• No results found

Mankiw-Ball - Financial Crises

N/A
N/A
Protected

Academic year: 2021

Share "Mankiw-Ball - Financial Crises"

Copied!
36
0
0

Loading.... (view fulltext now)

Full text

(1)

MACROECONOMICS

MACROECONOMICS

FINANCIAL SYSTEM

FINANCIAL SYSTEM

(2)
(3)

In

In

this

this

c

c

h

h

a

a

t

t

e

e

r

r

,

,

ou

ou

will

will

learn:

learn:

In

In

this

this

c

c

h

h

a

a

t

t

e

e

r

r

,

,

ou

ou

will

will

learn:

learn:

 common features of financial crisescommon features of financial crises

 how financial crises can be self-perpetuatinghow financial crises can be self-perpetuating

 various policy responses to crisesvarious policy responses to crises

 ,,

including the U.S. financial crisis of 2007-2009 including the U.S. financial crisis of 2007-2009

 oow w ccaapp tta a gg t t oo tteen n pp aayys s a a rroo e e n n nnaanncc aa

crises affecting emerging economies crises affecting emerging economies

(4)

Common features of financial crises

Common features of financial crises

 Asset price declinesAsset price declines

 involving stocks, real estate, or other assetsinvolving stocks, real estate, or other assets

 often interpreted as the ends of often interpreted as the ends of bubblesbubbles

 Financial institution insolvenciesFinancial institution insolvencies

 a wave of loan defaults may cause bank failuresa wave of loan defaults may cause bank failures

 hedge funds may fail when assets bought withhedge funds may fail when assets bought with

borrowed funds lose value borrowed funds lose value

(5)

Common features of financial crises

 Liquidity crises

 if its depositors lose confidence, a bank run

de letes the bank’s li uid assets

 if its creditors have lost confidence, an

inv m n nk m h v r l llin

commercial paper to pay off maturing debts

 ,

(6)

Financial crises and a

re ate demand

 Falling asset prices reduce aggregate demand

 consumers’ wealth falls 

postpone spending

 ,

firms and consumers to borrow

 Financial institution failures reduce lending

 banks become more conservative since more

(7)

Financial crises and a

re ate demand

 Credit crunch: a sharp decrease in bank lending

 may occur when asset prices fall and financial

institutions fail

 forces consumers and firms to reduce spending

e a n agg. eman worsens e nanc a cr s s

 falling output lower firms’ expected future earnings,

reducing asset prices further

 falling demand for real estate reduces prices more

(8)

CASE STUDY

sas er n e

s

 Shar asset rice declines: the stock market fell

13% on 10/28/1929, and fell 89% by 1932 ,

defaults and a bank panic

 A credit crunch and uncertainty caused huge fall in

consumption and investment

 Falling output magnified these problems

, creating deflation, which increased the real value o e s an ncrease e au s

(9)

Financial rescues: emer enc loans

 The self-perpetuating nature of crises gives

policymakers a strong incentive to intervene to tr to break the c cle of crisis and recession.  During a liquidity crisis, a central bank may act

as a , prov ng emergency

loans to institutions to prevent them from failing.

 Discount loan: a loan from the Federal

(10)

Financial rescues: “bailouts”

 Govt may give funds to prevent an institution from failing, or may give funds to those hurt by the failure

 Purpose: to prevent the problems of an nso ven ns u on rom sprea ng

 Costs of “bailouts”

 direct: use of taxpayer funds

,

(11)

“Too bi to fail”

 The larger the institution, the greater its links to

other institutions

 Links include liabilities such as de osits or

borrowings

if they are so interconnected that their failure

 TBTF institutions are candidates for bailouts.

(12)

Risk Rescues

 Risky loans: govt loans to institutions that may not

be repaid

 institutions borderin on insolvenc  institutions with no collateral

 Equity injections: purchases of a company’s

stoc y t e govt to ncrease a near y nso vent

company’s capital when no one else is willing to buy t e company s stoc

 Controversy: govt ownership not consistent with

(13)

The U.S. financial crisis of 2007-2009

 Context: the 1990s and early 2000s were a time

of stability, called “The Great Moderation”

- stock prices dropped 55%

 unemployment doubled to 10%

 failures of lar e, resti ious institutions like

(14)

The sub rime mort a e crisis

 2006-2007: house prices fell, defaults on

subprime mortgages, huge losses for institutions holdin sub rime mort a es or the securities

they backed

Financial declared bankruptcy in 2007

 qu y cr s s n ugus as an s re uce lending to other banks, uncertain about their

ability to repay

(15)

Disaster in Se tember 2008

After 6 calm months, a financial crisis exploded:

 Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac 

defaults, U.S. Treasury became their conservator on their bonds to prevent a larger catastrophe

e man ro ers  

declared bankruptcy, also due to losses on MBS

(16)

Disaster in Se tember 2008

 American International Group (AIG)

about to fail when the Fed made $85b emergency loan to prevent losses throughout financial system

 The money market crisis 

nervous depositors pulled out (bank-run style) until Treasur De t offered insurance on MM de osits

 Flight to safety 

,

(17)

The flight to safety: - -10 7 8 Corporate bond  5 6   r   a    t  e    (    % interest rate  3 4   n    t  e  r  e   s    t 1 2    i Treasury bill  0

(18)

An econom in freefall

 Falling stock and house prices reduced consumers’

wealth, reducing their confidence and spending.

bank lending fell sharply because

an s cou no rese oans o secur zers

 banks worried about insolvency from further

osses

 Previousl “safe” com anies unable to sell

commercial paper to help bridge the gap between roduction costs and revenues

(19)

The olic res onse

 TARP – Troubled Asset Relief Program (10/3/2008)

 $700 billion to rescue financial institutions

 “ ”

subprime MBS

institutions

 . .

in Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, AIG, and others

(20)

The olic res onse

 Monetary policy:

Fed funds rate reduced from 2% to near 0% and has remained there

 The fiscal stimulus package (February 2009):

ax cu s an n ras ruc ure spen ng cos y near y 5% of GDP

ongress ona u ge ce es ma es oos e real GDP by 1.5 – 3.5%

(21)

The aftermath

 The financial crises eases

 Dow Jones stock price index rose 65% from

3/2009 to 3/2010

 Many major financial institutions profitable in

 Some taxpayer funds used in rescues will

,

(22)

The aftermath: unemplo ment persists

27 10 24 8    f  o  r  c   e 21 6    f    l  a    b  o  r   e   e    k  s rate (left scale)

  r   c   e   n    t average  duration of    p unemployment  (right scale) 15 2    2    0    0    7    2    0    0    8    2    0    0    8    2    0    0    8    2    0    0    8    2    0    0    8    2    0    0    8    2    0    0    8    2    0    0    8    2    0    0    8    2    0    0    8    2    0    0    8    2    0    0    8    2    0    0    8    2    0    0    9    2    0    0    9    2    0    0    9    2    0    0    9    2    0    0    9    2    0    0    9    2    0    0    9    2    0    0    9   e   c   a

  n   b  e   a  r   p  r   a  y   u   n    J  u    l    J  u    l   u

  g   e  p   t  c   o  v   e  c   a

  n   b  e   a  r   p  r   a  y   u   n    J  u    l   u   g

(23)

The aftermath

 Constraints on macroeconomic policy

 Huge deficits from the recession and stimulus

constrain fiscal policy

 Monetary policy constrained by the zero-bound

roblem: even a zero interest rate not low enough to stimulate aggregate demand and reduce unemployment

(24)

Reforming financial regulation:

egu at ng non an

nanc a nst tut ons

 Nonbank financial institutions NBFIs do not en o

federal deposit insurance, so were less regulated than banks

 Since the crisis, many argue for bank-like

regu a on o s, nc u ng:

 greater capital requirements

 restrictions on risky asset holdings  greater scrutiny by regulators

(25)

Reforming financial regulation:

ress ng oo g o a

 Polic makers have been rescuin TBTF

institutions since Continental Illinois in 1984 ,

 limit size of institutions to prevent them from

ecom ng

 limit scope by restricting the range of different

 Such proposals would reverse the trend toward

(26)

Reforming financial regulation:

scourag ng excess ve r s - a ng  

 Most economists believe excessive risk-takin is a

key cause of financial crises.

 requiring “skin in the game” – firms that arrange

r s y ransac ons mus a e on some o e r s

 reforming ratings agencies, since they

un eres ma e e r s ness o su pr me

 reforming executive compensation to reduce

ncen ve or execu ves o a e r s y gam es n hopes of high short-run gains

(27)

Reforming financial regulation:

ang ng regu a ory s ruc ure

 There are man different re ulators, thou h not b

any logical design.

gaps in regulation contributed to the 2007-2009 .

 Proposals to consolidate regulators or add an

(28)

CASE STUDY

e o

- ran c u y

 establishes a new Financial Services Oversi ht

Council to coordinate financial regulation agencies annually

 FDIC gains authority to close a nonbank financial

institution if its troubles create systemic risk

 prohibits holding companies that own banks from

s onsorin hed e funds

 requires that companies that issue certain risky

(29)

Financial crises in emer in economies

 Emerging economies : middle-income countries

 Financial crises more common in emerging

- ,

often accompanied by capital flight.

 Capital flight: a sharp increase in net capital

outflow that occurs when asset holders lose confidence in the economy, caused by

(30)

Ca ital fli ht

 Interest rates sharply when people sell bonds

 Exchange rates depreciate sharply when people ’

 Contagion: the spread of capital flight from one

country to another

people worry that Country B might be next,

h ll n r ’ n rr n

causing the same problems there

(31)

Ca ital fli ht and financial crises

 Banking problems can trigger capital flight

 Capital flight causes asset price declines, which

 High interest rates from capital flight and loss in confidence cause aggregate demand, output, and em lo ment to fall which worsens a

financial crisis

(32)

Crisis in Greece

 Caused by rising govt debt, fear of default  Asset holders sold Greek govt bonds, which

 Facing a steep recession, Greece could not pursue fiscal policy due to debt, or monetary

(33)

Crisis in Greece

Govt budget deficit, Interest rates on

8 9 14 16 -7 10 12 Greece  5 8 4 4 Germany 

(34)

The International Monetar Fund

 International Monetary Fund (IMF):

an international institution that lends to countries experiencing financial crises

 established 1944

 “ ”

 How countries use IMF loans:

 govt uses to make payments on its debt  central bank uses to make loans to banks  central bank uses to prop up its currency in

(35)

CHAPTER SUMMARY

CHAPTER SUMMARY

 Financial crises begin with asset price

declines, financial institution failures, or

both. A financial crisis can produce a credit

crunch and reduce aggregate demand, causing a recession, which reinforces the financial crisis.

 Policy responses include rescuing troubled

.

institutions with liquidity crises, giveaways, risky

(36)

CHAPTER SUMMARY

CHAPTER SUMMARY

 Financial rescues are controversial because

of the cost to taxpayers and because they

increase moral hazard: firms may take on more risk, thinking the government will bail them out if they get into trouble.

 Over 2007-2009, the subprime mortgage crisis

in the U.S. Stock prices fell, prestigious financial

, ,

References

Related documents

For the processing of personal data on customers that have entered into an agreement for a travel account, the processing of the travel account is also considered relevant for

In summary, the duration regression is consistent with the theoretical model in that some recruitment methods (community agency referrals and accepting walk-ins) are associated with

"leveraged". Orthodox Keynesians focused only on the first of these effects: they wanted to fine-tune economy through discretionary tax and spend policies, and emphasized

Numerous factors (e.g. the ability of IT systems to provide the data required and the extent to which organizations can define and develop appropriate mea- sures, and

Most contaminants in cosmetic products include bacteria such as Staphylococcus, Pseudomonas, Klebsiella, Achromobacter and Alcaligenes..

In light of these, we are now able to return to a key question set up in our introduction (and further contextualised in the literature review presented in section 3): how

Facility : Mount Vernon Cancer Centre at Mount Vernon Hospital Northwood, United Kingdom Facility : Norfolk and Norwich University Hospital Norwich, United Kingdom. Facility :

The foundation of this work is reflective practice by the educators, in community, to more deeply recognize the relationship between identity and pedagogy and to build