EVIDENCE CASES (Escolin) DNA Case
1. Agustin vs. CA GR 162571 June 15, 2005 Wire-Tapping
2. Gaanan vs. IAC GR L-69809 October 16, 1986
3. Salcedo vs. CA G.R. No. 110662. August 4, 1994. 4. Ramirez v. CA 248 s 590
Judicial Admissions
5. Torres vs. CA G.R. No. L-37421. July 31, Judicial Notice
6. Tabuena vs. CA G.R. No. 85423. May 6, 1991 7. Lucido v. Calupihan
8. Baguio v. Dejalagat G.R. No. L-28100. November 29, 1971 On Tax Cases
9. BPI-FB vs. CA G.R. No. 122480. April 12, 2000 10. Calamba Steel Center vs. CIR G.R. No. 151857. April 28, 2005 Rule 130
A. Object Evidence Photographs
11.Sison v. People, 250 SCRA 58, November 6, 1995
Facts: On July 27, 1986, in the aftermath of the 1986 EDSA Revolution, a rally was scheduled to be held at the Luneta by the Marcos loyalists. Despite being denied a permit, three thousand of them gathered at the Rizal Monument of the Luneta and started an impromptu singing contest, recited prayers and delivered speeches in between. When the authorities arrived and no permit could be produced, they were told to disperse. One of the leaders, Atty. Oliver Lozano, turned to his group and said “Gulpihin ninyo ang lahat ng mga Cory infiltrators,” and a commotion ensued. They eventually fled, and later, some of them converged at the Chinese garden of Luneta. Another commotion ensued and the loyalists started attacking persons in yellow, the color of the “Coryistas,” one of which was Salcedo. He was chased, boxed, kicked and mauled. One Ranulfo Sumilang was able to tow Salcedo away from them, but several accused came forward and resumed mauling Salcedo despite his pleas for mercy. He died upon arrival at the Philippine General Hospital of “hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic.”
Issue: Were the photographs of the incident presented properly given evidentiary weight despite lack of proper identification by their respective photographers?
Held: Yes. Photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by the photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced. The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or reproduction of the original, and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime.
The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify the pictures he has taken. The correctness of the photograph as a faithful representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by the testimony of the person who made it or by other competent witnesses, after which the court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy. Photographs, therefore, can be identified by the photographer or by any other competent witnesses who can testify to its exactness and accuracy. In this case, the counsel for two of the accused used the same photographs to prove that his clients were not in any of the pictures and therefore could not have participated in the mauling of the victim. When the prosecution used the photographs to cross-examine all the accused, no objection was made by the defense, not until Atty. Lazaro interposed at the third hearing a continuing objection to their admissibility. The use of these photographs by some of the accused to show their alleged non-participation in the crime is an admission of the exactness and accuracy thereof. That the photographs are faithful representation of the mauling incident was affirmed when some of the accused identified themselves therein and gave reasons for their presence thereat. The absence of two of the accused in the photographs, meanwhile, does not exculpate them. The photographs did not capture the entire sequence of the killing of Salcedo but only segments thereof. However, the accused were unequivocally identified by two witnesses.
Doctrine: Photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by the photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced. The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify the pictures he has taken. They can be identified by the photographer or by any other competent witnesses who can testify to its exactness and accuracy.
Facts: The plaintiffs brought an action in trespass against the defendants for personal injuries and property damage arising out of a collision between a car owned and operated by plaintiff, Jack Adamczuk, and a car owend by defendant, Morris Cohen, and driven by Elmer Holloway. A photograph was presented as evidence for the plaintiffs, and Adamczuk identified the roads and buildings appearing in the picture, stating that “the conditions presented by that picture truly represent the conditions of the crossing at the time of this accident except for the fact of daylight or dark.” The photograph was offered in evidence several times, but in each case, no proof could be given as to “who took it, or any identity as to the picture, other than the physical view thereon” or “where the camera was standing, under what conditions it was taken, and whether it was taken with a view to distorting it or not.”
The court ruled against Adamczuk, commenting that he had two days “since adjournment last Friday, to procure the original taker of this photograph and thus establish it in the legal way with the right of cross-examination to defendants’ counsel of the photographer.”
Issue: Was the picture presented in evidence properly denied evidentiary weight due to the absence of proof as to its photographer and the conditions under which it was taken?
Held: No. The rule is well-settled that a photograph may be put in evidence if relevant to the issue and if verified. It does not have to be verified by the taker. Its verification depends on the competency of the verifying witness and as to that the trial judge must in the first instance decide, subject to reversal for substantial error.
The objection that a photograph may be so made as to misrepresent the object is genuinely directed against its testimonial soundness; but it is of no validity. While a photograph can be deliberately so taken as to convey the most false impression of the object, so also can any witness lie in his words. A photograph can falsify just as much and no more than the human being who takes it or verifies it. There is no more reason to exclude it on such ground.
If a witness is familiar with the scene photographed and is competent to testify that the photograph correctly represents it, it should, if relevant, be admitted.
Doctrine: A photograph may be put in evidence if relevant to the issue and if verified. It does not have to be verified by the taker. Its verification depends on the competency of the verifying witness and as to that the trial judge must in the first instance decide, subject to reversal for substantial error.
13.State of Washington v. Tatum 360 P 2nd ed. 754 1961, j. Donworth
Facts: William Tousin of Pasco received monthly welfare checks from the state of Washington. In February, 1960, however, Tousin did not receive his check, which was usually mailed to and left on a window ledge in the hallway of the rooming house where he resided. The check turned out to have been endorsed and cashed at Sherman’s Food Store in Pasco by someone other than Tousin.
Caroline Pentecost, a employee at the store, testified that the initials appearing on the check were hers, though she could not specifically recall the above-mentioned transaction. According to her, whenever a check was presented to her for payment at the store, she was instructed by the store manager to initial it and then insert it into a “Regiscope” machine, which is designed to simultaneously photograph, through two separate lenses, both the check and the person facing the machine. Upon discovery of the forgery of the endorsement on the check, the Regiscope film of the transaction was sent to the Regiscope distributor in Portland to be developed. The processed film showed both the check and Ralph Tatum, who lived in the same rooming house as Tousin, with the food store in the background. Both the negative and the print therefrom were admitted in evidence, above Tatum’s objection.
Issue: Were the authenticated Regiscope negative and print properly admitted as evidence?
Held: Yes. Pentecost testified that the background shown in the photograph was that of the food store and that “regiscoping” each individual who cashed a check at the store was its standard procedure everytime a check was presented for encashment. Another witness, Phillip Dale, meanwhile, testified as to the Regiscope process. These testimonies amounted to a sufficient authentication to warrant the admission of the negative and the print into evidence.
Tatum was not precluded from attempting to prove that the individual portrayed in the Regiscope print was not him, that it was inaccurate in any respect and that he was somewhere else at the time the photograph was taken. However, these arguments go to the weight rather than to the admissibility of said negative and print. The Regiscope films, coupled with the other evidence presented, are sufficient to establish a prima facie case of first degree forgery.
Doctrine: The admission and use of demonstrative evidence, including photographs, have for many years been encouraged. Such admission or rejection of photographs as evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Such discretion extends to the sufficiency of identification. As to the required quantum of authentication of a photograph, some witness (not necessarily the photographer) may be able to give some indication as to when, where, and under what circumstances the photograph was taken, and that the
photograph accurately portray the subject or subjects illustrated. The photograph need only be sufficiently accurate to be helpful to the court and the jury.
14. Mendoza vs. Alarma G.R. No. 151970. May 7, 2008
Facts: The accused in a criminal case failed to appear in person before the court. Accordingly, the trial court declared his bail forfeited. The trial court gave the bondsmen a 30-day period to produce the accused or a reasonable explanation for their non-production. However, two years had passed from the time the court ordered the forfeiture and still no judgment had been rendered against the bondsmen for the amount of the bail. Instead, anorder of execution was issued and the property was put up for sale and was awarded to the highest bidders in good faith.
Issue/Answer:
WON the bondsmen still go after the property, on the ground that the trial court did not render a judgment against them/Yes.
Ratio:
Section 21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure clearly provides for the procedure to be followed before a bail bond may be forfeited and a judgment on the bond rendered against the surety. There are two requisites before the trial court judge may rule adversely against the bondsmen in cases when the accused fails to appear in court. First, the non-appearance by the accused is cause for the judge to summarily declare the bond as forfeited. Second, the bondsmen, after the summary forfeiture of the bond, are given 30 days within which to produce the principal and to show cause why a judgment should not be rendered against them for the amount of the bond.
It is only after this 30-day period (during which the bondsmen are afforded the opportunity to be heard by the trial court) that the trial court may render a judgment on the bond against the bondsmen. Judgment against the bondsmen cannot be entered unless such judgment is preceded by the order of forfeiture and an opportunity given to the bondsmen to produce the accused or to adduce satisfactory reason for their inability to do so.
In this case, no such judgment was ever issued and neither has an amount been fixed for which the bondsmen may be held liable. The law was not strictly observed and this violated the bondsmen’s right to procedural due process.
The issue of good faith in buying the property at the auction sale is not material. Since the execution and sale of the land was invalid, the basis for which title to the land had been issued has no more leg to stand on.
15. People vs. Tan G.R. No. L-14257. July 31, 1959
Facts: Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales and her co-accused were charged with the crime of falsification of public documents, in their capacities as public officials and employees, for having made it appear that certain relief supplies and/or merchandise were purchased by Gonzales for distribution to calamity indigents, in such quantities and at such prices, and from such business establishments or persons as written in said public documents. The truth was, no such distributions of such relief and supplies as valued and as supposedly purchased had ever been made.
The prosecution presented as evidence a booklet of receipts from the Metro Drug Corporation in Magallanes, Cebu City. Said booklet contained triplicate copies, the original invoices of which were sent to the company’s Manila office, the dupicates given to customers, and the triplicates left attached to the booklet. One of the Metro Drug’s salesmen who issued a receipt further explained that, in preparing receipts for sales, two carbon copies were used between the three sheets, so that the duplicates and the triplicates were filed out of the use of the carbons in the course of the preparation and signing of the originals.
The trial court judge, Hon. Bienvenido Tan, interrupted the proceeding, holding that the triplicates were not admissible unless it was proven that the originals were lost and cannot be produced. Another witness was presented, and he alleged that the former practice of keeping the original white copies no longer prevails as the originals are given to the customers, while only the duplicates are submitted to the Manila office.
Issue: Are the triplicates of the receipts admissible as evidence?
Held: Yes. Under the law on evidence, the best evidence rule is that rule which requires the highest grade of evidence obtainable to prove a disputed fact. The admissibility of duplicates or triplicates under this rule has long been settled. “When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of writing paper so that the writing of a contract upon the outside sheet, including the signature of the party to be charged thereby, produced 2 facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such signatures being thus reproduced by the same stroke of the pen which made the surface or exposed impression, all of the sheets so written on are regarded as duplicate originals and either of them may be introduced in evidence as such without accounting for the nonproduction of the others.”
Doctrine: The best evidence rule is that rule which requires the highest grade of evidence obtainable to prove a disputed fact. Carbon copies, however, when made at the same time and on the same machine as the original, are duplicate originals, and have been held to be as much primary evidence as the originals. Best Evidence Rule
16. People vs. Tandoy G.R. No. 80505. December 4, 1990
Facts: On May 27, 1986, Makati Police detectives organized a buy-bust operation, whereby Detective Singayan was to pose as the buyer. The target area was a store along Solchuaga St. in Barangay Singkamas, Makati. Detective Singayan stood alone near the store, waiting until three men approached him. One of them, Mario Tandoy, asked “Pare, gusto mo bang umiskor?” To this, Detective Singayan asnwered yes. Two P5.00 bills, each marked ANU (Anti-Narcotics Unit), were exchanged for two rolls of marijuana. Upon consummation of the deal, the team moved in and arrested Tandoy. The marked money, as well as eight foils of marijuana were confiscated from Tandoy and an information was filed against him. Tandoy was found guilty of violation of R.A. 6425. Hence, he appealed, alleging that the money was actually bet money, and that, under the best evidence rule, the Xerox copy of the marked bills were inadmissible in court.
Issue: Does the best evidence rule apply to the marked bills?
Held: No. The best evidence rules applies only when the contents of the document are the subject of inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether or not such document was actually executed or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.
The marked money is not an ordinary document falling under Sec. 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which excludes the introduction of secondary evidence, except in five specified instances. In this case, the marked money was presented solely for the purpose of establishing its existence and not its contents. Therefore, other substitutionary evidence, such as a Xerox copy, is admissible without need for the accounting of the original. Besides, the presentation at the trial of the buy-bust money was not indispensable to the conviction of Tandoy since the sale of the marijuana had been sufficiently proven by the testimony of the police officers involved in the operation, and the marijuana actually sold had been submitted as evidence.
Doctrine: The best evidence rules applies only when the contents of the document are the subject of inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether or not such document was actually executed or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.
17.Meyers v. US 171 F. 2nd Ed. Page 800 Nov. 8, 1948 18.Syller v. George Lucas and Co., Ltd. 797 F. 2nd ed 1504 august 26, 1986
19. US v. Balistoy G.R. No. 5791 December 17, 1910
Facts: Pedro Salazar filed a suit for the collection of a sum of money against Eustaquio Balistoy. Judgment was rendered in favor of the former, and Balistoy was ordered to pay him P275.92, plus interest. Two rural properties belonging to Balistoy were attached and set for sale at a public auction on May 27, 1908. Before the auction, Bernardo Gregorio requested the deputy sheriff to exclude one of the properties from attachment as he owned said property, having acquired it by purchase from Balistoy in 1905, prior to the filing of the complaint. Gregorio presented to the sheriff a document, at the end of which appears a memorandum stating that Balistoy bought the land referred to from Luis Balistoy and subsequently sold it to Gregorio.
Salazar filed a complaint for falsification against Gregorio and Balistoy for having simulated the conveyance of the property in favor of Gregorio in order to avoid its attachment and sale. Salazar further alleged that, though the said memorandum was dated February 1905, it was actually written in April 1908. However, the original document setting forth the memorandum was not presented, and only a copy thereof was produced in court.
Issue: Can a person be convicted of falsification of a document without the original of said falsified document?
Held: No. The issue in this case is whether the subject memorandum was falsified, having been made to appear to have been written on a date prior to the one when it was actually prepared and simulating the sale to a third party of a land, with the intent to defraud the creditor who, through proper judicial process, solicited and obtained the attachment and sale of said land.
Though the sheriff testified to having seen the original of the document wherein the memorandum was written, or at least the original memorandum of the conveyance, the mere exhibition of a copy of an unauthenticated private document cannot legally produce the effect of suspending the sale of said land inasmuch as such copy is not sufficient proof of the right of Gregorio, being a mere copy of a private
document whose legality has not been proven. He was not able to compare the copy of the memorandum with that written on the original document, having only seen the original for a few moments.
As the original document setting forth said memorandum was not presented, but merely a copy thereof, and as it could not be ascertained who had the original of said document, nor the exact date when it was written, doubt arises as to whether the original of the document really existed at all and whether the memorandum is an exact copy of that alleged to have been written at the end of said original document. Consequently, Gregorio and Balistoy cannot be convicted of its falsification.
Doctrine: In a criminal case for the falsification of a document, it is indispensable that the judges and the courts have before them the document alleged to have been simulated, counterfeited, or falsified, in order that they may find, pursuant to the evidence produced at trial, whether or not the crime of falsification was actually committed; in the absence of the original document, it is improper to conclude, with only a copy of said original in view, that there has been a falsification of a document which was neither found nor exhibited, because, in such a case, even the existence of such original may be doubted
20. Compania Maritima vs. Allied Free Works Union G.R. No. L-28999. May 24, 1977
Facts: On August 11, 1952, the Compañia Maritima and the Allied Free Workers Union entered into a written contract whereby the union agreed to perform arrastre and stevedoring work for Compañia Maritima’s vessels at Iligan City. The contract was to be effective for one month. The company could revoke the contract before its expiration if the union failed to render proper service, and it could be renewed by agreement of the parties. The company would also not be liable for the payment of the services of the union “for the loading, unloading and delivery of cargoes,” which should be paid for “by the owners and consignees of the cargoes.”
The shippers and consignees paid the union only for the arrastre work (handling and hauling of cargo on the wharf or between the establishment of the consignee or shipper and the ship’s tackle), but refused to pay for the stevedoring service (handling of the cargo in the holds of the vessel or between the ship’s tackle and the holds of the vessel). They claimed that the shipowner was the one obligated to pay for the stevedoring service because the bill of lading provided that the unloading of the cargo was at the shipowner’s expense. However, the company refused to pay for the stevedoring service on the basis of the contract. As the union workers were in dire need of work, the contract was not terminated, and was verbally renewed upon its expiration.
The union requested recognition as the exclusive bargaining unit, but was denied. Hence, the union filed with the CIR a petition for certification. The company terminated the contract and entered into a new stevedoring contract with Iligan Stevedoring Association. The union filed an Unfair Labor Practice suit and picketed the wharf to prevent the Iligan Stevedoring from performing the arrastre and stevedoring work. The company then sued the union, and the trial court awarded in favor of the company actual damages and other damages based on auditor’s reports showing alleged losses sustained by the company due to the acts of the union members. The union assailed the admissibility of said reports, alleging that they were hearsay evidence.
Issue: Were the auditor’s reports admissible in evidence as proof of the original records, books of accounts, reports or the like?
Held: No. The exception to the best evidence rule, which states that “when the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole, the original writings need not be produced,” cannot be applied in this case. The voluminour character of the records on which the accountant’s reports were based was not duly established. Moreover, in order for said rule to be applied, the records and accounts should be made accessible to the adverse party so that the correctness of the summary may be tested on cross-examination.
The general rule is that “an audit made by or the testimony of a private auditor is inadmissible in evidence as proof of the original records, books of accounts, reports or the like.” The company failed to show the difficulty or impossiblity of producing the records in court and their examination and analysis as evidence by the court.
Doctrine: The general rule is that an audit made by or the testimony of a private auditor is inadmissible in evidence as proof of the original records, books of accounts, reports or the like, unless it is proved that there would be difficulty or impossibility in producing the records in court and the examination and analysis thereof.
21.Villarey Transit v. Ferrer G.R. No. L-23893 Oct 29 1968
Facts: Jose Villarama, the operator of the Villa Rey Transit bus company pursuant to certificates of public convenience (CPC) granted to him by the Public Service Commission, sold two of the CPCs to the Pangasinan Transportation Company (Pantranco), with the condition that Villarama shall not, for 10 years, apply for any TPU service identical or competing with the buyer. Three months later, the Villa Rey Transit Inc. (VRTI) was formed, with Villarama’s wife and relatives as stockholders and incorporators. VRTI bought 5 CPCs from Valentin Fernando, two of which was levied pursuant to a writ of execution in favor of Eusebio Ferrer, a creditor of Fernando. The CPCs were sold at auction, of which Ferrer was the highest bidder.
Ferrer then sold the CPCs to Pantranco. VRTI filed a complaint for annulment of the sheriff’s sale in favor of Ferrer and the subsequent sale of the CPCs to Pantranco. Pantranco, on its part, alleged that Jose Villarama and VRTI were one and the same; hence, the non-competition clause in the abovementioned deed of sale executed by Villarama is also binding to VRTI. As evidence, Pantranco presented photostatic copies of ledger entries and vouchers, the admissibility of which was assailed by Villarama on the ground that the best evidence were the originals themselves.
Issue: Were the photostatic copies of the ledger entries and vouchers of VRTI sufficient to prove Pantranco’s allegations, and thereby are admissible as evidence?
Held: Yes. The photostatic copies of the ledger entries and vouchers showing that Villarama had co-mingled his personal funds and transactions with those made in the name of VRTI are very illuminating evidence. The requisites for the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original is in the custody of the adverse party are: a) the adverse party’s possession of the original; b) reasonable notice to the adverse party to produce the same; c) satisfactory proof of its existence; and d) the failure or refusal of the adverse party to produce the original in court.
Villarama himself admitted the previous existence of the files of VRTI. He said that the originals were missing and that VRTI was no longer in possession of the same. However, it is not necessary for a party seeking to introduce secondary evidence o show that the original is in the actual possession of the adversary. It is enough that circumstances show that the writing is in his possession or under his control. It is also not required that the party entitled to the custody of the instrument, upon notice to produce it, admit having it in his possession. The party seeking its production may introduce a copy thereof as in the case of loss because among the exceptions to the best evidence rule is “when the original has been lost, destroyed or cannot be produced in court.” The original of the vourchers in this case must be deemed to have been lost, thus, secondary evidence are admissible.
Doctrine: The requisites for the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original is in the custody of the adverse party are: a) the adverse party’s possession of the original; b) reasonable notice to the adverse party to produce the same; c) satisfactory proof of its existence; and d) the failure or refusal of the adverse party to produce the original in court. However, it is not necessary for a party seeking to introduce secondary evidence o show that the original is in the actual possession of the adversary. Neither is it required that the party entitled to the custody of the instrument, upon notice to produce it, admit having it in his possession.
22. De Vera v. Aguilar GR 83377; February 9, 1983
Facts: Marcosa Bernabe’s children mortgaged Bernabe’s land. Upon maturity of the mortgage, the Spouses Mariano and Leona Aguilar redeemed the property, and were able to acquire a title to said property. The title in the name of Bernabe, meanwhile, was cancelled. Three years later, however, Bernabe’s heirs wrote to the Spouses Aguilar, claiming that, as Bernabe’s children, they were co-owners of the property and, hence, entitled to the partition thereof. They also claimed that the Sps. Aguilar had resold the property to Bernabe. They filed a suit for reconveyance of the lot and presented a Xerox copy of an alleged deed of sale executed by the Sps. Aguilar, selling, transferring and conveying back to Bernabe the disputed lot. The trial court ruled in their favor. The Sps. Aguilar assailed the admissibility of the Xerox copy of the deed of sale on the ground that it was not the best evidence of the alleged sale and, hence, should be excluded.
Issue: Was the Xerox copy of the deed of sale properly admitted as evidence?
Held: No. Under the Rules of Court, “when the original writing has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the recollection of witnesses.” Prior to the introduction of secondary evidence, therefore, the proponent must first establish the former existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, contents, although this order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court. The sufficiency of proof for the admission of an alleged lost deed lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court.
In this case, the trial court merely ruled on the existence and due execution of the alleged deed of sale. Existence was sufficiently proved by the xeroxed copy of the alleged deed of absolute sale. Execution, meanwhile, may be established by the person or persons who executed it, by the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, or by any person who was present and saw it executed or who, after its execution saw it and recognized the signatures; or by a person to whom the parties to the instrument had previously confessed the execution thereof.
However, the loss or destruction of the originals were not proved. This may be done through the testimony of any person who knew the fact of its loss or by anyone who had made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place(s) where papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is indeed lost. However, all duplicates of such document must first be accounted for before using copies. Since all the duplicates are parts of the writing itself to be proved, no excuse for non-production of the writing itself can be regarded
as established until it appears that all of its parts are unavailable. Here, the notary public testified that there were 4 or 5 original copies of the alleged deed of sale. The petitioners, however, failed to account for all these copies. Therefore, secondary evidence cannot be admitted.
Doctrine: Prior to the introduction of secondary evidence, therefore, the proponent must first establish the former existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, contents, although this order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court.
23.Magdayao v. People G.R. No. 152881, 17 August 2004
Facts: On September 16, 1993, Engr. Magdayao was charged with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for having issued to Ricky Olvis a check dates September 30, 1991, in the amount of P600,000.00, despite not having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank, the Philippine National Bank, Dipolog Branch. Olvis alleged that, upon learning that the check was dishonored, Magdayao pleaded for time to pay the amount by retrieving the check and replacing it with two other checks. Magdayao, however, reneged on his promise. Despite repeated demands by Olvis, Magdayao failed to make good the check’s value.
As evidence for the prosecution, a photocopy of PNB Check No. 399967 was admitted by the court. The trial court eventually ruled in favor of Olvis.
Issue: Was the photocopy of the subject check inadmissible in evidence for failure of the prosecution to produce the original dishonored check?
Held: No. The law says that “the making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.”
It was incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce in evidence the original copy of PNB Check No. 399967 to prove the contents thereof, especially the names of the drawer and endorsee, the date and amount and the dishonor thereof, as well as the reason for such dishonor. Under the Rules on Evidence, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of the document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original thereof. This rule requiring the production of the best evidence is to prevent fraud. If a party is in possession of such evidence and withholds it and presents inferior or secondary evidence in its place, the presumption is that the best evidence was withheld from the court and the adverse party for a fraudulent or devious purpose which its production would expose and defeat. In case the original is in the custody or control of the adverse party, the latter must be given reasonable notice, and if he still fails or refuses to produce the original in court, only then may secondary evidence be presented.
In this case, Magdayao never produced the original of the check, much less offered to produce the same. He deliberately withheld the original of the check as a bargaining chip for the court to grant him an opportunity to adduce evidence in his defense, which he hailed to do due to numerous unjustified postponements.
Doctrine: As long as the original evidence can be had, the court should not receive in evidence that which is substitutionary in nature, such as photocopies, in the absence of any clear showing that the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court. To warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original of a writing is in the custody or control of the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides that the adverse party must be given reasonable notice, that he fails or refuses to produce the same in court.
24.Hutchison v. Buscas G.R. No. 158554, May 26, 2005
Facts: On October 1, 1987, the Spouses Ronald and Valentine Hutchison bought from V.A. Development Enterprises, Inc. a land in San Juan, Lubao, Pampanga, and occupied said land after a title was issued in their names. On August 2, 1989, Juanita Arrastia, the owner of the adjacent lot, sold a portion of her land to Enrique Buscas, as evidenced by a Quitclaim Deed in favor of Buscas. Though Buscas occupied said land, he failed to register his portion in his name and title remained in the name of Arrastia.
On January 10, 1995, Buscas commissioned geodetic engineer Narciso Manansala to survey his property. The survey revealed that a portion of Buscas land was occupied the Sps. Hutchison. Despite a demand latter to vacate sent to the Sps. Hutchison, however, the latter refused and insisted that the area was part of their land. A complaint for accion reinvindicatoria was filed. Buscas presented in evidence the Quitclaim Deed to prove his title over the disputed area, as well as testified on the survey conducted by Manansala. Another geodetic engineer confirmed the first survey with a verification plan and report which had been made as directed by the MTC judge in the previous unlawful detainer case which had been dismissed. Issue: Was the Quitclaim Deed sufficient to prove Buscas ownership of the disputed area?
Held: No. The law requires that the party who alleges a fact and substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proving it. Art. 434 of the New Civil Code provides that “to successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of a real proeprty, the person who claims a better right to it
must prove two things: first, the identity of the land claimed, and; second, his title thereto.” In this case, Buscas failed to establish both requirements.
A cursory reading of the Quitclaim Deed reveals that it specified only the extent of the area sold. Annex “A” of the Deed, where the entire lot of Arrastia was particularly described and where the specific portion of the property sold to Buscas was marked, was not presented at the trial. The Deed itself failed to mention the metes and bounds of the land subject of the sale. Thefore, it cannot be successfully used to identify the area Buscas was claiming and prove his ownership thereof. The presentation of the Annex “A” is essential as what defines a piece of land is not the size mentioned in the instrument but the boundaries thereof which enclose the land and indicate its exact limits. The surveys cannot be given evidentiary weight to prove the identity of the land sold to Buscas and his ownership thereof, as they merely relied on the self-serving statement of Buscas that he owns the portion of the lot adjacent to that of the Sps. Hutchison.
Moreover, the rules on evidence provide that where the contents of the document are the facts in issue, the best evidence is the instrument itself. Here, the identity of the land claimed and Buscas’ ownership thereof are the very facts in issue. The best evidence to prove such is the Quitclaim Deed and its Annex “A” where Buscas derives his title and where the land from which he purchased a part was described with particularity, indicating the metes and bounds thereof. Failure to adduce Annex “A” in evidence or produce secondary evidence after proof of the loss of the former is fatal to his cause.
Doctrine: The rules on evidence provide that where the contents of the document are the facts in issue, the best evidence is the instrument itself. Failure to adduce such in evidence or to produce secondary evidence upon proof of loss or destruction of the former is fatal to the cause of action.
25. Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga vs. Reyes G.R. No. 35366. August 5, 1931
Facts: The provincial fiscal of Pampanga filed two informations for libel against Andres Guevarra, alleging that the latter, with malicious intent, published on page 9 of the July 13, 1930 issue of the weekly paper Ing Magumasid a sqib in verse, of which a Spanish translation was included, intended to impeach the honesty, integrity and reputation of Clemente Dayrit and of Mariano Nepomuceno. The criminal cases were set for a joint trial.
As evidence, the fiscal attempted to present copies of the Ing Magumasid issue which contained the libelous article with the innuendo, another article in the vernacular published in the same weekly, and its translation into Spanish. The trial court held the copies as inadmissible, saying that, inasmuch as the libelous articles were not quoted in the information, said evidence cannot be admitted without amending the information. The court denied the petition to amend the information on the ground that it would impair the rights of Guevarra, holding that the omission of the libelous article in the original was fatal to the prosecution.
Issue: Are the copies of the weekly where the libelous article was published the best evidence of the crime of libel?
Held: Yes. The general rules regarding admissibility of evidence are applicable to cases of libel or slander. The evidence must be relevant, and not hearsay. This being so, the rule of procedure which requires the production of the best evidence, is applicable to the present case. The copies of the weekly where the libelous article was published, and its translation, constitute the best evidence of the libel charged. The newspaper itself is the best evidence of a published article.
Doctrine: The general rules regarding admissibility of evidence are applicable to cases of libel or slander. The copies of the weekly where the libelous article was published, and its translation, constitute the best evidence of the libel charged.
26. Ebreo v. Ebreo GR 160065 Feb. 28, 2006
Facts: Felipe Ebreo died intestate in 1926, leaving behind as his heirs his 5 children, Gil, Flaviano, Felino, Ignacio and Felipa. He also left behind an untitled parcel of land in Barangay Sampaga, Batangas City, which, pursuant to the subdivision made by him, was subdivided into six lots, identified as Lots A, B, C, D, E and F. On September 11, 1967, Felipe’s heirs executed and asigned a document entitled, “Kasulatan ng Pagbabahagi ng Lupa,” whereby they extrajudicially partitioned the property, except the portion known as Lot No. 9046-F. They agreed that said Lot F would remain under the co-ownership of Gil, Flaviano, Felino, Ignacio and the heirs of Felipa, who had already died. However, the plaintiffs were surprised to discover that Lot F was declared for taxation purposes in the name of Antonio Ebreo, Felino’s son.
The defendants alleged that, after the execution of the partition agreement, Lot F was sold by the heirs to Santiago Puyo, by virtue of which, the corresponding Real Property Tax Declaration was transferred in the latter’s name. The lot was allegedly subsequently sold by Puyo to Antonio Ebreo, for which a new tax declaration was issued. However, the deed of sale evidencing the alleged transaction between the heirs and Puyo, which was claimed to have been executed and ratified in 1968 before Atty. Doroteo Chavez, was never presented.
Issue: Was the defendants’ failure to present the Deed of Absolute Sale of the land to Puyo fatal to their claims?
Held: Yes. The defendants claim that the Deed of Sale could not be presented because the copy on file with the Office of the City Assessor was lost in the fire which occurred in May 23, 1979. They presented the testimonies of Antonio Pajilan, an employee at the City Assessor’s Office, Felino Ebreo, and Asuncion Aguado, the stepdaughter of Santiago Puyo.
However, the testimonies are at most secondary evidence which are inadmissible considering that the defendants failed to prove any of the exceptions provided in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and to establish conditions for their admissibility. Under this rule, before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original of a deed or document, the party has to prove with the requisite quantum of evidence, the loss or destruction or unavailability of all the copies of the original of said deed or document. The offeror must prove a) the execution and existence of the original; b) the loss and destruction of the original or its non-production in court; and c) unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part of the offeror.
The annotation of the Deed of Sale in a tax declaration is not sufficient proof of the transfer of property and inasmuch as the subject of inquiry is the Deed of Sale, it was incumbent on the defendants to adduce in evidence the original or a copy of the deed consistent with Sec. 3, Rule 130 of the Ruloes of Court.
Doctrine: Under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original of a deed or document, the party has to prove with the requisite quantum of evidence, the loss or destruction or unavailability of all the copies of the original of said deed or document. The annotation of the Deed of Sale in a tax declaration is not sufficient proof of the transfer of property.
PAROL EVIDENCE
27. Yu Tek v. Gonzales GR No. 9935 Feb. 1, 1915
Facts: Yu Tek & Co. and Basilio Gonzales entered into a Purchase Agreement covering 600 piculs of sugar at any place within the municipality of Santa Rosa for P3,000, to be paid in advance. The validity of the Purchase Agreement was from January 1, 1912 up to March 31, 1912 only. It was also stipulated that failure of Gonzales to deliver the 600 piculs of sugar within 3 months would rescind the contract, thereby obligating Gonzales to return the P3,000 to Yu Tek & Co., along with another P1,200 as indemnity for loss and damages.
Due to total failure of his sugar crop that year, Gonzales failed to comply with his obligation. As a defense, he claimed that the agreement between him and Yu Tek required delivery of the sugar from his own plantation and nowhere else. Yu Tek & Co., however, claimed that there was no such restriction as to the source of the sugar to be delivered. Gonzales was free to buy the sugar from the market or raise it himself, so long as he complied with his obligation.
Issue: Should parole evidence be allowed to determine the true intent of the agreement between Yu Tek & Co. and Gonzales?
Held: No. This case appears to be one to which the rule excluding parol evidence to add to or vary the terms of a written contract is decidedly applicable. There is not the slightest intimation in the contract that the sugar was to be raised by the defendant. Parties are presumed to have reduced to writing all the essential conditions of their contract. While parole evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions not mentioned at all in the contract, in the absence of fraud or mistake. In this case, Gonzales undertook to deliver a specified quantity of sugar within a specified time. No restriction was placed as to matter of obtaining the sugar. He was equally at liberty to purchase it on the market or raise it himself. Though Gonzales owned a plantation and expected to raise the sugar himself, he did not limit his obligation to his own crop of sugar. Therefore, the condition which Gonzales seeks to add to the contract by parole evidence cannot be considered. The rights of the parties must be determined by the writing itself.
Doctrine: Parties are presumed to have reduced to writing all the essential conditions of their contract. While parol evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake.
28. Ortanez v. Inocentes GR No. 107372 Jan. 23, 1997 29. Pastor v. Gaspar GR No. 1256
31. Chiu Chiong v. National City Bank GR No. L-7485 August 23, 1956
COLLATERAL AGREEMENT
32. Zacarias Robles v. Lizarraga Hermanos GR No. 26173 July 13, 1927
Facts: As administratrix of the estate of her husband Zacarias Robles, Sr., Anastacia de la Rama she leased the hacienda “Nahalinan” to Zacarias Robles, Jr. for six years. Robles, Jr., at his expense and without any right of indemnity at the end of the term, made various improvements and additions to the plant, such as new hydraulic press, reconstruction of dwelling house, building of camarins, reconstruction of ovens, and others.
Three years before the lease was to expire, Lizarraga Hermanos, a mercantile partnership, proposed to buy all of the property belonging to the hacienda. As Robles, Jr., still had over two years in his lease contract, he was asked to surrender such last two years and permit Lizarraga Hermanos to take possession as buyer. Lizarraga Hermanos agreed to pay him the value of all betterments made on the hacienda and to buy from him all that belonged to him personally on the hacienda. However, no reference of such surrender of Robles’ rights as lessee, except in fixing the date when the lease should end, nor of anything said concerning the improvements or property of a personal nature, was placed in the instrument of conveyance later executed.
Robles, Jr., eventually filed a complaint against Lizarraga Hermanos for the recovery of compensation for improvements made by him on the hacienda and the value of implements and farming equipment supplied by him, as well as damages for breach of contract. As evidence, he presented a letter written by Severiano Lizarraga to him, in which a reference is made to an appraisal and liquidation. Lizarraga Hermanos, however, assailed the admission of the letter as being prohibited parole evidence.
Issue: Is the letter admissible as evidence apart from the instrument of conveyance?
Held: Yes. The purpose of the parole evidence is to enforce an independent or collateral agreement constituting an inducement ot the making of the sale, or part of the consideration therefor. There is no rule of evidence of wider application than that which declares intrinsic evidence inadmissible either to contradict or vary the terms of a written contract, such being deemed to supersede all oral negotiations or stipulations concerning its terms and the subject-matter which preceded the execution of the instrument, in the absence of accident, fraud or mistake of fact. However, such rule does not extend so far as to preclude the admission of extrinsic evidence to show prior or contemporaneous collateral parole agreements between the parties, but such evidence may be received, regardless of whether or not the written agreement contains any reference to such collateral agreement, and whether the action is at law or in equity.
In this case, the deed of conveyance purports to transfer to Lizarraga Hermanos only such interests in certain properties as had come to the conveyors by inheritance, not those which Robles, Jr. had acquired by lease or purchase, or those that he had placed thereon by way of improvement. The verbal contract established in this case is therefore clearly independent of the main contract of conveyance, and evidence of such is admissible under the doctrine above stated. The written contract is complete in itself, the oral agreement is also complete in itself, and it is a collateral to the written contract, notwithstanding the fact that it deals with related matters.
Doctrine: The rule against the admission of parole evidence does not extend so far as to preclude the admission of extrinsic evidence to show prior or contemporaneous collateral parole agreements between the parties, but such evidence may be received, regardless of whether or not the written agreement contains any reference to such collateral agreement, and whether the action is at law or in equity.
33. PNB v. Benito Seeto GR L-4388 August 13, 1952
Facts: On March 13, 1948, Benito Seeto presented to the Philippine National Bank at Surigao a check in the amount of P5,000, payable to cash or bearer, and drawn by one Gan Yek Kiao against the Cebu branch of the Philippine National Bank of Communications. After consultation with the bank employees, Seeto made a general and unqualified endorsement of the check, which was accepted by PNB’s agency, which paid Seeto the value of the check therefore. Upon being presented to the drawee bank for payment, however, the check was dishonored for “insufficient funds.” PNB demanded refund from Seeto. Seeto, however, refused, claiming that at the time of the negotiation of the check, the drawer had sufficient funds in the drawee bank, and had not PNB delayed in forwarding the check until the drawer’s funds were exhausted, the same would have been paid.
PNB alleged that Seeto gave assurances that the drawer of the check had sufficient funds with the bank, and that Seeto had made a general and unqualified indorsement thereon. As evidence, PNB presented two witnesses at the trial, who testified that the check was cashed due to assurances given by Seeto and the promise that he would refund the amount paid by PNB should the check be dishonored.
Issue: Should parole evidence with respect to the verbal assurances made by Seeto be admitted as evidence?
Held: Yes. It has been held that any prior or contemporaneous conversation in connection with a note or its indorsement may be proved by parole evidence. An extrinsic agreement between indorser and indorsee which cannot be embodied in the instrument without impairing its credit is provable by parole. If, therefore, the supposed assurances that the drawer had funds and that the Seeto would refund the amount of the check if the drawer had no funds, were the considerations or reasons that induced the branch agency of PNB to go out of its ordinary practice of not cashing out of town checks and accept the check and to pay its face value, the same would be provable by parole, provided, of course, that the assurances or inducements offered would not vary, alter, or destroy the obligations attached by law to the indorsement.
However, in this case, there was no express obligation assumed by Seeto that the drawer would always have funds, or that he would refund the amount of the check even if there was delay in its presentation. Therefore, though the supposed assurances given were part of Seeto’s obligation as an indorser, such assurances were discharged by the unreasonable delay in the presentation of the check for payment. Doctrine: Any prior or contemporaneous conversation in connection with a note or its indorsement may be proved by parole evidence. An extrinsic agreement between indorser and indorsee which cannot be embodied in the instrument without impairing its credit is provable by parole.
34. Charles Woodhouse v. Fortunato Halili GR L-4811 July 31, 1953
Facts: Charles Woodhouse and Fortunato Halili entered into a written agreement organizing a partnership for the bottling and distribution of Mission Soft Drinks. Woodhouse was to secure the Mission Soft Drinks franchise for and in behalf of the proposed partnership, having had already informed the Mission Dry Corporation of California, before the agremeent, that Halili was willing to invest in the bottling and distribution of said beverages. Woodhouse was give “a thirty days’ option on exclusive bottling and distribution rights for the Philippines.” Formal negotiations between Woodhouse and Halili began, and Halili was eventually granted exclusive right, license, and authority to produce, bottle, distribute and sell the beverages in the Philippines.
Upon operation of the bottling plant, Woodhouse demanded that the partnership papers be executed. Halili hedged, promising to do so after the sales of the products had been increased. Halili kept delaying and refusing to give further allowances to Woodhouse. He alleged that his consent to the agreement was secured by the representation of Woodhouse that he owned, or was about the own an exclusive bottling franchise. Such representation was false since the franchise had already expired and was given to Halili himself, who claimed his consent to the agreement was vitiated by fraud.
As evidence, Halili presented, among others, drafts of the agreement prior to the final one, which drafts are presumed to have already been integrated in the final agreement. The prior drafts allegeldy showed that Woodhouse presented himself as the exclusive grantee of the franchise.
Issue: Do the prior drafts fall under the prohibition against parole evidence?
Held: No. As the purpose of considering the prior drafts is not to vary, alter, or modify the agreement, but to discover the intent of the parties thereto and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the contract, the principle of integration of jural acts is inapplicable in this case. The factual issue in this case is whether Woodhouse misrepresented himself to Halili. Hence, his acts or statements prior to the agreement are essential and relevant to the determination of the issue. Previous acts or statements are not being introduced as evidence to change or alter the terms of the agreement, but to prove how Woodhouse induced Halili to enter into it, to prove the representations or inducements, or fraud, with which or by which he secured the other party’s consent thereto. Such are expressly excluded from the parole evidence rule.
Fraud and false representation are an incident to the creation of a jural act, not to its integration, and are not governed by the rules on integration. Were parties prohibited from proving said representations or inducements, on the ground that the agreement had already been entered into, it would be impossible to prove misrepresentation or fraud. Furthermore, the parole evidence rule expressly allows the evidence to be introduced when the validity of the instrument is put in issue by the pleadings.
Doctrine: Fraud and false representation, being an incident to the creation of a jural act, not to its integration, are not governed by the rules on integration. Furthermore, the parole evidence rule expressly allows the evidence to be introduced when the validity of the instrument is put in issue by the pleadings.
EXCEPTIONS TO PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
35. Canuto v. Mariano GR L-11346 March 21, 1918
Facts: Espiridonia Canuto and Juan Mariano entered into a contract of sale with a right to repurchase over a parcel of land for P360. Such right of repurchase was to expire on December 4, 1914, one year after. Two
days before such expiration, Canuto begged an extension of tiem to repurchase the land as she would only be able to get the money to pay Mariano within the end of the month. Mariano agreed to extend it till December 31, as witnessed by Severino Pascual. The following Sunday, Canuto went to the house of Mariano, who promised to meet her at the house of an Atty. Mercado the next afternoon. However, when Canuto went to the meeting place the next day, Mariano didn’t show up. Since then, Mariano has refused to carry out the alleged oral agreement, insisting that the redemption period as set in the deed of sale. Issue: Was there an oral agreement extending the redemption period, and should parole evidence as to such extension be allowed?
Held: Yes. Mariano had extended the time within which Canuto could repurchase the land on the condition that she would find the money and make repurchase within the extended period. He cannot be permitted to repudiate his promise, it appearing that Canuto stood ready to make the payment within the extended period and was only prevented from doing so by the conduct of Mariano himself.
The rule forbidding the admission of parole or extrinsic evidence to alter, vary, or contradict a written instrument does not apply so as to prohibit the establishment by parole of an agreement between the parties to a writing, entered into subsequent to the time when the written instrument was executed, notwithstanding such agreement may have the effect of adding to, changing, modifying, or even altogether abrogating the contract of the parties as evidenced by the writing. Such parole evidence does not in any way deny that the original agreement of the parties was that which the writing purports to express, but merely goes to show that the parties have exercised their right to change or abrogate the same, or to make a new and independent contract. It is immaterial how soon after the execution of the written contract the parole agreement was made. If it was in fact subsequent and is otherwise unobjectionable, it may be proved and enforced.
Doctrine: The rule forbidding the admission of parole or extrinsic evidence to alter, vary or contradict a written instrument does not apply to an agreement between the parties, entered into subsequent to the time when the written instrument was executed.
36. Enriquez vs. Ramos G.R. No. L-18077. September 29, 1962
Facts: Plaintiffs entered into a contract of conditional sale with Pedro del Rosario over a land in QC for P600K, to be paid within 2 years. Upon a performance bond, Del Rosario was given possession of the land for development as a subdivision. He also undertook to pay for the subdivision survey, the construction of roads, the installation of light and water and the payment of whatever income tax may be required. Unable to pay, and to avoid court litigation, a contract of rescission was entered into. To release the performance bond, Del Rosario’s partner, Socorro Ramos, was allowed to buy 20 of the lots on condition that she assume the payment of P50K as her share in the construction of roads and other improvements required in the subdivision. A new deed of sale was executed in consideration of P235,056.00, of which an initial payment of P35,056 was made, the balance secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over the 20 lots and a ½ interest on a parcel of land in Bulacan. Ramos failed to pay the balance.
Ramos claimed that the contract failed to mention certain important conditions agreed upon, such as the plaintiffs’ promise to construct roads in the lands to be subdivided for sale. Such condition was allegedly a superfluity, there being an ordinance in QC requiring the construction of roads in a subdivision before lots therein could be sold, and said ordinance was deemed part of the contract. Ramos also claims that the true purchase price of the sale was P185,000.00, not P235,056.00, the difference being the voluntary contribution of Ramos to the cost of the construction of the roads which plaintiffs allegedly assumed to do. Issue: Was there an oral agreement or understanding between the parties as claimed by Ramos, and should parole evidence regarding such agreement be allowed?
Held: Yes. The construction of the roads was a condition precedent to the enforcement of the terms of the deed of sale for the reason that the subdivision regulations of QC requires, as a matter of law, that the sellers of land therein to be converted into subdivision lots construct the roads in said subdivision before the lots could be sold. The construction of roads in the prospective subdivision must have been uppermost in the mind of Ramos for her purpose in purchasing the property was to develop it into a subdivision. Such is proven by the execution by the plaintiffs of a so-called “Explanation” along with the deed of sale, stating that P50K was advanced as Ramos’ contribution to the construction of the roads. The document specifically states that the P50K would be deducted from the purchase price appearing in the deed of sale. The Rules provide that, when the terms of an agreement had been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all that has been agreed upon and that no evidence other than the terms there can be admitted between the parties. This holds true only if there is no allegation that the agreement does not express the true intent of the parties. If there is and this claim is in issue in the pleadings, the same may be the subject parole evidence. Ramos has specifically pleaded in her answer that the contract of sale in question does not express the true intent of the parties with regard to the construction of the roads. Doctrine: When the terms of an agreement has been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all that has been agreed upon, and no evidence other than the terms there can be admitted
between the parties. However, this holds true only if there is no allegation that the agreement does not express the true intent of the parties.
37. Madrigal v. CA GR No. 142944 April 15, 2005
Facts: In order to finance his wife Fermina’s travel to the U.S., Jose Mallari assigned to his son, Virgilio, a portion of a residential property situated at Olongapo City, upon assurance by the latter that Jose could remain in the property and that his sister Elizabeth could continue operating a store thereat. Virgilio would occupy one of the rooms in the house whenever he would go to Olongapo City on vacation, and he would renovate the other room and reserve it for his mother when she comes back from the U.S. It was also agreed upon that the property would not be disposed of without Jose’s consent and that Jose could redeem the same as soon as he could. A Deed of Absolute Sale was executed, conveying to Virgilio the said property for P50,000.00, though it was worth much more at that time. Worse, the deed described the property as a one-storey residential house sitting on a 135-square meter lot, though it was actually a 2-storey residential house sitting on a 340-square meter land.
Eight months later, without Jose’s knowledge, Virgilio, by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, sold the same property for P50,000.00 to Edenbert Madrigal, a longtime neighbor of the Mallaris. Jose was shocked when Madrigal demanded that he vacate said property. Jose then filed agianst Virgilio and Madrigal a complaint for annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by him and his wife or for redemption of the property at a reasonable price.
Issue: Did the court err in receiving parole evidence to establish that the Deed of Absolute Sale is actually one of equitable mortgage?
Held: No. The Deed of Absolute Sale cannot be viewed in isolation of the circumstances under which the same was executed by Virgilio’s parents, more so in the light of Jose’s disavowal of what the document, on its face, purports to state. It has been held that, even if the document appears to be a sale, parole evidence may be resorted to if the same does not express the true intent of the parties.
“Even when a document appears on its face to be a sale, the owner of the property may prove that the contract is really a loan with mortgage by raising as an issue the fact that the document does not express the true intent of the parties. Parole evidence then becomes competent and admissible to prove that the instrument was in truth and in fact given merely as a security for the repayment of a loan. And upon proof of the truth of such allegations, the court will enforce the agreement or understanding in consonance with the true intent of the parties at the time of the execution of the contract.” (Lustan v. CA)
Doctrine: Even if the document appears to be a sale, parole evidence may be resorted to if the same does not express the true intent of the parties. Parole evidence becomes competent and admissible to prove that the instrument was in truth and in fact given merely as a security for the repayment of a loan.
38. Maulini v. Serrano GR No. 8844 Dec. 16, 1914
Facts: Don Antonio Serrano loaned P3,000 to Padern, Moreno & Co. in behalf of Don Fernando Maulini. The loan was covered by a promissory note signed by F. Moreno in behalf of his own behalf and in behalf of his partner Jose Padern, payable to Serrano. Said promissory note was indorsed by Serrano in favor of Maulini, who is the real creditor.
Padern & Co. failed to pay at the time of the due date so Maulini instituted an action against the the company and Serrano for the collection of a sum of money. Serrano presented parole evidence, claiming that he was merely negotiating as agent in behalf of Maulini to loan money to the company, and that he received no other consideration for the said note other than a small amount for his services. Hence, he could not be held liable as an indorser. As there was no consideration, Serrano could not be deemed an indorser.
Maulini claimed that all parole evidence should not have been admitted, the terms of the agreement having been deemed reduced to writing. The promissory note, as it serves as evidence that there was a contract of indorsement, should be the only evidence admitted to determine the facts and circumstances of the case.
Issue: Should parole evidence be admitted to show the true intent of the parties?
Held: Yes. The prohibition in Section 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to this case. The purpose of that prohibition is to prevent alteration, change, modification or contradiction of the terms of a written instrument, admittedly existing, by the use of parole evidence, except in the cases specifically named in the section. In this case, the evidence offered was not for the purpose of varying, altering, modifying or contradicting the terms of the contract of indorsement admittedly existing between the parties, but to deny that there ever existed any agreement whatever. In other words, the purpose of the parole evidence was to demonstrate that a relation of any kind whatever was created or existed between him and the indorsee by reason of the writing on the back of the instrument and that no consideration ever passed to sustain an indorsement of any kind whatsoever.
