Preventing the First World War

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 Adam Smith  Adam Smith 17.42, Spring 2004 17.42, Spring 2004 David Art David Art

Preventing the First World War

Preventing the First World War

Introduction Introduction

The historical and political science communities have both shed light on the origins of the The historical and political science communities have both shed light on the origins of the First W

First World World War; many ar; many papers and papers and books have books have been published.been published.11 In this paper we will turn to theIn this paper we will turn to the question of design.

question of design. That is, now that we have a That is, now that we have a good understanding of the dynamics of good understanding of the dynamics of WWI,WWI, how could they be manipulated

how could they be manipulated to prevent it from occurring?to prevent it from occurring?22 In the conclusion, we will haveIn the conclusion, we will have discovered a host of manipulable causes,

discovered a host of manipulable causes, some of which are more imsome of which are more important than others. portant than others. TheThe smaller points of interest include: publishing literature explaining specific dangers of the p smaller points of interest include: publishing literature explaining specific dangers of the p re- re-WWI situation; and assassinating the members of the Black Hand

WWI situation; and assassinating the members of the Black Hand who would otherwise kill thewho would otherwise kill the Austrian archduke and spawn the

Austrian archduke and spawn the July crisis.July crisis.33 The most critical actions to take are: changing The most critical actions to take are: changing thethe “cult of the offensive” paradigm of many European cou

“cult of the offensive” paradigm of many European countries’ ntries’ populations; and evoking the populations; and evoking the samesame change in the European

change in the European leaderships, probably using assassination instead of relying onleaderships, probably using assassination instead of relying on transformation.

transformation.

We will step through these manipulable causes, and address how each can be manipulated We will step through these manipulable causes, and address how each can be manipulated as well as what effects those manipulations should have.

as well as what effects those manipulations should have.

 Addressing National Misperceptions and Blunders  Addressing National Misperceptions and Blunders

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1The single work which will be The single work which will be referenced the most isreferenced the most is Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War , an, an International Security Reade

International Security Reader which is composed of r which is composed of papers representing a diverse sampling of perspectives. papers representing a diverse sampling of perspectives. WWe wille will refer to this work as

refer to this work as OriginsOrigins throughout the footnotes.throughout the footnotes. 2

2There is a slight technicality here. There is a slight technicality here. If we just wanted to prevent this specific war from happening, i.e. a war If we just wanted to prevent this specific war from happening, i.e. a war  spawned from the July crisis of 1914, there are very simple ways that this could be done.

spawned from the July crisis of 1914, there are very simple ways that this could be done. On the contraryOn the contrary, in this, in this  paper we are interested in preventing the

 paper we are interested in preventing the main causes of the war main causes of the war from developing, hopefully preventing anyfrom developing, hopefully preventing any European war around that time period.

European war around that time period. 3

3As outlined in footnoteAs outlined in footnote 22, if we are , if we are successful, preventing the archduke’successful, preventing the archduke’s assassination shouldn’t be necessarys assassination shouldn’t be necessary. . OnOn the other hand, we include it

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Throughout the time leading up

Throughout the time leading up to Wto World World War I ar I there were several there were several pervasive misperceptions aboutpervasive misperceptions about the world which brought countries to take action

the world which brought countries to take actions which hurt international stabilitys which hurt international stability. . In order to remedyIn order to remedy this cause, we will publish several pieces of

this cause, we will publish several pieces of academic literature explaining why these ideas were indeedacademic literature explaining why these ideas were indeed misperceptions.

misperceptions. TTaking the time to publaking the time to publish this literature, wouish this literature, would be beneficial for many reasons. ld be beneficial for many reasons. TheseThese include generating even more discussion among scholars, to pressure governmental elites into thoroughly include generating even more discussion among scholars, to pressure governmental elites into thoroughly considering their doctrines, to motivate populations to try to understand the dynamics, and most

considering their doctrines, to motivate populations to try to understand the dynamics, and most importantly

importantly, to prime , to prime populations for a later (more simplistically expressed) information campaign. populations for a later (more simplistically expressed) information campaign. WWee now step through each idea to be expressed in the series of literature, in roughly the same order that they now step through each idea to be expressed in the series of literature, in roughly the same order that they should be published.

should be published.44

Security Dilemma and Alliances Security Dilemma and Alliances

How could a limited conflict between Austria and Serbia turn into a war with

How could a limited conflict between Austria and Serbia turn into a war with millions of millions of  casualties?

casualties? The answer is The answer is simple: ofsimple: offensive and defensive alfensive and defensive alliances. liances. Austria knew that Austria knew that if it if it wentwent to war, Germany would back it.

to war, Germany would back it. Likewise, Serbia was an ally of Russia, who was alsLikewise, Serbia was an ally of Russia, who was also alliedo allied with the French.

with the French.

The chief observation advanced

The chief observation advanced by historians about pre-1914 alliances (i.e. the Tripleby historians about pre-1914 alliances (i.e. the Triple Entente and Central Alli

Entente and Central Alliance) is that they were “blank checks.” ance) is that they were “blank checks.” That is to say that, alliancesThat is to say that, alliances were unconditional, so any country with man

were unconditional, so any country with many allies could consider its allies’ y allies could consider its allies’ forces to be on itsforces to be on its side, even if they pick a fight

side, even if they pick a fight..55

This is in contrast to the vast network of defensive alliances set up by Bis

This is in contrast to the vast network of defensive alliances set up by Bismark. mark. It turnsIt turns out that Europe was very peaceful during this time

out that Europe was very peaceful during this time..66

The thesis of this discussion should be that offensive alliances are a

The thesis of this discussion should be that offensive alliances are a bad thing for bad thing for  everyone.

everyone. This can be easily sThis can be easily shown by using security hown by using security dilemma and spiral model ardilemma and spiral model arguments.guments.

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4Most of these topics are from the list of causes given in Van Evera, p. 69.Most of these topics are from the list of causes given in Van Evera, p. 69. 5

5More discussion can be More discussion can be found in Vafound in Van Evera, p. n Evera, p. 91-101.91-101. 6

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That is, in the case of security dilemma, as

That is, in the case of security dilemma, as countries gain offensive power they threaten other countries gain offensive power they threaten other  countries more.

countries more. Using the spiral mUsing the spiral model, we can illustrate that odel, we can illustrate that as the other countries areas the other countries are threatened more, they are likely to respond b

threatened more, they are likely to respond b y making an effort to increase their forces in order y making an effort to increase their forces in order  to preserve

to preserve their own security.their own security.

 Defensive Advantages of

 Defensive Advantages of Military TMilitary Technologyechnology Despite the defensive advantage cau

Despite the defensive advantage caused by the current military technology, leaders insed by the current military technology, leaders in Europe strongly favored offense over defense.

Europe strongly favored offense over defense. Stephen VStephen Van Evera writes, “They largelyan Evera writes, “They largely overlooked the

overlooked the lessons of the American Civil lessons of the American Civil WWar, the Russo-Turkish War, the Russo-Turkish War of ar of 1877-78, the 1877-78, the Boer Boer  W

War, and the Russo-Japanese Warar, and the Russo-Japanese War, which had , which had demonstrated the power odemonstrated the power of the new f the new defensivedefensive technologies.”

technologies.” 77

This lesson should be apparent to

This lesson should be apparent to early twentieth century leaders, but is not being takenearly twentieth century leaders, but is not being taken into serious consideration.

into serious consideration. The only thing that we can do here is to distill all of the historicalThe only thing that we can do here is to distill all of the historical records into a single paper which describes in detail the lessons we want the readers to learn. records into a single paper which describes in detail the lessons we want the readers to learn. This should lower the energy required to digest these ideas, ma

This should lower the energy required to digest these ideas, ma king them more accessible toking them more accessible to leaders and the masses.

leaders and the masses.

The Dangers of Mobilization The Dangers of Mobilization

The first point to be made in

The first point to be made in this paper is that there are not any large pathis paper is that there are not any large payoffs for yoffs for  mobilizing first, des

mobilizing first, despite the overwhelming opposite view held by pite the overwhelming opposite view held by military elitmilitary elites. es. One GermanOne German analyst said, with the Schlieffen plan in mind, “A delay of a single day … can scarcely ever b analyst said, with the Schlieffen plan in mind, “A delay of a single day … can scarcely ever b ee rectified.”

rectified.”88 This was indeed not trueThis was indeed not true..99

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7Van Evera, p. 60Van Evera, p. 60 8

8Eyre Crowe, on July 27, quoted in Eyre Crowe, on July 27, quoted in Geiss,Geiss, July 1914 July 1914, p. 251., p. 251. 9

9Rationale for this assertion can be found in VRationale for this assertion can be found in Van Evera, p. 72-76. an Evera, p. 72-76. The arguments to be presenting in our paper The arguments to be presenting in our paper  mirror those presented in

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The second point is that mobilization is a

The second point is that mobilization is a very offensive move, and has security dilemmavery offensive move, and has security dilemma repercussions.

repercussions. That is, once any country That is, once any country mobilizes, every other country mobilizes, every other country becomes more likely tobecomes more likely to mobilize sooner than it would

mobilize sooner than it would have otherwise. have otherwise. This effect sThis effect snowballs as more and more countrinowballs as more and more countrieses mobilize.

mobilize. This is because the threat This is because the threat posed by any incremental mobilposed by any incremental mobilization is added on top of ization is added on top of  the previously existing threat, which makes another incremental mobilization more likely

the previously existing threat, which makes another incremental mobilization more likely. . ThisThis cascading effect

cascading effect ultimately undermines ultimately undermines stabilitystability.. Finally

Finally, the third point is that large scale mobilization can not be done in secret. , the third point is that large scale mobilization can not be done in secret. ContraryContrary to many military lead

to many military leaders’ viewsers’ views1010, mobilization required massively public announcements that, mobilization required massively public announcements that could be easily detected by eve

could be easily detected by every interested observerry interested observer..1111 The take-home point should be

The take-home point should be that since mobilization is not urgent, and since it meansthat since mobilization is not urgent, and since it means war, it should be postponed until after diplomatic discussions have occurred.

war, it should be postponed until after diplomatic discussions have occurred.

 Power Balance in Europe  Power Balance in Europe

In this paper we primarily describe Britain’s inherent interest in the balance of power in In this paper we primarily describe Britain’s inherent interest in the balance of power in Europe.

Europe. It isn’t It isn’t too difficult too difficult to illustrate, so to illustrate, so we will skip the diswe will skip the discussion of the logic. cussion of the logic. TheThe intended outcome is to raise awareness, so tha

intended outcome is to raise awareness, so that German leaders will more seriously consider t German leaders will more seriously consider  Britain’

Britain’s potential involvement, and to attempt s potential involvement, and to attempt to motivate Britain into making clear statementsto motivate Britain into making clear statements about its policies.

about its policies. For example, at the time tFor example, at the time that Germany was thinking about lhat Germany was thinking about launching the Firstaunching the First W

World World War, its military was only ar, its military was only thinking about thinking about how to how to out-race the small out-race the small British ExpeditionaryBritish Expeditionary Force

Force1212; it did not expect Britain to ; it did not expect Britain to enter into the war.enter into the war.

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10Russian leader Sazonov was under the false impression that he Russian leader Sazonov was under the false impression that he could engage in full mobilization without anyonecould engage in full mobilization without anyone knowing about it for much

knowing about it for much longer than possible.longer than possible. 11

11As outlined in Van Evera p. 76-80As outlined in Van Evera p. 76-80 12

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The second big point

The second big point is that Germany and Austria should not fear waning power andis that Germany and Austria should not fear waning power and missing windows of

missing windows of opportunityopportunity..1313 In fact, Germany’s relative power was increasing at the timeIn fact, Germany’s relative power was increasing at the time World War I broke out.

World War I broke out.

The Ineffectiveness of Colonial Possessions The Ineffectiveness of Colonial Possessions

German elites perceived an upcoming

German elites perceived an upcoming threat to their security; they believed that onethreat to their security; they believed that one effective way to

effective way to remedy this was by remedy this was by taking over more land. taking over more land. The Germans believed that holdingThe Germans believed that holding more land would allow them t

more land would allow them to out-produce Russia and other upcoming powerso out-produce Russia and other upcoming powers. . Jervis notes:Jervis notes: “Because of the perceived advantage of the offense, war was seen as the best route both to “Because of the perceived advantage of the offense, war was seen as the best route both to gaining expansion and to avoiding drastic los

gaining expansion and to avoiding drastic loss of influence. s of influence. There seemed to be no way for There seemed to be no way for  Germany merely to retain and safeguard her existing position.”

Germany merely to retain and safeguard her existing position.” As discussed above, however

As discussed above, however, in reality t, in reality there was no advantage of the ofhere was no advantage of the offense. fense. Thus,Thus, expanding Germany’

expanding Germany’s boarders was a very hard thing to accomplish. s boarders was a very hard thing to accomplish. Moreover, it is Moreover, it is alsoalso difficult for countries to turn newly acquired lands into productive assets.

difficult for countries to turn newly acquired lands into productive assets.1414 This paper will focus on these topics, in

This paper will focus on these topics, in an effort to disprove the war justification thatan effort to disprove the war justification that more land means

more land means more securitymore security..1515

The Cult of the Offensive and Its Security Undermining Properties The Cult of the Offensive and Its Security Undermining Properties

Although it is a point disputed b

Although it is a point disputed by some,y some,1616many people agree that the cult of the offensivemany people agree that the cult of the offensive mindset present in both government leaderships and among the populations of each country was mindset present in both government leaderships and among the populations of each country was the most dangerous factor present in international relations at the

the most dangerous factor present in international relations at the time, and thus was the number time, and thus was the number 

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13As outlined very well in Van Evera, p. 80-86.As outlined very well in Van Evera, p. 80-86. 14

14As discussed in Van Evera’s lectures.As discussed in Van Evera’s lectures. 15

15More information can be More information can be found in Van Evera, p. 67-72found in Van Evera, p. 67-72 16

16OriginsOrigins, p. , p. 109-133, “1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability109-133, “1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability,” Scott D ,” Scott D Sagan, henceforth referred to asSagan, henceforth referred to as Sagan.

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one cause o

one cause of the war.f the war.1717 Sagan claims that nobody really wanted a war in Sagan claims that nobody really wanted a war in Europe, but thatEurope, but that  brinksmanship and bad organizational operation were two o

 brinksmanship and bad organizational operation were two o f the prime causes.f the prime causes.1818 However,However, offense dominance can be easily observed in

offense dominance can be easily observed in many historical records from various players.many historical records from various players.1919 TheThe logical causation of

logical causation of the love for the the love for the offense stems from many different sources for each offense stems from many different sources for each countrycountry.. For example, German Secretary of State Jagow, in a message to an ambassador just before the For example, German Secretary of State Jagow, in a message to an ambassador just before the July crisis, explained a window of opportunity as one

July crisis, explained a window of opportunity as one cause for an offensive posture: “Russiacause for an offensive posture: “Russia will be ready to fight in a few years…I do not desire a preventive war, but if the conflict should will be ready to fight in a few years…I do not desire a preventive war, but if the conflict should offer itself, we ought not to shirk it.”

offer itself, we ought not to shirk it.”2020,, 2121 TTo present another o present another perspective, Belgium officers heldperspective, Belgium officers held that “T

that “To ensure against our being ignored o ensure against our being ignored it was essential that we should attack.”it was essential that we should attack.”2222 Unfortunately

Unfortunately, to add, to address each country’s incentives for an offensive posture would ress each country’s incentives for an offensive posture would bebe difficult.

difficult. Even if the resources are available to do this task, an offensive posture might be theEven if the resources are available to do this task, an offensive posture might be the right approach for some countries, but arguments could be

right approach for some countries, but arguments could be made and questions could be made and questions could be raised.raised. Whether or not such resources are available,

Whether or not such resources are available, this paper should focus on the enthis paper should focus on the ends of an offensiveds of an offensive  posture.

 posture. I.e., that believing in ofI.e., that believing in offense, and subsequently building up offense, and subsequently building up offensive weapons, causes afensive weapons, causes a security dilemma effect.

security dilemma effect.

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17OriginsOrigins, p. 59-108, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,” Stephen Van Evera,, p. 59-108, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,” Stephen Van Evera, hencefor

henceforth referred to th referred to as Vas Van Evera. an Evera. Also,Also, Origins,Origins, p. 20-58, “Civil-Military Relat p. 20-58, “Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of ions and the Cult of thethe Offensive, 1914 and 1984,”

Offensive, 1914 and 1984,” Jack Snyder, henceforth referred to as Jack Snyder, henceforth referred to as SnyderSnyder.. 18

18Sagan, p. 109Sagan, p. 109 19

19As quotes in VAs quotes in Van Evera, p. 71, French General de an Evera, p. 71, French General de Castelnau: “Give me 700,000 men and I Castelnau: “Give me 700,000 men and I will conquer Europe.”will conquer Europe.” Also, in Rohl, “Admiral von Muller,” p. 670, the German Admiral von Muller is quoted explaining the atmosphere Also, in Rohl, “Admiral von Muller,” p. 670, the German Admiral von Muller is quoted explaining the atmosphere in Germany when the war broke out: “The mood is brilliant.

in Germany when the war broke out: “The mood is brilliant. The government has succeeded very well in making usThe government has succeeded very well in making us appear as the attacked.”

appear as the attacked.” 20

20July 18, quoted in Schmitt, Coming of the War, Vol. 1, p. 321July 18, quoted in Schmitt, Coming of the War, Vol. 1, p. 321 21

21It is worth noting that different people in It is worth noting that different people in each country’each country’s organizations agreed with the cult of s organizations agreed with the cult of the offensivethe offensive doctrine to disparate extents.

doctrine to disparate extents. (For example, within a military or(For example, within a military organization, generals might be more motiganization, generals might be more motivatedvated toward the cult of the of

toward the cult of the offensive than foot soldiefensive than foot soldiers might be.) rs might be.) If we consider the averagIf we consider the average of this adoption withie of this adoption within eachn each country’

country’s organizations, then each of these organizations (for each country) will exhibit unequal belief in s organizations, then each of these organizations (for each country) will exhibit unequal belief in the cult of the cult of  the offensive policy

the offensive policy. . (For example, military organizat(For example, military organizations within a country are more likely to ions within a country are more likely to participate in cult of participate in cult of  the offensive principles than are civil organizations.)

the offensive principles than are civil organizations.) FinallyFinally, if we look , if we look at the average adoption for each at the average adoption for each countrycountry,, we will find that they exhibit lopsided acceptance of

we will find that they exhibit lopsided acceptance of the doctrine; it is a commonly held view the doctrine; it is a commonly held view that Germany wasthat Germany was more hawkish in this sense than

more hawkish in this sense than any other European countryany other European country.. 22

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Rehabilitating National Leadership in Germany  Rehabilitating National Leadership in Germany 

W

We do not expect e do not expect that European leaderships will change their objectives and that European leaderships will change their objectives and strategies tostrategies to reflect the new realizations presented in the series of papers previously outl

reflect the new realizations presented in the series of papers previously outlined. ined. WWe do note do not expect this simply because, based on h

expect this simply because, based on historical evidence, these organizations do not properlyistorical evidence, these organizations do not properly assimilate and adapt in r

assimilate and adapt in response to new information. esponse to new information. For example, it is For example, it is unlikely that leaders,unlikely that leaders, who subscribe to cult of the offensive doctrine, would

who subscribe to cult of the offensive doctrine, would believe any arguments which posit thatbelieve any arguments which posit that Germany is not a waning power as mentioned in the paper concerning European balance of  Germany is not a waning power as mentioned in the paper concerning European balance of   power.

 power.

The alternative that we will

The alternative that we will now consider is assnow consider is assassination. assination. This opens a very larThis opens a very large bag of ge bag of  worms, however

worms, however. . The largest obstacle in the way of using this tactic is tThe largest obstacle in the way of using this tactic is that if leaders arehat if leaders are assassinated, their people are more likely to become

assassinated, their people are more likely to become hawkish and regress back to their cult hawkish and regress back to their cult of theof the offensive nature.

offensive nature. The best solution to use, The best solution to use, then, is to make the assasthen, is to make the assassinations appear to be ansinations appear to be an accident.

accident. The world would become very suspiThe world would become very suspicious if the leaders of cious if the leaders of every country suddenlyevery country suddenly  became ill, and thus we limit our regime change efforts to Germany

 became ill, and thus we limit our regime change efforts to Germany. . Since Germany pressuresSince Germany pressures Austria to make multiple

Austria to make multiple fiat accompli fiat accompliss , , their leaderships’ removal from the theatre should havetheir leaderships’ removal from the theatre should have a net positive impact on the situation.

a net positive impact on the situation. Unfortunately

Unfortunately, a second obstacle now becomes apparent. , a second obstacle now becomes apparent. When we take out thisWhen we take out this leadership, we want to make sure that it will not be replaced by a worse leadership.

leadership, we want to make sure that it will not be replaced by a worse leadership. TTo solveo solve this, we will position the best person we can find to take over

this, we will position the best person we can find to take over. . This should not be too difficult,This should not be too difficult, however, since we have twenty one years before Wor

however, since we have twenty one years before World Wld War I would otherwise break out. ar I would otherwise break out. WWee should begin the

should begin the selection and installation immediately.selection and installation immediately.

Changing the Mindsets of the Populations Changing the Mindsets of the Populations

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 Now, we turn to the specific problem of how to change

 Now, we turn to the specific problem of how to change the cult of the offensive mindsetthe cult of the offensive mindset  pervasive throughout each country’s population, although we are chiefly interested in Germany  pervasive throughout each country’s population, although we are chiefly interested in Germany

since their posture was the most potent in causing the war. since their posture was the most potent in causing the war.

Fortunately

Fortunately, by this point we , by this point we have replaced the German leadership. have replaced the German leadership. Our new puppetOur new puppet government should then be ready to aide us in invoking a complete reversal of public opinion. government should then be ready to aide us in invoking a complete reversal of public opinion. Since the previous government had

Since the previous government had ambitions which conflicted with ours, along with controlambitions which conflicted with ours, along with control over the media and

over the media and other information outlets, the new government will be critical to other information outlets, the new government will be critical to thisthis operation.

operation.

In countries other than Germany, where we did not replace the leadership, we will also In countries other than Germany, where we did not replace the leadership, we will also launch a campaign.

launch a campaign. However, because some of However, because some of the leaderships might not the leaderships might not be amiable to our be amiable to our  cause, we do so with low

cause, we do so with low expectations of success. expectations of success. This is acceptable since we This is acceptable since we are chieflyare chiefly interested in Germany, as previously mentioned.

interested in Germany, as previously mentioned. The best way to achieve this

The best way to achieve this operation is through public reloperation is through public relations campaigns. ations campaigns. Indeed, theIndeed, the  previous German leadership found this to be

 previous German leadership found this to be an effective strategyan effective strategy..2323 What information should we f

What information should we feed the masses through our propaganda machine? eed the masses through our propaganda machine? TheThe  basis of our philosophy will have been

 basis of our philosophy will have been established in the series of papers previously outlined.established in the series of papers previously outlined. From there, we should add a

From there, we should add a few more themes, most of which are few more themes, most of which are intended to counter the aims of intended to counter the aims of  each country’

each country’s elites. s elites. That is, we should purvey how bad and messy battle truly is, perhaps witThat is, we should purvey how bad and messy battle truly is, perhaps withh references to the late nineteenth century wars which revealed the horrible nature of modern references to the late nineteenth century wars which revealed the horrible nature of modern warfare.

warfare. Furthermore, we should try Furthermore, we should try to move the masses fto move the masses from nationalism to a sense rom nationalism to a sense of of  European cooperation.

European cooperation.

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T

To get these ideas across, we should o get these ideas across, we should use all of the typical advertising mechanisms (e.g.use all of the typical advertising mechanisms (e.g. sensationalism).

sensationalism). WWe should also take advantage of all media outlets available to us, ande should also take advantage of all media outlets available to us, and encourage public discourse beyond what we publish.

encourage public discourse beyond what we publish.

Preventing the July Crisis Preventing the July Crisis

Finally

Finally, we wish to prevent the July crisis from ever happening. , we wish to prevent the July crisis from ever happening. In theoryIn theory, if we solved, if we solved our original problem, this

our original problem, this would not be would not be necessarynecessary..2424 However, if we only reduce the probablyHowever, if we only reduce the probably that war would break out, we would like to reduce the number of dice that will be rolled. that war would break out, we would like to reduce the number of dice that will be rolled.

T

To accomplish this, we will arrange for the o accomplish this, we will arrange for the assassination of every member of the Black assassination of every member of the Black  Hand.

Hand.2525 Because we have the ability to see into the future (and in Because we have the ability to see into the future (and in all locations on the face of theall locations on the face of the Earth), we can easily identifying them by spyi

Earth), we can easily identifying them by spying on one of their future meetings. ng on one of their future meetings. After After  identifying the targets, we will hire professionally trained assassins to carry out the operation. identifying the targets, we will hire professionally trained assassins to carry out the operation.

Once again, however, we must

Once again, however, we must deal with possible repercussdeal with possible repercussions. ions. The most dangerous oneThe most dangerous one here is that Serbs will become enraged and engage in even more terrorist activities.

here is that Serbs will become enraged and engage in even more terrorist activities. WWe lower thee lower the  probability that this will happen by killing every member of the

 probability that this will happen by killing every member of the Black Hand, instead of just theBlack Hand, instead of just the actual assassins.

actual assassins. UnfortunatelyUnfortunately, we can only mitigate this , we can only mitigate this risk.risk.

Conclusion Conclusion

In conclusion, we have devised a scheme of systematic approaches to mutate the causes In conclusion, we have devised a scheme of systematic approaches to mutate the causes of the First W

of the First World World War into benign artifacts. ar into benign artifacts. WWe have done e have done this by first publishing a series of this by first publishing a series of   papers which outline why most of the

 papers which outline why most of the incorrect international relations theories at the time were,incorrect international relations theories at the time were, indeed, incorrect.

indeed, incorrect. Then, we removed the German leadership and rThen, we removed the German leadership and replaced it with a more benigneplaced it with a more benign entity

entity. . Next, we motivated the masses of each country (particularly in GermanyNext, we motivated the masses of each country (particularly in Germany) to abandon cult) to abandon cult

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24See footnoteSee footnote 22.. 25

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of the offensive doctrine, in light of propaganda

of the offensive doctrine, in light of propaganda we give them and the we give them and the papers previouslypapers previously  published.

 published. FinallyFinally, we prevented the July crisis from ever happening by assassinating those who, we prevented the July crisis from ever happening by assassinating those who would start it.

would start it.

In a large sense, the First W

In a large sense, the First World World War was over-determined. ar was over-determined. This made the problem of thisThis made the problem of this  paper a difficult one, since many facets of the world at that time had to be removed or altered.  paper a difficult one, since many facets of the world at that time had to be removed or altered.

By addressing each one, and

By addressing each one, and by taking extra precautions (e.g. preventing the by taking extra precautions (e.g. preventing the July crisis), weJuly crisis), we were able to prevent the First World War.

Figure

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