COVER SHEET
Ryan, Christine M and Walsh, Peter (2004) Collaboration of Public Sector Agencies: Reporting and Accountability Challenges. International Journal of Public Sector Management 17(7):pp. 621-631.
Accessed from http://eprints.qut.edu.au
COLLABORATION OF PUBLIC SECTOR AGENCIES:
REPORTING AND ACCOUNTABILITY CHALLENGES
Christine Ryan School of Accountancy
Queensland University of Technology Peter Walsh
Centre of Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies Queensland University of Technology
Ryan,C. & P.Walsh, 2004, Collaboration of Public Sector Agencies: Reporting and Accountability Challenges, International Journal of Public Sector Management, Vol 17:7, pp 621-631.
Corresponding author: Christine Ryan
School of Accountancy
Queensland University of Technology George Street
BRISBANE, 4000 Phone: 61 7 3864 4320 Email:[email protected]
COLLABORATION OF PUBLIC SECTOR AGENCIES:
REPORTING AND ACCOUNTABILITY CHALLENGES
ABSTRACT
There is increasing pressure being placed on government agencies both in Australia and internationally to act in a more collaborative, integrated manner. Community and welfare programs are being conducted in new “shared” or “whole-of-government” ways, which pose a challenge to traditional models of public sector reporting. Existing accountability mechanisms are designed for vertical accountability relationships, and these are inadequate for horizontal or “networked” accountability across government agencies. This paper uses the case of the Community Renewal Program based in a Queensland state government department to illustrate the problems which arise when reporting on “shared” programs. The paper offers a different approach to improve reporting and accountability for shared programs.
INTRODUCTION
Under the Westminster system of government that exists in Australia the complex business of government is conducted by functional departments, each of which is accountable to a Minister, who in turn is accountable to Parliament (Mulgan and Uhr, 2000; Hampson, 1999; Muir, 2002). Under this model funds are provided to government agencies to deliver specific programs of services which contribute to the achievement of broader government objectives.
The international trend in public management is towards greater collaboration of public sector agencies. For example, a central theme of the Blair Government’s Modernising Government program promotes “joined-up” government, whereby a government department collaborates with other departments, local government authorities, or non-profit organisations, to conduct “shared” or “whole-of-government” programs (Prime Minister and the Minister for the Cabinet Office, 1999). Similarly, in Canada, “horizontal” arrangements are increasingly being used to respond to issues which require shared accountabilities (Auditor General of Canada, 1999, 2000; Peters, 1998; Hopkins et al., 2001).
Within the Australian context, governments are required to tackle increasingly intractable and multi-faceted problems that do not fit easily with current departmental structures (Keating, 2000). Indeed the Australian Auditor-General commented that an “interesting outcome of the recent public sector reform directions is that virtually all of the results most governments strive to achieve require the coordinated efforts of two or more agencies/parties/levels of government” (Barrett, 2001a, p. 13) Australia, then, is also undertaking “whole-of-government” programs.
These changes in the way services are delivered pose a challenge to traditional models of public sector reporting. While these problems are acknowledged in some quarters (in the UK see for example, Prime Minister and the Minister for the Cabinet Office, 1999; Bellamy, 1998; National Audit Office 2001a, b; UK Cabinet Office, 2000; in Canada see Auditor General of Canada, 1999, 2000; in Australia, see Barrett 2001b), discussion on reporting and accountability issues in this context is scant. In fact, in recent reviews of annual reporting requirements conducted in two states the issue of reporting on shared programs was not addressed (see Audit Office of New South Wales, 2000; Queensland Public Accounts Committee, 2001).
While many see whole-of-government programs as significant opportunities to engage the community in social and political processes (Wilkins 2002), the focus of this paper is on the resource allocation and accountability challenges that arise from their shared nature. The challenge faced by central agencies is how to report these new programmes within existing reporting frameworks. The objective of this paper is to examine these issues using the case of the Community Renewal Program in Queensland. The paper will be of interest to regulators and agencies as they examine the most appropriate manner in which to discharge the accountability obligations of shared programs. The paper begins by examining notions of public sector accountability. It then examines current regulations for reporting in Australia, using the case of the community renewal program. The paper concludes by discussing the policy implications of whole-of-government programs.
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
Although the notion of “accountability” is contested, there is general agreement that accountability is more complex in the public sector than it is in the private sector (Parker and Gould, 1999; Mulgan, 1997; Sinclair, 1995). The traditional model of accountability is based on a “hierarchical model” with a top-down/bottom-up focus expressed through forms of financial control. Thus, government financial management systems have tended to be primarily concerned with line-item expenditure within tightly controlled cash budgets (O’Faircheallaigh et al., 1999; Glynn and Murphy, 1996; Ryan, 1993). But with the introduction of the “new public management” approach, agencies are now required to specify their outputs and link these to the delivery of broader government policy outcomes. New forms of accountability have become “necessarily ambiguous”, “elusive”, and “subjectively construed” (Sinclair 1995, p. 219), moving from external to internal accountabilities, focusing on accountability to the “customer” as opposed to Parliament and the public (see Parker and Gould, 1999). “Who” is accountable has expanded beyond the political realm to include bureaucrats (Parker and Guthrie, 1993); also, “for what” has expanded beyond fiscal compliance to include performance accountability on the efficient and effective delivery of outputs to a broad group of stakeholders (Gray and Jenkins, 1993; Pollitt, 1990).
The trend in the delivery of services by multi agencies has led to “inevitable tensions and dysfunctionalities” (Glynn and Murphy, 1996, p. 129). Bellamy (1998) argues that the ways in which public accounts are structured and performance assessed reinforces the traditional functional “silos” of government; she suggests that changes within the public sector have “fundamental implications for the structure and auditing of public accounts, as well as for the processes by which public servants are held to account”
(1998, p. 7). Edwards (2001) also questions whether the principles of individual ministerial accountability to the taxpayer through Parliament are appropriate when the boundaries between the public and not-for-profit sectors are blurred. Hampson (1999) refers to the growing realisation by governments that the problems facing society are “interconnected and amorphous”, and Kettl (2000) notes the inadequacies of traditional function-based government structures in dealing with area-based problems, creating tension when vertical structures of government are dealing with horizontal problems. Similarly, Considine (2002, p. 28) compares vertical and horizontal accountability and argues that the “traditional standard line of authority is now contradicted everywhere by the demands of entrepreneurship and output-based performance”. In his view, performance-based budgets and management regimes have solved “some older problems by creating new accountability gaps and failures” (2002, p. 28).
The challenge when reporting performance outcomes of shared programs reveals a lack of an effective governance framework that transcends the traditional vertical silos of government. As a priority, there is a need for frameworks and appropriate reporting mechanisms for shared programs. The British government’s “Invest to Save” budget encourages cross-departmental co-operation by providing financial incentives to two or more agencies to jointly deliver services which are more efficient, innovative, “joined-up” and locally responsive (Prime Minister and the Minister for the Cabinet Office, 1999; Bellamy, 1998; National Audit Office, 2001a, b; UK Cabinet Office, 2000). The British government has recognized that the existing system of allocating resources and accounting for budgets is a barrier to joined-up government, and as an alternative has introduced a model which emphasises separate funding to “lead agencies” for priority programs. Budgets are pooled, and funds may be managed by a single agency, though
accountability is shared by a group of ministers. The National Audit Office (UK) (2001a) has indicated that accountability for joint expenditure requires that:
the roles and responsibilities of partners, how their performance is to be measured and reported, and the accounting and audit arrangements to ensure propriety over public expenditure all need to be clearly set out and understood. (p. 8)
The Auditor General of Canada (2000) has also proposed a framework for collaborative arrangements under which the department designated to lead the management of a horizontal program has the critical role of ensuring that issues are managed in a way that meets the partners’objectives and obligations. The lead department needs to have the necessary power to discharge its responsibilities, to ensure that partners are kept informed, that performance is monitored, and that partners live up to their commitments (see par. 20.152). Joint initiatives rely on clear expectations, and each of the partners knowing in concrete terms what it is expected of them. This requires an up-front framework agreement, and “credible” reporting which depends on the collection and sharing of reliableand compatible data.
In Australia, there is increasing recognition that shared outcomes require broader corporate governance arrangements across government. Barrett (2001a, c) has outlined the concept of “network bureaucracy” or “network governance” as a way to ensure proper integration and co-ordination of joint activities. In his view, a more formal governance framework is required than the traditional bureaucratic model of co-ordination through the establishment of inter-agency task forces or committees (Barrett,
2001a). Further, he asserts that if there is no central agency oversight, this can be “problematical” (2001b).
There is clearly a growing realization by the Auditors-General in these three countries of the benefits of a more collaborative mode of operating. This requires “cultural transformation in government agencies”, and “siloed” organisations need to become more integrated and externally focused (Barrett, 2001a, c). However, as yet, regulators have not moved to incorporate these concerns into their reporting guidelines.
Wilkins (2002) canvasses a range of options on how ministers might account to Parliament for “shared” initiatives. One option is for each government department to answer for its own part of the initiative; however, such “siloed” reporting would be fragmented and it would be difficult to obtain any meaningful information on the impact of the whole program. A second option is for the lead department to take responsibility for reporting; this option may provide integrated reporting, but there is the possibility that the role of partner agencies will be sidelined. A third option is for a non-participating minister to take on a coordinating role, but while this option may provide some impartiality, the minister concerned is made accountable for something for which he/she is not responsible. A fourth option is for the ministers to take collective responsibility. While this may achieve integrated reporting, there is no apparent basis for it in the Westminster system which emphasizes individual ministerial accountability. A fifth option would be for the premier/treasurer to take responsibility on a whole-of-government basis.
In summary, it is apparent from the literature on accountability that the tensions which exist between the traditional vertical notions of accountability of governments and newer horizontal solutions being sought for program delivery have only begun to be addressed from a theoretical perspective.
THE CASE OF THE COMMUNITY RENEWAL PROGRAM Background
The Community Renewal Program was introduced in 1998 as a key activity under the Queensland Government’s Crime Prevention Strategy (Department of the Premier and Cabinet, 1999). The Department of Housing is the lead agency for the program, and receives a separate funding allocation from Treasury through the budget process. Most of these funds are not spent by the Department itself, but are allocated to specific projects managed by State government agencies and local councils (Department of Housing, 2000). The program is aimed at building sustainability amongst communities which have high crime rates, or other symptoms of individual, family and community stress. Many of these disadvantaged communities have high concentrations of public housing, poor quality private housing or Indigenous housing owned by local governments. The program takes an ‘area-based approach’ by involving local communities and local governments in the identification of issues and the development of solutions. Decisions are made through Community Reference Groups and Regional Managers Forums, and are submitted for formal approval to the Minister for Housing and local Members of Parliament.
The Community Renewal Program works on the level of the social and physical development of the local suburb (Davies, 2000). It involves local solutions, local
coordination, a wide range of area specific initiatives, links to physical renewal, and community action planning. To date 15 Community Renewal areas have been approved, including 338 sub-projects in the following categories: employment and training; community services; neighbourhood amenity; community facilities; sport and recreation; community safety; community engagement; and arts and cultural development.
Funding
Government funding for shared programs in Queensland usually requires a lead agency to be nominated for all joint budget submissions. This agency is responsible for presenting the joint budget for consideration; then, if approved, the funding is usually allocated to each participating agency. For the Community Renewal Program, a budget of $37.5m was allocated for the period 1998/99 to 2000/2001, and a further commitment of $45m for the next three-year period (Queensland Government, 2002f). Funding arrangements for this program were unusual in that the funding was provided to the Department of Housing as lead agency, and then distributed by the Department to other government agencies. This funding through the Department of Housing is only part of the total government commitment to the program; other departments and local governments contribute both dollars and “in kind” assistance to the program.
Reporting and Accountability Challenges
While a number of effective projects have been funded through the Community Renewal Program, it is difficult to assess and quantify its overall impact, or to get a clear picture of the total funding and outputs delivered across the many state and local government agencies involved. Under the current reporting framework—whereby
Ministerial Portfolio Statements (MPSs) are presented by the Minister of the lead department—there is no clearly defined model to report on either the total inputs, outputs or outcomes pertaining to the program. This lack of definition has created problems, e.g. there has been confusion about whether to address queries about a specific project to the Minister for Housing or to the Police Minister as the agency that delivers the particular program.
The 2002-03 Ministerial Portfolio Statement of the Department of Housing contains a description of the program and a descriptive review of output performance for the past three years, an Output Statement and an Output Statement of Financial Performance. The Output Statement gives socio-economic measures under four main headings: “Quantity”—change in property values, change in crime rates, change in student retention, employment levels, number of Community Action Plans developed; “Quality”—residential satisfaction; “Timeliness”—Community Action Plans and Renewal Exit Strategies established on time; “Location”—Local renewal areas established. Accompanying the Output Statement is a Statement of Financial Performance for the period under the headings Operating Revenue and Operating Expenses, and the resultant net surplus or deficit. The implication of this information is that there is some correlation between the output measures and the financial statement.
However, there are two key problems with these Statements in terms of reporting. The first key problem is that the Output Statement cannot be directly linked to the Output Statement of Financial Performance because outputs are being delivered by a number of agencies, whereas the Operating Statement of Financial Performance relates only to those funds contributed by the Department of Housing. Thus, while the Output
Statement contains some valuable performance information from a whole-of-government perspective, it is impossible to ascertain within even broad parameters any relationship between the output measures and the total cost reported for the program. This is due to the strict requirements of the MPS which limit reporting to the Department of Housing’s budget allocation. Clearly,recognition of the shared nature of the program, and the extent of involvement of other agencies would enhance evaluations on the program.
An examination of the Ministerial Portfolio Statements of other State Government agencies involved in the Community Renewal Program reveals that, although some of the renewal activities are mentioned in these statements, there is no direct reference to the Community Renewal Program (Queensland Government 2002a,b,c,d,e,f). Information is also contained in the annual reports of those agencies participating in the program. An examination of the annual report of the Department of Housing provides some summarised performance information that is not quantified and contains less detail than the MPS. The annual report also does not provide complete information on the full range of projects funded by the program. Although it mentions that Community Renewal is a whole-of-government program and provides some examples of the types of initiatives funded by the program, it does not provide a complete picture of the contribution by other agencies, local government or community groups. A review of the Annual Reports of some of the key local governments involved in Community Renewal reveals varying amounts of disclosure about the program and activities undertaken (Logan City Council, 2002; Caboolture Shire Council, 2002; Ipswich City Council, 2002; Cairns City Council, 2001).
A second problem relates to the measures used to report on output performance; measures used are often not appropriate and often contested. An inherent feature of accountability in the governmental context is that some identifiable individuals or defined group are held responsible for a set of activities that correspond to their actual span of control and capacity to act (Perri 6 et al., 2002). In the case of Community Renewal, a number of the output measures are beyond the control of the program and are not directly related to the program’s objectives, e.g. it is difficult to hold Community Renewal Program responsible for school retention rates, crime rates, or property values in the renewal areas.
Response of the Community Renewal Program
These dual problems of reporting have been responded to in various ways. In response to the first problem on the broader contributions from other agencies, the Community Renewal Program produced a separate report as a supplement to the Annual Report and MPS mentioned above. The Progress Report (Department of Housing, 2002) differed from conventional reporting by providing detailed information on each renewal area including contributions by other government agencies. In order to gather this information, significant time and energy was required to contact each agency involved and distill from those agency records the funds contributed. There were no systems in place to collect the appropriate information; this had to be done outside the normal reporting information systems. A network of agency contact people had to be established, and these people were in turn required to liaise within their respective agencies in order to identify the correct details of funding contributions for each project. This process highlighted the lack of appropriate governance mechanisms at a central level to support a whole-of-government program such as Community Renewal.
Whilst the Progress Report captured the financial contributions from other agencies, it did not quantify the in-kind contributions which had been made. For example, Community Renewal relies heavily on the involvement of both regional managers of various government departments within those regions where renewal areas are located as well as input on a voluntary basis from local residents and community workers involved in the Community Reference Groups. The time and effort involved by these government officers and community members is difficult to quantify but is nevertheless a significant indirect cost involved in program implementation. Local governments are also a key player, but their contributions varied widely across the renewal areas (see Department of Housing, 2002).
In addition to the contributions made by other agencies, the funding provided by Community Renewal assists other government agencies to meet their output targets. For example, Community Renewal funded the establishment of a centre in one renewal area that provides integrated services to young children, and this centre provides a base for Queensland Health to deliver its services. However, there is no mechanism to formally acknowledge the shared nature of this arrangement. It is evident, therefore, that current reporting and accountability arrangements do not provide a means to report on joint efforts and impacts.
In response to the second problem relating to the appropriateness of the output measures, a new set of measures have been developed and adopted in the latest MPS (2003-04). Performance measures have been revised so that they can report on outcomes more within the span of control of the program. The headings in the new
Output Statement remain the same, but items under each relate specifically to the program: “Quantity”—level of community engagement with Community Renewal, proportion of targeted groups participating progress against local renewal plans [instead of changes in property value, crime rates, etc]; “Quality”—satisfaction with renewal area as a place to live, satisfaction with level of changes in renewal area since Community Renewal; “Timeliness”—proportion of Local Renewal Plans reviewed annually, average project submission processing time; and “Location”—level of satisfaction with services available locally”.
Whilst the measures in the new Output Statement are more appropriate for reporting on program performance, they still do not overcome the first problem whereby the cost figures do not take account of contributions from other agencies.
The Community Renewal Program thus illustrates the accountability and governance problems that can emerge from the use of traditional structures and processes for shared programs. These problems are compounded by a lack ofguidance from lead agencies in determining what type of information should be included about shared or whole-of-government programs in departmental reporting.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Clearly, changes need to be made from reporting processes which focus on individual agency management and reporting. A framework is needed to accommodate government and community expectations on greater collaboration in program delivery, and the resulting horizontal accountability. The key issue here is how to capture the full range of inputs and outputs for shared or whole-of-government programs. The
approach adopted by Community Renewal provides a potentially promising solution whereby it can be seen that a lead agency can collect and provide meaningful performance information. However, the preparation of a separate document has the disadvantage of adding another layer of reporting. Clearly, Treasury—as the lead government agency responsible for funding policy guidelines—needs to be proactive and take the lead in developing guidelines for performance reporting on whole-of-government programs. Thus the current MPS format needs to be reworked to incorporate additional and appropriate performance information. In shared programs, the guidelines need to provide a strong mandate for lead agencies to collect the required performance information from other agencies. The solution brokered by the Community Renewal Program, whereby it as the lead agency collected shared program information, provides the beginning of a workable and accountable model. Lead agencies need to take responsibility for compiling outcomes on a whole-of-program basis, otherwise the coordination and gathering of information may be piecemeal. The output information would indicate the shared nature of the program, an indication of the other agencies involved in the program, and an indication of the contribution of the other agencies (both in cash and in kind) to the program. This output information, which needs to be agreed upon by all participants in the project, could then be reported by other agencies contributing to the project.
CONCLUSION
Governments are increasingly seeking new ways of improving outcomes in service delivery. One way to achieve this is to recognise that government agencies must act in a more collaborative ‘joined-up’ way, with agencies at the same level of government, across different levels of government, and with the nonprofit sector.
This paper has argued that the increasing pressure being placed on government agencies to act in a more collaborative, ‘joined-up’ way has not been matched by attention to reporting processes. Using the case of the Community Renewal Program in Queensland, the paper has shown how the traditional “vertical” accountability arrangements do not adequately accommodate horizontal programs of service delivery. This paper has suggested a possible model for reporting and argued that agencies such as Treasury need to provide guidelines on reporting. If this is not done, then shared programs may suffer from the stigma of non-transparency in the discharge of their accountability obligations. Existing budget processes and annual reporting guidelines need to be adapted to meet new methods of service delivery.
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