Abstrat. The paper presents features and implementation of a sharedredundant approah to inreasethe reliabilityof
networkedontrolsystems.Commonapproahesbasedonredundantomponentsinontrolsystemusepassiveorativeredundany.
Wedealwithquasi-redundantsubsystems(sharedredundany)whereasbasifeaturesareintroduedinthepaper. Thistypeof
redundanyoersseveralimportantadvantagessuhasminimizingthenumberofomponentsaswellasinreasingthereliability.
The example of a four-rotor mini-heliopter ispresented in order to show reliability improvingwithout using any additional
redundantomponents.Themainaimofthispaperistoshowtheinueneoftheloadinreasingfollowingdierentsenarios. The
resultsouldhelptodeterminetheappliationswherequasi-redundantsubsystemsareagoodsolutiontoremaininasigniant
reliabilitylevelevenifritialfailureappears.
Keywords: sharedredundany,dependability,networkedontrolsystems
1. Introdution. Tobeableto obtainrelevantresults ofreliability evaluations for omplexsystems, it
isneessaryto desribethe maximumof spei dependenieswithin thestudied system andtheirinuenes
on the system reliability. Dierent methods or approahes for ontrol systems' reliability improvement are
developed in order to be applied to spei subsystems or to deal with dependeniesamong subsystems. A
lassialtehniqueonsists in designingafault-tolerantontrol [1℄where themain aimis toproposearobust
ontrol algorithm. Guenab andothers in [2℄ dealwiththis approahand reonguration strategyin omplex
systems,too.
On the other side is the design of reliable ontrol arhitetures. Probably the most used tehnique is
to onsider the redundant omponents whih enlarge the system struture and its omplexity too. Ative
and passive redundany is the simplest way howto improve dependability attributes of the systemssuh as
reliability, maintainability, availability, et [3℄. However, as it wasmentioned the ontrol struture turns to
be moreomplexdue to aninreasingnumberof omponentsaswell asthenumberof possibledependenies
amongomponents,itisin partiulartheaseforNetworkedControlSystems[4℄[5℄.
The paper introdues omplex networked ontrol arhiteture based on asade ontrol struture. The
asade struture was hosen purposely due to its advantages. This struture is widely used in industrial
appliationsthankstopositiveresultsforqualityofontrolwhiharealreadydesribedandgenerallyknown[6℄.
Ontheothersideitoerssomepossibilitiesofsystemreliabilityimprovement. Therearepotentiallyredundant
omponentssuhasontrollers(primary,seondary). Ifmorethanonenetworkisimplementedweouldonsider
them aspotentiallyredundant subsystems too. Finally if thephysial system allowsit, it is possibleto take
protfromsensors. Theasadestrutureandotherfeatures areintroduedin moredetails inthethirdpart.
Thepaperisorganisedasfollows. Afterbringinglosertheresearhbakground,thesharedredundanyis
introdued. Theontrollersandnetworksarepresentedinmoredetailsinordertoshowsomedependenieswhih
ouldbeappearedwhenasharedredundanyapproahisimplemented. Inthenextpartarepresentednetworked
topologiesonsideredasasadeontrol(CC)strutureofthe4-rotormini-heliopter(drone)model[7℄. Using
Petri netswerepreparedthe modelsof theintroduedquasi-redundantomponentsaswell asdrone'sontrol
struture. A simple model of the two quasi-redundant subsystems is evaluated. Finally, are proposed the
simulationresultsofthementionedsimpletwoomponentsmodelaswellasthemodeloftheomplexdrone's
struturewithshortonlusion.
2. Researh Bakground. Control arhiteture design approah was taken into aount by Wysoki,
Deboukand Nouri[8℄. Theypresentsharedredundanyaspartsofsystems(subsystems)whih ouldreplae
anothersubsystem in aseof itsfailure. This feature is onditionedwith thesame orsimilar funtion of the
subsystem. Wysoki et al. introdue the sharedredundant arhiteture in four dierent examplesillustrated
onX-by-Wire"systemsusedinautomotiveappliations. Presentedresultsshownadvantagesofthisapproah
inontrolarhiteturedesign.
The shared redundany approah involves the problemati of a Load Sharing [9℄. Thus, some of the
omponents take part of the load of the failed omponents in order to let the system in funtional mode.
∗
LaboratoireGIPSA-Lab(GIPSA-LabUMR5216CNRS-INPG-UJF)BP46,F-38402SaintMartind'HèresCedex,Frane
†
ConsiderationoftheloadsharinginmehanialomponentsispresentedbyPozsgaiandothersin[10℄. Pozsgai
andothers analyzethistypeofsystemsandoermathematialformalismfor simplesystem1-out-of-2and
1-out-of-3. Alsotherearesomemathematialstudies[9℄ofseveralphenomenaappearedonthiseldofresearh.
Bebbingtonand othersin[9℄analyzeseveralparametersofsystemssuhassurvivalprobabilityofloadshared
subsystems.
3. SharedRedundany. Speikindofredundantsubsystemswhihhavesimilarfeaturessuhasative
redundanyhowevergivesussomeadditionaladvantageswhihwillbeintroduedinfurthertext. Thiskindof
spares representsanother typeofredundantomponentswhihare notprimarydeterminedasredundantbut
theyare ableto replaesomeothersubsystems ifit isurgentlyrequired. This typeofredundany isreferred
assharedredundany [8℄orquasi-redundany [11℄. Dueto itsimportantadvantagesitisusefultodesribethis
kind of spares in order to show several non-onsideredand non-evaluated dependenies whih ould havean
inuenetothesystemreliability. Identiationanddesriptionofthisinueneshouldnotbeignoredinorder
toobtainrelevantresultsofthereliabilityestimationofthesystemswhihinvolvethiskindofspares.
As it was mentioned above, the shared redundany (SR) mentioned by Wysoki and others in [8℄ is in
further text taken into aount in the same meaning as a quasi-redundant (QR) omponent. Thus,
quasi-redundantomponentsarethepartsof thesystemwhih followtheirprimarymission whentheentiresystem
is in funtional state. However, when some parts of the system fail then this funtion ould be replaed by
anotherpartwhih followsthesameorasimilar mission,thusby quasi-redundantpart. Thequasi-redundant
omponentsarenotprimarydetermined asativeredundantsubsystembeauseeahonehasitsownmission
whihmustbeaomplished. Only in aseoffailureit ouldbeused. InNCSappearsthequestionoflogial
reonguration of the system when the data ow must behangedin order to replae the funtionality of a
subsystembyanotherone. Forexample,somenewnodeswill losethenetworkonnetionandthesystemhas
toavoidthestatewhenpaketsaresenttoanodewhihdoesnotexist. Thus,themainfeaturesoftheshared
redundanyouldbesummarizedasfollows:
"Quasi-redundantomponentisnotonsideredasprimaryredundantomponentsuhastheativeorthepassive
redundantomponents."
Generallyinnetworkedontrolsystems,threekindsofquasi-redundantomponents(subsystems)ouldbe
onsidered:
•
QRontrollers.•
QRnetworks.•
QRsensors.Hene,aneessarybutnotsuientonditionisthataontrolstruturewhereSRouldbeonsideredhas
tobeomposedatleastoftwoabovementionedsubsystems(ontrollers,networks,atuators). Thesubsystems
shouldhavesimilarfuntionalityoronstrutioninordertobeabletoreplaethemissionofanotheromponent.
Inaseofquasi-redundantomponentsthere areseverallimitations. Inorderto takeprotofquasi-redundant
networks,itisneessarytoonnetallnodesinallonsideredQRnetworks. Thus,inaseofdierentnetworks
theomponentsshouldhaveimplementedallneessaryommuniationinterfaes. InaseofQRontrollersthe
hardwareperformanehasto allowimplementingmorethanoneontrol task.
Third mentionedomponentsaresensors. Considerationof thesensorsasQRomponentshasimportant
physial limitations. Inorder to be ableto replaeasensor formeasuringaphysial valueX by anotherone
formeasuringYitisneessaryto usemulti-funtional"smartsensors.Weansupposethat someombination
of the physial values an not be measured by using one sensor dueto the inability toimplement the required
funtionalityinone hardwareomponent.
Other limitation is the distane between failed sensor and its QR sensor whih ould have a signiant
inuenetothepossibilityofitsreplaing. Generally,implementationoftheQRsensorswithinontrolsystem
strutureouldbemorediultthantheappliationoftheSRapproahonontrollersornetworks.
There areseveral naturallysuitableontrol strutureswhih ouldimplementthe sharedredundany
ap-proah withoutother modiations suh as asadeontrol struture (Fig. 3.1). This struture is often used
in industrial appliations thanks to its important features whih improvethe quality of ontrol. With using
asade aontrol struture there are several onstraints[8℄. The main ondition requires that theontrolled
system must ontain a subsystem (seondary subsystem FS(s)Fig. 3.1) that diretly aet to the primary
Fig.3.1. Mainstrutureoftheasadeontrol
Fig.3.2.NCCSwithtwonetworksandalternativenetworkonnetions
Usually for seondary subsystems there is a ondition of faster dynamis than primary proess. This
onditionmust notbefullled [8℄;inthis ase,somemodiationsofonventionalasadestruture(Fig. 3.1)
andontrollawsmustbeprovided.
3.1. Quasi-redundantontrollers. Intheprevioustext,severalsuitableontrolstrutureswerebriey
introdued. Asitwasshowntheontrollersoveredbythesestruturesouldbeonsideredasquasi-redundant
omponentsbydefault. Thus,thehardwareofbothomponentsouldbesharedinordertoimplementashared
redundantapproah.
Let'sonsider the networkedasadeontrolsystem shown in gure3.2. Thesystem isomposedof ve
main omponents (Sensor
S1
,S2
, ontrollersC1
,C2
and atuatorA
) and two networks. Theommuniationow among omponents is determined by its asade ontrol struture. Thus, sensor
S1
sends a measuredvaluetoontroller
C1
(Master), theontrollerC2
(Slave) reeivesthevaluesfrom thesensorS2
aswellastheontroller
C1
inorder toomputeanatuatingvaluefortheatuatorA
.Eahpartofthesystem(omponentsandnetworks)presentsindependentsubsystem. However,when
quasi-redundant omponents are studied, the system is not onsidered as omposed of independent omponents.
Depending on the performane parameters of the used hardware equipment in the ontrol loop, a spei
inueneonthesystemreliabilityshouldbetakenintoaount. Thussomedependeniesshouldnotbeignored
in the dependability analysis. In the NCCS shown in Fig. 3.2 we ould onsider ontrollers
C1
andC2
asthe quasi redundant subsystems (omponents). Both QR ontrollers have a primary mission whih should
be followed. Thus, aontroller
C1
ontrols outer ontrol loopand ontrollerC2
stabilizes inner ontrol loop.Howeverinaseoffailureofoneofthem,weouldonsidertheseondoneasakindofspare.
As it wasmentioned previously, the ontrollers follow theirprimary mission stabilization orperformane
optimization of the ontrolled system. Therefore, in regards to the similar hardware, it allows sharing the
omputingapaityandexeutingdierenttasks. Thus,inordertoimplementtheSRapproah,bothontrollers
havetoenapsulatebothontroltasksfortheouterandtheinnerontrolloop(seetheasadeontrolstruture
ingure3.1).
Fig.3.3. Possiblesenariosforquasi-redundantontrollers
aswellasseondarysubsystems. Inthisaseweansupposetwosenarios.
The rst one supposes that the ontroller is able to exeute all the neessary tasks within the required
sample periods (Fig. 3.3a). Thus, nodelays orotherundesirable onsequenesare expeted. Inthis asethe
behaviorofthequasi-redundantomponentissimilarasin theaseofativeredundantomponents. Thus,in
theaseoffailureof oneoftheomponents,theseondtakesareaboutitsmission untilitsfailure.
Figure 3.3b showsa seond ase when time to exeute both neessarytasks is greater thanthe required
sampling period. Thus, the ontroller will ause the delays whih have signiant inuene to the system
stability[12℄[13℄. Therefore,thisdelayouldbeknownwhihallowsitspartiallyompensatingbyusingseveral
methods [14℄. Thus, weansuppose that thesystemdestabilizationwillnotourimmediatelyafter therst
delayand weare abletoompensateitforsometime interval. Thus, quasi-redundantontrollerdoesnotfail
immediatelybut itsreliabilitydereased.
Thereareseveralsituationswhenthissenarioouldbeonsidered.Inritialsystemswherethefailureofan
importantomponentouldauseundesireddamagesorotherdangerousonsequenes,thesharedredundany
approah ouldhelp to alloatesometime intervalin order tomaintain thesystemin asafestate. Thus, the
SRapproahanbeasignianttehniquetoseurethesystembefore adamagerisk.
3.2. Quasi-redundant networks. The seond partof the NCS whih ould be taken into aount as
SRsubsystemsarenetworks. Let'ssupposeasystemwithtwonetworks(Fig.3.2)whereallomponentsould
ommuniate(onnet)onthesenetworks(
N1
andN2
)ifitisneeded. InthisaseweanapplytheSRapproahonthissystem.
Consideredfuntionalityof the quasiredundantnetworks is asfollows. Both networks transmitrequired
datanetwork
N1
transmitdatafromS1
toC1
andfromC1
toC2
suhasnetworkN2
fromS2
toC2
andfromC2
to A.Thus bothnetworks areativeandalloatedduring thesystemmission. Thesameasin theaseofQRontrollers: when anetwork failed,theseond oneantakeitsloadafterasystemreonguration. Thus,
allrequireddataaresentthroughtheseond network. Hene,twosimilarsenariosaswiththeontrollertask
exeution ould bedesribed. The amount of transmitted data on the network with a speied bit rate has
logiallyinueneontheprobabilityoffailureofthenetwork(ofoursethisdependsonthenetworktypeand
other parametersmentioned). This inuene ouldbeignored whenthe network performaneparametersare
suient. However,wean suppose that theprobabilityof network failure isinreasing simultaneouslywhen
thenetworkloadinreases.
Theharateristibetweennetwork loadingandits bit ratedepends on thenetwork typeand havetobe
measuredinrealnetworkonditionsin ordertodeterminethetypeofdependenylinearornonlinear.
Notonlythenetworkbitrateanbeimportanthoweverothernetworklimitationssuhasmaximalnumber
of nodesonneted tothe network,et. All limits ofthe QRsubsystemsanreate dependenieswithdiret
inueneonthesystemreliability. Primary,weouldonsiderthesedependeniesasundesirablebutinaseof
ritialfailuresthisSRapproahgivessometimetosavethesystem.
WhenNCSwithanSRapproahareanalyzed,thisharateristishouldbeinludedinthepreparedmodel
andfurtherevaluatedin ordertodetermineitsinuenetothereliabilityofthewholeNCS.
Fig.3.4. Possiblefailurerateurvesforthesubsystem
S
2
duringitsmissionHowever,there areseveral importantsenarioswhenthe reliabilityof thesystemould be dereasedin order
topreventdangerousonsequenesorotherundesirableevents.
These senarios ould appear when someonditions ould not be fullled (insuient exeution time or
networkbitrate)butthesystemneedsometimein ordertotakeasafestate. Hene,itisneessarytoidentify
anddesribetheinuene ofthese dependenieswhih leadstomorerelevantresults. Thus, preventfromtoo
pessimistiortoooptimistiresultsofthereliabilityanalysisoftheonsideredsystems. Thedependeniesould
bedistinguishedasfollows:
•
ativeredundantdependeny,•
singlestephangeofthenominalfailurerateλ
n
∈ h
0; 1
i
inreasedonebyaonstantvaluesteploadhange,
•
timedependhangeof thenominalfailure rateλ
n
-funtional dependeny-theloadof thesubsystemishangedwithtimepassedfromspearedsubsystemfailure,
1. linear,
2. nonlinear.
Let's assume that the destabilization of the system does not our immediately after the rst delay on
thenetwork aused by insuient ontroller's hardware ornetwork's parameters. Thus, the quasi-redundant
ontrollerdoesnotfailimmediatelybutin thisaseitsfailurerateinreaseswhihorrespondonsequentlyto
adereasedreliability.
Thus,inaseoftheativeredundantdependenywesupposethataquasi-redundantsubsystemhassuient
apaitiesinordertofollowitsprimarymissionaswellasthemissionofthefailedsubsystem(orsubsystems).
A singlestephange of thenominal failure rate ofthe subsystem isonsidered in the aseof subsystems
wherethefailurerateofthequasi-redundantsubsystemishanged(inreased)onebyaonstantvalue(Fig.3.4)
during its life time. Thus, the new inreased failure rate
λ
′
remains onstantduring further life time of the
subsystem. For example,let's suppose aNCS with twoEthernet networks where one of them hasfailed and
onsequently the systemis reongured and all nodes (omponents) start to ommuniate through the
non-failednetworkwhihhasasuientbit rateapaityinorderto transmitalltherequireddata. However,the
amount of data has beeninreased whih onsequentlyinreases the probability of pakets' ollisions(under
theassumptionof alassialCSMA/CDprotool,for instane). Thus, theprobabilityoffailure (failurerate)
hasbeeninreaseduptothenewvalue
λ
′
.
Athirdaseonsidersthehangeofthenominalfailurerate
λ
n
whihdependsonthetimepassedfromthemomentofthefailureuntilurrenttimeoftheworkingofthequasi-redundantsubsystemwhihenapsulatesthe
exeutingneessarytasks(own tasksaswellas tasksofthefailedsubsystem). Thus,afuntionaldependeny
has to be onsidered. This dependeny of the hange of the failure rate
λ
n
ould be desribed by a linearor nonlineardependeny/ funtion. We ouldstudy the previousexampleof the systemwith twonetworks.
However,in this asethebit rate oftheseond (non-failed) networkis notsuient. Consequently delaysin
datatransmissionaswellasotheronsequentialundesirable problemssuh assystemdestabilizationmightbe
aused. Weansupposethat thenon-failed networkwill failin sometime. Thus,thenominal failure rate
λ
n
oftheseond network isnowtimedependentandis linearlyornonlinearlyinreaseduntil thesystemfailure.
Mentionedexampleswithrelatedequationsarefurtherdisussedinmoredetails.
Let'ssuppose that the reliability ofthe system
R
(
t
)
, probability of thefailure during time intervalh
0;
t
i
,(suhasthenetworksinthepreviousexamples)whereasthesubsystem
S1
willfail atrstandthenthequasi-redundantsubsystem
S2
willfollowbothmissions (S1
andS2
). Ingure3.4 areshowntwoabovementionedsenarioswhenthenominalfailurerate
λ
n
ofthesubsystemisinreasedbyaonstantvalueorbyavaluewhihouldbedesribedas alinearornonlinearfuntion(funtionaldependenies).
Atrstinreasingthefailurerate
λ
n
onetimebyaonstantvalue(seeFig.3.4)willbedealt. Itorrespondstothereliabilityredutionofthequasi-redundantsubsystem
S2
byinreasingthefailurerate,duringitsmission,from its nominal value
λ
n
upto newλ
′
. Consequently, thesystem will followits primary mission thanks to
theQRsubsystem
S2
butitsfailure rateisalreadyinreasedandonsequentlytheprobabilityoffailure ofS2
is higher. The dierene betweennominal
λ
n
andinreasedλ
′
failure rate will be alled derease fator
d
R
.Thus,thementionedonstantvalueisharaterizedbythedereasefator
d
R
oftheQRsubsystemandanewhangedfailurerate
λ
′
atthefailtime
t
f
isgivenbythefollowedsimpleformula:λ
′
=
λ
n
+
d
R
(3.1)ThefailurerateinreasesonlyonetimebythespeiedvalueandtheQRsubsystem
S2
withanewonstantfailurerate
λ
′
willfollowbothmissionsofitsownmissionand missionofthefailedsubsystem
S1
.Theseondaseshowningure3.3onsidersthereliabilityredutionwherethefailurerate
λ
n
isinreasedduringtheworkingofthesubsystem
S2
byaspeieddereasefator. Thishangeofthenominalfailureratedependsontimewhereaswithtimeextendingthefailurerateofthe
S2
isgotnearto1(systemfailed). Thus,adereasefuntion
f
d
R
(
t
)
isrepresentedbyalinearornonlinearharateristianddependsontherealsubsystemwhihisonsideredasquasi-redundant. Thus,aninreasedfailurerate
λ
′
ofthesubsystem
S2
dependsontimetandisgivenbythefollowingformula:
λ
′
(
t
) =
λ
n
+
f
d
R
(
t
)
(3.2)As it was mentioned, the derease funtion
f
d
R
(
t
)
an be represented by a simple linear funtion, forexample,
λ
′
(
t
) =
λ
n
+
d
R
10
−
3
(
t
+ 1
−
t
f
)
(3.3)where
t
+ 1
allowshangingthenominalfailure rateλ
n
atthemomentofthefailureattimet
f
.Ontheothersideanonlinearexponentialfuntionanbeonsideredasfollows:
λ
′
(
t
) =
λ
n
+
e
d
R
(
t−t
f
)
(3.4)where
λ
′
is the valueof the inreased failure rate,
λ
n
is the nominal failure rate of theomponent,t
f
isthetimeofthefailureoftheomponent,
d
R
isthedereasefatorwhihhasadiretinueneontheinreasedfailurerate.
3.4. Appliation to a mini-drone heliopter. TheNCCstrutureisapplied fortheontrol ofafour
rotorsmini-heliopter(Drone,Fig.3.5). Theproposed ontrol strutureforthis realmodel isasfollows. The
NCCarhitetureisomposedofoneprimaryontroller(Master)andoneseondaryontroller(Slave),thirteen
sensors,fouratuatorsandtwoommuniationnetworks.
The Master is designed for attitude stabilization (ontrol) through Slave ontroller for angular veloity
ontrolforeahpropeller. Theaimoftheontrolistostabilize oordinatesoftheheliopter[10℄.
The ontrollersare used as quasi-redundant omponents within the presented networkedasade ontrol
system (further only NCCS). They use the sameontrol algorithm (propeller's angular veloity ontrol) but
withdierentinputdata(setpoint,systemoutput,et.)
Hene,in aseof failure, oneof them ouldretransmit alltherequireddata to anotherone,whereas
pre-programmedontrolalgorithmshouldomputetheatuatingvalue. Thus,thefailedontrollerisreplaedbya
seondonewhihstartstoomputetheatuatingvalue.
Otherquasi-redundantparts ofthisontrolstruturearenetworks(Fig.3.6). Asintheaseofontrollers,
one of the networks an ompensate another one after a system reonguration. Usually, two networks are
primary designeddue to redutionamountof transmitted data. However, in aseof network failure all data
ouldberetransmittedthroughtheseond one.
The desribed approah for subsystem's failure ompensation by usingthe sharedredundany requires a
logial reonguration of the NCCS. Thus, in ase of failure the hardware onguration is non-touhed but
Fig.3.5.Casadeontrolstrutureofamini-heliopterwithonenetwork
Fig.3.6. Casadeontrolstrutureof amini-heliopterwithtwonetworks
4. Simulation and results. All thepresentednetworkedontrolarhitetures(Fig. 3.5,3.6)were
mod-elledbyusingPetrinets. Thistoolwashosenthankstoitsabilitytomodeldierenttypesofomplexsystems
and dependenies within them. Toprovide the reliability analysis,the Monte Carlo simulation (further only
MCS)method wasused. Themultiple simulationsofthemodelled arhiteture[1℄areprovidedto obtainthe
reliabilitybehaviorofthebasitwoquasi-redundantomponents(forexampletwoontrollersinCCSstruture).
Modelofthesystemoversthesimulationoftherandomeventsofthebasiomponentsofthesystemsuhas
sensors,ontrollersandatuatorsaswellasthenetwork'srandomfailures. Softwareusedformodelpreparation
isCPNToolswhihallowmultiplesimulationofthemodelinordertoobtainstatistiallyrepresentativesample
oftheneessarydatatodeterminethereliabilitybehaviorofthestudiedmodel.
As it was mentioned, the simulation of the simple two quasi-redundant omponents with all onsidered
hanges ofthefailure rate(single,linear,nonlinear)wasprovided. Thus, newfailure rate
λ
′
ofthenon-failed
omponentisomputedbyusingequation(3.1),(3.3)and(3.4).
This hange ould be alled as single hange beause the omponent's failure rate is hangedonly one
duringtheQRomponent'slifetime. Bothomponentshaveequalnominalfailurerate
λ
n
= 0
.
001
.Fewexamplesoftheinueneofthesinglestephangeofthefailureratebythespeieddereasefator
d
R
tothereliabilitybehaviorareshowningure4.1. Weanseethereareveurves.Twonon-dashedurvesshow
Fig.4.1. Inueneof theinreased failure rateof theomponentby a onstantdereasefator
d
R
tothereliabilityof thesystemomposedoftwoquasi-redundantomponents
Table4.1
MTTFFofSimulatedControlStruturesWithDierentDereaseFators
Dereasefator
d
R
MTTFF-Drone(Fig.3.5) MTTFF-Drone(Fig.3.6)0
55(+11%)
58(+22%)
2
∗
10
−
3
54(+9%)
56(+17%)
10
−
2
53(+7%)
54(+13%)
59
∗
10
−
2
50
.
5(+2%)
49(+3%)
0
.
999
49
.
6
47
.
6
omponents withoutredundant relationrst urve from the bottom). These twourvesdetermine borders
wherethereliabilityofthestudiedsystemanbehangeddependingonthevalueofthedereasefator
d
R
.Asweanseefromgure4.1,asingleinreasingofthenominalfailurerate
λ
n
ofthenon-failedomponentsbythesamevalueaswasnominalfailurerate
λ
n
uptoλ
′
= 0
.
002
(d
R
= 0
.
001
)auseasigniantredutionofthereliability.
Table4.1showseveralvaluesofthelifetime(parameterMTTFF)forthestudiedsystem.Eahtable(Table
4.1, 4.2, 4.3) showsthelife timeof the studied omponentsasativeredundant subsystems
(
d
R
= 0)
and asindependent subsystems
(
d
R
= 0
.
999)
. From thevalue of the derease fatord
R
= 0
.
01
the life time of thesystemsigniantlyimproves(
18%
andmore). Theresultsofthelinearandnonlinearfailurerateinreasingareshownintables4.2and4.3. Inalltablesarenotedtheperentualvalueoftheinreasedlifetimeorresponding
tothedereasefator.
Table4.1 shows the MTTFF parameters of both omplex mini-heliopter strutures. In the rst drone
struture (Fig. 3.5) two quasi-redundant ontrollers are onsidered. In the seond struture (Fig. 3.6) two
groupsofquasi-redundantsubsystemsareonsideredandsimulatedtheontrollersandthenetworks.
Inallsimulatedsystemswasobservedtheinueneofthesinglestepofthefailureratebyavaluespeied
bythedereasefator
d
R
. Thesameasintables4.14.3,thereareshownthelifetimeofsystemorrespondingtodierentdereasefators
2
.
10
−
3
,
10
−
2
,
59
.
10
−
3
. Weanseethatinreasingtheomponent'snominalfailure
rate
λ
n
byadereasefatorequalto59
.
10
−
3
,whihrepresentsapproximately
59
timeshigherthefailurerate,hasasigniantinueneto dereasingthelife time ofthe system. Theresultsarealittlebit betterthanin
theaseofthesystemwithoutredundantomponents
(
d
R
= 0
.
999)
,butweouldseethat theyarealmostthesame.
Thedrone'sstrutureomposesoftwenty(twenty-onestruturewithtwonetworks)omponentsthirteen
sensors(
3
gyro-meters,3
magneto-meters,3
aelerometers,4
rotors'angularveloitysensors),twoontrollers,fouratuatorsandone(two)networks. Duetothehighratioofindependentomponentsandsharedredundant
omponentswithinthedrone'sstruture(
18
independentand2
quasi-redundantFig.3.5)thereisadierenebetweenlife timesforminimaland maximal
d
R
issigniantlysmaller(about11%
and22%
)thanin theaseTable4.3
MTTFFoftheTwoQuasi-RedundantWithLinearInreasingoftheFailureRate
λ
n
= 10
−
3
At. red.d
R
= 10
−
3
d
R
= 10
−
2
d
R
= 10
−
1
Noredundany(
d
R
= 0
MTTFF[Tu℄ 1503(+300%) 1153(+231%) 812(+63%) 611(+22%) 499
subsystemthan in thedrone'sase. As itwasmentionedabovethis isaused bythe dierenein omplexity
betweenbasianddrone'sNCCarhiteture. Inaseofomparisonbetweentwodronesstrutures(Fig.3.5,3.6)
theresultsarebetterforarhiteturewithtwonetworkswhihisomposedoftwoquasi-redundantsubsystems
ontrollers(Master,Slave)andnetworkswhenthedereasefatorissmallerthan
59
.
10
−
3
. Theinreasingofthe
nominalfailureratebythedereasefatorgreaterthan
59
.
10
−
3
signiantlydereasesthelifetimeofthedrone.
Ontheotherside,eveniftheontrollerloadingwillhangeitsfailurerateapproximatelytentimes
(
d
R
= 10
−
2
)
thesystem'slife timeisabout
7%
longerthanin theaseofthesystemwithoutasharedredundantapproahimplementation.
4.1. Reliability approximation. Inpreviousartilestateswefousedon thedesriptionof the
depen-denies among QR omponents and their inuene to the nal reliability of the systems. The aim of this
researh is to propose a simple analytial method whih desribes the reliability behavior of the shared
re-dundant subsystems withdynamially hanged failurerate. Hene, in nextstates weintrodue ananalytial
equationwhihallowsapproximatingthereliabilityofthetwoomponentsystem. Ofourse,aquasi-redundant
approahisonsidered. Thus,anallysimplemethodforthedependabilityanalysisisproposedasanextension
of theommon known methods for the dependability analysis. The proposed method forreliability behavior
approximationsupposesthat bothquasi-redundantomponentshavethesameorsimilarnominal failure rate
wheredierenesaresmallandouldbeignored. Asitwasmentionedabove,thesystemomposedoftwoQR
omponentsisonsidered. Inthisasestudy,weintrodueonlytheresultsforreliabilityapproximationwhere
asinglestephangeof the failurerate (furtheronly FR) is onsidered. ThisFR behavioris desribed in the
previouspartof the artile(3.3) byequation 3.1. Thus, let's supposetwo QRomponentswith thenominal
failure rate
λ
n
and dene thederease fatord
R
, then the reliabilityR2
qr
(
t
)
behavior of the QRsubsystemomposedofbothomponentsanbedesribedasfollows:
R2
qr
(
t
) = 1
−
2
Y
i
=1
(1
−
e
−
(
λ
n
+
k
i
d
R
)
t
)
(4.1)where
k
i
istheapproximatedoeient.The parameterderease fator
d
R
and approximated oeients of equation 4.1 are shown in table 4.5.Ineah row ofthe table is shown thederease fator with the orresponding valueof the oeients
k1
andk2
. Thetable showsseveraldierentvaluesofthedereasefatorwhereasnon-mentionedvaluesanbeeasilyapproximatedbyusinganappropriatemethod.
Themaximalerroroftheapproximationgivenbytheparametersoftheequation4.2islessthan1
R2
λ
n
(
t
) = 1
−
2
Y
i
=1
(1
−
e
−
(
λ
n
+
dR
2
)
t
)
(4.2)where
d
R
isthedereasefatorandλ
n
thenominalfailurerateoftheQRomponents. Itisneessarytoexplainthat theerror ofall theapproximationsonvergeto thehighest mentionedlimits(1% fortable's oeients)
Table4.4
MTTFF oftheTwoQuasi-RedundantWithExponentialInreasingoftheFailureRate
λ
n
= 10
−
3
At. red. (d
R
= 0
)d
R
= 10
−
3
d
R
= 10
−
2
d
R
= 10
−
1
NoredundanyMTTFF[Tu℄ 1503(+300%) 902(+80%) 676(+35%) 537(+8%) 499
Table4.5
ParametersofEquation4.1foraSingleStepFRChange
Dereasefator
d
R
k
1
k
2
λ
n
0
.
44
0
.
52
2
λ
n
0
.
39
0
.
395
3
λ
n
0
.
28
0
.
393
4
λ
n
0
.
198
0
.
434
5
λ
n
0
.
154
0
.
46
6
λ
n
0
.
13
0
.
4653
7
λ
n
0
.
11
0
.
46
8
λ
n
0
.
099
0
.
471
9
λ
n
0
.
09
0
.
46
10
λ
n
0
.
081
0
.
463
20
λ
n
0
.
0445
0
.
38
30
λ
n
0
.
0296
0
.
377
40
λ
n
0
.
0225
0
.
385
50
λ
n
0
.
0182
0
.
3518
70
λ
n
0
.
0133
0
.
3284
80
λ
n
0
.
011625
0
.
32475
100
λ
n
0
.
0094
0
.
3332
4.2. MTTFparameterapproximation. Eahquasi-redundantsubsystemdoesnotexeedthelimitsof
thebound oftheminimal (
M T T Fmin
) andmaximal timelife (M T T Fmax
)of thequasi-redundantsubsystem.The parameter
M T T Fmax
represents the maximal time life of the QR subsystem whih ould be obtainedwhen the onditionsare equal to the onditions of thesubsystem with ative redundant omponents. Thus,
the nominal failure rate of the non-failed omponent is not hanged when its load has been inreasedthe
ase when thederease fator is equalto zero. Thelowest life time limitould bedened by theparameter
M T T Fmin
whih haraterizesthe subsystem omposed of the independent omponents. Thus, when one ofthe omponents fails the system is onsidered as failed. In term of the derease fator, it is equal to 1 or
(
1
−
λ
n
)for asinglestepFRhange. Let'ssuppose thesystemlife time limitedbythebound dened bytheMTTFparametersuhas
h
M T T Fmin
;
M T T Fmax
i
. Thesetwoparametersouldbefoundbysolvingthesimplefollowingequations[15℄:
M T T Fmin
=
Z
∞
0
n
Y
i
=1
R
i
(
t
)
dt
(4.3)and
M T T Fmax
=
Z
∞
0
(1
−
n
Y
i
=1
(1
−
R
i
(
t
)))
dt
(4.4)where
R
i
(t)isthereliabilityofeahomponent.Inthenalpartoftheresultspresentationwedesribedthelife timeinreasingofthetwoomponentQR
subsystem withregardto thelife timeparameter
M T T F
min
whereasvariousvaluesof thedereasefatord
R
areonsidered. Weonsideritasasimpleandfastmethodforlifetimeapproximation. Theresultsareshownin
table4.5. Asinthepreviouspartofthisasestudy,weonsideronlytheinueneofthesinglestepinreasing
ofthenominalfailure rateto thenallife timeofthetwoomponentsQRsystemharaterizedbyitsMTTF
parameter. Inthe rstline, thefailure rate ofthenon-failed QR omponentharaterizedbythe multiple of
thenominal failurerate
λ
n
. Theseond lineshowstheorrespondingMTTFparameterperentageredutionwithinthelimitsdenedbytheabovementionedintervalofthemaximalandminimallifetimes(MTTF).The
MTTFvaluesintrodued intable 4.5arerounded,henethemethoderrorisabout
+
/
−
2
forthemultiple offator,theapproximatederrorisabout
+
/
−
1
ofvaluesshownin thetable. Thus,in theaseofverysimilaranalysis resultof onsidered omplexstruturesit is neessaryto prepare theexatmodel in order to obtain
amoreexatMTTFparameterredution. This method ouldbeused forthe QRsubsystemswith thesame
failurerateorforthesystemwhendiereneamongthenominalfailurerate
λ
n
oftheomponentsisverysmallandanbeignored. IntheaseofanominalFRsmallerthan
10
−
2
,theinreasedvalue100.
λ
n
shouldrepresentapproximately0.1 whereasthe errorould behigher. Then, it ould beuseful that the valueof nominal FR
determinedforatimeintervalTtransformstothegreatervalueforashortertimeinterval(unit).
5. Conlusion. Thepapershowstheinueneofadditionalreliabilitydereasingofthequasi-redundant
omponent to entire reliability ofthe studied system. Thedesriptionof this dependeny is gettingloserto
show thebehaviorof thesystemreliabilitywhen ashared redundanyapproahis implemented. Theresults
shown in tables 4.14.3 ould be very helpful in order to approximate the life time of the quasi-redundant
subsystemsunder dierentonditionsofthefailurerateinreasing. Thepresentedasadeontrolarhiteture
is suitable for a shared redundany approah implementation and ould be applied to similar systems. For
example, Steer-by-Wire ontrol [16℄ of two front wheels in a ar, et. In addition the paper has shown the
onventionalasade ontrolstruture within onditionsof networkedontrolsystemsasnaturallysuitableto
protfromquasi-redundantsubsystemsasnetworks,ontrollersandpotentiallysensorsifthephysialproess
allowsit. Despiteof someonstraintsforusingthis typeofontrol,theasadearhitetureis widelyusedin
industrialontrolappliations. Hene,onlythereongurationalgorithmshouldbeimplementedtotakeprot
fromquasi-redundantsubsystems.
Thease study presentedin parts 4.1 and 4.2 (results setion) extends the eld of ommon methods for
reliabilityapproximation. Equations(4.1,4.2)areonsideredassimpleand fastanalytialmethod inorderto
evaluatethereliabilityofthesystemswhihoverstwo-omponentQRsubsystemswithsinglestepFRhange.
Themainadvantagesofthequasi-redundantomponentsouldbesummarizedasfollows:
•
The system is omposed only of neessary omponents (parts) for following the primary mission ofthesystemwhereashighersystemreliabilityisensuredwithoutusing anyadditionalativeredundant
omponents.
•
Following the rst point we ould suppose less number of omponents used for saving the ontrolmission. Thus,theeonomiaspetouldbesigniant.
•
Preventionofthesystem'sritialfailure whenaQRsubsystemhasnosuienthardwareapaities.REFERENCES
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Editedby: JanuszZalewski
Reeived: September30,2009