(1910) Cavalry Tactics as Illustrated by the War of the Rebellion

CAVALRY

TACTICS

Illustrated

_by

the

War

of

the

Rebellion

TOGETHER WITH

MANY

INTERESTING FACTS

IMPORTANT

FOR

CAVALRY TO KNOW.

BY

CAPTAIN

ALONZO

GRAY,

Fourteenth

U.

S. Cavalry.

FART

I.

U.S.

CAVALRY

ASSOCIATION,

FORT LEAVBNWORTH, KANSAS.

BY

ALONZO GRAY.

PRKS3OFKETCHK80N PRINTING CO.

In

_pursuing

_{the subject} of _cavalry tactics I

found

_that,

while

certain _principles

were

_{accepted as correct,} I

was

not

familiar

with

the battles in

which

these _principles

were

_ap

plied. I believe it to

be

true that there is

no

modern

_prin ciple of cavalry tactics,

which

is_accepted

_today

_{as correct}

by

any

first-class _military

_power,

which was

not_{fully illustrated}

during

the

War

ofthe Rebellion.

No

war which

has

occufed

A since that

time

has, in

any

respect,

added

to the cavalry tac

tics

which were

_{in daily} use

_during

that _{great struggle.}

I _give it as

_my

humble

_opinion that increased

_range

of firearms

and

the addition of

machine

_guns, increase the

sphere

ofaction of,

and

_necessity for,_{well-organized cavalry} ;

that bicycles,

motorcycles

and

automobiles

will

_prove

to

be

only valuable auxiliaries to _cavalry in _transporting

informa

tion

back

to the rear,

and

thus saving an unnecessary

_expen

diture of horse flesh;

and

that

while

flying

machines

may

bring

information,

by

so

_{doing they}

will

widen

the

_sphere

of action of

_good

_cavalry

; and,

more

than

ever before, as a

result of

such

_information, it will

be

_necessary to

_{have good}

cavalry

ready

to

move

_{on extremely}

short notice.

In looking for

_examples

to illustrate the tactical _prin ciples of cavalry operations, I

have

drawn

_mostly

from

the

Records

of_{the Rebellion (indicated} in references

_by

R. _R.),

but

have

not

endeavored

to _{give exact quotations}; instead I

have quoted

only so

much

as is _necessary to illustrate the

point involved.

The

illustrations are

_{taken mostly}

after the

opening

campaign

of 1863, at

which

time

the

Federal

_cavalry

erate _cavalry

was

at its best. _(Life

_{and campaigns}

of _Maj. Genl. _J. E. B. Stuart, p. 257.)

The

reason

_why

more

Federal than Confederate

_reports

are

_quoted

is

because

the

former

are

much

more

numerous.

Whenever

a _report states

_{what happens}

to the

_enemy

or the

_enemy

s losses,

be

the report

Federal

or Confederate, that _portion of it

should

be

_accepted

with

_great caution.

While

the

work

principally treats of tactics, I

have

in

corporated reports of

such

facts

and

expedients

as are use

ful for

_every

_cavalryman

to

know.

It is

_my

intentionto follow this work, Part I,

with

a

work

on

_"Troop

_Leading

of _{Cavalry,"}

wherein

the decisions are

based on

the _principles herein illustrated.

This

work

is

undertaken

in the

_hope

that the lessons

learned

_{during our}

_great

war

will not

be

forgotten.

ALONZO

GRAY.

Camp

Stotsenburg,

Pampanga,

P. I.

A OONOI8E

HISTORY

OF

THE

ORGANIZATION

AND

ARMAMENT

OF

THE

UNITED

STATES CAVALRY.

The

first

mounted

force, consisting of one squad-March5,1792.

ron,

was

authorized

by

Act of Congress

March

5, 1792.

The

Act

of

March

2, 1799, authorized three regi-March2,1799

ments

of _cavalry, to be

_composed

of five _squadrons ofMarch15,1802.

two

companies each.

_They

were

not all raised,

and

those

which

were

raised

were

mustered out

March

16,

1802.

The

Act _{of April} 12, 1808, authorized a regimentApril12,isos.

of _light dragoons.

By

Act

of

_January

11, 1812, Congress ordered an-January11,1812

other _regiment of _{light dragoons.}

By

Act of

March

30, 1814, these _light

_dragoon

Marchso,isu.

regiments

were

consolidated.

The

consolidated regi

ment was composed

of eight troops, each consisting of

five officers

and

116 enlisted men.

By

Act

of _{Congress, June 15, 1815,} this _regimentJune15,isi5.

was

disbanded.

Congress,

by

Act

of

March

2, 1833, authorizedMarch2,im.

the raising of the 1st _Dragoons. This

was

the _begin ning of our present cavalry organization.

The

regi

ment

w^as

_composed

of ten _companies to serve on horse

or foot as

_might

be directed.

On May

23, 1836, Congress authorized the raisingMay23, isse.

of another

_dragoon

_regiment

which

was

to be _just like

the first. It

became

the _{2d Dragoons.}

By

an

Act

known

as the "Ten

_Regiment

Bill"

Con-

Feb.11,1347.

gress,

on

February 11, 1847, authorized ten _regiments,

one of

which

was

the 3d

_Dragoons

and

another the

Mounted

Rifles.

Each

of these _regiments

was

to have

of _1848, the 3d

_Dragoons

were

disbanded

and

the

Mounted

Rifles mustered out, but _immediately recruited

and sent to _Oregon.

March3,1865.

_B

y

Act

of

March

3, 1855, Congress authorized

two

_{regular regiments} of _cavalry.

_They

became

the First

and

Second _Cavalry.

May4,i86i.

By

presidential order, G. O. _16, A. G. O., 1861, the 3d _Cavalry

was

added to the _{regular army.} It

consisted of three battalions, each

_composed

of

two

squadrons of

two

companies each. This order

was

con firmed

_{by Act}

of _{Congress July 29, 1861.}

August3,i86i. _All

_mounted

troops

were

organized into _{one arm,} called cavalry, by Act of

August

3, 1861.

_By

this act

The

1st

_{Dragoons became}

the 1st _Cavalry;

The

_{2d Dragoons became}

the

2d

_Cavalry;

The Mounted

Rifles

became

the

3d

_Cavalry;

The

1st _Cavalry

became

the 4th _Cavalry;

The

2d

_Cavalry

became

the 5th _Cavalry;

The

_{3d Cavalry}

became

the 6th _Cavalry.

Bqua

e d

fi

rSn

tioIlof

_The

_Act

_of

J^J

29, 1861, defines a _squadron as consisting of

two

troops or companies.

At

the

beginning of the

war

all _regiments

had

ten troops or five _squadrons.

The

6th _{Cavalry, formerly} the 3d, was, by

Act

of Congress, to have _{twelve troops} at the time of its _{organization. (See}

G

_.O.

16, A. G.

O.,

_May

4, 1861.)

%

Act

of _{Congress July 17, 1862,}

promulgated

in G. O. 91, A. G. O., July 29, 1862, all United States cavalry

was

organized as follows:

Each

_regiment to have 1 _colonel, 1 lieutenant colonel, 3 _majors, 1 sur geon, 1 assistant _surgeon, 1 _{regimental adjutant,} 1

regimental quartermaster, 1 _regimental

commissary, 1

sergeant major, 1 _{quartermaster}

sergeant, 1

commis

sary sergeant, 2 hospital stewards, 1 saddler _sergeant,

1 chief _trumpeter, 1 chief farrier or blacksmith, 12 companies or _troops.

lieutenant, 1 second lieutenant, 1

_{supernumerary}

second lieutenant, 1 1st _sergeant, 1 _{quartermaster sergeant,} 1

commissary

sergeant, 5 sergeants, 8 corporals, 2

team

sters, 2 farriers or blacksmiths, 1 saddler, 1 wagoner,

and

78 privates. Total

100

enlisted.

G. O. No. 7, A. G. O., January 7, 1863, provides that each troop or

company

of United States cavalry

shall have

from 60

to

78

_privates.

The

volunteer cavalry

went

out with 10 troops peral

unteer<

regiment. G. O. No. 126, A. G. O.,

September

6, 1862, directed that each regiment of volunteer cavalry should have the

same

organization as that prescribed for the regular service. (See G. O. 91, A. G. O., 1862, above.) This orderdirectedthatthis _organization should bestrict

ly adhered to

by

all concerned.

G. O. No. 110, A. G. O., April 29, 1863, gave the organization of the volunteer cavalry

and

but slightly

changed

the above. It _provided for 2 trumpeters per

troop and fixed the enlisted strength at the

minimum

of 82

and

the

maximum

at

100

_{per troop.}

By

Act

of July 28, 1866, Congress provided for the July88,1866. organization of the 7th, 8th, 9th

and

10th regiments of

cavalry,

and

by

Act

of February 2, 1901, it _provided for Feb.2,1901.

the llth, 12th, 13th, 14th

and

15th regiments.

ARMAMENT.

During

the

Mexican

War

the _dragoons

were armed

with musketoons,

which were

carried

on

_sling belts, ex

cept

when

marching

the sling belt

was

unsnapped.

They

also carried

dragoon

sabers of Prussian _pattern

and

horse _pistols.

The Mounted

Rifles

were armed

with _percussion

rifles

and

Colts

_army

revolvers, but no sabers.

The

_{cavalry regiments} were

armed

with sabers, rifle-carbines

and

Colt"s

_navy

revolvers.

(Bracketts _History of

U.

S. _{Cavalry, p. 160.)}

During

the Civil

War

the

U.

S. _Cavalry

was

Thelance.

1811.

1814.

1826.

Scott Tactics.

changed for _carbines, and the _single

loading carbines were, in the latter _{part of the war,}

changed for repeat ing ones. See Exts. Nos. 74, 133, 151, 141.

At

the _beginning of the

war

the sabers

were

the Prussian _pattern, with a _{long straight} blade.

These

were

_replaced later _by the _light

cavalry saber with a curved blade, which

was

_{regarded with}

_much

_more

favor than the Prussian saber.

The

Colt s revolver

was

_generally carried. It

was

loaded with

_powder

and ball

and

fired with _percussion caps.

Only

one lancer _regiment

went

_out, the _{6th Penn.,}

and

it _{changed the lance for the saber in}

April, 1863. DRILL REGULATIONS.

Previous to 1896 Drill _Regulations were called

Tac

tics.

In 1811

_Anthony

Finley of Philadelphia published

"Colonel Harries Instructions for a Volunteer _Corps of _{Cavalry."}

In 1814 Colonel

Wm.

_Duane,

Adjutant General,

U. S.

_Army,

_published "Hand

Book

for

Cavalry." It

was

a _system of drill _regulations.

In 1826 a

Board

of Officers

was

convened to _report

"A _Complete

_System

of

Cavalry Tactics."

Maj.

Gen.

Winfield

Scott

was

_president

and

Lieut. Col. Z.

_Taylor

was

a

member

of the

board

These

tactics

were

_published in ₁₈₃₄

and

were

known

as the "Scott Tactics."

The

_system

was

_{a double rank system}

_{where two}

troops, side by side, each in double _{rank, constituted} a squadron, and four _{squadrons a regiment.}

The

_squad

ron

was commanded

_by the senior _captain.

While

the

drill differs

from

that of the _{present time, the principles} are _essentially the same.

Much

of the _phraseology of our _present drill _regulations is a _repetition of that of the

called the

"

41 _{Tactics,"} or "Poinsett Tactics."

_They

T

differed

from

the "Scott Tactics

"

in_providing for_{a regi}

ment

of 10_{companies, or} 5 _squadrons.

The

_{"History} of the U. S. _{Cavalry," by Brackett,}

on

_page

48

states: "The _system of _cavalry tactics

adapted to the _organization of the

_dragoon

_regiments

was

authorized _by the

Hon.

_J. R. _{Poinsett, Secretary of}

War,

on the 10th of _February, 1841. It is _mainly a translation of the tactics of the French service, and has not yet (June 1, _{1863) been improved upon, though} sev eral _{attempts have been made, but they have all}

proved

failures. I believe almost _{every cavalry} officer of ex

perience considers the tactics of 1841 as _{far superior} to anything which has _yetbeen introduced into our service."

The

41 tactics

were

used _by the eastern _cavalry

during the entire

war and

_by the _{regular cavalry after} the war.

The

western _cavalry used the 41 tactics till the fall _{of 1864,}

_when

_they

began

to use the

Cooke

tac

tics,

which

prescribed a single rank formation.

Whenever,

in _{a report, the} term _{"squadron"} is _used,

it will

mean

a unit of

two

_{troops; while the term} "bat

talion" will

mean

_{four troops} either in _single or double rank.

Because of the almost universal use of the 41 tac tics, it will be _necessary to describe

some

of their

im

portant features.

"The _squadrons of a _regiment in order of battle are Battle order,

distinguished by the denominations first, _{second, third,}

fourth and.fifth; _{they are}

formed

on the

same

line, in

order of these numbers,

_{commencing on}

the _right with an interval of 12_paces. This is _{the primitive}

and

habitual order of the _squadrons in _regiments.

Each

_squadron is

composed

of four _{platoons, distinguished}

by the

denom

inations first, second, third and _fourth,

_{commencing on}

the _right.

The

first

and

second _platoons

form

the first

The

"Column of _{Squadrons"}

was

a

column where

each _squadron

was

inline with full distance. In a "Close

Column

of _{Squadrons"} the _squadrons

were

closed to- 12

paces distance.

poke

sTactics

November

1, 1861, the

War

_Department

_officially adopted the tactics written _by Colonel _Philip St.

_George

Cooke.

_They

were

_published in 1862

and

known

as the

"Cooke Tactics."

While

it

was

ordered that "All additions or de

partures

from

the exercises

and maneuvers

laid

down

are _positively forbidden," as _previously stated, they

were

not _{used by} the _{eastern cavalry} at all,

and

not _by the western cavalry till 1864. I

make

this statement on in formation obtained

from

veterans of the

war and

believe it to be correct.

Principles/)!

The

principles of the

Cooke

Tactics differ_materially

from

_{any preceding} them.

The

_single rank formation

is here introduced.

A

_troop is called a _squadron

and

is

composed

of four _platoons.

In 1857 the

War

_Department

_published the _report

on _foreign armies

made

by Captain Geo. B. McClellan.

On

p.

278

he

recommends

that the

word company

be

changed to _squadron

and

that the _single rank formation be adopted.

Cooke

_{acknowledges getting} his ideas

from

conver

sations with McClellan.

The

introduction of the

Cooke

tactics states that the _single rank formation

was

tested

_by

the British in

Portugal in 1833

and

_1834,

and

it

was

found that it

greatly simplified all _cavalry movements.

Battle order.

The

battle order for a_regiment of ten _troops is four

troopsin line; fourin lineof troops in

column

of platoons

at full distance,

300

paces in the rear of the first _line;

one _troop 50_paces behind eachflank ofthe first line, each

in

column

of platoons at full distance. In case the _regi

ment

had _{only eight troops, the}

two

_{center troops of} the second line

were

the _{missing troops.}

hav-ing between

them

the necessary distance to

form

line in

every way.

The

"Close Column" is

formed

of _troops with distance _{of platoon front} one

from

the other.

The

"Double Column" is

formed by

advance

from

the center of the line, by platoons at _wheeling distance.

Other

_{than mentioned,} these tactics are

much

the Doublecolumn

i 1 1 1 i ffours.

same

as the drill _{regulations of the present} time.

The

double

column

of fours does not

seem

to have been used during the Civil

War.

After his

war

_experience General

Cooke

rewrote his tactics in 1883.

The

double

column

of fours is _{then introduced.}

_Of

_this

_movement

_General

Cooke

_says: "A

new

system with

two

lines

and

double

column

of fours as the _greatest novelties

was

devised

and

was, in fact, _{approved by} a board of _experienced

officers as

early as 1868."

_(Upton

Board.)

General

_Wesley

Merritt reviewed these tactics

and

Merritt reviews

highly

commended

these

movements

as "Valuable C

changes in the interest of _rapidity of

maneuver

and celerityof formation, which are so _important for the ef fective action of _cavalry under the

_changed

conditions

for its uses in

modern

warfare."

When

_Cooke, Merritt

and

_Upton

_agree that the double

column

of fours is invaluable in the interests of

celerity, I conclude that:

Any

organization

which

will not admit of the _ap plication of double

column

of fours is incorrect.

Upton

s _{Assimilated Tactics}

_were

adopted by G. O. isvs _Uptons

No. 6, A. G. O., 1873.

The

_cavalry service never tookTactics kindly to the effort to unite

them

with _infantry.

The

Drill _{Regulations of 1896}

_seem

_{tobe a}

combina-Drlll Regula.

tion of

Cooke and

_Upton.

_They

differ

from

the Assim-tions 1896

ilated Tactics _chieflyin that _theybroke the tie that

bound

the cavalry to _{the infantry.}

THE

CONFEDERATE

CAVALRY.

The

Confederate _cavalry under Stuart in the east stuart

scav-early obtained a superiority over that of the Federalalry Government. After the _Gettysburg

_campaign

the

Con

quality of horses

which

they had

when

the

war

began could no longer be obtained. Stuarts _cavalry

was

or ganized

and armed

the

same

as the _{cavalry of the}

_Army

of the Potomac.

^wheeler

s cav- _{in the}

western armies of the _{Confederacy the single} rank formation began to be used _{early in the} war.

Mor

gan began

to use it

from

the start. Forrest _{soon began}

to use it,

and Wheeler

found that it

was

_necessary to the

conditions under which _they were _laboring.

^

wheelersTEC-

_Wheeler

_{wrote a}

set _{of cavalry} tactics

which were

officially adopted by the _{following order}:

Headquarters

Army

of the Tennessee, Dalton, Ga.

February 17, 1864.

General Orders No. 22.

The

_system of _cavalry tactics _prepared

_by

_Major

General Joseph

W

heeler is _adopted for the use of the cavalry of the

Army

of theTennessee.

By command

of General _Johnston.

K.

_FALCONER,

_A.^V. G.

These tactics _{were used by}

Wheeler

in 1863. _(See

Campaigns

of

Wheeler and His

_{Cavalry, p. 375.)}

mSe

ent

er8 Ar~

_At

the battle of Murfreesboro

Wheeler

s _cavalry

was

armed

with the rifle orcarbine, sabers and revolvers.

(Campaigns

of

Wheeler and

His _{Cavalry, p. 62.)}

The

_{following report of} an _{inspection of}

Wheeler

s

cavalry is _{of great importance} since it

makes

statements regarding the use of the saber which cannot be contro verted and

which

are _agreed to _by all

men who

saw

that

weapon

extensively used duringthe war.

po\t e

wS?eie?B

^

xt<

^

*

At

^east one re

^

ment

f each _brigade cavalry. should be

armed

with _pistols

and

sabers. This

_might

be held in reserve, under ordinary circumstances, as the charging regiment; as at _present constituted, this

com

mand

is _virtually little else than

mounted

infantry.

A

change in this _respect is

deemed

_{very important,} and I

earnestly and respectfully

recommend

the adoption of

this suggestion at the earliest _practicable

moment.

A

light carbine

might

be carried in addition. It is a matter of regret that the saberhas been so

much

overlooked; its

moral influence is _great.

The

_{"fannade,} the _glitter of the keen blades in the air in the _{event of a charge, pro} duce in themselves a

most

_terrifying effect." In a

hand

to

hand

conflict the _necessity of the saber is

most

_ap

parent.

(February, 1865,

Wheeler and His

Cavalry, p. 408.)

Wheeler

was, without doubt, the ablest Confederate

cavalry leader inthewest.

He

was

always readyto

work

in the

team and

_play a _{subordinate part} to his

command

ing general.

Ext. No. 2.

The

carbines

and

rifles

were

flashing: Penpicture of

. . the cavalryflght

and

_banging

_away

at times,

and

scattering- shots,

w

henofshelbyvine.

,, * Shelbyville,

the

_game

was

at _{long range,}

and

then,

when

a _changeTenn.,June27,

came

on

and

the

work

_grew

_{hot, the spiteful sharp explo}

sions swelled into _{a crackling roar} like that of a cane-brake on fire, when, in a single minute, hundreds of boiler-like _joints have burst asunder.

Add

to all the whizzing, angry whirl of countless leaden missiles

which

split the air about you; the hoarse, unnatural shouts of

command

for in battle all sounds of the

human

voice

seem

out of _pitch

and

_{tone; the} wild, defiant _yell and the answering huzzas of the _opposingline; the plunging

and

rearing of frightened horses; the charges here

and

there of _companies or _{squadrons which}

seem

to be shot out of

the

_{main body}

as flames shot out of a house

on

fire;

here

and

_{there the sharp, quick cry}

from

some

unfor tunate trooper

who

did not hear one leaden _messenger for _only those are heard

which

have _{passed by;} the

heavy,

soggy

striking of the helpless

body

against the ground; the scurrying

away

of the frightened horse, as often into _danger as out of it,

whose empty

saddle tells

the foethatthere is

one

rifle lessto fear. All _{these sights}

and

sounds

_go

to

make

_up

the _{confusing medley} of a

battle-field.

ForreBt- Forrest

was

a very able _{man, but,} like Stonewall Jackson,

was

at his best

when

_operatingalone.

He

could not bear restraint

and

did not

work

well to the central

idea.

? habifS

Ext

Na

2A.

The

country, rocky

and

rugged,

was

fought on

thickly clad with cedars,

and

difficult, ofcourse, for

cav-jJanyHiiijenn,airy

movements,

so that, for the

most

_{part, the fighting}

was

on foot, which, however,

was

now

Forrests habitual

tactics,

(Campaigns

of Forrest

and

of Forrests _{Cavalry, p.}

621.

November

29, 1864.)

COMMENT.

Forrest _{always had an} escort, but he

and

his escort always participated in the thickest of the fighting.

It

would seem

that if _{a general does not personally}

enter the _{heavy fighting,} under the _changed conditions of warfare, a _large escort

would

be a nuisance.

Armament of Forrests _{cavalry generally carried sabers,} but

sel-Forrestscavalry. J

dom

used them. His _cavalry

_may

be considered the _high

est _{type of}

mounted

infantry.

Morgan

was

essentially a raider; although a hard

fighter

when

the occasion

demanded,

he _{preferred a} loose sort of warfare to

_working

in _conjunction with other troops,

Morganscavy. Ext. No. 3.

We

were, in fact, not cavalry, but

mounted

riflemen.

A

small

_body

of

mounted

men

was

usually kept in reserve to act

on

the flanks, but otherwise

we

_{fought very} little on horseback _except on _scouting expeditions.

We

never used sabers,

and

long

guns were

not exactly the

_weapons

_{for cavalry}evolutions.

Morgan

rarely fought with the

army;

he had to

make

his

command

a _{self-sustaining one. Nearly every}

man

had a _pistol

and some had

two.

The

_{pistol pre}

ferred

and

_usually

worn

was

the

_Army

Colt.

(Morgan

s _Cavalry,

_by

_Duke.)

Mosby.

_Mosby

was

a _partisan

and

_fought

whenever

_every

ex-ceeded

300

men,

mounted on

the best horses the state of Virginia could produce.

His

men

were

all _picked

men

who

knew

the _country

where

_they

were

_operating.

With

this class of horses he could _{always fight} on his

own

terms.

When

_{not raiding or harassing}

trains, they scat

tered inthe_{surrounding country}

_{and came}

_together again

on

call.

_They

were armed

with the revolver _only, ex cept that

most

men

had

_{two, besides carrying extra cylin} ders to _slip loaded into the

_{weapon when}

all loads

were

CHAPTER

I.

ARMS AND

THEIR

USES

REVOLVER

vs.

SABER.

EMBRACING

A DISCUSSION OF

THE

RELATIVE

MERITS OF

THE REVOLVER

AND

SABER

AND

SHOWING

WHEN

EACH SHOULD

BE USED.

THE

TERM

PISTOL, IN

ANY

REPORT,

MEANS

REVOLVER.

Bowieknives. _{Ext. No.} 4. But while a few of the Confederate

soldiers were _efficientlyarmed, almost every

man

of

them

had a bowie knife

and

revolver.

The

Arkansas

and

Texas

troops, especially, carried

enormous

knives, that

might have

made

a

_Malay

s blood run cold, but in the end these

_huge

knives did _duty far oftener as cleavers than as _bayonets.

(Morgan

s _{Cavalry, by Duke.)}

u ofpistol. Ext. No. 5. Colonel

Wickham

and a

few

of his Junefll^iscaf

1 *

men

threw themselves into afield on the roadside,

and

by the fire of their _pistols checked further _pursuit.

(Life and

Campaigns

of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 289.)

Forrests men Ext. Nfo. 6. Forrest _placed his

men

dismounted verAlimomited_{immediately behind} a _gully.

The

first Federal _charge

Feb k

2V64. MiS8"

was

checked at

60

_yards.

The

second Federal charge

was

checked at

40

_yards.

The

third Federal _charge

was

not checked till it reached

20

_yards.

The

fourth

Fed

eral _charge

went

_through.

The

Confederate rifle

am

munition

was

exhausted and _{they fought} with revolvers.

(Campaigns

of Forrest and of Forrest s _Cavalry,

p. 399.)

uteof revolver, Ext. No. 7.

Two

_strong lines of _{Federal infantry} Ti^h.mingopressed

upon

Rucker, Bell and Duff, through

an

open

10,istST" field. Their front line

came

within

30

_{paces of the}

Con

federates,

who

then

drew

their revolvers

and

drove the

enemy

back _{with great slaughter.}

(Campaigns

of Forrest

and

of Forrest s _Cavalry,

Ext. No. 8.

The

9th _{Penn. Cavalry}

had

been with- Federal, use

drawn

from

the _battery

and

_placed in _{position by} the

sidem^nleT

8 dls

"

of the _road,

_{and by}

close _pistol

fighting, held the largeTe^Ko.z^Gs! columns of the

_enemy

in check.

(Col. E.

M. McCook,

R. R., Vol. 31, Part I, p. 654.)

Ext. No. 9.

_{The enemy}

charged in _{gallant style, Texan. use}

re-and

were

_{repulsed twice,} the second time the

Texans

v

^

P ooi,MiSS.,

using their six-shooters at

20

paces. Fb.a,i86 (Maj. Genl. S. D. Lee,

C

S., R. R., Vol. 32, Part

I, p. 365.)

Ext. No. 10. In one instance the

2d U.

S. _Cavalry 2du.s._cavalry

j ,1 , . userevolver,

dis-drove the

_enemy

before

them

with their _pistols

(

dis-mounted

-mounted)

after the carbine

ammunition had

_given out.

Co

(Brig. Genl. A. T. A. Torbert, R. R., Vol. 36, Part Ml I, p. 805.)

Ext. No. 11.

Anderson

advanced in

_good

_style, the charge with

Confederates with sabers, supported by the 5th Georgiavers r

agan.t

e

cai-... , ,

J & bines does not

with pistols. Ihree times these

two

_{regiments charged}8UCCeed

-the 4th _Michigan, but each time _they were driven backGa-Jlln aO 1864!

in confusion.

(Col. R.

H.

G. _Minty, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II _p

821.)

Ext. No. 12.

The enemy

_relied

wholly

upon

the saber against

carbine

and

_{the pistol;}

_my

_men

preferred the saber.

A^e!

ve

short but _closely contested _{struggle ensued, which re-vaTsept^iSf^l} suited in _{the repulse} of the _enemy.

Many

prisoners

were

taken

and

_{quite a}

number

of both sides were left on the

field.

(Brig. Genl. G. A. Custer, R. _R., Vol. _43, Part I p. 456.)

Ext. No. 13.

The

_charge

was met

_{by one}

_from

the

m

the meiee

enemy

and

the-

command

_was

_broken.

_{The men}

_had

_notf.Vi

b

iStoS

weapons

but their _carbines, and these

were

_extremely

_^sTb^T

Gap

difficult to load and inefficient in the melee that ensued.

Feb>₁₉₎1865

The

rebels

_(Mosby

s

_men)

had _very

few

sabers but were well _{supplied with revolvers and rode}

up

to our

men

and

shot

them

down

without _meeting

more

resistance than

men

could

make

with carbines. I ascribe the

dis-aster to * * * fourth, to the

men

having- neither sabers nor revolvers, and _{consequently being unable} to engage in a melee _successfully with an

_enemy

armed

with

at least

two

revolvers to the man.

(Maj. Thos. Gibson, 14th Pa. Cav., R. R., Vol. 46, Parti, p. 465.)

sabers necea- Ext. No. 14.

Lomax

s cavalry are

armed

entirely country.

11 n

with rifles and have no sabers, and the consequence is etSj*i864.

HI11

that _they cannot _fight

on

horseback, and in this _open

country they cannot successfully fight

on

foot against large bodies of cavalry.

(Lieut. Genl. Jubal A. Early, C. S., R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 559.)

Ext. No. 15. I could not stand that; but,

drawing

combat with an . 1 . ,,.

Indian, revolver

my

saber, rushed

_upon

themonster and inflicted a severe

wins against sa

bercut.

wound

on his head.

At

the

same

moment

he fired his

Solomons _Fork,

....

- ..

July29, 1857. last barrel within a foot of _me, the ball _taking effect in the center of the breast, glancing to the left

and

_lodging

near

_my

left _nipple.

(Life and

Campaigns

of _Maj. Genl. _J. E. B. Stuart, p. 21.)

saber usedasa Ext. No. 16. Colonel

Munford

was

dismounted by ^Manassas^Jirtya saber strokeand his horse

was

killed.

(Life and

Campaigns

of _Maj. Genl. _{J. E. B. Stuart,}

p. 107.)

individual Ext. No. 17. _Perceiving his _{danger, Colonel} Davis turned

_upon

Allen with a cut of his saber, which Allen

m

Fieetwood,*va., avoided by throwing himself

on

the side of his horse; at

June9,1K63.

the

game

moment

he fired

and

Colonel Davis fell.

(Life

and Campaigns

of _Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 265.)

Revolver wins Ext. No. 18. Colonel

_HamptOD,

while _engaging1

against the aber f , . , , .

one of the

_enemy

with his saber,

was

shot _through the

*"^!

body

by another,

and

_mortally

wounded.

(Life

and Campaigns

of _Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 289.)

*Inthe reports ofSouthernOfficerstheengagementat_BrandyStation is_given

Ext. No. 19. _{Captain Latane and Captain Royall} individual

. , combat, revolver

met hand

to hand, one with the saber and the other withwins against sa

ber.

thepistol,

and

Latane receivedinstant death. Royall

was

chickahominy

severely

wounded

by

Latane s saber

and

_by the

men who

IBS-/.

charged close at Latane s side.

(Life

and Campaigns

of Maj. Genl. _J. E. B. Stuart, p. 56.)

Ext. No. 20. _Corporal Caroll

and

Private _Jett f

Co. UC," after the

hand

to

hand

fight in the field,

showed

me

their sabers cut off close to the hilt,

and

Carolls 3 forehead

was

_{gashed with} a saber.

(Life

and Campaigns

of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 344, Gettysburg campaign.)

Ext. No. 21.

And

the road

was

soon,

and

for sev- Forrests

cav-.

it-

airy usessaberas eral miles, thickly dotted with the

wounded

and

slam aacuttingweapon

number

of

whom

had

been cut

down

by

the sabers ofKy"

r ifei!*28i i&Vi

the untrained but _{heavy-handed Confederates}

who

fol

lowed Forrest thatwinter afternoon.

(Campaigns

of Forrest

and

of Forrests _Cavalry,

p. 52.)

Ext. No. 22. Forrest

was

assaulted simultaneous- Pistol wins against saber

ly

by two

officers with their sabers; but, eluding the f ull

^^

th?*g ew

force of their thrusts _{by bending} his

_body

_suddenly

for-j^jjjfjg"^ 11

,

1

ward, their

sword

_{points only} touched his shoulder.

Car

ried a

few

pacesahead

by

the _impetus ofhis horse, check

ing

and drawing which

aside in time to shoot one of his

opponents as he

came

up, he thrust his saber point into the other. * * * _obliging

him

to run his saber through one,

and

disabletheother _by a blow onthe

sword

arm.

(Campaigns

of Forrest and of Forrest s _{Cavalry, p.}

53.)

Ext. No. 23. Private

W.

H.

_{Terry, while engaged}

^officer uses

single-handed with a Federal _trooper

whom

he

was

ham-

sacremanto, Ky., Dec.Jo, oi.

mering

with his exhausted rifle,

was

run through the

heart _{by Captain}Davis.

(Campaigns

of Forrest and of Forrest s _{Cavalry, p.}

charge in coi- Ext. No. 24.

He

drew

his

men

_up for the

work

in umn of

squad-r

Forrests cav-an Pen space, in a

column

of squadrons.

The

order to

charge

up

the ravine

was

_given, with instructions for the

first

and

_{second companies} of the _squadrons severally to U8

Fort _Donison,deploy to the _right

and

left as _they advanced.

About

Feb.15,i86a.

the batterv a

^and

to

fa^

_struggle ensued. Sabers,

pistols

and

carbines were lavishly used, with

much

cost

of lives on both sides.

(Campaigns

of Forrest and of Forrests _Cavalry,

p. 82.)

Forrest uses Ext. No. 25. Forrest resolved to _charge.

At

shot-guns during tjeDearly

part of

twenty paces the Confederates gave a volley with their shiioh, April 7 _shot-guns, a formidable

_weapon

at that distance,

and

1862.

rushed in with _pistols

and

sabers.

(Campaigns

of Forrest and of Forrests _Cavalry,

p. 146. Battle of Shiioh.)

saber used as Ext. No. 26.

_Very

_many

_charges

were

made

and

shock weapon.

Cpp rviiie,Va.,the saber used _freely.

(Genl. A. Pleasonton, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I,p. 912.)

saber used aa Ext. No. 27.

There were

several _charges

and

the

shock weapon.

Brandy Station,Saber

was

USed With SUCCCSS.

(Genl. Buford, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 932.)

sturdy men of Ext. No. 28.

They

outnumbered

us three to one, as

a cutting

e

weap but could not withstand the heavy saber blows of the

]y Ford sturdy

men

of

Maine

who

rode through

them and

over

(Genl. Kilpatrick, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 986.) stuart scav- Ext. No. 29.

The

charge

was

spiritedly

made

and

^ooTbfrVugh sabers freely used> as the heads of

m

y

men

wil1

attest Md.,jV^isSs!

(Lieut< Col _Preston, 1st Vt. _Cav., R. R., Vol. 27, Parti, p. 1015-)

Kiipatrick s Ext. No. 30.

Upwards

of

200

left in our hands

duXl8

U av e ann b a e

h

were

wounded

_by

the saber alone.

Cft

way a

neS n

borough (General Kilpatrick,

Savannah

Campaign,

R. R.,

Vol. 44, p. 365.)

stuartscav- Ext. No. 31. Jones brigade, with

drawn

sabers,

(General Stuart, C. S., R. R., Vol. 27, Part II, p.

\ ^"Jily6,1868.

Ext. No. 32.

With

an _abiding faith in the

_god

of

battles,

and

a firm reliance on the saber, your success

will continue.

(Maj. Genl. _J. E. B. _Stuart, C. _S., R. R., Vol. 27, Part II, p. 720.)

Ext.

No.

33. After _driving-thewholecavalry force saber used to r ,, 1-1 it 1 i finiahthefight.

of the

_enemy

_steadily all _{day long,} our _troops

went

in _{seriersviiie,} about 4o clockwith the saber

and

ayell

and

routed them.iseJ.

(Brig. Genl. S, D. _Sturgis, R. _R., Vol. _32, Part I, p. 134.)

Ext. No. 34. This _great disaster

would

have at once been retrieved but for the insufficient

armament

of

the

command.

Besides the 1st

and 2d

Md.

and

a _squad

ron of the 8th Va., there

was

not a saber in the

com

mand.

In that _{open country, perfectly level,} the _only

mode

_Cia8 a

sldlrybecause

of _{fighting charging cavalry}

was

_{by charging,} and this_^s.haven 6a

~

the

men

were unableto do.

va Ne Iii Cr 4 Ck i864

(Brig. Genl. Bradley T. _Johnson, C. S., R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 6.)

Ext. No. 35.

The

_cavalry

made

some handsome

Prisoners

cap-i , .

, . , tured with the

saber charges, in which

most

of the _prisoners were _cap-saber

-fl11_j Cedarville, Va.,

tUred. _Aug.16,1864.

(Maj. Genl. P.

H.

Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 19.)

Ext. No. 36. Forrest

was

_{charged by} a Federal

ba p t ers re nal ol c o^r

-officer

who

_lunged at

him

with his saber; Forrest parriedt

w

hr n

ust

ver saber the thrust with his _{pistol, and, firing,} killed his resolute_vi

_^

a

A r la

^

ap r le f adversary. 18(i5

(Campaigns

of Forrest

and

of Forrests _Cavalry,

p. 668.)

The

_following is another account of the

same

af fair:

Ext. No. 37.

While

_{charging, Captain Taylor} ran

Sameasabove

and

ordered

him

tosurrender. Forrest then

drew

his

re-cu

8 t

oldieru8e*the_v

lver and shot

him

dead.

Another

of our boys ran

after him, striking at

him

with his saber as he ran.

(The

Last

_Campaign,

_by E. N. _{Gilpin, published}

in the _{Cavalry Journal.)}

in the thick Ext. No. 38.

The enemy

had

used the saber

al-woodstherevol- . .

verissuperiorto

most

_exclusively, torrest

and

his staff

were

_{armed, each}

thesaber.

NearMaples-with

two navy

revolvers, and the

men

with Spencer rifles

ville,ll..Apr.1, .

1865. _{as well as}

pistols. It

was

a contest of sabers with fire

arms, with the odds of four to one _{against the}

Confed

erates. _Forrest, Lieut.

Boon

and five of his

men

_only

were

_wounded,

while

some

_thirty of the

_enemy

were

killed

and

as

_many

_{as sixty}

were

left in _{the hospital,} near

by,badly

wounded.

(Campaigns

of Forest and of Forrests _{Cavalry, p.}

669.)

saber dis- Ext. No. 39.

The

10th

Ohio

made

a

most

gal-BearCreeksta.lant saber charge against the

enemy

_posted behind rail VsJi.

Ga NoT< 16)

barricades; dismounted, they drove the

enemy

in con

fusion, killing

and wounding

many

with the saber. (Col. Atkins, R. R., Vol. 44, p. 389.)

saber usedana Ext. No. 40.

The

_captain

had

command

of the

ad-^wiTsons^Bjiidi

vance

company

and

didnot

hear

theordertoturnoffthe

road, so he charged on past the artillery, cutting right

and

left

_among

the

_enemy

until shot

down

_by them,.

(Col. J. G. Vail, R. R., Vol.49, PartI, p. 455.)

The

_{following discussion} is taken

from

"Volunteer

Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade," written

by

Captain Frederick Whittaker, 6th _{N. Y. Cavalry}:

Ext. No. 41.

So

far as the authors observation goes, he never

remembers

an instance in which the saber charge, resolutely pushed, failed to drive the pistols.

But

the individual fancy of the colonel seemed to _regulate the matter for his _regiment. If he

were

an enthusiastic

swordsman

_{he always}

_managed

to infuse the

same

_spirit

into his men,

and

such

men

depended

on

theirsaberswith just confidence.

The

saber is a

_weapon

that _requires

constant practice to keep ones

hand

_in,

and

our _cavalry

officers as a class are _{entirely deficient in the practice.}

In all the instances _during the

war

in

which

the saber _proved ineffective it

_may

be _safely asserted that it

was

_owing

to

two

_things

want

_{of fencing} practice

and

blunt sabers. _(Pp. 6

and

_7.)

Now,

the moral effect of the _charge is tremendous.

The

fierce _{charging yell, rising}

and

_{swelling higher}

and

higher till it _{overtops the} sound of _{musketry, frightens}

more

men

thanbullets. _{Very, very}

few

_troops will stand

up

against a _{charge unsupported by works;}

we

_might

say none.

One

side or the other is sure to _{give way,} not

from

the force of the _weapons, but _{simply because they} are afraid.

_{Anything which}

_encourages

men

to _charge

home

doubles their morale,

and

morale is _everything.

(P. 11. See also Exts. Nos. 1, 2, 480.)

The

true use of the revolver lies in _irregular

war

fare,

where

single combats

and

sudden encounters of

small _parties take place,

on

horseback, in

narrow

lanes,

among

woods and

fences,

where

the saber cannot beused. In

such

_places,

and wherever

_{regular order}is

broken

_up,

the revolver is invaluable. In _{pursuits, patrols}

and

sur prises it is _superior to the saber. In line _charges in the field, the latter is _{always conqueror} if it is _sharp.

But

one _{thing should be impressed}

_upon

_every

man

never to _{try long} shots

when

on

horseback.

The

revolver on the _{right hip} should have a cord fastened to it a _yard long.

The

men

should be practiced in firing at a target while passing at _speed,

and

then _dropping the _pistol

on

the _opposite side, to use the cord while they handle the saber. _{(P. 14.)}

The

men

_{should be taught never} to fire before the word.

The

moral effect of a reserved _volley is tremen dous. _{Irregular firing during an advance} is both useless

and

_{demoralizing. Thirty or forty} feet

from

the

_enemy

s

line is the time tofire, all _{together aiming} low. _{(P. 15.)}

Ext. No. 42.

We

overtook about

_{300 Cheyenne}

The saber is

warriors

drawn

_up

inline of battle,

and marching

boldlyfoose a

orTa e

rtisan

SolomonsFork,of most

_company

commanders

to _give a _{carbine volley} 1857.

and

then _{charge with}

drawn

_pistols,

and

use our sabers as a dernierressort; but,

much

to

_my

_{surprise, the colonel} ordered "Draw _{sabers, Charge/}

We

_set

up

a terrific

yell, which scattered the Cheyennes in _{disorderly flight,}

and

we

_kept

_up

the _charge in _pursuit.

_{Very few}

of the

company

horses

were

fleet

_enough

after the

march

to

keep up with Indians on _{fresh ponies.}

(Lifeand

Campaigns

of _Maj. Genl. _J. E.

B

Stuart, p. 20.)

in the Gettys- Ext. No. 43. Just then

Hampton

arrived with the

burgcavalryfight ., ,T _,

both saber and 1st N. C.

and

_{the Jeff Davis Legion,}

and

the battle

was

revolver were J

usedinthemeiee.renewed back and forth across the _plain until all of

July3,1863.

_Hampton

s _{brigade except} the

Cobb

Legion, and all of Fitz

Lee

s _{brigade except the} 4th Va. Cav. were

_engaged

in the fierce

hand

to

hand

melee

which

followed.

For

many

minutes the _fight with saber and _{pistol raged}

most

furiously.

(Life

and Campaigns

of _Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 340. Battle of Gettysburg.)

wooded coun- Ext. No. 44.

There

was

little chance for

mounted

try not suitable_r 1 . . .

fortheuseofthe_fighting in _{eastern Virginia,} the dense _woods, the

arma-saber by large

bodiesof cavalry,

ment

of both _parties,

and

the _practice of _barricading

making

it _{impracticable} to use the saber _{with anything}

like a _{large force;}

and

so, with the exception of Yellow Tavern, thedismounted

method

_prevailed in _{almost every}

engagement.

(Sheridans Memoirs, Vol. I, p. 424.)

COMMENTS ON

THE

SABER

AND

REVOLVER.

It will be seen

from

the next _chapter that _duringthe

War

of _{the Rebellion, the}

same

as for centuries _past, the saber

was

essentially a

weapon

for shock action.

_During

the thick of the melee it

was

still to _{be preferred}; but

.

when

the melee

began

to dissolve into individual combats

the saber

was

or should _{have been exchanged} for the re volver. _{This exchange can} be effected _{by throwing}

_away

the saber, returning it to the scabbard or _{by dropping}

knot.

The

second

method

of getting rid of it is _quite

impossible

when

in motion, while the third will be ac

companied

by

some

danger to the _trooper if the

_weapon

is as _sharp as it should be.

_Up

to the _present time, therefore, there is no _satisfactory

_way

to _exchange the saber for the revolver while in action.

In the individual

combat

the revolver will be the winner in _{almost every} case. If the trooper is _expert in

its _use, he has _nothing to fear

from

an individual

_enemy

armed

with a saber. _(Exts. 15, 17, 18, 19, 22, 36, 37,

38, 41.)

The

revolver was, at times, used for collective fire

dismounted, but _only under _exceptional circumstances, such as

from

behind a stone wall, or for defensive _pur poses after the carbine

ammunition

had

become

ex hausted. _(Exts. 5 to 10

and

_90.)

The

revolver should, then, be used

whenever

_regu

lar order is broken _{up. (Ext. 41.)}

That

_is, in individ ual _{combat, charging} as _foragers on

_wagon

trains or ar

tillery (Ext. 24), inthe

woods

(Exts. 38, 44), on patrol

duty,

when

on

mounted

skirmish line in close _country, in irregular or partisan warfare

where

sudden encounters of small _parties are to _{be expected. (Ext. 41.)}

In the melee the carbine is useless _against the re volver. _{(Ext. 13.)}

As

to the _{type of revolver or}

pistol needed the con

clusions that can be reached are that there is needed for the cavalry a

_weapon

_{of large} caliber or _{great stopping} power, quick firing,

and

accurate not to exceed fifty

yards. Since the change

from

the saber to the revolver

will be

made

_during the fight, it is evident that the trooper should be able to get his

_weapon

into action with the _{greatest degree} of _rapidity.

Such

a contrivance as a holster with a button _flap

and

_{carrying the} butt to the front should be discontinued at the earliest

moment.

All references to the saber as a _{thrusting weapon,}

which were

_observed, have been extracted. _(Exts. 22,

23, 36, 37.) It will be noticed that it

was

so used

_by

of

than are enlisted men.

_Only

a _{small portion of} the ref erences to the saber as _{a cutting}

_weapon

have been ex tracted. _{(Exts. 15, 16, 17,}

20, 21, 28, 29, 37, 40, 55, 83.)

Not

_only these references, but conversations with vet erans of the Civil

war

lead to the conclusion that the en

listed

man

is _going to use his saber almost _{entirely as} a

cutting weapon.

At

the close of the

war

it

was no

dif ferent than at _{the beginning.} It is believed that the cav alry at the close of the

war

was

as well trained in

swordsmanship

as _{any troops} that the United States will

ever put in the field. If, then, our best _{trained cavalry} is _going to use the saber _{chiefly as a cutting weapon,} it is better to _give it a

_weapon

_adapted to the

manner

in which it will be used rather _{than one adapted} to the use of a trained fencer.

The

above statements deal with historical facts

and

not with abstract theories. It is not to be inferred that thecut is to _{be preferred} to _{the thrust,}

since the _contrary is the _case, but it is reiterated that the cut has been and will be used to the almost entire exclu sion of the thrust.

There

has been _{a great} deal of discussion in the U.

S. _cavalry service in _{years past}

regarding the relative merits of therevolverand saber.

Such

discussion is time wasted.

_{Each weapon}

has its distinct

and

_proper uses,

and

neither can _{replace the other;} neither can either of

them

be discontinued as a _{necessary part of}

_modern

cav

alry

armament.

It is often asserted that the horse is the real

_weapon

in the shock _{(Ext. 67),} and that it

makes

no difference whether a _{trooper has} a revolver or saber in his hand. (See Exts. _{29, 30, 35, 43,}

and

_{Chapter II.)}

The

moral

effect of the flash and _glitter of a "three-foot razor"

is

not to _{be ignored.}

The

41 tactics _prescribed that the _charge should be

at a "raise saber" and it

was

so usedall _through the war. Upton, after his

war

_{experience as a successful cav}

alry

commander,

retained the "raise saber" for the _charge

men

used it

no

matter

what

was

_prescribed. Untrained

men

_{instinctively} use the saber as _they

would

use a club.

The

Cooke

tactics of 61 _prescribes the "tierce

point" as the charging position,

and

Cooke, after his

Civil

war

_experience, still _{prescribed the} "tierce _point"

inhis tactics of 83.

The

"tierce _point"

was

_{officially adopted} as the

charging position of the saber in the Cavalry Drill

_Regu

lations of 1896.

In the effect of the _{saber previous} to and at the in stant of contact is _largely a moral one (see Exts. 1, 2,

41₎, then it

would seem

that this effect

may

be materially

increased

_by

_{carrying the saber during} the _charge at a

"raise saber" rather than at the _position of _"charge saber" as

now

used, since in the former _position its flash

and

_glitter,

and

therefore its moral effect, will be

much

greater than if carried at the latter.

THE

LANCE.

At

Vionville,

Aug.

16, 1870.

Bredow

s _brigade

was

AB & defensive

weaponthe lance

composed

of

two

_regiments.

One

was armed

with the

i^noj>etter

than

saber

and

the other with the lance.

With

_equal

numbers

they charged in the

same

line under identical conditions and suffered _equal losses. This

would

indicate that as a defensive

_weapon

the lance is _{not superior} to the saber. In our service

we know

very little about the lance.

In the

Mexican

war

we

had

lancers for _opponents, as

will be seen

from

_{the following}:

Ext. No. 45.

The

_cavalry

made

one

most

_gallant sabers against

J _{Mexicanlancers.}

charge against the

enemy

on

the

23d

of _February,

and

Bennavista, cut their

_way

_{through them;} but the

Mexican

lancers

were

far from, _being a _{contemptible enemy, and}

_many

of

them were

admirable horsemen.

Our

_people

had

the

advantage of larger horses

and

heavier

men

_{as a general} thing, but the

Mexicans were

much

more

agile,

and

could

handle their horses as well as _{any people} on earth, while with the lance _they

were

_greatly our _superiors,

and

used

that

_weapon

with _great effect both at

Buena

Vista

and