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PRO REO
In dubio pro reo is means "when in doubt, for the accused.” Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity. The rule applies when the court is faced with two
possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to him. The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient to the accused (Intestate estate of Gonzales vs. People, G.R. No. 181409, February 11, 2010).
POSITIVIST THEORY AND CLASSICAL THERORY
The positivist theory states that the basis for criminal liability is the sum total of the social and economic phenomena to which the offense is expressed. The purpose of penalties is to secure justice. The penalties imposed must not only be retributive but must also be reformative, to give the convict an opportunity to live a new life and rejoin society as a productive and civic-spirited member of the community. The adoption of the aspects of the Positivist theory is exemplified by the indeterminate sentence law, impossible crime, privilege mitigating circumstance of minority and modifying circumstances, rule on imposition of penalties for heinous and quasi-heinous crimes) (Joya vs. Jail Warden of Batangas, G.R. Nos. 159418-19, December 10, 2003;).
Under the classical theory, man is essentially a moral creature with an absolutely free will choose between good and evil. When he commits a felonious or criminal act, the act is presumed to have been done voluntarily, i.e. with freedom, intelligence and intent. Man, therefore, should be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired (People vs. Estrada, G.R. No. 130487, June 19, 2000). Since the Revised Penal Code is based on the classical school of thought, it is the identity of the mens rea which is considered the predominant consideration and, therefore, warrants the imposition of the same penalty for conspirators on the consequential theory that the act of one is thereby the act of all (Hon. Sandiganbayan, Honrado, G.R. No. 115439-41, July 16, 1997). Under this theory, the criminal liability is based on the result of the felonious act (proximate cause rule).
CHARACTERISTIC OF CRIMINAL LAW
There are three characteristics of criminal law, to wit: (1) generality (2) territoriality, and (3) prospectivity. The general, territorial and prospective characteristics of criminal law are principles that define and demarcate the scope and limitation of the operation of criminal law. Under these three principles, the operation or enforceability of criminal law is limited to wrongful acts committed on or after its effectivity (prospectivity) within the territory of the Philippines (territoriality) by person living and sojourning therein (generality).
GENERALITY - Generality principle is akin to territoriality principle in the sense that
the demarcating factor of both principles is the territory of the Philippines. Under generality principle, criminal law is enforceable to person living or sojourning in the territory of the Philippines. Under the territoriality principle, criminal law is applicable only to criminal act committed within the territory of the Philippines. But the concept of generality is different from territoriality. The applicability of territoriality principle or generality principle will depend on the issue raised by the accused in questioning the jurisdiction of the court. If the accused attacks the jurisdiction of the court because of the unique characteristic of his person (e.g. he is a foreigner, military, hermit, primitive, ambassador, legislator, President), the applicable principle is generality. If the accused attacks the jurisdiction of the court due to the unique characteristic of the place where the crime was committed (e.g. the place of commission is foreign vessel, embassy or high sea) etc, the applicable principle is territoriality.
1. Military officers - The Revised Penal Code and special criminal laws are
enforceable against military men living or sojourning in the Philippines. However, CA 408 (Articles of War) which vests jurisdiction over members of the AFP to the courts-martial. RA 7055 (AN ACT STRENGTHENING CIVILIAN SUPREMACY OVER THE MILITARY) did not divest the military courts of jurisdiction to try cases involving "service-connected crimes or offenses" under CA 408 (Example: Mutiny or sedition, quarrels, frays; disorders, breaking an arrest or escaping from confinement, releasing prisoners without proper authority, wrongful appropriation of captured property, corresponding with, or aiding the enemy, spies, dueling, fraud against the government affecting matters and equipment). In fact, RA No. 7055 mandates that these service-connected crimes shall be tried by the court-martial (Navales v.
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it excludes members of the AFP from the operation of the Revised Penal Code and special criminal laws if the crimes committed by them are service-connected as defined by RA 7055.
2. Consular officers - Despite the ruling in Schneckenburger vs. Moran, consular
officers and employees are now enjoying immunity from criminal prosecution of acts performed in the exercise of consular function under 1967, Convention on Consular Relation. Slander (Liang vs. People, GR NO 125865, January 28, 2000) or reckless imprudence resulting in homicide is not function-related. Consul is liable for committing this crime.
TERRITORIALITY PRINCIPLE: Under the principle of territoriality, the Philippines has
jurisdiction over crimes committed inside its territory except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application.
1. Embassy - The ground occupied by US embassy is in fact the territory of the USA to
which the premises belong through possession or ownership. A person who committed a crime within the premises of an embassy will be prosecuted under the law of Philippines because of the principle of territoriality (See: Reagan vs. Commission on Internal Revenue, 30 SCRA 968, En Banc; Answers to 2009 Bar Examination Questions by UP Law Complex). However, jurisdiction of the Philippines over the embassy is limited or restricted by “the principles of inviolability of diplomatic premises”, which is a generally accepted principle of international law. Warrant of arrest cannot be served inside US embassy without waiver of American government of its right under the principle of inviolability.
2. English rule - There are two fundamental rules in International Law regarding
crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessel (not military vessel), if the same is within the 12-mile territorial water (not internal or archipelagic water or high seas) of the Philippines to wit: (1) French rule - Crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessel within the territorial water of the Philippines are subject to the jurisdiction of the flag state (extra-territoriality principle) unless their commission affects the peace and security of our country. (2) English rule – Crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessel within the territorial water of the Philippines are subject to jurisdiction of the Philippines (territoriality principle) unless their commission does not affect its peace and security, or has no pernicious effect therein. It is the English rule that obtains in this jurisdiction.
3. Convention of the law of the Sea - Under the Convention on the Law of the Sea,
the flag state of foreign merchant vessel passing through the territorial sea has jurisdiction over crimes committed therein. However, the Philippines can exercise jurisdiction to arrest any person or to conduct any investigation in connection with any crime committed on board the ship during its passage in the following cases: (1) if the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal State; (2) if the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the country or the good order of the territorial sea; (3) if the assistance of the local authorities has been requested by the master of the ship or by a diplomatic agent or consular officer of the flag State; or (4) if such measures are necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances.
4. Drug trafficking - Following the English rule, the Philippines has no jurisdiction
over transportation of opium in a foreign vessel in transit in territorial water of our country because possession of opium does not have a pernicious effect on our country (U.S. vs. Look Chaw). But under the Convention of the law of the Sea, the Philippines can exercise jurisdiction to arrest any person or to conduct any investigation involving transportation of dangerous drugs since this is a measure necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances.
EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY - Under the principle of extra-territoriality, the Philippines
has jurisdiction over crimes committed outside its territory for those five instances mention in Article 2 such as crime committed in vessel of Philippines registry (ownership is not material), function-related crime committed by public officer (such as corruption or direct bribery), crimes against national security (such as treason, espionage; rebellion is not a crime against national security), and crime against law of nation such as piracy and mutiny). In People vs. Tulin, G.R. No. 111709, August 30, 2001- “Piracy is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law (Article 2). The same principle applies even if accused were charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy under the penal code but under a special law, PD No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of the law penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole world.”
PROSPECTIVITY: Article 22 of RPC - If the court in trying an accused, who committed
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(1) it is favorable to the accused and (2) the accused is not a habitual delinquent (Article 22). Ex post facto law - Congress in passing a law can insert retroactive effect provision therein subject to the Constitution of ex post facto law. If the retroactive provision of the law has passed the constitutional test on prohibition against ex post facto law, the court must give retroactive effect to this law even if the accused is a habitual delinquent. Nullum crimen poena
sine lege – If the law repeals a previous law or provision defining a crime, the applicable
principle is not Article 22 of RPC but nullum crimen poena sine lege (There is no crime when there is no law punishing it). Since the intention of the new law is to decriminalize an act punishable by the repealed law, the accused should be acquitted or released if the already convicted, even though he is a habitual delinquent.
X committed crime under RA No. 6425, the penalty for which is life imprisonment. RA No. 7659 amended RA No. 6425 by prescribing the penalty of reclusion temporal. Should RA No. 7659 be given retroactive effect? Answer: Yes. The maximum duration of reclusion temporal is 40 years of imprisonment while life imprisonment has no duration. Thus, reclusion
perpetua is a lighter penalty than life imprisonment. The amendatory law, being more lenient
and favorable to the accused than the original provisions thereof should be accorded retroactive application (People vs. Morilla, GR No. 189833, February 05, 2014).
RA No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of death penalty, prescribes reclusion perpetua in lieu of death penalty or life imprisonment if the special law does not use the nomenclature of the penalties under RPC and declares a person sentenced to reclusion perpetua as a prescribed or reduced penalty is ineligible for parole. This law has a retroactive effect. Penal laws which are favorable to accused are given retroactive effect. This principle is embodied under Article 22 of RPC, which provides: Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal (People vs. Talaro, et.al., GR No. 175781, March 20, 2012).
REPEAL: Decriminalization - Repeal of a penal law deprives the courts of jurisdiction to
punish persons charged with a violation of the old penal law prior to its repeal (Sindiong and Pastor, 77 Phil. 1000; Binuya, 61 Phil. 208; U.S. vs. Reyes, 10 Phil. 423; U.S. vs. Academia, 10 Phil. 431; Arizala vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 43633, September 14, 1990; Almuete, et al., G.R. No. L-265, February 27,19 76). The intention of the new law is to decriminalize an act punishable of old law. Thus, person cannot be punished for subversion under RA 1700, which was repealed by RA 7637, even though he is a habitual delinquent.
New regulation - Repeal with re-enactment of a penal law does not deprive the courts of
jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of the old penal law prior to its repeal. Such repeal even without a saving clause would not destroy criminal liability of the accused (U.S. vs. Cana, 12 Phil. 241). The intention of the new law is not to decriminalize an act punishable of old law but merely to provide new regulation. If the new law is favorable to the accused, who is not a habitual delinquent, it shall be given retroactive effect. Example: “A” was charged for the crime of rape under Article 336 of RPC for raping his minor daughter. However, RA 8353 expressly repealed Article 336 but re-enacted the provision on rape by reclassifying it as a crime against person, redefining it and prescribing a graver penalty for the commission thereof. The repeal of Article 336 does not deprive the courts of jurisdiction to try and punish “A” for rape under Article 336. RA No. 8353 shall not be given retroactive effect since it is not favorable to the accused.
DECRIMINALIZATION
1. Vagrancy - Before Article 202 of RPC punishes vagrancy and prostitution. But Article 202 of RPC as amended merely penalizes prostitution. In sum, RA No. 10158 has decriminalized vagrancy by omitting portions of Article 202 involving crime vagrancy. A reading of the Senate deliberation pertaining to the passage of law decriminalizing vagrancy shows that they considered vagrants as victims of poverty and that the law on vagrancy serves to oppress the very people that the government sought to protect.
In view of the new policy of the State decriminalizing vagrancy, which is embodied in RA No. 10158, ordinance, which punishes vagrancy, should be declared as contrary to law, and hence, invalid. Settled is the rule that what the national legislature expressly allows by law, a local legislature may not disallow by ordinance or resolution (Lina vs. Pana, G.R. No. 129093, August 30, 2001). The spring cannot rise higher than its source. As aptly explained by Justice Nachura in his book, “An ordinance must not be contrary to the Constitution or law. Prohibited
activities may not be legalized in the guise of regulation; activities allowed by law cannot be prohibited, only regulated.”
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RA No. 10158 shall be given retroactive effect. Under Section 2 and 3 thereof, all pending cases for vagrancy shall be dismissed and all persons serving sentence for vagrancy shall be immediately released. Since Sections 2 and 3 of RA No. 10158 expressly provide retroactive application to the law without distinction, whether the offender is a habitual delinquent or not.
2. Premature marriage - Under Article 351 of RPC, a woman in contracting marriage
within 301 days from death of husband, or dissolution or annulment of marriage is liable for the crime of premature marriage. However, RA No. 10655 decriminalizes premature marriage by repealing Article 351. Premature marriage was decriminalize since Article 351 discriminates women because this provision is not applicable to men. Moreover, Article 351 sought to prevent a possible confusion as to whether the father of the child born after the dissolution of the marriage is the first husband or the second. This preventive measure is not anymore necessary since paternity and filiation could now be easily determined through modern technology.
MISTAKE OF FACT PRINCIPLE:
Requisites: (1) That the acts done would have been lawful had the facts been as the accused believed them to be (2) that the mistake of fact is not due to negligence or unlawful intent of the offender. The Supreme Court in several cases had applied the “mistake of fact” doctrine, which allowed the accused, who committed a crime on a mistaken belief, to enjoy the benefit of the justifying circumstance of self-defense (United States vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488), defense of person and right (US vs. Bautista, G.R. No. 10678 August 17, 1915), defense of honor (United States vs. Apego, 23 Phil. 391), performance of duty, (People vs. Mamasalaya, G.R. No.L-4911, February 10, 1953), and the exempting circumstance of obedience of an order of superior officer (People vs. Beronilla, G.R. No. L-4445, February 28, 1955). In Ah Chong, the accused, who believed that the victim was a robber and that his life was in danger because of the commencement of unlawful aggression, was acquitted due to mistake of fact doctrine in relation to the rule on self-defense. In Oanis vs. Galanta, the accused, who believed that the sleeping victim is a notorious criminal to be arrested by them, was held guilty of murder for shooting him since the mistake of fact principle in relation to performance of duty is not applicable. Second element is not present since they did not ascertain first his identify despite opportunity. The first element is not likewise present since the killing of victim believed to be a criminal was not necessary consequence of the due performance of duty of the accused as police officers.
The gist of the theft is the intent to deprive another of his property in a chattel, either for gain or out of wantonness or malice to deprive another of his right in the thing taken. This cannot be where the taker honestly believes the property is his own or that of another, and that he has a right to take possession of it for himself or for another, for the protection of the latter. However, the belief of the accused of his ownership over the property must be honest and in good faith and not a mere sham or pretense. If the claim is dishonest, a mere pretense, taking the property of another will not protect the taker (Gaviola vs. People, G.R. No. 163927, January 27, 2006). This belief of ownership as a defense in theft is in accordance with the mistake of fact doctrine.
X informed the authorities regarding armed rebel elements on board a vehicle in a certain barangay. Several policemen, Barangay officers and members of the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF) responded to information and set a check point. X pointed at an approaching jitney occupied by rebels. They flagged down the vehicle but the same did not stop. They attacked the vehicle with automatic weapons by firing directly thereat. One died and another was wounded. It turned out however that the victims are unarmed innocent civilians. Are those responsible for the death and injuries of the victims liable for homicide? Is the doctrine of mistake of fact applicable? Answer: They are liable for homicide and attempted homicide. The duty of those manning the check point is to identify the occupants of their suspect vehicle and search for firearms inside it to validate the information they had received; they may even effect a bloodless arrest. While, rebellion is a continuing offense, they cannot open fire at or kill the suspects under any and all circumstances. There is no evidence showing that they were placed in real mortal danger in the presence of the victims. Hence, the mistake of fact principle is not applicable since there is negligence or bad faith on their part (Yapyucu vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 120744-46, June 25, 2012).
South African athlete Oscar Pistorius has been found guilty of culpable homicide after the judge found he killed his girlfriend by mistake. The judge said the athlete had acted "negligently" when he fired shots through a toilet door, but in the "belief that there was an intruder". If the case happened here, should the athlete be convicted of homicide or reckless imprudence resulting in homicide?
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Answer: The athlete should be held liable with homicide with privilege mitigating circumstance of defense of property.
In mistake of fact, which negates dolo, it is important requisite that that act would have been lawful had the fact been as the accused believed them to be. If there was really an intruder inside the toilet, it would be considered as unlawful aggression against his property, which would allow him to use reasonable means to repel it in accordance with the self-help doctrine under Article 429 of the Civil Code and defense of property under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code. However, the means employed by him firing shots through the toilet door is not reasonable; and hence, he is only entitled to privileged migrating circumstance of incomplete defense of property (See: People vs. Narvaez, G.R. Nos. L-33466-67, April 20, 1983). In sum, the act would have been attended by the privilege mitigating circumstance of incomplete justification had the facts been as the accused believed them to be.
VOLUNTARINESS – Concurrence of freedom, intelligence and intent makes up the
“criminal mind” behind the “criminal act.” Thus, to constitute a crime, the act must, generally and in most cases, be accompanied by a criminal intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit
rea. No crime is committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is
innocent (People vs. Ojeda, G.R. Nos. 104238-58, June 3, 2004). Voluntariness is an element of crime, whether committed by dolo or culpa or punishable under special law. The act to be considered a crime must be committed with freedom and intelligence. In addition to voluntariness, intentional felony must be committed with dolo (malice), culpable felony with culpa, and mala prohibita under special law with intent to perpetrate the act or with specific intent (such as animus possidendi in illegal possession of firearm). Presumption of
voluntariness: In the determination of the culpability of every criminal actor, voluntariness is
an essential element. Without it, the imputation of criminal responsibility and the imposition of the corresponding penalty cannot be legally sanctioned. The human mind is an entity, and understanding it is not purely an intellectual process but is dependent to a large degree upon emotional and psychological appreciation. A man’s act is presumed voluntary. It is improper to assume the contrary, i.e. that acts were done unconsciously, for the moral and legal presumption is that every person is presumed to be of sound mind, or that freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person (People vs. Opuran, G.R. Nos. 147674-75, March 17, 2004).
CRIMINAL INTENT – To be held liable for intentional felony, the offender must commit
the act prohibited by RPC with specific criminal intent and general criminal intent. General criminal intent (dolo in Article 3 of RPC) is an element of all crimes but malice is properly applied only to deliberate acts done on purpose and with design. Evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a felony. A deliberate and unlawful act gives rise to a presumption of malice by intent. On the other hand, specific intent is a definite and actual purpose to accomplish some particular thing. In estafa, the specific intent is to defraud, in homicide intent to kill, in theft intent to gain (Recuerdo vs. People, G.R. No. 168217, June 27, 2006, ). In the US vs. Ah Chong, the accused was acquitted because of mistake of fact principle even though the evidence showed that he attacked the deceased with intent to kill (United States vs. Apego, G.R. No. 7929, November 8, 1912; Dissenting opinion of J. Trent), which was established by the statement of the accused "If you enter the room I will kill you." Article 249 (homicide) should be read in relation to Article 3. The accused was acquitted not because of the absence of intent to kill (specific intent) but by reason of lack of general intent (dolo or malice).
PRESUMED MALICE - The general criminal intent (malice) is presumed from the
criminal act and in the absence of any general intent is relied upon as a defense, such absence must be proved by the accused (Ah Chong case, the accused was able to rebut the presumption of general criminal intent or malice). Generally, a specific intent is not presumed. Its existence, as a matter of fact, must be proved by the State just as any other essential element. This may be shown, however, by the nature of the act, the circumstances under which it was committed, the means employed and the motive of the accused (Recuerdo vs. People, G.R. No. 168217, June 27, 2006). There are other specific intents that are presumed. If a person died due to violence, intent to kill is conclusively presumed. Intent to gain is presumed from taking property without consent of owner.
MOTIVE
Doubt as to the identity of the culprit - Motive gains importance only when the
identity of the assailant is in doubt. As held in a long line of cases, the prosecution does not need to prove the motive of the accused when the latter has been identified as the author of the crime. The accused was positively identified by witnesses. Thus, the prosecution did not have
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to identify and prove the motive for the killing. It is a matter of judicial knowledge that persons have been killed for no apparent reason at all, and that friendship or even relationship is no deterrent to the commission of a crime. The lack or absence of motive for committing the crime does not preclude conviction where there are reliable witnesses who fully and satisfactorily identified the petitioner as the perpetrator of the felony (Kummer vs. People, GR No. 174461, September 11, 2013).
Circumstantial or inconclusive evidence - Indeed, motive becomes material when the
evidence is circumstantial or inconclusive, and there is some doubt on whether a crime has been committed or whether the accused has committed it. The following circumstantial evidence is sufficient to convict accused: 1. Accused had motive to kill the deceased because during the altercation the latter slapped and hit him with a bamboo, prompting Romulo to get mad at the deceased; 2. Accused was chased by the deceased eastward after the slapping and hitting incident; 3. Said accused was the last person seen with the deceased just before he died; (4) Accused and Antonio Trinidad surrendered to police authorities with the samurai; (5) Some of the wounds inflicted on the deceased were caused by a bolo or a knife. (Trinidad vs. People, GR No. 192241, June 13, 2012).
INDETERMINATE OFFENSE DOCTRINE – In People vs. Lamahang, G.R. No. 43530,
August 3, 1935, En Banc - Accused who was caught in the act of making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store was held guilty of attempted trespassing and not attempted robbery. The act of making an opening on the wall of the store is an overt act of trespassing since it reveals an evident intention to enter by means of force said store against the will of its owner. However, it is not an overt act of robbery since the intention of the accused once he succeeded in entering the store is not determinate; it is subject to different interpretations. His final objective could be to rob, to cause physical injury to its occupants, or to commit any other offense. In sum, the crime the he intended to commit inside the store is indeterminate, and thus, an attempt to commit it is not punishable as attempted felony.
In Cruz vs. People, G.R. No. 166441, October 08, 2014 - The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim, and was already touching her genitalia with his hands and mashing her breasts when she freed herself from his clutches and effectively ended his designs on her. Yet, inferring from such circumstances that rape, and no other, was his intended felony would be highly unwarranted. This was so, despite his lust for and lewd designs towards her being fully manifest. Such circumstances remained equivocal, or "susceptible of double interpretation" (People v. Lamahang). Verily, his felony would not exclusively be rape had he been allowed by her to continue, and to have sexual congress with her, for some other felony like simple seduction (if he should employ deceit to have her yield to him) could also be ultimate felony.
PROXIMATE CAUSE
Proximate cause is the primary or moving cause of the death of the victim; it is the cause, which in the natural and continuous sequence unbroken with any “efficient intervening
cause” produces death and without which the fatal result could not have happened. It is the
cause, which is the nearest in the order of responsible causation (Black’s Law Dictionary).
Intervening cause - The direct relation between the intentional felony and death may be broken
by efficient intervening cause or an active force which is either a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the felonious act of the offender. Lightning that kills the injured victim or tetanus infecting the victim several days after the infliction of injuries, or voluntary immersing the wounds to aggravate the crime committed by accused is an intervening cause. Thus, the accused is liable for physical injuries because of the intervening cause rule. On the other hand, carelessness of the victim, or involuntary removal of the drainage, lack of proper treatment is not an intervening cause. Hence, the accused is liable for the death because of the proximate cause rule.
If the victim died due to tetanus of which he was infected when the accused inflicted injuries upon him, the crime committed is homicide (People vs. Cornel, G.R. No. L-204, May 16, 1947). If the victim died due to tetanus of which he was infected after the accused inflicted injuries upon him, the crime committed is physical injuries. The accused is not liable for homicide because tetanus is an efficient intervening cause. Thus, the proximate cause of the death of the victim is not the infliction of injuries. In Villacorta vs. People, G.R. No. 186412, September 7, 2011 (Justice De Castro), there had been an interval of 22 days between the date of the stabbing and the date when victim was rushed to hospital, exhibiting symptoms of severe tetanus infection. Since the victim was infected of severe tetanus, he died the next day. The incubation period of severe tetanus is less than 14 days. Hence, he could not have been infected at the time of the stabbing since that incident occurred 22 days before the victim was
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rushed to the hospital. The infection of victim’s stab wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause. The accused was held liable for physical injuries.
Proximate cause has been defined as "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred." Although there was no direct injury on his vital organs of the victim, his wounds affected his kidneys, causing multiple organ failure and eventually his death. Accused is liable for homicide. Without the stab wounds, the victim could not have been afflicted with an infection which later on caused multiple organ failure that caused his death. The offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim if his delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the victim (Belbis, Jr. vs. People, GR No. 181052, November 14, 2012).
ERROR IN PERSONAE - In case of error in personae, person is criminally responsible
for committing an intentional felony although the consequent victim is different from that intended due to mistake of identity. Requisites: In order to make a person criminally liable in case of error in personae, the following requisites must be present: (1) Offender committed an intentional felony; (2) The consequent victim against whom the felony was directed is different from that intended due to mistake of identity. If the penalty for the intended crime is different from that of the committed crime, the court shall impose the penalty for the intended crime or committed crime, whichever is lesser.
ABERRATIO ICTUS - In case of aberratio ictus, person is criminally responsible for
committing an intentional felony although the consequent victim is different from that intended due to mistake of blow. Requisites: In order to make a person criminally liable in case of aberratio ictus, the following requisites must be present: (1) Offender committed an intentional felony; (2) The consequent victim against whom the felony was directed is different from that intended due to mistake of blow. The crime committed against the intended victim and victim injured due to aberratio ictus shall be made a complex crime (compound crime). The court shall impose the penalty for the most serious crime in its maximum period.
The circumstance of aberratio ictus (mistake in the blow) can neither exempt the accused from criminal responsibility nor mitigate his criminal liability. Under Article 4 of RPC, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended (Matic vs. People, G.R. No. 180219, November 23, 2011).
PRAETER INTENTIONEM: In case of praeter intentionem, person is criminally
responsible for committing an intentional felony although its wrongful consequence is graver than that intended. Requisites: In order to make a person criminally liable under Article 4 (1) in case of praeter intentionem, the following requisites must be present: (1) Offender committed an intentional felony; (2) The wrongful act done, which is graver than that intended, is the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony committed by the offender. Praeter intentionem may be appreciated as mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong than that committed.
When death resulted, even if there was no intent to kill, the crime is homicide, not just physical injuries, since with respect to crimes of personal violence the penal law looks particularly to the material results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for all the consequences thereof. He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused (Seguritan vs. People, G.R. No. 172896, April 19, 2010).
1. Mitigating circumstance - The mitigating circumstance that “the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed” or praeter intentionem is obtaining
when there is a notable disparity between the means employed by the accused to commit a wrong and the resulting crime committed. The intention of the accused at the time of the commission of the crime is manifested from the weapon used, the mode of attack employed and the injury sustained by the victim (People vs. Maglian, G.R. No. 189834, March 30, 2011).The mitigating circumstance of praeter intentionem cannot be appreciated if the acts employed by accused were reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually produce the death of the victim (People vs. Sales, G.R. No. 177218, October 3, 2011).
2. Evident premeditation- In case of aberatiu ictus and error in personae, the SC did
not appreciate evident premeditation since the victim, who was actually killed, is not contemplated in the premeditation of the accused (People vs. Trinidad, G.R. NO. L-38930, June 28, 1988; People vs. Mabug-at, 51 Phil., 967; People vs. Trinidad, G.R. No. L-38930, June 28, 1988). However, praeter intentionem and evident premeditation can be
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independently appreciated. there is no incompatibility between evident premeditation and no intention to commit so grave a wrong since the latter is based on the state of mind of the offender while the former manner of committing the crime (Reyes; People vs. Enriquez, 58 Phil. 536).
3. Treachery - If accused employed means to render the victim defenseless, treachery
shall be appreciated even if the killing is due to error in personae (People vs. Del Castillo, Sr., G.R. No. L-32995, April 30, 1984) or aberratio ictus (People vs. Mabug-at, G.R. No. 25459, August 10, 1926, En Banc) or with the circumstance of praeter intentionem (People vs. Cagoco, G.R. No. 38511, October 6, 1933)
4. Conspiracy - Conspirators, who conspired to kill a particular parson, are equally
liable for the killing of another person due to error in personae (People vs. Pinto, Jr. and Buenaflor, G.R. No. No. 39519, November 21, 1991). However, conspirator, who never even fired a single shot and whose only participation was to drive their getaway vehicle and to lend his firearm to his back rider so that the latter could finish off the target victim was not found accountable for the injury sustained by the unintended victim was just a star-crossed bystander who was accidentally hit in the process (aberratio ictus) (People vs. Herbias, G.R. No. 112716-17, December 16, 1996; People vs. Flora and Flora, G.R. No. 125909, June 23, 2000).
INTENT TO KILL: Intent to kill is an element of homicide and murder. But even if
offender had no intent to kill, he would be held just the same liable for homicide or murder if his felonious act is the proximate cause of the death of the latter. Even if there is no intent to kill, offender is liable for homicide or murder if the victim died as a result of the “felonious act” of the former. The offender’s act is considered felonious if it is accompanied with criminal or evil intent such as intent to inflict injury, intent to hide the body of the crime, intent to threaten victim, intent to silence the hold-up victim, or intent to rape. Offender is liable for homicide because it is the natural, direct and logical consequence of an act committed with criminal intent.
a. With intent to hide the body of the crime – In People vs. Ortega, Jr., G.R. No.
116736, July 24, 1997 - Ortega stabbed the victim. Garcia assisted Ortega in concealing the body of the victim by throwing the body into the well. Victim died due to drowning. Issue: Is Garcia liable for the death of the victim as principal in homicide even if his intention was not to kill the victim but merely to assist Ortega in concealing his dead body not knowing that the victim was still alive at that time? In assisting Ortega carry the body of victim to the well, Garcia was committing an intentional felony; concealing the body of the crime to prevent its discovery makes him liable as an accessory in homicide. Hence, Garcia should be held liable for the direct, natural and logical consequence of his felonious act of assisting Ortega in hiding the body of the victim. Since proximate cause of death of the victim is the felonious and accessory act of throwing the victim into the well, Garcia should be held liable for the death as principal in homicide.
b. With intent to threaten – In US vs. Valdez, G.R. No. 16486, March 22, 1921, En
Banc - The accused in rage he moved towards victim with a big knife in hand, threatening to stab him. Victim believing himself in great and immediate peril jumped into the water where he was drowned. The accused was found guilty of homicide. The act of threatening to stab victim constitutes a felony of threat. Hence, accused is liable for the direct, natural and logical consequence of his intentional and felonious act. It was held that: "If a man creates in another
man's mind an immediate sense of danger which causes such person to try to escape, and in so doing he injures himself, the person who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the injuries which result."
d. Intent to inflict injury - Intentional infliction of injury resulting in death of the
victim constitutes homicide or murder. In People vs. Pugay, et al., No 74324, November 17, 1988, the deceased, a retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends. Deceased used to run errands for Pugay and at times they slept together. During a town fiesta fair was held in the public plaza. Accused, Pugay and Samson with several companions, who appeared to be drunk, made the deceased dance by tickling him with a piece of wood. Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the accused Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline from under the engine of the Ferris wheel and poured its contents on the body of the former. Then, the accused Samson set victim on fire making a human torch out of him. Pugay and Samson were stunned when they noticed the deceased burning. Crime committed by Samson: There is no intent to kill. The act of the Accused was merely a part of their fun-making that evening. Accused merely intended to set the deceased's clothes on fire. His act, however, does not relieve him of criminal responsibility. Burning the clothes of the victim would cause at the
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very least some kind of physical injuries on his person, a felony. Since such felony of physical injuries resulted into a graver offense, he must be held responsible therefor. (Note: The crime is not murder qualified by means of fire because the fire was not use to kill but merely to inflict injury).
e. Recklessness – Even if there is no intent to kill and evil intent, offender is liable for
culpable felony if the victim died as a result of the recklessness of the former. Crime committed by Pugay: Having taken the can from under the engine of the Ferris wheel and holding it before pouring its contents on the body of the deceased, this accused knew that the can contained gasoline. The stinging smell of this flammable liquid could not have escaped his notice even before pouring the same. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act that may be committed by his companions who at the time were making fun of the deceased. The accused is only guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence.
f. Accident - If there is no intent to kill, evil intent and recklessness on the part of the
accused, he is not liable for his intentional act, which caused the death of the victim. In United States vs. Tanedo (15 Phil. Rep., 196), deceased went with the accused to hunt wild chickens at the forest. While hunting, the accused came upon a wild chicken, and, not seeing deceased about and not knowing or having any reason to believe that he was in that vicinity shot the chicken. The bullet that hit the chicken recoiled and hit the deceased. It was held that accused is not criminally liable. Life was taken by misfortune or accident while in the performance of a lawful act executed with due care and without intention of doing harm. Note: The accused could not have foreseen that the slug after hitting the chicken would recoil and hit deceased. The principle enunciated in Tanedo case will not apply if the place where the accused lawfully discharged his firearm is populated. In People vs. Nocum, G.R. No. L-482, 25 February 1947, En Banc - There was a fistic fight between two persons. Desiring to stop the encounter, accused shouted at the combatants. As these paid him no attention, he drew a .45 caliber pistol and shot twice in the air. The bout continued, however; so he fired another shot at the ground, but unfortunately the bullet ricocheted, and hit an innocent by-stander, resident of the place. Victim died. It was held that: “The mishap should be classed as homicide
through reckless imprudence, the slaying having been unintentional. It is apparent that defendant willfully discharged his gun-for without taking the precautions demanded by the circumstance that the district was populated, and the likelihood that his bullet would glance over the hard pavement of the Manila thoroughfare. Note: The accused should have foreseen
that the slug after hitting the pavement would recoil and might hit somebody.
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
Offender shall be held liable for impossible crime if the following requisites are present: (1) offender performing an act which would have been an offense against person or property; (2) offender performed an act with evil intent; (3) offender did not commit the offense because of the impossibility of its accomplishment or employment of inadequate or ineffectual means; and (4) offender in performing an act is not violating another provision of the law (Luis B. Reyes).
Impossible crime of theft - X, employee of Mega Inc., received check from the
customer of her employer. Instead of remitting the check to her employer, X deposited the check under her account. However, the drawee bank dishonored the check because of insufficiency of funds. What is the crime committed by X? Answer: The crime committed is impossible crime of qualified theft. Qualified theft is a crime against property. The act of depositing the check is committed with evil intent. The mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Inc. showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. There is factually impossibility to accomplish the crime of qualified theft since the check is unfunded. (Jacinto vs. People, G.R. No. 162540, July 13, 2009).
Intod principle - In Intod vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103119, October 21, 1992 –
Outside the house of the victim, accused with intent to kill fired at the bedroom, where the victim is supposed to be sleeping. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire. The accused were convicted of impossible crime. Accused shoot the place where he thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the accused failed to accomplish their end due to its factual impossibility. In the United States, criminal laws are silent regarding impossible crimes; hence where the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible of accomplishment, the offender shall be liable for attempted crime. On the other hand, where the offense is legally impossible of accomplishment, the actor cannot be held liable for any crime. In the Philippines, the crime committed is impossible crime if the offense sought to be committed is
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factually or legally impossible. Killing a dead person is impossible crime because of legal impossibility. Putting the hand inside an empty pocket with intention to steal a wallet is impossible crime because of factual impossibility.
Raping a dead person - Prior to RA 8353, rape is a crime against chastity. Thus, if a
person raped a dead person believing that she was just sleeping, offender could not be held liable for impossible crime (J. Ramon Aquino). In impossible crime the act could have constituted the crime against person or property if its accomplishment was not impossible. Rape is neither a crime against person nor against property. However, RA 8353 reclassifies rape from crime against chastity to crime against person. Hence, an offender for raping a dead person without knowing that she was already dead may now be held liable for impossible crime.
Committing another crime - “A” discharged shotgun at “B” from a distance of 300
yards; but because of the limited range of the firepower of the shotgun, it would be impossible for “A” to harm “B”. “A” is liable of discharged of firearm and not impossible crime. Where the offender unlawful entered the house and took a watch that turned out to be his own, he is liable for trespass to dwelling and not impossible crime (Criminal Law Conspectus by Justice Florenz Regalado). If the accused administered abortive drugs upon his girlfriend whom he believed to be pregnant, which turned out not to be true, but the woman became ill for more than 30 days, the accused will be liable for serious physical injuries and not impossible crime of abortion (Criminal Law Reviewer by Gregorio).
STAGES
ATTEMPTED AND FRUSTRATED STAGES: In attempted felony, the offender performs
directly an overt act, which consists of one or more acts of execution, but not enough to consequently produce the felony. In frustrated felony, the offenders perform all the acts of execution that would produce the felony as a matter of consequence. To determine whether the felony is at the attempted or frustrated stage, acts of execution of execution of a felony must be identified. Example: The acts of execution that would produce homicide or murder are infliction of mortal wounds upon the victim. If the wounds inflicted upon the victim with intent to kill are non-mortal, the crime committed is attempted homicide; if wounds are mortal, the crime committed is frustrated homicide.
In attempted felony and frustrated felony, the external acts performed by the offender and the intended felony must have a direct connection; but in an attempted felony, the offender failed to perform all the acts of execution; thus his external acts would “not produce” the felony as a consequence; on the other hand in a frustrated felony, the offender performed all the acts of execution; thus, his external acts “would produce” the felony as a consequence.
FRUSTRATED AND CONSUMMATED - In frustrated and consummated felony, the
accused performed all acts of execution that would produce the felony as a consequence. If the felony is not produced due to external cause, the crime committed is frustrated felony; if the felony is produced the crime committed is consummated.
In frustrated felony, the offender performed all the acts of execution but the felony was not produced as a consequence due to extraneous cause. However, there are felonies, the commission of which has no frustrated stage since the performance of all the acts of execution immediately consummates the felony. In homicide or murder case, once the offender inflicted mortal wound on the victim, all the acts of execution are considered performed. However, what consummates homicide or murder is not the infliction of mortal wounds but the death of the victim as a consequence of the mortal wound inflicted. Thus, if the mortally wounded victim did not die due to medical intervention, homicide or murder is only at the frustrated stage. On the other hand, in rape once the offender sexually penetrate the labia of the vagina of the victim, all the acts of execution are considered performed. But since sexual penetration consummates rape, there are no occasions where the offender performed all the acts of execution and yet the felony was not produced as a consequence. In sum, there is no such thing as frustrated rape since the performance of all the acts of execution immediately consummates rape.
ABSOLUTORY CAUSE – In attempted felony and frustrated felony, the offender failed
to accomplish his criminal objective by reason of extraneous causes; if the causes are not extraneous, the accused will be absolved from criminal liability.
a. Negative Act - In the attempted stage of the execution of a felony, the offender must
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has not yet performed all the acts of execution that would produce the felony as a consequence, he must spontaneously desist from further doing criminal acts that will complete all the acts of execution. Example: “A” with intent to kill shot “B”; “B” sustained non-mortal wound. To be exempt from criminal liability for attempted homicide or murder, “A” must spontaneously desist from further shooting “B” in order not to inflict mortal injury upon him.
b. Positive Act – If the offender performs all the acts of execution, which would
produce the felony as a consequence, offender is not exempted from liability for frustrated felony even if he voluntary desisted from further doing criminal act. Spontaneous desistance is a defense in attempted felony but not in frustrated felony. In the frustrated stage of the execution of a felony, the offender must do a “positive act” to be exempt from criminal liability; since the offender has performed all the acts of execution that would produce the felony as a consequence, he must do something to prevent, or thwart the production of the felony. Example: “A” with intent to kill shot “B”; “B” sustained mortal wound. To be exempt from criminal liability for frustrated felony, it is not enough that “A” would desist from further shooting “B”. The spontaneous desistance is not a valid defense since “A” had already inflicted mortal wound on “B” that would cause his death as a consequence. Thus, “A” must save the life of “B” by treating his wound. If “B” did not die because “A’s” medical treatment, the latter will not be held liable for frustrated felony because the homicide was not produced due to the will of “A”.
c. Not absolutory cause – If the felony is consummated, offender cannot undo what
was done. Offender would not be absolved from criminal liability even if he had done something that will mitigate the effects of the felonious act. Example: (1) Restitution of funds malversed immediately and voluntarily made before the case was instituted is not an absolutory cause (Navarro vs. Meneses III, CBD Adm. Case No. 313, January 30, 1998, En Banc). (2) “A” stole chicken under the house of “B” one evening. Realizing that what he did was wrong, “A” returned the chicken to the place under the house of “B”. Since the crime of theft was already consummated, the return of the stolen property does not relieve “A” of criminal responsibility. “A” had already performed all the acts of execution, which produced the crime of theft before he returned the chicken (Reyes). (3) The fact that the accused abandoned victim after six days of captivity does not lessen his criminal culpability much less exempt him from criminal liability for the kidnapping and detention of victim (Baldogo, G.R. No. 128106-07, January 24, 2003, En Banc).
SPONTANOEUS DESISTANCE - The term spontaneous is not equivalent to voluntary.
Even if the desistance is voluntary, the same could not exempt the offender from liability for attempted felony if there is an external constraint. The term “spontaneous” means proceeding from natural feeling or native tendency without external constraint; it is synonymous with impulsive, automatic and mechanical (People vs. Lizada, G.R. No. 143468-71, January 24, 2003, En Banc).
Accused had previously raped the victim several times. During the subject incident, accused was wearing a pair of short pants but naked from waist up. He entered the bedroom of victim, went on top of her, held her hands, removed her panty, mashed her breasts and touched her sex organ. However, accused saw Rossel peeping through the door and dismounted. He berated Rossel for peeping and ordered him to go back to his room and to sleep. Accused then left the room of the victim. Held: Accused intended to have carnal knowledge of victim. The overt acts of accused proven by the prosecution were not merely preparatory acts. By the series of his overt acts, accused had commenced the execution of rape, which, if not for his desistance, will ripen into the crime of rape. Although accused desisted from performing all the acts of execution, however, his desistance was not spontaneous as he was impelled to do so only because of the sudden and unexpected arrival of Rossel. Hence, accused is guilty only of attempted rape (People vs. Lizada, G.R. No. 143468-71, January 24, 2003, En Banc).
HOMICIDE OR MURDER – The intent to kill, as an essential element of homicide at
whatever stage, may be before or simultaneous with the infliction of injuries. The evidence to prove intent to kill may consist of, inter alia, the means used; the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim; and the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after the killing of the victim (Escamilla vs. People, GR No. 188551, February 27, 2013).
X opened the door and while still in the car drew a gun and shot A once, hitting him just below the left armpit. X sped away. The wound sustained by A is not fatal. What is the crime committed? Answer: X only shot the victim once and did not hit any vital part of the
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latter's body. If he intended to kill him, X could have shot the victim multiple times or even ran him over with the car. Since intent to kill is lacking but wounds are inflicted upon the victim, the crime is not attempted murder but physical injuries only (Pentecostes, Jr. vs. People, GR No. 167766, April 07, 2010).
X was charged with frustrated murder for hacking the neck of victim with the use of a scythe. Invoking the doctrine in Pentecostes, Jr., X claimed that had he intended to kill victim, he could have repeatedly hacked him to ensure the latter’s death. Is the argument tenable? Answer: No. Pentesoste Jr. case is not applicable since the victim in that case was shot in the arm, a non-vital part of the body. In this case, the use of a scythe against victim’s neck was determinative of the homicidal intent of X. A single hacking blow in the neck could be enough to decapitate a person and leave him dead. Refraining from further hacking the victim does not negate intent to kill. What could have been a fatal blow was already delivered and there was no more desistance to speak of (People vs. Abella, G.R. No. 198400, October 07, 2013).
Using a gun, he shot the victim in the chest. Despite a bloodied right upper torso, the latter still managed to run towards his house to ask for help. Nonetheless, petitioner continued to shoot at him three more times, albeit unsuccessfully. The wound sustained by the victim is fatal. The crime committed is frustrated homicide (Escamilla vs. People, GR No. 188551, February 27, 2013).
COMPLEX CRIME
Killing persons and injuring two more by treacherously detonating a hand grenade in a dancing place constitutes the complex crime of multiple murders with double attempted murder. Single act of detonating an explosive device may quantitatively constitute a cluster of several separate and distinct offenses, yet these component criminal offenses should be considered only as a single crime in law on which a single penalty is imposed because the offender was impelled by a single criminal impulse which shows his lesser degree of perversity. Even though the other victim did not suffer mortal wounds, the crime committed is not physical injuries, because accused was motivated by the same intent to kill when he detonated the explosive device inside the dancing place (People vs. Barde, G.R. No. 183094, September 22, 2010).
RECOMMENDED EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
Accused was convicted of crime RA No. 8282 for his failure to remit SSS contributions of his employees and was sentenced to suffer up to 20 years of reclusion temporal. The penalty is excessive since he already paid his delinquent contribution. Under Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, the courts are bound to apply the law as it is and impose the proper penalty, no matter how harsh it might be. The same provision, however, gives the Court the discretion to recommend to the President actions it deems appropriate but are beyond its power when it considers the penalty imposed as excessive. Although an accused is convicted under a special penal law, the Court is not precluded from giving the Revised Penal Code suppletory application in light of Article 10 of the same Code (Mendoza vs. People, G.R. No. 183891, October 19, 2011).
CONSPIRACY
IMPLIED CONSPIRACY In People vs. Dollendo, G.R. No. 181701, January 18, 2012
-The “evidence of a chain of circumstances,” to wit: that appellant went inside the house of Romines to ascertain that the victim was there; that he fetched Dollendo to bring him to Ruiz; that he gave the dipang to Dollendo to commit the crime; and that they both fled after the stabbing, taken collectively, shows a community of criminal design to kill the victim. Evidently, there was conspiracy in the commission of the crime.
COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY - It is immaterial whether appellant acted as a
principal or as an accomplice because the conspiracy and his participation therein have been established. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all and the conspirators shall be held equally liable for the crime (People vs. Siongco, G.R. No. 186472, July 5, 2010).
DISSOCIATION - To exempt himself from criminal liability, a conspirator must have
performed an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent the commission thereof (People vs. Ebet, G.R. No. 181635 November 15, 2010).
MASTERMIND - To be held liable as conspirator, it must also be shown that the
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mastermind of a crime (People vs. Vera, GR No. 128966, August 18, 1999). One who plans the
commission of a crime is liable as conspirator and principal by inducement (People vs. Comiling, G.R. No. 140405, March 4, 2004, En banc).Notwithstanding, the fact that one was not at the crime scene, evidence proved that he was the mastermind of the criminal act or the principal by inducement. What is important is that inducement was the determining cause of the commission of the crime. The command or advice made by principal by inducement was of such nature that, without it, the crime would not have materialized (People vs. Janjalani, G.R. No. 188314, January 10, 2011).
PRESENCE - Accused, unarmed, appeared in the company of his employer, and
another person. His employer shot and killedthe victim. Accused did nothing to prevent the killing. Accused fled together with his employer and other person.The fact that accused appeared together with employer and another and fled with them proves a certain degree of participation and cooperation in the execution of the crime. However, there is doubt as to whether accused acted as a principal or just a mere accomplice. Such doubt should be resolved in favor of the milder form of criminal liability—that of a mere accomplice (People vs. Tomas, G.R. No. 192251, February 16, 2011). If the accused is armed at the time, he could be held liable as principal on the basis of implied conspiracy. The fact that the companion of the criminal actor is armed may mean that the former is supplying moral assistance to the latter. The armed presence of conspiratorial companion may prove a sense of security and encouragement on the part of the material executor or may serve as deterrence against possible defender or rescuer (Galgo, G.R. No. 133887, May 28, 2002, En Banc).
SPECIAL LAW - B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the supplementary
application of the provisions RPC including the rule on conspiracy. Hence, such rule may be applied supplementarily. Thus, a non-issuer of bum check can be held liable for violation of BP Blg. 22 on the basis of conspiracy. (Ladonga vs. People, G.R. No. 141066, February 17, 2005). The principle of conspiracy may be applied to RA No. 9262. Thus, a person (such as mother-in-law), who has no marital, sexual or dating relationship with the victim, can be held liable for violence against woman on the basis of conspiracy (Go-Tan vs. Go, G.R. No. 168852, September 30, 2008)
Anti-graft law - May a private person be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g)
of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the filing of the Information? Answer: Yes. The death of the public officer does not mean that the allegation of conspiracy between him and private individual can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of the public officer is his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and private individual (People vs. Go, GR NO. 168539, March 25, 2014, en banc).
Robbery with rape – When a homicide takes place by reason of or on the occasion of
the robbery, all those who took part shall be guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide whether they actually participated in the killing, unless there is proof that there was an endeavor to prevent the killing. The records are bereft of any evidence to prove, or even remotely suggest, that appellant attempted to prevent the killing. Therefore, the basic principle in conspiracy that the "act of one is the act of all," applies in this case (People vs. Ebet, GR No. 181635, November 15, 2010; People vs. De Leon, GR No. 179943, June 26, 2009; People vs. Diu, GR No. 201449, April 03, 2013)
If a robber tries to prevent the commission of homicide after the commission of the robbery, he is guilty only of robbery and not of robbery with homicide. All those who conspire to commit robbery with homicide are guilty as principals of such crime, although not all profited and gained from the robbery. One who joins a criminal conspiracy adopts the criminal designs of his co-conspirators and can no longer repudiate the conspiracy once it has materialized (People vs. Ebet, GR No. 181635, November 15, 2010; People vs. Diu, GR No. 201449, April 03, 2013).
Kidnapping with rape - A, B and C kidnapped X from her house, and then detained
her in a safe house for purpose of extorting ransom. While C went to Jolibee to buy food, A raped X in the presence of B. What is the crime committed by A, B and C? Answer: A is liable for special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape. Since X is a female, taking her away from her house against her will and holding her as captive constitute kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Raping the kidnapped victim is a qualifying circumstance. These two crimes should be integrated together to form a composite crime where the law prescribes a single penalty.
