REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW
A. Definition and Division of Political Law
Political Law – is that branch of public law which deals with the organization and operations of the governmental organs of the State and defines the relations of the State with the inhabitants of its territory. a. Constitutional Law
b. Administrative law c. Election Law
d. Law of Public Officers
e. Law on Municipal Corporations
In case of Macariola vs. Asuncion, the court says ; Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign. Likewise, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges from engaging in commerce is, as heretofore stated, deemed abrogated automatically upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to America, because it is political in nature.
B. Definition of Constitutional Law
Constitutional Law may be defined as that branch of Public Law which treats of constitution, their nature, formation, amendment, and interpretation.
It refers to the law embodied in the Constitution as well as the principles growing out of the interpretation and application made by the courts of the provisions of the Constitution in specific cases. Thus, the Philippine Constitution itself is brief but the law of the Constitution lies scattered in thousands of Supreme Court decisions.
Distinguished Constitutional Law from Political Law
Political Law deals specifically with the study of the structure and powers of our government.
Constitutional Law is one of the division of Political Law that defines the specific duties and responsibilities of our government together with their privileges and rights and as a fundamental or supreme law of the land, it enumerates the rights of every citizens with their corresponding functions where the sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.
C. Constitution (1987 Constitution) a. Definition
Constitution - define as the supreme law of the land and established by the people which prescribes the permanent framework of the system of government, which establishes basic principles upon which the government founded, and which defines and allocates to the various organs of government their respective powers and duties.
Social Contract Theory – People entrust their rights to the government. The government in return does their part and gives the people what due to them.
b. Function
(1) Serves as the supreme or fundamental law
(2) Establishes basic framework and underlying principles of government
(3) Defines and allocates to the various organs of government their respective powers and duties.
c. Classification
A Constitution may be written or unwritten, conventional or cumulative, and rigid or flexible.
(i) Written – is one which has been given definite written form at a particular time.
(ii) Unwritten – is one which has not been reduced to writing at any specific time but it is the collective product of a gradual political development, consisting of unwritten usages and customary rules, judicial decisions, and legislative enactments of a fundamental character written but scattered in various records without having any compact form in writing.
(iii) Conventional – enacted deliberately and consciously by a constituent body or ruler, at a certain time and place.
(iv) Cumulative – is a product of gradual political development.
(v) Rigid – is one which can be amended through a formal and difficult process.
(vi) Flexible – is one which can be changed by ordinary legislation.
The 1987 Philippine Constitution is a written, conventional and rigid Constitution.
d. Essential Qualities of a Written Constitution (i) As to form, a good written constitution should be:
Brief – because if a constitution is too detailed, it would lose the advantage of a fundamental law which in a few provisions outlines the government of the whole state and the rights of the citizens. Broad- because a statement of the powers and
functions of government, and of the relations between the governing body and the governed, requires that it be as comprehensive as possible. Definite- because otherwise the application of its
provisions to concrete situations may prove unduly difficult if not impossible.
(ii) As to contents, it should contain at least three sets of provisions;
Constitution of Government Constitution of Liberty Constitution of Sovereignty e. Parts of a Constitution
f. Interpretation of the Constitution
In Francisco vs House of Rep., G.R. No. 160261, The Supreme Court ruled that;
“ The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution. “The Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or "judicially
discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review. There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over
congressional action. Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and
interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.” g. Supremacy of the Constitution
The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest official of the land, must defer. No act shall be valid, however noble its intentions, if it conflicts with the Constitution. The Constitution must ever remain Supreme. All must bow to mandate of this law. Expediency must not be allowed to sap its strength nor greed for power debase its rectitude.
In case of Mutuc vs COMELEC;
I ssue: Whether the taped jingles fall under the phrase “and the like.”
Held: Under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumeration are applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution. The Constitutional Convention Act
contemplated the prohibition on the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its
distribution (distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the words “and the like.”). Taped jingles therefore were not prohibited. NOTE: Ejusdem-Generis - Latin: of the same kind. A rule of statutory construction, generally accepted by both state and federal courts, "that where general words follow enumerations of particular classes or persons or things, the general words shall be construed as applicable only to persons or things of the same general nature or kind as those enumerated
IN CUSTODIA LEGIS. In the custody of the law. In general, when things are in custodia legis, they cannot be distrained, nor otherwise interfered with by custodia legis, they cannot be distrained, nor otherwise interfered with by a private person.
In case of Alih vs Castro; The Supreme Court declared those seized in custodia legis and declared that the operation conducted by Maj. Gen. Castro was ILLEGAL. The respondents have all the time to obtain a search warrant granted that they have about 10 trial courts. The SC also held the protection of the petitioner's human rights as stated in Art IV Sec 3 and 4 of the 1973 Constitution regarding illegal search and seizure. The presumption of innocence of the petitioners should be observed and that they cannot be subjected to self-incriminating instances like paraffin tests, photographing and finger printing.
In this case, "The Constitution is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times and under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government."
In case of Manila Prince Hotel vs GSIS; In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, especially on matters involving national patrimony, when a choice has to be made between a “qualified foreigner” and a “qualified Filipino,” the latter shall be chosen over the former.
A provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available.
II. AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
Section 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention. A. Amendment vs Revision
Amendment is a change or alteration for the better; an amendment or change within the lines of the original instrument which will bring about improvement
Revision is the rewriting or overhauling of the entire instrument.
B. Proposal – is the motion of initiating suggestions or proposals on amendment or revision, which may either be by;
(a) Congress, upon vote of ¾ of all its members; (b) Constitutional Convention
(c) The people thru initiative
In case of Santiago vs COMELEC; R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.
While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
In case of Lambino vs COMELEC;
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present.
First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf.
Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before – not after – signing.
Moreover, “an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of that which is proposed” and failure to do so is “deceptive and misleading” which renders the initiative void.
In the case of the Lambino Group’s petition, there’s not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the
proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is attached to it. The signature sheet merely
asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral- Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. This omission is fatal.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. That’s why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be “directly proposed by the people x x x in a petition” – meaning that the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nation’s fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.
C.
Submission-In case of Tolentino vs COMELEC; The Supreme Court held that in Section 1 of Article 15, there should be only one “election” or plebiscite for the ratification of all amendments the Convention may propose.
D. Ratification: Article 17 Section 4, Paragraphs 1 and 2 Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment
or revision.
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by
the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.
E. The position of the Convention in our system of government
There are three theories on the relative position of the Constitutional Convention vis-à-vis the regular department of the government.
The first, as announced in Loomis v. Jackson, holds that the constitutional constitution is supreme over the other departments of the government because the powers it exercises are in the nature of sovereign powers. This theory is thus called the Theory of Conventional Sovereignty. The second, as announced in Wood’s Appeal, considers the constitutional convention inferior to the other departments of the government since it is merely a creation of the legislature.
The third, as announced in Frantz vs Autry, declares that as long as it exists and confines itself within the sphere of its jurisdiction, the constitutional convention must be considered independent of and co-equal with the other departments of the government.
The third of these theories, which is the most popular, has been observed in our government since the case of Mabanag vs. Vito.
III. History and Background
A. The Philippine Revolution and the Malolos Constitution
On June 29,1898, Gen, Aguinaldo established the Revolutionary Government replacing the Dictatorial Government with himself as the President and a Congress whose function was advisory and ministerial. The decree making such change stated
that the aims of the new government were “to struggle for the independence of the Philippines, until all nations including Spain will expressly recognize it,” and “to prepare the country for the establishment of a real Republic.”
On September 15, 1898, revolutionary Congress of Filipino representatives met in Malolos, Bulacan at the call of the Revolutionary Government. The Malolos Congress ratified on Sept. 29, 1898 the proclamation of Philippine Independence made by Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo in Kawit, Cavite on June 12,1898 and framed the so-called Malolos Constitution.This Constitution was the first democratic constitution ever promulgated in the whole Asia. It established a “free and independent Philippine Republic”. However, it was not recognized by the family of nations. It had short-lived.
B. The Organic Laws under the American Period (1) Mckinley’s Instructions (April 7, 1990)
President McKinley's instruction to the Philippine Commission in April 1900 directed that, "... Beginning with the 1st day of September, 1900, the authority to exercise that part of the power of government in the Philippine Islands which is of legislative nature, is to be transferred from the Military Governor to this commission." The instruction also gave the Commission the power to appoint to officers under the judicial, educational, and civil service systems and in the municipal and departmental governments. The instruction charged the Commission, "... In all the forms of government and administrative provisions which they are authorized to proscribe, the Commission should bear in mind that the government which they are establishing is designed not for our satisfaction, or for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace and prosperity of the people of the Philippine islands, and measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of just and effective government."
(2) The Spooner Amendment (1901)
The Army Appropriation Act, also known as the Spooner Amendment, is passed by the US Senate. It provides that the US President governs the Philippines by the authority of Congress and not as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, thereby formally ending the US military regime in the archipelago.
(3)The Philippine Bill of 1902, or the Cooper Act of July 1, 1902, provided for the retention of executive powers of the Philippine Commission and the establishment of a bicameral Philippine Legislature. It provided for the creation of the Philippine Assembly, a body that would share legislative powers with the Philippine Commission and would function as the lower chamber of the proposed Philippine Legislature. It also provided for a bill of rights for the Filipinos, and the appointment of two Filipino resident commissioners to represent the Philippines in the United States Congress but without voting rights. On October 16, 1907, the first session of the Philippine assembly opened, with an elected lower house and the Philippine Commission, previously established, as the upper house.
(4) The Philippine Autonomy Act or Jones Law
Statute announcing the intention of the United States government to “withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands as soon as a stable government can be established therein.” The U.S. had acquired the Philippines in 1898 as a result of the Spanish–American War; and from 1901 legislative power in the islands had been exercised through a Philippine Commission effectively dominated by Americans. One of the most significant sections of the Jones Act replaced the Commission with an elective Senate and, with minimum property qualifications, extended the
franchise to all literate Filipino males. The law also incorporated a bill of rights.
C. Japanese Occupation
(1) The Philippine Executive Commission- a civil government composed of Filipinos was organized by the military forced of occupation. The commission exercised both the executive and legislative powers. The laws enacted were, however, subject to the approval of the Commander-in-chief of the Japanese Forces.
(2) The Japanese-sponsored Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated with Jose Laurel as the President. The same as the Philippine Executive Commission. The ultimate source of its authority was the Japanese military authority and government.
D. The 1935 Constitution
The original 1935 Constitution provided for unicameral National Assembly and the President was elected to a six-year term without re-election. It was amended in 1940 to have a bicameral Congress composed of a Senate and House of Representatives, as well the creation of an independent electoral commission. The Constitution now granted the President a four-year term with a maximum of two consecutive terms in office.
A Constitutional Convention was held in 1971 to rewrite the 1935 Constitution. The convention was stained with manifest bribery and corruption. Possibly the most controversial issue was removing the presidential term limit so that Ferdinand E. Marcos could seek election for a third term, which many felt was the true reason for which the convention was called. In any case, the 1935 Constitution was suspended in 1972 with Marcos' proclamation of martial law, the rampant corruption of the constitutional process providing him with one of his major premises for doing so.
In case of Mabanag vs Vito, the Court held;
It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provision. This doctrine is predicated on the principle of the separation of powers, a principle also too well known to require elucidation or citation of authorities. If a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect. If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political question. The two steps complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory process as provided in section I of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution "consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There is no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even in dependent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal then into that of a ratification.
E. The 1973 Constitution
The 1973 Constitution, composed of a preamble and 17 articles, provides for the shift from presidential to parliamentary system of government. The Constitution vests the legislative power in the National Assembly. A Prime
Minister is elected from among the members of the National Assembly and serves as the head of government and commander-in-chief of the Philippine Armed Forces. A President is elected from among the members of the National Assembly and serves as the symbolic head of state with a six-year term. The judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court, composed of a Chief Justice and 14 Justices. The National Assembly exercises the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the lower courts. All justices of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower courts are appointed by the Prime Minister. This Constitution retains the independence of the Commission on Elections and establishes two independent Constitution al bodies [Civil Service Commission and the Commission on Audit] as well as the National Economic Development Authority [NEDA]. On 24 August 1970, Congress enacted RA No. 6132, otherwise known as the Constitution al Convention Act, for the purpose of convening a Constitution al Convention. The 320 delegates met from June 1971 until 30 November 1972, when they approved the draft of the new Charter. While in the process of drafting a new Constitution , President Ferdinand Marcos declared Martial Law on 21 September 1972. The draft Constitution was submitted to the Citizen's Assemblies from January 10 to 17, 1973 for ratification. On 17 January 1973 , President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1102, announcing the ratification of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The above constitution was amended in 1976, 1980 and in 1981. There were minor amendments done in 1984.
In case of Sanidad vs COMELEC;
The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country. When the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he could convene the interim National Assembly. In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when engaged in the amending process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the interim National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment, amending of the
Constitution is not legislative in character. In political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic character and that of a legislative character. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being the case, approval of the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with
proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution. F. The 1986 Provisional Constitution
The 1986 Provisional Constitution, popularly known as the Freedom Constitution, promulgated by President Corazon C. Aquino on March 25, 1986, was a provisional constitution after a successful People Power Revolution. Under the Freedom Constitution, executive and legislative powers are exercised by the President, and shall continue to exercise legislative powers until a legislature is elected and convened under a new Constitution. Furthermore, the President is mandated to convene a Constitutional Commission tasked to draft a new charter.
(1) Snap Election
In the Philippines, the term "snap election" usually refers to the 1986 presidential election, where President Ferdinand Marcos called elections earlier than scheduled, in response to growing social unrest. Marcos was declared official winner of the election but was eventually ousted when it was alleged that he cheated in the elections.
In the current constitution, a snap election will be held for the positions of president and vice president on the condition that both positions are vacant, and outside the 90-day range of the next scheduled presidential election.
(2) The February 1986 Revolution (3) Proclamation No.1 , Feb. 25, 1986
Pres. Aquino declared that she and her vice-president were “taking power in the name and by the will of the Filipino People” on the basis of the clear sovereign will of the people expressed in the election of Feb. 7, 1986. In her oath, she swore to preserve and defend the “fundamental law” (not the “Constitution”) and execute “just laws” ( instead of “its laws).
(4) Proclamation No. 3, March 25, 1986
That the provisional government established thereunder was revolutionary in character having been installed by direct action of the people or by “people power”, deriving its existence and authority directly from the people themselves and not from the then operating 1973 Constitution.
G. The 1987 Philippine Constitution (1) The Constitutional Commission of 1986
The 1987 Constitution was drafted by a Constitutional Commission created under Article V of Proclamation No. 3 issued on March 25, 1986 which promulgated the “Freedom Constitution” through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people.
(2) Proclamation No. 58 (Feb. 11, 1987) (3) When Considered ratified?
Article 18 Section 27 (1987 Constitution)
This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.
The foregoing proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines was approved by the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 on October 12, 1986 and accordingly signed on October 15, 1986 at the Plenary Hall, National Government Center, Quezon City, by the
Commissioners whose signatures are hereunder affixed/
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. Theory and Justification of Judicial Review
In case of Angara vs Electoral Commission, the Court held that;
In case of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent thereof. In case of Francisco vs House of Representatives, the court ruled that;
The judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
There must be an actual case or controversy
The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party.
The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity.
The decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
Article 8 Sec.5, paragraph (2)
(1)
Actual Case or Controversy- involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. A “controversy” must be the one that is appropriate for judicial determination. It must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. Prematurity
In the case of PACU vs. Secretary of Education the petition contesting the validity of a regulation issued by the Secretary of Education requiring private schools to secure a permit to operate was dismissed on the ground that all the petitioners have permits and are actually operating under the same. The petitioners questioned the regulation because of the possibility that the permit might be denied them in the future. This Court held that there was no justiciable controversy because the petitioners suffered no wrong by the implementation of the questioned regulation and therefore, they are not entitled to relief. A mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education will withdraw the permit does not amount to a justiciable controversy. The questioned regulation in the PACU case may be questioned by a private school whose permit to operate has been revoked or one whose application therefor has been denied. NOTE: Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions. Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law upon the complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation.
In case of Mariano vs COMELEC held that the petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
The decided case of Cutaran vs DENR the court defined the word “justiciable controversy” Court cannot rule on the basis of petitioners' speculation that the DENR will approve the application of the heirs of Carantes. There must be an actual governmental act which directly causes or will imminently cause injury to the alleged right of the petitioner to possess the land before the jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked. There is no showing that the petitioners were being evicted from the land by the heirs of Carantes under orders from the DENR;
A justiciable controversy has been defined as, "a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest” which may be resolved by a court of law through the application of a law. Courts have no judicial power to review cases involving political questions and as a rule, will desist from taking cognizance of speculative or hypothetical cases, advisory opinions and in cases that has become moot. Subject to certain well-defined exceptions courts will not touch an issue involving the validity of a law unless there
has been a governmental act accomplished or performed that has a direct adverse effect on the legal right of the person contesting its validity.
In the instant case of Montecarlos vs COMELEC, there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review. Petitioners' prayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill lowering the membership age in the SK does not present an actual justiciable controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review because it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court. A proposed bill, having no legal effect, violates no constitutional right or duty. The Court has no power to declare a proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutional because that would be in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act of Congress. The power of judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo.22 The second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states –
"Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." Thus, there can be no justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality of a proposed bill. The Court can exercise its power of judicial review only after a law is enacted, not before.
Mootness
In case of Gonzales vs Narvasa, that, with respect to the PCCR, this case has become moot and academic.
An action is considered “moot” when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead.
The PCCR submitted its recommendations to the President on December 20, 1999 and was dissolved by the President on the same day. It had likewise spent the funds allotted to it. Thus, the PCCR has ceased to exist, having lost its raison d’etre. Subsequent events have overtaken the petition and the Court has nothing left to resolve.
The staleness of the issue before us is made more manifest by the impossibility of granting the relief prayed for by petitioner. Basically, petitioner asks this Court to enjoin the PCCR from acting as such. Clearly, prohibition is an inappropriate remedy since the body sought to be enjoined no longer exists. It is well established that prohibition is a preventive remedy and does not lie to restrain an act that is already fait accompli. At this point, any ruling regarding the PCCR would simply be in the nature of an advisory opinion, which is definitely beyond the permissible scope of judicial power.
In case of Defunis vs Odegaard; DeFunis did not cast his suit as a class action, and the only remedy he requested was an injunction commanding his admission to the Law School. He was not only accorded that remedy, but he now has also been irrevocably admitted to the final term of the final year of the Law School course. The controversy between the parties has thus clearly ceased to be "definite and concrete" and no longer "touches the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests."
There is a line of decisions in this Court standing for the proposition that the "voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case, i. e., does not make the case moot." These decisions and the doctrine they reflect would be quite relevant if the question of mootness here had arisen by reason of a unilateral change in the
admissions procedures of the Law School. For it was the admissions procedures that were the target of this litigation, and a voluntary cessation of the admissions practices complained of could make this case moot only if it could be said with assurance "that `there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated.'" Otherwise, "the defendant is free to return to his old ways," and this fact would be enough to prevent mootness because of the "public interest in having the legality of the practices settled." But mootness in the present case depends not at all upon a "voluntary cessation" of the admissions practices that were the subject of this litigation. It depends, instead, upon the simple fact that DeFunis is now in the final quarter of the final year of his course of study, and the settled and unchallenged policy of the Law School to permit him to complete the term for which he is now enrolled.
Exceptions to Mootness
In case of Acop vs. Guingona, the court sayd that it’s necessary to resolve the merits of the principal issue raised for a proper disposition of prayer c) and for future guidance of both bench and bar as to the application of Sections 3(d) and 4 of R.A. No. 6981. As we have ruled in Alunan III vs. Mirasol, and Viola vs. Alunan III, "courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.'"
In case of Sanlakas vs Executive Secretary; The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the issuance of Proclamation No. 435, declaring that the state of rebellion has ceased to exist, has rendered the case moot. As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot cases, judicial power being limited to the determination of "actual controversies." Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is "capable of repetition yet evading review." The case at bar is one such case. The same as in the case of Pimentel vs Ermita, the court held that as a rule, the writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts already done. However, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.
In the present case, the mootness of the petition does not bar its resolution. The question of the constitutionality of the Presidents appointment of department secretaries in an acting capacity while Congress is in session will arise in every such appointment.
2. Proper Party
In case of Joya vs PCGG , THE COURT HELD THAT ONE HAVING NO RIGHT OR INTEREST TO PROTECT CANNOT INVOKE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT AS PART-PLAINTIFF IN AN ACTION. THIS IS PREMISED ON SEC. 2, RULE 3, OF THE RULES AND W/C PROVIDES THAT EVERY ACTION MUST BE PROSECUTED AND DEFENDED IN THE NAME OF THE REAL PARTY INTEREST AND THAT ALL PERSONS HAVING INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT OF THE ACTION AND IN OBTAINING RELIEF AND SHALL BE JOINED AS PLAINTIFFS. THE COURT WILL EXERCISE ITS POWER OF JUDICAL REVIEW ONLY IF THE CASE THAT A PARTY WHO HAS THE LEGAL STANDING TO RAISE THE CONSTITUTIONAL OR LEGAL QUESTION.
ANY CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECT IN THEIR ACQUISITION AND THEIR SUBSEQUENT DISPOSITION MUST BE RAISED ONLY BY THE PROPER PARTIES TRUE OWNERS THEREOF – WHOSE AUTHORITY TO RECOVER EMANATES FROM THEIR PROPRIETY RIGHTS. HAVING FAILED TO SHOW THAT THEY ARE THE LEGAL OWNERS OF THE ARTWORK THAT THE VALUED PISCES HAVE BECOME PULICLY OWNED, PETITIONERS DO NOT POSSESS ANY CLEAR LEGAL
RIGHT TO QUESTION THEIR ALLEGED UNAUTHORIZED DISPOSITION.
In case of CHR Employees Assoc. vs CHR, the court held that; On petitioner's personality to bring this suit, which held in a multitude of cases that a proper party is one who has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of
Citizen Standing
In Tañada v. Tuvera, the Court asserted that when the issue concerns a public right and the object of mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real parties in interest; and because it is sufficient that petitioner is a citizen and as such is interested in the execution of the laws, he need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result of the action.
In Chavez vs PEA, the Court ruled that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement of constitutional rights - to information and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources - matters of transcendental public importance, the petitioner has the requisite locus standi.
Associational Standing
In KMU Labor Center vs Garcia, the court held that; In line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi, ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of planters, and
non-profit civic organizations were allowed to initiate and prosecute actions before this court to question the constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities.
Court is ready to brush aside this barren procedural infirmity and recognize the legal standing of the petitioner in view of the transcendental importance of the issues raised. And this act of liberality is not without judicial precedent. As early as the Emergency Powers Cases, this Court had exercised its discretion and waived the requirement of proper party.
In John Hay vs Lim, The court says; The grant by the law on local government units of the right of concurrence on the bases' conversion is equivalent to vesting a legal standing on them, for it is in effect a recognition of the real interests that communities nearby or surrounding a particular base area have in its utilization. Thus, the interest of petitioners, being inhabitants of Baguio, in assailing the legality of Proclamation 420, is personal and substantial such that they have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the government act being challenged." Theirs is a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the proclamation and not merely an interest in the question involved or an incidental interest," for what is at stake in the enforcement of Proclamation 420 is the very economic and social existence of the people of Baguio City.
In the case of Kilosbayan, Inc., et al. v. Teofisto Guingona, Jr., et al., ruled in the same lines and
enumerated some of the cases where the same policy was adopted, viz:
. . . A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers
Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure." Insofar as taxpayers' suits are concerned, this Court had declared that it "is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained," or that it "enjoys an open discretion to entertain the same or not.
Taxpayers Standing
In ITF vs COMELEC, the court held that;The issues central to the case are "of transcendental importance and of national interest." As alleged, Comelec’s flawed bidding and questionable award of the Contract to an unqualified entity would impact directly on the success or the failure of the electoral process. Any taint on the sanctity of the ballot as the expression of the will of the people would inevitably affect their faith in the democratic system of government. Further, the award of any contract for automation involves disbursement of public funds are in gargantuan amounts; therefore, public interest requires that the laws governing the transaction must be followed strictly. Truly, our nation’s political and economic future virtually hangs in the balance, pending the outcome of the 2004 elections. Hence, there can be no serious doubt that the subject matter of the case is "a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest"; in other words, it is of "paramount public interest" and "transcendental importance." This fact alone would justify relaxing the rule on legal standing, following the liberal policy of the Court whenever a case involves "an issue of overarching significance to our society." ITF, et. al.’s legal standing should therefore be recognized and upheld. Moreover, the Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue when there is a claim of "illegal disbursement of public funds," or if public money is being "deflected to any improper purpose"; or when petitioner(s) seek to restrain respondent(s) from "wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law."
In Jumamil vs Café, The court defined the word locus standi and interest;
Legal standing or locus standi is a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act being challenged. It calls for more than just a generalized grievance. The term “interest” means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Unless a person’s constitutional rights are adversely affected by the statute or ordinance, he has no legal standing.
Voter’s Standing In TOLENTINO VS COMELEC Court Ruling:
"Legal standing" or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental act.
The requirement of standing, which necessarily "sharpens the presentation of issues," relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual cases or controversies
Thus, generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable
to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
In questioning, in their capacity as voters, the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001, petitioners assert a harm classified as a "generalized grievance." This generalized grievance is shared in substantially equal measure by a large class of voters, if not all the voters, who voted in that election.
On the other hand, we have relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised our discretion to give due course to voters' suits involving the right of suffrage
We accord the same treatment to petitioners in the instant case in their capacity as voters since they raise important issues involving their right of suffrage, considering that the issue raised in this petition is likely to arise again.
Legislative Standing In Ople vs Torres
RULING:
Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308.
The ripeness for adjudication of the petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the
implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. All signals from the respondents show their
unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that we tighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an important
constitutional principle and a fundamental right.
GOVERNMENTAL STANDING:
In People vs Vera;
HELD: The People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act 4221 really violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws.
Facial Challenge
In Estrada vs Sandiganbayan, the court defined the “face challenge”;
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."
3. Earliest Opportunity
4. Necessity of Deciding Constitutional Questions
In case of Arceta vs Mangrobang, the court held that; Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative. The Court examined the contentions of Arceta and Dy carefully; but they still have to persuade us that BP 22 by itself or in its implementation transgressed a provision of the Constitution. Even the thesis of Dy that the present economic and financial crisis should be a basis to declare the Bouncing Checks Law constitutionally infirm deserves but scant consideration. As stressed in Lozano, it is precisely during trying times that there exists a most compelling reason to strengthen faith and confidence in the financial system and any practice tending to destroy confidence in checks as currency substitutes should be deterred, to prevent havoc in the trading and financial communities. Further, while indeed the metropolitan trial courts may be burdened immensely by bouncing checks cases now, that fact is immaterial to the alleged invalidity of the law being assailed. The solution to the clogging of dockets in lower courts lies elsewhere.
Mandatory Notice
In case of Mirasol vs. C.A, the court held that;
(Notice to Solicitor General) of the Rules of Court provides that "in any action which involves the validity of a statute, or executive order or regulation, the Solicitor General shall be notified by the party attacking the statute, executive order, or regulation, and shall be entitled to be heard upon such question." The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor General to decide whether or not his intervention in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To deny the Solicitor
General such notice would be tantamount to depriving him of his day in court. The mandatory notice requirement is not limited to actions involving declaratory relief and similar remedies. The rule itself provides that such notice is required in "any action" and not just actions involving declaratory relief. Where there is no ambiguity in the words used in the rule, there is no room for construction. In all actions assailing the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order, or proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory.
C. FUNCTIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
In case of Salonga vs Cruz-Pano, the court enumerates their functions for the judicial review;
The setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, of intrusions of State authority into areas reserved by the Bill of Rights for the individual as constitutionally protected spheres where even the awesome powers of Government may not enter at will is not the totality of the Court's functions. The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees.
The fact that the petition was moot and academic did not prevent the Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous decisions ever printed in the Reports. Herein, the prosecution evidence miserably fails to establish a prima facie case against Salonga, either as a co-conspirator of a destabilization plan to overthrow the government or as an officer or leader of any subversive organization. The respondents have taken the initiative of dropping the charges against Salonga. The Court reiterates the rule, however, that the Court will not validate the filing of an information based on the kind of evidence against Salonga found in the records.
D. The Exercise of Judicial Review
In case of Ynot vs IAC, Under the provision granting the SC jurisdiction to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide final judgments of lower courts" in all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures, lower courts can pass upon the validity of a statute in the first instance.
E. Effect of Declaration of Unconstitutionality New Civil Code, Article 7
Laws are repealed only by the subsequent ones, and their violation or nonobservance shall not be excused
by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary. When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter
shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution. In case of Serrano de Agbayani vs PNB,
The decision reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, for that matter an executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially declared results in its being to all intents and purposes a mere scrap of paper. As the new Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution. It is understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and
