Deep Ecology Essay

A critique of deep ecology A critique of deep ecology

The ‘deep ecology movement’ has been around now for three decades. Since its The ‘deep ecology movement’ has been around now for three decades. Since its creation by Arne Naess in Norway in the early seventies the deep ecology movement creation by Arne Naess in Norway in the early seventies the deep ecology movement has become widespread in all parts of the globe. The movement was made very

has become widespread in all parts of the globe. The movement was made very  popular when Naess and George Sessions put tog

 popular when Naess and George Sessions put together an eight step platform outliningether an eight step platform outlining the principle beliefs of the supporters of this movement. As the movement took off, the principle beliefs of the supporters of this movement. As the movement took off, and deep ecology, as it were, became a household name, various philosophers started and deep ecology, as it were, became a household name, various philosophers started to develop their own theories which focused more on the question of man’s obligation to develop their own theories which focused more on the question of man’s obligation or moral duty to nature. Philosophers like Singer, Regan, Rolsten III and Taylor were or moral duty to nature. Philosophers like Singer, Regan, Rolsten III and Taylor were all trying to develop an environmental ethic which could be applied to this modern all trying to develop an environmental ethic which could be applied to this modern age. Whilst these theories were being developed the deep ecology movement was still age. Whilst these theories were being developed the deep ecology movement was still in the background, becoming more sociably recognised as the years went by.

in the background, becoming more sociably recognised as the years went by.

Around the late 80s early 90s deep ecologists found themselves defending deep Around the late 80s early 90s deep ecologists found themselves defending deep ecology in the form of academic papers and in recognised Environmental Ethics ecology in the form of academic papers and in recognised Environmental Ethics Journals. It was at this point, and it is clear from early deep ecology papers, that a Journals. It was at this point, and it is clear from early deep ecology papers, that a social movement had just met a philosophical debate. Since then, deep ecologists like social movement had just met a philosophical debate. Since then, deep ecologists like Katz, Rothnberg, Light, Fox, Clark, Sylvan have all tried to develop the philosophical Katz, Rothnberg, Light, Fox, Clark, Sylvan have all tried to develop the philosophical roots of deep ecology.

roots of deep ecology.

This essay addresses the philosophy of deep ecology as opposed to the deep ecology This essay addresses the philosophy of deep ecology as opposed to the deep ecology movement. There is a six point summary of the philosophy of deep ecology included movement. There is a six point summary of the philosophy of deep ecology included in the appendix at the end of this essay, as opposed to the popular eight step platform in the appendix at the end of this essay, as opposed to the popular eight step platform which was devised for the social movement of deep ecology.

which was devised for the social movement of deep ecology.

The purpose of this paper is to firstly give a detailed description of deep ecology and The purpose of this paper is to firstly give a detailed description of deep ecology and secondly to argue that deep ecology as a philosophical movement isn’t as successful secondly to argue that deep ecology as a philosophical movement isn’t as successful as the deep ecologies social movement. My aim is to offer a fair and non-biased as the deep ecologies social movement. My aim is to offer a fair and non-biased critique. The paper is broken into four sections entitled: Arne Naess, Self-realisation, critique. The paper is broken into four sections entitled: Arne Naess, Self-realisation, Biocentricism and finally a conclusion.

Biocentricism and finally a conclusion.

Arne Naess Arne Naess

A deep ecology essay which does not mention Arne Naess is comparable to a

 phenomenology essay which doesn’t mention Husserl. Arne Naess’ work introduced the themes the deep ecology for the first time. However to get a sense of where these themes came from I will give a brief picture of Arne Naess life, followed by two sections which analyse two key terms in deep ecology, which are Self-realisation and  biocentric equality.

Arne Naess was born in Olso, in 1912. As he was growing up he became an avid mountaineer. In fact it was mountaineering, along with his philosophical training, which encouraged him to develop an eco philosophy. In Ecology, community and  lifestyle, Arne reflects upon the week spent in a cold bleak mountain hut at the age of  15:

The effect of this week established my conviction of an inner relation  between mountain and mountain people, a certain greatness, cleanness, a

concentration upon what is essential, a self-sufficiency; and consequently a disregard of luxury, of complicated mean of all kinds. 1

Later in his life, Arne built a simple cabin at a place called

 Tvergastein. The term ‘Deep Ecology’ was coined by Arne Naess in

1972 and it was in this simple cabin that most of Arne’s work on

‘Deep Ecology’ was put together.

Stephan Harding, a colleague of Arne’s, who teaches Gaia theory

and deep ecology, claims that since becoming the youngest-ever

professor of philosophy at the University of Oslo, whilst still in his

twenties, Arne Naess revealed his brilliance by studying and writing

extensively in many fields, including semantics, philosophy of 

science, and the works of Spinoza and Gandhi. But he is much more

1

Arne Naess/ David Rothenberg, Ecology, Community and lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy , Cambridge University Press, 1990. p3

2

The famous 20th

century philosopher Martin Heidegger also sought refuse for longs periods of time in a log cabin in the Black Forest. Whilst Heidegger is known for his phenomenological existentialism, his later works have a strong environmental theme, often coupled with kind poetic undertones. Cf. The Princple of Reason, Indiana Uni Press. 2001.

than an academic. His approach to ecology bears the stamp of his

life's experience as a philosopher in the truest sense; as a lover of 

wisdom, and as a lover of mountains.

In 1969, Naess resigned as Professor of Philosophy after thirty years

of work. The threat of an eco-catastrophe had become too obvious.

Naess believes philosophy could chart the way out of the chaos, a

philosophical praxis was needed; action without this underlying

wisdom is useless. This is a fundamental belief in Arne’s philosophy.

So what of Arne’s philosophy, what exactly are the beliefs which

underlie Arne’s deep ecology? The concept of Self-realisation in

Naess’ work forms the backbone of Naess’ deep ecology. Nearly all

the aspects of deep ecology refer back to this concept, though some

aspects carry a right of their own. It is a concept which some feel

has very little philosophical grounding. In this section of the paper I

would like to expound the concept of Self-realisation in Naess’ work,

once I have established the principles of such a concept I will

introduce various criticisms which I believe are valid and deserve a

mention.

Self-realisation

 Naess explains that we are not outside the rest of nature and therefore cannot do with it, as we please, without changing ourselves. Naess claims we should take the view that humans are not the centre of the world; they are in fact only part of nature like any other life form. We are in a constant relationship, even if we do not know it, with other life forms, i.e. plants, birds etc. When one realises this constant relationship with nature we feel a strong sense of identification with nature. This process of 

identification with nature is referred to as Self-realisation. During this transcendental relationship the self is no longer limited by the ego, it expands; we develop a wide identification with nature. Naess calls this expanded self the ecological self. We 3

WWW site:Stephan Harding, Deep Ecology

 become aware of how reliant we are on other forms of life. This increased sense of  reliance brings empathy and concern for non-human life. As a result there is a natural inclination to protect all life.

The process of identification is a very important stage to Self-realisation. For  example, you have identification with your mother, father and siblings, in the sense that you feel a duty toward them. This identification can extend wider than your  family; it can extend to your friends, your neighbours and your country. Naess would say it can extend to the whole of humanity and it doesn’t stop there either. You can identify yourself with pets, with other animals, with plants and other natural elements. Through identification with others you find Self-realisation. The process of 

identifying with plants and animals may seem alien to some but when we take a deeper look into Naess beliefs we see that identification is inherent to all life on this earth.

The identity of the individual, ‘that I am something’, is developed through interaction with a broad manifold, organic and inorganic. There is no completely isolatable I, no isolatable social unit.4

To distance yourself from the interaction with broad manifolds of organic and inorganic things is to distance yourself from the part of you which the ‘I’ is built upon. Your sense of self is shaped upon factors like family, home and surroundings. The more factors we can identify with the better. Naess claims that once

Self-realisation has occurred it is the rain forest in you that is dying. At this point it is clear  that what Naess is describing is not an environmental ethic rather it is an ontological  philosophy. Once self realisation occurs ethics seems absurd, for disrespecting

anything would be a degradation of our self.

Self-realisation for Arne Naess is deeply rooted (excuse the pun) in emotion and intuition. He is undoubtedly describing a feeling which he himself felt or does feel from time to time. W.H. Murray wrote of feelings akin to Naess’ transcendental relationship after completing a first ascent of Tower Ridge on Ben Nevis in winter:

4

Arne Naess/ David Rothenberg, Ecology, Community and lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy , Cambridge University Press, 1990. p164

In the quiet I felt something of the limitation of personality fall away as desires were stilled; and as I died to self and became more absorbed in the hills and sky, the more their beauty entered into me; until they seemed one with me and I with them. Later, while we walked slowly across the plateau, it became very clear to me that only the true self, which transcends the  personal, lays claim to immortality.5

I cannot, and do not wish to convey any doubt to the sincerity of these feelings. However, I believe as Murray goes on to say, that all the above feelings are grounded in the spiritual side of man, not the philosophical. Naess, on the other  hand believes that spiritual, philosophical and religious beliefs are all relevant in determining an environmental ethic. Naess’ esoteric theory of Self-realisation has  been built a variety of academic disciplines that are quite distinct, however in  Naess’ work they are in union, which runs contrary to the traditions of 

Continental Philosophy.6

 Naess’ philosophy may be questionable if Self-realisation is entirely grounded on spiritual beliefs more so then philosophical beliefs, however I would like to

address this issue later and see if this is a valid reason for casting deep ecology aside simply due to its lack of analytical methodology, for now though, I would like to introduce another fundamental belief of deep ecology.

Biocentricism

It seems fair to say that if an environmental theory supports biocentricism, it can be classed as a deep ecology of sorts7_{. Paul Taylor adheres to a biocentric outlook on}

nature and his four main components of this outlook sum up nicely what it means to

5

Murray, W.H. Mountaineering in Scotland, Baton Wicks Publications, 1997. p138

6

Recent works by Merleau-Ponty and Martin Heidegger actually encompass the embodied existence of  nature.

7

The definition used for deep ecology is taken from Naess’ seminal article ‘The Shallow and the Deep  Long-Range Ecological Movement’ in which he sets out the difference between deep and shallow

have a biocentric view point. Taylor’s four components are as follows: 1) Humans are thought of as members of the earth’s community of life, holding that membership on the same terms as apply to all the nonhuman members. 2) The earth’s natural

ecosystems as a totality are seen as a complex web of interconnected elements, each  being dependent on the functioning of the other. 3) Each individual organism is

conceived as a teleological centre of life, pursuing its own good in its own way. 4) The claim that humans by their very nature are superior to other species is a

groundless claim and must be rejected.8_{Taylor’s four components remain the same as}

 Naess’ and Sessions’ components for their biocentricism. However, it seems that  Naess and Sessions have emphasised biocentric equality more so than Taylor. Naess’

and Sessions’ deep ecology includes all organic matter which reside in the ecosphere. In Naess’ deep ecology a rock and a bird should be viewed as equal.

I would like to take a moment to examine this point of view and see if it is logically  possible to include non-living organic matter into the realm of biocentricism. This is a

notable point as Taylor has been criticised in the past for his preference of a Protozoa (most basic of living entities) over a stalactite.9_{Naess believes that a stalactite is of} 

the same worth as a protozoon. As a speleologist I must agree on some level with  Naess. There is a part of me which is willing to respect a stalactite for a multitude of 

reasons; it is older than human existence, therefore existing before we did. It is a  beautiful natural object, it grows at an atomic rate, which I find admirable in this fast

age of ours, its teleological end is perhaps to become a pillar, a straw or perhaps a curtain.10 _{The idea of a cave brings up another important point, which I feel is worth}

 pondering. Chemosynthesis was discovered in Moldeva Cave in Romania about a decade ago, this proved beyond reasonable doubt that life can exist without the sun  providing energy in the form of photosynthesis. In these caves Spiders and insects had

managed to evolve entirely from bacteria to insect without light. The process is entirely chemical, evolution has occurred through chemical reactions which have a similarity to any other form of chemical reaction. If what we consider common living organisms, i.e. tree, as having a right to grow then there is little reason why a stalactite doesn’t. In the process of trying to logically prove that a stalactite should be viewed in

8

Pojman, P. Louis, Environmental Ethics, Reading in theory and application, Wadsworth Pub. Co, 1998. p 206

9

Brennan, Andrew, The Ethics of the Environment , Dartmouth Pub. Co Ltd. 1995. p31

10

the same light as a living organism I will need to refer to chemistry. The making of a stalactite is a complex process, and one which relies on a variety of conditions before it happens. One condition is the stalactite itself is in an environment which encourages growth, a bit like a plant being placed on the window sill to allow light at it. The cave, like the sun, provides energy for the stalactite to evolve through chemical processes. When rainwater percolates through the soil it picks up C02 from the organic material in the soil. The chemical process [Ca(2+) + 2HCO3(-) + H20 + CO2 ===> CAVE] shows how the acidic water eats away at the limestone and creates an environment which allows growth of the stalactite. From a scientific view point the above chemical  process is no more intricate then that of photosynthesis

[6C02+6H20-SUNLIGHT-C6H1206+6O2]. If allow science is to contribute to our argument, and I see no reason why we shouldn’t, then a stalactite may have more of an autotelic right than most would have thought. Arne Naess allows, but more so almost relies on this type of  scientific logic to get his point of view across. He often uses it in a matter-of-fact kind of way. In this sense the ‘Deep’ in the term Deep Ecology, has to be seen as the

 philosophical ground, where as ‘Ecology’ is scientific in every aspect.

However, it is one thing to include organic matter; it is another to call it equal. Naess couldn’t be vaguer in regard to his philosophy of equality and rights. ‘Equality’ as  Naess suggests is a sort of quantification that is misleading. From the point of view of 

analytical philosophy the term ‘right’ like many other terms in daily life is rather  suspicious. Does it have a meaning that can be clarified? According to Naess it does not, though he uses it in the sense that it provides the best expression of an intuition which he is unable to reject in all seriousness.11

This argument of equal intrinsic worth is a common debate among eco-philosophers, and one which has as much strength as it has weaknesses. Nevertheless, Arne Naess’ theories in this regard seem a bit weaker than most. George Sessions writes that Naess suggests that biocentric equality as an intuition is true ‘in principle’, although in the  process of living, all species use each other as food, shelter, etc.12

11

Arne Naess/ David Rothenberg, Ecology, Community and lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy , Cambridge University Press, 1990. p167

12

Besides the ‘intuition principle’ Naess does offer a view that a living entity has an autotelic right to live. This view is similar to Paul Taylor’s view in regard to all

individual organisms are teleological centres of life.13 _{In fact it was Aristotle who was}

the first to recognise living entities had a ‘good’ in their own right, an intrinsic value as it were. This line of argument is very common in environmental philosophy, and one which raises a lot of debate. I believe John O Neill’s article entitled ‘The varieties of intrinsic value’ goes a long way in clearing up the debate on intrinsic value. O  Neill’s thesis shows that while it is the case that natural entities have intrinsic value in

the strongest sense of the term, such value does not entail any obligations on the part of human beings.14

To continue this debate over biocentric equality seems fruitless in one regard. There is no doubt that this sort of debate can only help strengthen certain positions and offer  some clarity, but for deep ecologists like Naess, Sessions, Devall and Fox

environmental axiology (i.e., environmental value theory) is of little importance. The majority of other eco-philosophers are primarily concerned with developing

arguments to establish the fact that nonhuman entities — or certain kinds of 

nonhuman entities — are intrinsically valuable (i.e., valuable in and of themselves, independently of their use value to humans). Indeed, this approach is so central in environmental ethics that many environmental philosophers persist in thinking that this is also the chief worry of deep ecologists. However, deep ecologists are not  primarily concerned with environmental axiology. Rather, deep ecologists are  primarily concerned with advocating the realisation of a certain state of being,

specifically, a worldly realisation which manifests as the most expansive sense of self  as possible.15 Arguments for intrinsic value imply definite codes of conduct. In

contrast, deep ecologists openly decline any move towards moral ought and seek  instead to invite and inspire certain states of being. Naess remarks “I’m not so much interested in ethics or morals. I’m interested in how we experience the world.” 16_{I will}

come back to this point in the conclusion, but let’s move on to some other criticisms which seem popular in the deep ecology debate.

13

Taylor, Paul, Respect for nature, Princeton University Press, 1986.

14

Brennan, Andrew, The Ethics of the Environment , Dartmouth Pub. Co Ltd. 1995. p55

15

Trumpeter (1990) ISSN: 0832-6193 The Meanings of "Deep Ecology" Warwick Fox University of Tasmania. http://trumpeter.athabascau.ca/context/v7.1/fox.html (21-11-03)

16

Arne Naess/ David Rothenberg, Ecology, Community and lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy , Cambridge University Press, 1990. p20

I would like to discuss a view held by opponents of deep ecology which Fox calls the ‘anthropocentric fallacy’ that claim a human based environmental ethic must be anthropocentric in some shape or form. In keeping with this fallacy J

.B. Callicott

holds the view that there can be no value apart from an

evaluator...all value is as it were is in the eye of the beholder. The

value that is attributed to the ecosystem, therefore, is humanly

dependent or at least dependent upon some variety of morally and

aesthetically sensitive consciousness.

_{This statement implies that}

any environmentally sensitive ethic must be in principle

anthropocentric. An easier way to say it is that any ethics conceived

by a human must be anthropocentric. If this is the logic we’re going

to adhere to then it seems that any values conceived by a Jew must

be Jewish values. Any values conceived by a homosexual must be

homosexual in nature. If we look at the argument from a

hermeneutical stand point, which I believe a lot of this debate boils

down to, we have to ask whether we can interpret something

objectively. If we can interpret something from a non-subjective

standpoint, ergo objectively, surely this is a ground for a biocentric

viewpoint to be accepted. Gadamer’s hermeneutical theories set

forth in Truth and Method claim that we are all connected through

historical situatedness. Every time we interpret something we do so

through the filter of the tradition we belong to. Using Gadamer’s

hermeneutics when an Indian sees a bird flying south, it is his

culture’s belief which allows him to understand the true significance

of the situation. If the Indian’s cultural beliefs are holistic and

biocentric than the Indian’s viewpoint is both holistic and biocentric.

 Today’s modern society is not generally biocentric, though once you

adhere to that indigenous tradition it may be possible, to

understand through a biocentric viewpoint.

17

Dale T. Snauwaert, The Relevance of the Anthropocentric-Ecocentric Debate, Adelphi University www.ed.uiuc.edu/EPS/PES-yearbook/96_docs/snauwaert.html (22-10-03)

 The last point I wish to address is the anti-human notion which some

people feel is inherent in deep ecology. Thanks to the remarks of 

self proclaimed deep ecologist David Foreman, deep ecologists

around the globe are now being painted with the same brush. I refer

to remarks made in Simply Living, an Australian periodical where

Foreman stated:

When I tell people how the worst thing we could do in

Ethiopia is to give aid – the best thing would be to just let

nature seek its own balance, to let people there just starve –

they think this is monstrous.

It clear that Foreman will never win an award for his contribution

to humanitarianism in times of need, yet the point which is

unclear to some is that Foreman’s comments are not shared by

Naess’ deep ecology. In Ecology, community and lifestyle there is

a section entitled ‘The uniqueness of human kind should not be

underestimated’ and in this particular section Naess addresses

the misconception that humans should never have priority over

non-human needs. Naess once again reiterates one of his

environmental norms which states ‘You shall not inflict

unnecessary suffering upon other living beings!’ It is clear that

Foreman, a deep ecologist, has perhaps misunderstood what

Naess is saying. For anyone who feels that deep ecology is

anti-human please read the literature, you will be told otherwise.

Conclusion

 There were two points which I left unaddressed in the preceding

sections which I wish to address now. The first was whether deep

ecology should be cast aside due to its spiritual nature and the

second was the fact that deep ecologists are not concerned with

moral ought and obligation. I will address both these points

18

Pojman, P. Louis, Environmental Ethics, Reading in theory and application, Wadsworth Pub. Co, 1998. p156

simultaneously, as they both shape my overall opinion of deep

ecology and help me to come to a conclusion in regard to the nature

and essence of deep ecology. The main problem with commenting

on deep ecology is trying to distinguish the philosophy from the

movement. This process is difficult and due to the nature, and

strength of the movement I believe it will be quite some time before

there exists a solid break in each.

Deep ecology like many great philosophical works was inspired

by feelings and intuition. Is it not the case that most philosophies

were shaped at the start by a feeling, intuition of some sort?

Some times, as is in the case of great philosophically regarded

work, feelings and emotions coincide with reality, and the insight

gained through these feelings can led to solid philosophical work.

I, however, believe that Naess has not accomplished this feat,

yet.

According to Naess the fundamentals of deep ecology, if verbalized

are Buddhist, Taoist, Christian or of other religious persuasions, or

philosophic with affinities to the basic view of Spinoza, Whitehead,

Heidegger and others. The basic principles of the deep ecology

movement are grounded in religion or philosophy.

_{However as we}

have already stated Naess claims that ethics do not concern him,

his philosophy as well as the movement are more concerned with

the way we experience the world.

 There are a few things that one notices about Naess after reading a

lot of his work. Firstly, though philosophy is mentioned in his work, it

is clear that what Naess is not in anyway relying on philosophy to

ground his basic beliefs. Secondly, Naess usually refers to the deep

19

Some of Naess’ unpublished work show a form of holistic phenomenology. A phenomenology which allows much more then a cognitive processes to guide it. Naess has never given up the idea of creating a more solid grounded philosophy which ideally would be comparable to mainstream contemporary  philosophy. Katz, Light, Rothenberg, Beneath the Surface, Critical Essays in the Philosophy of Deep  Ecology. The MIT Press, 2000. p151-p167

20

ecology as a movement, never as a philosophy. Thirdly, Naess uses

a philosophical method which Spinoza used in his Ethics, this is only

to try to define and clarify underlying premises which Naess has. In

general, Spinoza’s geometric proofs are designed so that if we

accept the definitions and axioms at the outset, and deductions

from these are properly made, then we must accept the concluded

propositions. In practice as Naess shows, Spinoza’s method is

difficult to say the least. Why did Naess use such a rigorous and

difficult method? I think Naess uses it because he really believed

Spinoza to be correct in his formulation, that is, if the original

premise is true then all deduction made from the first premise

should also hold true. I believe it was the rigor of such a method

which inspired Naess, though it was also this rigor which I believe,

proved too much for him.

It is from most other commentators of environmental ethics, and

possible from Naess earlier writing that his theory lacks

philosophical conviction. The question is whether it should have a

place in environmental ethics at all, considering the fact that it is

not an ethical theory. Some people like Bookchin claim it shouldn’t

be allowed to make its way into our ethical discussions, other like

Fox believe it should. I for one take Fox’s stance on this view. After

reading various amount of environmental ethics literature I conclude

that there are many ethical theories which lack ethics just as much

as deep ecology, if not more. Writers like J.B. Callicot, A. Leopold, M.

Bookchin, J. Lovelock all have wonderful theories but they too lack

ethical credibility. Paul Taylor’s clinically written Respect for Nature

provided us with a strong environmental ethic, yet an ethic which

can, like all the rest, be argued with. I believe deep ecology has a

right to stay in our conversations and books as much as other

theories in regard to environmental ethics.

Arne Naess’ deep ecology was always intended to be a social

movement, this social movement was ground in somewhat weak

philosophy, yet the movement did bring about an ecological

awareness, one of its fundamental goals. It has influenced and

instilled philosophers around the globe to develop the theories of 

deep ecology or perhaps to develop better and different theories of 

environmental ethics. Arne Naess’ overriding ambition was to instill

an ecological awareness in people which made them conscious of 

what they could do to help right the environmental wrongs of 

modern society. If environmentalists manage to right these wrongs

using deep ecology or any other form of eco-philosophy, Arne

Naess’ work will not have been in vain. As for the philosophy of deep

ecology I believe it will become stronger and stronger, and hopefully

someday it will become applicable enough that an ethics may be

formed from it.

Appendix

Six points of the Deep Ecology philosophy.

What is the essential content of the philosophy of deep ecology?

Eric Katz, David Rothenberg and Andrew Light have developed

these six points which offer some philosophical content to deep

ecology:

1. The rejection of strong anthropocentricism.

2. The consideration of ecocentricism as a replacement for

anthropocentricism. (Ecocentricism and biocentricism are

often used interchangeably.)

3. Identification with all life forms.

4. The sense that caring for the environment is part of individual

human realisation.

5. A critique of instrumental rationality. (The mode of thinking

which makes efficiency and quantifiable results the goal of all

human activity.)

6. Personal development of a total world view. (Six points were

taken from Katz et al, Beneath the Surface, The MIT Press,

2000)

Bibliography:

• Arne Naess/ David Rothenberg, Ecology, Community and lifestyle: Outline of 

an Ecosophy, Cambridge University Press, 1990.

• Blackstone, T. William, Philosophy & Environmental Crisis, University of 

Georgia Press, 1974.

• Brennan, Andrew, The Ethics of the Environment , Dartmouth Pub. Co Ltd.

• Dale T. Snauwaert, The Relevance of the Anthropocentric-Ecocentric Debate,

 Adelphi University www.ed.uiuc.edu/EPS/PES-yearbook/96_docs/snauwaert.html (22-10-03)

• Honderich, Ted. The Oxford companion to philosophy. Oxford University

Press, 1995

• Murray, W.H. Mountaineering in Scotland, Baton Wicks Publications, 1997. • Pojman, P. Louis, Environmental Ethics, Reading in theory and application,

Wadsworth Pub. Co, 1998.

• Scherer, Attig, Ethics and the Environment , Prentice-Hall, 1983.

• Sessions/ Devall, Deep Ecology, Living as if nature mattered . Gibbs Smith

Pub. 1985, p6 Some of Katz, Light, Rothenberg,  Beneath the Surface, Critical   Essays in the Philosophy of Deep Ecology. The MIT Press, 2000.

• Sessions/ Devall, Deep Ecology, Living as if nature mattered . Gibbs Smith

Pub. 1985

.

• Taylor, Paul, Respect for nature, Princeton University Press, 1986. • Trumpeter (1990) ISSN: 0832-6193 The Meanings of "Deep Ecology"

Warwick Fox University of Tasmania.

http://trumpeter.athabascau.ca/context/v7.1/fox.html (21-11-03)

• WWW site: Stephan Harding, Deep Ecology