________________________________________________________________________ 1. HEIRS OF PEDRO LOPEZ vs. DE CASTRO
324 SCRA 591-618, February 3, 2000 FACTS:
In this case, two applications for registration of the same parcel of land were filed in different branches of the Court of First Instance. The certificates of title were issued in the name of respondent de Castro, while the other, for the heirs of Pedro Lopez was still pending.
On July 25, 1956, Pedro Lopez et al. filed an application for the registration of a 69-hectare parcel of land in Tagaytay City with the CFI of Cavite.
On June 24, 1957, Assistant Fiscal Legaspi, representing the Municipality of Silang Cavite, submitted an opposition on behalf of the municipality. The opposition was amended alleging that the subject lot had been its patrimonial property since 1930 or earlier.
In their answer, the applicants claimed that a part of the whole tract of land they sought to register was their inheritance. The municipality filed a motion to dismiss.
On February 7, 1969, the lower court issued an order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit on the ground that the oppositor municipality had no personality to intervene considering that Lot 1 was outside of its territorial limits.
The municipality filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order. The court denied it in its July 23, 1970 order.
The applicants filed a motion praying that the clerk of court be commissioned to receive evidence for them it appearing that the order of July 23, 1970 had become final and executor “by virtue of which the municipality of Silang no longer had any personality. The court granted said motion and directed clerk of court to submit a report.
In his report, dated April 15, 1971, clerk of court Rolando Diaz stated that since time immemorial, the Delos Reyes’ owned and possessed parcel of land in question. On November 3, 1870, they sold it to Dimaranan. On September 15, 1892, the property was passed to Pedro Lopez de Leon, Sr. And Maxima Trinidad until their death when their children took over ownership and possession thereof. Upon their death, their respective heirs succeeded over the property and on February 25, 1971, they partitioned it.
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On April 19, 1971, the court rendered a decision approving the report of the clerk of court and ordering the decree of title be issued in favor of the applicants (Lopez’).
In the course of examining the records for the purpose of issuing the decree of registration in favor of Pedro Lopez, et al., the Land Registration Commission discovered that lot 1 had been decreed in favor of private respondent Honesto de Castro, et al.
Further investigation revealed that sometime in 1967, Honesto de castro et al. sought the registration of the same parcel of land in question and succeeded in declaring it in their names.
On August 19, 1981, the CFI of Cavite issued an order declaring the court had lost jurisdiction, without however dismissing the case.
Seven (7) years later, on June 28, 1988, the heirs of Pedro Lopez filed a complaint “for execution of judgement and cancellation of land titles of the defendants and their successors-in-interest” before the RTC of Cavite.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the titles issued to the defendants be cancelled?
HELD:
No. In land registration proceedings, all interested parties are obliged to take care of their interest and to zealously pursue their objective of registration on account of the rule that whoever first acquires title to a piece of land shall prevail. Where more than one certificate of title is issued over the land, the person holding a prior certificate is entitled to the land, as against a person who relies on a subsequent certificate. This rule refers to the date of the certificate of title, not the date of filing.
Petitioners failed to exercise the due diligence required of them as applicants for land registration. In the year 1981, the CFI of Cavite issued an order regarding the case-stating that it had lost jurisdiction regarding the case. With this, petitioners were presumed to have been notified of the land
registration proceedings filed by private respondent. They let seven years to pass from such discovery before they acted to revive what already was a
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dormant judgment. In short, they were guilty of laches-negligence/failure to do that which is ought to be done.
Sec. 32. Review of decree of registration (Presidential Decree 1529) The decree of registration shall not be reopened by reason of absence, minority or other disability, subject, however, to the right of any person...deprived of land, to file in the proper Court of CFI a petition for reopening and review not later than ONE YEAR.
Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible.
Hence, the heirs of Pedro Lopez lost their property in favor of Honesto de Castro.
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2. THE DIRECTOR OF LAND vs. COURT OF APPEALS 276 SCRA 276
FACTS:
On December 8, 1986, respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of title over a parcel of land. During the pendency of the petition, applicant died, he was substituted by his heirs, which was represented by their aunt Josefa Abestado.
The Land Registration Court dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction. In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned that applicants failed to comply with the provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529 requiring the applicants to publish the notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. It was only published in the official gazette. Consequently, the court has not acquired jurisdiction over the instant application with want of compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not newspaper publication is mandatory in a land registration case?
HELD:
Yes. Under the provision of section 23 of PD 1529, the public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application of land registration by means of publication, mailing and posting. Upon receipt of the order of court setting time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the official gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
Publication in a newspaper of general circulation is mandatory, the reason is due process and the reality that the official gazette is not widely read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach the interested party/ies on time, if at all. In sum, the all-encompassing in run nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective and disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.
Wherefore, the petition is granted and the application of private respondent for land registration is dismissed.
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3. CACHO vs. COURT OF APPEALS 269 SCRA 159, March 3, 1997
FACTS:
On 10 December 1912, the application of Doña Demetria Cacho for the registration of two parcels of land was decided.
On 29 June 1978, petitioner Teofilo Cacho, son and sole heir of Demetria, field a petition for reconstitution of two original certificates of title under RA 26.
On 29 June 1993, the lower court decreed the reconstitution and re-issuance of Decrees Nos. 10364 and 18969, noting that the LRC Registry Book of Ordinary Registration Cases showed that Decree No. 10364 was issued o9 May 1913 and Decree No. 18969 was issued on 07 July 1915.
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision. ISSUE:
Did the Court of Appeals commit reversible error in its decision? HELD:
Yes. A land registration proceeding is binding upon and conclusive against all persons including the government and its branches.
A decree of registration that has become final shall be deemed conclusive upon all matters that might be litigated or decided in the land registration proceeding.
The lower court and the court of appeals correctly found that decrees of registration had in fact been issued in the case at bench.
To allow the final decrees to be once again be subject to the conditions set forth in the 1914 case of Cacho vs U.S. would be tantamount to setting aside the decree which cannot be reopened after the lapse of one year from the enrty thereof. Such action would definitely run counter to the very purpose of the Torrens System.
Requiring the submission of new plan as a condition for the re-issuance of the decree would render the finality attained by the Cacho vs U.S. case nugatory, thus, violating the fundamental rule regarding res judicata.
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In land registration proceedings, the ownership of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the losing party had been in possession of land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
The issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the land registration commission.
A final decision in land registration cases can neither be rendered inefficacious by the statute of limitation nor by laches.
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4. DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS 308 SCRA 317, June 17, 1999
FACTS:
Lot 10704 was a parcel of land partly local and corn land situated at Cagmanaba, Oas, Albay. Originally, the land was owned by Eliseo Rivera who began possessing and occupying the same in the concept of owner openly, continuously, adversely, and exclusively since 1926. He planted corn and coconut seedlings which later bore fruit. Sometime in 1928, the spouses Ignacio Almazar and Gregoria Rivera purchased the land from him. The land now was declared in the name of Gregorio Rivera under Tax Declaration No. 18333. They continued planting corn.
On 22 May 1971, private respondents/claimant herein purchased the land from Rivera. For taxation purposes, the land was declared in the name of claimant’s wife, Estrella Nota. They constructed a house as their abode and continued to plant corn and coconut as means of livelihood and for family consumption.
The land was surveyed in the name of herein claimant per certification of CENRO. Likewise, all taxes have been paid up to the current year.
Finding that the claimant has satisfactorily possessed and occupied the land in the concept of owner openly, continuously, adversely and exclusively since 1926, the court ordered the registration and confirmation in the name of Spouses Monico Rivero and Estrella Nota.
The Director of Lands appealed to the CA alleging the claimant’s possession of the lot since 1926 is not sufficiently supported by the evidence and that no evidence that Gregoria Rivera declared the same in her name for tax purposes during her alleged occupancy.
The CA affirmed the judgment of the lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Spouses Monico Rivero and EStrella Nota have a registrable title to the lot in question?
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HELD:
Yes. Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act provides: “Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interests have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bonafide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least 30 years immediately preceding the application for confirmation of the title except when prevented by war or force majeure. They shall be conclusively essential to the government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.”
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5.REPUBLIC vs. DOLDOL
295 SCRA 359, September 10, 1998
FACTS:
Sometime in 1959, respondent Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of land in Opol, Misamis Oriental. On 1963, he filed an application for saltwork purposes for the said area but the Director of Forestry rejected the same.
Sometime in 1965, the Provincial Board of Misamis Oriental passed a resolution reserving a certain lot as a school site. This lot unfortunately included the lot of Doldol.
Sometime in 1970, the Opol High School filed a complaint for accion possessoria with the RTC, the court ruled on school’s power.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of teh court ruling that Doldol was entitledto the portion he occupied, he having possessed the same for 32 years (1959-1991).
ISSUE:
Whether or not Doldol has the better right to possess the land in dispute?
No. The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions set by law are complied with the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to grant, a government grant, without the necessity of title/certificate of tile being issued.
The evidence presented shows that the land in dispute is alienable and disposable in accordance with the District Forester’s Certification. Doldol thus meets the first requirement.
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Consequently, Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title to the disputed land since his occupation of the same started only in 1955, much later than June 12, 1945. Not having complied with the conditions set forth by law, Doldol cannot be said to have acquired a right to the land or a right to assert a right superior to the school given that then Pres. Aquino had reserved the lot for Opol National School.
“The privilege occupying public lands with a view of pre-empting confers no contractual or vested right in the land occupied and the authority of the President to withdraw such lands for sale or acquisition by the public, or to reserve them for public use, prior to divesting by the government of title thereof stands eventhough this may defeat the imperfect right of settler. Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired” (Solicitor General)
In sum, Opol National Schoolhas the better right of possession over the land in dispute.
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________________________________________________________________________ 6.PALOMO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
266 SCRA 392, January 21, 1997 FACTS:
On 13 June 1913, then Governor General of the Philippine Islands issued EO NO. 40, which reserved for provincial park purposes parcels of land situated in Naga,Tiwi, Albay.
Subsequently, the then Court of First Instance in Albay, ordered the registration of 15 parcels of land covered by EO No. 40 in the name of Diego Palomo on 1916-1917. Palomo donated these parcels of land to his heirs, herein petitioners, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo, two years before his death in 1937.
Claiming that the aforesaid OCT were lost during the Japanese occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstruction. In 1953, the RD issued TCT to said lot.
In 1954, President Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47, converting the area embraced by EO No. 40 into “Tiwi Hot Spring National Park”, under the control, management, protection and administration of Commissions of Parks and Wildlife, now a Division of the Bureau of Forest Development. The area was never released as alienable and disposable portion of public domain and, therefore, is neither susceptible of disposition under Public Land Law nor registrable under Land Registration Act.
The Palomos, however, continued in possession of the property, paid real taxes thereon and introduced improvements by planting rice, bananas, pandan and coconuts. They also mortgaged the parcels of land to guarantee a loan from BPI.
In 1974, petitioners filed a civil case for injunction with damages against employees of the Bureau of Forest Development who entered the land and cut down the bamboos thereat.
In 1974, October, the RP filed a Civil case for Annulment and Cancellation of CoT involving 15 parcels of land registered in the name of petitioners.
The court dismissed the complaint of the petitioner. On the other hand, the court rule din favor of the RP.
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The petitioners appealed to the CA which affirmed the findings of the lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner certificate of titles are valid? HELD:
No. Under the Spanish Crown, private ownership of land could only be acquired through royal concessions, which were documented in various forms, such as:
1. Royal Grant 2. Special Grant 3. Title by Purchase
4. Possessory Information Title obtained under the Spanish Mortgage Law or under the Royal Decree of January 26, 1889.
Unfortunately, no proof was presented that petitioner’s predecessors-in-interest derived the title from an old Spanish grant. Petitioners placed much reliance on the decisions of the Court of First Instance which were not signed by the judge but were merely certified copies of notification to Diego Palomo bearing the signature of the Clerk of Court.
As testified by the District Forester, records in the Bureau of Forestry show that the subject lands were never declared as alienable and disposable and subject to private alienation prior to 1913 up to the present. As part of the reservation for provincial park purposes, they form part of the forest zone.
Under the law, forest land cannot be owned by private persons, it is not registrable and possession thereof no matter how lengthy cannot convert it into private ownership.
Tax declarations are also not conclusive proof of ownership in land registration cases.
Public land may not be the subject of registration.
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7.JAMES BRACEWELL vs. COURT OF APPEALS & REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
323 SCRA 193, January 25, 2002 FACTS:
Sometime in 1908, Maria Cailles, married to James Bracewell, Sr. acquired parcels of land involving 9,657 sq. m. located at Las Pinas, Metro Manila. In 1961, Maria Cailles sold the said parcels of land to her son, petitioner. In 1963, petitioner filed an action for confirmation of imperfect title under Sec. 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141. The Director of Lands opposed petitioner’s application on the ground that neither he nor his predecessors-in-interest posses sufficient title to the subject land nor had they been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same for at least 30 years prior to the application, and that the subject land was part of public domain.
The C.F.I. ruled in favor of petitioner upholding the right of M. Cailles. In 1985, the Solicitor General re-submitted his opposition. The lower court issued an order granting the application of petitioner. The Solicitor General appealed to respondent Court in 1992 which reversed and set aside the lower court’s order. It also denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner has vested rights over the parcels of land? 2. Whether or not Sec. 48 of Court of Appeals No. 141 could be
invoked in this particular case? HELD:
No. Sec. 48 of C.A 141 was amended by PD 1073 in January 1977, which now reads (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure.
Petitioner failed to show that the parcels of land subject of his application are alienable or disposable. It was conclusively shown by the government that the same were only classified as alienable on March 27, 1972. Even the petitioner and his predecessors occupied the same since 1908, he still cannot claim title thereto by virtue of possession since the subject parcels of
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land were not yet alienable land at that time nor capable of private appropriation.
There can be no imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet classified or disposable or alienable. In the absence of such classification, the land remains public land until released therefrom and open to disposition.
____________________________________________________________________________ 8.THE DIRECTOR, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU vs. COURT OF APPEALS & AQUILINO CARINO
324 SCRA 757, February 7, 2002 FACTS:
On May 15, 1975, private respondent A. Carino filed for the registration of some 43,614 sq. m. lot located at Cabuyao, Laguna. According to respondent, the subject land was originally owned by his mother Teresa Lauchengco who died in 1911, and later administered by him in behalf of his five sisters and brothers after the death of their father in 1934.
Private respondent’s statements were confirmed by the report of the Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands. It further stated that the land was agricultural in nature and improvements thereon were sugarcane, bamboo clumps, etc.; That the land subject for registration was outside any civil or military reservation, etc. and that the same land was free from claim and conflict; That Carino had been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the land who acquired the same thru inheritance from his deceased mother.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of Court of Appeals which affirmed the RTC’s decision ordering the registration of Lot No. 6 in the name of Respondent Carino was valid?
HELD:
No. The petition for land registration at bar is under the Land Registration Act which requires that he who alleges in his petition or application, ownership in fee simple, must present muniments of title since the Spanish times, such as Titulo Real, or royal grant, a Concession Especial or special grant, a Composicion Con Al Estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de compra, or title through purchase; informacion possessoria or adjustment title, which would become a titulo gratuito or a gratuitous title.
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9.TURQUESA vs. VALERA 322 SCRA 573
FACTS:
More than half a century ago, private respondent applied for the registration of two parcels of land locate d in Abra. Rosario Valera, private respondent, presented documents showing that when she was still single, she bought lot 1 from Cristeta Trangued and heirs of Juan Valera Rufino who were allegedly in possession thereof since the Spanish in the concept of owners and who declared it in their name for taxation purposes. From 1929, she continued possession of said land in concept of owner and continued to pay tax thereon in her name.
The Director of Lands, together with petitioners and other persons opposed the application of private respondent. In the course of the hearing, the oppositors (except the director of lands) averred that their lands were included in lot 1 which private respondent sought to register in her name. Oppositors moved for an ocular inspection in order to determine the correct boundary limits of the lands they respectively claim, but the same was denied.
On 23 April 1956, the trial court ruled that applicant has a registrable title.
Oppositors appealed. On 15 March 1966, the CA set aside the appealed decision and remanded it to the lower court.
In accordance with the CA directive, three (3) commissioners were appointed by the Trial Court to conduct ocular inspection. The observations and findings were the following:
(1) the claims of petitioners as shown in the sketch plan are not shown in the original survey.
(2) the claims of other petitioners appeared in the original survey although three of these claims bear different identifying names.
(3) the “Calle para Collago” maintained by the oppositors to be the extent or boundary of the property of the applicant on the south side is existing and still is the existing boundary on the south and on the southeast side as shown in the sketch plan.
However, the court just reiterated its former decision ordering the registration of the lot in the name of applicant Rosario Valera.
ISSUE:
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Does Rosario Valera have a rightful claim over the lot in question? HELD:
No. She doesn’t have a rightful claim over the land.
The burden of proof in land registration cases is incumbent on the applicant who must show that he is the real and absolute owner in fee simple of the land applied for. On him also rests the burden to overcome the presumption that land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.
Even if petitioner/s (Partolan) was excluded by the order of general default and (Baltar) did not appeal from the trial court’s decision of April 23, 1956. The applicant must still prove and establish that she has registrable rights over the land, which must be grounded on incontrovertible evidence and based on positive and absolute proof. The declaration of the applicant that the land applied for has been in the possession of herpredecessor-in-interest for a certain period, does not constitute the “WELL-NIGH INCONTROVERTIBLE” and “CONCLUSIVE” evidence required in land registration. If an applicant does not have any rightful claim over real property, the Torrens System of registration can confirm or record nothing.
It must be borne in mind that what defines a piece of land is not the size or area mentioned in its description, but the boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits.
The Damasens were declared to have a rightful claim over the specific portions of Lot.
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10.FELIPE SEVILLE, et. al. vs. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, et. al./ CALIXTRA YAP
351 SCRA 112, February 2, 2001 FACTS:
On June 14, 1980, Calixtra Yap sold to LSBDA (Leyte Sub-Basin Development Authority) a lot consisting of 464,920 square meters located at Sto. Rosario, Isabel, Leyte. On June 1, 1982, LSBDA filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application with the Bureau of Lands covering said lot. Thereafter, an original Certificate of Title (OCT) was issued in the name of LSBDA. In 1989, LSBDA assigned all rights over the property to the National Development Company (NDC), and as a result, a new TCT was issued. The property was leased to Philippine Associated Smelting & Refining Corporation, Philphos & LEPANTO.
In 1988, the estate of Joaquin Ortega, represented by their administrator Felipe Seville, filed a complaint for recovery of real property, rentals, & damages against the respondents. After trial, the Court declared, among others, the following:
1. The Deed of Sale by Calixtra Yap in favor of LSBDA is NULL & VOID ab initio;
2. The intestate estate of Joaquin Ortega is declared owner in fee simple of the 735,333 sq. m. & NDC is ordered to segregate same area & convey the same to the estate of J. Ortega.;
3. The Register of Deeds is ordered to issue 8 new titles; 4. xxxx
5. xxxx 6. xxxx 7. xxxx 8. xxxx
A motion for reconsideration was filed with the Court of Appeals where the latter REVERSED & SET ASIDE the RTC’s judgment.
Hence, this petition.
In their Memorandum, petitioners submitted the following issues for the reconsideration of the Court:
1. Whether or not the sale of Calixtra Yap of the estate of the late Joaquin Ortega in favor of LSBDA was NULL & VOID;
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2. Whether or not the issuance of a Miscellaneous Patent & an Original Certificate of Title in favor of LSBDA was valid;
3. Whether or not petitioners are guilty of laches;
4. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to the remedy of reconveyance & the damages awarded by the Trial Court.
HELD:
The petition has no merit. There was no showing that the land had been classified as alienable before the title was issued to LSBDA, hence, petitioners could not have become owners thereof through prescription. Petitioners’ challenge to LSBDA cannot be granted, because it is based on a wrong premise and amounts to a collateral attack, which is not allowed by law.
“Certificate not subject to collateral attack – A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.” It has been held that a certificate of title, once registered, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, modified, enlarged or diminished, except in a direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise, the reliance on registered titles would be lost.
LSBDA’s title was based on Miscellaneous Sales Patent issued by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. LSBDA acquired the property in a public auction conducted by the Bureau of Lands. Therefore, the same was valid.
Moreover, the title became indefeasible & incontrovertible after the lapse of one year from the time of its registration and issuance. Sec. 32 of PD 1529 provides that “upon expiration of said period of 1 year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title shall become incontrovertible.”
Petitioners also claim that the disputed property should be reconveyed to them. This cannot be allowed. The proper remedy is an action for reversion, which may be instituted only, pursuant to Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act, which states that, “All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.”
________________________________________________________________________ 11.SERNA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
308 SCRA 527, June 18, 1999 FACTS:
Dionisio Fontanilla was the original owner & possessor of a parcel of land with an area of 12,508 sq. m. located at Lucap, Alaminos, Pangasinan.
In 1938, Fontanilla sold the land to his daughter Rosa Fontanilla who then started paying the real estate property tax thereon.
On August 21, 1955, Rosa sold the land to her nephew, herein Respondent Santiago Fontanilla, thru a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale. The instrument was not registered. Respondent spouses Fontanilla constructed their house on the lot in question.
On December 16, 1957, Rosa’s heirs, Estanislao Pajaro and his two children, Fructoso & Paciencia, executed another Deed of Absolute Sale over the same land in favor of Respondent Fontanilla.
In 1978, respondent spouses Fontanilla went to the United States (U.S.) and stayed there until 1981. While in the U.S., Petitioners Enriqueto & Amparo Serna (Ampara is a grandchild of Dionisio Fontanilla), applied for the land registration of the same land in Pangasinan. In 1979, the registration was approved and the Register of Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title No. 139 to petitioners. Such title was transcribed in the registration book of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan.
On May 7, 1981, Respondent spouses Fontanilla filed with the Court of First Instance (CFI) an action for reconveyance.
After trial, the CFI ruled in favor of Respondent spouses Santiago Fontanilla & Rafaela Rasing declaring them absolute and legal owners of the land in question; ordering the defendants to transfer & recover OCT No. 139 to spouses Santiago Fontanilla & Rafaela Rasing.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).
On August 22, 1995, the CA AFFFIRMED the decision of the RTC. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but said motion was denied on February 26, 1996.
ISSUES:
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1. Whether or not the appealed decision was supported by evidence? 2. Whether or not the decision was in accordance with law &
jurisprudence?
HELD:
1. YES. The appealed decision was supported by evidence.
Respondent spouses Fontanilla & R. Rasing proved that they were enjoying open, continuous and adverse possession of the property for more than 60 years from 1921. xxxx
Though mere tax declaration does not prove ownership of the property of the declarant, tax declarations & receipts can be strong evidence of ownership of land when accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for prescription.
2. YES. The decision was in accordance with law and jurisprudence. At the time material hereto, registration of untitled land was pursuant to Act No. 496, as amended. Later, PD 1529, the Property Registration Decree, amended & codified laws relative to registration of property. “Adjudication of land in a registration (or cadastral) case does not become final & incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree. After the lapse of said period, the decree becomes incontrovertible & no longer subject to reopening or review.”
“An action based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in 10 years. This means that petitioners should have enforced the trust within 10
years from the time of its creation or upon the alleged fraudulent registration of the property. Discovery of the fraud must be deemed to have taken place from the issuance of the certificate of title “because registration of real property is considered a constructive notice to all persons and it shall be counted from the time of such registering, filing or entering.”
Respondent spouses Fontanillas’ action for reconveyance was timely as it was filed within 10 years from the issuance of the Torrens Title over the property.
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12. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS & ROMEO DIVINAFLOR
349 SCRA 451 FACTS:
Lot 107391, with an area of 10,775 square meters, is a parcel of riceland located at Maramba, Oas, Albay. Originally, the land was owned by Marcial Listana who was in possession & occupation of the same in the concept of an owner, openly, continuously & exclusively in 1939.
On May 21, 1973, Romeo Divinaflor acquired ownership of the land by means of an Absolute Deed of Sale. He had it declared in his name thru a tax declaration.
Finding that the claimant, together with his predecessor-in-interest, has “satisfactorily possessed & occupied this land in the concept of an owner, openly, continuously, adversely, notoriously, & exclusively since 1939, very much earlier to June 12, 1945,” the Court ordered the registration & confirmation of lot 10739 in the name of Spouses Romeo Divinaflor & Nenita Radan.
The Director of Lands appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) alleging that the finding of the Trial Court was not sufficiently supported by evidence. The Director contended that the earliest tax declaration presented by claimant took effect only in 1980 & the certificate of real estate tax payment was dated 1990.
The CA affirmed the judgment appealed from, ruling that, “To our mind, it is not necessary, in cases of this nature, to present tax declarations & tax receipts of the land in question. All that the law mandates is proof of “open, continuous, peaceful & adverse possession” which appellee has convincingly established xxxxx.”
Thereafter, a Motion for Reconsideration of the above-mentioned decision was likewise denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent Divinaflor has acquired registrable title over the subject property?
HELD: YES. Respondent Divinaflor acquired a registrable title over the subject property.
PD 1073, Sec. 48, provides that, “Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious
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possession & occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceing the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant & shall be entitled to a Certificate of Title under the provisions of this Chapter.”
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13. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (DBP) vs. COURT OF APPEALS
331 SCRA 267, April 28, 2000 FACTS:
The land in dispute, 19.4 has., was owned by Ulpiano Mumar since 1917. He sold it to respondent Cajes in 1950 for which tax declarations were issued in 1950, 1961, and 1974.
In 1969, unknown to Cajes, Jose Alvarez obtained registration of a parcel of land with an area of 1,512,468 sq. m. in his name, on June 16, 1969, which included the 19.4 has. Occupied by Cajes.
In 1972, Alvarez sold the land to Sps. Beduya who, like Alvarez, were never in possession of the property. Sps. Beduya then obtained a loan from petitioner DBP (Development Bank of the Philippines) for P 526,000.00 and mortgaged the land.
In 1978, another mortgage over the land was executed by SAAD Investment Corp. represented by G. Beduya and Sps. Beduya in favour of DBP for P 1.43 million.
In 1985, mortgage on the property was foreclosed. In the foreclosure sale, DBP was the highest bidder.
It appears that respondent Cajes had also applied for a loan from DBP in 1978, offering his 19.4 has. as security for the loan which was approved. However, after the release of the loan, DBP found out that the land mortgaged by Cajes was included in the land mortgaged by the Sps. Beduya. Petitioner DBP cancelled the loan & demanded payment from Cajes.
Sometime in April of 1986, more than a year after the foreclosure sale, a re-appraisal of the property covered by TCT No. 10101 was conducted by petitioner’s representatives. It was then discovered that private respondent Cajes was occupying a portion of said land. Private respondent Cajes was informed that petitioner had become the owner of the land he was occupying, & he was asked to vacate the property. As private respondent refused to do so, petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages against him, invoking that it was an innocent purchaser for value. The Regional Trial Court-Tagbilaran City rendered a decision declaring
petitioner DBP the lawful owner of the entire land on the ground that the decree of registration was binding upon the land.
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The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision. Hence, this petition. ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner bank is a mortgagee in good faith?
2. Whether or not petitioner bank can can be considered an innocent purchaser for value?
HELD :
No. At the time of the constitution of the mortgagee, the mortgagee-bank failed to conduct an ocular inspection. While an innocent mortgagee is not expected to conduct an exhaustive investigation on the history of the mortgagor’s title, in the case of banking institutions, a mortgagee must exercise due diligence before entering into said contract. Judicial notice is taken of the standard practice for banks, before approving a loan, to send representatives to the premises of the land offered as collateral & to investigate who are the legal owners thereof. Banks, having been impressed with public interest, are expected to exercise more care & prudence than private individuals in their dealings, even those involving registered lands.
Petitioner was already aware that a person other than the registered owner was in actual possession of the land when it bought the same at the foreclosure sale. “A person who deliberately ignores a significant fact which would create a suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man is not an innocent purchaser for value.” It is a well-settled rule that a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, & then claim that he acted in goof faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor.”
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14. VDA. DE VILLANUEVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS 351 SCRA 12, February 1, 2001
FACTS:
On December 20, 1962, the land registration court, in a final decision, awarded the disputed lots, measuring 98,800 sq. m. to Spouses Antonio & Rosario Angeles. They sold the lots to Victorino Santiago in 1967 who converted some parcels into fishponds. In 1977, Santiago sold the lots to Anacleto Santiago, husband of respondent Lina Santiago. At the time of the last sale, no decree of registration had yet been issued for the said lots despite the final judgment in the land registration case.
On February 28, 1978, Victorino Santiago filed an action for forcible entry against Carlos Villanueva & his wife, petitioner Estrelita Villanueva, which was dismissed since Victorino had already sold the property to Spouses Santiago.
On December 12, 1978, the decrees of registration covering the subject lots were issued & OCTs were transcribed in the name of Antonio Angeles on December 27, 1978.
On February 22, 1979, Antonio Angeles, as original owner & vendor, executed a Deed of Confirmation Sale, Waiver & Quitclaim over the lots in favour of Anacleto Santiago, the vendee, for which TCTs were subsequenty issued in the name of Anacleto Santiago. The lots were declared for taxation purposes.
On February 26, 1979, the Santiagos sued the Villanuevas for forcible entry. On February 14, 1980, a criminal case was also filed against the Villanuevas for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law.
In the meantime, Carlos Villanueva & Anacleto Santiago both died. Hence, the present case was brought by Anacleto’s heirs against the heirs of Carlos.
In their complaint dated July 30, 1991, Lina Vda. De Santiago & her children maintained that as successors-in-interest of Anacleto, they were unlawfully deprived of the possession, use & enjoyment of the fishponds for the last 12 years by Carlos & now, by the latter’s widow, Estrelita Vda. De Villanueva, and their children.
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The Santiagos asked the court the Viilanuevas to vacate the lots and restore to them possession & ownership of the lots registered in their precedessor’s name.
In a decision dated December 18, 1992, the Trial Court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action and res judicata. The CA reversed the RTC decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent’s certificate of title constitutes valid and indefeasible proof of ownership.
HELD :
Yes. The high court ruled that respondent’s titles constituted indefeasible proof of ownership which entitles them to possession of the properties.
In land cases, the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein.
A title once registered under the Torrens system cannot be defeated by adverse, open and notorious possession; neither can it be defeated by prescription. It is a notice to the whole world and as such, all persons are bound by it and no one can plead ignorance of the registration.
________________________________________________________________________ 15. CERVANTES vs. COURT OF APPEALS
354 SCRA 47 FACTS:
On July 8, 1985, Guillermo Francisco, et.al, filed an amended complaint alleging that they were the heirs of the late Antonio G. Francisco who was the registered owner of a parcel of land containing an area of 3,768 located at Bugallon, Pangasinan. Said heirs discovered that Antonio Cervantes & spouses Armando Abad were illegally occupying & had declared in their names certain portions of said property.
Despite demands to vacate the subject property, petitioners refused to do so. Hence, an action for recovery of land was filed by Guillermo Francisco. In his answer, Antonio Cervantes denied the allegations in the complaint & in defense, claimed legal possession over one of the parcels of land in question alleging that he and his siblings inherited the land from their late father Tranquilino Cervantes who purchased the same in 1947 from Juan Abad (deceased), who in turn earlier purchased the property from Guillermo Francisco’s predecessors-in-interest. Cervantes prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
On the other hand, spouses Armando Abad alleged that their possession was lawful and in concept of an owner for more than 70 years dating back before 1920. According to them, the land was purchased by their parent, the late Juan Abad, and Marcelino Nievera from Estefania Ignacio Vda. De F. Totanez, who purchased the same from Antonio Fernandez, who in turn purchased the property from Vicente Espino, whose possession & ownership of the property was public, exclusive, notorious, open & continuous long before the alleged registration of the subject property in the name of Antonio Francisco, under Act No. 496, the latter being known as a mere trustee or overseer.
On October 28, 1987, the Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of Guillermo Francisco declaring that they were the owners of the parcels of land. The defendants were ordered to vacate immediately the parcel of land and pay actual damages.
On August 25, 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Trial Court in toto.
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated February 13, 1995.
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ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioners Cervantes & Abad have a right to the parcels of land they were occupying?
HELD: No. Petitioners have no right over the land.
It is a fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein, in this case, Antonio Francisco. A title once registered under the Torrens System cannot be defeated even by adverse, open & notorious possession, neither can it be defeated by prescription. Petitioners cannot prove their ownership of the subject parcels of land through tax declarations & corresponding tax receipts inasmuch as they are not conclusive evidence of ownership.
________________________________________________________________________ 16. Sps. ZARAGOZA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
341 SCRA 309 FACTS:
Flavio Zaragoza Cano was the registered owner of certain parcels of land situated at the Province of Iloilo. He had four children: Gloria, Zacariaz, Florentino and Alberta, all surnamed Zaragoza. He died intestate & was survived by his four children.
On December 28, 1981, private respondent Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan filed a complaint against Spouses Florentino & Erlinda, herein petitioners, for delivery of her inheritance share, consisting of Lots 943 & 871, & for payment of damages. She Claimed that she was a natural-born Filipino citizen & the youngest child of Flavio. She further alleged that her father, in his lifetime, partitioned the aforecited properties among his 4 children. The shares of her brothers & sisters were given to them in advance by way of deed of sale but without consideration, while her share was not conveyed by way of deed of sale because she became an American citizen & was prohibited to acquire land in the Philippines except by hereditary succession.
Petitioners Florentino & Erlinda, in their answer, admitted their affinity with private respondent & the allegations on the properties of their father. They, however, denied knowledge of an alleged distribution by way of deeds of sale to them by their father. They said that lot 871 was still registered in the name of their father, while lot 943 was sold by him to them for valuable considerations. They denied knowledge of the alleged intention of their father to convey said lots to Alberta & that there was partitioning of the estate of their father during his lifetime.
On October 7, 1986, the Regional Trial Court of Ilo-ilo promulgated its decision, adjudicating lot 871 in then name of Flavio Zaragoza Camo to Plaintiff Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan
ISSUE:
Whether or not that question regarding the validity of the Certificate of Title issued in the name of petitioner is allowed in this petition.
HELD:
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No. The petition is a collateral attack. It is not allowed by Section 48 of the PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree which provides:
Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack-A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
In the case of Halili, the court held that a certificate of title accumulates in one document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee eld by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of the owners. The title, once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished, except in direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise, all security in registered titles would be lost.
_______________________________________________________________________ 17. TAN vs. PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION
353 SCRA 292 FACTS:
On 29 December 1925, petitioner bought from respondent Helen Aguinaldo a parcel of land at Valley Golf Subdivision Antipolo, Rizal. The lot was then registered in the name of respondent Aguinaldo. No claims, liens or encumbrances appeared on the said title. After payment of the agreed purchase price, the title was cancelled and a new one in the name of petitioner was issued.
On 29 February 1996, two months after he bought the property, petitioner was served a copy of the petition for certiorari filed by respondent bank. Said petition stated that said petitioner was being sued as a nominal party as the new registered owner of the said parcel of land. It was only then that petitioner learned that the lot he bought from respondent was subject between her and respondent bank.
It appeared that respondent Aguinaldo and her husband obtained loans from respondent bank. To secure payment of this obligation, they executed a real estate mortgage over three parcels of land in favor of the respondent bank-PBC.
Upon maturity of these loans, respondent bank sent demand letter to respondent Aguinaldo. Despite said demands, the loans remained unpaid. Respondent bank then initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding on the
real estate mortgage. In the public sale, the mortgage properties were sold to respondent bank as the highest bidder.
On 15 February 1990, before the expiration of the redemption period of one year, respondent Aguinaldo filed a complaint for the nullification of the aforesaid foreclosure proceeding.
On 15 April 1995, the trial court rendered its decision against the respondent.
The respondent bank filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision had become final and executor. Upon presentation of the court’s decision and certification, the register of deeds cancelled respondent bank’s title and issued a new title in the name of respondent Aguinaldo. She subsequently sold the lot to petitioner.
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Respondent bank filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court but the same was denied. It then brought the case to the CA by way of certiorari and thereafter moved for partial reconsideration praying for the reinstatement of the Transfer Certificates of Title. In its decision the CA reinstate said titles in the name of the respondent PBC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s title over the said parcel of land is valid?
HELD:
Yes. The petitioner’s title is valid.
It must be noted that petitioner’s title was irregularly issued after the lot covered by the same was sold to him by respondent Aguinaldo. Petitioner relied on the seller’s title, which was then free from any claims, liens or encumbrances appearing thereon.
As such, petitioner’s title can only be challenged in a direct attack/proceeding. It is well settled that a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only in direct proceeding in accordance with law. Having obtained a valid title over
the subject lot, petitioner is entitled t protection against indirect attacks against his title.
If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller’s title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition is ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to him. If these were permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded and land transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence would be the land conflicts could be even more numerous and complex than they are now possibly also more abrasive, if not even violent. The Government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens System, should be the first to accept the validity of the titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law is satisfied.
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18. OMANDAM vs. COURT OF APPEALS 349 SCRA 483, January 18, 1991
FACTS:
On January 29, 1974, the Bureau of Lands in Pagadian City issued in favor of Camilo Lasola a Homestead Patent covering one parcel of land. Sometime in 1978, the RD issued an OCT in his name.
On April 28, 1983, the same lot was bought by (respondent) Blas Trabasas from Dolores Sayson, who claimed that she was the owner of such land.
Sometime in 1984, Trabasas discovered that petitioners Omandam and Itom had occupied the land.
In 1987, Omandam protested Lasola’s homestead patent before the Bureau and prayed for the cancellation of the OCT. In the same year, Trabasas repurchased the same land from Lasola.
On April 16, 1990, Spouses Trabasas filed a complaint against Omandan for recovery of possession and/or ownership of the subject land with the RTC.
The RTC issued its decision (1993) declaring that neither respondents (Trabasas) nor their predecessors-in-interest were ever in possession of the land. “Trabasas has no equitable right to the possession of the land under litigation.”
Trabasas appealed to the CA. The CA reversed RTC decision. It ordered (petitioners) Omandam and Itom to vacate the land and surrender it to the respondents (Trabasases) =)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts have jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of decree or registration issued by the Director of Lands?
HELD:
No. Courts have no jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of decree or registration issued by the Director of Lands.
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Commonwealth Act no 141 (Public Land Act) gives in its sections 3 and 4 to the Director of Lands primarily and to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now the Secretary of DENR) ultimately the authority to dispose and manage public lands. The courts have no jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of the decree of registration issued by the Director of Lands. Only the DENR secretary can review, on appeal, such decree.
It will be recalled that the Bureau of Lands approved Lasola’s homestead application on May 21, 1968. Nineteen years after, in 1987, Omandam filed the protest with the Bureau of Lands. Thereafter, Trabasas instituted the present action in the Regional Trial Court for recovery of possession and/or ownership. The trial court held that petitioners were entitled to a declaration of equitable possession over the area in question. THE TRIAL COURT THEN ORDERED THE CANCELLATION OF RESPONDENTS’ TITLE AND THE ISSUANCE OF A NEW ONE. IN EFFECT, THE COURT’S ORDER REVERSED THE AWARD MADE BY THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS IN FAVOR OF LASOLA. THIS REVERSAL WAS IN ERROR, FOR THE PROPER ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY, THE DENR UNDER CA 141, HAD PRIOR JURISDICTION OVER THE
PATENT ON THE SUBJECT MATTER, WHICH IS THE CONTESTED HOMESTEAD AREA.
________________________________________________________________________ 19. DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
171 SCRA 71, 1966
FACTS:
The land in question was situated in Obando, Bulacan. It adjoined the Kailogan River and private respondent Valeriano had converted it into a fishpond.
In their application in 1976, private respondents claimed that they were the co-owners in fee simple of the land partly through inheritance and partly by purchase and that; it was not within any forest or military reservation.
The Republic of the Phil., represented by the Dir of the Bureau of Forest Development, opposed the application on the principal ground that the land applied for was WITHIN THE UNCLASSIFIED REGION of Obando, Bulacan and that such area was denominated as FOREST LANDS-did not form part of the disposable and alienable portion of the public domain.
The Trial Court ordered registration of the subject land in favor of the Valerianos. This was affirmed by the CA which said in part that “since the subject property is entirely devoted to fishpond purposes, it cannot be categorized as part of forest lands.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts can reclassify the subject public land.
HELD:
No. Courts cannot reclassify... it’s beyond their competence and jurisdiction.
The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the Government (Bureau of Forest Development) and not of the Courts. In the absence of such classification, the land remains as unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.
Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever possession applicants (Valeriano) may have had, and, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
The conversion of the subject property into a fishpond by Applicants does not automatically render the property as alienable and disposable.
The recommendation of the District Forester for release of subject property from unclassified region is not the ultimate word on the matter.
________________________________________________________________________ 20.DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. ABANILLA
124 SCRA 358, 1983
FACTS:
Plaintiff-appellee (Director of Lands) in his complaint, alleged that defendant-appellant (Maria Abanilla) had, through fraudulent means, secured a Free Patent and an Original Certificate of Title over a public land situated in Roxas, Isabela. Said free patent application included portions of land occupied by Esteban Esquivel & Wilson Nueasa who bought the land from Dominador Cullanan who also bought the same from defendant-appellant Abanilla.
Defendant-appellant Abanilla in her answer alleged that her application for a free patent over a parcel of public land & the subsequent issuance of an
Original Certificate of Title, were lawful, since the occupancy of Esquivel was merely tolerated by her and was never adverse and Wilson Nuesa’s occupancy never affected her right over the portion he claims because the sale made by her to Dominador Cullanan was void ab initio.
The Trial Court entered judgment declaring the Free Patent and the corresponding Original Certificate of Title null and void, ordering the Director of Lands to cancel the said patent and issue another patent in favor of Abanilla, excluding the respective portions of land possessed by Esquivel & Nuesa, and ordering Abanilla to surrender to the Register of Deeds of Isabela the Original Certificate of Title, who was thereby ordered to cancel the same.
Defendant-appellant claimed that the lower court erred in ordering the cancellation of both free Patent & Original Certificate of Title issued in her name and in not dismissing the action considering that a period of six years and six months had already elapsed from February 1953 when the patent was issued to August 11, 1959 when the present action was instituted in the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the patent and original certificate of title issued by virtue of the said patent can still be cancelled despite the lapse of six (6) years and six (6) months.\
HELD:
Yes. The patent can still be cancelled.
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Section 91 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, expressly provides that any false statement in the application, which is an essential condition of the patent or title “shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the concession, title, or permit granted.”
The Doctrine of Indefeasibility of Torrens Title does not apply to free patent secured through fraud since said grant is null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
The lapse of one (1) year period within which a decree of title may be reopened for fraud would not prevent the cancellation thereof, for to hold that a title had been secured through fraud or in violation of the law, would be the height of absurdity. Registration should not be a shielf of fraud in securing title.
The State is not bound by the period of prescription stated in Sec. 38, Act 496, any may still file action for cancellation of certificate of title even after six years from its issuance.
________________________________________________________________________ 21.PADRE vs. COURT OF APPEALS
214 SCRA 446, 1992 FACTS:
Plaintiffs Agripino Padre, et. al, sought to quiet title on two (2) parcels of land situated at Taleb, Bantay, Ilocos Sure, thru two (2) civil cases they filed before the lower court where the latter made its findings of facts and conclusion, to wit:
1. Civil Case No. 2954 – The land was originally owned by Jose Padre who gave it to Fausta Padre without a Deed of Transfer. Fausta Padre declared the land for taxation purpose in her name. On
December 2, 1966, she sold a portion of the land to Avelina Paranada, married to Vicente Viernes. The late Jose Padre had been in possession of the subject land up to the time it was given to Fausta. Fausta was also in possession of the property until the years 1973-1975 when Juliana Pacleb Parel cut down trees on the land. Hence, the case was filed.
2. Civil Case No. 2964 – The land was originally owned by Calixto Paa who gave the same to Sabas Paa without a deed of transfer. Calixto declared the land for taxation purposes in his name. He paid realty taxes to evidence his possession. The complaint was filed because Juliana Pacleb Parel cut down some trees on the portion of the land in question.
On the other hand, defendant Juliana Pacleb Parel, et. al. contended that the parcel of land was formerly owned by the late Silvestre Paa who sold it to Blas Pacleb without a deed of transfer. Some of the adjoining lots were the properties of Bartola Pero, the deceased grandmother of Juliana Parel, one of the defendants and a portion of it was the land of Roman Pacleb, the predecessors-in-interest of defendant Juliana Pacleb Parel.
The defendants in both Civil Cases were in actual possession of the land in dispute. Being in actual possession under claim of ownership, it was presumed that defendants were the owners.
After carefully considering the evidence adduced by the parties, the Court found that the plaintiffs-Padre, et.al., had not established their cause of preponderance of evidence. The Court found defendants-Parel, et.al., to have been in possession under claim of ownership, continuously, and uninterruptedly and long before that, the land was in the possession of their grandfather, grandmother & father under similar circumstances. The Court however denied the claims of defendants for damages, attorney’s fees & _____________________________________________________________________________ _
expenses of litigation. The plaintiff had the right to litigate & it was not sound public policy to punish a party by making him pay damages, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation for having exercised their right erroneously xxx.
In this appeal, the appellants raised several errors of the lower court.
1. WON the Director of Lands possesses the competence of the regular courts over possessory actions?
2. WON the Regional Trial Court has the power to ascertain who has prior possession of public lands?
HELD:
1. YES. The Director of Lands possesses the competence of the regular courts over possessory actions.
Jurisdiction: The authority given to the Lands Department over the disposition of public lands does not exclude the courts from their jurisdiction over possessory action, the public character of the land notwithstanding.
2. YES. The Regional Trial Court has the power to ascertain who has prior possession of public lands.
The jurisdiction of courts in possessory actions involving public lands is limited to the determination of who has the actual physical possession or occupation of the land in question or the better right of possession.
Petition DISMISSED.
________________________________________________________________________ 22. HEIRS OF GREGORIO TENGCO vs. HEIRS OF JOSE ALIWALAS 168 SCRA 198, 1988
FACTS:
The instant case stemmed from an action to quiet title instituted by the late Victorio Vda. De Aliwalas against the Heirs of Gregorio Tengco, the Director of Lands & the Register of Deeds of Pampanga.
