Chapter 2, STATCON, CALTEX vs PALOMAR and Other Cases

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STATUTOR

STATUTORY CONSTRU

Y CONSTRU

CTION, CHA

CTION, CHAPTER 2

PTER 2

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC. vs.

ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE

POSTMASTER GENERAL,

G.R. No. L-19650, September 29, 1966

CASTRO,

J., En Banc J., En Banc

Construction, verily, is the art or process of

Construction, verily, is the art or process of discoveringdiscovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the

and expounding the meaning and intention of the authorsauthors of the law with respect to its application to a

of the law with respect to its application to a given case,given case, where that intention is

where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law

explicitly provided for in the law (Black, Interpretation of (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1).

Laws, p. 1).

FACTS:

In 1960,In 1960,

Caltex (Philippines)

conceived aconceived a promotion

promotional scheme to dal scheme to drum up patronage for its rum up patronage for its oiloil products

products––i.e. "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest." It i.e. "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest." It callscalls for participants therein to estimate the

for participants therein to estimate the actual numberactual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a spe

dispense during a specified period. cified period. Participation is toParticipation is to be open indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle owners be open indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers".

and/or licensed drivers". No fee or consideration iNo fee or consideration iss required to be

required to be paid, no purchase of Caltex productspaid, no purchase of Caltex products required to be made.

required to be made.

Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails for the said Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails for the said contest, Caltex made a letter to

contest, Caltex made a letter to the postal authorities tothe postal authorities to justify its position that the contest does not violate the justify its position that the contest does not violate the anti-lottery provisio

anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. ns of the Postal Law. UnimpressUnimpressed,ed, the then Acting Postmaster General,

the then Acting Postmaster General,

Enrico Palomar

,, opined that the scheme falls within the purview of the opined that the scheme falls within the purview of the provisions of The Postal Law

provisions of The Postal Law––i.e. Chapter 52 of thei.e. Chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code, sections 1954(a), 1982 Revised Administrative Code, sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983, which prohibits the

and 1983, which prohibits the non-mailable matter of non-mailable matter of any information regarding "any lottery,

any information regarding "any lottery, gift enterprise,gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance,

or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of anyor drawing of any kind".

kind".

Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing a petition for declaratory relief

a petition for declaratory relief against the Postmasteragainst the Postmaster General, praying that judgment be

General, praying that judgment be rendered declaringrendered declaring its Caltex Hooded Pump Contest not to be violative of its Caltex Hooded Pump Contest not to be violative of the Postal Law, and

the Postal Law, and ordering respondenordering respondent to t to allowallow

petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to the petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to the attention of the public. The trial court ruled that

attention of the public. The trial court ruled that thethe contest does not violate the Postal Code and that the contest does not violate the Postal Code and that the Postmaster General has no right to bar the public Postmaster General has no right to bar the public distribution of the contest rules by the mails. The distribution of the contest rules by the mails. The Postmaster General appealed to the

Postmaster General appealed to the Supreme Court.Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Whether or not the scheme proposed by Caltexscheme proposed by Caltex is within the coverage of

is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably requires an

the Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into theinquiry into the intended meaning of the words used

intended meaning of the words used therein?therein?

HELD:

No. No. "Caltex Hoode"Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" prod Pump Contest" proposed byposed by Caltex is not a lottery that

Caltex is not a lottery that may be administratively andmay be administratively and adversely dealt with under

adversely dealt with under the Postal Law. the Postal Law. The term inThe term in question is used in association with the word

question is used in association with the word "lottery"."lottery". "Lottery" extends to all

"Lottery" extends to all schemes for the distribution of schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift

prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitionexhibitions,s, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and

prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of various forms of gambling. The three essential elements of a lottery are: gambling. The three essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration; secon

First, consideration; second, prize; and third, d, prize; and third, chance (Elchance (El Debate", Inc. vs. T

Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio). opacio). In the present case, theIn the present case, the elements of prize and chance are too obvious in the elements of prize and chance are too obvious in the disputed

disputedCaltex’sCaltex’sscheme. scheme. However, wiHowever, with regards to theth regards to the third element

third element ––i.e. consideration, SC found nowhere ini.e. consideration, SC found nowhere in the said rules of any requirement that any

the said rules of any requirement that any fee be paid,fee be paid, any merchandise be bought, any service be rendered, or any merchandise be bought, any service be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to

any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate. The scheme does not only appear to

participate. The scheme does not only appear to be, but be, but actually is, a

actually is, a gratuitous distribution of property bygratuitous distribution of property by chance.

chance. Like a Like a lottery, alottery, a““gift enterprisegift enterprise””comes alsocomes also within the prohibitive statutes only if it exhibits the within the prohibitive statutes only if it exhibits the tripartite elements of prize, chance and consideration. tripartite elements of prize, chance and consideration. The apparent conflict of opinions is explained by the The apparent conflict of opinions is explained by the fact that the

fact that the specific statutory provisionspecific statutory provisions relied upons relied upon are not identical, the terms "lottery" and "gift

are not identical, the terms "lottery" and "gift

enterprise" are used interchangeably; every case must enterprise" are used interchangeably; every case must be resolved upon the

be resolved upon the particular phraseology of theparticular phraseology of the applicable statutory

applicable statutory provisionprovision..

With the meaning of lottery settled, and consonant to With the meaning of lottery settled, and consonant to the well-known principle of legal

the well-known principle of legal hermeneuticshermeneuticsnoscitur noscitur a sociis

a sociis—— it is only logical that the it is only logical that the term under aterm under a constructio

construction should be accorded no n should be accorded no other meaning thanother meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift if it involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not in enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate the law the slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate that element of

that element of consideraticonsideration from the "gift on from the "gift enterprise"enterprise" therein included.

therein included. Gratuitous distributioGratuitous distribution of property byn of property by lot or chance does not constitute "lottery", if it is not lot or chance does not constitute "lottery", if it is not resorted to as a device to evade

resorted to as a device to evade the law and nothe law and no consideratio

consideration is derived, n is derived, directly or indirectly, from thedirectly or indirectly, from the party receiving the chance, gambling spirit not being party receiving the chance, gambling spirit not being cultivated or stimulated thereby.

cultivated or stimulated thereby. Under the Under the prohibitiprohibitiveve provisions of the Postal Law, gift enterprises and

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schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration.

ALFREDO L. AZARCON, petitioner, vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and

JOSE C. BATAUSA, respondents.

G.R. No. 116033 February 26, 1997

PANGANIBAN, J., Third Division

Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either

impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice (Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590, 596, September 28, 1995).

Facts:

Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business, hauling dirt and ore. His services were contracted by PICOP. Occasionally, he engaged the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla

whose trucks were left at the former’s premises.

On May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by BIR commanding one of its Regional Directors to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and other personal property of Jaime Ancla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and a delinquent taxpayer. A Warrant of Garnishment was issued to and subsequently signed by accused Azarcon ordering him to transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit to BIR the property in his possession owned by Ancla. Azarcon then volunteered himself to act as custodian of the truck owned by Ancla.

After some time, Azarcon wrote a letter to the Reg. Dir of BIR stating that while he had made representations to retain possession of the property of Ancla, he thereby relinquishes whatever responsibility he had over the said property since Ancla surreptitiously withdrew his equipment from him. In his reply, the BIR Reg. Dir. said

that Azarcon’s failure to comply with the provisions of

the warrant did not relieve him from his responsibility. Along with his co-accused, Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of public funds or property. On March 8, 1994, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision sentencing the accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging

from 10 yrs and 1 day of prision mayor in its maximum period to 17 yrs, 4 mos and 1 day of reclusion temporal. Petitioner filed a motion for new trial which was

subsequently denied by Sandiganbayan. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

(1) Whether the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy. (2) Whether petitioner can be considered a public officer by reason of his being designated by the Bureau of Internal Revenue as a depositary of distrained property.

Held

: No. SC finds Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon and his co-accused Jaime Ancla to be both private individuals erroneously charged before and convicted by

Respondent Sandiganbayan which had no jurisdiction over them.

Rationale:

(1) It is hornbook doctrine that in order "(to) ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction or not, the provisions of the law should be inquired

into." Furthermore, "the jurisdiction of the court must appear clearly from the statute law or it will not be held to exist. It cannot be presumed or implied." And for this purpose in criminal cases, "the jurisdiction of a court is

determined by the law at the time of commencement of the action."

Section 4 of PD 1606 provides for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It was specified therein that the only instances when the Sandiganbayan will have

jurisdiction over a private individual is when t he

complaint charges the private individual either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer or employee who has been charged with a crime within its jurisdiction. However, the Information does no charge petitioner Azarcon of becoming a co-principal,

accomplice or accessory to a public officer committing

an offense under the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction.

Thus, unless the petitioner be proven a public officer, Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the crime charged.

Art. 203 of the RPC determines who public officers are. Granting that the petitioner, in signing the receipt for the truck constructively distrained by the BIR,

commenced to take part in an activity constituting public functions, he obviously may not be deemed authorized by popular election. Neither was he

appointed by direct provision of law nor by competent authority. While BIR had authority to require Azarcon

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to sign a receipt for the distrained truck, the National Internal Revenue Code did not grant it power to appoint

Azarcon a public officer. The BIR’s power authorizing a

private individual to act as a depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to appoint him as a public officer. Thus, Azarcon is not a public officer. (2) Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either

impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice." This is particularly observed in the interpretation of penal statutes which "must be construed with such strictness as to carefully safeguard the rights of the defendant . . . ."

Article 222 of the RPC “apply to private individuals who, in any capacity whatever, have charge of any insular, provincial or municipal funds, revenues, or property and to any administrator or depository of funds or property attached, seized or deposited by public authority, even if such property belongs to a private individual.” The language of the foregoing provision is clear. A private individual who has in his charge any of the public funds or property enumerated therein and commits any of the acts defined in any of the provisions of Chapter Four, Title Seven of the RPC, should likewise be penalized with the same penalty meted to erring public officers. Nowhere in this provision is it expressed or implied that a private individual falling under said Article 222 is to be deemed a public officer.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH

XIII, HON. JESUS P. MORFE, PRESIDING JUDGE, AND

PRES. ROXAS RURAL BANK INC., respondents.

G.R. No. L-30381 August 30, 1988

FERNAN, C.J., Third Division

A "real party in interest" has been defined as the party who would be benefitted or injured by the judgment of the suit or the party entitled to avail of the suit. Indeed, if the bank were not a real party in interest, the legislature would not have provided for its joining as a party in the escheat proceedings.

The phrase "or actions" in this section is very significant. It manifests awareness on the part of the legislators that a single action to cover all banks wherever located in the Philippines would not be legally feasible.

ESCHEAT - is a proceeding whereby the real and personal property of a deceased person in the Philippines, become

the property of the state upon his death, without leaving any will or legal heirs.

FACTS:

In January 1968, pursuant to Section 2 of Act No. 3936 (Unclaimed Balance Law), some 31 banks forwarded to the Treasurer of the Philippines all deposits and credits held by them in favor, or in the names of such depositors or creditors known to be dead, or who have not been heard from, or who have not made further deposits or withdrawals during the preceding ten years or more. Respondent Bank, has only two (2) names appeared: Jesus Ydirin with a balance of P126.54 and Leonora Trumpeta with a deposit of P62.91.

Thereafter, or on July 25, 1968, the Republic of the Philippines instituted before the CFI of Manila a complaint for escheat against the aforesaid 31 banks, including herein private respondent. Likewise named defendants therein were the individual depositors and/or creditors. Summonses were accordingly issued to defendant banks and the creditors/depositors requiring them to file severally their answers to the complaint within 60 days after the first publication of the summons with notice that should they fail to file their answers, plaintiff would take judgment against them by default.

Private respondent Bank filed before the CFI a motion to dismiss the complaint as against it on the ground of improper venue. Opposed by the petitioner, the motion to dismiss was granted in the first assailed Order. Its motion for reconsideration of said dismissal order having been denied in the second assailed order, petitioner interposed the instant appeal on pure questions of law.

ISSUES: (1)

Whether or not Pres. Roxas Rural Bank is a real party in interest in the escheat proceedings

(2)

Whether or not venue of action has been properly laid in the City of Manila, since all defendant banks,

wherever they may be found, could be included in one single action

(3)

Whether or not Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court on venue, likewise, governs escheat proceedings.

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1. A "real party in interest" has been defined as the party who would be benefitted or injured by the judgment of the suit or the party entitled to avail of the suit. There can be no doubt that private respondent bank falls under this definition for the escheat of the dormant deposits in favor of the government would necessarily deprive said bank of the use of such deposits. It is in this sense that it stands to be "injured by the judgment of the suit;" and it is for this reason that Section 3 of Act No. 3936 specifically provides that the bank shall be joined as a party in the action for escheat. Indeed, if the bank were not a real party in interest, the legislature would not have

provided for its joining as a party in the escheat proceedings.

2. The first sentence of Section 3 of Act No. 3936 directs the Attorney General, now Solicitor General, to commence an action or actions in the name of the People of the Philippines in the Court of First Instance of the province where the bank is located. The phrase "or actions" in this section is very significant. It manifests awareness on the part of the legislators that a single action to cover all banks wherever located in the Philippines would not be legally feasible in view of the venue prescribed for such action under the same section, i.e., the province where the bank is located. Thus, the addition of the last sentence, which the lower court had correctly interpreted to mean "that for escheat of unclaimed bank balances all banks located in one and the same province where the Court of First Instance concerned is located may be made parties defendant "in one action" was clearly intended to save on litigation and publication expenses, but certainly not as authority for the lumping together of all banks wherever found in the Philippines in one single escheat proceedings.

3. Anent the third issue raised, suffice it to say that Section 2(b) of Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court cannot govern escheat proceedings principally because said section refers to personal actions. Escheat proceedings are actions in rem which must be brought in the province or city where the rem in this case the dormant deposits, is located.

CESARIO URSUA, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondents.

G.R. No. 112170 April 10, 1996

BELLOSILLO, J., First Division

Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied.

FACTS:

Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a CENRO assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato, being investigated by the

Ombudsman on a complaint for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and illegal cutting of mahogany trees and hauling of illegally-cut logs in the area. To have a copy of the complaints against him, he was asked by his counsel, Atty. Francis Palmones, to take his letter-request to the Office of the Ombudsman in the absence of his law firm's messenger, Oscar Perez. Before

proceeding, he talked to Perez who advised him not to worry as he could just sign his (Perez) name if ever he would be required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint.

When petitioner arrived at the Office of the

Ombudsman in Davao City he was instructed by the security officer to register in the visitors' logbook. Instead of writing down his name petitioner wrote the name "Oscar Perez" after which he was told to proceed to the Administrative Division for the copy of the complaint he needed. He handed the letter of Atty. Palmones to the Chief of the Administrative Division, Ms. Loida Kahulugan, who then gave him a copy of the complaint, receipt of which he acknowledged by writing the name "Oscar Perez." Before petitioner could leave the premises he was greeted by an acquaintance, Josefa Amparo, who also worked in the same office. They conversed for a while then he left. When Loida learned that the person who introduced himself as "Oscar Perez" was actually petitioner Cesario Ursua, a

customer of Josefa Amparo in her gasoline station, Loida reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged. The trial court found him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085. He was sentenced to suffer a prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional minimum as minimum, to four (4) years of prision correccional medium as maximum, with all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to

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pay a fine of P4,000.00 plus costs. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed just the same the conviction of petitioner but nevertheless modified the penalty by imposing an indeterminate term of one (1) year as minimum to three (3) years as maximum and a fine of P5,000.00.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner Cesario Ursua violated Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085, and is guilty of using an alias?

HELD:

No. While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted.

Rationale:

Time and again we have decreed that

statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.

An“alias”is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A man's name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known as aliases. Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a

different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the

prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142

as amended. Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal

statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by

conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. Indeed, our mind cannot rest easy on the proposition that petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the act done by him.

PEDRO SANTOS TO, petitioner, vs.

HON. ERNANI CRUZ-PAÑO, Presiding Judge, Court of

First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch XVIII,

and JUAN Y. OCAMPO, respondents.

G.R. No. L-55130 January 17, 1983

DE CASTRO, J., Second Division

If only for the above observation as to how the law should be applied in order that its objective could be realized and achieved, We cannot but find respondent judge's reasons for his denial of the petition for probation insufficient to justify a deviation from a policy of liberality with which the law should be applied.

FACTS:

Petitioner was convicted by respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) of the crime of estafa for having issued a bouncing check for P5,000.00, and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from seven years and eight months of prision mayor as minimum, to nine years and four months of prision mayor , as maximum. He

appealed to the Court of Appeals which reduced the penalty to one year and one day of prision

correccional as minimum, to one year and eight months as maximum.

Upon the Court of Appeals' decision becoming final, petitioner not having appealed therefrom, he filed a petition for probation with respondent judge, who, despite the favorable recommendation of the Probation Office, denied the petition on July 24, 1980, on the following grounds: (a) to grant probation to petitioner will depreciate the seriousness of the offense

committed, and (b) petitioner is not a penitent offender.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to probation?

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HELD:

Yes. SC finds no sufficient justification for

respondent judge's holding petitioner to be a non-penitent offender. The liberality with which the Probation Law should be applied in favor of the applicant for its benefits affords the better means of achieving the purpose of the law (Balleta Jr. vs. Hon. Leviste).

Rationale:

Under Section 9, P.D. 968 (Probation Law), petitioner may not be disqualified from being entitled to the benefits of probation based from a reading of the law in its entirety, with liberality rather than undue

strictness. In expressly enumerating offenders not qualified to enjoy the benefits of probation, the clear intent is to allow said benefits to those not included in the enumeration.

The respondent judge’s reasons of denying petitioner’s

probation - i.e. (1) petitioner will depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed, and (b)

petitioner is not a penitent offender–are all erroneous. First, for purpose of probation, what the law gives more importance to is the offender, not the crime. The inquiry is more on whether probation will help the offender along the lines for which the probation system has been established, such as giving the first-time offender a second chance to maintain his place in society through a process of reformation. Respondent judge would thus be writing into the law a new ground for disqualifying a first-offender from the benefits of probation. Second, the appeals made by the petitioner do not make him a non-penitent offender. If petitioner appealed the decision of the respondent judge to the Court of Appeals, he cannot be blamed for insisting on his

version by which he could hope either to be acquitted or at least given a lighter penalty that would entitle him to the benefits of probation. The recourse he took has, indeed, proved to be well worth the effort. His penalty was reduced on appeal which placed him within the benign purpose of the Probation Law.

ERNESTO M. DE GUZMAN,

petitioner, vs.

HON. ABELARDO SUBIDO, as Civil Service

Commissioner, HON. NORBERTO AMORANTO, as

Mayor of Quezon City, ET AL.,

respondents

G.R. No. L-31683 January 31, 1983

GUTIERREZ, JR.,

J.:

The phrase “criminal record” governing qualifications for

appointment could not have been intended by the

Legislature to automatically cover every violation of a municipal or city ordinance carrying a sanction of a nominal fine to enforce it.

FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto M. de Guzman was appointed patrolman in the Quezon City Police

Department by Mayor Norberto S. Amoranto on August 16, 1965. He was a civil service eligible having taken and passed the civil service patrolman's examination given on November 24, 1962. He had also passed the usual character investigation conducted before appointment. As a newly appointed patrolman, the petitioner went through and successfully completed the police training course.

On March 21, 1966, the petitioner's appointment was forwarded to the Commissioner of Civil Service. On August 18, 1966, or a year after the appointment and with no action on the appointment papers being taken by the respondent commissioner, the respondents city treasurer and city auditor stopped the payment of the petitioner's salaries.

On May 12, 1967, the respondent commissioner

returned the Petitioner's appointment papers, without action thereon, to the respondent mayor on the ground that Mr. de Guzman was disqualified for appointment under Republic Act No. 4864, the Police Act of 1966, Section 9 (5) because of the presence of criminal record culled from his information sheet, where the petitioner

“Yes”for Jaywalking-paid fine P5.50; Municipal O.d. (Mla.) Sect. 1187 (cochero) paid fine of P5.00.

The petitioner filed for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction at the CFI but he was denied because according to the court,the requirement of “no criminal record” means without any criminal record

and makes no distinction whether an act violates a state law or only a municipal or city ordinance.

ISSUE:

Whether or not violations and/or convictions of municipal ordinances, one, for 'Jaywalking' and the other, Manila Municipal Ordinance No. 1187,

prohibiting the cochero from 'occupying any part of the vehicle except the seat reserved for him', constitute 'CRIMINAL RECORD' to disqualify the petitioner under the Police Act of 1966 (Rep. Act No. 4864) from

appointment to the Quezon City Police Force?

HELD:

No. Respondent Subido (Civil Service

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into the nature of the petitioner's acts instead of taking every "Yes" answer in Question 15 of the information sheet as an automatic disqualification.

The requirements for applicants to a policeman’s

position may be quite stringent but the basic policy of attracting the best qualified is not served by

automatically excluding any person who in an absent minded mood or while hurrying to an urgent

appointment may unwittingly have crossed a street or stepped down from the curb in violation of a jaywalking ordinance. The same thing is true of a person who may have worked his way through college as a cochero and, who, pitying his horse struggling up an incline or a bridge, leaves his seat to stand aft and forward to balance the calesa load or who, alone on his way home, sits in the seat intended for passengers only to be fined for violating an obscure municipal ordinance.

The phrase “criminal record” governing qualifications

for appointment could not have been intended by the Legislature to automatically cover every violation of a municipal or city ordinance carrying a sanction of a nominal fine to enforce it. A violation of a municipal

ordinance to qualify as a “crime “ must involve at least a certain degree of evil doing, immoral conduct,

corruption, malice, or want of principles reasonably related to the requirements of the pubic office.

Under Rule VI of the Civil Service Rules and Regulations, the respondent commissioner had 180 days from

receipt of the appointment papers to act on them. Inaction means the appointment is approved as

properly made. The papers were returned more than a year by the commissioner after he received them. The appointment, not having any defect of record except the matter in issue in this case, must be deemed complete and properly made after the 180 days period. The termination of the petitioner's services was, therefore, an illegal and invalid removal. The petitioner should be reinstated, assuming he meets the physical and other requirements of the Integrated National Police under the new legislation and procedures governing police forces. In addition to being paid any salaries for services actually rendered but not paid, the petitioner, following the formula in cases of illegal dismissals is entitled to five years backpay (Cristobal v. Melchor, 78 SCRA 175,187 ).

BRUNO O. APARRI,

petitioner, vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS and LAND AUTHORITY, the

latter in substitution for REMEDIOS O. FORTICH, as

Chairman, ANGELINO M. BANZON, RAFAEL B. HILAO,

VALERIANO PLANTILLA and SEVERO YAP, as

members of the Board of Directors of the defunct

National Resettlement and Rehabilitation

Administration (NARRA),

respondents.

G.R. No. L-30057 January 31, 1984

MAKASIAR,

J.: Second Division

It is necessary in each case to interpret the word "term" with the purview of statutes so as to effectuate the statutory scheme pertaining to the office under examination.

FACTS:

On January 15, 1960, members of the Board of Directors of the defunct National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) approved Resolution No. 13, appointing petitioner Mr. Bruno 0. Aparri, as General Manager. On March 15, 1962, the same Board of Directors approved Resolution No. 24, resolving and fixing the term of office of the incumbent General Manager up to the close of office hours on March 31, 1962.

Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction with the then Court of First Instance of Manila on March 29, 1962. The petition prayed to annul the resolution of the NARRA Board dated March 15, 1962, to command the Board to allow petitioner to continue in office as General Manager until he vacates said office in accordance with law and to sentence the private respondents jointly and severally to pay the petitioner actual damages in the sum of P95,000.00, plus costs.

On August 8, 1963, when the case was still pending decision in the lower court, R.A. 3844 (Agricultural Land Reform Code), took effect. The said law abolished the NARRA and transferred its functions and powers to the Land Authority. The then CFI of Manila rendered judgment, finding the case as moot and academic and dismissed the said case.

On appeal to the then Court of Appeals, the appellate tribunal affirmed the decision of the lower court. The motion for reconsideration by petitioner in the then Court of Appeals was denied on January 10, 1969. On January 20, 1969, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the then Court of Appeals dated September 24, 1968. The same was initially denied for lack of merit in a resolution dated

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January 27, 1969; but on motion for reconsideration filed on February 11, 1969, the petition was given due course.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Board Resolution No. 24 (series of 1962) was a removal or dismissal of petitioner

without cause.

HELD:

Removal entails the ouster of an incumbent before the expiration of his term. The petitioner in this case was not removed before the expiration of his term. Rather, his right to hold the office ceased by the

expiration on March 31, 1962 of his term to hold such office.

A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power. By "appointment" is meant the act of designation by the executive officer, board or body, to whom that power has been delegated, of the individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When the power of appointment is absolute, and the

appointee has been determined upon, no further consent or approval is necessary, and the fo rmal evidence of the appointment, the commission, may issue at once. Where, however, the assent or

confirmation of some other officer or body is required, the Commission can issue or the appointment is

complete only when such assent or condition is

obtained. Thus, the petitioner was appointed as general manager pursuant to Resolution No. 13, which is still incomplete because of the lack of approval of the

President of the Philippines to such appointment. Such appointment was made complete only upon approval of Resolution No. 24, wherein President submitted to t he Board his "desire" to fix the term of office of the

petitioner up to the close of office hours on March 31, 1962.

The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office. Upon the expiration of the officer's term, unless he is authorized by law to hold over, his rights, duties and authority as a pubic officer must ipso facto cease. In the law on Public Officers, the most natural and frequent method by which a public officer ceases to be such is by the expiration of the term for which he was elected or appointed.

It is necessary in each case to interpret the word "term" with the purview of statutes so as to effectuate the statutory scheme pertaining to the office under

examination. In the case at bar, the term of office is not fixed by law. The power to fix the term is vested in the Board of Directors subject to the recommendation of the Office of Economic Coordination and the approval of the President of the Philippines. Resolution No. 24 speaks of no removal but an expiration of the term of office of the petitioner. The statute is undeniably clear. It is the rule in statutory construction that if the words and phrase of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous, its meaning and the intention of the legislature must be determined from the language employed, and, where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction (Black on Interpretation of Laws, Sec. 51).

LORENZO M. TAÑADA and DIOSDADO

MACAPAGAL,

petitioners, vs.

MARIANO JESUS CUENCO, FRANCISCO A. DELGADO,

ALFREDO CRUZ, CATALINA CAYETANO, MANUEL

SERAPIO, PLACIDO REYES, and FERNANDO

HIPOLITO in his capacity as cashier and disbursing

officer,

respondents

G.R. No. L-10520

February 28, 1957

CONCEPCION,

J.

, En Banc

What has been said above, relative to the conditions antecedent to, and concomitant with, the adoption of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reveals clearly that its framers intended to prevent the majority party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and that the structure thereof is founded upon the equilibrium between the majority and the minority parties therein, with the Justices of the Supreme Court, who are

members of said Tribunals, holding the resulting balance of power. The procedure prescribed in said provision for the selection of members of the Electoral Tribunals is vital to the role they are called upon to play. it constitutes the essence of said Tribunals. Hence,

compliance with said procedure is mandatory, and acts performed in violation thereof are null and void.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Senate may not elect, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, those Senators who have not been nominated by the political parties specified in the Constitution; that the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate may nominate not more than three (3) members

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the second largest number of votes in the Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the other three (3) Senators who shall sit as members in the Electoral Tribunal; that neither these three (3) Senators, nor any of them, may be nominated by a person or party other than the one having the second largest number of votes in the Senate or its representative therein; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate has no standing to validly make such nomination and that the nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by Senator Primicias, and the election of said respondents by the Senate, as members of said Tribunal, are null and void ab initio.

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