Tanada vs Tuvera 24 Apr 1985 – J. Escolin Facts:
Invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, Tañada, et.al. seek a writ of mandamus to compel public officials to publish presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamation, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Issue: Whether the unpublished laws have binding force and effect. Held: No.
Ruling:
The publication in the Official Gazette is required to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of regulations and make penalties binding on the person affected thereby.
The publication of all presidential issuances of a “public nature” or “of general applicability” is a mandated by law, and is a requirement of due process. Presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden on the people, such as tax and revenue measures fall within this category.
Before a person may be bound by law, he must be first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. When not published, such shall have no force and effect.
Concept:
NCC Article 2: Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.
E.O. 200 Section 2: Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the "Civil Code of the Philippines," and all other laws inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. (18 Jun 1987)
RAC Section 18 (also E.O. 200 Sec. 1): Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided. (25 Jul 1987)
Kasilag vs. Rodriguez 7 Dec 1939 – J. Imperial Facts:
1. The children, private respondents, and heirs of the former owner of the land in question, Emiliana Ambrosio, filed a case against petitioner requesting that the land of their mother be returned to them.
2. Court of first instance ruled that Exhibit 1 contract is null and void because
3. Private respondents are the children and heirs of the former owner of the land in question, Emiliana Ambrosio.
4. Court of Appeals ruled against petitioner and claims that he acted in bath faith because he knew that the contract he made with Ambrosio was an absolute deed of sale and that the Ambrosio could not sell the land because it is prohibited by Sec. 116
Issue: Should the petitioner be deemed a possessor in good faith because he was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated? (230)
Ruling:
1. When the original contract was altered by the verbal contract it instead converted the former into a contract of antichresis. 2. Antichresis is illegal under Sec 116 of Act 2874.
3. The verbal contract that allowed the petitioner to take possession of the land and its fruits are part of the antichresis thus also void.
4. ISSUE: In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the well grounded belief that he was not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. The court rules that the petitioner’s ignorance of the law is possible and excusable, thus it is said he acted in good faith.
5. Conclusion:
b. Contract of antichresis which was agreed upon verbally is not. c. petitioner acted in good faith
d. respondents have a right to the possession of the land and to enjoy the mortgaged improvements
e. respondents may redeem the mortgage of the improvements by paying petitioner Php. 1,000.00 W/O interest. f. petitioner may sell the improvements for paying himself back.
*Cardinal rule in interpreting contracts- the intention of the contracting parties should always prevail because their will has the force of law between them…” (225)
*fundamental rule in interpreting contracts- the terms, clauses, and conditions contrary to law, morals, and public order should be sperated from the valid and legal contract…” (226)
Concept:
Bad Faith- “Every person who is unaware of any flaw in his title, or in the manner of its acquisition, by which it is invalidated, shall be deemed a possessor in good faith.”
Good Faith- “…consists in his belief that the person from whom he received the things was the owner of the same and could transmit the title thereto.” (230)
A. Exhibit 1 Contract- mortgaged land in favor of petitioner for Php. 1,000.00 with interest at 12% per year. Should Ambrosio fail to pay within 4 and a half years, she must sell her land for the price of the said loan and the said intrest.
B. Verbal Contract- Emiliana and petitioner modified exhibit 1 when she was unable to pay the interests and the tax on the land and its improvements, thus she gave petitioner control of the land, gathered all the products in the land and in exchange, did not collect the interest on the loan.
Frivaldo vs Comelec 28 Jun 1996 – J. Panganiban Facts:
Juan Frivaldo – obtained the highest number of votes in three successive elections but was twice declared to be disqualified due to his alien citizenship
Raul Lee – second placer in the canvass, incumbent governor 20 Mar 1995 – Frivaldo files CoC for Governor of Sorsogon
23 Mar 1995 – Lee files petition to disqualify on citizenship grounds 1 May 1995 – Comelec 2nd Division grants petition; disqualifies Frivaldo
8 May 1995 – election day and Frivaldo wins; motion for reconsideration still unacted upon - Frivaldo: 73,440 vs Lee: 53,304
11 May 1995 –Comelec en banc affirms Frivaldo disqualification 9 Jun 1995 – Lee files petition for his proclamation with the Comelec
21 Jun 1995 – Comelec en banc orders proclamation of Lee as winning governor - 30 Jun 1995, 8:30 PM – Lee proclaimed
- 30 Jun 1995, 2 PM – Frivaldo takes oath of allegiance as citizen of the Philippines after his petition for repatriation was approved
19 Dec 1995 – Comelec 1st Division rules that Lee proclamation was illegal because Frivaldo has reacquired his citizenship 23 Feb 1996 – Comelec en banc upholds 1st Division ruling; denies Lee’s motion for reconsideration
26 Feb 1996 – Lee files petition with SC 27 Feb 1996 – SC issues TRO
Issue: Who should be the rightful governor of Sorsogon? Held: Frivaldo.
Ruling:
1. Frivaldo’s repatriation was valid and legal.
a. Lee’s argument that P.D. 725 had been effectively repealed
- Memo of Cory dated 27 Mar 1987 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of PD 725. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and a repeal may be express or implied.
- No express repeal was made. It did not categorically or impliedly state that PD 725 was being repealed. Repeals by implication are not favoured.
- Cory did not repeal PD 725 but left it to Congress to deal with the matter.
b. Lee argues that serious congenital irregularities flawed the repatriation proceedings when Frivaldo’s application was approved in just one day
- Frivaldo filed on 17 Aug 1994 as confirmed by SolGen. Special Committee only reactivated on 8 Jun 1995. Frivaldo re-submitted the required form on 29 Jun 1995. It cannot be said that there was indecent haste in the processing.
- Many others were processed, not only Lee. The mere fact that the proceedings were speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude that such proceedings were necessarily tainted.
- Any contest on the legality of Frivaldo’s repatriation should have been pursued before the Committee itself or in the OP if it fails, pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion.
c. Lee contends that citizenship must exist on the day of his election
Sec 39 of Local Government Code: an elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter in the province where he intends to be elected…
- The law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship unlike that for residence and age.
- An official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Frivaldo was therefor qualified when he re-assumed citizenship on 30 Jun 1995.
- This is the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life, and meaning to the law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which it was enacted. Sec 39 speaks of qualifications of elective officials, not of candidates.
- Vasquez vs Giap: the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and country do not end up being governed by aliens, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term.
- The law intended the citizenship qualification to be a qualification distinct from being a voter. LGC requires an elective official to be a registered voter. Registration is the core of this qualification. It is clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province. d. Repatriation of Frivaldo retroacted to the date of filing his application on 17 Aug 1994
- PD 725 is a curative statute – it undertakes to cure errors and irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce their intended consequences by reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply with some technical requirement.
- It was the legislative intent to give the statue retroactive application (allowing Filipino woman to who marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship).
- Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality should now be mooted by his repatriation.
intended right and justice to prevail. Frivaldo consistently took oath of allegiance when he ran in 1988, 1992, and 1995. 2. Decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person’s future status with finality. Lack of citizenship is not a continuing disqualification.
3. Comelec has jurisdiction. The Constitution has given the Comelec ample power to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective provincial officials. Power to annul a proclamation must be done within 10 days following proclamation. Frivaldo filed in 6.
4. Lee proclamation is not valid.
- Labo vs Comelec: the fact remains that Lee was not the choice of the sovereign will - Aquino vs Comelec: Lee is a second placer, just that, a second placer.
- No sufficient evidence presented to show that the electorate of Sorsogon was fully aware in fact of Frivaldo’s alleged disqualification such that the voters intentionally wasted their ballots in knowing that he was ineligible.
- Frivaldo has seasonably re-acquired his citizenship and inasmuch as he obtained the highest number of votes in the elections, he should be proclaimed.
5. Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code is merely directory as Sec 6 of RA 6646 authorizes the Comelec to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections.
- Sec 78: Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy shall be decided not later that fifteen days before the election.
- Sec 6, RA 6646: If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for, the Comelec shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action and upon motion during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation.
This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our country to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our people, for in case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot.
Frivaldo, at 81 years old, showed loyalty to and love of country as well as nobility of purpose. He sought American citizenship only to escape the clutches of the dictatorship. At first opportunity, he returned to this land, and sought to serve his people once more. He demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to reacquire his nationality of birth despite several legal setbacks. He therefore deserves every liberal interpretation of the law which can be applied in his favour.
Concept:
NCC Article 4: Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
Curative statutes – those which undertake to cure errors and irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce their intended consequences by reason of some statutory disability or the failure to comply with some technical requirement. They operate on conditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive in operation. (Tolentino)
Peftok Integrated Services Inc. vs. NLRC July 31, 1998 – J. Purisima
Facts:
1. This case is about the claims of the security guards which they waived thru an execution of waiver or quitclaims, but subsequently being claimed by the guards.
2. Pertinent sheriff’s return shows that the aforesaid decision was partly executed up to fifty percent (50%), Timber Industries of the Philippines (TIPI) having paid half of their solidary obligation to the security guards-employees, who quitclaimed and waived fifty percent (50%) of the benefits adjudged in their favor.
3. October 13, 1989,Eduardo Abugho, Claro Mendez and Leonardo Daluperi executed a waiver of all their claims against PEFTOK for the period ending on June 30, 1989.
4. May 29, 1992, Eduardo Abugho, Fidel Sabellina, Leonardo Daluperi, Claro Mendez and Reynaldo Maasin executed another waiver and quitclaim purportedly renouncing whatever claims they may have against PEFTOK for the period ending March 15, 1998
5. Eduardo Abugho, Fidel Sabellina, Leonardo Daluperi, Reynaldo Maasin and Claro Mendez subsequently executed affidavits stating
a. that the quitclaims were prepared and readied for their signature by PEFTOK and
b. they were forced to sign the same for fear that they would not be given their salary on pay day, and worse, t c. Fear that their services would be terminated if they did not sign the said quitclaims under controversy. d. Waivers of claims signed by them are contrary to public policy;
e. the same being written in the English language which they do not understand and f. the contents thereof were not explained to them.
6. Petitioner PEFTOK theorizes that the quitclaims executed by the security guards suffer no legal infirmity. Like any other right, the claims in dispute can be waived and waiver thereof is not prohibited by law.
Issue: Are the rights or claims of the guards have been waived because of the execution of quitclaims? Held: No
Ruling:
1. It is clear that guards affixed their signatures to subject waivers and/or quitclaims for fear that they would not be paid their salaries on pay day or worse, still, their services would be terminated if they did not sign those papers.
2. In short, there was no voluntariness in the execution of the quitclaim or waivers in question.
3. It should be borne in mind that in this jurisdiction, quitclaims, waivers or releases are looked upon with disfavor. 4. “They are commonly frowned upon as contrary to public policy and ineffective to bar claims for the full measure of the
workers’ legal rights.” Concept:
NCC Article 6: Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law
LLedo vs. Lledo 9 Feb 2010 – J. Nachura Facts:
1. Petitioner filed an admin case against respondent for abandonment and immorality, when she found out that he was living with another woman and had children with her.
2. Respondent was dismissed from service.
3. Son of petitioner then asked if the court could give a refund of what respondent gave GSIS, so as to help them financially. 4. GSIS denied this claiming that it would create a “negative impact on the financial viability of the GSIS” and that it would be in conflict with CA 186, Section 9.
Issue: May a dismissed govt. employee be allowed to recover the contributions he paid to the GSIS? Laws:
1. CA 186 (Sec 9) effect of dismissal from service- “benefits under his membership policy shall be automatically forfeited to the system except one-half of the cash or surrender value which would be paid to the member or the beneficiary if he is dead.” 2. RA 660 heavily amended CA 186
3. PD 1146 (Sec4) effect of separation from the service- “A member shall continue to be a member… unless the terms of his separation provide otherwise… and shall be entitled to whatever benefits earned…”
Ruling:
1. None of the laws repealed section 9 of CA 186.
2. In Pari Materia, statcon principle, states that all like laws should be read in harmony. None of the laws in question directly repeals section 9 of CA 186.
3. PD 1146 even goes so far to mention in its section 13 that: “employees… have the option to retire under this act or under CA 186…”
4. None of the other statutes also carry a specific provision that covers “effect of dismissal from service.” De Castro vs JBC
20 Apr 2010 – J. Bersamin Facts:
This is a Resolution denying the motions for reconsideration on the Court’s earlier Decision allowing PGMA to appoint the next Chief Justice within the prohibition on midnight appointments.
The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno falls on 17 May 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. On 18 Jan 2010, the JBC unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on 17 May 2010. Qualifying for appointment were Justices Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, and Sandoval. Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of nominees. Issue: Can PGMA appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement?
Held: Yes. Ruling:
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them.
Stare decisis does not hold in this case. The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a particular decision that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a rectification. A judicial pronouncement in an earlier decision may be followed as a precedent in a
subsequent case only when its reasoning and justification are relevant, and the court in the latter case accepts such reasoning and justification to be applicable to the case. The application of the precedent is for the sake of convenience and stability. The
Constitution itself recognizes the innate authority of the Court en banc to modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down in any decision rendered en banc or in division.
The Constitutional Commission did not clearly extend the prohibition on presidential appointments to the Judiciary. Concept:
NCC Article 8: Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
S. D. MARTINEZ and his wife, CARMEN ONG DE MARTINEZ, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. WILLIAM VAN BUSKIRK, defendant-appellant. J. Moreland – December 27, 1910
Facts:
1. September 11, 1908, the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding in a carromata (Kalesa) on Calle Real, district of Ermita, city of Manila when a delivery wagon to which attached was a pair of horse coming at great speed.
2. The wagon hit the carromata and overturned it causing severe wounding to the plaintiff by making a serious cut upon her head, and also injuring the carromata itself and the harness upon the horse which was drawing it.
3. Defendant presented that
a. cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the time the accident occurred, was a good servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero
b. delivery wagon had sent to deliver some forage at Paco Livery Stable
c. the cochero tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon and then went back inside of the wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered
d. while unloading the forage, another vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a whip and made some other noises, which frightened the horses attached to the delivery wagon and they ran away
e. horses then ran up and on which street they came into collision with the carromata Issue: Was the cochero negligent?
Held: No Ruling:
1. Undisputed evidence that the horses which caused the damage were gentle and tractable; 2. the cochero was experienced and capable; that
3. he had driven one of the horses several years and the other five or six months;
4. that he had been in the habit, during all that time, of leaving them in the condition in which they were left on the day of the accident;
5. that they had never run away up to that time and there had been, therefore, no accident due to such practice;
6. that to leave the horses and assist in unloading the merchandise in the manner described on the day of the accident was the custom of all cochero who delivered merchandise of the character of that which was being delivered by the cochero of the defendant on the day in question, which custom was sanctioned by their employers.
7. In our judgment, the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the manner described by the evidence
8. The act of defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the manner proved was not unreasonable or imprudent. Acts the performance of which has not proved destructive or injurious and which have, therefore, been acquiesced in by society for so long a time that they have ripened into custom, cannot be held to be themselves unreasonable or imprudent. Indeed the very reason why they have been permitted by society is that they beneficial rather than prejudicial.
9. It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the universal practice of merchants to deliver merchandise of the kind of that being delivered at the time of the injury, in the manner in which that was then being delivered; and that it is the universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left at the time of the accident. This is the custom in all cities.
Concept:
1987 Constitution, Section 5: The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and
programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain.
COURT RULES: RULE 129 What Need Not Be Proved
Sec. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable to unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. (1a)
Sec. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. — During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
1. Basically, since the act of the cochero was a custom and a public knowledge during those times, therefore it cannot be said that he was negligent in doing his work.
Go It Bun vs. Dizon 18 Sep 1992 – J. Nocon Facts:
1. Petitioner insured their buildings furniture. A fire transpired and the insurance companies don’t want to pay them for the damages.
3. Petitioner’s first counsel did not inform them that the respondent companies opted to dismiss the case, thus the time for filing an appeal had already lapsed.
4. Petitioners claim that:
a. Respondent judge acted oppressively and arbitrarily in dismissing the appeal to the decision because of their lawyer. b. Their appeal has been perfect when they filed their notice of appeal (Sec 23)
5. Respondent insurance companies found out that petitioner had mortgaged his property in favor of Tan Hua.
6. Petitioner claims that the redemption period must be counted from Feb 24, 1982 when the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property was registered.
Issue: Is the petitioner excused from filing late because their attorney did not inform them of the motion to dismiss? Laws:
1. Sec. 23 – “In cases where appeal is taken, the perfection of the appeal shall be upon expiration of the last day to appeal by any party.”
Ruling:
1. SC rules in favor of the Petitioner as regards to the first point that they should have been granted the original appeal because it was their lawyer who was negligent.
2. Respondent insurance companies filed a motion to dismiss which exceeded the time specified by law, thus the judge should have denied it.
3. Petitioners claim on the redemption period is erroneous. He forfeited all his rights to redeem the said insurance because Tan Hua became the successor of interest and that his date to redeem the property pursuant to Sec 30, rule 39 of the rules of court was March 18. But the fire transpired on March 19.
4. Petitioners should have been forewarned when Choi Ping Tai received a letter from their attorney stating that all was not well. 5. Petitioners should have taken steps to settle whatever misunderstanding they had with their lawyer or hire another lawyer to handle their appeal.
Barreto vs Gonzalez 7 Mar 1933 – J. Hull Facts:
Manuela Barretto and Augusto Gonzalez are both citizens of the Philippines who were married in the City of Manila on 19 Jan 1919. They lived together until the Spring of 1926 and had 4 children. Upon separation, the parties agreed upon a 500-peso monthly support.
After the agreement, Gonzalez went to Reno, Nevada and obtained an absolute divorce on the grounds of desertion on 28 Nov 1927. On the same day, he married another Filipino citizen and had 3 children. Before he left, he reduced the amount of support he had agreed to pay monthly.
In August 1928, he returned to the Philippines. Shortly, Barretto instituted a case requesting that the Philippine courts confirm the divorce issued by the Nevada court. She also prays that the Court order Gonzalez to pay the monthly support. The CFI of Manila decided in favor of Barretto. Gonzalez appealed.
Issue: Can the Reno divorce be applied in Philippine law? Held: No. The judgment is reversed.
Ruling:
The Philippine policy on divorce is clearly set forth in Act No. 2710. The conduct of the parties praying that the Reno divorce be ratified clearly indicates a purpose to circumvent the laws of the Philippines. At all times, the matrimonial domicile of the couple has been the Philippines and the residence obtained by Gonzalez in Nevada for the purpose of securing a divorce was not a bona fide residence and did not confer jurisdiction to the Nevada courts.
Article 9 of the Civil Code: the laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition, and legal capacity of persons, are binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a foreign country.
good morals, shall not be rendered without effect by any foreign laws or judgments or by anything done or any agreements entered into a foreign country.
Under these circumstances, it is doubtful that any foreign divorce will be recognized. The hardships of the existing divorce laws are well known to the Legislature but it is the duty of the Court to enforce the law. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict or liberal.
Concept:
NCC Article 15: Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
FC Section 26 par 2: Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)
GERMANN & CO., plaintiff-appellees, vs. DONALDSON, SIM & CO., defendants-appellants. J Ladd – November 11, 1901
Facts:
1. This is an action to recover a sum claimed to be due for freight under a charter party
2. The defendants claimed that the original power (obiter: I think this is referring to a general power of attorney) is invalid under article 1280 No. 5 of the Civil code which provides that powers for suits must be contained in a public instrument. No claim is made that the document was not executed with the formalities required by the German law in the case of such an instrument. 3. General power for suits, executed in Manila October 27, 1900, by Fernando Kammerzell, and purporting to be a substitution in
favor of several attorneys of powers conferred upon Kammerzell in an instrument executed in Berlin, Germany, February 5, 1900, by Max Leonard Tornow, the sole owner of the business carried on in Berlin and Manila under the name of Gemann & Co.
4. The first-named instrument was authenticated by a notary with the formalities required by the domestic laws. The other was not so authenticated.
5. Both Tornow and Kammerzell are citizens of Germany. Tornow is a resident of Berlin and Kammerzell of Manila. Issue: Is the general power valid?
Held: Yes Ruling:
1. We see no reason why the general principle that the formal validity of contracts is to be tested by the laws of the country where they are executed should not apply. (Civil Code, art. 11.)
2. We are clearly of opinion that the instrument contains an explicit grant of a power broad enough to authorize the bringing of the present action, even assuming the applicability of the domestic law as claimed by the defendants.
3. By this instrument Tornow constitutes Kammerzell his “true and lawful attorney with full power to enter the firm name of Germann & Co. in the Commercial Registry of the city of Manila as a branch of the house of Germann & Co. in Berlin, it being the purpose of this power to invest said attorney will full legal powers and authorization to direct and administer in the city of Manila.
4. It appears to be expressly and specially authorized by the clause conferring the power to “exact the payment” of sums of money “by legal means.” This must mean the power to exact the payment of debts due the concern by means of the institution of suits for their recovery.
Tomawis vs. Balindong 5 Mar 2010 – J. Velasco Jr. Facts:
1. Private respondents filed with the SDC (Shari’a District Court)a case claiming that they were the owners of the lot in question because they are the heirs of Acraman Radia.
2. They claim that petitioner took the land on the claim that he bought the land from Mangoda Radia.
3. Respondent judge ruled against petitioner, thus petitioner claimed that SDC lacked jurisdiction to try the case. 4. Case was moved to the SC because the “Shari’a Appelate Court has not yet been established.”
5. Petitioner claims that Art. 143 of PD 1083 was repealed by BP 129. Issue: Does the SDC have jurisdiction over this case?
Held: Yes. Laws:
1. Art 143 of PD 1083- SDC shall have jurisdiction over all actions arising from customary contracts in which the parties are Muslims. 2. BP 129- vests the RTC the exclusive jurisdiction in all civil action that involve the title or possession of real property…
Ruling:
1. Pari Materia- general and special laws related on the same topic should be harmonized and read together.
2. PD 1083 is a special law that grants specific jurisdiction to the SDC, while BP 129 is a general law that grants jurisdiction to the RTC.
3. Rule of Statcon is that a general law does not repeal a special law unless they in a state of conflict that is not reconcilable. ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.
20 Jul 1961 – J. J.B.L. Reyes Facts:
1. Litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo, the of Nita Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician.
2. The trial court rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo and against defendant Geluz, ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages
3. Nita Villanueva came to know the Antonio Geluz, defendant, for the first time in 1948 4. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally married. 5. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent she had herself aborted by the defendant. 6. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant.
7. As she was then employed in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the defendant in October 1953.
8. On February 21, 1955, for the THIRD TIME, Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus
9. Nta’s husband, campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion.
10. It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of damages against Geluz Note: Nita went into 3 abortion procedures
Issue:
1. Whether or not an action for damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child. 2. Whether or not the unborn child acquires civil personality.
Held: No. Ruling:
1. we believe to be error, for the said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality
2. no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs.
3. even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act).
4. American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held that recovery cannot had for the death of an unborn child
5. This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity.
6. Therefore, the parents can still ask for damages. limited to moral damages on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations
7. But in this case no moral damages was awarded because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections.
Concept:
2. Parents of unborn fetus cannot sue for damages on its behalf Quimiging vs Icao
31 Jul 1970 – J. J.B.L. Reyes Facts:
a. Felix Icao, a married man, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with Carmen Quimiging several times by force and intimidation. As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite efforts to abort and had to stop studying.
b. Carmen Quimiging filed a petition claiming support at 120 pesos per month.
c. Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that the child had been born. Court dismissed the complaint.
d. Carmen moved to amend complaint to allege that she had given birth to a baby girl but the Court disallowed by saying that no amendment was allowable. Thus the appeal.
Issue: Does Carmen have a valid cause of action for damages against Icao? Held: Yes. Dismissal of the case for failure to state a cause of action was in error. Ruling:
1. A conceived child, although yet as unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it. It may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the Civil Code.
Art 742: Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be accepted by those persons who would legally represent them if they were already born.
2. The lower court’s theory that support does not contemplate to children as yet unborn violates Article 40 of the Civil Code. Art 40: the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it provided that it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article (i.e. that the fetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother’s womb).
3. A married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused.
Concept:
NCC Art. 40: Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article.
NCC Art. 41: For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.
De Jesus vs. Syquia 28 Nov 1933 – J. Street Facts:
1. Petitioner had a relationship with a wealthy man (Respondent) who got her pregnant.
2. The respondent went on a trip to China and Japan and while there sent letters to her showing paternal interests with the use of the words “junior” and “padre”
3. After respondent came home, he lived with them in a house for a year but left and began living with another woman when petitioner started showing signs of a second pregnancy.
4. She is now filing for damages for the breach of his promise to marry her and to compel him to recognize Ismael and Pacita as Natural children begotten by him and to have him pay a regular 500 pesos per month for maintenance.
Issue: Can the letters written by the father before the child’s birth be the basis for the compulsory acknowledgment of the child by the defendant after its birth? Held: Yes (NOTE: Actions for compulsory recognition have been abolished under the New Family Code) Ruling:
1. Court rules that the word “padre” is sufficient to prove an acknowledgment of paternity.
2. It is a universal rule of jurispriduence that a child, upon being conceived becomes a bearer of legal rights and capable of being death with as a living person. The fact that it is as yet unborn is no impediment to the acquisition of rights.
3. It is undeniable that the defendant had acknowledged this child in the writings and because he supplied a home for it and the mother in which they lived together in.
4. The law does not fix a period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural child and the period in this case was long enough to evince the father’s resolution to concede to his status of being a father.
CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner, - versus - HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAÑO
13 Oct 2009 – J. Chico Nazario Facts:
1. Hortillano, an employee of Continental Steel filed on 9 January 2006, a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the Union
2. The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child. Hortillano’s wife, Marife V. Hortillano, had a premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy.
3. According to the Certificate of Fetal Death dated 7 January 2006, the female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency
4. Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance
Respondent Union
1. Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to the CBA. 2. CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical
personality
3. Union cited cases wherein employees of MKK Steel Corporation (MKK Steel) and Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation (Mayer Steel), sister companies of Continental Steel, in similar situations as Hortillano were able to receive death benefits under similar provisions of their CBAs.
4. Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that all doubts in labor legislations and labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety of and decent living for the laborer.
Petitioner Continental Steel
1. CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality.
2. It claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillano’s case.
3. Relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42[16] of the Civil Code, contended that only one with civil personality could die. 4. The unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought,
Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at all. 5. Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and unambiguous
6. Similar cases involving the employees of its sister companies were irrelevant and incompetent evidence Procedural Facts
1. Atty. Montaño, the appointed Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a Resolution ruling that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave with pay and death benefits.
2. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed Atty. Montaño’s Resolution Issue: Whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to CBA Held: Yes.
Ruling:
I. Civil Personality – not relevant
1. The issue of civil personality is not relevant herein.
2. Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die.
3. Life is not synonymous with civil personality.
4. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die.
5. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception
II. Meaning of dependent
1. The unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental Steel itself defines, a dependent is “one who relies on another for support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid of someone else.” Under said general definition, even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents.
acquired civil personality. Without such qualification, then child shall be understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb.
III. Meaning of legitimate
1. Legitimate merely addresses the dependent child’s status in relation to his/her parents 2. A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage
3. All children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status. 4. according to the Family Code and the afore-cited jurisprudence, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child attaches upon
his/her conception
IV. Interpretation of Labor Code
1. We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one.
2. It cannot be said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently.
3. Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and other death benefits should be interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof.
4. Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor
Concept:
1. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die Ang Ladlad vs COMELEC
8 Apr 2010 – J. del Castillo Facts:
1. On 17 Aug 2009, Ang Ladlad, an organization of LGBTs, applied for registration with the Comelec to participate in the 2010 party-list elections.
2. After admitting the evidence, the Comelec 2nd Division dismissed the Petition on 11 Nov 2009. It was dismissed on moral grounds citing the Bible and the Koran. It was further stated that “older practicing homosexuals are a threat to the youth” and that the State must protect the youth from moral and spiritual degradation.
3. The Comelec en banc upheld the decision by a vote of 4-3 with Chairman Melo as the deciding vote. 4. On 4 Jan 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this petition in the SC.
Issue: Can Ang Ladlad be accredited as a party-list organization for the 2010 elections? Held: Yes. It met the requirements under the party-list law.
Ruling:
1. Comelec erred in ruling that the enumeration of sectors mentioned in Ang Bagong Bayani was exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
2. It was a grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the Comelec to utilize the Bible and Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects.
3. The Philippines has not seen it fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Therefore, the “generally accepted public morals” have not been convincingly transplanted into the realm of law.
4. Comelec has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth. It did not justify its position that the petitioner’s admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
5. Moral disapproval is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. It amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.
6. Homosexuals are not a separate class meriting special or differentiated treatment. No violation of equal protection clause. 7. We recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation (Article 26 of ICCPR). It
requires that the laws of general application relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation.
Concept:
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Limjoco vs. Intestate of Fragante 27 Apr 1948 – J. Hilado
Facts:
1. Pedro Fragrante is a Filipino who applied with the Public Service Commission to install an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. 2. Pedro died but his intestate estate is financially capable of managing the proposed service.
3. CA 146 sec. 15 allows this to happen by authorizing the Judicial Administrator of his estate to maintain and operate the ice plant. 4. Petitioner argues that the Public Service Commission was incorrect in granting the rights to such ice plant to the legal rep of the estate and not to him, thus this SC case.
Issue: Is the estate of Pedro Fragante a juridicial person? Held: Yes.
Ruling:
1. Pedro’s application did not lapse because of his death, thus it makes up part of the assets of his estate. Since the certificate equates to property, it would thus belong to the decedent in his lifetime and survived to his estate and judicial admin after his death.
2. Court of Indiana: The estate of a decent is a person in legal contemplation. The word ‘person’… is a generic term, and includes artificial as well as natural persons (like corporations)
3. There would be a grave injustice for failure to recognize the said estate as person for the quashing of the proceedings for no other reason than his death would entail prejudicial results to his investment
4. In the matter of estates of deceased persons, it has been the constant doctrine that it is the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets left by the decedent, instead of the heirs directly, that becomes vested and charged with his rights and obligations which survive after his demise (estate has legal personality independent of the heirs)
5. Under the present legal system, such rights and obligations as survive after death have to be exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased.
6. If Pedro Frangate had lived he would still have obtained the said certificate. (I think that is one of the injustices they wished to avoid)
Concepts:
A. The estate obtains a personality of its own which can also be sued (I imagine). The Judicial Administrator will thus take charge in representing the estate, as seen in the current case.
DIONISIO DUMLAO, in his own behalf and in his capacity as Administrator of the Testate Estate of the late Pedro Oria, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. QUALITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, INC., defendant-appellee.
30 Apr 1976 – J. Aquino Facts:
1. On February 28, 1962 the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in Civil Case No.T-662 rendered a judgment ordering defendants Vicente Soliven, Pedro Oria, Santiago Laurencio, Marcelino Sumalbag and Juana Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastic Products, Inc. the sum of P3,667.03 plus the legal rate of interest from November, 1958.
2. In case the defendants failed to pay the said amount before its decision became final, then Quality Plastic Products, Inc. "is hereby authorized to foreclose the bond
3. Defendants' failed to pay the amount of the judgment and after the decision had become final, the lower court, on motion of Quality Plastic Products, Inc., ordered the "foreclosure" of the surety bond and the sale at public auction of the land of Pedro Oria
4. PROBLEM: It turned out that Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960 when the action was filed. Oria's death was not known to Quality Plastic Products, Inc. Nor were the representatives of Quality Plastic Products, Inc. aware that in the same Tayug court Special Proceeding No. T-212, Testate Estate of the deceased Pedro Oria, was pending.
5. On March 1, 1963 Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs in Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc., also in the Tayug court for the annulment of the judgment against Oria and the execution against his land.
6. The ground for annulment was lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased Oria
Issue: Is the judgment of the lower court's judgment against the deceased Pedro Oria who, being already in the other world, was valid?
Ruling
1. Since no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, the judgment against him is a patent nullity
2. As far as Oria was concerned, the lower court's judgment against him in Civil Case No. T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person.
3. He was not, and he could not have been, validly served with summons. He had no more civil personality. His juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost through death.
4. Lower court was wrong n ruling that since Soliven's counsel also appeared as counsel for Oria, there was a voluntary appearance which enabled the court to acquire jurisdiction over Oria.
5. The execution sale of Oria's land covered by OCT No. 28732 is also void Concept:
1. Service of summons on dead persons is void
2. Voluntary appearance of person who was already dead when summoned cannot be implied appearance 3. Counsel cannot appear for a dead man
Eugenio vs Velez 17 May 1990 – J. Padilla Facts:
1. Vitaliana Vargas died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in the residence of Tomas Eugenio on 28 Aug 1988. 2. Unaware of her death, her brothers and sisters filed on 27 Sep 1988 a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis
Oriental.
3. The court granted petition on 28 Sep 1988 but was returned unsatisfied by Eugenio’s refusal to surrender the body arguing that a corpse cannot be a subject of habeas corpus proceedings. As common law husband, Eugenio claimed legal custody.
4. Court issued two orders dated 29 and 30 Sep 1988 directing the delivery of the body to a funeral parlor and its autopsy. 5. Eugenio filed motion to dismiss due to lack of jurisdiction. Before resolving the motion, the court allowed the Vargases to
amend their petition claiming legal custody of the body instead.
6. On 17 Nov 1988, the court denied the motion to dismiss and proceeded as in ordinary civil cases. It rendered a decision on 17 Jan 1989 stating that it has jurisdiction on the case and that the Vargases had the rightful custody over the dead body. 7. Eugenio filed a new petition for review with the SC on 23 Jan 1989. It was consolidated with his earlier petition. Issue: Who has custody over the corpse of Vitaliana?
Held: The Vargases. Ruling:
1. After the fact of Vitaliana’s death was made known to the petitioners on the habeas corpus proceedings, amendment of the petition for habeas corpus was proper to avoid multiplicity of suits.
2. The writ of habeas corpus as a remedy became moot and academic due to the death of the subject allegedly restrained of liberty, but the issue of custody remained.
3. Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and a woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not here.
4. Tomas Eugenio has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from even marrying Vitaliana. The provisions of the Civil Code, when referring to a spouse, contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. He was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.
5. Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters under Sec. 1103 of the RAC. RAC Sec 1103: Persons charged with duty of burial. The immediate duty of burying the body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall devolve upon the persons hereinbelow specified:
(b). If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child, and left any kin, the duty of burial shall devolve upon the nearest of kin of the deceased, it hey be adults and within the Philippines and in possession of sufficient means to defray the necessary expenses.
Concept:
NCC Art. 42: Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will.
Marcos vs. Manglapus 27 Oct 1989 – En Banc Facts:
1. In a prior case that was denied by the President and was not overruled by the SC, which involved barring the return of the petitioners (former President Marcos and his family). It was ruled in that case that it would be against national security to allow them to return. The President has the right to deny the rights of individuals if it would be for the betterment of the general welfare of the country she serves.
2. Petitioners are now requesting that they be allowed to return home in order to bury Former President Marcos. 3. The President claims that their return would still pose a threat to national interest and welfare.
4. Petitioners claim that the President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country.
Issue: Should the Petitioner be allowed to bring back the body of former President Marcos back to the Philippines? Held: No
Ruling:
1. The petitioners have failed to show compelling reasons to change the decision of the court.
2.The threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been show to have ceased.
Dissenting: 1. Paras:
A. Although already dead, he is still entitled to certain rights. “It is not corret to say that a dead man, since he is no longer a human being, has ceased to have rights. For instance, our RPC prohibits the commission of libel against a deceased individual…” (766) 2 Padilla:
A. It is the right of every Filipino to be buried in his country because it is a CONTINUING RIGHT that starts from birth and ends only on the day he is finally laid to rest in his country.
Concepts:
A. “a corpse can no longer be considered as a person. It cannot be the subject of rights; because juridical capacity is extinguished by death… The corpse becomes thing in the juridical sense…”
RAMON JOAQUIN, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO C. NAVARRO, respondent. 29 May 1953 – J. Tuazon
Facts:
Feb. 6, 1945: battle of liberation of Manila, Joaquin Navarro, Sr., 70, wife Angela Joaquin, 67, daughters Pilar (32-33), Concepcion, and Natividad (23-25), son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., 30 and his wife Adela Conde sought refuge on the ground floor of German Club Building
Building was set on fire and Japanese started shooting hitting the three daughters who fell.
Navarro Sr. decided to leave building. His wife, Angela Joaquin didn’t want to leave so he left with his son, his son’s wife and neighbor Francisco Lopez
As they came out, Navarro Jr. was hit and fell on the ground the rest lay flat on the ground to avoid bullets German Club collapsed trapping may people presumably including Angela Joaquin.
Navarro Sr., Adela and Francisco sought refuge in an air raid shelter where they hid for three days.
Feb. 10, 1945: on their way to St. Theresa Academy, they met Japanese patrols, Sr. and Adela were hit and killed. Only Francisco Lopez survived and served as the witness in this proceedings
Why need to know the order of death?
The importance of the question whether Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before Joaquin Navarro, Jr., or vice versa, lies in the fact that it radically affects the rights of succession of Ramon Joaquin, the present petitioner who was an acknowledged natural child of Angela Joaquin and adopted child of the deceased spouses, and Antonio C. Navarro, respondent, son of Joaquin Navarro, Sr. by first marriage.
Issue: Who died first Angela Joaquin de Navarro, the mother, or Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the son? Held: Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died before his mother
Ruling:
It is believed that in the light of the conditions painted by Lopez, a fair and reasonable inference can be arrived at, namely: that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died before his mother.
No evidence is available on the point. All we can decide is that no one saw her alive after her son left her aside, and that there is no proof when she died.
This circumstance alone cannot support a finding that she died latter than her son, and we are thus compelled to fall back upon the
statutory presumption. Indeed, it could be said that the purpose of the presumption of survivorship would be precisely to afford a
solution to uncertainties like these. Hence the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr. aged 30, must be deemed to have survived his mother, Angela Joaquin, who was admittedly above 60 years of age (Rule 123, sec. 69, subsec. (ii), Rules of Court).
see revised rules on evidence rule 131 Sec 3 jj-kk
Rule 123, Section 69, Revised Rules of Court: When two persons perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle or conflagration, and it is not (a) shown who died first and there are no (b) particular circumstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is presumed from the probabilities resulting from the strength and age of the sexes.
Art. 33, Civil Code 1889: Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die of the two or more persons who would inherit one from the other, the person who alleges prior death of either must prove the allegation; in the absence of proof the presumption shall be that they died at the same time and no transmission of rights from one to the other shall take place. (NCC Article 43, present)
Both rule 123 and Art 33 CC (see new Rule 131 and NCC 43) will be substitute if there are no facts. Most provisions, as their language plainly implies, are intended as a substitute for lacks and so are not to be available when there are facts. With particular reference to section 69 (ii) of Rule 123, "the situation which it present is one in which the facts are not only unknown but
unknowable.
But since there are facts in this case, they won’t be applicable. Where there are facts known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, presumption does not step in. Facts are credible because witness was found disinterested, trustworthy and entitled to credence by courts.
Fair and reasonable inference would suggest that Jr. died before his mother based on Lopez’ testimony and deduced from established facts and has strong probability. Opposite theory would be based on surmises, speculations and conjectures. The clubhouse where Mrs. Angela Joaquin was staying was relatively safer at the moment compared to her husband, son, and daughter-in-law who left her.
Mr. Lopez' statement that the collapse of the clubhouse occurred about 40 minutes after Joaquin Navarro the son was shot in the head and dropped dead. She could have perished within those five or fewer seconds, as stated, but the probabilities that she did seem very remote. True, people in the building were also killed but these, according to Lopez, were mostly refugees who had tried to slip away from it and were shot by Japanese troops. It was not very likely that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Sr. made an attempt to escape.
Barlin vs Ramirez 24 Nov 1906 – J. Willard Facts:
1. The church and convent at Lagonoy were burned on 13 Jan 1869. Upon the instructions of the provincial governor, they were rebuilt by the labor of the people because of polo y servicios and the materials were paid for by the parish priest from the church funds.
2. Fr. Vicente Ramirez was appointed parish priest and took possession of the church on 5 July 1901.
3. On 9 Nov 1902, the people of Lagonoy and Fr. Ramirez decided to separate from the Roman Catholic Church and join the Filipino National Church. They did so because the Pope continues to ignore the rights of the Filipino clergy.
4. On 14 Nov 1902, Fr. Agripino Pisino, his successor, was appointed and demanded the delivery of the church and other church possessions. Fr. Ramirez refused and cited the decision on 9 Nov 1902.
5. In Jan 1904, Rev. Jorge Barlin instituted this petition against Fr. Ramirez to recover the property of the Roman Catholic Church. On 1 Nov 1904, the municipality of Lagonoy intervened in the case, supported Fr. Ramirez, and claimed ownership of the said properties.
Issue: Who owns the church?
Held: The Roman Catholic Church had by law the exclusive right to the possession of the church and it had the legal right to administer the same for the purposes for which the building was consecrated.
Ruling:
1. Fr. Ramirez took possession of the property only as servant of the Roman Catholic Church. The only right that he has to it was the one given to him by Rev. Barlin. Thus, he will not be allowed to say that the Roman Catholic Church is not the owner of the property when possession is demanded of him.
2. The municipality of Lagonoy never had possession of the property. Its claim of ownership principally lied on the belief that all church properties belong to the Spanish Government and were transferred to the US Government following the Treaty of Paris. Through Sec. 12 of the Philippine Bill of 1902, such ownership was transferred to the Philippine Government.
3. The Spanish Government was not the owner of the properties. Law 12 states that: “No sacred, religious, or holy thing, devoted to the service of God, can be the subject of ownership by any man, nor can it be considered as included in his property holdings.” Law 13 defined sacred things as “those which are consecrated by the bishops, such as churches, the altars therein, crosses, chalices, censers, vestments, books, and all other things which are intended for the service of the church.”
4. From the earliest times, churches and other consecrated objects were considered outside of the commerce of man. It was not mentioned in Article 339 (definition of public property) and Article 344 (definition of public use) of the Civil Code. Its mention in Article 25 of the Regulations for the Execution of the Mortgage Law proves that they do not belong to the State.
5. The possession, care, and custody of such properties were given by the Spanish law to the Roman Catholic Church. It is not necessary to show that the church as a juridical person was the owner of the buildings.
Concept:
1. See Art. 44-47, 1767-1768 of the NCC
2. B.P. Blg. 68: The Corporation Code of the Philippines
Section 2. Corporation defined. - A corporation is an artificial being created by operation of law, having the right of succession and the powers, attributes and properties expressly authorized by law or incident to its existence.
Section 4. Corporations created by special laws or charters. - Corporations created by special laws or charters shall be governed primarily by the provisions of the special law or charter creating them or applicable to them, supplemented by the provisions of this Code, insofar as they are applicable.
3. Spanish Civil Code, Art. 339: Property of public ownership is: (1) That destined to the public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports, and bridges constructed by the State, and banks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character; (2) That belonging exclusively to the State without being for public use and which is destined to some public service, or to the
development of the national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the defense of the territory, and mines, until their concessions has been granted.
Spanish Civil Code, Art. 344: Property for public use in provinces and in towns comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and public works of general service supported by the said towns or provinces.
Camid vs. Office of the President 17 Jan 2005 – J. Tinga
Facts:
1. An executive order gave way to the existence of the municipality of Andong.
2. This executive order alongside other executive orders were assailed in the case of Pelaez vs. Auditor General.
3. The conclusion of that case showed that the President has no right to create a municipality thus all executive orders and municipalities created by those orders are considered void.
4. Petitioners believe that because:
