07changinginstitutional.pdf

Changing

Institutional

Structures

to

Improve

the

Coordination

of

Land

Use

and

Transportation

in

the

Research

Triangle

Robert

J.

Schneider

Introduction

When

Sandy Ogburn.

Assistanttothe

General

Manager

atTriangleTransitAuthority

(TTA).

firstarrivedin the

North

Carolina

Research

Triangleregion

from

Philadelphia,she

planned

tostayonly

two

years.

However,

because

of

"theslowerpace

of

life, all the

amenities intheregion,

and

the beautifulblue

color

of

the sky." she

and

her family

have

made

theTriangle

home

forover

25

years.

During

that

time.

Ms.

Ogburn

has

been

an active

member

of

theTriangle

community,

servingas a

member

of

the

Durham

CityCouncil,aschairofthe

Durham-Chapel

Hill-CarrboroMetropolitan

Planning Organization

(DCHC MPO)

Transportation

Advisory

Committee, and

aschair

ofthe

TTA

Board

ofDirectors.

Unfortunately, recenttrends

may

threaten

thehighquality

of

lifethathasattracted people,

like

Ogburn. and

businessestotheTriangle inthe

past. Trafficcongestion

and

airpollution

problems

that

have

plagued other fast-growing

metropolitanareas

have

come

tothe Triangle.

According

tothe

North

Carolina

Department

of

Environment and

Natural

Resources

(NC

DENR).

the Research Triangle region

experiencedeight

Code Red

("unhealthy")

and

twenty-three

Code

Orange

("unhealthy for

sensitivegroups")

ozone days

in 1

999

(NC

DENR

2000).

Automobile

emissionsarea

major

source

of

thispollution,

and

an inefficient

regional transportationsystemcontributestothe

emissions

problem

by exacerbatingtraffic

congestion. Traffic

volumes on

Interstate

40

at

the

Wake-Durham

county

line increased

from

about 71.000vehiclesper

day

in 1

990

toover

1 1,000 vehiclesper

day

by

1

995

(Eisenstadt

and

Hoar

1995).

Commuters

oftenspend an

hour

traversing the 10-milestretch ofInterstate

40

between Research

Triangle Park

and

Raleigh.

The

region'scongestion

problem

has increasingly

drawn

press coverage, with helicoptertraffic

reports

and

live

views from

traffic

cameras

broadcast each night

on

the local news.

Ms.

Ogburn

attributes

much

of

the

blame

for

theTriangle's

worsening

congestion toalack

of

coordination

between

theregion's land use

and

transportationdecision-makers.

She

stated ina

recent interview,

"We

[intheTriangleregion] are

quickly

going

the

way

of

many

largemetropolitan

areasbynotacting regionally. Airpollutiondoes

notstopatthe county line. It's not a

Durham

problem. It's not a Raleigh problem. It's

our

problem

as a region."

She

suggestsalso thatthe

economic

viabilityoftheTriangle,

which

is

dependent on

theregion's qualityoflife,will be

damaged

when

agencies

and

municipalitiesact

individually.

Over

thepast

few

years,businesses

have begun

toquestion

moving

toandstayingin

theTriangle becausetheir

employees

are

frustratedwithairpollution

and

trafficcongestion

problems.

Ogburn

warns."Ultimately,without

regional coordination,ourqualityoflifewillbe

diminished,

and

theTrianglewill

become

a less

desirableplace tolive.

People

will search for

greener pastures

—

literally"

(Ogburn

2000).

Airpollution

and

trafficcongestionare

one

resultoflanduseandtransportationdecisions

thatare

made

by

individual municipalities,such

asRaleigh,

Durham.

Chapel

Hill,

and

Cary,

without consideration

of

theireffectson the

region as awhole.

These

fourcitiesand nearby

employment

centerofthe region. Research

TrianglePark,

and

the

Raleigh-Durham

InternationalAirportare located inthecenter

of

the"triangle." Malls, sporting events

and

most

jobsarewithinan hour's driveof almost

any

household

in the region.

Because

Triangle

residentstravel

between

all

communities

inthe

regiontotake

advantage of

social, cultural,

employment, and

otherresources, it

makes

sense

touse regional

approaches

toplanning

and

share

the costs

and

benefits of

development.

Figure1: RegionalTrafficCongestion

Source:

WML

Purpose

and Methodology

This paper arguesthatthe lack

of

coordination

between

localitieswith landuse

decision-makingauthority

and

regionalagencies

withtransportationdecision-making

power

causestheTriangleregionto

develop

unsustainable landuse patterns

and

transportation systems.

The

purpose

of

this

paper

isto:

suggest general keysto success for

cooperativeregional

governance

structures;

evaluate the effectiveness

and

feasibility

ofalternativeinstitutional

frameworks

for

regionalcoordinationin

comparison

tothe

current landuse

and

transportation

decision-makingstructuresinthe

Triangle;

and

recommend

five institutional

changes

that

could beadopted separately or in

combinationto

improve

regional

coordinationintheTriangleregion.

Two

sources

of

opinion,responsestoa brief

questionnaire

from

fiveregionalagencies located

indifferent parts

of

thecountry

(Alabama,

California,Illinois/Iowa.

North

Carolina,

and

Oregon) and academic

literatureon

inter-jurisdictionalcooperation,suggestkeysto

success

and

guidetheevaluation

and

recommendations.

Taking

a

Regional

View

Proponents

of

regionalcoordination

of

land

use

and

transportation

development

cite

numerous

planningissues that aretheresult

of

thebalkanization

of

local

governments

withina

region

and

a lack

of concern

aboutthe impacts

of

development

and

regulation policies

on

other

jurisdictions

(MSRC

1993;Chapralis 1994;

Pincetl 1994; Baldassare, etal. 1996; Leo, etal.

1998;

Rusk

2000).

Research

hasidentified

several

problems

that relatespecificallyto

coordinating land use

and

transportation

between

jurisdictions:

Inefficient regional

development

patterns

determined

by

land usechoices

made

atthelocal leveltendnot tosupport

higherdensitiesin locationsthat will

optimizethe efficiencyofregional

transportationsystems(Porter 1997:

Rusk

2000).

Inefficient transportation

system

leadingto

poor

connectivity

between

roads

and

transit systems across

jurisdictionalboundaries. Lessdirect

transit routesresult in fewer

transportation

mode

choicesfor residents.

and

awkward

road connections result in

more

airpollution

and

time spentintraffic

(Porter 1994; Baldassare. etal. 1996).

Individual local

development

choices

resultingreaterdispersionofjobs

throughoutaregion. Low-skilledjobs

become

less accessibleto

workers

with

little

money

to

spend

on

transportation

Interstates

and

other

freeways

make

"greenfield"sitesat the

edge of

metropolitan areas accessible

and

attractive fordevelopment.

As

aresult,

centralcity lots

and

buildingsthatare

served

by

roads, sewer, utilities,schools,

and

other services are

abandoned

for

these

new

sites that arenot served

by

infrastructure

and

publicservices

and

may

be sensitive environmental areasor

productive farmland(Porter 1997).

Critics

of

regionalcooperationstatethat

there isa lack

of

concrete evidence linking

politicalfragmentationtospecificproblems.

Detractorsalsopoint outthat larger

governments

areinefficient,

and

thatsmall local

governments

providecitizenswithincreased choice,

more

responsiveness

and

a greater

chance

forpublic

inputin landuse

and

transportationdecisions

(Pincetl 1994; Baldassare. etal. 1996; Porter

1997).

Movement

Towards

Regional

Strategies in the

Triangle

Recent

initiatives

show

thatthere is

receptiveness

towards

usingregional strategies

tocoordinateland use

and

transportation

decisionsin theTriangle. In 1972. theTriangleJ

Council

of

Governments

(TriangleJ

COG),

one

of 18

North

Carolina

COGs.

was

formed

as a

voluntary organization of municipal

and

county

governments from

thesixcounties

of

the region

(Figure2).

The

Greater Triangle Regional

Council

(GTRC),

a coalition

of

developers,

environmentalists, fanners,

neighborhood

activists,business owners,university

representatives,

and

chamber

of

commerce

members

from

the region,

was

formed

in 1993to

providea privateperspective

on

theregion's

problems

(Warrick 1993).

GTRC

helpedto

developa series

of

"smart

growth"

principlesfor

theTriangle region

(Leavenworth

1999).

The

principlesinclude:

Design

new

and

preserveexisting

neighborhoods

and

communities

tofoster

walkability. safety

and

asense

of

place;

Promote

different

mixed-use

centers

of

various scales foreach citv,

town and

crossroads in the Triangletoserve as

centers

of

civic,social, cultural,

and

economic

life,

and

astransportationhubs;

Createaseamless,regional,multi-modal

transportation

system

which

interlinks

new

and

existingresidential,

employment,

commercial,

and

recreational areas;

Promote development

patterns

and

designs that take

advantage

of

and

supportregional

and neighborhood

transportationsystems;

Preserve

more

natural areas

and open

space

and

provide fortheir

interconnectionatlocal

and

regional

levels;

and

Coordinate

landuse

development and

transportation infrastructure

and

services

to helpachieve

each of

these principles.

There

hasalso

been

statesupportfor linking

land use

and

transportationattheregional level.

The

North

Carolina

Commission

to

Address

Smart Growth.

Growth Management,

and

Development

Issues

("Smart

Growth

Commission")

isdeveloping

recommendations

that itwill presenttothestatelegislaturein

January

2001

(Godschalk

2000).

One

ofthe

recommendations

the

Smart

Growth Commission

isconsideringisforthestatetoallow localitiesto

voluntarily

form

regional

governments.

Under

thisarrangement,thevoluntaryregional

governments

will adoptregional smart

growth

plans,

and

if

members

adoptlocal smart

growth

plansconsistentwiththeregional plan, the

localities in theregioncould

have

accesstoa

"smart

growth

toolbox"(Stradling2000). This

would

allow Triangle

communities

touseaseries

of

state supported smart

growth

policies, suchas

transfer

of development

rightsor impactfees

on

new

development,

withouta formal act

from

the

state legislature.

Regions

thatrequire

consistency witha regionalsmart

growth

plan

would

alsobeeligiblefor statefunded incentives

to

implement

regionalplanningefforts. Thistype

of

initiativecouldresultina regional

forum

to

uniteland use

and

transportation

development

Keys

to

Success

for

Regional

Coordination

of

Land

Use and

Transportation

Modeling

regional strategiesaftersuccessful

regional initiativesin other parts

of

thecountry

could help ensurethesuccessofregional

initiativesinthe Triangle.

Responses from

the

five regional agencies

and

other

academic

research suggestthere are several critical

elementstocreating a regionalinstitutional

structurethatfosters integrative

decision-making

(Table 1).

These

elements fall

under

two

main

evaluativecriteria,feasibility

and

effectiveness.

A

regional structure's effectiveness isthe extent

to

which

theorganizationisabletoget results

by

implementing

landuse

and

transportation

development

tools

and

decisions.

A

regional

structure's feasibility is the degree

of

difficulty

inmaintainingthenecessary institutional

arrangements

from

political, legal

and

technical

perspectives. Equity,ortheability

of

agenciesto

includeallregional stakeholdersin landuse

and

transportation decisions, isanimportant

component

withinthiscategory. Regional

institutions

must

beequitable inordertomaintain

the support

of

grassroots

and

otherpublic

interest groups.

The

literature

shows

thatregional

governments

are

most

effective

when

agencies:

Integrate a

number

oftools to create a

comprehensive

regional

development

program

(Lassar 1991: Leo. et

ah

1998):

Establish concrete,understandable,

common

goalsfor

communities

withinthe

region(Porter 1997):

^S^s-^WZ

TriangleJCouncilofGovernments

(Chatham. Durham.Johnston. Lee.

Orange and

Wake

Counties)

Figure2:North CarolinaCouncils of

Government

Source:

Land

of Sky RegionalCouncil, S'CCouncils

of

Government

* Establish jointadvisory

committees

to

address land use

and

transportation

issues:

Promote

active

communication and

collaboration

between

jurisdictions:

and

Emphasize

implementation

of

plans

and

programs.

Italso

shows

that regionalinitiativesare

most

feasible

when

agencies:

Solicitpublicinvolvementinthe landuse

and

transportation process(Carlson

and

King

1998):

Take

a

bottom-up approach

todeveloping

regional plans,

work

w

ithlocal

jurisdictions as

much

as possible,

and

allow localimplementation ofregional

strategies (Baldassare. et al. 1996):

Understand

traditional institutional

barrierstoregional coordination,suchas

local

home

ruleauthority (Porter 1997):

Obtain

state supportforregional

cooperation (Porter 1997: Carlson

and

King

1998):

and

Define a clear objective(such as

reductionofregionalairpollution,

reductionin regionaltrafficcongestion,or

better

management

of

regional

infrastructure) that requires regional

coordinationtobe achieved (Chapralis

1994: Porter 1997).

Current

Institutional

Arrangements

The

Triangle'scurrentinstitutionalstructure

has

many

of

the attributesthat should leadto

successful regionalcoordinationas

mentioned

above. Yet.analternativeinstitutional

arrangement

may

be able to achieve greater

effectivenesswhile maintainingfeasibility.

Established

Institutional

Arrangements

The

initiatives

of

the

GTRC

and

other

proponentsofregionalcooperation

have

promoted

thisconcept withinthe Triangle's

establishedinstitutional

framework. However.

current

power

structure for land use and

transportationdecisions

remains

inplace.

Currently, four

government

agencies

influence regional transportation

and

landuse

planningin the Triangle.TriangleJ

COG

playsa

roleinfacilitating

agreements between

localities,

providingdata

and

suggestingprinciplesforland

use

and

transportation

development.

The

region

has

two

separateMetropolitan Planning

Organizations,theCapital

Area

MPO

(CAMPO),

which

represents areas

around

Raleigh,

and

the

Durham-Chapel

Hill-Carrboro

MPO

(DCHC

MPO).

Both

MPOs

have the

power

to

develop

transportationimplementation

programs and

todistribute state

and

federal

transportation funds. Finally,theTriangleTransit

Authority has

been

giventhe responsibility

of

planning

and

operatinga regionaltransitsystem.

Despite theexistence

of

these regional

governments,currentinstitutionalarrangements

dictatethatlanduse planning

and

development

decisionsremainfirmlywithintheadministrative

purview of

municipal

and

county

government.

Local

governments have

the

power

to:

Develop comprehensive

land use plans;

Enact zoningordinances/establish zoning

districts:

Raisetaxes

and

acquire land;

and

Create subdivision

and

transit-oriented

development

guidelines.

Incontrast, regional

governments

play

more

of an advisoryorclearinghouserole withouta

greatdeal of decision-making power. For

example.

TTA

has limited

power

toacquire land

within

and around

theright-of-wayofitsfuture

regional railcorridor.

TTA

has

encouraged

local

municipalitiestozoneahigh-density

mix

ofland

uses inareasnear future rail stationsin its

Station

Area

Development

Guidelines

(TTA

1998),yetitcan

do

littleifmunicipalitiessuchas

Cary

or

Chapel

Hilldecideto

zone

areas near

future stationsaslow-densityresidential.

Hence,

local landusedecisionswill

have

a significant

impact

on

the efficiency

of

thefuturerail system

as a whole.

TriangleJ

COG

providesdatato

municipalitiesthat

may

have

smallstaffsor

budgetssothatall parts

of

the regioncan

achieve a basic level

of

land use

and

transportationplanning. Yet,

membership

in

TriangleJ isnotmandatory,

and

localities suchas

SilerCity

and

Wilson

Millsare not represented.

Under

itsvoluntarystructure.TriangleJ

COG

can:

Mediate

landuse

and

transportation

disputes

between

localities:

Provideland use

and

transportation data

toallmunicipalitiesinthe region:

Develop

model

ordinancesfor localities;

and

Establish regional land use

and

transportation principles.

Finally,while

COGs

likeTriangleJ

may

develop

regional principles,theyhave

no

power

to

implement

their

recommendations

(Municipal

Cooperation

Guide

1993). Therefore,theirplans

are often"ignored almostatwill by

member

local

governments"

(Porter 1997). Fora regional

agency

to

have

true land use

and

transportation

power, it

must

be givenstatutory

home

rule

powers, there

must

be an express grantof

powers

tothe

agency

through a state

constitutionalprovisionforregionalgovernments,

orthere

must

be specific stateor federal

legislation thatallowsthe consolidationoflocal

municipalitiesto

form

regional

governments

(Richardson 2000).

Alternative Institutional

Arrangements

The

Research Triangle could

improve

regionalcoordination

of

landuseand

transportation

development by

adoptinga

different structure

of

regionalgovernance.

Experiences

from

otherregionsin the United

Statesprovide

examples of

successful

inter-jurisdictionalarrangements. Table 1

shows

how

theeffectiveness

and

feasibilityofregional

initiativescouldbeaffectedor

improved

under

alternative

arrangements

tothe present regional

government

structurein the Triangle.

Table 1 describessix regional

governance

structuresthatare currently used in regions

of

Table

1: Institutional

Arrangements

to

Coordinate

Land

Use

and

Transportation Planning

Institutional

Arrangement

Potential to Improve LandUseand

TransportationCoordination

Description/Powers Effectiveness Feasibility Example!s)

Voluntary

Cooperative

Arrangement

BetweenLocal

Governments

Regionalcouncilsof governmentsor

public/privateregionalorganizations

thatfostercommunicationorsettle

disputesbetweenjurisdictions,

provide dataandtechnical expertise,andsetregionalgoals

+/-

+/-TriangleJCouncilof Governments(TriangleRegion);

SouthAlabamaRegional PlanningCommission; Bi-State Regional PlanningCommission; PugetSoundCouncilof Governments(a)

Mandatory

Membershipin

Regional

Commission

Agencycollectsannualduesfromall

municipalitiesinregiontohold

regional publicmeetings ordevebp

advisoryregionalplan

+ + AtlantaRegionalCommission

(b)

Single-Purpose

RegionalAgency

RegionalPublic Service Authorityor Regional Environmental

ConservationAgencyprovidinga

specific service toregion,such as

airquality,sewer,airport,ortransit

managementoften have

implementationpoweroverspecific service

+/-

+/-Triangle TransitAuthority

(TriangleRegion);BayArea

AirQuality Management

District;

New

Jersey Pinelands

Commission;SanFrancisco Metropolitan Transportation

Commission(c)

Multidisciplinary

AgencywithJoint

MissionofLand

Useand

Transportation Coordination

Regional transportationagency with

landusepersonnel ordeveloperson

stafEmay havepoweroverlanduse

developmentintransportation corridorsorneartransitstations

+ +/- Washington D.C.Metropolitan

AreaTransitAuthority(d)

SingleMetropolitan Planning

Organization

Agency mandated byfederal legislationtocoordinate

transportationplanningandallocate federalandstatetransportation fundingthroughout regionsofover

200.000residents

+

+/-Durham-ChapelHiD-Carrboro

MPO

or CapitalArea

MPO

(Triangle Region):

MPOs

in all

urbanregionsoftheUnited States(e)

Formal

Metropolitan or Regional

Government

Single governmentbodywith

complete landuseand

transportationplanning,regulation

and implementation control over

entireregion; officialsmaybe

electedunderstate-grantedHome

Rulepowerorappointed from

localities

++

-

PortlandMetroCouncil;Twin

Cities MetropolitanCouncil(f)

Status

Quo

InstitutionalArrangement=landuseauthorityatlocallevel;voluntaryregionalcouncilof

governments; transportation authoritysplitbetweentwo

MPOs;

one single-purpose transitagency

KEY:

=majorpositivechangefromstatusquoforgivencriterion;

~=minor

positivechange fromstatusquofor

givencriterion; +/-

=no

improvementormixedevaluationforgivencriterion;-

_=minor

negativechangefrom

statusquo forgivencriterion;

—

=majornegativechange fromstatusquoforgivencriterion

SOURCES:

(a)Porter 1992:Atkins 1993;

MRSC

1993:Pincetl 1994:Porter1994:

GTRC

1997:Porter 1997;Rusk2000

(b)

GTRC

1997

(c)Lassar 1991; Easley 1992;Porter 1992:Atkins 1993: Chapralis 1994;Pincetl 1994; Baldassare,etal. 1996;Porter1997

(d)TCRP

1998

(e)Atkins 1993;Pincetl 1994;Rusk2000

theUnitedStates.

The

institutional

arrangements

arenotmutuallyexclusive.

For

example, theTriangleregionhasavoluntary

cooperative

agreement between

local

governments,asingle-purposeregionalagency,

and

two

metropolitanplanningorganizations.

The

rating

of

a regional institution'seffectiveness

represents the positive ornegativechange, in

comparison

totheTriangle's current structure

of

governance, with respecttothe extentto

which

theregionisabletoachieve coordination

of

land

use

and

transportation

by

usingregional

development

tools.

The

ratingofa regional

institution's feasibility represents the positiveor

negative change, in

comparison

totheTriangle's

current structure

of

governance, with respect to

thedegree

of

difficulty thattheinstitutionwill

have

implementing

landuse

and

transportation

decisions

from

apolitical, legal

and

technical

perspective.

The

institutional

arrangement

ratings are nottaken

from

the perspective

of

any

oftheTriangle'sregional organizations,local

governments

orbusinessorenvironmental

interests; they are based on evidence that is

presented throughout thepaper

on

the successor

failureoftheseinstitutionsinother regions

of

the

United States.

Evaluation

of

Institutional

Arrangements

Currently,theTriangle

Region

hasa

voluntarycooperative

arrangement

between

local

governments

(TriangleJ

COG),

a

single-purposeregional

agency (TTA). and

two

separate

MPOs.

CAMPO

and

DCHC

MPO.

The

effectiveness

and

feasibilityofregional

coordinationoflanduse andtransportation

may

be

improved

if

one

orseveral

of

the alternative

institutional

arrangements

areadopted.

Implementing

a

more

comprehensive

regional

strategy

may

bethe best

way

tocoordinate land

use

and

transportation

development

inthe

Triangle.

Effectiveness

and

Feasibility

As

stated earlier, the effectiveness

of

an

institutional

arrangement

isbased onthedegree

to

which

theregion's governing

powers

can be

usedtocoordinateland use

and

transportation

development. Several agenciesin theTriangle

have

statedmissionstocoordinate land use.

transportationorboth acrosstheregion;

however,

landuseplanning

power

iscurrently

heldbyindividual local

and

countyjurisdictions

within theTriangleregion. Therefore,an

alternativeinstitutional structurecouldbe

more

effective forcoordinating landuse

and

transportation systems.

Based

solely

on

effectiveness, creating a

government agency

that

would

covera large

geographic area

would

appear

tobe an easy

solutionto

improve

coordinationoflanduse and

transportation

development

intheTriangle

region. Empirically,

however,

thefeasibilityof

inter-governmental

arrangements

tendsto

decreaseas the size

of

theirjurisdictions

increases.

Land

use control isa "'ferociously

jealously

guarded

local

power"

(Pincetl 1994).

Resistancetoregional

government

comes

both

from

publicpolicy

and

public sentiment.

There

tendstobepolitical support inthe

Triangleforthestatus

quo

regionalinstitutions.

Moreover,

councilsof

governments

likeTriangle

J are

found

inevery state

and

are

even

needed

toqualifyfor

some

state

and

federal funds,

many

regional agencies like

TTA

arecreated to

providepublic transitservice,

and

MPOs

are

mandated

federally. Therefore,adopting a

new

landuse

and

transportation policy-setting

structureintheTriangle

would

alterinstitutions

that areboth familiartoresidents

of

the region

and

used

commonly

throughoutthe nation.

Two

main

legal obstaclesaffect the

feasibilityofregional

governance

tocoordinate

landuse

and

transportationplanning: 1)

most

stateenablinglegislationcauses landuse

planningtobe executedatthe local

government

level,whileitsimpactontransportation corridors

and

infrastructureextend across local

boundaries;

and

2) federallegislation(i.e.

Transportation Equity

Act

forthe2

1

il

Century

-TEA-2

1)

mandates

thattransportationplanning

be executedattheregional

government

level, yet

regional Metropolitan Planning Organizations

do

not

have

the legal

power

to control land use.

Recommendations

Though

each

of

the following

recommendations

couldbeadopted separately,a

comprehensive

regional strategy

may

bethe

most

beneficial fortheTriangleregion. For

example,

a regional sales tax

may

be

most

effective

and

feasible ifit isadministered

by

a

councilof

governments

thatall local

governments

participate in

and which

hasthe

power

torequire that local landuse

and

transportationdecisionsareconsistentwitha

regionalplan.

1.

Require

Mandatory Membership

in the

Triangle

J Council

of

Governments.

The

North

CarolinaGeneral

Assembly

could

enactabillrequiringthatall localities

become

members

oftheir

COGs.

Each

municipality

would

be charged an annual feebased

on

its

number

of

residents. This

would

provide

more

resourcestoTriangleJ

and

alsoensure local

representation

on

thecouncil

and

giveall

localitiesand countiesintheTrianglea greater

stake in theplans

and

recommendations of

the

regional agency.

The

AtlantaRegional

Commission

(ARC)

utilized

mandatory

membership

and

a percapitaannual fee to

successfully

develop

an advisoryregional plan

(GTRC

1997).

ARC

used theannual $0.80 per

capita feetohold publicmeetings

and

gather

input

from

citizenstodevelopthe plan. Local

plannerscredited

ARC

with

improv

ing

communication

among

localities

and

discouraging

development

with adverseregional impacts

(GTRC

1997). Inthe Triangle, fee

revenue

could beused tohire

more

staff,collect

and

provideadditionaldata,

and

facilitatedisputes

between

municipalities.

Though

mandatory

membership

and

an annual feestill

would

not

allowthecooperative

agency

to

implement and

enforce landuse

and

transportation decisions, it

may

provideagreater incentive forlocalities to

pay

attentiontothe land use

and

transportation

guidelinesprovided

by

TriangleJ. Also,

because

mandator}

participation

and

annualfee

requirements

must

be

mandated by

state

legislation, thisact

would

sendapowerful

message

to local

governments

aboutthe

importance ofregional coordination.

2. Establish a

Land

Use

Division in the

Triangle

Transit

Authority

that

has

power

over land

use decisions in transit corridors

and

station areas.

InanticipationofitsRegional RailInitiative.

TTA

could follow the

model

ofthe

Washington

D.C. Metropolitan

Area

TransitAuthority

(

WAMTA)

by

establishing aland usedivision

w

ithinthe agency.

Under

thisarrangement,

TTA

could ensurethatlanduses withintransit

corridors

and

neartransit stationsare

transit-supportive. Specifically,

by working

withlocal

officials,the

agency

could

encourage

higher

density

and

a better

mix

ofland usesto support

ridership

on

theregionalsystem. Further,official

corridor

and

station landuse planscouldbe

created

by

TTA.

orlocalitiescould be requiredto

comply

with

TTA

landuse guidelines.

These

changes

would

improve

the overall success

of

transitintheTriangleregion.

WAMTAs

landusedivisiondevelops

advisory landuse plansfor transitcorridors

and

areas neartransit stations.

Although

WAMTA

couldnot establishzoningregulations,itsjoint

land

use-development

division

worked

closely with localjurisdictionstofosterappropriaterail

station area

development

patterns

when

planning

the

Washington

regionalrail

system

(TCRP

1

998

).

A

similar

arrangement

could

work

inthe

Triangle region. Ideally,individuallocalities

would

give

up

some

localcontrol overland use

around

rail stationssothat

TTA

couldestablish

mixed

use

zoning

intransitstationareas

and

corridors

and

mandate

localconsistency with

stationarea

development

guidelines.

However,

even

if

TTA's

land use

power

was

limited,orif

anotherregional

governmental

agency

was

grantedland useauthority,alandusedivision

could advocate for a

mix

of

land uses

and

moderate

tohighresidential

and

commercial

densities

developed

nearstationsin

Durham.

RTP.

Morrisville.Cary.

and

Raleigh.

These

land

uses

would

helpsupport highridership levels

when

trainsbegintorunin 2007. Unfortunately,

there

would

most

likelybe strongpolitical

resistanceto

TTA

havingalltransitcorridor

and

3.

Merge

the

Raleigh

and

Durham MPOs.

With

thesupport

of

localmunicipalities, the

two

MPOs

could be consolidated into

one

agency

that

would

coordinatetransportation

planning

and

programming

forthe entire region.

Under

aconsolidated

MPO.

allmunicipalities

within theTriangle

would

be ableto

work

witha

singleorganization

towards

a single regional

vision. Ideally, this

would

result inthefundingof

projectsthatextend

beyond

current jurisdictional

boundaries tothe region asa whole, suchas

transitconnections

between

Raleigh

and

Durham.

The

Bi-StateRegionalPlanning

Commission

operating inthe

Quad

Citiesregion has

jurisdictionoverfourdistinctcities,Davenport,

IA.Bettendorf, IA,

Rock

Island. IL,

and

Moline.

IL.

The

commission

transcends municipal,

federal

and

geographic boundariestoserve

communities

on

bothsidesoftheMississippi

River. Likethese residents

of

Iowa

and

Illinois,

who

make

a large

number

of

trips

among

the

Quad

Cities,residents

of

Chapel

Hill

and

Durham

make

alarge

number

of

commuting

and

social tripsto

Cary and

Raleigh

and

vice versa.

Therefore, a single

MPO

arrangement might

also

beeffective in theTriangle.

Combining

the

two

MPOs

is legallyfeasible

becausethe state legislature has alreadypassed

a

law

toallowthe

Durham

and

Raleigh planning

organizations tomerge.

CAMPO.

however,

opposed

the

merger

(

The

Chapel

Hill

News,

II

12/00).possiblyout

of concern

that local

interests

would

not be represented

by

a larger

agency. For

example.

Chapel

Hill

may

have

less

power

toreceive fundingforsidewalk

improvements and

its

system

of

bikeways

ifthe

MPO

must

alsoaddress the

needs

of

towns

like

Cary and

Smithfield.

4.

Give

the Triangle

J Council of

Governments

authority

over land

use

and

transportation

development.

Ifthe state legislature

and

the

governor

are

persuaded

by

the

North

Carolina

Smart

Growth

Commission

toenactlegislation that

would

require orallowtheformation

of

regional

agencies.TriangleJ

COG

couldobtain authority

over landuse

and

transportationdevelopment.

The

agency

would

be able tocreate a smart

growth

plan

and

requirethat localities

comply

withits landuse

and

transportation

development

provisions or

develop

anegotiated process

of

cross-acceptance

(Godschalk

2000).

With

this

structure inplace.TriangleJ

would

receive

incentives for creating plans,

and

localitiesinthe

regioncould levy impactfees

on

new

developments,

set

up

taxincrement financing

districts,orestablish transfer

of

development

rightsprograms.

Modeled

afterthe Portland

Metro

Council

and

Twin

Cities(Minneapolis-St. Paul)

Metropolitan Council,thistypeofregional

body

(withsupportingstatelegislation)could

coordinateitsregional landuse plans withthe

regionaltransportation system

and

ineffect

overseethe

Durham

and

Raleigh

MPOs

and

TTA. The

agency

would

not onlybe ableto

achievethe land use

and

transportation

coordination goals lobbiedforbytheGreater

TriangleRegional Council, itcouldalso:

Establish a regional taxor

mandate

regional cost-sharing;

Adopt

regionalzoning ordinancesto

establish

minimum

and

maximum

development

density,

mixed

land uses,

and

transit-orientedortraditional

neighborhoods;

Write subdivision

and

transit-oriented

development

regulationstorequire

facilitiesfor

walking and

bicycling;

Acquire

landforpublic buildings

and

public right-of-way;

Review

developments of

regional impact

and

plan

and

siteregionalpublicfacilities;

Establishan urban

growth

boundary;

and

Levy

bonds

toprovide infrastructurein

transitcorridors orprovidetaxincentives

for businesses tolocate neartransit

corridors orhubs.

The Twin

Cities

Metro

Council

mandated

thattheplansofall 189 cities

and towns

in the

regionbeconsistentwith itsregionalsystems

plans(Lassar 1991 ).

As

a result, it has

been

credited withguiding93 percent

of development

intheregion

between

1

980 and

1

990

toareas

designatedinits

comprehensive

plan,saving$1

billion ininfrastructurecosts

(GTRC

1997).

Portlandused itsregional

zoning

authority toset

minimum

densitytargets

of

four to tendwelling unitsperacre forall

27 of

itsmunicipalities

(Porter 1997). Similarly,

King

County,

WA

proposed

a

measure

that

would

require a

minimum

of

15.000jobstobe contained within

one-half mile of14high-density urbancenters in

ordertosupportitstransitsystem. Opposition

surfaced,

however,

when

projections

showed

thatthetransit

system

would

reducetraffic

by

only

two

percent(Porter 1994).

Regionalauthorityoverlanduse decisions

would

most

likely

come

from

thestate

legislature.

As shown

by

the success

of

the

agenciesinPortland

and

the

Twin

Cities, regional

cooperation

mandated by

state statute

may

be

the

most

legally

and

politicallyfeasible

way

to

create an effective

growth

management

program

(Porter 1997;

Rusk

2000).

Though

municipalities

may

resentthis

top-down

approach, astatutory

mandate

could help counter

opposition

from

localproponents

of

home

rule

authority. Thirteenstates,includingFlorida,

Georgia

and

Tennessee,

have

statewide

growth

management

lawsthat integrate transportation

andlanduseplanning

and development

(Godschalk

2000).

Recommendations

ofthe

Smart

Growth Commission

may

persuade

Raleigh

lawmakers

toenactlegislation that

would

allowa regionalcoordinating

body

with

similar

powers

tobe createdin the Triangle.

InCalifornia,the JointExercise of

Powers

Act

(California

Government

Code

Section

6500-6599.1)allows

two

or

more

public agenciesto

"jointlyexercise

any

power

common

tothe

contractingparties."

The

legislationpermitsthe

creation

of

new

government

entities

and

can give

regional agencies

powers

such asthe authority to

issue

revenue bonds

to

pay

for streets, roads,

bridges,or

mass

transit facilities

and

vehicles

(Carlson

and

King

1998).

A

similaractofthe

North

CarolinaGeneral

Assembly

could provide

these

development

management

toolstoa

regional

government

inthe Triangle.

Formal

regional

governance

powers

are

more

difficult toestablish. Localofficials

may

notbewillingto

cede

aregional

group

control

over decisionsthatcould

keep

them

from

implementing

some

oftheir

own

plans.

For

example,

though

thereview

of developments of

regional impact

(DRI)

isrequired inthe

Twin

Cities

and

Atlanta,local

governments

resisted

DRI

review in

Palm

Beach

County.

FL,

leading

tothe

demise of

the

Palm

Beach Countywide

Regional

Council

(Porter 1997).

When

regional

governance

was

proposed

in

San

Francisco,

some

anti-growthgroups perceivedthatregional

authority

w

ould

undermine

theirgrassroots

support.

At

the

same

time, proponents

of growth

thoughtthattaking

power

away

from

local

governments

would

reducethe

number

of

sites

open

for

development

withintheregion(Porter

1997).

Even

withinthe area

covered

by

the

successful

Twin

Cities

Metro

Council.

90

percent

oflocalities

were opposed

tothe idea

of

regional

governance

when

it

was

firstproposed.

Other

politicalobstaclestoestablishing

governments

thatcover

wide

geographic areas

include thefactthat

suburban

voters traditionally

oppose

regional

governments,

aswellas federal

fundingcutstoregionalagencies inthe early

1980s. Regional

governments"

power

touseland

use

and

transportation

management

tools

may

alsobe

impeded

by

thepoliticalclimate.

For

example,municipalitiesinthe

Twin

Citiesregion

may

begintolobbyagainsttax-sharingifthey

see excessive

revenue

losses.

And

although

PortlandMetro's

home

rule

powers

include

taxingauthority, the

agency

has not

used

the

power

to date

because

of

the negative public

attitude

toward

taxes(Steele2000). Opposition

toregional authorityis

found

intheTriangleas

well. Steve Ford, staffwriter for

The

Raleigh

News and

Observer,

commented. "Our

counties,

and

in

some

cases

towns

within thosecounties,

arestilltoo competitive

and

jealous

of

local

prerogativesto agreeto cede real

power

toa

regional

body"

(Ford 1999). Regional bodiesare

perceived

by

residents

and

localitiesto

have

a

more

difficulttime providing informationto.

and

addressingtheconcernsof.individual citizens

thanlocal

governments

(Pincetl 1994; Porter

1997).

crisis,regional

governance

becomes

more

politicallyfeasible. Environmentalprotection

and

local

growth

regulation are

now

high-profile

issues in metropolitan areas.

Because of

traffic

congestion,automobilepollution,

and

aprojected

$10

billionfundingshortfallfor

new

freeways,

secondaryroads,

mass

transit, high

occupancy

vehiclelanes,

and

pedestrian

and

bicycle

facilitiesoverthenext25 to

50

years(Stradling

2000).

many

Triangleresidents

and

business

leaders, aswell as the

mayors of

Cary.

Chapel

Hill

and

Durham,

supportaregional tax for

transportation

improvements.

Though

amajority

ofthe

members

of

the Raleigh

Chamber

of

Commerce

do

notsupport increased taxes, the

leadersofthe

Chamber

would

support

new

local

taxesthatcould help relievetraffic (Stradling

2000). Precedentforregional taxation in the

Triangle

was

set

when

TTA

established afive

percent tax

on

car rentals in

Durham, Orange

and

Wake

Counties in 1

997

thatgenerates

$6

million peryear.

A

regional sales tax

would

allowgreaterfunding ofacoordinated,

region-wide

transportationsystem

(Hyman

2000).

Several other

programs have

overcome

business

and

citizen concerns. In the

New

Jersey Pinelands. a transferof

development

rights

program

administered

by

aregional

government

has

been

successful in protecting

environmentallysensitive landswhile focusing

higher-density

development

inareas withhigh

transportation accessibility(Porter 1997).

The

AtlantaRegional

Commission

and

Twin

Cities

MetropolitanPlanning

Commission

usetheir

power

to review

DRIs

toensure that local

projects

do

not

have

an adverse impact

on

the

region as a

whole

(GTRC

1997).

Though

the

public

and

developers intheseregions worried

thatthe

development

process

would

be hindered

byadditionalreviews,the

new

Commission's

existence

seems

to be an effective incentive for

developerstothink regionally.

To

date,

no

projects

have been

delayed in the

Twin

Cities

(Lassar 1991).

Portland has successfully

adopted

subdivisionguidelines requiring pedestrian

and

bicycle facilities

and

theestablishment

of

minimum

standards fortransportation

performance

throughout theregion (Porter

1997). Finally, the

New

Jersey Pinelands

and

Twin

Cities

have

both

been

abletocreate tax

incentives forbusinessesto locate neartransit

hubs

(GTRC

1997; Porter 1997).

These

are

some

of

the toolsthat

would

bepossible

under

a

regional

framework

in the Triangle.

5.

Levy

Regional

Sales

Tax

to be

Administered by Triangle

J

Council of

Governments.

If

TTA

and

the

two

MPOs

were

contained

withinTriangleJ.the

agency

could be given the

authority toadministera regional salestax.

The

Regional TransportationAlliance, a

group

of

business

and government

leadersorganized by

theGreater Raleigh

Chamber

of

Commerce,

and

the

mayors

of

Cary,

Chapel

Hill

and

Durham

will

lobbythestatelegislaturein January

2001

to

allowthe regiontovote

on

thistypeoftax.

A

regional sales taxcould helpfundtransitplanning

and improvements,

such as

TTA*s

Regional Rail

Initiative,stationarea plans, busshelters,

and

land acquisition intransitcorridors. Itcouldalso

providefundingforhighway, sidewalk

and

bicycle

system

construction

and maintenance

throughouttheTriangleregion.

The

RTA

hasalsogiven itssupportto

GTRC*s

effortstoestablish a regional land use

strategy

and

transportationinitiatives. Policies

backed by

the

RTA

include

merging

the

Durham

and

Raleigh

MPOs.

implementing

TTVs

RegionalRail Initiative,

and encouraging

the

statetoallowthe region

and

localities to increase

transitfunding through aregional 5-centgastax

orlocal salestax.

According

tothe Institute for

Transportation Research

and

Education at

North

Carolina State University, sales taxescouldraise

$65millionannuallyfortheregion(Paik 1999).

The

local sales taxinitiativefollowsthe

model of Charlotte/Mecklenburg

County,

where

legislationallowedtheregion's votersto

approve

a salestaxthat raises $1 million per

week

for

mass

transit

(Hyman

2000).

A

regional

body

with taxingauthorityintheTriangle

would

providetheregionwith

more

transitfundingthan

iscurrently available forthe entire state(the

legislature has

capped

NC DOT

statewide

transitfundingat$5 million annually).

The

tax

would

alsoallowresidents

of Chapel

Hill

and

Cary

tohelp

pay

forroadsthatthey use

when

visiting

Durham

and

Raleigh.

Yet.thefeasibility oftaxation

remains

in

question.

While

leaders oftheRaleigh

Chamber

of

Commerce

support the 0.5 percenttax. they

have

stopped

promoting

itaggressivelybecause

only

37

percent

of

the

Chamber's

5000 members

supportthetax(Stradling2000).

The

region

may

looktothe

Twin

Cities foran

example

of

a

regional tax-sharingprogram.

As

a resultofthis

Metro

Council initiative.

40

percent

of

the

commercial

and

industrial taxbase

of

each

municipality

goes

toaregionalpool

of

funds,

which

helps subsidizeinfrastructurecosts for

poorermunicipalities. Withoutthetax-sharing

program,thepercapita tax disparity

would

have

been

50:1;withtax-sharing, it

was

only 12:1

(GTRC

1997).

The mayors

of

Can.

Chapel

Hill

and

Durham

alsosupportaregion-wide,multi-modal

transportation plan.

According

to

The Chapel

Hill

News,

"currentplanningactivityisfocused

either

on

asingle partoftheTriangle,the

separateCapitol

and

Durham-Chapel

Hill

planningorganizations,or

on

distinct

modes

of

transportation...

Nowhere

isthere in place a

region-wide,multi-modaltransportationplan.

That's

what

the

mayors want"

(

The

Chapel

Hill

News,

7/12/00).

Further Support for Regional

Solutions

Public supportforregional

governments

is

often easierto

come

by

iftheorganization

created focuses

on

aconcrete,

narrow

regional

goal,suchas

water

quality protection,transit

provision,orpark system

management

(Belldassare.etal. 1996: Porter 1997). For

instance,

many

Triangleresidentsperceivethat

trafficcongestion

and

airpollution reducethe

quality

of

life

and

viability

of

businesses inthe

region(Hicks 1995: Ford 1999:

Dyer

and

Feagans

2000). In 1993.columnist

Neal

Price

cited"longer

commuting

times,pockets

of

ugly

and

mounting

trafficcongestion,

and

airpollution high

enough

totrigger

ozone

alert

days"

as

negativeresults

of

theTriangle's

fragmented

leadership

(Warrick

1993).

These problems

have

helped buildsupportfortherecent regional

development

management

strategyproposals

of

the

GTRC.

RTA.

and

the

mayors of

Cary.

Chapel

Hill

and

Durham.

Yet. furthersupportfor

regional cooperation

may

notbe generatedif

planners

and

policy-makersatTriangleJ

COG

TTA,

the

Durham

and

Raleigh

MPOs,

and local

and county

governments do

notconnect

what

Triangleresidentsconsidercritical issuestothe

inefficient results

of

local landuseauthority

and

regional transportation control.

Between

1950

and

1990.the urbanized

population

of

theTriangle

grew

lessthan

300

percent, while thetotal urbanized area

grew by

900

percent(

Whisnant

2000).

Connecting

the

local land use decisionsthat

have

fosteredthis

lower-density,non-contiguous

growth

tothe

regional

problems

oftrafficcongestion

and

automobilepollutioncanhelprallypublicsupport

forcooperativeregional solutions.

For

example,

planners can present concrete data, suchas the

number

of

extra

automobile

tripsthat are

needed

forresidentsof

Apex

orHillsboroughlivingin

neighborhoods

thatarenotserved

by

public

transitorarenotwithin

walking

distanceof

commercial

centers. In addition,plannerscan

provide informationabout

how

much

work

and

familytime islostto

commuting

when

a

residence is located five,tenor

twenty

miles

from

an

employment

center.

They

can also

explain

how

much

additionalcarbon

monoxide.

h\

drocarbon

or

ozone

pollutioniscreatedby

thesetrips.

Summing

emissionsincreases,

additional

commuting

expenses, decreasesin

transitridership. losses

of

exercise,

and

timelost

overthe entire regioncan be used as apowerful

example of

thepublic costs generated

by

uncoordinatedtransportation decisions.

Between

1

990 and

2020.thepopulationof

theTriangle isprojectedtoincrease 76percent,

from

700.000

to 1.230.000(Eisenstadt

and

Hoar

1995). This

growth

willbe

accommodated more

efficientlyifland use

and

transportationsystems

arecoordinatedoverthe entire region. Ifa

regional

body

isdedicatedspecificallytoaddress

issues

of

trafficcongestion

and automobile

pollutioninthe Triangle,it

may

buildcredibility

through smallsuccesses.

With

this credibility,it

may

beable toobtainbroader

powers

to

coordinateland use

and

transportation

Summary

Evidence from

otherpartsofthecountry

reveals the strengths

and weaknesses of

multi-jurisdictionalcooperation

and

suggestskeysto

success forregionalcoordination oflanduse

and

transportation

development.

Evaluatingthe

effectiveness

and

feasibilityofalternative

institutional

frameworks

intheTriangleregion

demonstratesthat land use

and

transportation

coordinationcouldbe

improved

by adopting

alternative

government

arrangements. This

paper

recommends

fivespecificinstitutional

changes

inordertoachieve regional gains: 1

)

merge

the Raleigh

and

Durham MPOs;

2)

require

mandatory

membership

intheTriangleJ

Council

of Governments;

3) establish a

Land

Use

Division withintheTriangleTransit

Authority with

power

overlanduse decisions

neartransitcorridors

and

stations;4) give the

TriangleJCouncil

of

Governments

authorityover

landuse

and

transportation development;

and

5)

levy a regional sales taxtobe administered

by

TriangleJ

COG.

Sandy

Ogburn

suggeststhattheTriangle has

made

progress

toward

takingthiskindofregional

view.

The

Trianglehosteda

World

Class

Region

Conference

in 1987.

which

eventually inspired

thecreation of

TTA

and

GTRC.

Within the past

fiveyears, therehas

been

renewed

interest in

regionalplanningstrategies. "Right

now

the

mayors

are interested

and

the business

community

is interested."says

Ogburn.

But

significantshiftsinattitudesstill

must

be

made:

"Although

the restofthe

world views

us asa

region,individually

we

do

not

view

ourselvesasa

region.

Not

working

asaregion

impedes

sitting

atthe table

and working

through

problems

together."

Adopting

aninstitutional structurethat

fosterscoordinated landuse

and

transportation

systemsat the regional level can ensurethatthe

quality

of

life intheTriangleregionremainsas

highas it

was

when

Sandy

Ogburn

first

moved

here 25 years

ago.©

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