LABOR CASE DIGESTS
Labor Standards and Social Legislation
Arellano University School of Law
5:30-8:30 pm, Thursday
Dean Porfirio DG. Panganiban, Jr.
LIST OF CASES
Article 1-6: Labor in General
1. Maternity Children’s Hospital vs. Secretary of Labor 2. Calalang vs. Williams
3. People vs. Vera Reyes 4. People vs. Pomar
5. Phil. Association of Service Exporters Inc vs. Drilon 6. Cerezo vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co
7. Abella vs. NLRC
8. Euro-Linea, Phils. Inc, vs. NLRC 9. Manila Electric Company vs. NLRC
10. Sosito vs. Aguinaldo Development Corporation 11. Colgate Palmolive Philippines vs. Ople
12. Mendoza vs. Rural Bank of Lucban 13. Gelmart Industries Phils. Inc. vs. NLRC 14. Lagatic vs. NLRC
15. China Banking Corporation vs. Borromeo
16. Associated Watchmen and Security Union vs. Lanting 17. Pampanga Bus Company vs. Pambusco Employees 18. Gregorio Araneta Employees vs. Roldan
19. Phil. Steel Worker’s Union vs. CIR 20.Tiong King vs. CIR
21. Roldan vs. Cebu Portland Cament. Co Article 5: Rules and Regulations
22. Rizal Empire Insurance Group vs. NLRC
23. Philippine Association of Service Exporters vs. Drilon 24.CBTC Employers Union vs. Clave
Article 6: Applicability
25. National Housing Corporation vs. Juco 26. National Service Corp vs. NLRC
27. Republic vs. CA
28. Luzon Development Bank vs . Association of Luzon Development Bank
et.al.
29.Social Security System Employees Association vs. CA Article 7-11: Emancipation of Tenants
30. Association of Small Landowners of the Philippines vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform
31. Acuna vs. Arroyo 32. Pabico vs. Juico
33. Maanay vs. Juico 34. Alita vs. CA 35. Gonzales vs. CA
36. Luz farms vs. Secretary of Agrarian Report
Article 13: Recruitment and Placement 37. People vs. Panis
38. People vs. Goce
39. Darvin vs. CA and People of the Philippines Article 19-24: Overseas Employment
40. Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA 41. Abdu Basar and Kathleen Saco
42. PHILSA International Placement vs. Secretary of Labor 43. Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corp. vs. NLRC
44. Millares and Lagda vs. NLRC
45. Tierra International Corporation vs. NLRC 46. Dilan vs. POEA Administrator
47. Vinta Maritime Co. vs. NLRC and Basconcillo 48. Marsaman Manning Agency vs. NLRC
49. Asian Center for Career and Employment Services vs. NLRC and Ibno
Mediales
50. Athena International Manpower services Inc. vs. Villanos 51. Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA
52. Inter Orient Maritime Enterprise Inc. vs. NLRC
53. Norse Management Corporation vs. National Seamen Board 54. NFD International Manning Agents vs. NLRC, et al.
Article 20: National Seamen Board
55. Phil.International Shipping Corporation vs. NLRC 56. Mc Kenzie vs. Cul
57. Virjen Shipping and Marine Services vs. NLRC 58. Suzara vs. Benipayo
59. Chavez vs. Bonto-Perez, Rayala, et al.
Article 25-39: Regulations of Recruitment and Placement Activities 60. Finman General Assurance vs. Inocencio
61. Eastern Assurance and Surety Corp. vs. Secretary of Labor 62.Salazar vs. Achacoso and Marquez
Article 34: Prohibited Practices
63. Soriano vs. offshore Shipping and Marketing corp. 64.Seagull Maritime Corp. vs. Balatongnan
Article 35: Suspension and/or Cancellation of License Authority 65. Catan vs. NLRC
66. Royal Crowne International vs. NLRC 67. Facilities Management Corp. vs. De La Osa Article 38: Illegal Recruitment
68. People of the Philippines vs. Bulu Chowdry 69. People of the Philippines vs. Cabais
70. People of the Philippines vs. Flores 71. People vs. Sagayado
72. People vs. Benzon Ong 73. People vs. Calonzo 74. People vs. Hernandez
75. People vs. F. Hernandez, K. Reichl and Y.G. de Reichl 76. People vs. tan Tiong Meng
77. People vs. Arabia and Tomas 78. People vs. Verano
79. People of the Philippines vs. Espanol 80. People of the Philippines vs. Roxas 81. People of the Philippines vs. Remullo 82.People of the Philippines vs. S. Angeles Article 40: Employment of Non-Resident Aliens
83. Almodiel vs. NLRC, et al. 84. General Miling Corp. vs. Torres 85.Dee C. Chuan and sons vs. CIR Article 57-72: Apprentices
86. Nitto Enterprises vs. NLRC and R. Capili
87. Filamer Christian Institute vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court Article 82-95: Conditions of Employment
88. “Brotherhood” Labor Unity Movement of the Philippines vs. Zamora 89. Tabas, et., al vs. California Manufacturing Co. et al.
90. Sevilla vs. CA
91. Continental Marble Corporation vs. NLRC 92. Encyclopedia Britannica Inc. vs. NLRC
93. Dy Keh Beng vs. International Labor and Marine Union 94. Zanotte Shoes vs. NLRC
95. Air Material wing Savings and Loan association inc. vs. NLRC 96. Hydro Resources Contractors Corp. vs Pagalilauan
97. Insular Assurance Co. vs. NLRC
98. Angelina Francisco vs. NLRC , Kasei Corp. etc 99. Opulencia Ice Plant vs. NLRC
100.Domasig vs. NLRC
101.Equitable Banking Corporation vs. NLRC and R.L. Sadac 102.Zamudio vs. NLRC
103.Paguio vs. NLRC et.al.
105.Feati University vs. Hon. Jose S. Bautista and Feati Faculty Club 106.Citizens League of Free Workers et, al vs. Abbas
107.Villamaria vs. CA and Bustamante
108.Sy et.al vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and J. Sahot 109.Makati Haberdashery , Inc, vs., NLRC
110.Cauddanetaan Piece Workers Union vs. Undersecretary Bienvenido
Laguesma
111. Ruga et.al. vs. NLRC
112.A. Maraguinot and P.Enero vs. NLRC and Viva Films 113.Orlando Farm Growers vs. NLRC
Article 82: Excluded Employees
114.National Sugar Refineries Corp. vs. NLRC 115.Penaranda vs. Banganga Plywood Corp et.al. 116.Auto Bus Transport System Inc . vs. Bautista 117.Union of Filipino Employees vs. Vivar
118.San Miguel Brewery Inc. vs. Domestic Labor Organization 119. Abundio Cadiz vs. Philippine Sinter Corporation
120. Rosales vs. Tan Que
121.Adriano Quintos vs. D.D Transport Co., Inc.,
122. Lara vs. Del Rosario Article 83: Hours of Work
123.Manila Terminal Co. Inc vs. CIR et.al
124.Interphil Laboratories Employees Union FFW, et al vs. Interphil
Laboratories
Article 84: Hours Worked
125.Pan American World Airways System vs. Pan American Employees
Association
126. Jose Gayona vs. Good Earth Emporium and Supermarket
127.University of Pangasinan Faculty Union vs. University of Pangasinan 128.Luzon Stevedoring Co. Inc. vs. Luzon Marine Department Union 129.Cagampan et. al vs.NLRC
130.National Development Company vs. CIR 131.FSime Darby Pilipinas Inc vs. NLRC
132.Mercury Drug Co Inc vs. Nardo Dayao et.al 133.National Shipyards and Steele Corporation vs. 134.Bisig ng Manggagawa ng Philippine Refining Co. Inc 135. PNB vs. PNB Employees Assn
136. Pamapanga Sugar Development Co. vs. CIR Article 87-88: Offset Overtime
137.NWSA vs. NWSA Consolidated Unions Article 91-93: Rest Days
139.Sto. Domingo vs. Phil. Rock Products Article 94: Holiday and Holiday Pays
140.Jose Rizal College vs. NLRC and NATOW 141.San Miguel Corp vs. CA et. al
142.Insular Bank of Asia and American Employees Union vs. Hon. Amado
G. Inciong
143.The Chartered Bank Employees Association vs. Hon. Blas Ople 144.Obango vs. NLRC and Antique Electric Cooperative Inc.
145.Union of Filipro Employees vs.Benigno Vivar Jr NLRC and Nestle Phils
Inc
146.Wellington Investment and Manufacturing Corporation vs.Cresenciano
B.Trajano
147.Jose Rizal College vs. NLRC
148.Baltazar vs. San Miguel Brewery Inc
149.Davao Integrated Port Stevedoring Services vs. Abarquez 150. Kwok vs. Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corp Article 97: Wages and Salary
151.Songco et. al vs.NLRC 152.Ruga et. al vs.NLRC
153.State Marine Corporation and Royal Line vs. Cebu Seamens
Association Inc
154.Philippine Marine Corporation and Royal Line vs. Cebu Seamen’s
Association
155.International School Alliance of Educators vs. Hon. Quimbinsing Article 99-101: Minimum Wage
156.Atok Big Wedge Mining Co. Inc vs. Atok Big Wedge Mutual Benefit
Association
157.De Racho vs. Municipality of Iligan
158.Planas Commercial vs. NLRC, A. Ofialda et.al Article 100: Elimination or Diminution of Benefits
159.Davao Integrated Ports Stevedoring Services vs. Abarquez
160.Cebu Autobus Company vs.United Cebu Autobus Employees Assn 161.Nestle Philippines vs. NLRC
162.R. Tiangco and V. Tiangco vs. Hon. Vicente Leogardo, Jr. 163.Globe Mackay Cable vs. NLRC
164.Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Topform Manufacturing vs. NLRC 165.Pag-asa Steel Works vs.CA, et.al
166.Lexal Laboratories vs. Court of Industrial Relations et.al 167.National Sugar Refineries Corp. vs. NLRC
168.American Wire and Cable Daily Rated Employees Union vs .American
Wire and Cable Co and the Court of Appeals
169.Traders Royal Bank vs. NLRC
170.National Federation of Sugar Workers vs. Ovejera 171.Universal Corn Products vs. NLRC
172.Philippine Airlines vs.NLRC and Airline Pilots Assn. of the Philippines 173.San Miguel Corporation vs. Inciong
174.Philippine Duplicators Inc vs. NLRC 175.Isalama Machine Works vs. NLRC et. al
176. Alliance of Government Workers et. al vs. Minister of Labor and Employment
Article 101: Payment by Results 177.Tan vs. Lagrama
178.Lambo vs. NLRC
179.Makati Haberdashery vs. NLRC
180. Labor Congress of the Philippines vs. NLRC and Empire Food Products
Article 102: Payment of Wages
181.Jimenez et. al. vs. NLRC and Juanatas Article 106: Labor-Only Contracting
182.Neri vs. NLRC, Far East Bank and Trust Co 183.Manila Water Co. vs. Pena
184.San Miguel Corp vs. Aballa
185. Philippine Bank of Communication vs. NLRC 186.Tabas et. al. vs. California Manufacturing Company 187.Mafinco Trading Corporation vs. Ople, NLRC et.al. 188.Insular Life Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. NLRC
189.Rhone-Poulenc Agrochemicals Philippines, Inc vs. NLRC 190. Escario et. al. vs. NLRC
Article 119: Prohibition Regarding Wages
191.Radio Communication of the Philippines Inc. vs. Secretary of Labor 192.Apodaca vs. NLRC
193. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Compnany Employee vs. NLRC 194.National Federation of Labor vs. NLRC
195.Manila Mandarin Employees Union vs. NLRC
Article 120-127: Wage Studies, Wage Agreements and Wage Determination
196.Cagayan Sugar Milling Co. vs. Secretary of Labor et. al. 197. ECOP vs. NWPC
Administration and Enforcement 198.Meycauayan College vs. Drilon
199.St. Joseph College vs. St. Joseph College Worker’s Association 200. COCOFED et.al vs. Hon. Cresenciano B. Trajano et.al. 201. Cebu Oxgygen and Acetelyn vs. Drilon
202. Odin Security Agency vs. Hon. Dionisio Dela Serna et.al 203. Urbanes etc. vs. Hon. Security of Labor
204. Zialcita vs. PAL
205. Gualberto vs. Marinduques Industrial Mining Corporation Article 156-161: Health, Safety and Social Welfare Benefits
206. Philippine Global Communication Inc 207.
Article 166-184: Employees’ Compensation and State Insurance fund 208. Jose B. Sarmiento vs. Employees Compensation Commission et. al. 209. Raro vs. Employees Compensation Commission
210.Belarmino vs. Employees Compensation Commission 211.Hinoguin vs. Employees Compensation Commission 212.GSIS vs. CA AND F. Alegre
213. Velariano vs. ECC and GSIS
214.Iloilo Dock and Engineering Corporation vs. WCC et.al 215.Alano vs.ECG
216. Lazo vs.Employees Compensation Commission 217. Menez vs. ECC
218. Mabuhay Shipping Service vs. nlrc
219. Interiorent Maritime Enterprises vs. Pineda 220. NAESS Shipping Philippines vs. NLRC 221. YSMAEL Maritime Corporation vs. Avelino Article 191-193: Disability Benefits
222. Vicente vs. ECC 223. Abaya vs. ECC 224. Ornilno vs. ECC 225. Vicente vs. ECC 226. GSIS vs. CA Article 194 : Death Benefits
227. Canonizado vs. Almeda Lopez 228. Manzano vs ECC
Article 195-205:
229. ECC vs. Sanico
230. Suanes vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission Article 280: Regular and Casual Employment
231.Philippine Federation of Credit Cooperatives, Inc v.NLRC 232.De Leon v. NLRC
233.Violeta v. NLRC 234.Romares v. NLRC
235.Phil Federation of Credit Cooperatives, Inc v. NLRC 236.Phil. Fruit and Vegetable Industries, Inc v.NLRC 237.De Leon v. NLRC
238.E. Ganzon, Inc v. NLRC
239.Hacienda Fatima v. National Federation of Sugarcane Workers 240. Magante v. NLRC
242.Ecal v. NLRC
243.Kimberly etc. v. Drilon 244.Mercado v. NLRC
245.Datu and Co, Inc. v. NLRC
246.International Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. NLRC 247. Millares v. NLRC
Article 281: Probationary Employment 248.Labor Congress of the Phil. v. NLRC 249.Highway Copra Trades v.NLRC 250.San Miguel Corp v. NLRC
251.International Catholic Migration Commission v. NLRC 252.De la Cruz, Jr v.NLRC
253.Grand Motors Corp. v. MOLE
254.International Catholic Migration Commission v. NLRC 255.Phil. Federation of Credit Cooperatives , Inc v. NLRC 256.Escorpizo v.University of Baguio
257.Cebu Marine Beach Resort v. NLRC 258.Magcalas v. NLRC
259.Lao Construction v. NLRC 260. ALU-TUCP v.NLRC 261.Kiamco v. NLRC
262.Phil. Jai-Alai and Amusement Corp v. Clave 263.Sandoval Shipyards, Inc v. NLRC
264.Magante v. NLRC
265.Tucor Industries, Inc v. NLRC 266.Rada v. NLRC
267.Mamansag v. NLRC 268.Uy v. NLRC
269.Phil. Airlines Inc, v. NLRC 270.Villa v. NLRC
271.Phil. Fruits and Vegetables Industries, Inc. v. NLRC 272.Imbuido v. NLRC
273.Maraguinot v. NLRC
274.A.M. Oreta and Co.,Inc v. NLRC 275.Southern Cotabato v.NLRC 276.Purefoods Corp. v. NLRC 277.Aguilar Corp. v. NLRC
278.Tabas v. California Manufacturing Co. Inc. 279.Phil Geothermal Inc v. NLRC
280. Mercado v. NLRC
281.International Pharmaceutical, Inc. v .NLRC 282.Cebu Engineering and Development Co. v. NLRC 283.Highway Copra Traders v. NLRC
284.Brent School v. Zamora 285.Cielo v. NLRC
287.St. Theresa’s School v. NLRC 288. Servidad v. NLRC
289.Purefoods Corp. v. NLRC 290. Phil. Tabacco etc v. NLRC 291.San Miguel Corp v. NLRC 292.Grand Motors Corp v. MOLE
293.Orient Express Placement Philippines v. NLRC
294.International Catholic Migration Commission v. NLRC 295.Bernardo v. NLRC
296.Escorpizo v. University of Baguio 297.A’ Prime Security Services Inc. v. NLRC 298.De La Cruz, Jr. v. NLRC
299.Mariwasa Manufacturing Inc. v. Leogardo
300. Phil. Federation of Credit Corporation, etc. v. NLRC 301.Escorpizo v. University of Baguio
302. St. Michael Academy v. NLRC Article 282: Termination by Employer
303.International Catholic Migration Commission vs. NLRC 304. Orient Express Placement Philippines vs. NLRC 305.Manila Trading and Supply Co, Inc. v. Zulueta 306. Makati Haberdashery, Inc. v. NLRC
307.Ocean East Agency Corp v. NLRC 308. Arboleda v. NLRC
309. Samson v. NLRC 310.PNCC v. NLRC
311.Golden Thread Knitting Industrial Inc. v. NLRC 312.Austria v. NLRC
313.Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corp v. NLRC 314.Naguit, Jr. v. NLRC
315.Cebu Filveneer Corp v. NLRC 316.Westin Phil. Plaza Hotel v. NLRC
317.Tierra International Production Corp. v. NLRC 318.Legahi v. NLRC
319.Vitarich Corp v. NLRC 320.Rosario v. Victory Rice Mill 321.PNOC-EDC v. Abella
322.National Sugar refineries Corp. v. NLRC 323.Judy Philippines Inc. v. NLRC
324.PLDT v. NLRC
325.Tres Reyes v. Maxim’s Tea House
326.Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corp. v. NLRC 327.Cebu Filveneer Corp v. NLRC
328.Citibank N.A. v. Gatchalian 329.RDS Trucking v. NLRC
330.Paguio Transport Corp v. NLRC 331.Jardine Davies, Inc. v NLRC
332.Panday v. NLRC
333.Farrol v. Court of Appeals 334.Sulpicio Lines, Inc. v.Gulde 335.Santos v. San Miguel Corp.
336.Greenhills Products, Inc. v. NLRC 337.Vitarich v. NLRC
338.Cathedral School of Technology v. NLRC 339.International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC 340. Oania v. NLRC
341.Lim v.NLRC 342.Escobin v.NLRC
343.Metro Transit Corp. Inc. v. NLRC 344.Leonardo v.NLRC and Fuerte v. Aquino 345.Hacienda Dapdap v. NLRC
346.Premiere Development Bank v. NLRC 347.Phil. Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC
348.CMP Federal Security Agency, Inc. v. NLRC 349.Mendoza vs. NLRC
350.Batongbacal v. Associated Bank 351.Manila Electric Co. Inc. v. NLRC 352.Brent School v. Zamora
353.Romares v. NLRC 354.Santos v. NLRC 355.Chua-Qua v. Clave 356.Aparente Sr. v. NLRC 357.Lacorte v. Inciong 358.Starlite etc. v. NLRC 359.Quiambao v. NLRC
360. San Miguel Corp v. NLRC 361.Westin Phil. Plaza Hotel v. NLRC 362.Phil. Wireless, Inc v. NLRC
363.Globe- Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. v. NLRC 364.Phil. Airlines v. NLRC
365.Kwikway Engineering Works v. NLRC 366.Wiltshire File Co., Inc. v. NLRC
367.Almodiel v. NLRC 368.Escareal v. NLRC
369.AG & P United Rank and File Assn v. NLRC 370.Caffco International Ltd v. Office MOLE 371.Sebuguero v. NLRC
372.Wiltshire File Co.., Inc. v. NLRC
373.Tierra International Construction Corp. v.NLRC 374.Guerrero v. NLRC
375.Tierra International Construction Corp. v. NLRC 376.Almodiel v. NLRC
377.Panlilio v. NLRC
379.Revidad v. NLRC 380. Balbalec v. NLRC
381.San Miguel Jeepney Service v. NLRC
382.Lopez Sugar Corporation v. Federation of Free Workers 383.Revidad v. NLRC
384.Catatista v. NLRC
385.Central Azucarera de la Carlota v. NLRC 386.Somerville Stainless Steel Corp. v. NLRC
387. Bago-Medellin Sugar Can Planters Assn., Inc. v. NLRC Article 287: Retirement From Service
388. Habana v. NLRC
389.Azcor Manufacturing, Inc. v. NLRC
390. Metro Transit Organization, Inc. v. NLRC 391.Reyes v. CA
392.Wilt Hahn Enterprises v. Maghuyop
393.Cheniver Deco Print Technics Corporation v. NLRC 394.Admiral Realty Co., Inc. v. NLRC
395.Phil. Wireless Inc. v. NLRC 396.Pascua v. NLRC
397.Intertrod Maritime Inc. v. NLRC 398.Manila Broadcasting Co. v. NLRC 399. Valdez v. NLRC
MATERNITY CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL VS. SECRETARY OF LABOR G.R. NO. 78909
JUNE 30 1984 Facts:
Petitioner is a semi-government hospital, managed by the Board of Directors of the Cagayan de Oro Women's Club and Puericulture Center, headed by Mrs. Antera Dorado, as holdover President. The hospital derives its finances from the club itself as well as from paying patients, averaging 130 per month. It is also partly subsidized by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the Cagayan De Oro City government. Petitioner has forty-one (41) employees. Aside from salary and living allowances, the employees are given food, but the amount spent therefor, is deducted from their respective salaries (pp. 77-78, Rollo).
On May 23, 1986, ten (10) employees of the petitioner employed in different capacities/positions filed a complaint with the Office of the Regional Director of Labor and Employment, Region X, for underpayment of their salaries and ECOLAS, which was docketed as ROX Case No. CW-71-86.
The Regional Director issued and order based on the reports of the Labor
Standard and Welfare Officers, directing payment of P723, 888.58 representing underpayment of wages and ECOLAs to all the petitioner’s employees. Petitioner appealed to the Minister of Labor and Employment which modified the decision as to the period for the payment ECOLAs only. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner and was denied by the Secretary of Labor.
Issue:
Whether or not that the salaries of the petitioner including the ECOLAS included on the labor standards prescribed by law.
Held:
Labor standards refer to the minimum requirements prescribed by existing laws, rules, and regulations relating to wages, hours of work, cost of living allowance and other monetary and welfare benefits, including occupational, safety, and health standards (Section 7, Rule I, Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional Office, dated September 16, 1987).
CALALANG V. WILLIAMS 70 PHIL 726, GR NO. 47800 DECEMBER 2, 1940
FACTS:
The National Traffic Commission resolved that animal-drawn vehicles be
prohibited from passing along some major streets such a Rizal Ave. in Manila for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Secretary of Public Works approved the resolution on August 10,1940. The
Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
ISSUE:
Does the rule infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice? What is Social Justice?
HELD:
No. The regulation aims to promote safe transit and avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. Persons and
property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated.
Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the
maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of
measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of Salus Populi est Suprema Lex.(Justice Laurel)
PEOPLE VS. VERA REYES G..R. NO. L-45748
APRIL 5, 1939 IMPERIAL, J. Facts:
Defendant was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila by the assistant city fiscal with a violation of Act No. 2549, as amended by Acts Nos. 3085 and 3958. The information alleged that from September 9 to October 28, 1936, the accused, in his capacity as president and general manager of the Consolidated Mines, having engaged the services of Severa Velasco de Vera as stenographer, at an agreed salary of P35 a month willfully and illegally refused to pay the salary of said stenographer corresponding to the above-mentioned period of time, which was long due and payable, in spite of her repeated demands.
After the hearing, the court sustained the demurrer, declaring unconstitutional the last part of section 1 of Act No. 2549 as last amended by Act No. 3958, which considers as an offense the facts alleged in the information, for the reason that it violates the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt, and
dismissed the case, with costs de oficio. The fiscal appealed from said order. In the appeal, the Solicitor-General contends that the court erred in declaring Act No. 3958 unconstitutional, and in dismissing the cause. The last part of section 1 of Act No. 2549, as last amended by section 1 of Act No. 3958 considers as illegal the refusal of an employer to pay, when he can do so, the salaries of his
employees or laborers on the fifteenth or last day of every month or on Saturday of every week, with only two days extension, and the nonpayment of the salary within the periods specified is considered as a violation of the law. The same Act exempts from criminal responsibility the employer who, having failed to pay the salary, should prove satisfactorily that it was impossible to make such payment. Issue:
Whether the last part of section 1 of Act No. 2549 as last amended by Act No. 3958 is constitutional and valid.
Held:
The court held that this provision is null because it violates the provision of section 1 (12), Article III, of the Constitution, which provides that no person shall be imprisoned for debt. We do not believe that this constitutional provision has been correctly applied in this case. A close perusal of the last part of section 1 of Act No. 2549, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 3958, will show that its
language refers only to the employer who, being able to make payment, shall abstain or refuse to do so, without justification and to the prejudice of the laborer or employee. An employer so circumstanced is not unlike a person who defrauds another, by refusing to pay his just debt. In both cases the deceit or fraud is the essential element constituting the offense. The first case is a violation of Act No. 3958, and the second is estafa punished by the Revised Penal Code. In either case the offender cannot certainly invoke the constitutional prohibition against
imprisonment for debt.
The Court of Appeal held that the last part of section 1 of Act No. 2549, as last amended by section 1 of Act No. 3958, is valid, and reversed the appealed order with instructions to the lower court to proceed with the trial of the criminal case until it is terminated, without special pronouncement as to costs in this instance. PEOPLE VS POMAR
G.R. NO. L-22008 NOVEMBER 3, 1924 JOHNSON, J.
FACTS
Julio Pomar, manager and person-in-charge of a tobacco factory, employed Macaria Fajardo as cigar-maker. She was granted vacation leave beginning July 16, 1923 by reason of pregnancy. On October 26, 1923, a case was filed against defendant Pomar for failing to pay Fajardo her regular wages corresponding to 30 days before and 30 days after her delivery and confinement, in accordance with Act 3071. Defendant Pomar contended that his act does not constitute any offense because Act No. 3071 unconstitutional.
ISSUE
WON Act 3071 is valid and constitutional HELD
No. Act 3071 is unconstitutional. While it is contended that the Act is within the police power of the State, it cannot be exercised in contravention of the
constitution.
The right to enter into lawful contracts constitutes one of the liberties of the people of the State. If that right be struck down or arbitrarily interfered with, there is substantial imprisonment of the people under the Constitution. The right to enter into lawful contracts is as essential to the laborer as it is to the capitalist. A citizen cannot be compelled to give employment to another citizen nor can anyone be employed against his will. Liberty includes the right to labor but also to refuse to labor and consequently the right to labor or for labor and to
terminate such contracts and to refuse to make such contracts.
PHIL. ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS INC VS DRILON G.R. NO. 81958
JUNE 30, 1988 SARMIENTO, J. FACTS:
The Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for
"discrimination against males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character. In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law."
Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was passed in the absence of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in violation of the Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI members face should the Order be further enforced.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Department Order No. 1 in nature of the police power is valid under the Constitution?
HELD:
As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed validity. In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands. The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue
discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.
The Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by physical and personal abuse. As precisely the caretaker of
Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts.
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an identical predicament. Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as classifications are concerned, this Court is content that distinctions are borne by the evidence. Discrimination in this case is justified.
There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas workers" this Court has no quarrel that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good and welfare.
The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending review of the administrative and legal measures, in the
Philippines and in the host countries . . ."), meaning to say that should the
authorities arrive at a means impressed with a greater degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted.
It is incorrect to say that Department Order No. 1 prescribes a total ban on overseas deployment. From scattered provisions of the Order, it is evident that such a total ban has not been contemplated.
The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided by law. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of
legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rule-making powers in the enforcement whereof.
The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the Government. Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction, where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as a controlling economic way of life.
This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on the business of recruitment. The concern of the Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of Government regulation. The interest of the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens. The Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent. We do not find the impugned Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief prayed for.
ABELLA VS NLRC G.R. NO. 71813 JULY 20, 1987 PARAS, J. FACTS:
On June 27, 1960 the petioner, Rosalina Perez Abella leased a farm land known as Hacienda Danao-Ramona, for a period of ten (10) years. She opted to extend the leased contract for another ten(10) years. During the existence of the lease, she employed the private respondents Ricardo Dionele, Sr.,and Romeo Quitco. Upon the expiration of her leasehold rights, petitioner dismissed private
respondents and turned over the hacienda to the owners thereof on October 5, 1981, who continued the management, cultivation and operation of the farm. On November 20, 1981, private respondents filed a complaint against the
petitioner at the Ministry of Labor and Employment, Bacolod City District Office, for overtime pay, illegal dismissal and reinstatement with backwages. After the parties had presented their respective evidence, Labor Arbiter Manuel M. Lucas, Jr., in a Decision dated July 16, 1982, ruled that the dismissal is warranted by the cessation of business, but granted the private respondents separation pay.
Petitioner appealed, the National Labor Relations Commission, in a Resolution affirmed the decision and dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied. Hence, the present
petition. ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents are entitled to separation pay? HELD:
The petition is devoid of merit. Article 284 of the Labor Code as amended by BP 130 is the law applicable in this case. The purpose of Article 284 as amended is
obvious-the protection of the workers whose employment is terminated because of the closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. Without said law, employees like private respondents in the case at bar will lose the benefits to which they are entitled
for the thirty three years of service in the case of Dionele and fourteen years in the case of Quitco. Although they were absorbed by the new management of the hacienda, in the absence of any showing that the latter has assumed the
responsibilities of the former employer, they will be considered as new employees and the years of service behind them would amount to nothing.
It is well-settled that in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Codeand its implementing regulations, the workingman's welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration.
The instant petition is hereby dismissed and Decision of the Labor Arbiter and the resolution of the ministry of labor and employment are hereby affirmed. EURO-LINEA PHIL, INC. VS. NLRC
G.R. NO. 78782 DECEMBER 1 , 1987 PARAS, J.
Laborer’s Welfare: Liberal Approach Facts:
Petitioner Euro-Linea Phil, Inc hired private respondent Pastoral as shipping expediter on a probationary basis for a period of six months. Prior to hiring by petitioner, Pastoral had been employed by Fitscher Manufacturing Corporation also as shipping expediter. On 4 February 1984, Pastoral received a
memorandum terminating his probationary employment in view of his failure “to meet the performance standards set by the company”. Pastoral filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner. On 19 July 1985, the Labor Arbiter found petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal. Petitioner appealed the decision to the NLRC on 5 August 1985 but the appeal was dismissed. Hence the petition for review seeking to reverse and set aside the resolution of public respondent NLRC, affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter, which ordered the reinstatement of complainant with six months backwages.
Issue:
Whether or not the National Labor Relations Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in ruling against the dismissal of the respondent, a temporary or probationary employee, by his employer.
Although a probationary or temporary employee has a limited tenure, he still enjoys the constitutional protection of security of tenure.
Furthermore, what makes the dismissal highly suspicious is the fact that while petitioner claims that respondent was inefficient, it retained his services until the last remaining two weeks of the six months probationary employment. No less important is the fact that private respondent had been a shipping expediter for more than one and a half years before he was absorbed by petitioner. It therefore appears that the dismissal in question is without sufficient justification.
It must be emphasized that the prerogative of management to dismiss or lay-off an employee must be done without abuse of discretion, for what is at stake is not only petitioner's position but also his means of livelihood. The right of an
employer to freely select or discharge his employees is subject to regulation by the State, basically in the exercise of its paramount police power.
Petition dismissed for lack of merit and decision by the NLRC is affirmed. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY VS. NLRC
G.R. NO. 78763 JULY 12,1989 MEDIALDEA, J.
FACTS: Apolinario Signo was employed in Meralco as supervisor-leadman since Jan 1963. In 1981, he supervised the installation of electricity in de Lara’s house in Antipolo. De Lara’s house was not yet within the required 30-meter distance from the Meralco facility hence he is not yet within the service scope of Meralco. As a workaround, Signo had it be declared that a certain sarisari store nearer the facility be declared as de Lara’s so as to facilitate the installation. Evertything would have been smooth thereafter but due to fault of the Power Sales Division of Meralco, de Lara was not billed for a year. Investigation was conducted and Meralco found out the irregularity in Signo’s work on de Lara’s electricity installation. Signo was dismissed on May 18, 1983. Signo filed a case for illegal dismissal and for backwages. The Lanor Arbiter ruled that though there is a breach of trust in the actuations of Signo dismissal is a harsh penalty as Signo has been employed for more than 20 years by Meralco and has been commended twice before for honesty. The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter. Meralco appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been due process in the dismissal of Signo. HELD: The SC sustained the decision of the NLRC. Well-established is the principle that findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but even finality. Judicial review by this Court on labor cases does not go so far as to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the
proper labor officer or office based his or its determination but is limited to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Notwithstanding the existence of a valid cause for dismissal, such as breach of trust by an employee, nevertheless, dismissal should not be imposed, as it is too severe a penalty if the latter has been employed for a considerable length of time in the service of his employer.
Reinstatement of respondent Signo is proper in the instant case, but without the award of backwages, considering the good faith of the employer in dismissing the respondent.
SOSITO VS. AGUINALDO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION G.R. NO. L-48926
DECEMBER 14, 1987 CRUZ, J.
Facts:
Petitioner Manuel Sosito was employed in 1964 by the private respondent, a logging company, and was in charge of logging importation, with a monthly salary of P675.00, when he went on indefinite leave with the consent of the company on January 16, 1976. On July 20, 1976, the private respondent, through its president, announced a retrenchment program and offered separation pay to employees in the active service as of June 30, 1976, who would tender their resignations not later than July 31, 1976. The petitioner decided to accept this offer and so submitted his resignation on July 29, 1976, "to avail himself of the gratuity benefits" promised. However, his resignation was not acted upon and he was never given the separation pay he expected. The petitioner complained to the Department of Labor, where he was sustained by the labor arbiter. The company was ordered to pay Sosito the sum of P 4,387.50, representing his salary for six and a half months. On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission, this decision was reversed and it was held that the petitioner was not covered by the retrenchment program.
Issue: whether or not the petitioner is entitled to separation pay under the retrenchment program of the private respondent.
Held: The petitioner is not one of those entitled for separation pay under the retrenchment program. It is clear from the memorandum that the offer of separation pay was extended only to those who were in the active service of the company as of June 30, 1976. It is equally clear that the petitioner was not eligible for the promised gratuity as he was not actually working with the company as of the said date. Being on indefinite leave, he was not in the active service of the private respondent although, if one were to be technical, he was still in its employ. Even so, during the period of indefinite leave, he was not entitled to receive any salary or to enjoy any other benefits available to those in the active service.
COLGATE PALMOLIVE PHILIPPINES VS. OPLE G.R. NO. 73681
JUNE 30, 1988 PARAS, J. Facts:
On March 1, 1985, the respondent Union filed a Notice of Strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) on ground of unfair labor practice consisting of alleged refusal to bargain, dismissal of union officers/members; and coercing employees to retract their membership with the union and restraining non-union members from joining the union. MOLE declared that the union is not authorized.Union reiterated the issue in its Notice to Strike, alleging that it was duly registered with the Bureau of Labor Relations under Registry No. 10312-LC with a total membership of 87 regular salesmen (nationwide) out of 117 regular salesmen presently employed by the company as of November 30, 1985 and that since the registration of the Union up to the present, more than 2/3 of the total salesmen employed are already members of the Union, leaving no doubt that the true sentiment of the salesmen was to form and organize the Colgate-Palmolive Salesmen Union. The Minister directly certified the respondent Union as the collective bargaining agent for the sales force in petitioner company and ordered the reinstatement of the three salesmen to the company on the ground that the employees were first offenders.
Issue:
Whether the Minister of Labor correctly certified the respondent as the petitioner’s union.
Held: No.
Petitioner concedes that respondent Minister has the power to decide a labor dispute in a case assumed by him under Art. 264 (g) of the Labor Code but this power was exceeded when he certified respondent Union as the exclusive bargaining agent of the company's salesmen since this is not a representation proceeding as described under the Labor Code. Moreover the Union did not pray for certification but merely for a finding of unfair labor practice imputed to petitioner-company.
The procedure for a representation case is outlined in Arts. 257-260 of the Labor Code, in relation to the provisions on cancellation of a Union registration under Arts.239-240 thereof, the main purpose of which is to aid in ascertaining
majority representation. Contrary to the respondent Minister's observation, the holding of a certification election at the proper time is not necessarily a mere formality as there was a compelling legal reason not to directly and unilaterally
certify a union whose legitimacy is precisely the object of litigation in a pending cancellation case filed by certain "concerned salesmen," who also claim majority status. Even in a case where a union has filed a petition for certification elections, the mere fact that no opposition is made does not warrant a direct certification. More so as in the case at bar, when the records of the suit show that the required proof was not presented in an appropriate proceeding and that the basis of the direct certification was the Union's mere allegation in its position paper that it has 87 out of 117 regular salesmen. In other words, respondent Minister merely relied on the self-serving assertion of the respondent Union that it enjoyed the support of the majority of the salesmen, without subjecting such assertion to the test of competing claims.
The order of the respondent Minister to reinstate the employees despite a clear finding of guilt on their part is not in conformity with law. Reinstatement is simply incompatible with a finding of guilt. Where the totality of the evidence was sufficient to warrant the dismissal of the employees the law warrants their
dismissal without making any distinction between a first offender and a habitual delinquent. Under the law, respondent Minister is duly mandated to equally protect and respect not only the labor or workers' side but also the management and/or employers' side. The law, in protecting the rights of the laborer,
authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. To order the reinstatement of the erring would in effect encourage unequal protection of the laws as a managerial employee of petitioner company involved in the same incident was already dismissed and was not ordered to be reinstated. MENDOZA VS. RURAL BANK OF LUCBAN
G.R. NO. 155421 JULY 7, 2004 PANGANIBAN, J. Facts:
On April 25, 1999, the Board of Directors of the Rural Bank of Lucban, Inc., issued Board Resolution Nos. 99-52 and 99-53, “that in line with the policy of the bank to familiarize bank employees with the various phases of bank operations and further strengthen the existing internal control system[,] all officers and employees are subject to reshuffle of assignments. Moreover, this resolution does not preclude the transfer of assignment of bank officers and employees from the branch office to the head office and vice-versa." Petitioner filed a Complaint before Arbitration Branch No. IV of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The Complaint -- for illegal dismissal, underpayment, separation pay and damages. Petitioner argues that he was compelled to file an action for
constructive dismissal, because he had been demoted from appraiser to clerk and not given any work to do, while his table had been placed near the toilet and eventually removed.
designed primarily to force him to resign.After the NLRC denied his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner brought before the CA a Petition for Certiorari
assailing the foregoing Resolution. The Court of appeals Find that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the NLRC.
Hence, this Petition. Issue:
Whether the petitioner was constructively dismissed from his employment? Held:
The Petition has no merit.
Constructive dismissal is defined as an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or a diminution of pay; or when a clear
discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee. Jurisprudence recognizes the exercise of management
prerogatives. For this reason, courts often decline to interfere in legitimate business decisions of employers. Indeed, labor laws discourage interference in employers' judgments concerning the conduct of their business. The law must protect not only the welfare of employees, but also the right of employers. The law protects both the welfare of employees and the prerogatives of
management. Courts will not interfere with business judgments of employers, provided they do not violate the law, collective bargaining agreements, and general principles of fair play and justice. The transfer of personnel from one area of operation to another is inherently a managerial prerogative that shall be
upheld if exercised in good faith -- for the purpose of advancing business interests, not of defeating or circumventing the rights of employees. GELMART INDUSTRIES PHILS., INC. VS. NLRC
G.R. NO. 85668 AUGUST 10, 1989 GANCAYCO, J. Facts:
Private respondent Felix Francis started working as an auto-mechanic for petitioner Gelmart Industries Phils., Inc. (hereinafter referred to as GELMART) sometime in 1971 As such, his work consisted of the repair of engines and under chassis, as well as trouble shooting and overhauling of company vehicles. He is likewise entrusted with some tools and spare parts in furtherance of the work assigned to him.
On April 11, 1987, private respondent was caught by the security guards taking out of GELMART's premises one (1) plastic container filled with about 16 ounces
of "used' motor oil, without the necessary gate pass to cover the same as required under GELMART's rules and regulations. By reason thereof, petitioner, on April 13, 1987, was placed under preventive suspension pending investigation for violation of company rules and regulations. Under the said rules, theft and/or pilferage of company property merits an outright termination from employment. After due investigation, or on May 20, 1987, private respondent was found guilty of theft of company property. As a consequence, his services were severed.
Thereafter, private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. In a decision dated February 26, 1988, Labor Arbiter Ceferina J. Diosana ruled that private respondent was illegally dismissed and, accordingly, ordered the latter's reinstatement with full backwages from April 13, 1987 up to the time of actual reinstatement.
Issue:
Whether or not the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ordering the reinstatement of private respondent to his former position with payment of backwages equivalent to six (6) months.
Held:
Consistent with the policy of the State to bridge the gap between the underprivileged workingmen and the more affluent employers, the NLRC rightfully tilted the balance in favor of the workingmen — and this was done without being blind to the concomitant right of the employer to the protection of his property.
Thus, without being too harsh to the employer, on the one hand, and naively liberal to labor, on the other, the NLRC correctly pointed out that private respondent cannot totally escape liability for what is patently a violation of company rules and regulations.
Considering that private respondent herein has no previous derogatory record in his fifteen (15) years of service with petitioner GELMART the value of the
property pilfered (16 ounces of used motor oil) is very minimal, plus the fact that petitioner failed to reasonably establish that non-dismissal of private respondent would work undue prejudice to the viability of their operation or is patently inimical to the company's interest, it is more in consonance with the policy LAGATIC VS. NLRC
G.R. NO. 121004 JANUARY 28, 1998 ROMERO, J.:
FACTS:
Cityland employed Petitioner, Romeo Lagatic, as a marketing specialist in May 1986. He was tasked with with soliciting sales for the company as well as
accepting call-ins, referrals, and making client calls and cold calls. It was believed by Cityland that cold calls is an effective and cost-efficient method of finding
clients and required all marketing specialist to make the same but requires submissions of daily progress reports on cold calls for assessment and to
determine its results. Petitioner was suspended for 3 days on November 1992, for his failure to submit cold call reports on different days of September and October 1992 despite a written reprimand for infractions of the same committed a year earlier and a warning that if he continues to not comply with the requirement it will result in termination.
Petitioner failed again to submit cold call reports for 5 days of February 1993 despite the aforesaid suspension and warning. He was then verbally reminded to submit the reports and was given an extension up to Feb. 17, 1993. Petitioner still did not comply and instead wrote a note with the words, “TO HELL WITH COLD CALLS! WHO CARES?”, and exhibiting it to his co-employees. He left the note lying on top of his desk where everyone could see it to worsen the matter.
On Feb. 23, 1993, a memorandum was received by the Petitioner requiring him to explain why Cityland should not implement their previous warning for his failure to submit cold call reports, as well as, for the written statement he exhibited. The petitioner replied through a letter that his not complying with the submission of cold call reports must not be deemed as gross insubordination and he denied having knowledge about the damaging statement that was being accused of him. Cityland found the petitioner of guilty of gross insubordination and then served upon him a notice of dismissal on Feb. 26, 1993. The petitioner then felt wronged by the dismissal and filed a complaint against Cityland for illegal dismissal, illegal deduction, underpayment, overtime and rest day pay, damages and attorney’s fees. The labor arbiter dismissed it but it was appealed and affirmed by the NLRC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent NLRC gravely abused its discretion in not finding the petitioner illegally dismissed.
HELD:
The petition lacks merit.
To constitute a valid dismissal from employment, two requisites must be met, namely: (1) the employee must be afforded due process, and (2) the dismissal must be for a valid cause.
Petitioner loses sight of the fact that except as provided for, or limited by, special laws, an employer is free to regulate, according to his discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment. Employers may, thus, make reasonable rules and
regulations for the government of their employees, and when employees, with knowledge of an established rule, enter the service, the rule becomes a part of the contract of employment. It is also generally recognized that company policies and regulations, unless shown to be grossly oppressive or contrary to law, are
Corollarily, an employee may be validly dismissed for violation of a reasonable company rule or regulation adopted for the conduct of the company business. An employer cannot rationally be expected to retain the employment of a person whose x x x lack of regard for his employers rules x x x has so plainly and completely been bared. Petitioners continued infraction of company policy requiring cold call reports, as evidenced by the 28 instances of non-submission of aforesaid reports, justifies his dismissal. He cannot be allowed to arrogate unto himself the privilege of setting company policy on the effectivity of solicitation methods. To do so would be to sanction oppression and the self-destruction of the employer.
More than that, his written statement shows his open defiance and disobedience to lawful rules and regulations of the company. Likewise, said company policy of requiring cold calls and the concomitant reports thereon is clearly reasonable and lawful, sufficiently known to petitioner, and in connection with the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. There is, thus, just cause for his dismissal. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION V. BORROMEO
G.R. NO. 156515 OCTOBER 19, 2004 CALLEJO, SR., J. Facts:
Respondent Mariano Borromeo was Assistant Vice-President of the Branch Banking Group of China Banking Corporation for the Mindanao Area. Without authority from the Executive Committee or Board of Directors of the bank, he approved several DAUD/BP (Drawn Against Uncollected Deposits/Bills Purhcased) accommodations amounting to P2,441,375 in favour of Joel
Maniwan. Such checks, which are not sufficiently funded by cash, are generally not honoured by banks. This came to the knowledge of the bank authorities. A memorandum was issued to the Mariano seeking clarification relative15 to the matter. The respondent accepted full responsibility for committing an error in judgment and abuse of discretion.
Mariano resigned from the Bank and apologized “for all the trouble I have caused because of the Maniwan case.” The respondent, however, vehemently denied benefitting therefrom. His acts having constituted violation of the Bank’s Code of Ethics, the respondent was directed to restitute the amount of P1,507,736.79 representing 90% of the total loss of P1,675,263.10 incurred by the Bank. However, in view of his resignation and considering the years of service in the Bank, the management earmarked only P836,637.08 from the respondent’s total separation benefits or pay. The said amount would be released upon recovery of the sums demanded from Maniwan in a civil case filed against him by the bank with the RTC in Cagayan de Oro City.
The respondent made a demand on the bank for the payment of his separation pay and other benefits, but the bank maintained its position to withhold the sum
of P836,637.08. Thus, Mariano filed with the NLRC a complaint for payment of separation pay, mid-year bonus, profit share and damages against the bank. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favour of the bank. Respondent appealed to the NLRC but it affirmed in toto the findings of the Labor Arbiter. The CA, however,
alleging that respondent was denied his right to due process, set aside the NLRC decision and ordered that the records of the case be remanded to the Labor Arbiter for further hearings on the factual issues involved. The bank filed a motion for reconsidered but denied the same. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the bank has the prerogative/right to impose on the respondent what it considered the appropriate penalty under the circumstances pursuant to its company rules and regulations.
Held:
The petition is meritorious.The bank was left with no other course but to impose the ancillary penalty of restitution. It was certainly within the bank’s prerogative to impose on the respondent what it considered the appropriate penalty under the circumstances pursuant to its company rules and regulations.
The petitioner’s bank business is essentially imbued with public interest and owes great fidelity to the public it deals with. It is expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. As a corollary, and like all other business enterprises, its prerogative to discipline its employees and to impose appropriate penalties on erring workers pursuant to company rules and regulations must be respected. The law, in protecting the rights of labor, authorized neither oppression nor self-destruction of an employer company which itself is possessed of rights that must be entitled to recognition and respect.
Significantly, the respondent is not wholly deprived of his separation benefits. As the Labor Arbiter stressed in his decision, “the separation benefits due the
complainant were merely withheld. Even the petitioner bank itself gives “the assurance that as soon as the bank has satisfied a judgment in the civil case, the earmarked portion of his benefits will be released without delay.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the CA is reversed and set aside. The Resolution of the NLRC is reinstated.
ASSOCIATED WATCHMEN AND SECURITY UNION VS. LANTING G.R. NO. L – 14120
LABRADOR, J. Facts:
Petitioner and its members declared a strike against respondent-company and other shipping firms. Subsequently, through the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), the strikers expressed their willingness to return to work. However, the respondent-company stated that it would re-instate the said strikers if the
petitioner would file a bond of Php 5, 000.00. Petitioner did not comply with said condition, thus, their members were not re-instated by the respondent-company. Eventually, petitioners filed a case against the respondent-company for allegedly committing unfair labor practice. The trial court decided in favor of the
petitioners on the basis that the bond hinders the re-employment of the union members. The CIR, however, reversed the trial court’s decision.
Issue:
Is the respondent company guilty of unfair labor practice when it asked the petitioner to file a bond of Php 5, 000.00 in order for the latter’s members to be re-instated?
Ruling:
No, the Supreme Court finds no merit in the petitioner’s contention that the respondent-company committed unfair labor practice. As embodied in the Labor Code, the employers are vested with certain rights that they may exercise so as to protect their interests and capital.
In the present case, the Court ruled in favor of the respondents due to the following reasons:
The law gives respondent company the right to protect its interest, especially, when in this case, the union members abandoned their posts without notice when they joined the strike. Consequently, the acts of the union members exposed the company to possible dangers such as theft and pilferage.
It was obvious that the bond asked by the respondent company was not
demanded from the petitioner. The agreement between the two parties was plain and simple – re-instatement shall be applied to those agencies who are willing to file the bond.
There is no existing contract between the two parties and that the union members were not direct employees of the respondent company. Said union members were merely casual guards of the said company.
Therefore, the Court affirms the decision of the CIR and costs are imposed against the petitioner.
PAMPANGA BUS COMPANY, INC., VS. PAMBUSCO EMPLOYEES' UNION, INC.
G.R. NO. 46739
FACTS:
On May 31, 1939, the Court of Industrial Relations issued an order, directing the petitioner herein, Pampanga Bus Company, Inc., to recruit from the respondent, Pambusco Employees'Union, Inc., new employees or laborers it may need to replace members of the union who may be dismissed from the service of the company, with the proviso that, if the union fails to provide employees possessing the necessary qualifications, the company may employ any other persons it may desire. This order, in substance and in effect, compels the company, against its will, to employ preferentially, in its service, the members of the union.
Issue:
Whether or not the said order issued by the CIR valid and not violative of the right of the employer to select employees.
Held:
We hold that the court has no authority to issue such compulsory order. The general right to make a contract in relation to one's business is an essential part of the liberty of the citizens protected by the due-process clause of the
Constitution. The right of the laborer to sell his labor to such person as he may choose is, in its essence, the same as the right of an employer to purchase labor from any person whom it chooses. The employer and the employee have thus an equality of right guaranteed by the Constitution. Section of Commonwealth Act No. 213 confers upon labor organizations the right "to collective bargaining with employers for the purpose of seeking better working and living conditions, fair wages, and shorter working hours for laborers, and, in general, to promote the material, social and moral well-being of their members." This provision in granting to labor unions merely the right of collective bargaining, impliedly recognizes the employer's liberty to enter or not into collective agreements with them. Indeed, we know of no provision of the law compelling such agreements. Such a fundamental curtailment of freedom, if ever intended by law upon grounds of public policy, should be effected in a manner that is beyond all possibility of doubt. The supreme mandates of the Constitution should not be loosely brushed aside. As held by the Supreme Court of the United States in Hitchman Coal & Co. vs. Mitchell (245 U. S., 229; 62Law. ed., 260, 276): GREGORIO ARANETA EMPLOYEES UNION VS. ROLDAN G.R. NO. L-6846
JULY 20, 1955 FACTS
A petition for certiorari to review the Resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations dated March 31, 1953.
The Agricultural Division of the Gregorio Araneta, Inc., was established in 1947 with a capital of P200,000. The total investment in that Division in 1953 was about P3,000,000. To reduce this overcapitalization, the Board of Directors felt
that it was necessary either to invite fresh capital from outside or to adopt a retrenchment policy. When Heacock and Company refused the invitation to invest in the enterprise, the Board took the alternative of retrenchment.
The Board decided not to import as much merchandise as usual. It also reduced credits. All these plans required a reduction in the volume of business
necessitating likewise a reduction of personnel and caused the laying off of 17 employees. The selection of those to be laid off was made by a technical man and approved by the Board. These employees were given one month separation pay, except Nicolas Gonzalez who refused to receive it.
The reorganization of the Agricultural Division was adopted by unanimous resolution of the Board of Directors as a consequence of the retrenchment policy. This was adopted even before the petitioner, "Gregorio Araneta Employees' Union", was organized and; consequently, it was never directed against the union. Judge Bautista adds: ". . . Considering this fact, and taking into account all the circumstances of this case, especially the actual reduction of business of said Division, the court fails to find sufficient justification for altering the action of the Board of Directors regarding those employees, who received their severance pay". Judge Bautista, however, believed that Gonzales should not have been separated because his work was shifted to another employee by the name of Augusto Achacoso, who was thus overburdened.
Both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration with the court en
banc. The latter modified the decision of Associate Judge Bautista in its
resolution of March 31, 1953, prepared by the Presiding Judge Arsenio C. Roldan and concurred in by Associate Judges Modesto Castillo and Juan L. Lantin. The modification consists only in holding that the laying off of Gonzalez was also legal. Judge Bautista dissented with regard to the separation of Gonzalez, giving the same reasons he gave in his original opinion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the company engaged in unfair labor practice by adopting a policy of retrenchment aimed at the Union or any of its members.
HELD:
We find no reason for disturbing the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations, en banc. The laying off of the 17 employees was due to the
retrenchment policy which the Company had to adopt in order to reduce the overcapitalization and minimize expenses. The volume of business was considerably reduced.
It should be noted that the retrenchment policy was adopted before even the organization of the petitioning union. It was not, therefore, aimed at the Union or any of its members for union or labor activities. It was not an unfair labor
practice.
In view of the foregoing, the petition is denied, without pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
PHILIPPINE STEEL METAL WORKERS’ UNION V. CIR G.R. NO. L-2028
APRIL 28, 1949 REYES, J.
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari to review an order of the Court of Industrial Relations on the ground that the same was rendered in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion.
On March 1, 1985, the respondent Union filed a Notice of Strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) on ground of unfair labor practice consisting of alleged refusal to bargain, dismissal of union officers/members; and coercing employees to retract their membership with the union and restraining non-union members from joining the union.
The said order was issued of said court involving an industrial dispute between the respondent company (a corporation engaged in the manufacture of tin plates, aluminum sheets, etc.) and its laborers some of whom belong to the Philippine Sheet Metal Workers' Union (CLO) and some to the Liberal Labor Union.
The dispute was over certain demands made upon the company by the laborers, one of the demands, being for the recall of eleven workers who had been laid off. Temporarily taken back on certain conditions pending final determination of the controversy, these eleven workers were in the end ordered retained in the
decision handed down by the court on February 19, 1947.
The petitioner tried to prove that the 11 laborers were laid off by the respondent company due to their union activities.
On February 10, 1947, that is, nine days before the decision came down, filed a motion in the case, asking for authority to lay off at least 15 workers in its can department on the ground that the installation and operation of nine new labor-saving machines in said department had rendered the services of the said
workers unnecessary. Issue:
W/N the firing of the laborers due to their union activities is valid? Ruling:
Yes. The right to reduce personnel should, of course, not be abused. It should not be made a pretext for easing out laborers on account of their union activities. But neither should it be denied when it is shows that they are not discharging their