Administrative Law Cases Compilation

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DEFINITION

CASE 1: LAUREL v. DESIERTO- KAMAE CRUZ

FACTS: In June 1991, President Aquino issued AO 223, constituting a committee for the nationwide preparation for the national centennial celebration in 1998. Subsequently, President Ramos issued EO 128, reconstituting the said committee, which later on became the National Centennial Commission (NCC). Then VP Laurel was appointed as the chair.

This commission was an ad-hoc body, the existence of which shall terminate upon the completion of all activities related to the celebration.

Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo ’98 Corporation (Expocorp) was created, Laurel being one of its incorporators and directors. Laurel was later on elected as Expocorp Chief Executive Officer.

In August 1998, Senator Ana Coseteng delivered a privilege speech in the Senate denouncing alleged anomalies in the construction and operation of the Centennial Exposition Project at the Clark Special Economic Zone. Upon Senator Drilon’s motion, the privilege speech was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation and several other Senate Committees for investigation.

In February 1999, President Estrada issued AO 35, creating an ad hoc and independent citizen’s committee to investigate all the facts and circumstances surrounding the projects. Former senator Saguisag was appointed as the committee chair.

In March 1999, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee recommended for prosecution.

In November 1999, in its report, the Saguisag committeerecommended the Ombudsman to conduct further investigation for possible violations of Sec. 3 (a of RA 3019, Sec. 4 (a) in relation to Sec. 11 of RA 6713 and Art. 217 of the RPC.

In April 2000, Laurel filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a motion to dismiss questioning the former’s jurisdiction. The Ombudsman denied the motion. Laurel moved for reconsideration but it was also denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

In November 2000, a resolution was issued finding probable cause to indict Laurel and Pena for conspiring to violate Sec. 3 (a) of RA 3019, in relation to RA 1594. Ombudsman Desierto approved the resolution with respect to Laurel but dismissed the charge against Pena.

Laurel mainly assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the ground that he is not a public officer because:

(1) Expocorp was a private corporation, not a GOCC; (2) The NCC was not a public office;

(3) He, both as chairman of NCC and of Expocorp, was not a public officer as defined under RA 3019.

ISSUE: WON Laurel, as the NCC chair, is a public officer. HELD: Yes.

RATIO: Neither the Constitution nor RA 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), defines who public officers are. However, Mechem, a recognized authority in this subject, provides that “a public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 1

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some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.”

According to Mechem, the characteristics of a public office include the delegation of sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the designation of the position as an office.

Laurel argues that his office does not involve the delegation of sovereign functions. However, this court believes that NCC performs executive functions. The executive power is generally defined as the “power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.” The executive function, therefore, concerns the implementation of the policies as set forth by law.

First, the NCC performs executive functions because it was precisely created to execute the policies and objectives needed to rationalize the relevance of historical links with other countries. This is in pursuant of Art. 14 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the provisions on education, science and technology, arts, culture and sports.

Second, the President, upon whom the executive order is vested, created the NCC by executive order. Hence, the NCC is an implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers. Third, NCC also had a role in the country’s economic development, especially in Central Luzon, hence contributing to the fundamental state policy of promoting industrialization and full employment.

The fact that the NCC is a mere ad-hoc body does not make it less of a public office because, as provided for by Chief Justice Marshall, if a duty be a continuing one, which is defined by rules prescribed by the government and not by contract, which an individual is appointed by government to perform, who enters on the duties pertaining to his station without any contract defining them, if those duties continue though the person be changed, it seems very difficult to distinguish such a charge or employment from an office of the person who performs the duties from an officer.

Under RA 3019 Sec. 2 (b), a “public officer” “includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified for exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government as defined in the preceding paragraph.” The use of the word “include” means this definition is not restrictive.

Art. 203 of the RPC provides that a “public officer” is “any person who, by direct provision of law, popular election or appointment by competent authority, takes part in the performance of public functions in the government of the Philippines, or performs in said government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official, of any rank or class.” Sec. 2 (1) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 states that an “officer” as distinguished from “clerk” or “employee” refers to a “person whose duties not being of a clerical or manual nature, involves the exercise of discretion in the performance of the functions of the government. When used with reference to a person having authority to do a particular act or perform a particular person in the exercise of governmental power, “officer” includes any government employee, agent or body having authority to do that act or exercise of that function. Sec. 3 (b) of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees) define a “public official” as including elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the career or non-career service including military and police personnel, whether or not they receive compensation, regardless of amount.

CASE 2: VETERANS FEDERATION OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REYES- GC PILLENA

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NOTE: PDF FORMAT

CHARACTERISTICS

CASE 3: SANTOS v. SECRETARY OF LABOR- GABRIEL ABLOLA

FACTS: Segundo Santos was, for a number of years, employed as Labor Conciliator I (Regional Office No. 4) of the Department of Labor, His monthly pay was P259 per month, or P3108 per annum. On August 24, 1960, he was extended an appointment (promotion) as Labor Conciliator II (Regional Office No. 3, Manila), with compensation per annum of P3493 vice Juan Mendoza, Jr., resigned. This appointment, effective September 1, 1960, was approved by the Commissioner of Civil Service on May 14, 1962, and released to the Department of Labor on May 25, 1962. In June of 1962, respondent Secretary of Labor appointed Ricardo Tiongco, one of the respondents, to the same position of Labor Conciliator II. 1 Petitioner’s demand for the revocation of respondent Tiongco’s appointment and payment to him (Santos) of salary differentials was rejected by respondent Secretary of Labor. From the foregoing events stemmed the present petition for mandamus filed on August 20, 1962 three days before Santos actually retired from the service which was on August 23, 1962. 2 The petition prays, inter alia, that respondents be commanded to nullify the appointment of Tiongco, and to uphold as legal and existing petitioner’s appointment, as Labor Conciliator II, for September 1, 1960; and that the salary differentials aforesaid be paid petitioner. Respondents

seasonably answered the petition.

Before the case could be tried on the merits, that is, on February 14, 1963, Santos died. A motion to substitute the "Estate of Segundo Santos, deceased," represented by Rodolfo Santos, one of the heirs, was filed. This triggered a move on respondents’ part to seek dismissal of the case. The court, on April 10, 1963, dismissed the petition without costs. Hence, this appeal on purely questions of law.

ISSUE: May the Estate of Segundo Santos, deceased, be substituted in place of petitioner herein?

HELD AND RATIO: Public office is a public trust. It is personal to the incumbent thereof or appointee thereto. In this sense, it is not property which passes to his heirs. None of the heirs may replace him in that position. It is in this context that we say that the Estate of the deceased Segundo Santos may not press Santos’ claim that he be allowed to continue holding office as

Labor Conciliator II. Actio personalis moritur cum persona.

But jurisdiction of the court had attached before the death of Santos. That jurisdiction continues until the termination of the suit. It is true that what is left is a money claim for salary differentials. But death will not dislodge jurisdiction on that money claim — it subsists, Resolution of this question depends upon the right of Segundo Santos to the position of Labor Conciliator II. We rule that the Estate of the deceased Segundo Santos may be substituted for him in the present proceedings.

Ruling on Merits:

On August 24, 1960, Petitioner, a second grade eligible, was appointed Labor Conciliator II at an annual compensation of P3493 effective September 1, 1960. As far as salary is concerned, no ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 3

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law, rule or regulation has been violated. Because, an annual pay of P3493 is well within the

range provided for second grade civil service eligibles.

Respondents challenge the legality of petitioner’s appointment as Labor Conciliator II. They say that such appointment is within the prohibition set forth in the memorandum circular of the Civil Service Commission dated February 16, 1961, thus: "Employees should not be assigned or promoted to positions the initial rate of the salary allocation of which exceed the maximum allowable for their eligibility." Respondents likewise aver that it was because of this circular, that the appointment of petitioner as Labor Conciliator II was recalled on September 7, 1961. The

circular was not violated.

And the withdrawal of petitioner’s appointment is not a proven fact. What the record clearly discloses is that the original appointment of petitioner as Labor Conciliator II was not taken out of the Civil Service Commission; it was approved by the Commissioner of Civil Service on May 14, 1962 and released to the Secretary of Labor on May 25, 1962. More important now is that the defense of recall has been abandoned by respondents. The case was ready for trial below. They did not go to trial. Instead, they thought it advantageous to them — upon petitioner’s death — to submit their case on their motion to dismiss based solely on legal grounds, namely, that the death of petitioner extinguished the controversy, and that the remaining claim for damages is ancillary to mandamus and is also abated by death. The money claim here involved, however, descended to Santos’ heirs. And, as we have earlier in this opinion stated, his Estate may prosecute that claim to its conclusion. It will not be in harmony with our sense of justice to return this case to the court below — at this stage — just to allow respondents to prove their defense of recall of petitioner’s appointment. Respondents had a choice: To go trial on the merits upon the issues raised in their answer; or, seek to overthrow petitioner’s case on legal issues. They did elect the latter. They cannot be permitted once again to return to the lower court for a trial on the merits. Suitors should not normally be allowed to gamble with court proceedings in the hope of obtaining beneficial results. It is unfair that this case should, on respondents’ choice, be made to bounce from the lower court to this Court, and back to the lower court and perhaps only to be appealed once again to an appellate court. The ensuing delay, increased cost of litigation, and trouble and anxiety and harassment to be caused to the adverse party, the wastage of the courts’ time — these are

reasons potent enough to support this view.

At all events, petitioner’s right to salary differentials and the duty to pay him are both clear. Civil Service approval completed petitioner’s appointment, 6 clinched the case for him. The rest is a question of mathematical computation. Petitioner’s pay as Labor Conciliator I was at the rate of P259 per month of P3108 per annum. His increased compensation as Labor Conciliator II from September 1, 1960, to August 23, 1962, the date of his retirement is at the rate of P3493 per annum, specified in his promotional appointment, and reiterated in the 5th indorsement of the Commissioner of Civil Service to the Secretary of Labor dated May 22, 1962. He is entitled only to the pay set forth in his appointment, and no more — absent a legal adjustment thereof. There is no such adjustment here. Petitioner’s salary differentials during the period covered amounts to P761.68. And this should be paid to his Estate. Upon the view we take of this case, we vote to reverse the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 10, 1963, and direct the Secretary of Labor and the corresponding Cashier to pay the Estate of the deceased petitioner Segundo Santos the sum of P761.68

CASE 4: ABEJA v. TANADA- DON TUTAAN

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FACTS: In this petition for certiorari, petitioner seeks the annulment of the orders issued by respondent Judge Tanada which decreed, among others, the revision of some 36 precincts contained in the counter-protest filed by respondent Radovan.

Petitioner Evelyn Abeja and private respondent Rosauro Radovan (deceased) were contenders for the office of municipal mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, in the May 11, 1992, national elections. Based on the official returns of the Municipal Board of Canvassers for the said municipality, private respondent was credited with 6,215 votes as against petitioner's 5,951 votes. After the proclamation of private respondent, petitioner filed an election contest, with the RTC of Lucena City. The protest covered twenty-two (22) precincts. On June 5, 1992, private respondent filed an Answer with a Counter-Protest of the results in thirty-six (36) precincts. During the pre-trial, private respondent's counsel filed a motion praying that the 36 counter-protested precincts be revised only if it is shown after completion of the revision of the 22 protested precincts that petitioner leads by a margin of at least one vote. The trial court declared discussion on the matter to be premature. The revision of the ballots covering 22 protested precincts was completed in September 1992. Thereafter, petitioner urged private respondent to commence the revision of the 36 counter-protested precincts by praying the necessary fees for the purpose. Private respondent refused. Petitioner moved that the counter-protest of private respondent be considered withdrawn. Private respondent opposed the motion and reiterated that the ballots of the 36 counter-protested precincts should only be revised and recounted if it is shown after the revision of the contested ballots of the 22 precincts that petitioner leads by at least one vote. Petitioner filed another motion, praying that the counter-protest be considered withdrawn from the time the final report of the Board of Revisors is submitted to the court for approval. The then presiding Judge, Hon. Ludovico Lopez, did not rule on the aforementioned motions but, according to petitioner, Judge Lopez declared during a hearing that once a ruling is made on the contested ballots of the 22 protested precincts, he will not allow further revision of ballots. Judge Lopez was reassigned to the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City. Before transferring to his new post, Judge Lopez issued an order which contained his ruling in each of the contested ballots in the 22 contested precincts and the reasons therefor. The ruling did not contain a summation of the exact number of votes to be credited to each of the parties, or a declaration of the winner in the election protest for that matter.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Determine Votes, To Proclaim Winner and to Allow Assumption of Office considering that based on her own computation of revised ballots ruled upon by Judge Lopez, she led private respondent by a margin of 281 votes. Private respondents filed a Motion to Correct the order issued by Judge Lopez as well as oppositions to the motion of petitioner. Respondents claim that petitioner's "Motion to Proclaim Winner" is premature since the 36 counter-protested precincts are yet to be revised. Respondent Judge Federico Tanada, who succeeded Judge Lopez, denied the "Motion to Determine Votes, to Proclaim Winner and to Allow Assumption of Office" filed by petitioner. Respondent judge ruled that petitioner's motion was indeed premature on the ground that until after the 36 counter-protested precincts have been revised, the court could not render a valid decision.

ISSUE: WON private respondents should be allowed to proceed with the revision of the 36 precincts subject of the counter-protest.

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HELD AND RATIO: No, the assailed orders of respondent judge as well as the results of the revision of the 11 ballot boxes subject of the counter-protest are set aside.

Petitioner argues that the sequence in the presentation of evidence may be altered for special reasons the applicable rules of procedure do not allow presentation of evidence after the court has already rendered a decision. Clearly, petitioner considers the order of Judge Lopez to be the "decision" on the case although the order did not contain a summation of the total votes credited to each of the parties or a declaration of the winner in the election protest. Petitioner objects to the stand taken by private respondent on the procedure to be followed for being "unprocedural" in the sense that a decision rendered on the election protest would be subject to another decision for the counter-protest. It is further argued that since the 36 counter-protested precincts were already under the jurisdiction of the trial court, the same should have been revised unconditionally and should not have been subjected to the whim and caprice of the private respondent.

The record shows that the revision of ballots in the 22 protested precincts was completed sometime in September 1992. Judge Lopez issued a ruling on the said revision almost a year later. Private respondent failed to commence the revision of the ballots in the counter-protested precincts, stubbornly maintaining the position that said precincts should be revised only if it is shown after the revision that petitioner leads private respondent by at least one vote. No law or rule authorizes such a procedure. Consequently, private respondent must be deemed to have waived or abandoned his counter-protest. The applicable Comelec rules provide for the presentation of evidence by the parties in succession in the order or sequence provided under Sec. 2, rule 17 (Comelec Rules) which must be submitted within a reasonable time, if not immediately after the revision of the precincts covered by the protest proper. By insisting that the counter-protested precincts should be revised only if it is shown after the revision of the protested precincts that his opponent leads by at least one vote, private respondent is adopting a self-serving rule without legal sanction calculated to unduly prolong the litigation. It is readily apparent from the provisions of the applicable Comelec Rules that the court shall render its decision after both parties shall have presented their respective evidence. Nowhere in the said provisions is it indicated that presentation of evidence by the protestee may continue after the court has ruled on the evidence of the protestant and determine the number of votes obtained by the latter. Otherwise, it would be possible for the protestee to prolong the protest and render it moot by expiration of the term of office contested.

Furthermore, private respondent is guilty of laches, which, in the case at bar, private respondent unreasonably failed to cause the revision of the counter-protested precincts despite being afforded ample time to do so and must be deemed to have abandoned it.

CASE 5: NATIONAL LAND TITLES AND DEEDS REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATION v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION- RONWELL LIM

FACTS: Violeta Garcia was a Bachelor of Laws graduate. On 1977, she was appointed Deputy Register of Deeds VII (later reclassified to Deputy Register of Deeds III) under permanent status. Sometime after, however, EO 649 was enacted. It authorized for the restructuring of the LRC to NALTDRA and regionalized the Offices of the Registers therein. The problem with this law,ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 6

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however, is that it imposes a new requirement of BAR membership to qualify for a permanent appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II or higher. For not being a member of the bar, therefore, Garcia was issued an appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II under temporary status. It was nonetheless renewed in 1985. On 1986, however, then Minister of Justice notified her of the termination of her services for allegedly receiving bribe money. Thus, Garcia appealed but the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) dropped her appeal on grounds that the termination of her services was due to the expiration of her temporary appointment. Thereafter, the CSC issued a resolution, directing that Garcia be restored to her position. According to the CSC, under the vested right theory, the new requirement of the BAR membership will not apply to her but only to new applicants during or after the passage of EO 649. Since she had been holding said position even before the passage of EO 649, the same shall not apply to her. Thus, the NALTDRA filed the present petition to assail the validity of the said CSC Resolution. It contends that Sec 8 & 10 of EO 649 abolished all existing positions in the LRC and transferred their functions to the appropriate new offices created by said EO. It also created offices, which requires the issuance of new appointments to qualified office holders. Verily, EO 649 applies to Garcia, and not being a member of the Bar, she cannot be reinstated to her former position as Deputy Register of Deeds II

ISSUE: WON EO 649, Section 4, which require bar membership, should be applied to Violate Garcia.

HELD: Yes.

RATIO: EO 649 abolished all the positions in the now defunct LRC and required new appointments to be issued to all employees of the NALTDRA. The question of whether or not a law abolishes an office is one of legislative intent about which there can be no controversy whatsoever if there is an explicit declaration in the law itself, as in this case. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity.

On the contention that Garcia has a vested right on the position, the SC ruled that there is no such thing as a vested interest in an office, or even an absolute right to hold it. Except constitutional offices, which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary. None of the exceptions to this rule are obtaining in this case. To reiterate, the position that private respondent Garcia would like to occupy anew was abolished pursuant to EO 649, a valid reorganization measure. There is no vested property right to be re employed in a reorganized office. Not being a member of the Bar, the minimum requirement to qualify under the reorganization law for permanent appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II, she cannot be reinstated to her former position without violating the express mandate of the law.

PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY

CASE 6: FRANCISCO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES- FRANCIS TORRES

FACTS: On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).”

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate_{ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE}

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Justices of this Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.”

The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.

The House Committee on Justiceruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.

To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint ]_{was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives} Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution.

This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

Petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental importance, and that he “himself was a victim of the capricious and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12th_{Congress,” posits that his right to bring an impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman} Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives.

ISSUES:

[1] WON the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution; and

[2] WON Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules of the 12th_{Congress are} unconstitutional.

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[1] Yes. The second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI. [2] Yes. Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules are unconstitutional. RATIO: Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

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(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed on June 2, 2003 and the second impeachment complaint filed was on October 23, 2003, it violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

On the other hand, under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term “initiate” a meaning different meaning from filing and referral.

Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

CASE 7: GUTIERREZ v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES- ANNESIR KADJIM

FACTS: Petitioner files "Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 15 February 2011)" dated February 25, 2011.

Petitioner’s arguments:

 The Court sharply deviated from the ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives

 There never was a simultaneous referral of two impeachment complaints as they were actually referred to the committee "separately, one after the other.

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 The initiation of an impeachment proceeding must be reckoned from the filing of the complaint, insisting on actual initiation and not "constructive initiation by legal fiction" as averred by Justice Adolfo Azcuna in his separate opinion in Francisco.

 The word "initiate" must be read in its plain, ordinary and technical meaning, for it is contrary to reason, logic and common sense to reckon the beginning or start of the initiation process from its end or conclusion.

ISSUE: WON the Feb. 2011 decision is inconsistent with the Francisco ruling.

HELD: No.

RATIO: Petitioner’s Motion concedes that the Francisco doctrine on the initiation of an impeachment proceeding includes the House’s initial action on the complaint. By recognizing the legal import of a referral, petitioner abandons her earlier claim that per Francisco an impeachment proceeding is initiated by the mere filing of an impeachment complaint.

In Justice Azcuna’s opinion which concurred with the majority, what he similarly found untenable was the stretching of the reckoning point of initiation to the time that the Committee on Justice (the Committee) report reaches the floor of the House.4_{Notably, the provisions of the} Impeachment Rules of the 12th Congress that were successfully challenged in Francisco provided that an impeachment proceeding was to be "deemed initiated" upon the Committee’s finding of sufficiency of substance or upon the House’s affirmance or overturning of the Committee’s finding,5_{which was clearly referred to as the instances "presumably for internal} purposes of the House, as to the timing of some of its internal action on certain relevant matters."6_{Definitely, "constructive initiation by legal fiction" did not refer to the aspects of filing} and referral in the regular course of impeachment, for this was precisely the gist of Francisco in pronouncing what initiation means.

The Court adhered to the Francisco-ordained balance in the tug-of-war between those who want to stretch and those who want to shrink the term "initiate," either of which could disrupt the provision’s congruency to the rationale of the constitutional provision. Petitioner’s imputation that the Court’s Decision presents a sharp deviation from Francisco as it defers the operability of the one-year bar rule rings hollow.

Petitioner would have been correct had the subject constitutional provision been worded as "no initiation process of the impeachment proceeding shall be commenced against the same official more than once within a period of one year," in which case the reckoning would literally point to the "start of the beginning." To immediately reckon the initiation to what petitioner herself concedes as the start of the initiation process is to countenance a raw or half-baked initiation.

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In re-affirming what the phrase "no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated" means, the Court closely applied Francisco on what comprises or completes the initiation phase. Nothing can be more unequivocal or well-defined than the elucidation of filing-and-referral in Francisco. Petitioner must come to terms with her denial of the exact terms of Francisco.

The facts of the case do not call for the resolution of this issue however. Suffice it to restate a footnote in the Court’s Decision that in such case of "an abbreviated mode of initiation[, x x x] the filing of the complaint and the taking of initial action [House directive to automatically transmit] are merged into a single act."8_{Moreover, it is highly impossible in such situation to coincidentally} initiate a second impeachment proceeding in the interregnum, if any, given the period between filing and referral.

The phraseology of the one-year bar rule does not concern itself with a numerical limitation of impeachment complaints. If it were the intention of the framers of the Constitution to limit the number of complaints, they would have easily so stated in clear and unequivocal language.

The Court added nothing new in pinpointing the obvious reckoning point of initiation in light of the Francisco doctrine. Moreover, referral of an impeachment complaint to the appropriate committee is already a power or function granted by the Constitution to the House.

REQUIREMENTS FOR PUBLIC OFFICE

CASE 8: BINAMIRA v. GARRUCHO- RALPH VILLANUEVA

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CASE 9: TAPISPISAN v. COURT OF APPEALS- CHEYENNE YU

FACTS: Tapispisan is a public school teacher and has been occupying the position of Teacher 3 since September 1992. She has been teaching for the last 30 years and is currently assigned at the Villamor Air Base Elementary School in Pasay City.

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Atty. Sibug, one of the respondents, issued Division Memorandum No. 33 which designated (a): respondent Rumbaoa as OIC-Head Teacher of P. Villanueva Elementary School and (b) respondent Teves as OIC-Principal of Don Carlos Elementary School.

Tapispisan felt aggrieved that she has been unduly by-passed and filed a protest with Atty. Sibug contesting the designation.

But the protest was denied. Prompting Tapispisan to bring the matter to the Regional Directos of DECS-NCR, but was likewise denied.

Tapispisan’s claim: 1. Designation of both Rumbaoa and Teves was made with favouritism and in gross violation of Civil Service and DECS rules and regulations on promotions. 2. She was more qualified for promotion than the other two.

DECS-NCR decision: complaint/ protest dismissed. Appointment of both Rumbaoa and Teves are in order due to the Civil Service Commission’s attestation of their qualifications.

Not contented, matter was brought before the Civil Service Commission, alleging that such designation is made in violation of the ban on appointments and promotions during the election period.

CSC: dismissed; Only appointments/ promotions and not designation can be the subject of the protest.

CA: also dismissed the petition; Rumbaoa and Teves are merely designated in acting capacity ISSUE: WON Rumbaoa and Teves are entitled to such designation/ qualified to such public offices.

HELD: Yes.

RATIO: There was no favouritism in their designation. They satisfactorily proved their merit and fitness to hold such positions in their respective designated positions. Their designations were made by the appropriate appointing authority and were duly attested by the Civil Service Commission, which under the Constitution is the central personnel agency of the government charged with the duty of determining questions of qualifications of merit and fitness of those appointed to the civil service.

In the appointment or promotion of employees, the appointing authority considers not only their civil service eligibilities but also their performance, education, work experience, trainings and seminars attended, agency examinations and seniority.

The appointing authority has the right of choice which he may freely exercise according to his best judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. The final choice of the appointing authority should be respected and left undisturbed.

Difference between APPOINTMENT and DESIGNATION

1. Appointment: selection by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. Enjoys a security of tenure unless replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. EXECUTIVE in nature

2. Designation: the imposition by law of additional duties of an incumbent official. LEGISLATIVE in nature

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Rumbaoa and Teves: designated in such capacities only, not appointed. Therefore it does not violate the ban on appointments and promotions during the election period. Petition denied.

CASE 10: PIMENTEL v. ERMITA- REGINALD LAMPITOC

FACTS: While Congress was in session, due to vacancies in the cabinet, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) appointed Arthur Yap et al as secretaries of their respective departments. They were appointed in an acting capacity only. Senator Aquilino Pimentel together with 7 other senators filed a complaint against the appointment of Yap et al. Pimentel averred that GMA cannot make such appointment without the consent of the Commission on Appointment; that, in accordance with Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, only the undersecretary of the respective departments should be designated in an acting capacity and not anyone else.

On the contrary, then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita averred that the president is empowered by Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in session. Further, EO 292 itself allows the president to issue temporary designation to an officer in the civil service provided that the temporary designation shall not exceed one year.

During the pendency of said case, Congress adjourned and GMA issued ad interim appointments re-appointing those previously appointed in acting capacity.

ISSUE: WON the appointments made by ex PGMA is valid.

HELD: Yes.

RATIO: The argument raised by Ermita is correct. Further, EO 292 itself provided the safeguard so that such power will not be abused hence the provision that the temporary designation shall not exceed one year. In this case, in less than a year after the initial appointments made by GMA, and when the Congress was in recess, GMA issued the ad interim appointments – this also proves that the president was in good faith.

It must also be noted that cabinet secretaries are the alter egos of the president. The choice is the president’s to make and the president normally appoints those whom he/she can trust. She cannot be constrained to choose the undersecretary. She has the option to choose. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in theADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE _{DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 13}

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guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.

The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the President’s confidence. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee.

Anent the issue that GMA appointed “outsiders”, such is allowed. EO 292 also provides that the president “may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch.” Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent.

NOTE: AD INTERIM APPOINTMENTS vs APPOINTMENTS IN AN ACTING CAPACITY

Ad Interim Appointments Appointments in an Acting_Capacity

DESCRIPTION

It is permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the COA does not alter its permanent character. (Matibag v. Benipayo)

Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission of Appointments.

WHEN EFFECTIVE Upon Acceptance by Appointee Upon Acceptance by Appointee

WHEN MADE When Congress is in Recess Any time when there is vacancy

SUBMITTED TO THE COA YES NO

CASE 11: LUEGO v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION- VIKTOR GUTIERREZ

(15)

FACTS: Petitioner was appointed Admin Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Solon. The appointment was described as “permanent” but the CSC approved it as “temporary,” subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent and another employee.

Subsequently, the CSC found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and, accordingly directed that the latter be appointed to said position in place of the petitioner whose appointment is revoked. Hence, the private respondent was so appointed to the position by Mayor Duterte, the new mayor.

The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, questions the order and the validity of the respondent’s appointment.

ISSUE: WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement.

HELD: No.

RATIO: The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the respondent CSC to reverse him and call it temporary.

Section 9(h), Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides that the Commission shall have inter alia the power to “…approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service… ….and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess appropriate eligibility or required qualifications.”

The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the CSC Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the CSC Laws.

CSC is without authority to revoke an appointment because of its belief that another person was better qualified, which is an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor. CASE 12: UMOSO v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION- REBECCA FLORES

FACTS: Umoso is a Senior Civil Engineer who was promoted to the position of Supervising Civil Engineer of DPWH.

Caronan is a Senior Civil Engineer who protested the appointment in a letter addressed to the Regional Director of the DPWH. He complained that the candidates for promotion had not been fairly evaluated by DPWH’s Central Review Board. He claimed that he was entitled to preferential consideration being the employee next in rank in the Planning and Design Section

The letter was referred to DPWH Committee, which upheld Caronan’s protest and held that Umoso would take Caronan’s position. (So Caronan now would be the Supervising Engineer and Umoso, the Senior Civil Engineer)

The DPWH Secretary approved the recommendation of the DPWH Committee.

(16)

Umoso now appealed to the MSPB Civil Service for which MSPB made a comparative study of Umoso and Caronan’s qualifications. Their decision was that since Caronan was chosen by the Secretary of DPWH, having 9 yeas of direct exposure and experience, his appointment must be upheld. Further saying that the Secretary has the administrative supervision and control over the entire department including the power to review appointments issued by the DPWH Regional Director.

Thus, UMOSO appealed to the Civil Service Commission

ISSUE: WON DPWH has the authority to set aside an appointment made by the Regional director of an appointee? YES.

HELD: Yes.

RATIO: The authority of the Regional Director to appoint is merely a delegated function. Thus it can be reviewed and set aside by the Department Secretary who is the SOURCE of the delegated power. To hold that the Secretary has no authority to review the appointment would create a false impression that the Secretary and Regional Direction are of the same rank.

When the Secretary upheld Caronan’s appointment, the Secretary of DPWH is merely exercising his power and authority as Head of the Department.

Caronan being the choice of the Secretary of DPWH clearly met the requirements for permanent appointment thus this should not be disturbed. This is in line with a number of SC decisions upholding the discretion of the appointing authority.

DISQUALIFICATION

CASE 13: MONSANTO v. FACTORAN- JOYCE BAYLON

FACTS: Salvacion Monsanto, an assistant treasurer of Calbayog City, and three other accused; was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced them to imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum and a fine of P3,500.

Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction to the Court which affirmed the same. She filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was given absolute pardon by President Marcos which she accepted on December 21, 1984.

By reason of the said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer that she be restored to her former position as assistant city treasurer since the same post was still vacant.

Her letter- request was then referred to the Ministry of Finance for resolution in view of the provision of the Local Government Code transferring the power of appointment treasures from the city governments to the said Ministry. The Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon.

However, she also claims that the full pardon bestowed upon her by the President has already wiped out the crime which, according to her, also implies that her government service has never interrupted and therefore, she is entitled to back pay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50

(17)

The Ministry of Finance referred the issue to the Office of the President and Factoran, Deputy Executive Secretary; which denied Monsanto’s request averring that Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her former position.

ISSUES:

(1) WON a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment; and

(2) Effects of a full and absolute pardon HELD:

(1) No. (2)

RATIO: (1) To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.

The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public documents.

The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

(2) A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. But unless expressly grounded on the person’s innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing.

A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered.

CASE 14: GARCIA v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT- ARJUNA GUEVARA

FACTS: Petitioner was a supervising lineman in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Lucena City. A criminal case of qualified theft was filed against him. The president grated him an executive clemency. The petitioner filed a claim for back payment of salaries. The petitioner was later recalled to the service on 12 March 1984 but the records do not show whether petitioner’s reinstatement was to the same position of Supervising Lineman. ISSUE: WON Garcia is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive clemency.

HELD: Yes._{ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE} DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 17

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RATIO: The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for appointment to public office which was forfeited by reason of the conviction of the offense. But since pardon does not generally result in automatic reinstatement because the offender has to apply for reappointment, he is not entitled to back wages.

If the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this innocence and makes him a new man and as innocent; as if he had not been found guilty of the offense charged. 7 When a person is given pardon because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon relieves the party from all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean name, good reputation and unstained character prior to the finding of guilt.

In the case at bar, the acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was founded not on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact that petitioner did not commit the offense imputed to him. Aside from finding him innocent of the charge, the trial court commended petitioner for his concern and dedication as a public servant. Verily, petitioner’s innocence is the primary reason behind the grant of executive clemency to him, bolstered by the favorable recommendations for his reinstatement. This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be reinstated to his former employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency.

Petitioner’s automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to back wages. This is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is innocent from the start and to make reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from the service. The right to back wages is afforded to those with have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charges against them.

Therefore, the court ordered the full back wages from April 1 1975 (date when he was illegally dismissed) to March 12 1984 (reinstated) to the petitioner.

CASE 15: CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY- JEAN GUECO

FACTS: The two petitions in this case sought to declare unconstitutional Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino. The assailed law provides that:

Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of which the President is the Chairman.

The petitioners alleged that the cited provision of EO 284contravenes the provision of Sec. 13, Article VII which declares: The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 18

(19)

They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

The petitioners maintained that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" used in Section 13 of Article VII meant that the exception must be expressly provided in the Constitution. Public respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in the Constitution" in Section 13,Article VII makes reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB insofar as the appointive officials mentioned therein are concerned. The provision relied upon by the respondents provides: Sec. 7. . . .

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

ISSUES:

(1) Does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB?

(2) Does the prohibition apply to positions held in ex officio capacity?

(3) Can the respondents be obliged to reimburse the perquisites they have received from the offices they have held pursuant to EO 284?

HELD: (1) No. (2) No. (3) Yes.

RATIO: (1) The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned.

Although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself. While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution "must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2),Article VII; or acting as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.

(20)

(2) The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that these posts do no comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. The term ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of office."

Ex-officio likewise denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office." The additional duties must not only be closely related to, but must be required by the official's primary functions. If the functions required to be performed are merely incidental, remotely related, inconsistent, incompatible, or otherwise alien to the primary function of a cabinet official, such additional functions would fall under the purview of "any other office" prohibited by the Constitution.

(3) During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de facto officers and as such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. It has been held that "in cases where there is no de jure officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office. Any per diem, allowances or other emoluments received by the respondents by virtue of actual services rendered in the questioned positions may therefore be retained by them. Overall, Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional as it actually allows a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987Cons

CASE 16: CAASI v. COURT OF APPEALS- PATRICIA CAÑALITA

FACTS: These are two consolidated cases both involving the disqualification, under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, of one Merito Miguel for the position of mayor in Bolinao, Pangasinan to which he was elected in the local elections of Janauary 18, 1988.

One case is a petition for review on certiorari of the COMELEC decision dismissing the three petitions of Cascante, Catabay, and Celeste, for the disqualification of Miguel.

The other case is a petition for review of the decision dated June 21, 1989, of the Court of Appeals in dismissing the petition for quo warranto filed by Mateo Caasi, a rival candidate for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, also to disqualify Merito Miguel on account of his being a green card holder.

Petitioners’ contention: That Merto Miguel is a green card holder, hence a permanent resident of the United States, not of Bolinao.

Merito Miguel’s answer: Admits that he is a holder of a green card but denied that he is a permanent US resident. He argues the following:

o The green card is only for convenience purposes o To visit his children in the US

o For his periodic medical examination o He is permanent resident of Bolinao

o He voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, as well as the Congressional elections

(21)

COMELEC (except Commissioner Badoy, Jr.): dismissed the petitions on the ground that the possession of a green card by the respondent (Miguel) does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines ; that respondent has sufficiently indicated his intention to continuously reside in Bolinao as shown by his having voted in successive elections in said municipality.

In his dissenting opinion, Commissioner Badoy pointed out that as a green card holder, Miguel must, under the Omnibus Election Code, prove that he has waived his status as a permanent immigrant to qualify for elections. This respondent failed to do.

ISSUES:

(1) WON a green card is a proof that the holder is a permanent US resident. (2) WON Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of US. HELD:

(1) Yes. (2) No.

RATIO: (1) On its face, the green card issued by the United States immigration to Miguel identifies the latter in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. He was issued a requisite green card or authority to reside in the United States permanently.

Immigration is said to be a movement from one country to another with the intention to reside in the latter.

An immigrant is a person who removes into a country for the purpose of permanent residence. As resident of the United States, Miguel owes allegiance to it.

The law applicable here is Sec.68 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides: Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless such person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.

(2) There is no evidence which shows that Miguel waived his status as permanent resident of the US before he ran for election. His act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country.

The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not hard to find. Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must possess (Sec. 42, Chap. 1, Title 2, Local Government Code). Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a permanent resident of the United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January 18, 1988.

The assumption is that those who are resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such entire devotion to the interest and welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their public duties here, they must keep another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign country of their choice in order to preserve their status as permanent residents thereof.

Miguel thus is disqualified for the position of Mayor in Bolinao, Pangasinan.

(22)

SCOPE OF QUALIFICATIONS

CASE 17: CUYEGKENG v. CRUZ- KELVIN HUNG

FACTS: Petitioners are dorctors Jose Cuyegkeng, Pedro Mayuga, Benjamin Roa, Timoteo Alday, Dominador Jacinto, Alejandro Gaerlan and Rosita Rivera- Ramirez.

The Council of the Philippine Medical Association, pursuant to section 13 of RA2382, otherwise known as the Medical Act of 1959, approved and submitted to the President a revised list of physicians for appointment to the Board of Medical Examiners. The 12 recommendees were:

1. Dr. Cesar Filoteo 2. Dr. Jose Cuyegkeng 3. Dr. Edgardo Caparas 4. Dr. Antonio Guytingco 5. Dr. Pedro Mayuga 6. Dr. Benjamin Roa 7. Dr. Jose Cocjin 8. Dr. Timoteo Alday 9. Dr. Dominador Jacinto 10. Dr. Alejandro Gaerlan 11. Dr. Oscar Chacon

12. Dr. Rosita Rivera- Ramirez

The Assistant Executive Secretary informed the council that the President has decided to appoint Dr. Cesar Filoteo (UP), De. Oscar Chacon(UP), Dr. Edgardo Caparas (UST). Dr. Jose Cocjin (UST), Dr. Antonio Guytingco (Government Physician) and Dr. Pedro Cruz (Government Phyisician). The Petitioners, citing Section 13 of RA 2382, alleged that Dr. Pedro Cruz cannot assume the position since he was not in the list of recommendees submitted by the council to the President. Respondent alleged that the list was merely recommendatory.

ISSUE: WON the President can lawfully appoint Cruz to assume the position in the Board of Medical Examiners.

HELD: Yes.

RATIO: The Court is divided into three groups. First group believes that the provisions of the cited section are mandatory. However, section 14 which lays down the qualifications for eligibility does not specify that the candidate must be included in the list submitted by the Executive Council to the President. By imposing the restriction on the appointments, it curtails the the President’s power of appointment. Consequently, Section 13 of RA2382 is unconstiututional and appointment of respondent is lawful and valid.

The second group believes that the provisions of section 13 are merely directory. The function of the council is purely recommendatory and those names appearing on the list are mere recommendees. Hence, Section 13 is constitutional and the respondent has valid title to his office.

The third group believes that it is not important to inquire into the constitutionality of the provision as well as the nature of the cited provision as either mandatory or directory.

As mentioned in the letter of the Asst. Executive Secretary to the Council, the President intended to appoint two government physicians. The list included two government physicians namely: Dr. Guytingco and Dr. Gaerlan both of whom were personal physicians of the President. The President thought of appointing one to the board and retain one to look after his health. (appointed Guytingco to the Board)