall (2005a; 2005b) have recognized the need for a more pluralistic notion of power by claiming that disciplinary discussions in International Relations are too focused on realist versions and direct forms of power. They state that 'to understand how global outcomes are produced and how actors are differentially enabled and constrained requires a consideration of different forms of power in international politics' (2005a, 3). In Power in Global Governance (2005a) they bring together variety of theoretical perspectives to examine how power is presented in world politics. They identify four forms of power: compulsory, institutional, structural and productive power. Hence, it is not just the simple forms of power that matter, since only together these different dimensions are able to form a complete theory. In short, compulsory power refers to more direct control over another, involving specific actors. This form is related to the realist version of power. Institutional power is more indirect and diffused through for example specific international institutions. Structural power is again more direct but 'concerns the social capacities and interests'. Finally productive power is both diffused and 'working in the level of social relations of constitutions'. This means that productive power produces subjects by creating meanings and significations. (Barnett & Duvall 2005a.) Therefore, power and governance are 'inextricably linked' and global governance is not just a mechanical coordination of international politics, but also a distribution of
different values and ideologies such as democracy, human rights and liberalism (Barnett & Duvall 2005a, 13).
This kind of approach to global governance automatically raises a question of who are the actors, the ones holding the power and benefitting from the outcomes? It has been suggested that despite the many defaults of nation states, they are not disappearing but adapting to the new context of governance (Castells 2008, 87). Yet, the modern state-centric Westphalian system of global governance has moved towards a more diverse composition that has not replaced the states but stretched the boundaries by including new issues and actors in the sphere (Thakur &Weiss 2010, xvi–xvii). For example, Karns and Mingst (2010) list several important actors from states to non-governmental organizations and inter-governmental organizations to multinational corporations. In less critical point of view, states and their sovereignty are likely to remain in the centre of global governance, while international institutions are helping to build cooperation and shared goals (Thakur & Weiss 2010, 3–4). However, in this thesis the traditional description of global governance is challenged by more critical view, which gives an opportunity to examine the participation of civil society actors from a critical standpoint. Civil society participation is examined in the context of the European Union, which is one of the most well-known intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) in the world.
As many other concepts in world politics, also IGOs are referred and defined in several different ways. In this thesis I use a definition that describes them as 'organizations that include at least three states among their membership, that have activities in several states, and that are created though a formal intergovernmental agreement such as treaty, charter, or statute' (Karns & Mingst 2010, 5). Today’s most powerful IGOs were created in aftermath of the Second World War, and since that the number of them has significantly increased (Gutner 2016). This is also true concerning on the EU, and in the following chapter I will contextualize this background more carefully. Yet, here I still want to further clarify why states create IGOs in the first place. Margaret Karns and Karen Mingst (2010, 7) itemise multiple functions that these IGOs offer for states: analysing data, creating forums for exchanging views and decision-making, defining rules and allocating resources to name but a few. However, these institutions have also the ability to restrict,
set agendas, pressure governments and facilitate the creations of rules and norms for them (Karns & Mingst 2010). Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore (2005, 161) argue that it is often thought that globalization and complex reality of international relations requires IGOs to manage and perform diverse functions, but this might not be their only incentive. Thus, while international institutions are seemingly producing common goods through collaboration, they also employ compulsory and institutional power with their authority and productive power by shaping subjectivities and meanings of political phenomena (Barnett & Finnemore, 175). Even more pessimistic description of power politics and anti-thesis for liberal institutionalism claims that structures of all institutions are designed by 'the winners' of the system and just 'help mitigate the regimes losers’ destructive ambitions' (Gruber 2005, 102–103). Hence, instead of a neutral and equal system of arranging global issues, global governance is a web of power relations and some are able to gain more than others.
Global governance has not been able to bring peace and harmony to the world, and for many ways it has failed to create coordination and cooperation between different actors. Meanwhile global inequality is growing and according to Oxfam statistics eight men own the same wealth as the 3.6 billion people who make up the poorest half of the world (Oxfam 2017). Yet, despite of all its shortcomings global governance is most likely not going to disappear. According to Jan Aart Scholte (2011b, 342) even more global governance is needed in the future, but since it needs to be truly accountable, civil society should be a central part of it. In a similar vein, Karns and Mingst (2010, 29) note that even though 'power relation of states matter, so do the resources and actions of non-state actors', and above all, three key challenges of legitimacy, accountability and efficiency should be considered while building the structures of global governance. Also Jang et al. (2016) believe that in the near future individual empowerment gains more momentum and along with it the influence of civil society is expected to grow.
2.2 In search of global civil society
In this thesis my purpose is not to sum up the diverse conceptualizations of civil society and then produce a single complete one. Moreover, my aim is to explore the traditionally
used conceptualizations in order to analyse how civil society is described today and why. Especially, I want to address the “globality” of civil society, and thus use the notion of global civil society instead of mere European civil society. These conceptualizations are not important only for understanding the historical trajectory, but as Buckley (2013b, 239) well describes; the way we put names and labels to objects, impacts also the identity constructed and actions pursued.
As the whole framework of global governance, also the notion of global civil society has multiple and contested definitions (Scholte 2011a, 33) and the illustrations of it have varied from 'civic-consensual' to more 'radical activist' representations (see for example Buckley 2013b; Castells 2008). In practice none of these illustrations are as straightforward as they might sound. In point of fact, taken out of the context global civil society is a generic term that is used to describe very different kind of things. Therefore, it is always important to define what is meant by the concept and how it is understood (Lipschutz 2007, 304). The fact that most theories of global civil society are based on narratives of local civil society makes the concept even more confusing. Yet, it is difficult to get pass this logic, and as indicated in the previous subchapter states still have a significant role in global governance.
Perhaps the biggest academic discussions considering civil society are about where it is located, whom or what it includes and what kind of normative presuppositions it inherently has. What has generally been agreed is that civil society lies more or less outside the official government and the private sector, which makes the notion of 'third sector' to come alive (Scholte 1999, 3). This notion includes a spectrum of civil society actors from labour unions to religious communities and social entrepreneurs to diverse civil society organizations. Yet, according to Scholte (1999, 4) the concept of civil society should also be defined through its reasoning and attempt to shape policies, norms or deeper social structures because 'civil society exists when people make concerted efforts through voluntary associations to mould rules: both official, formal, legal arrangements and informal social constructs.' In similar vein, Bob Reinalda (2001) concludes that non-governmental organizations are emerging as a special set of organizations that are private in their form but public in their purpose. Besides placing civil society outside of family,
market and state, these definitions give certain normative presuppositions for it. Thus, it appears that many theories emphasize the normative value of civil society and its ability to create a global harmony (see for example Kaldor 2003; Keane 2003). According to Mary Kaldor (2003, 583) a historical review shows that despite its changing content, the concept of civil society has been based on the same core meaning and an idea of a social contract among individuals.
Location of civil society is closely linked to the debate of what it is. Traditionally civil society has been portrayed at least in two divergent ways: on the one hand as a transformative actor resisting the status quo, and on the other hand as an open space for communication. The former could be described through Gramscian theory. For Antonio Gramsci civil society was located between state and market and represented the Polanyian double-movement against the self-regulated markets (Buckley 2013b; Lipschutz 2007, 304). This approach stresses the role of civil society as a counter-hegemonic movement and sees it as a so-called 'post-modern prince' contesting the power of empire and neo-liberalistic hegemony and common-sense (illustrated in Buckley 2013b). In other words, civil society is seen as a contender, a movement of resistance, not completely separated from state but acting as its consent and aiming to alter the power of markets. For some it is due to the over-idealistic expectations, that global civil society literature has not been able to properly historicize the concept of civil society, and therefore it still makes an artificial division between the public and the private realm (Lipschutz 2007, 304). The later expression can be described with the Habermasian critical theory, which is based on normative presuppositions of communicative action and defines civil society as an establisher of free public sphere outside of the state and economic organizations (Patomäki 2007, 314). In other words, it is a network for exchanging information and points of views that lies between the state and society (Habermas 1996, 360). This public sphere would be the means to a more transparent and legitimate system, and thus more separate from a state than in the Gramscian notion. A quality of dialogue is important aspect of public sphere thematic and it contains promises of consultation, deliberation and partnership (Fairclough 2003, 80). Thereby Fairclough lists several normative feature that effective public sphere dialogue needs to have:
a) People decide to enter dialogue, and can continue the dialogue on other occasions;
b) Access is open to anyone who wants to join in, and people have equal opportunities to contribute to the dialogue;
c) People are free to disagree, and differences between them are recognized; d) There is a space for consensus to be reached, alliances to be formed; e) It is talk that makes a difference – it can lead to action (e.g. policy change).
Kaldor’s (2007, 300) definition is close to the public sphere but gives more emphasis on politics and agency. It also gives a great historical review of the concept:
Like the public sphere, the medium through which individuals negotiate a social contract has changed over time and this explains the changing empirical definitions of civil society. Over time, free public spaces get institutionalized and debate and negotiation move to new arenas. Thus, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries debates about public affairs took place in coffee houses and were reflected in parliamentary debates, which is why civil society at that time referred to a rule-governed society based on a social contract. In the nineteenth century, the spread of capitalism created autonomous spaces in the economy and debates involved the emerging bourgeois – hence for Hegel, and his definition was taken up by Marx, civil society was equated with bourgeois society. And in the twentieth century, the rise of workers’ movements and the emergence of mass political parties further narrowed the definition of civil society, at least according to the main twentieth century ideologist of civil society Antonio Gramsci, to the realm of culture and ideology.
Thus, even though civil society has been located outside of the private sector and states, it is still inherently linked up with a territorial state. According to Kaldor (2003) this link between state and civil society was broken in 1970s and 1980s when the concept was simultaneously used in Latin America and eastern Europe to oppose militarized regimes and advocate the change from the below. Kaldor continues by stating that the notion of a global civil society aroused around 1990s. The emergence of these “islands of civic engagement” was made possible by the international links and the existence of international human rights legislation. Hence, the new conceptualizing of civil society became a global one. (Kaldor 2003, 583–587.) However, in the light of the theories of
global governance the role of states is still a central one at the global sphere, and therefore the concept of global civil society cannot be truly separated from nation states.
A forum discussion on Theorizing Global Civil Society in Globalization (2007) gives a good sum up of the discussion. In his article Deriving Norms from Global Space: The
Limits of Communicative Approaches to Global Civil Society Theorising David Chandler
(2007) argues that just by being global and distinct from states, global civil society assumes a moral importance, and makes the idea of global public sphere mere idealist veil for political projects. His core claim is that global civil society is defined by the universal norms rather than real life actors, and thus the whole concept is lacking empirical evidence (Chandler 2007). Chandler (2007, 296) states that:
International civil society NGOs may be disingenuous when they argue that they advocate on behalf of the environment or those without a “voice”, but even these claims pale against the hubris of the liberal academics who claim to speak on behalf of “global civil society” as a whole when they reconstruct their own normative positions from their academic investigations of “global space”.
Kaldor (2007) directly responses to Chandler by reminding that 'it was already Hegel who defined civil society as an ethical realm'. Fred DallMayar (2007) does not take the critique but recognizes a need for more pluralistic and open political culture. Also Lipschutz (2007) admits that the use of the concept of global civil society is incoherent, but claims that it does not mean that the phenomenon would not exist at all. Instead of taking the concept mere 'normatively attractive realm of non-state actors', it should be seen as a logical continuation of capitalist globalization (Lipschutz 2007, 307). As for Heikki Patomäki (2007, 314) who sees the potentiality of global civil society especially in democratizing the opinion and will-formation by stating that: '[c]ivil society is thus not necessarily outside the state or against the state, but can be turned to make a contribution to a transformation of what a democratic state is.'
The general view on the existing theories on GCS shows that, as the framework of global governance has been stretched along with the rapid globalization, also the concept of civil society has been affected by the transition of world politics. The problem is that the
theories of global civil society are often based on the narrative of local civic participation, and an analogy of state, markets and private sector. Hence, the problem with many global civil society theories is that they focus on moral or political civil society in 'a global context where the rules and principles of representative democracy do not apply' (Patomäki 2007, 313). Instead of linking GCS to the nation states it should be seen as a part of neoliberal regime of governmentality and (quite unquestionably) global markets (Lipschutz 2005, 230). Lipschutz (2007) claims that global civil society is 'a central and vital element in an expanding global neoliberal regime of governmentality, which is constituted out of social relations within that regime and which, with and through the capillaries of productive power, helps to legitimize that system of governmentality.' It can be concluded that there is no single conceptualization of global civil society. Still common for many divergent illustrations is that they cherish a great faith in global civil society and its beneficial consequences in global governance. It has been suggested to increase accountability, efficiency, plurality and democracy in global governance; and thereby the whole legitimacy of it (McKeon 2009; Patomäki & Teivainen 2004; Scholte 2011a). Yet, the expressions of the concept, have obscured its meaning and transformative possibilities rather than clarified them (Buckley 2013a; Buckley 2013b). It is agreed that more empirical research on the identification of global civic actors is needed (see for example Bergesen 2007; Lipschutz 2007; Patomäki 2007) and to do this its representations and interpretations should be studied (Buckley 2013b, 232). Eva Heidbreder (2012) crystallizes that research gaps remain deep in consequence of both the diverse conceptualizations of the phenomenon and the ambiguous role of civil society as either in opposition or support to the state.
This thesis aims to contribute to fill this research gap by examining civil society participation from the critical global governance perspective. I have chosen to examine the European development governance and concentrate on more organized forms of civil society, and namely non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This of course limits my perception and might exclude some important elements of civil society participation. Also the prefix of “global” often seems disconnected and misleading. Since this paper treats EU politics, it could be more straightforward to refer to European civil society. However,
the Union is taken as a significant global actor and it is clear that the prospective Consensus has a global focus. Thus, it is justified to address global civil society instead of a European one. It also seems that in this context more organized forms of civil society are dominant. Therefore, this study focuses on NGOs and the radical activist versions that operate far from policy-making are left outside of the scope. Yet, I presume that this does not narrow the vision too much, but leaves room for potential resistance and opposition. In a following subchapter I will present the specific features of organized civil society.
2.3 NGOs as dominant civic actors
NGOs are loosely defined as non-profit voluntary organizations with social, political or environmental goals. They have operational purposes as they provide services to communities, supervise interests of certain groups as well as have a role in advocating different issues. (IR Online 2016.) Kaldor (2003, 589) relates NGOs to so called neoliberal paradigm of global civil society that is based on Western traditions. As shown in the previous subchapter, many conceptualizations of civil society stress its democratization effect. Yet, it should be acknowledged that reforms advocated by civil society actors are not self-evidently transformative and democratizing, as they can be conservative in a sense that they only aim at advocating their personal interests (Patomäki & Teivainen 2004, 7). However, it is believed that because of the globalizing nature of world politics the value of public support generated through civil society will be emphasized in the future (Kaldor 2003, 590) and new opportunities for NGOs to influence will increase (Trommer 2011).
NGOs are by definition located outside the governments and operating independently of them. Yet, many NGOs receive a partial government funding which makes them more or less reliable of the government policies. This also applies to international NGOs that receive funding from the EU. Pallas, Gethings and Harris (2014) argue that international NGOs are often criticized for failing to represent and engage with the grassroots stakeholders, but many explanations concentrate on external factors such as financial pressures that arouse from donor interests. They claim that what has been lacking is the examination of the effect of internal characteristics of international NGOs and the ways
they justify their being. This paper is particularly interested in these internal characteristics and self-identification of civil society groups, even though it is acknowledged that is impossible to completely separate those from external factors.
According to Kaldor (2003) NGOs are more involved in the official processes and negotiations than for example social movements (which Kaldor links to activist paradigm). A strong involvement in the political processes also raises questions of the independency of these actors. On the other hand, as Didier Caluwaerts and Min Reuchamp (2015) have stated more independent political projects of civil society often lack output legitimacy since by being outside of the system they are also fail to create any binding commitments for the official decision-makers. However, institutionalization and increased number of professionalized civil society groups again emerge accusations of the genuine representativeness of them (see for example Kutay 2012; Kutay 2015; Pallas et al. 2014). In their article Representation Beyond the State: Towards Transnational
Democratic Non-state Politics Teivo Teivainen and Silke Trommer (2017) state that more
attention should be paid to the question of representation of non-state actors in transnational level. The authors use a general description of representation and define it as 'making present in some sense what is nevertheless not literally present' (Pitkin 1989, 142 cited in Teivainen & Trommer 2017, 19) and claim that representation is always “speaking for other”.
This discussion of representativeness is also linked to the North-South divide, and the problem of Western dominated agendas. Previous studies show that there has been instances in which international NGOs located in the global North have been neglecting the concerns of their Southern partners, and thereby reinforcing the pre-existing imbalance in global order (Pallas et al. 2014, 1263). Also Teivainen and Trommer (2017, 28) recognise this problem and conclude that 'denying the relevance of representation in non-state collective decision-making may hide and reproduce power structures'. This highlights the necessity to examine the participation of civil society actors from a critical perspective. In the following chapter I will scrutinize the participation of non-governmental organizations in the context of European development governance.
3 CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT GOVERNANCE
Here I will portray European development governance by setting the EU development politics in the framework of global governance presented in the previous chapter. I will start by briefly outlining its normative basis, and then turn into the EU decision-making processes regarding development politics and civil society participation. However, the European Union (also referred as the EU or the Union) is taken more as a context, and the civil society as the actor in the spotlight. Thus, the main purpose of this chapter is not to explore the EU decision-making per se but to further conceptualize global civil society by focusing on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and their participation in the EU policymaking.
3.1 Normative basis of EU development politics
The EU is a significant actor at the sphere of global development politics. It claims to be the world’s leading donor in official development assistance (ODA) by giving almost half of the world’s development aid (European Commission 2016a). Yet, this figure consists both the EU institutions and its member states, which blurs “who” the EU actually is. In practice the Union is not a single actor, but a complex set of institutional arrangements acting in cooperation with the member states. However, it is one of the most powerful intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) in the world and has the ability to make rules and exercise power also within its member states. The Union has also significant subranational characteristics and by revising of the basic Treaty provisions, the member states have given some of their sovereignty to the central institutional structure (Goebel 2013).
In this thesis it is not possible, or even purposeful, to describe the institutional background of the Union in its full length. Yet, it is relevant to acknowledge that there is a long and colourful history behind the entity. In short, the foundation of EU, the European Economic Community (EEC), was established in the aftermath of the Second World War in 1958 with the aim of securing peace and cooperation (EU 2016). Thereafter the Union
has expanded from six fairly homogenous countries to a group of 28 very heterogeneous states. And of course the historical roots of Europe reach beyond the 20th century. Especially regarding to the development politics it is necessary to recognize the vestiges of colonialism. Past relationships are still represented in the arrangements between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific group. According to Himadeed Muppidi (2005) global governance involves “a politics of difference”, and the objects of global governance carry a special burden in helping to reproduce a colonial order. Therefore, EU development politics is claimed to be essentially neoliberal and promoting Western governance practices (Hout 2010).
Yet, in his article Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? Ian Manners (2002) claims that in consequence of its normativity, the EU differs from the other great powers. Manners (2002, 252) wanted to picture the Union from the view point of norms rather than power and emphasized its ability to change the definition of what is referred as “normal” by stating that 'the most important factor shaping the role of the EU is not what is does or what it says, but what it is.' Later Manners (2009) further clarified his notion of normative power, and claimed that new global challenges required the EU to use its normativity. Within this normativity Manners included the core Western liberal values such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law. From this perspective it seems that the values promoted by the Union would somehow be more neutral and untouchable than the ones promoted by other empires. Even though this notion has faced criticism, it has nonetheless had considerable impact on the studies of European foreign policy (Diez 2005, 77).
In this thesis the notion of power is highlighted as the EU is set in the framework of global governance. Besides it is acknowledged that the operative development politics is traditionally linked to foreign, security and trade policies – and thus not separate from many external and internal interests and incentives. Thus, it is taken for granted that power relations reach all parts of global governance, and also the alleged normative intentions. In her dissertation Inside the European Consensus on Development and Trade:
Analysing the EU’s Normative Power and Policy Coherence for Development in Global Governance Marikki Stocchetti (2013, 267) has well captured the foundation of the
Union’s normative position and suggest that 'the EU’s normative role cannot be understood independently of the different forms of power that the EU may deploy in line with its material and immaterial interests.'
Seeing that development politics is necessarily based on the view of what development is and how it is reached (see for example Koponen 2009), it is purposeful to discuss the normative basis of the Union – and whole European development governance. Critical voices remind that even colonialism was once justified by humanitarian grounds and intentions to “civilize” the other (Rist 2002, 55), and also language of human rights can be seen as “the ideological gloss” of the dominance of Western world (Douzinas 2007, 7). Even though in this thesis I will not go more deeply into this discussion, it should be acknowledged that the principles of development politics are not given, but have certain historical and ideological roots based in Western traditions. On this ground it is essential to evaluate the reasoning of European development governance more critically.
3.2 Decision-making and participation
Herein, I will outline the most relevant institutional actors considering the EU development politics and the role of civil society within. The European Commission (EC) proposes new issues and implements development policies, and is also responsible for the process of formulation the new Consensus on Development. Besides the Commission, other important organs are the European External Action Service, the European Parliament (EP), the European Council (The Council) and the Council of the European Union. The figure 3.1 shows how the roles are divided.
EU’s development politics is guided by both international treaties and general agreements of the Union. The legal basis for European development policy was established in the Maastricht Treaty (1992), and a more specific policy mandate for European development cooperation was structured in the Commission’s Development statement in 2000 (Henölk & Keijzer 2016). In practice, EU policies on development are based on the Lisbon Treaty (2007) and the European Consensus on Development. Lisbon Treaty sets the legal basis and main objective of 'the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty'
(Article 208). The European Consensus on development (2005) then identifies the shared values, goals, principles and commitments for the Union, and is made jointly by the three main EU institutions: Commission, Parliament and Council.
Figure 3.1: The most relevant institutional actors in the EU development politics.
Source: adapted from Donor tracker http://donortracker.org/donor-profiles/european-union/actors-decision-making
In a way the Consensus is a statement of past records and future intentions, and provides common policy guidelines for EU development policy at the national, bilateral and the Community level (Stocchetti 2013, 168). At the same time, it is an expression of EU’s development discourse and 'reinforces the power that the EU and its member states are using in the field of international development' (Stocchetti 2013, 169). In 2012 this jointly made Consensus was updated by so called Agenda for Change with a more strategic EU approach to reduce poverty, including a more targeted and concentrated allocation of funding (European Commission 2016a). Yet, since the “old” Consensus is based on Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of United Nations, the new Agenda for Sustainable development and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will broaden the
Development policy & Financing
European Commission PROPOSES & IMPLEMENTS European External action service CO-LEADS PROGRAMMING European Parliament ADOPTS LEGISTLATION & BUDGET Council of the European Union DEFINES PRIORITIES AND CO-DECIDES LEGISTLATION & BUDGET European Council SETS POLITICAL GUIDELINESscope from poverty eradication to wider spectrum of global challenges (Henölk & Keijzer 2016).
Already a quick look at the Union’s complex institutional settings and a high stack of different treaties shows that the entity is rather far from an ordinary citizen. Even for a person well up on the matter it might be difficult to perceive the bureaucratic decision-making structure. Therefore, it is not surprising that many observers claim that the Union lacks democratic representativeness and suffers from severe democratic deficit (Kröger 2016, 7). In consequence, civil society organizations have been thought to democratize the EU and fix the democratic deficit in whole (Kröger 2016). To increase the level of democratic representativeness, the Union has been promoting a wider participation of civic actors. In the White paper on governance (2001) the Commission recognizes that civil society is a valuable partner in development and plays an important role in the development of Community policies. The Lisbon Treaty (2009, Article 11) takes into account the importance of broad consultations and 'an open, transparent and regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society', thus constitutionally legitimizing the involvement of civil society in European governance. And in the Action Plan on Human rights and Democracy (2015) the Commission and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, promote stronger partnerships between authorities and local civil society organizations, and also address some specific threats to NGOs space. It has even been stated that these policy initiatives and promotion of civil society involvement are signs of a new governance mode (Heidbreder 2012).
The review of the EU documents indicates that global civil society has, at least on paper, an important role in the EU development politics. When reflected to the two conceptualizations illustrated in chapter 2 (i.e. a Gramscian counter-hegemonic movement of resistance and Habermasian public sphere), it seems necessary to add one more conceptualization to the picture. Heidbreder (2012, 7) states that besides these two definitions civil society can be described as 'a collaborator, constituent element and integrated player in political processes'. By reviewing literature on EU politics Heidbreder separates two dominant analytical perspectives for civil society participation: civil society
as organized actors in multi-level governance and civil society as proponents of European public sphere. First one relates to organized groups that represent specific interests, and can be taken as a participant and collaborator in policy-making or opposition to the state. Second perspective is drawn from normative assumptions of a public sphere and takes its theoretical ground from deliberation. These three conceptualizations also give differing democratizing functions to civil society and its participation. (Heidbreder 2012.)
Yet, I have discussed the shrinking space and questioned significance of NGOs. In this more pessimistic approach, the provision of participatory democracy contained in the Lisbon Treaty has been criticized by arguing that the current debate surrounding civil society participation at the EU level is 'built on somewhat nebulous ground, both theoretically and empirically' (Kutay 2015, 817). Acar Kutay (2012, 29) claims that the involvement of the European NGOs has not legitimized and democratized the EU governance, and NGOs themselves lack accountability, representativeness and inclusiveness. In similar vein, Nora McKeon (2009, 2) states that giving voice to civil society does not necessarily create meaningful incorporation of these actors. Therefore, intergovernmental organizations might include civil society to the decision-making process simply to establish a good governance image.
The problem could also be the governance system itself. For example, Beate Kohler-Koch (2010a, 112) claims that the multi-level EU system makes direct relations between represented and representatives difficult; thus the image of representation and reality do not match. Kohler-Koch states that although the Commission has stressed the legitimacy input of civil society the European NGOs remain distant from stakeholders and direct communication down to the grassroots level is marginal (Kohler-Koch 2010a). Thus, 'the promise of “involving civil society” has not bridged the gap between Europe and the people, but rather sponsored a Brussels-based CSO elite working in the interest of deeper integration' (Kohler-Koch 2010b, 335 cited in Heidbreder 2012, 11). However, civil society organizations have a contradictory situation since they need to be highly professionalized “Brussels-activists” and at the same time hold close relation to diverse national, regional and local stakeholder contexts (Heidbreder 2012, 11).
This critique is in line with the wider global governance literature. According to critical perception of global governance also global civil society is part of the system and not inevitably a democratizing vehicle. Among other interest groups and the private sector, civil society actors seek to influence policy-outcomes by advocating the EU institutions. In practice many civil society organizations have Brussel-based offices or belong to wider NGO platforms. These structural arrangements make participation of ordinary citizens more complex and leave the stage for professional NGO workers. Therefore, there is an urgent need for more studies on civil society participation in the EU. And with high hopes on the growing body of research Heidbreder (2012, 29) states:
After more than ten years of EU initiatives aimed at democratizing the EU via civil society participation, and in the light of a growing body of scientific accounts that modify or disappoint high-flying hypotheses, reconciling the theoretical and empirical position of civil society within the logic of representative democracy highlights the outstanding research challenge in order to close the gap between theory, rhetoric, and reality about civil society participation in the European Union.
Along with this statement and the theoretical and contextual background presented, I want to get back to the question of how do civil society actors participate in European development governance, and in this case in formulating the new Consensus on development.
3.3 Summary of the theoretical chapters
In previous two chapters I have discussed the theoretical framework of civil society in global governance and the specific context of European development governance. The theoretical discussion of global governance is mainly focused on the idea of cooperation, consensus and coordination, and is described as a rational answer to globalization, deepening interdependence and increasing number of global conflicts. The governance approach of the EU seems to follow this traditional description. However, by masking the existence of power, the system loses some of its core values such as accountability, legitimacy and democracy. Already by acknowledging the multiple forms of power, the hierarchical and unequal structures of governance could be realised and empirically
studied (Barnett & Duvall 2005a; 2005b). Thus, this thesis examines the EU development politics through the lenses of power and sees development governance as an inherently hierarchic and controlled system of Western liberalism.
Similarly, many of the theories fail to relate global civil society to the notion of power and see beyond its normative promises. The diverse academic discussion show that global civil society is not a coherent entity. There are disagreements on its actor-space division and relation to states and markets and need for more empirical evidence is obvious. In this thesis I have chosen to concentrate on more organized forms of civil society, that excludes the most radical versions of civic participation. I have described three divergent conceptualizations: a counter-hegemonic movement, a collaborator and an open sphere. These conceptualizations also give differing democratizing functions to civil society and its participation. but there seem to be a shared vision that civil society is needed in global governance. Furthermore, as I explored the existing literature on civil society in global governance, I realized that the question of representation was a crucial aspect of civic participation.
Therefore, the aim of this paper is to examine how these conceptualizations match the civil society participation in the process of developing new European Consensus on development. How civil society groups position themselves in European development governance and in relation to other actors such as the EU and the private sector? What kind of arguments are made and who these groups represent? And what kind of power do these groups have? By answering these questions, I am able to further conceptualize the phenomenon of global civil society and strengthen the linkage between theory, rhetoric and reality.
4 METHODOLOGICAL ORIENTATION
In this chapter I will review the analytical framework and data sources of the thesis. Firstly, I will justify the methodological points of departure, including social constructivist approach and the importance of language and discourses in social studies. The focus is on discourses, since even though this study pays attention to language the point is not to study linguistics as such. The core idea is that the way civil society actors speak also tells who they are. Secondly, I will present the specific data analysis methods, and outline Norman Fairclough’s approach to critical discourse analysis (CDA). Thirdly, I will describe the process of data collection and detail the sample more specifically. Lastly, I raise certain limitations regarding the methodological choices taken.
4.1 Analytical framework
There is no single way to study reality and the world around us. However, plurality doesn’t mean that anything goes, and there are many variations and degrees to accomplish basic criteria of a scientific inquiry (i.e. systematic, public and worldly knowledge) (Jackson 2011). Yet, it is crucial to be consistent in the conduct of inquiry and 'stand in some specific place within the broad universe of scientific methodologies' (Jackson 2011, 196). This thesis belongs to the field of International Relations (IR), and is engaged in a social constructivist approach and a qualitative case study design. Here in, I will outline the analytical framework of the thesis in order to give a better understanding of where I stand in the research field.
For a start, it is important to clarify the concepts of methodology, epistemology, and ontology, to explain how and for what purpose the research project is undertaken (Lamont 2015, 24). On the epistemological ground, there are two broad traditions that give competing claims to what should be counted as acceptable knowledge: empiricism and interpretivism (Lamont 2015, 17). On the other hand, according to Patrick Thaddeus Jackson (2011) strict polarity between “hard science” and “soft interpretive approaches” is unnecessary, and has evolved unproductive debates within the field of IR. He claims
that the question and aporia should come first, and the puzzle should guide the selection of data and methods, not the other way around (Jackson 2011). In this case the research emerged from the dilemma that high hopes and over-optimistic conceptualizations of civil society seemed to be conflicting with the trend of shrinking civic space. My intent is to provide a better understanding of the role of civil society in global governance. Further conceptualization is important because these conceptual descriptions have actual effects to the actions produced. Since in this thesis the theoretical framework of global governance is based on the idea of multifaceted nature of power, also the analytical perspective needs to give room for various interpretations.
Therefore, this study acknowledges the importance of ideas and identities, and not just the material forces. The claim of social constructivism is not that ideas (shared knowledge and culture) are more important than material interests and power, but that the latter presuppose ideas and are constituted by them. In other words, according to a social constructivist approach, knowledge, concepts and the whole reality is socially constructed (Wendt 1999). Yet, constructivism is not a straightforward theory of international politics. In this thesis constructivism is understood more as a reflexive meta-theoretical position. This means that the social world is not only a part of the real world, but might also affect it (see Cuzzini 2000).
While social constructionism is an umbrella term for several theories of society and culture, discourse analysis (DA) is one of the most popular approaches within. Yet, discourse analysis is not purely a method for analysing data, and it should not be detached from its theoretical and methodological orientations. Thus, critical discourse analysis (CDA) contains ontological premises by seeing the role of language in the social construction of the world, certain theoretical models and methodological guidelines and finally specific techniques for the analysis. (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 4.) Solely the word discourse has many definitions, and there is no consensus of what it should mean and how it should be analysed. Yet, it can be agreed that discourse is 'a particular way of talking about and understanding the world' (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 1). French philosopher Michel Foucault has played a central role in developing the concept. The idea of Foucault’s early stage, so called archaeology of science (see for example Foucault
