Introduction: Parties, Electoral Systems and Political Theory

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Introduction: Parties, Electoral Systems and

Political Theory

Matteo Bonotti & Daniel Weinstock

To cite this article: Matteo Bonotti & Daniel Weinstock (2021) Introduction: Parties, Electoral Systems and Political Theory, Representation, 57:3, 287-295, DOI: 10.1080/00344893.2021.1960590

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Introduction: Parties, Electoral Systems and Political Theory

Matteo Bonotti ^aand Daniel Weinstock^b

aPolitics and International Relations, School of Social Sciences, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia;

bKatharine A. Pearson Chair in Civil Society and Public Policy, Faculty of Law and Faculty of Arts, McGill University, Montreal, Canada

ABSTRACT

In recent years, several political theorists have restored and defended the central role played by political parties and partisanship in liberal democracies, highlighting the positive contribution that they can make to democratic politics. Little attention, in this growing body of literature, has been paid to the institutional framework in which political parties are located, and which may significantly shape the kind of party system in which individual parties and partisans operate. One of the key elements of this institutional framework is the electoral system. One question that deserves urgent attention is the following: how does electoral design affect parties and partisans’ ability to make a positive contribution to democracy? While some of the existing literature on electoral systems does engage with the normative dimensions of electoral design, very few political theorists have addressed this question. The articles in this special issue aim to fill this gap in the literature. By re-examining some of the key debates in the normative literature on parties and partisanship through the lens of electoral design, they advance both bodies of work in an original way that will help to set a new research agenda in this_field.

KEYWORDS

Political arties; Electoral systems; Political theory

In recent years, several political theorists have restored and defended the central role played by political parties in democratic polities (e.g., Bonotti,2017; Bonotti & Bader, 2014; Invernizzi-Accetti & Wolkenstein,2017; Muirhead,2014; Rosenblum,2008; Wein- stock,2015; White & Ypi,2016; Wolkenstein,2016,2019). In many ways, this body of work has developed as an answer to what political scientists often refer to as the

‘crisis’ of political parties and party democracy (e.g., Daalder,2002; Dalton & Watten- berg, 2002; Delwit, 2011; Ignazi, 1996; Mair, 2013; Papadopoulos, 2013; Whiteley, 2010). The list of pathologies characterising this crisis is well-known.

Parties, it is often argued, no longer provide a source of identiﬁcation for many citizens. According to the so-called ‘partisan dealignment hypothesis’ (e.g., Dalton, ^1984; Dalton, Flanagan, & Beck,1984; Inglehart,1990, Ch. 10), processes of social modernis- ation have contributed to reducing the extent to which individuals in liberal democracies identify with political parties. This phenomenon has been traced back to various causes, including higher levels of education, which allow citizens to navigate political life without

CONTACT Matteo Bonotti matteo.bonotti@monash.edu https://doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2021.1960590

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the need for parties’ guidance; the rise of mass media and public interests groups, which compete with parties in the articulation of societal interests; and parties’ declining depen- dence on party members for campaigning and political funding (Dalton,2002, pp. 22_– 23). Another factor often cited to explain declining levels of party identification is the decreasing level of programmatic differentiation between parties. As one scholar observes, ‘[p]arty convergence erodes partisanship … When the differences between parties’ brands shrink, voters are less likely to find a comparative fit with one over the other… Alternatively, when parties clearly distinguish themselves from their competi- tors, partisanship will strengthen_{’ (Lupu,}2016, p. 28, original emphasis).

Furthermore, some have argued that parties’ ability to provide a channel or ‘linkage’ (Lawson,1988) between citizens and the state has also faded. As the late Peter Mair once famously argued,

the functions that parties do perform, are seen to perform, and are expected to perform, have changed from combining representative and governing roles to relying almost exclu- sively on a governing role [e.g. candidate selection, recruitment, etc.]. This is the _ﬁnal passing of the traditional mass party. (Mair,2013, p. 97)

This process of party‘cartelization’ (Katz & Mair,1995), combined with growing levels of state regulation of parties in many democracies, has led some scholars to consider parties analogous to‘public utilities’ (van Biezen,2004). Broader phenomena such as declining voter turnout and increasingly volatile elections have further contributed to the alleged crisis of parties and party democracy.

In response to this crisis, normative political theorists have highlighted the positive contribution that parties and partisanship can make to democracy. More specifically, some have justified the desirability of parties in democratic polities by appealing to the values of legitimate opposition, regulated rivalry, and nonviolence: by institutionalising societal pluralism in a nonviolent way, parties can make a key contribution to the stability of liberal democracy (e.g., Rosenblum, 2008). Others have highlighted parties’ contribution to public justification. This is the process through which citizens and, more importantly, public officials, justify political rules to those subject to them, i.e., their fellow citizens (e.g., Bonotti, 2017; White & Ypi, 2011; cf. Muirhead & Rosenblum, 2006). Central to this normative dimension of partisanship is the idea that parties ought to justify laws and policies by appealing to the common good rather than to the partial and sectarian interests of specific individuals or groups (the latter, it is often argued, is what‘factions’, rather than ‘parties’, do).

A related normative defence of parties and partisanship appeals to the role of parties within the context of deliberative democracy. While deliberative democrats have traditionally been critical of parties and partisanship, viewing their adversarial nature as inimical to the consensus-oriented nature of deliberation, other have pointed out that parties’ role in selecting, articulating and synthetising policy issues via coherent platforms, combined with their creative nature, can play a key role in deliberative democracy (e.g., Muirhead,2019; Rosenblum,2008, p. 308). Deliberation is also central to another normative defence of parties, one centred around their role in restoring the linkage between citizens and society which, we have seen earlier, has faded in recent decades. More speciﬁcally, some have argued, this linkage could be re-established by introducing various forms of intra-party democracy within parties, and especially forums and

288 M. BONOTTI AND D. WEINSTOCK

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channels for intra-party deliberation (e.g., Invernizzi-Accetti & Wolkenstein, 2017; Wolkenstein,2016). Finally, some have examined the so-called‘ethics of partisanship’, and especially the ‘virtues distinctive to partisans that are cultivated and expressed through partisan activity… [such as ] … inclusivity, comprehensiveness, compromise, and loyalty’ (Muirhead & Rosenblum,2020, p. 105).

Little attention, in this growing body of literature, has been paid to the institutional framework in which political parties are located, and which may significantly shape the kind of party system in which individual parties and partisans operate. One of the key elements of this institutional framework is the electoral system. One question that deserves urgent attention is the following: how does electoral design affect parties and partisans’ ability to make the aforementioned contributions to democracy? While some of the existing literature on electoral systems does engage with the normative dimensions of electoral design (Dummett,1985,1997; Diamond & Plattner, 2006; van der Hout & McGann, 2009), very few political theorists have addressed this question (partial exceptions include Beitz,1989; Christiano,1996; Weinstock,2015). The articles in this special issue aim to address this gap in the literature. By re-examining some of the key debates in the normative literature on parties and partisanship through the lens of electoral design, they advance both bodies of work in an original way that will help to set a new research agenda in thisfield.

An Overview of This Special Issue

The articles in this special issue are diverse but also present many points of connection. One of the key areas of research in the normative literature on parties and partisanship, we have seen, concerns the role of parties within the context of deliberative democracy. Thefirst two contributions to this collection focus on this topic and bring it into dialogue with the normative dimensions of electoral design. In her article, Dominique Leydet evaluates Single Member Plurality (SMP) and Proportional Representation (PR) electoral systems in connection with deliberative democracy’s ‘systemic turn’, i.e., the view that deliberative standards do not need to be fully met by all institutions, sites and actors in a democracy but can be distributed across them, with different components playing different functions. Within this systemic deliberative framework, Leydet points out, political parties (which have traditionally been considered incompatible with deliberative democracy) can play a crucial role in promoting citizens’ deliberative agency. More specifically, they can do so by selecting and synthesising large number of politically relevant issues into manageable political platforms; making the key policies and issues central to these platforms visible to citizens; and, by competing with other parties, helping citizens understand reasons for and against different policy proposals. Crucially, Leydet argues, parties’ ability to accomplish these deliberative tasks is affected by the party system in which they operate which, in turn, depends on the electoral system. Leydet focuses especially on two democratic goods, i.e., ideological diversity and intellig- ibility, which she considers central to democratic debate. Neither SMP nor PR, she argues, can equally advance both goods and avoid trade-offs between them. Therefore, she concludes, reforms may be required in order to reduce trade-offs under each system, and these reforms will need to take into account the broader institutional environment in which these electoral systems operate.

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But deliberative democracy, we have seen, can occur not only outside parties but also within them. In his article, Fabio Wolkenstein examines the democratic organisational reforms (both aggregative and deliberative) that many scholars have invoked in order to give members greater voice within parties, restore the linkage between parties and citizens, and thus help counter the alleged crisis of political parties in liberal democracies. Wolkenstein points out how these reforms have received several criticisms. He focuses especially on the view that by empowering ordinary party members, and opening its decision-making processes up to new supporters and activists, a party may risk reducing its own electoral competitiveness, since members and supporters may select candidates or policies that most voters dislike. According to Wolkenstein, these dynamics depend on the electoral system under which a party operates. More specifically, he argues, if a party selects unpopular candidates or policies under afirst-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system, this can have serious negative consequences for its electability. Conversely, under a PR system a party can still gain seats and influence policy-making even if it significantly changes its political platform as a result of greater intra-party democracy. Therefore, Wolkenstein argues, PR systems create an institutional environment under which democratic organisational reforms are less costly than under FPTP systems and thus more likely to be implemented by political parties. Electoral design, he concludes, can therefore provide a key incentive for the implementation of party reforms aimed at countering the crisis of political parties in liberal democracies.

Leydet and Wolkenstein’s insightful contributions help bridge the normative litera- tures on parties and electoral design in an innovative way. However, like most of the existing literature in this area, they focus on individual parties and their relationship with the broader institutional framework in which they operate. But what happens when parties join forces and form government coalitions? Do coalitions affect parties and partisans’ ability to realise their normative goals and, if so, how? Two articles in the special issue tackle this surprisingly overlooked topic. Jonathan White focuses especially on ‘grand coalitions’, i.e., coalitions that include the two major parties in a party system. These kinds of coalition, he points out, are often criticised because by bringing together parties from very different ideological orientations they often encourage them to compromise and abandon their respective principled commitments. White argues that parties’ decision to join or not to join a grand coalition, and their ability to preserve their principled commitments, can be influenced by the electoral system under which they operate, and by the political culture that emerges under it. Both FPTP and PR systems, he claims, present features that can encourage or hinder parties and partisans’ ability to maintain and advance principled political commitments. Therefore, White concludes by defending a mixed electoral system that combines the proportional representation of opposition parties with government by a single party.

James Hodgson’s article also focuses on party coalitions, though from a diﬀerent perspective. His starting point is Robert Goodin’s (2008) normative justiﬁcation for parties and party competition, grounded in the idea of democracy as the form of government by which a community gives laws to itself. Democracy thus intended, Goodin argues, requires competing parties providing rationales for government via their electoral man- ifestoes. According to Hodgson, Goodin’s argument seems to imply that party coalitions undermine parties’ contribution to democracy since they dilute or compromise each party’s rationale for government, producing policies that may lack democratic

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authorisation. However, Hodgson points out, coalition governments (which are frequent in many democracies) can be reconciled with Goodin’s argument. More speciﬁcally, he claims, post-electoral coalitions that involve deep forms of compromise can help produce more coherent rationales for government in the long term. Conversely, post-electoral coalitions that eschew deep compromise, pre-electoral coalitions involving several parties, and pre-electoral coalitions consisting of a single ‘big tent’ party will hinder the realisation of that ideal.

The articles considered so far focus on the broader institutional context of party politics: parties and partisans’ ability to realise the normative goals ascribed to them, these accounts show, is affected by the incentives and constraints created by the electoral system under which parties operate. However, institutions on their own (including the electoral system) cannot always help realise normatively desirable goals unless they are supported by ethical partisans. The so-called ‘ethics of partisanship’, we have already seen, involves the ‘virtues distinctive to partisans that are cultivated and expressed through partisan activity… [such as ] … inclusivity, comprehensiveness, compromise, and loyalty’ (Muirhead & Rosenblum, 2020, p. 105). Ethical partisans are those who display such virtues. In their contribution to this special issue, Lise Esther Herman and Russell Muirhead focus on this aspect by addressing the democratic erosion that has characterised both old and new democracies over the past decade. One of the sources of this phenomenon is what they refer to as‘abusive legalism’, i.e., the use of democratic procedures formally consistent with the rule of law in order to weaken the integrity of democratic institutions and electoral fairness. According to Herman and Muirhead, abusive legalism and its effects are not the result of institutional flaws but rather a consequence of some partisan political actors’ weak normative commitment to democratic procedures. More specifically, they argue, the avoidance of abusive legalism and the promotion of electoral fairness depend on mainstream partisans’ commitment to political pluralism, i.e., their acceptance that they are not the exclusive representatives of the people and the recognition of other parties’ legitimate claim to govern. Herman and Muirhead’s analysis combines empirical insights with contemporary theories of democratic partisanship and shows that partisans’ commitment to pluralism is not only a normative ideal but can also have real-world positive implications for democratic processes and electoral fairness, thus also opening up a new avenue for further empirical research.

Theﬁnal article of this special issue, by Emilee Booth Chapman, takes a step back and considers broader theoretical and methodological question regarding the normative study of parties and partisanship. Normative theories of parties and partisanship aimed at guiding real-world parties and partisans, Chapman argues, should take into account empirical research, especially that which focuses on the pathologies of partisanship and on its psychological, behavioural, and institutional dimensions. This, Chapman argues, can help enhance partisanship’s contribution to democracy while reducing its potential shortcomings. While acknowledging that some of the existing normative literature on parties and partisanship has drawn upon this kind of empirical research, Chapman highlights the need to address three empirical aspects of party politics that have been relatively overlooked in that literature, and which are relevant to the formu- lation of a normative ideal of partisanship in political theory: marginal partisanship, aﬀective polarisation, and identity convergence. Addressing these phenomena,

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Chapman argues, requires a rethinking of normative democratic theorising on parties and partisanship, as well as the need to pay greater attention to the interaction between diﬀerent types of partisanship. This can provide useful tools for critically asses- sing real-world party systems and partisan practices. One of the key upshots of Chap- man’s analysis is that normative work on parties and partisanship should shift its focus from normative regulative ideals to the interconnections between partisanship and other political practices as well as to the factors and processes that aﬀect partisan atti- tudes and behaviours.

Future Research Vistas

The articles in this volume show that re-examining the normative dimensions of parties and partisanship through the lens of institutional and electoral design can reveal complex intersections between the two research areas and help political theorists working on these topics to develop more refined and empirically informed normative analyses. More broadly, we hope that the special issue will also stimulate further research on political representation and democratic theory. Some of the literature in this area has dealt with issues concerning electoral design in relation to different types of representation, e.g., ‘delegate’ vs. ‘trustee’ models (e.g., see Beitz, 1989; Christiano, 1996), yet it has almost entirely neglected the normative role of parties. Conversely, a number of scholars have examined the relationship between political representation, parties, and partisanship (e.g., see Muirhead & Rosenblum,2020, pp. 97–99) but neglected electoral design, By bridging the gap and unveiling the complex connections between these distinct debates, this collection will bring a fresh perspective on them and be of interest to scholars working in different areas of democratic theory. Furthermore, the empirically informed analysis that characterises the contributions to this special issue can provide a better basis (i.e., than purely ideal accounts) for policy recommendations aimed at restoring and enhancing the role of parties in response to the alleged crisis of party democracy. In this sense, the volume will also be of interest to policymakers and other stakeholders beyond academics, by providing them with theoretical insights that could guide future party and electoral reforms.

There are numerous other questions concerning electoral design that are of interest in their own rights, and that also have either direct or indirect impact on the environment of norms and incentives within which political parties and their members operate. For example, there has been a small resurgence of interest in the question of whether voting should be mandatory (Brennan & Hill, 2014; Maskivker, 2019). This literature has thus far invoked notions of individual liberty on the one hand, and of individual responsibility on the other, to determine whether a case can be made for a legal require- ment to vote. But it has not engaged with a question of how the introduction of vast numbers of new voters that would be brought about through compulsory voting in countries in which, say, only three quarters of the eligible voting population exercise their right to vote would change the ways in which political parties carry out the functions that have traditionally been ascribed to them. Similarly, normative questions concerning the extension of the pool of eligible voters through the granting of the right to vote to younger citizens (Lau, 2012; Weinstock, 2021) or to non-resident nationals (Goodin & Tanasoca, 2014; Weinstock, 2010) have been examined in recent years

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through the lenses of fairness, epistemic capacity, and the like, but they have not been connected to questions concerning their potential impact, whether positive or negative, on the role of political parties in healthy democracies.

As a ﬁnal illustrative example, there is a growing literature on alternatives to party democracy that might according to their proponents realise some of the values that are central to the democratic ideal. Some have advocated lottocratic systems wherein representatives in at least one of the legislative chambers are selected by sortition rather than by election (or by some other means, such as selection by governing elites) (Guerrero,2014). Others have advocated direct democratic schemes that eschew some of the institutional mediations (such as political parties) that representative democracies have historically put in place (Landemore,2020). While it is important for democratic theorists to continue to imagine radically novel schemes that might be put in place in order to form the collective will in a way perhaps more adequate than what present schemes of representation allow, it is also essential that they keep in mind the unintended consequences that wholesale transformations of political systems might have. In particu- lar, it is important that they reckon with the important functions that political parties have come to play in actually existing liberal democracies, and that they provide an account of the ways in which these functions might be realised in possible democratic systems in which political parties have less of a role to play.

The recent move by many democratic theorists to consider the institutional realisation of democracy (rather than simply democracy’s governing ideals) is salutary. The recent focus on political parties is, we hope, a harbinger of things to come in democratic theory. What the examples brieﬂy adduced above make plain is that a further challenge for democratic theorists is to think about the institutions of democracy in a systemic manner. This involves keeping track of the ways in which institutional changes that might seem desirable when considered in isolation might ripple through the democratic system as a whole, impacting their overall ability to realise democratic desiderata in ways that must be attended to by theorists. The articles in this special issue constitute contributions to the development of what we hope will be a broader theoretical trend.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes on contributors

Matteo Bonottiis Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations in the School of Social Sciences at Monash University.

Professor Daniel Weinstockis the Katharine A. Pearson Chair in Civil Society and Public Policy in the Faculties of Law and of Arts at McGill University.

ORCID

Matteo Bonotti http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8241-4896

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