What is the meta-history?

Jörn Rüsen:

What is the Meta-History?

Approaching a Comprehensive Theory

of Historical Studies

The title of my paper already gives an answer to the question what meta-history is: meta-history is the theory of historical studies. But what does theory mean and what historical studies? Theory is a form of cognition and knowledge, characterized by generalizing statements, and therefore it is an abstraction from concrete, single and unique phenomena. We find it in the knowledge of everyday-life and in all academic disciplines.

Here, in the academic disciplines, it is a matter of controversy, whether all

disciplines really have theoretical elements and use theories. The dominant philosophy of history in the second half of the 19th

century e.g. (Windelband, Rickert, Dilthey) made a sharp distinction between

individualizing and generalizing modes of thought and used this distinction to

humanities, mainly all disciplines which are dealing with history.

I think that the difference between theoretical and a- or non-theoretical disciplines or sciences (in the broader

meaning of the word science) is completely misleading. Why? Even in those disciplines like historical studies, where abstract

theories are not the main purpose of their cognitive work, we will find generalizing statements as necessary elements for

describing and explaining the events of the past and their temporal order. Max Weber illuminated these theoretical elements as ideal types, which are necessary to

conceptualize the individuality of historical phenomena by means of a certain kind of theorizing.

But the theoretical status of meta-history is different. It has a reflective nature; it is a theory about the cognitive forms and procedures of historical thinking. If one concedes that historical thinking uses

theoretical elements, meta-history even is a theory about theory. That exactly is

Thus meta-history reflects history, - history not as something which happened in the past, but as a way of dealing with the past, of making sense of experiencing it for the purpose of orienting the people of the present in the temporal dimension of their lives.

Meta-history reflects the mental procedures and structures of making sense of the

experience of the past. It draws a mental or intellectual map of historical consciousness. This reflection and mapping does not refer to all dimensions and activities of historical consciousness, but concentrates on its specific manifestation in historical studies as an institutionalized form of historical thinking. In the non-English speaking world this institutionalized form is called 'science'. So meta-history is a space for the discourse on the question whether history is a science or not. If it is a science, what then is its distinctive nature when comparing it with other academic disciplines, mainly the natural sciences?

With this concentration on the ' scientific' character of historical thinking meta-history

has got a place in the work of the professional historians, mainly when explaining the rules of historical method. This has led to a narrowing of the scope of understanding what historical thinking is about. Without a more general and

fundamental insight into the mental and intellectual work of historical consciousness there is no clear idea of what its activities in the professional form of an academic

discipline actually are.This argument

indicates my way of conceptualizing meta-history. It reflects all those mental

elements and principles which constitute historical thinking. So it only considers

'thinking' (or to be more precise: it inquires into sense-making, since this includes the work of a literary forming, which indeed refers less to cognitive elements than to esthetic ones). It addresses its context in the social life of the people and all social, political and economic conditions, under which history is performed in human life; but this applies only to a performance in respect to its importance for thinking,

Meta-history starts its reflective work with the fundamental and general question: "what makes sense in historical thinking?"

In order to find an answer to this question for the basic category of historical sense, it is useful to distinguish single elements of sense generation in general and applying them to the special field of historical consciousness.

Sense making is a dynamic procedure of the human mind, which can be described in an abstract way as a process which leads from perception and experience to

interpretation, which produces knowledge,

and from interpretation to orientation, which uses knowledge for understanding the problems of human life, and, finally, from orientation to motivation, which gives the human will a direction, a purpose and an aim.

This complex interrelationship of basic principles of human sense generation can be picked up and transformed into a similar abstract scheme of basic principles and activities of historical consciousness. This scheme refers to the special form of

historical thinking, which is typical for its modern academic character. It should express the idea of historical thinking as a process of cognition, which starts from a question and ends in an answer. Question and answer can be related to the social and cultural context, within which the process of cognition takes place and which has an

impact on it. At the same time the step from this context to the specific procedures of historical research and of history writing could be marked.

So the beginning of meta-history should be a reflection on the beginning of the

activities of the human mind in respect to the challenge of specific mental operations: I mean the operations which can only find an answer by referring to the perception and experience of the human past in a cognitive manner.

This challenge can be identified as needs

for orientation in the temporal dimension of

human life. In every human life form these needs are permanently produced by the experiences of temporal changes, to which the affected people have to adjust their lives. In the specific view on historical studies they acquire the form of interests, which demand cognition

(Erkenntnisinteressen). History as 'science' is the result of a fundamental

transformation of needs for orientation into interests for cognition.

These needs and interests give the human mind the direction towards the past, which brings the past into a perspective, within which it receives meaning and becomes a matter of understanding. The past in itself is not history; it acquires this character within a perspective, which relates it to the present and to the future perspective of human life. Here is the place where fundamental questions, what history in general is about, have to be discussed. Philosophy of history becomes visible as an integral part of the work of the professional historians. That does not mean they have

to turn into a philosophers as such; but that their work can't be understood without an impact of philosophical presuppositions concerning the meaning of the past as

history. General periodizations covering the whole realm of historical experience are here at stake as well.

But not only general philosophical questions or comprehensive periodizations fall into this realm of meta-history. In the specific work of professional historians concepts of

interpretation play an enormous role. They

stem from the leading questions they want to answer. A well known example is the theory of modernization or –to say it in a

more updated way– modernizations in modern history. These concepts have their own logical form, namely that of a more or less articulated hypothesis. 'Science'

endows concepts of interpretation with a theoretical form, in which they function by opening the realm of historical experience according to the research guiding

questions. It is them which define what constitutes a historical source. Many history teachers in school and university tell their students that proper historical thinking starts with the sources. But what is a

source? In general: all relicts from the past, everything which can give information of what, when, where, and why happened in the past. But historical thinking has to

select the relevant sources for the required information; for this selection a filter is necessary and a criterion, which may

decide upon what is relevant and important and what is not. This filter and this criterion have a theoretical status in relation to the information furnished by the sources.

Concepts of interpretation and more or less theoretically explicated perspectives are

only insofar useful as they disclose relevant source material, which can be used to get the information about the past to answer the question at the beginning of the

cognition-process. Historical perspectives are only meaningful, if they become - so to speak -filled with evidence. Historical

thinking without evidence of what happened in the past is senseless. Historical sense and meaning demand

evidence as a necessary condition for the

possibility of any form of historical knowledge. Therefore the approach to evidence and its content of information about the past is a necessary principle and procedure of historical thinking. It has its own logic. It is the logic of making

statements plausible by referring to so-called facts. These facts are not simply

given, they don´t lie around in the open, but they have to be brought about by dealing with all the materials in which the past is still present.

Here is the place in the mental map of historical thinking where the essence of its modern ' scientific' character is located: the

methodical rules of historical research.

From their very beginning as an academic discipline till today historical studies are characterized as an academic discipline and distinguished as professional. From all

other ways of doing history it differs by its ability to gain solid historical knowledge by research. Research is a way of dealing with the evidence of the past. It brings about new knowledge of what happened, and when and where and why it did so. Research endows this knowledge with a

certain reliability, namely that of being based on evidence.

This knowledge always has its specific – namely historical – form. It can only be sufficiently analyzed when it is shaped

according to this specific form usually called

historiography. This form has its specific

logic as well, which is fundamentally different from the logic of theoretical

conceptualization and empirical research. It is the narrative logic of telling a story.

The difference and the interrelationship between gaining knowledge by research and presenting it in a historiographical form is a highly controversial issue of

meta-principles exist -method and representation - but since both govern clearly different logics, it is anything but clear how they are synthesized on the logical basis of historical thinking. Many theoretists today think that interpretation is nothing but

re-presentation. Thus they radically deny the 'scientific' character of historical studies and position historical thinking only in a place in literature. On the other hand professional historians insist on rational procedures of gaining solid knowledge out of the sources and deny any logical

supremacy of narration over all single procedures.

It is the task of meta-history today to

recognize these contradictions and to show that the narrative structure of historical knowledge does not oppose the rationality of methodical research. Neither does it exclude elements of rational argumentation from historical presentation.

The reconstruction of the main principles of historical sense generation would be

incomplete if the function of

knowledge were omitted. It is the function which decides whether the

thought-provoking needs for orientation - or more specifically: interests in historical

knowledge - are fulfilled or not. Then the results of the process of generating

meaning out of the experience of the past may come to an end (and immediately start again with new questions). As all other

constitutive principles that one of the

function of historical knowledge in practical life has its own specific logic. It is the logic of serving practical life by cultural

orientation. It makes historical knowledge effective. Regarding the rational status of historical studies, this logic furnishes historical knowledge with elements of

'practical truth'. This truth criterion can be clearly (in respect to its logic) distinguished from the empirical and theoretical truth of research as well as from the criteria of a convincing re-presentation.

Here the issue of identity plays an important role. Without a historical

reference to the past the question who we are, to whom we belong and who the

others are, with whom we have to live together cannot be answered. Every piece of historical knowledge contributes to this answer. Very often this does not occur directly, but only mediated, and more or less disconnected from identity politics. Looking at the function of historical thinking in its cultural context and realizing the

close connection between functions and needs, we become aware that the cognitive dimension of historical thinking is

ones, - mainly (but not exclusively) to a political one (an esthetic dimension is already apparent in the principle of

historiographical forming). The motivational forces of the human mind can't be

overlooked when focussing on the roots of historical thinking and its role in practical life. This makes politics constitutive for historical cognition (but only as one factor besides others)..

What now is the specific role of academic or ' scientific' argumentation in this field of practical life? It is not at all separated from it, but is rooted in it and needed by it. Its necessity is based on a fundamental need for the reliability of historical knowledge in human life. Historical studies with its

emphasis on evidence and its explanatory interpretation plays an important role in giving reasons and in criticizing the claim for plausibility in historical presentations. -It is the advantage of this concept of meta-history to emphasize the interrelationship between the cognitive work of the

the specific logic of historical cognition without knowing how it is rooted in and refers to cultural life. The usual distinction between serving life purposes

(Lebensdienlichkeit) and claims for rationality and even objectivity is

completely misleading. We come much closer to the reality of doing history when we consider their mutual dependence, and at the same time those areas of historical thinking where not primarily practical purposes are pursued. Here the

commitment to empirical and theoretical evidence may play the foremost role.

Till now my argumentation has emphasized different logics as necessary factors of

historical thinking. Each of the five enumerated principles have a different logic: each is necessary, and all five together are sufficient for reconstructing and explaining what constitutes historical thinking as a mental activity with special respect to historical studies. Therefore I think that my concept of meta-history is comprehensive indeed. It can claim for a systemic order covering the issue of

historical thinking in all its relevant dimensions.

The sequence of these logics might give a misleading impression, since from the very beginning they are interrelated, but without giving them this sequential order, the

internal (even logical) dynamics in historical thinking would not have become visible. But how are these logics interrelated? This question cannot be answered without a systematic reconstruction of the discursive form of historical thinking and their specific logic of communication. In a very

schematic way these forms of

the different principles of historical sense generation are mediated.:

1. Needs for orientation and concept of historical understanding are systematically interrelated in a discourse of symbolization, where ' history' is defined as a cultural unit in human life orientation.

2. Concepts of historical understanding and rules for treating the sources are

systematically mediated by a strategy of

cognition. Here the approach to evidence in

historical perspective is the dominating issue.

3. Rules for treating the sources in a historical perspective and forms of

representation are mediated by a strategy

of esthetics. It is this strategy which

enables empirical knowledge about the human past to the historiographical representation of the past.

4. Forms of representation and functions of orientation are mediated by a strategy of

rhetoric. With this strategy the

historiographically represented past can play a role in the historical culture of the present.

5. Functions of orientation and needs for orientation are mediated by a discourse of

memory politics and identity formation in

practical life. Here the role of historical knowledge in practical life is at stake.

In these five views at the discursive and communicative dynamics of historical thinking become visible. But the proper understanding of this dynamics would be impossible if the role of human subjectivity in making sense of history did not undergo some differentiation concerning its

dimensions. Today everybody is convinced that it is the human mind which brings about the meaning of history. Sense generation is mainly, if not exclusively, seen as a cultural issue of the presence referring to the past. Thus by the mental creativity of historically minded people history is completely determined. This

a construction of the past brought about in the present. The past has no voice of its own in the sense generating process of historical thinking. It is nothing but a soundboard for the tunes that people of today want to hear in order to place themselves into the course of time.

Is this true? Is the past really voiceless? Using the scheme of historical sense

generation we can easily show that matters are much more complicated. At least three different dimensions of pursuing the

process of historical sense generation can be distinguished.

1. The first one is the level where the dominance of human subjectivity is

evident. It is the level of (re-)construction. The whole process of conceptualizing

historical perspectives, of working with the sources and of forming historical knowledge historiographically is governed by the

2. But what about the influence of the

context, within which these capacities were used? What about important criteria and modes of discourse and even the whole culture of their terms of doing history? Arent´t they already pregiven in the cultural life, of which the historians

themselves are a part of? And is the past not already present in these circumstances and conditions of the historical thinking of the present? In order to make this evident it is useful to distinguish a level of historical sense generation where the effectivity of its conditions and circumstances is

of practical life or of functioning historical sense generation. Here the historians as

constructors of historical meaning themselves are constructed; they are offspring 'children of their time'.

3. Both levels are interrelated, and it is useful to distinguish another level of its own, artificially separated from the two others, where this interrelationship takes place. It is the level of pragmatism where the constructors interfere in those

processes where the constructing of the constructors takes place. The historians are activists of historical culture on the level of theoretical reflection; yet, on the

level of pragmatic reconstruction they are still actors, but no longer the masters of what takes place here in the public and private life. They are the actors who rewrite their pregiven roles on the stage of history without being able to rewrite the whole screenplay. And they have no chance or possibility of changing or stepping out of it.

This brings me to the last point of my concept of meta-history. When we look at the three different dimensions in which historical sense generation takes place, we know that their distinction is artificial, that they are three angles of one comprehensive

systemic interrelatedness and internal

unity? It is the unity of the creative process of historical sense generation, that is when historians do their work in the context of the historical culture of their time. Sense takes place before and beyond it is noticed and reflected and handled by the

historians. They execute it in their practical work, and by doing so it becomes a matter of their creativity, but, nevertheless, at the same time they remain but performers (executors) of sense.

Doing and be done coincide in the absolute presence of sense during the actual

performance and practise of historical thinking. Doing history in the human mind is a part of history as the temporal

execution of human life. This very history is different from the history the historians address, research and re-present. It is so– to-speak history in and as presence. Only afterwards it can be reflected in its

complicated temporal dimension. As such this can't be thought because thinking already raises it to the status of the

subject matter of thinking. It is no longer left in the status of its actualperformance and action, of its doing and being done. It is un-pre-thinkable. In this fascinating ontological status of unpre-thinkability it is a real basis, the ground for any historical sense-generating by historical thinking. This is an epistemological argument, which transgresses the cognition process, and even the traditional philosophy of history (in both forms: concerning what happened in the past and what afterwards is said about and understood by it). Nevertheless, here we have the logical consequence of an analysis of the the historians´ intellectual

work of when they want to come to terms with the past in order to serve the cultural orientation of the presence for the sake of the future. Of course, I am full aware that by speaking about this unprethinkability I am, at the same time, approaching the end of thinking about historical thinking, of meta-history. Nonetheless, I have tried my best to cope with what has been left to us.