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Network  Security

Computer  Security  &  Forensics  

Security  in  Compu5ng,  Chapter  7

Topics

l

Network  AAacks  

l

Reconnaissance  

l

AAacks  

l

Spoofing  

l

Web  Site  Vulnerabili5es  

l

Denial  of  Service

l

Network  Defences  

l

Firewalls  

l

Demilitarised  Zones  

l

Virtual  Private  Networks  

l

Honey  Pots  

l

Vulnerability  Scanners  

l

Secure  Socket  Layer

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August  2015 Computer  Security  &  Forensics

AAacks  -­‐  Reconnaissance

l

Reconnaissance  

l Port  Scan  -­‐  check  ports  of  services  with  known  bugs,  looking  for  unpatched  versions  

Thu,  2010-­‐07-­‐15  14:23:03  -­‐  UDP  Packet  -­‐  Source:24.64.116.2,13915  Des5na5on:82.69.?.?,1028  -­‐  [DOS]   Fri,  2010-­‐07-­‐16  10:12:29  -­‐  TCP  Packet  -­‐  Source:91.121.120.137,3607  Des5na5on:82.69.?.?,5905  -­‐  [DOS]   Fri,  2010-­‐07-­‐16  10:12:29  -­‐  TCP  Packet  -­‐  Source:91.121.120.137,3611  Des5na5on:82.69.?.?,5906  -­‐  [DOS]   Fri,  2010-­‐07-­‐16  10:12:29  -­‐  TCP  Packet  -­‐  Source:91.121.120.137,3613  Des5na5on:82.69.?.?,5907  -­‐  [DOS]   Fri,  2010-­‐07-­‐16  10:12:29  -­‐  TCP  Packet  -­‐  Source:91.121.120.137,3615  Des5na5on:82.69.?.?,5908  -­‐  [DOS]   Fri,  2010-­‐07-­‐16  10:12:29  -­‐  TCP  Packet  -­‐  Source:91.121.120.137,3617  Des5na5on:82.69.?.?,5909  -­‐  [DOS]   Fri,  2010-­‐07-­‐16  10:12:29  -­‐  TCP  Packet  -­‐  Source:91.121.120.137,3619  Des5na5on:82.69.?.?,5910  -­‐  [DOS]   Fri,  2010-­‐07-­‐16  10:12:32  -­‐  TCP  Packet  -­‐  Source:91.121.120.137,3617  Des5na5on:82.69.?.?,5909  -­‐  [DOS]   Fri,  2010-­‐07-­‐16  10:12:32  -­‐  TCP  Packet  -­‐  Source:91.121.120.137,3593  Des5na5on:82.69.?.?,5901  -­‐  [DOS]   Fri,  2010-­‐07-­‐16  10:12:32  -­‐  TCP  Packet  -­‐  Source:91.121.120.137,3601  Des5na5on:82.69.?.?,5904  -­‐  [DOS]   Fri,  2010-­‐07-­‐16  10:12:32  -­‐  TCP  Packet  -­‐  Source:91.121.120.137,3597  Des5na5on:82.69.?.?,5902  -­‐  [DOS]   Fri,  2010-­‐07-­‐16  10:12:32  -­‐  TCP  Packet  -­‐  Source:91.121.120.137,3607  Des5na5on:82.69.?.?,5905  -­‐  [DOS]

3

AAacks  -­‐  Reconnaissance

l

Reconnaissance  

l Social  Engineering  

l Try  to  get  users  to  reveal  cri5cal  informa5on  about  network  structure  and  accounts  -­‐  e.g.   ‘Help  Desk’  

l Intelligence  

l ‘Scavenge’  any  publicly  available  informa5on   l Discussion  of  methods  on  forums  

(3)

August  2015 Computer  Security  &  Forensics

Spoofing

l Give  the  appearance  of  being  a  trusted  en5ty    

l Masquerade  

l Appear  to  be  a  valid  service,  e.g.  via  URL  confusion   l www.paypal.com  -­‐  www.paypak.com  

l User  could  mistype  ‘l’  and  press  adjacent  ‘k’  on  keyboard   l Site  could  then  look  exactly  like  PayPal...  

l Note  that  above  example  is  not  real   l Session  Hijacking  

l Intercept    a  session  started  by  a  user  who  does  not  ‘log-­‐out’  

l Could  also  block  user’s  ‘log-­‐out’  communica5ons  and  con5nue  session  

l Wiretap  +  packet  injec5on  (or  simply  using  public  PC)  enables  an  aAacker  to  con5nue  a   users  session  -­‐  e.g.  add  a  new  delivery  address  and  order  away...

5

Spoofing

l

Man  in  the  Middle  

l

Interceptor  eavesdrops  on  communica5on  and  obtains  private  keys  used  for  

securing  coms,  able  to  monitor  en5re  process,  undetected  

l

Recent  DNS  flaw  made  it  very  easy  to  develop  man  in  the  middle  aAacks  via  a  

process  called  

DNS  cache  poisoning

 

l

Flaw  enabled  rogue  DNS  rou5ng  informa5on  to  be  injected  into  DNS  tables  

l

PC  requests  IP  address  of  www.microsok.com  and  gets  back  a  bogus  machine  

(4)

August  2015 Computer  Security  &  Forensics

Web  Site  Threats

l

Buffer  Overflows  

l This  is  as  applicable  to  web  apps  as  it  is  to  standalone  applica5ons   l php  or  Java  servlet  code  could  be  forced  to  crash  

l Outcome  of  crash  will  depend  on  server  configura5on   l

Server  configura5on  issues  -­‐  the  ../  problem...  

l Web  server  environment  and  permissions  need  to  be  5ghtly  constrained  

l No  default  applica5ons  able  to  provide  alterna5ve  forms  of  remote  access  should  be   available  e.g.  telnet,  ssh,  xterm  

l Web  server  permissions  should  not  allow  access  to  folders  above  document  tree   l hAp://www.weakserver.com/../../  

l Web  server  rights  should  be  restricted  -­‐  not  run  as  ‘root’

7

Web  Site  Threats

l

Applica5on  Data  Valida5on  

l Improper  use  of  session  management  and  display  of  form  requests  leads  to  vulnerabili5es   l Using  the  ‘GET’  method  for  sending  user  names  and  passwords  (and  con5nually  using  this  

in  subsequent  forms  -­‐  see  also  mySQL  injec5on)  

l What  might  you  think  if  you  no5ced  a  web  site  that  used  the  URL?  

(5)

August  2015 Computer  Security  &  Forensics

Denial  of  Service

l Ping  aAack  -­‐  network  tes5ng  oken  uses  the  Internet  Control  Message  Protocol  (ICMP)  ping  applica5on  to  check  

that  a  computer  is  responding  to  network  traffic.  A  single  ping  response  has  a  very  low  overhead     l An  aAacker  can  send  an  avalanche  of  ping  requests,  overwhelming  the  computer  

l Smurf  -­‐  a  varia5on  on  the  ping  aAack  

l A  modified  ping  packet  is  sent  to  a  network  in  broadcast  mode  with  the  IP  address  of  a  target  machine  set  as   the  sender  -­‐  the  real  sender  sets  their  machine  to  ignore  ping  traffic  

l Due  to  the  broadcast  status  of  the  packet,  all  computers  on  the  network  pick  up  the  ping  request  and   respond  to  it,  however,  they  send  it  to  the  unfortunate  ‘sender’  address,  frequently  taking  it  off-­‐line  

l Traffic  Redirec5on  

l Routers  are  responsible  for  rou5ng  traffic  and  determining  op5mal  traffic  paths  

l If  a  router  can  be  corrupted  to  adver5se  a  path  it  controls  as  being  good,  increased  network  traffic  will  be   routed  through  it  -­‐  if  it  was  ‘lying’,  the  local  network  grinds  to  a  halt

9

Distributed  Denial  of  Service

l A  more  common  form  uses  a  Trojan  virus  to  install  control  sokware  in  a  network  of  suscep5ble  computers  (their  

users  are  usually  the  suscep5ble  ones)  

l The  infected  computer  con5nues  as  though  all  is  well  -­‐  it  becomes  a  ‘zombie’,  wai5ng  for  orders   l Once  the  aAacker  has  built  up  a  significant  (10-­‐20,000)  number  of  ‘bots’,  they  can  order  this  ‘bot-­‐net’  to  

aAack  via  a  DDoS  

l The  order  may  come  from  the  aAacker  directly  using  a  bot-­‐net  controller  or  more  likely  via  some  network  

service  the  ‘zombie’  is  listening  on  (e.g.  IRC),  the  actual  aAack  message  may  look  innocent  

l The  order  can  contain  the  type,  dura5on  and  target  for  the  aAack   l The  actual  aAack  method  may  vary,  e.g.  email,  ping,  web  server  request  

(6)

August  2015 Computer  Security  &  Forensics

Network  Defenses

l

Firewalls  

l

Demilitarized  Zones  (DMZ)    

l

Virtual  Private  Networks  (VPN)  

l

Intrusion  Detec5on  Systems  (IDS)  

l

Honey  Pots  

l

Vulnerability  Scanners

11

l

Firewalls  are  designed  to  protect  a  user/organisa5on  from  harm  

l Derived  from  the  concept  of  a  ‘firewall’  being  used  as  a  barrier  between  engine  and  occupants     l Can  user  router  or  sokware  to  implement  firewall  

l A  home  network  using  NAT  acts  as  a  default  firewall  since  services  have  to  be  enabled   l

A  more  useful  view  is  a  castle  with  gatekeeper  

l The  gatekeeper  checks  for  valid  services  before  allowing  requests  to  access  server   l The  services  are  usually  iden5fied  by  the  ports  they  use  

l

AAacks  

l Sneak  intruder  through  (tunnel,  backdoor)   l Subvert  firewall  (trojan)  /  masquerade  as  a  


Firewalls

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August  2015 Computer  Security  &  Forensics

Demilitarized  Zones  (DMZ)

l

A  business  wishing  to  offer  public  services  

(e.g.  a  web  site  or  email)  can  place  these  

services  inside  a  demilitarized  zone  

l

Two  firewalls  are  used  

l

The  inner  wall  protects  the  private  network  

and  is  very  strict  

l

The  outer  wall  allows  public  service  requests  

through  

l

Separates  private  business  network  from  

publicly  accessible  network

13

HTTP

SMTP Public  Services

Private  Services

Virtual  Private  Network  (VPN)

l

What  if  a  user  requires  access  to  private  network  services  but  is  outside  the  

firewall(s)?  

l

A  virtual  private  network  connec5on  can  be  established  

l

This  creates  a  secure,  encrypted  connec5on  through  the  firewall  

l

Communica5on  is  then  diverted  via  this  connec5on  and  ‘appears’  inside  the  

internal  network  without  having  to  validate  against  the  other  firewall  checks  

(8)

August  2015 Computer  Security  &  Forensics

Honey  Pots

l

When  inves5ga5ng  poten5al  security  weaknesses  or  trying  to  iden5fy  

aAackers,  it  can  be  useful  to  create  a  ‘Honey  Pot’  

l

A  Honey  Pot  is  a  vulnerable  machine  that  is  closely  monitored  and  all  access  

to  it  is  logged  

l

Baited  to  tempt  hacker  to  aAack  where  normal  users  would  not  use  

l

E.g.  use  interes5ng  names  and  accounts  

l

Can  deliberately  infect  with  a  virus  to  trace  communica5ons  back  to  controller    

l

Very  useful  if  you  wish  to  determine  if  you  are  under  aAack  

l

Exploits  network  admins  knowledge  of  what  is  good  and  what  is  not  

l

Water  control  plant  example

15

Vulnerability  Scanners

l

Checks  computers  and  network  architecture  for  known  vulnerabili5es  

l

Can’t  always  fully  test  weaknesses  since  likely  to  break  live  system  

l

Best  to  test  on  a  system  before  it  is  deployed  

l

Metasploit  is  a  well  known  vulnerability  scanner  

l

Available  for  common  opera5ng  systems  

l

hAp://www.metasploit.org/  

(9)

August  2015 Computer  Security  &  Forensics

Secure  Socket  Layer

l

Secure  Socket  Layer  (SSL)  is  a  common  method  of  establishing  a  secure  

connec5on  across  a  network  

SSL  is  flexible  about  the  encryp5on  methods  used  -­‐  part  of  setng  up  the  

connec5on  is  determining  a  common,  shared  encryp5on  protocol  between  client  

and  server  

Once  established,  the  client  and  server  switch  to  communica5ng  via  this  protocol  

l

HTTPS  is  Hypertext  Transfer  Protocol  over  Secure  Socket  Layer  

l

Also  known  as  Transport  Layer  Security  (TLS)  

l

Note  that  a  secure  connec5on  to  a  hacker  doesn’t  help  you  much...

17

Summary

l

Network  AAacks  

l

Reconnaissance  

l

AAacks  

l

Spoofing  

l

Web  Site  Vulnerabili5es  

l

Denial  of  Service

l

Network  Defences  

l

Firewalls  

l

Demilitarised  Zones  

l

Virtual  Private  Networks  

l

Honey  Pots  

l

Vulnerability  Scanners  

l

Secure  Socket  Layer

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