Labor Cases: 7th Assign. 2-I <3
1. Alhambra Industries v. NLRC, 238 SCRA 232
2. Interorient Maritime Enterprises v. NLRC, 235 SCRA 268
3. Colegio De San Juan De Letran v. Association of Employees And Faculty Of Letran, 340 SCRA 587.
4.
Farrol v. CA. 325 SCRA 3315.
Vh Manufacturing Inc. v. NLRC, 322 SCRA 4176.
Cebu Filveneer Corporation v. NLRC, 286 SCRA 5567.
Golden Thread Knitting Industries v. NLRC, 304 SCRA 7208.
Central Pangasinan Electric Coop Inc. v. Macaraeg, 395 SCRA 7209.
Salvador v. Philippine Mining Service Corp., 395 SCRA 72910.
Habana v. NLRC, 298 SCRA 53711.
PLDT v. Tolentino, 438 SCRA 55512.
Fujitsu Computer Products of the Phils. v. CA, 454 SCRA 73713.
Genuino Ice Co Inc v. Magpantay, 493 SCRA 19514.
Lakpue v. Belga, 473 SCRA 61715.
Micro Sales Operation Network V NLRC, 472 SCRA 32816.
Challenge Socks Corp v. CA, 474 SCRA 35617.
Chua v. NLRC, 453 SCRA 24418.
Paguio Transport Corp v. NLRC, 294 SCRA 65719.
Santos v. San Miguel Corporation, 399 SCRA 17220.
Philippine National Construction Corporation v. Matias, 458 SCRA 14821.
Vitarich Corp v. NLRC, 307 SCRA 50922.
Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corp v. NLRC, 290 SCRA 47923.
Leonardo v. NLRC, 333 SCRA 58924.
Floren Hotel v. NLRC, 458 SCRA 12825.
Batongbacal v. Associated Bank, 168 SCRA 60026.
Stellar Industrial Service Inc v. NLRC, 252 SCRA 32327.
Santos v. NLRC, 287 SCRA 11728.
Aparente Sr v. NLRC, 331 SCRA 8229.
Eastern Telecommunications Phils Inc v. Diamse, 491 SCRA 23930.
Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corp v. Nlrc, 206 SCRA 702ALHAMBRA INDUSTRIES V. NLRC (RUPISAN)
238 SCRA 232 BELLOSILLO; November 18, 1994
NATURE
Special civil action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari
FACTS
- Alhambra employed Rupisan as salesman on 6-mo probationary basis. Alhambra made surprise audit, alleged violations were purportedly committed by him. He was placed under 1-mo preventive suspension. He protested. He alleges that charges against him had become academic when he was given clearance of all accountabilities.
- A day before end of suspension, he was terminated. He sued Alhambra. - Labor Arbiter found that the termination was for just cause, but there was a violation of due process (failure to furnish copy of audit report).
- Both parties appealed to NLRC which affirmed Arbiter’s findings.
ISSUE
WON NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining finding of Labor Arbiter that Rupisan was illegally dismissed but directing his reinstatement so he could have explained
HELD
YES
- Employment is no longer just an ordinary human acctivity. For most families the main source of their livelihood, employment has now leveled off with property rights which no one may be deprived of without due process of law.
- Termination of employment is not anymore a mere cessation or severance of contractual relationship but an economic phenomenon affecting members of the family. This explains why under the broad principles of social justice the dismissal of employees is adequately protected by the laws of the state. - A termination without just cause
entitles a worker to reinstatement regardless of whether he was accorded due process. On the other hand, termination of a worker for cause, even without procedural due process, does not warrant reinstatement, but the employer incurs liability for damages.
- Since the Labor Arbiter found a valid ground for dismissal, it erred when it directed reinstatement.
- To order reinstatement and compel the parties to start the procedure from step one would be circuitous because almost invariably that same issue of validity of the ground of dismissal would be brought back to the Labor Arbiter for adjudication. We laid down in Wenphil Corporation v. NLRC3 that an otherwise justly grounded termination without procedural due process would only sanction payment of damages
- Standards of due process in judicial as well as administrative proceedings have long been established. In its bare minimum due process of law simply means giving notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered.
- When the private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner, he was afforded the right to an investigation by the labor arbiter.
- Although belatedly, private respondent was afforded due process before the labor arbiter wherein the just cause of his dismissal had been established. With such finding, it would be arbitrary and unfair to order his reinstatement with backwages. - It will be highly prejudicial to the interests of the employer to impose on him the services of an employee who has been shown to be guilty of the charges that warranted his dismissal from employment. Indeed, it will demoralize the rank and file. - However, the petitioner must nevertheless be held to account for failure to extend to private respondent his right to an investigation before causing his dismissal. INTERORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES INC V NLRC (TAYONG) 235 SCRA 268 FELICIANO; August 11, 1994 NATURE
PETITION for reviewof a decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
FACTS
- Captain Rizalino Tayong, a licensed Master Mariner with experience in commanding ocean-going vessels, was employed on 1989 by petitioners for 1 yr as stated in his employment contract. He assumed command of petitioners’ vessel at the port of Hongkong. His instructions were to replenish bunker and diesel fuel, to sail to South Africa and there to load 120,000 metric tons of coal. However, while in HK and unwarding cargo, he received a weather report that a storm would hit HK, so precautionary measures were taken to secure the safety of the vessel and its crew, considering that the vessel’s
turbo-charger was leaking and the vessel was 14 yrs old. He also
followed-up the requisition by the former captain for supplies of oxygen and acetylene necessary for the welding-repair of the turbo-charger and the economizer.
-The vessel then sailed from HK for Singapore. Captain Tayong reported
a water leak from M.E. Turbo Chapter No. 2 Exhaust gas casing
so he was instructed to black off
the cooling water and maintain reduced RPM unless authorized by the owners. However, the vessel stopped in mid-ocean for 6 hrs and 45 minutes due to a leaking economizer. He was instructed to shut down the economizer and use the auxiliary boiler instead.
- The Chief Engineer reminded Captain Tayong that the oxygen and acetylene supplies had not been delivered. He then informed the shipowner that the departure of the vessel for South Africa may be affected because of the delay in the delivery of the supplies. The shipowner advised Captain Tayong to contact its technical director who
would provide a solution for the supply of said oxygen and acetylene. The technical director recommended to Captain Tayong that by shutting off the water to the turbo charger and using the auxiliary boiler, there should be no further problem. Captain
Tayong agreed to the
recommendation of the technical director, but communicated his reservations regarding proceeding to South Africa without the requested supplies. So the shipowner advised him to wait for the supplies.
- Finally, the vessel arrived at South Africa. However, Captain Tayong was instructed to turn-over his post to the new captain, and was repatriated to the Philippines after serving petitioners for around 2 wks. He was not informed of the charges against him, and was just sent a letter after arriving in the Philippines. He therefore instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal before the POEA, claiming his unpaid salary for the unexpired portion of the written employment contract, plus attorney’s fees.
- POEA: dismissed complaint, there
was valid cause for his untimely repatriation (the company alleged that due to Captain Tayong’s refusal to sail immediately to South Africa, the vessel was placed “off-hire” by the charterers, and the charterers refused to pay the charter hire or compensation corresponding to 12
hours, amounting to US
$15,500.00.They fired Captain Tayong for lost of confidence; POEA believed that the Captain’s concern for the oxygen and acetylene was not legitimate as these supplies were not necessary or indispensable for running the vessel.)
- NLRC: reversed and set aside POEA
decision because Captain Tayong had not been afforded an opportunity to be heard and that no substantial evidenced was adduced to establish the basis for petitioners’ loss of trust or confidence. Captain had acted in accordance with his duties to maintain the seaworthiness of the vessel and to insure the safety of the ship and crew.
WON Captain Tayong was arbitrarily dismissed and without cause as reasonably established in an appropriate investigation (whether
or not Captain Tayong had reasonable grounds to believe that the safety of the vessel and the crew under his command or the possibility of substantial delay at sea required him to wait for the delivery of the supplies needed for the repair of the turbo-charger and the economizer before embarking on the long voyage from Singapore to South Africa)
HELD
YES
Ratio It is well settled in this
jurisdiction that confidential and
managerial employees cannot be arbitrarily dismissed at any time, and without cause as reasonably established in an appropriate investigation. Such employees,
too, are entitled to security of tenure, fair standards of employment and the protection of labor laws.
Reasoning
- Captain Tayong was denied any
opportunity to defend himself. Petitioners curtly dismissed him from his command and summarily ordered his repatriation to the Philippines without informing him of the charge or charges against him, and much less giving him a chance to refute any such charge. In fact, it was only 2 months after his repatriation that Captain Tayong received a telegram dated 24 October 1989 from Inter-Orient requiring him to explain why he delayed sailing to South Africa. - NLRC’s conclusion was supported by substantial evidence: The official report of the technical director, which stated that a disruption in the normal functioning of the vessel’s turbo charger and economizer had prevented the full or regular operation of the vessel and that he was the one who recommended the reduction of RPM during the voyage to South Africa instead of waiting in Singapore for the supplies that would permit shipboard repair of the malfunctioning machinery and equipment, supported
NLRC’s conclusion that Captain Tayong did not arbitrarily and maliciously delay the voyage to South Africa.
- Captain Tayong's decision (arrived at after consultation with the vessel's Chief Engineer) to wait seven (7) hours in Singapore for the delivery on board the Oceanic Mindoro of the requisitioned supplies needed for the welding-repair, on board the ship, of the turbo-charger and the economizer equipment of the vessel, did not constitute merely arbitrary, capricious or grossly insubordinate behavior on his part. In the view of the NLRC, that decision of Captain Tayong did not constitute a legal basis for the summary dismissal of Captain Tayong and for termination of his contract with petitioners prior to the expiration of the term thereof.
Obiter
- The captain of a vessel is a
confidential and managerial employee within the meaning of the above doctrine. A master or
captain, for purposes of maritime commerce, is one who has command of a vessel. A captain commonly performs three (3) distinct roles: (1) he is a general agent of the shipowner; (2) he is also commander and technical director of the vessel; and (3) he is a representative of the country under whose flag he navigates. Of these roles, by far the
most important is the role performed by the captain as commander of the vessel; for such role (which, to our mind, is analogous to that of "Chief Executive Officer" [CEO] of a present-day corporate enterprise) has to do with the operation and preservation of the vessel during its voyage and the protection of the passengers (if any) and crew and cargo. In his role as general agent of the shipowner, the captain has authority to sign bills of lading, carry goods aboard and deal with the freight earned, agree upon rates and decide whether to take cargo. The ship captain, as agent of the shipowner, has legal authority to enter into contracts with respect to the vessel and the trading of the vessel, subject to applicable limitations established by statute, contract or
instructions and regulations of the shipowner. To the captain is committed the governance, care and management of the vessel. Clearly, the captain is vested with both management and fiduciary functions.
- Indeed, if the ship captain is convinced, as a reasonably prudent and competent mariner acting in good faith that the shipowner's or ship agent's instructions (insisted upon by radio or telefax from their officers thousand of miles away) will result, in the very specific circumstances facing him, in imposing unacceptable risks of loss or serious danger to ship or crew, he cannot casually seek
absolution from his
responsibility, if a marine casualty occurs, in such instructions. 23
- Compagnie de Commerce v. Hamburg: xxx where by the force of circumstances, a man has the duty cast upon him of taking some action for another, and under that obligation adopts a course which, to the judgment of a wise and prudent man, is apparently the best for the interest of the persons for whom he acts in a given emergency, it may properly be said of the course so taken that it was in a mercantile sense necessary to take it."
- ON management prerogative: that prerogative is nevertheless not to be exercised, in the case at bar, at the cost of loss of Captain Tayong's rights under his contract with petitioner's and under Philippine law.
Disposition petitioners having failed
to show grave abuse of discretion amounting to loss or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC in rendering its assailed decision, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners
COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN V ASSN OF EMPLOYEES
AND FACULTY OF LETRAN
340 SCRA 587
KAPUNAN; September 18, 2000
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- Private respondent Ambas, the newly elected president of the Association of Employees and Faculty of Letran (Union) wanted to continue the renegotiation of its CBA with petitioner Colegio de San Juan de Letran (Letran) for the last 2 years of the CBA’s 5 year lifetime. However, petitioner claimed the CBA was already prepared for signing by the parties. The CBA was submitted to a referendum by the union members, who rejected it.
- Petitioner accused the union officers of bargaining in bad faith before the NLRC which decided in favor of petitioner but was later reversed on appeal with the NLRC.
- The Union notified the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of its intention to strike on the grounds of petitioner’s refusal to bargain. Later, the parties agreed to disregard the unsigned CBA and start negotiating a new 5 year CBA for which the Union submitted its proposals. Ambas protested a recent changing of her schedule and petitioner sent the Union a letter dismissing Ambas for alleged insubordination after which the Union amended its notice of strike to include the said dismissal.
- Both parties again discussed the ground rules for the CBA renegotiation but petitioner stopped the negotiations after purportedly receiving information that a new group of employees (ACEC) filed a petition for certification election, giving rise to the issue of majority representation of the employees. - The Union finally went on strike and the Sec. of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction, ordering those on strike to return to work and for petitioner to accept them under the same terms before the strike. All were readmitted except Ambas. The Sec. issued an order declaring petitioner guilty of unfair labor practice and directing the reinstatement of Ambas with backwages. Letran’s MFR was
denied and the CA affirmed the Sec.’s decision, hence this petition.
ISSUES
1. WON petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the union
2. WON the termination of the Ambas amounts to an interference of the employee’s right to self-organization
HELD
1. YES
- Petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by its stern refusal to bargain in good faith with respondent union.
- Article 252 defines collective
bargaining as the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement. The Union, in sending its proposals during the 2nd
CBA negotiations, kept up its end of the bargain while Letran devised ways and means to prevent the negotiation. - Letran also failed to make a timely reply to the Union’s proposals (no counter-proposal a month later), violating Article 250 which requires such a reply within 10 days upon receipt of a written notice of said proposals. Letran’s refusal to reply is an indication of bad faith, showing a lack of sincere desire to negotiate. - In a last ditch effort, Letran suspended the bargaining process on the ground that it allegedly received information that ACEC had filed a petition for certification election. The mere filing of a petition for certification election does not ipso facto justify the suspension of negotiations when there is no legitimate representation issue raised; also, such an action for intervention had already prescribed.
2. YES
- While we recognize the right of the employer to terminate the services of an employee for just cause, the dismissal of employees must be made within the parameters of law and pursuant to the tenets of equity and fair play and must be exercised in good faith. It must not amount to interfering with, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization as it
would amount to unlawful labor practice under Article 248.
-It would appear that Letran terminated Ambas in order to strip the union of a leader who would fight for her co-workers’ rights at the bargaining table and frustrate their desire to form a new CBA. The charge of insubordination was a mere ploy to give a color of legality to the action to dismiss her. Management may have the prerogative to discipline its employees for insubordination but when it interferes with employees’ right to self-organization, it amounts to union-busting which is a prohibited act.
Disposition petition is DENIED for
lack of merit
FARROL V CA (RCPI)
325 SCRA 331
YNARES-SANTIAGA; February 10, 2000
FACTS
- Wenifrado Farrol was the station cashier of RCPI Cotabato City Station. - There was a P50K cash shortage in the branch’s Peragram Petty Cash Funds. Farrol was required to explain the cash shortage. He paid to P25K to RCPI
- He was then required to explain why he should not be dismissed. Petitioner wrote to the Field Auditor stating that the missing funds were used for the payment of the retirement benefits earlier referred by the Branch Manager and that he already paid P25k. After he made 2 more payments of the cash shortage, he was placed under preventive suspensions. He still made 2 payments of the balance.
- RCPI then sent Farrol a letter informing him of the termination of his services for alleging that part of the cash shortage was used for payment of salaries and retirement benefits, disregard of policies
involving statistical reports,
malversation/misappropriation (which is a ground for dismissal), and loss of trust and confidence.
- Unaware of the termination letter, he requested his reinstatement since
his preventive suspension had expired. Ferrol even manifested his willingness to settle the case. RCPI informed him that his employment had already been terminated. The conflict was sent to the grievance committee. Two years later, it was submitted for voluntary arbitration. - VA ruled in favor of Farrol. RCPI filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which reversed VA decision. CA also dismissed MFR.
- Farrol now filed a petition for review on certiorari on the ground that his dismissal was illegal because he was not afforded due process and that he cannot be held liable for the loss of trust and confidence reposed in him.
ISSUE
WON he was illegally terminated
HELD
YES
- BOP resides on the employer to prove that there was valid cause for dismissal, and that he was afforded the opportunity to be heard and defend himself.
- For the 1st notice, RCPI required
petitioner to explain why he failed to account for the shortage. The 2nd
notice was that informing Farrol of his termination. it does not clearly cite the reasons for dismissal, nor were there facts and circumstances in support thereof.
- Even assuming there was a breach of trust and confidence, there was no evidence that Farrol was a managerial employee. The term “trust and confidence” is restricted to managerial employees.
- RCPI alleges that under its rules, petitioner’s infarction is punishable by dismissal. However, employer’s rules cannot preclude the state from inquiring whether strict and rigid application or interpretation would be too harsh to the employee. This is
Farrol’s 1st offense, to which the Court
holds that dismissal is too harsh and grossly disproportionate.
Disposition CA is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and new one entered REINSTATING the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator subject to the MODIFICATION that petitioner’s separation pay be recomputed to
include the period within which backwages are due. For this purpose, this case is REMANDED to the Voluntary Arbitrator for proper
computation of backwages,
separation pay, 13th month pay, sick leave conversion and vacation leave conversion. VH MANUFACTURING INC V NLRC (GAMIDO) 322 SCRA 417 DE LEON; January 19, 2000 NATURE
Before us is a petition for certiorari
FACTS
- Since November 5, 1985 Gamido was employed in VH Manufacturing’s business of manufacturing liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders. He served as a quality control inspector with the principal duty of inspecting LPG cylinders for any possible defects. His service with the company was abruptly interrupted on February 14, 1995, when he was served a notice of termination of his employment. - His dismissal stemmed from an incident on February 10, 1995 wherein VH’s company President, Alejandro Dy Juanco, allegedly caught private Gamido sleeping on the job. On that same day, private respondent was asked through a written notice from the petitioner’s Personnel Department to explain within twenty-four (24) hours why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for his violation of Company Rule 15-b which provides for a penalty of separation for sleeping during working hours. Without delay, private respondent replied in a letter which reads: "Sir, ipagpaumanhin po ninyo
kung nakapikit ako sa aking puwesto dahil hinihintay ko po ang niliha hi Abreu para i quality pasensiya na po kung hindi ko po namalayan ang pagdaan ninyo dahil maingay po ang painting booth." Notwithstanding his
foregoing reply, he was terminated. - Feeling aggrieved, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, praying for reinstatement to his position as quality control inspector. Labor Arbiter declared that Gamido’s dismissal is
anchored on a valid and just cause. NLRC reversed the decision.
ISSUE
WON Gamido’s dismissal was too harsh a penaltly for his violation of company rule 15-b
HELD
YES
- Basically, the reason cited for the dismissal of private respondent is sleeping on the job in violation of Company Rule 15-b. But according to Gamido, he was not sleeping on the job but was merely idle, waiting for the next cylinder to be checked. - In view of the gravity of the penalty of separation, as provided by the Company Rules and Regulation., in termination disputes, the burden of proof is always on the employer to prove that the dismissal was for a just and valid cause. What is at stake here is not only the job itself of the employee but also his regular income therefrom which is the means of livelihood of his family.
- A thorough review of the record discloses that, contrary to the findings of the Labor Arbiter, petitioner’s claim that private respondent slept on the job was not substantiated by any convincing evidence other than the bare allegation of the officer.
- Next, VH’s reliance on the authorities it cited that sleeping on the job is always a valid ground for dismissal, is misplaced. The authorities cited involved security guards whose duty necessitates that they be awake and watchful at all times inasmuch as their function, to use the words in Luzon Stevedoring
Corp. v. Court of Industrial Relations,
is "to protect the company from pilferage or loss." Accordingly, the doctrine laid down in those cases is not applicable to the case at bar. - Finally, while an employer enjoys a wide latitude of discretion in the promulgation of policies, rules and regulations on work-related activities of the employees, those directives, however, must always be fair and reasonable, and the corresponding
penalties, when prescribed, must be commensurate to the offense involved and to the degree of the
infraction. In the case at bar, the dismissal meted out on private respondent for allegedly sleeping on the job, under the attendant circumstances, appears to be too harsh a penalty, considering that he was being held liable for first time, after nine 9 of unblemished service, for an alleged offense which caused no prejudice to the employer, aside from absence of substantiation of the alleged offense. Neither was it shown
that private respondent’s alleged negligence or neglect of duty, if any, was gross and habitual. Thus, reinstatement is just and proper.
Disposition petition is hereby
DISMISSED, and the challenged Decision and Order of public respondent NLRC are AFFIRMED.
CEBU FILVENEER CORPORATION V NLRC (VILLAFLOR)
286 SCRA 556 PUNO; February 24, 1998
FACTS
- Villaflor was the chief accountant of CFC. The top execs were Italians: Cordaro (president), Kun (GM), Marinoni (Production manager). Guillermo was the accounting clerk of Villaflor.
- Kun resigned from the company and asked for the liquidation of his investment: P125k. Two weeks later, he asked Guillermo for a blank check and a blank check voucher. Guillermo gave him. Three days later, Villlaflor noticed that a check voucher was missing. She asked Guillermo, who said that Mr. Kun has it.
- Villaflor immediately informed Mr. Cordaro of what happened. She also wrote to the bank demanding the return of the encashed check.
- Marinoni charged Villaflor of complicity in Kun’s irregular disbursement of company funds. Two days later, she was prevented entry to the office by the security guards. Her office drawer and safe were also forcibly opened upon order of Marinoni. Villaflor reported the incident to the PNP.
- Marinoni suspended her for 30 days without pay for failure to come to work for half a day (the day she was
prevented entry). The next day she was preventively suspended for 30 days pending investigation of her involvement in Kun’s booboo. The company also printed a newspaper ad for an accountant.
- Villaflor filed for illegal dismissal with the LA. LA decided in her favor. NLRC affirmed.
ISSUE
WON Villaflor was illegally dismissed
HELD
YES
- Due to its far reaching implications, our Labor Code decrees that an employee cannot be dismissed, except for the most serious causes. Article 282 enumerates the causes for which the employer may terminate an employee.
- Company says it’s loss of trust. The SC said that Villaflor’s omission cannot be described as “willful” to justify dismissal. A breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely. Petitioners merely proved the omission of the private respondent but there is no evidence whatsoever that it was done intentionally.
- Company says she’s grossly or habitually negligent in the performance of her duties. The SC said that since she has not been remiss in the performance of her duties in the past, she can’t be charged with habitual negligence. Neither is her negligence gross in
character. Gross negligence
implies a want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. She had not the
slightest reason to distrust Kun because he was the GM and appears to have conducted himself well in the performance of his duties in the past. At most, it’s error of judgment, not gross negligence.
Disposition NLRC decision affirmed.
GOLDEN THREAD KNITTING INDUSTIRES V NLRC (MACASPAC)
304 SCRA 720
BELLOSILLO; March 11, 1999
NATURE
Petition to review decision of NLRC
FACTS
- several employees of Golden Thread Knitting Industries (GTK) were dismissed for different reasons. 2 employees were allegedly for slashing the company’s products (towels), 2 for redundancy, 1 for threatening the personnel manager and violating the company rules, and 1 for abandonment of work.
- The laborers filed complaints for illegal dismissal. They allege that the company dismissed them in retaliation for establishing and being members of the Labor Union.
GTK, on the other hand, contend that there were valid causes for the terminations. The dismissals were allegedly a result of the slashing of their products, rotation of work, which in turn was caused by the low demand for their products, and abandonment of work. WRT to the cases involving the slashing of their products and threats to the personnel manager, the dismissals were in effect a form of punishment.
- The labor arbiter ruled partially in favor of GTK. He said that there was no showing that the dismissals were in retaliation for establishing a union. He, however, awarded separation pay to some employees.
- NLRC, however, appreciated the evidence differently. It held that there was illegal dismissal and ordered reinstatement.
ISSUE
WON there was illegal dismissal
HELD
YES
Ratio Dismissal is the ultimate
penalty that can be meted to an employee. It must therefore be based on a clear and not on an ambiguous or ambivalent ground.
Reasoning
- WRT to the case involving slashing of towels, the employees were not given procedural due process. There was no notice and hearing, only
outright denial of their entry to the work premises by the security guards. The charges of serious misconduct were not sufficiently proved.
- WRT to the employees dismissed for redundancy, there was also denial of procedural due process. Hearing and notice were not observed. Thus, although the characterization of an employee’s services is a management function, it must first be proved with evidence, which was not done in this case. the company cannot merely declare that it was overmanned. - WRT to the employee dismissed for disrespect, the SC believed the story version of the company (which essentially said that the personnel manager was threatened upon mere service of a suspension order to the employee), but ruled that the dismissal could not be upheld.
“the dismissal will not be upheld where it appears that the employee’s act of disrespect was provoked by the employer. xxx the employee hurled incentives at the personnel manager because she was provoked by the baseless suspension imposed on her. The penalty of dismissal must be commensurate with the act, conduct, or omission to the employee.”
- The dismissal was too harsh a penalty; a suspension of 1 week would have sufficed.
“GTK exercised their authority to dismiss without due regard to the provisions of the Labor Code. The right to terminate should be utilized with extreme caution because its immediate effect is to put an end to an employee's present means of livelihood while its distant effect, upon a subsequent finding of illegal dismissal, is just as pernicious to the employer who will most likely be required to reinstate the subject employee and grant him full back wages and other benefits.
Disposition Decision AFFIRMED
CENTRAL PANGASINAN ELECTRIC COOP INC V MACARAEG
395 SCRA 720
PUNO; January 22, 2003
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- De Vera was employed as teller and
Geronima Macaraeg as cashier by
Central Pangasinan Electric
cooperative inc. They accommodated and encashed two hundred eleven crossed checks of Evelyn Joy Estrada (de Vera’s sister) amounting to P6,945,128.95 payable to the cooperative despite the absence of any transaction or any outstanding obligation with it. They credited the checks as part of their collection and deposited the same together with their cash collection to the coop’s account at the Rural Bank of Central Pangasinan.
- The finance department noticed these checks which bounced (insufficient funds).De Vera and Macaraeg were confronted with the discovery. De Vera admitted that the checks were issued by her sister and that she encashed them from the money collected from petitioner’s customers.
- De Vera testified and admitted that she encashed the checks of Evelyn Joy Estrada because the latter is her older sister. Macaraeg admitted that she knew of the accommodations given by respondent de Vera to her sister; that she allowed her subordinate to do it because respondent de Vera is her kumare, and that she knew that Mrs. Estrada’s checks were sufficiently funded.
- On March 19, 1999, on the basis of the findings and recommendation of Atty. Fernandez (presided over the hearing), the General Manager issued to respondents separate notices of termination for “serious misconduct, and breach of trust and confidence reposed on them by management.” - Respondents questioned their dismissal before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB),claiming that their dismissal was without just cause and in violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), which requires that the case should first be brought before a grievance committee.
Eventually, the parties agreed to submit the case to a voluntary arbitrator for arbitration.
- LA-ruled in favor of defendants and ordered their reinstatement
CA-affirmed
ISSUES
1. WON the procedure leading to the termination of respondents Maribeth de Vera and Geronima Macaraeg was in violation of the provisions of the CBA
2. WON the respondents were validly dismissed
HELD
1. Issue is moot and academic - The parties’ active participation in the voluntary arbitration proceedings, and their failure to insist that the case be remanded to the grievance machinery, shows a clear intention on their part to have the issue of respondents’ illegal dismissal directly resolved by the voluntary arbitrator. 2. YES
- The respondents were validly dismissed. Article 282(c) of the Labor Code allows an employer to dismiss employees for willful breach of trust or loss of confidence. Proof beyond reasonable doubt of their misconduct is not required, it being sufficient that there is some basis for the same or that the employer has reasonable ground to believe that they are responsible for the misconduct and their participation therein rendered them unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded of their position.
Reasoning
- the acts of the respondents were clearly inimical to the financial interest of the petitioner. During the
investigation, they admitted
accommodating Evelyn Joy Estrada by encashing her checks from its funds for more than a year. They did so without petitioner’s knowledge, much less its permission.
- there was willful breach of trust on the respondents’ part, as they took advantage of their highly sensitive positions to violate their duties. - the acts of the respondents caused damage to the petitioner. During those times the checks were illegally
encashed, petitioner was not able to fully utilize the collections, primarily in servicing its debts.
- it is not material that they did not “misappropriate any amount of money, nor incur any shortage relative to the funds in their possession.” The basic premise for dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence is that the employees concerned hold positions of trust. The betrayal of this trust is the essence of the offence for which an employee is penalized.
- the respondents held positions of utmost trust and confidence. As teller and cashier, respectively, they are expected to possess a high degree of fidelity. They are entrusted with a considerable amount of cash. Respondent de Vera accepted
payments from petitioner’s
consumers while respondent
Macaraeg received remittances for deposit at petitioner’s bank. They did not live up to their duties and obligations.
SALVADOR V PHILIPPINE MINING SERVICE CORP
395 SCRA 729 PUNO; January 22, 2003
FACTS
- JOSE V. SALVADOR was first employed by respondent in 1981. He rose from the ranks and assumed the position of Plant Inspection Foreman in 1991. He was tasked to: (1) supervise plant equipment and facility inspection; (2) confirm actual defects; (3) establish inspection standards and frequency; (4) analyze troubles and recommend counter measures; and (5) prepare weekly/monthly inspection schedule.[3]
- As early as March 1, 1985, respondent instituted the “shift boss” scheme whereby the foreman from the Plant Section and the foreman from the Mining Section rotate as shift boss throughout their night shift to oversee and supervise both the mining and plant operations. The shift boss was entrusted with the care, supervision and protection of the entire plant.
- Aside from his employment with respondent, petitioner co-owned and managed LHO-TAB Enterprises, with his partner Ondo Alcantara. They were engaged in the manufacture and sale of hollow blocks. On September 29, 1997, petitioner’s employment relation with respondent was tainted with charges of pilferage and violation of company rules and policy, resulting to loss of confidence. Respondent’s evidence disclose that on September 29, 1997, at about 9:30 a.m., Koji
Sawa, respondent’s Assistant
Resident Manager for Administration, was on his way back to his office in the plant. He and his driver, Roberto Gresones, saw petitioner operating respondent’s payloader, scooping fine ore from the stockpile and loading it on his private cargo truck. As the truck was blocking the access road leading to the stockyard’s gate, Sawa’s car stopped near the stockpile and the driver blew the horn thrice. Petitioner did not hear him because of the noise emanating from his operation of the payloader. Sawa’s driver found a chance to pass through when the payloader maneuvered to get another scoop from the fine ore stockpile.
- As it was contrary to respondent’s standard operating procedure for the plant foreman to operate the payloader, Sawa went to the administration office to check the delivery receipt covering the loading operation of petitioner that morning. However, sales-in-charge Eduardo Guangco was in the wharf, overseeing the loading of respondent’s product. Hence, it was only in the afternoon that Sawa was able to verify the delivery receipt covering petitioner’s loading transaction. The delivery receipt showed that it was dolomite spillage that was purchased by buyer Ondo Alcantara, not the fine ore that he saw petitioner loading on his truck. The receipt also showed it was not the respondent but Alcantara, the buyer, who was responsible for loading the spillage he purchased from the plant. - On the basis of the foregoing facts PMSC terminated Salvador for pilferage of company property. Labor Arbiter and NLRC ruled in favor of
Salvador but CA reversed. Hence, this recourse.
ISSUES
1. WON the charge of pilferage against petitioner was supported by substantial evidence to warrant his dismissal from the service
2. WON the employer was well within its rights in imposing a harsh penalty considering the length of the employee’s service
HELD
1. YES
Ratio The settled rule in
administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings is that proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required in determining the legality of an employer’s dismissal of an employee, and not even a preponderance of evidence is necessary as substantial evidence is considered sufficient. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence or relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise. Thus, substantial evidence is the least demanding in the hierarchy of evidence.
Reasoning
- The Labor Code provides that an
employer may terminate the services of an employee for just cause and this must be supported by substantial evidence. In the case at bar, our evaluation of the evidence of both parties indubitably shows that petitioner’s dismissal for loss of trust and confidence was duly supported by substantial evidence.
2. NO
Ratio As a general rule, employers
are allowed wider latitude of discretion in terminating the employment of managerial employees as they perform functions which require the employer’s full trust and confidence.
Reasoning
- To be sure, length of service is taken into consideration in imposing the penalty to be meted an erring employee. However, the case at bar involves dishonesty and pilferage by petitioner which resulted in
respondent’s loss of confidence in him. Unlike other just causes for dismissal, trust in an employee, once lost is difficult, if not impossible, to regain. Moreover, petitioner was not an ordinary rank-and-file employee. He occupied a high position of responsibility. As foreman and shift boss, he had over-all control of the care, supervision and operations of respondent’s entire plant. It cannot be over-emphasized that there is no substitute for honesty for sensitive positions which call for utmost trust. Fairness dictates that respondent should not be allowed to continue with the employment of petitioner who has breached the confidence reposed on him.
- In the case at bar, respondent has every right to dismiss petitioner, a managerial employee, for breach of trust and loss of confidence as a measure of self-preservation against acts patently inimical to its interests. Indeed, in cases of this nature, the fact that petitioner has been employed with the respondent for a long time, if to be considered at all, should be taken against him, as his act of pilferage reflects a regrettable lack of loyalty which he should have strengthened, instead of betrayed.
Disposition The petition is DENIED.
HABANA V NLRC (HOTEL NIKKO)
298 SCRA 537 KAPUNAN; November 16, 1998
NATURE
Petition for certiorari seeking reversal of NLRC decision which affirmed LA
FACTS
- On March 16, 1989,
petitioner Antonio Habana was employed by Hotel Nikko Manila Garden (Nikko) as Rooms Division Director (RDD). One of his tasks as RDD was to conduct regular and surprise inspection of all work areas to ensure quality of performance. In the course of his employment, petitioner
encountered several
problems: his frequent clashes with Dolores Samson (his Senior Rooms Mgr) - ; frequent absence and
tardiness; rampant violations of hotel rules due to his failure to effectively manage his own division; and complaints regarding the overall quality (or lack thereof) of service of Nikko. As a result, private respondent Mr. Okawa, who replaced private respondent Mr. Yokoo as the executive asst. for Sales, issued a memorandum instructing petitioner, along with 2 others, to conduct and report daily inspection of the guestrooms and public areas.
Petitioner sent a
memorandum of protest claiming that Mr. Okawa’s orders was a form of harassment to “ease him out of his position” and illustrated in detail the other forms of alleged harassment supposedly perpetrated by Mr. Okawa.
He, however, manifested that he had no intention to resign.
- But on May 2, 1990, petitioner went to the Hotel’s Comptroller asking for his severance pay of P120,000 plus accrued benefits of P11, 865.28. The check was not given to him until he submitted his resignation letter (part of standard procedure). He also executed an Affidavit of Quitclaim, along with his resignation. The very next day, however, respondents received a letter from petitioner (addressed to Mr. Okawa) who insisted that he was forced to resign because he could no longer endure Mr. Okawa’s acts of harassment against him. 2 weeks later, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages against Hotel Nikko and its officers, including his direct superiors, Yokoo and Okawa. The LA dismissed the complaint finding that petitioner voluntarily resigned and that the alleged acts of harassment were non-existent. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA’s decision likewise finding that petitioner
voluntarily resigned as manifested by his act of negotiating for a huge amount of separation pay. When his MFR was dismissed, he came to the SC.
ISSUE
WON the resignation was forced upon Habana or he did so voluntarily
HELD
The resignation was voluntary.
Ratio Voluntary resignation is the
voluntary act of an employee who “finds himself in a situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service and he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment.”
Reasoning
- In this case, petitioner was clearly having trouble performing his job, which undeniably carries immense responsibilities. Notable too was petitioner’s failure to see eye to eye with his immediate bosses, Mr. Yokoo and Mr. Okawa. Because of these difficulties, it was quite reasonable for petitioner to think of, and eventually, relinquishing his position voluntarily (and get a fat sum as severance pay in the bargain) instead of waiting to be fired.
- Petitioner laments that he was completely stripped of his powers and functions as Director when Mr. Okawa tasked him with inspecting the hotel’s guest and public areas. Conducting these daily inspections, in effect, demoted him to a mere room inspector “one notch higher than a bellboy.” He claims that the humiliation he endured in going room to room, inspecting toilets and garbage areas, was all part of a malicious scheme to harass him out of his position. These orders were not borne out of mere whim and caprice. They were made in response to the complaints they were getting. Moreover, these measures executed by the hotel’s top management were legitimate exercise of management prerogatives.
- Petitioner asserts that private respondents coerced and intimidated him to resigning through their collective acts of harassment.
Contrariwise, private respondents contend that it was petitioner who approached them indicating his desire to resign due to his difficulty in coping with his responsibilities and his differences with his immediate boss, Mr. Okawa.
- Petitioner could not have been intimidated by private respondents to quit. In his memorandum, petitioner emphatically vowed not to resign despite private respondents’ alleged acts of harassment. Surprisingly, however, after only a few days he did quit alleging that he was forced and harassed to do so. If petitioner was adamant in his intention not to be coerced into leaving, how could he suddenly be forced to resign? Petitioner glaringly contradicted himself. His excuse is thus, unbelievable and unjustifiable. - Moreover, the issue in this case is factual in nature and firm is the principle that “factual findings of the NLRC, particularly when they coincide with those of the LA, are accorded respect, even finality, and will not be disturbed for as long as such findings are supported by substantial evidence.” We have painstaking reviewed the records of this case and we find no justifiable reason to overturn the findings of both the LA and the NLRC.
Disposition Petition is DISMISSED
HABANA V NLRC (HOTEL NIKKO)
298 SCRA 537
KAPUNAN; November 16, 1998
NATURE
Petition for certiorari seeking reversal of NLRC decision which affirmed LA
FACTS
- On March 16, 1989,
petitioner Antonio Habana was employed by Hotel Nikko Manila Garden (Nikko) as Rooms Division Director (RDD). One of his tasks as RDD was to conduct regular and surprise inspection of all work areas to ensure quality of performance. In the course
of his employment, petitioner
encountered several
problems: his frequent clashes with Dolores Samson (his Senior Rooms Mgr) - ; frequent absence and
tardiness; rampant violations of hotel rules due to his failure to effectively manage his own division; and complaints regarding the overall quality (or lack thereof) of service of Nikko. As a result, private respondent Mr. Okawa, who replaced private respondent Mr. Yokoo as the executive asst. for Sales, issued a memorandum instructing petitioner, along with 2 others, to conduct and report daily inspection of the guestrooms and public areas.
Petitioner sent a
memorandum of protest claiming that Mr. Okawa’s orders was a form of harassment to “ease him out of his position” and illustrated in detail the other forms of alleged harassment supposedly perpetrated by Mr. Okawa.
He, however, manifested that he had no intention to resign.
- But on May 2, 1990, petitioner went to the Hotel’s Comptroller asking for his severance pay of P120,000 plus accrued benefits of P11, 865.28. The check was not given to him until he submitted his resignation letter (part of standard procedure). He also executed an Affidavit of Quitclaim, along with his resignation. The very next day, however, respondents received a letter from petitioner (addressed to Mr. Okawa) who insisted that he was forced to resign because he could no longer endure Mr. Okawa’s acts of harassment against him. 2 weeks later, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages against Hotel Nikko and its officers, including his direct superiors, Yokoo and Okawa. The LA dismissed the complaint finding that petitioner voluntarily resigned and that the alleged acts of harassment were non-existent. On appeal, the
NLRC affirmed the LA’s decision likewise finding that petitioner voluntarily resigned as manifested by his act of negotiating for a huge amount of separation pay. When his MFR was dismissed, he came to the SC.
ISSUE
WON the resignation was forced upon Habana or he did so voluntarily
HELD
The resignation was voluntary.
Ratio Voluntary resignation is the
voluntary act of an employee who “finds himself in a situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service and he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment.”
Reasoning
- In this case, petitioner was clearly having trouble performing his job, which undeniably carries immense responsibilities. Notable too was petitioner’s failure to see eye to eye with his immediate bosses, Mr. Yokoo and Mr. Okawa. Because of these difficulties, it was quite reasonable for petitioner to think of, and eventually, relinquishing his position voluntarily (and get a fat sum as severance pay in the bargain) instead of waiting to be fired.
- Petitioner laments that he was completely stripped of his powers and functions as Director when Mr. Okawa tasked him with inspecting the hotel’s guest and public areas. Conducting these daily inspections, in effect, demoted him to a mere room inspector “one notch higher than a bellboy.” He claims that the humiliation he endured in going room to room, inspecting toilets and garbage areas, was all part of a malicious scheme to harass him out of his position. These orders were not borne out of mere whim and caprice. They were made in response to the complaints they were getting. Moreover, these measures executed by the hotel’s top management were legitimate exercise of management prerogatives.
- Petitioner asserts that private respondents coerced and intimidated
him to resigning through their collective acts of harassment. Contrariwise, private respondents contend that it was petitioner who approached them indicating his desire to resign due to his difficulty in coping with his responsibilities and his differences with his immediate boss, Mr. Okawa.
- Petitioner could not have been intimidated by private respondents to quit. In his memorandum, petitioner emphatically vowed not to resign despite private respondents’ alleged acts of harassment. Surprisingly, however, after only a few days he did quit alleging that he was forced and harassed to do so. If petitioner was adamant in his intention not to be coerced into leaving, how could he suddenly be forced to resign? Petitioner glaringly contradicted himself. His excuse is thus, unbelievable and unjustifiable. - Moreover, the issue in this case is factual in nature and firm is the principle that “factual findings of the NLRC, particularly when they coincide with those of the LA, are accorded respect, even finality, and will not be disturbed for as long as such findings are supported by substantial evidence.” We have painstaking reviewed the records of this case and we find no justifiable reason to overturn the findings of both the LA and the NLRC.
Disposition Petition is DISMISSED
FUJITSU COMPUTER PRODUCTS OF THE PHILS V CA (DE GUZMAN,
ALVAREZ)
454 SCRA 737 CALLEJO SR; April 8, 2000
NATURE
A petition for review assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals in reversing the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
FACTS
- Petitioner Fujitsu Computer Products Corporation of the Philippines (FCPP) is a corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws engaged in the manufacture of hard
disc drives, MR heads and other computer storage devices for export. - Respondent Victor de Guzman began working for FCPP on September 21, 1997 as Facilities Section Manager. As of 1999, he was also holding in a concurrent capacity the position of Coordinator ISO 14000 Secretariat. Allan Alvarez, on the other hand, was employed as a Senior Engineer on April 21, 1998. He was assigned at the Facilities Department under the supervision of respondent De Guzman.
- The garbage and scrap materials of FCPP were collected and bought by the Saro’s Trucking Services and Enterprises (Saro’s). On January 15, 1999, respondent De Guzman as Facilities Section Manager, for and in behalf of FCPP, signed a Garbage Collection Agreement with Saro’s, and the latter’s signatory therein was its owner and general manager, Larry Manaig.
- De Guzman served as middleman between Sta. Rosa Bible Baptist Church and Saro. The Church was looking for scrap metal, and was willing to buy the purlins at P3. The scrap metal was then delivered from FCPP to Sta. Rosa Bible Baptist Church.
- Ernesto Espinosa, HRD and General Affairs Director of FCPP, received a disturbing report from Manaig. Manaig reported that respondent De Guzman had caused the “anomalous disposal of steel [purlins] owned by FCPP.” Two of Manaig’s employees, Roberto Pumarez and Ma. Theresa S. Felipe, executed written statements detailing how respondent De Guzman had ordered the steel purlins to be brought out. Thereafter, petitioner Espinosa sent a two-page Inter-Office Memorandum dated July 24, 1999 to respondent De Guzman, effectively placing him under preventive suspension.
- On July 28, 1999, respondent Alvarez sent an e-mail message to his co-employees, expressing sympathy for the plight of respondent De Guzman. Respondent Alvarez used a different computer, but the event viewer system installed in the premises of petitioner FCPP was able to trace the e-mail message to him. Respondent
Alvarez submitted a written Explanation dated September 29, 1999 where he apologized, readily admitted that he was the sender of the e-mail message in question, and claimed that he “acted alone with his own conviction.” He alleged, however, that he was only expressing his sentiments, and that he was led by his desire to help a friend in distress. - Respondent Alvarez was informed that his services were terminated on the ground of serious misconduct effective August 13, 1999.
Respondent De Guzman’s
employment was, thereafter,
terminated effective August 23, 1999 through an Inter-Office Memorandum. - The respondents then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitioners with prayer for reinstatement, full backwages, damages and attorney’s fees before the NLRC. Labor Arbiter Antonio R. Macam ruled in favor of FCPP, stating that it was justified in terminating the employment of the respondents. According to the Labor Arbiter, respondent De Guzman, a managerial employee, was validly dismissed for loss of trust and confidence. Citing a number of cases,[24] the Labor Arbiter stressed that where an employee holds position of trust and confidence, the employer is given wider latitude of discretion in terminating his services for just cause.
- The NLRC sustained the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the respondents’ appeal for lack of merit. The NLRC also affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s finding that respondent De Guzman, a managerial employee who was routinely charged with the custody and care of the petitioner’s property, was validly dismissed on the ground of willful breach of trust and confidence. In so far as the dismissal of respondent Alvarez was concerned, the Commission held that the circumstances surrounding the sending of the clearly “malicious and premeditated e-mail message” constituted no less than serious misconduct. Hence, respondent Alvarez’s dismissal was also justified under the circumstances.
- The CA reversed the ruling of the NLRC and held that the respondents were illegally dismissed. According to the appellate court, the non-payment of the scrap steel purlins by the Sta. Rosa Bible Baptist Church (Sta. Rosa) to Saro’s was not a valid cause for the dismissal of respondent De Guzman. Contrary to the findings of the Labor Arbiter, respondent De Guzman did not betray the trust reposed on him by his employer, as the transaction involving the sale of scrap steel purlins was between Sta. Rosa and Saro’s. Anent the dismissal of respondent Alvarez, the CA ruled that his act of “sympathizing and believing in the innocence of respondent De Guzman and expressing his views” was not of such grave character as to be considered serious misconduct which warranted the penalty of dismissal.
ISSUES
1. WON De Guzman is guilty of breach of confidence, thus warranting dismissal
2. WON Alvarez committed serious misconduct in sending the e-mail
HELD
1. NO
- De Guzman is not guilty of breach of confidence.
Ratio To be a valid ground for
dismissal, loss of trust and confidence must be based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts. A breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. It must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer’s arbitrariness, whims, caprices or suspicion; otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the employer. In order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act complained of must be work-related and shows that the employee concerned is unfit to continue working for the employer.
Reasoning
- The term “trust and confidence” is restricted to managerial employees. In this case, it is undisputed that
