Case Digest 2

Legaspi v. CSC

G.R. No. L-72119 May 29, 1987

FACTS:

Valentin Legaspi, a citizen of the Philippines, had requested information from the Civil Service

Commission regarding the civil service eligibility of sanitation employees in the Health Department of

Cebu City. The Commission rejected the request asserting that Legaspi was not entitled to the

information.

Legaspi then instituted an action asking the Court to compel the Civil Service Commission to

provide the information. He also claimed that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of the sanitation

employees is guaranteed by the Constitution and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate

remedy to acquire the information.

However, the Solicitor General challenges the petitioner’s legal standing on the ground that the

he does not possess any clear legal right to be informed of the civil service eligibilities of the government

employees concerned and he has no actual interest in securing this particular information. He also argues

that there is no ministerial duty on the part of the Commission to furnish the petitioner with the information

he seeks.

ISSUE:

WON Civil Service Commission can refuse the disclosure of such information

RULING:

No. CSC cannot refuse.

1. The Supreme Court held that the government agencies have no discretion to refuse disclosure of,

or access to, information of public concern because the Constitution guarantees access to such

information.

Both the 1973 (Art. IV, Sec. 6) and 1987 (Art. III, Sec. 7) constitutions recognize the right of the

people to information on matters of public concern. These constitutional provisions are self-executing.

They supply the rules by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed by guaranteeing the

right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information.

2. The Court also held that a citizen does not need to show any legal or special interest in order to

establish his or her right to information.

When a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of

personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the

general "public" which possesses the right. In this case, the petitioner, as a citizen, has complied the

requirement of personal interest.

In this case, the route managers are certainly more than merely recommend

effectivemanagement action. They perform operational, human resource, financial andmarketing

functions for the company, all of which involve the laying down of operatingpolicies for themselves and

their teams.

3. The State bears the burden of proving that the information is either exempt from disclosure by law

or that it is not of public concern.

The government agency denying information access has the burden to show that the information is

not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the information has been exempted by law from the

obligation of disclosure.

In this case, the information was of public concern because it is the legitimate concern of citizens to

ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by eligible persons,

and the Civil Service Commission failed to cite any law limiting the requester’s right to know.

Chavez v. PEA and Amari

G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002

FACTS:

1973: The government through the Commission of Public Highways signed a contract with the

Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore

and offshore areas of Manila Bay

1977: President Marcos issued PD No. 1084 creating the PEA, which was tasked to reclaim

land, including foreshore and submerged areas and to develop, improve, acquire x xx lease and sell any

and all kinds of lands. On the same date, President Marcos issued PD. 1085 transferring to PEA the lands

reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and

Reclamation Project (MCCRRP)

1981: Pres. Marcos issued a memorandum ordering PEA to amend its contract with CDCP which

stated that CDCP shall transfer in favor of PEA the areas reclaimed by CDCP in the MCCRRP

1988: Pres. Aquino issued Special Patent granting and transferring to PEA parcels of land so

reclaimed under the MCCRRP. Subsequently she transferred in the name of PEA the three reclaimed

islands known as the “Freedom Islands”

1995: PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation, to

develop the Freedom Islands and this was done without public bidding

Pres. Ramos through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres approved the JVA

1996: Senate Pres.Maceda delivered a privileged speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as

the “grandmother of all scams”. As a result, the Senate conducted investigations. Among the

conclusions were:

1. The reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the

public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore

PEA cannot alienate these lands;

2. The certificates of the title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and

3. The JVA itself is illegal

1997: Pres. Ramos created the Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view

of the Senate Committee report.

1998: The Philippine Daily Inquirer published reports on on-going renegotiations between PEA and

AMARI

PEA Director Nestor Kalaw and PEA Chairman ArsenioYulo and former navy officer Sergio Cruz were

members of the negotiating panel

Frank Chavez filed petition for Mandamus stating that the government stands to lose billions of pesos

in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI and prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of the

renegotiations of JVA. He cited that the sale to AMARI is in violation of Article 12, Sec. 3 prohibiting sale

of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations and Article 2 Section 28 and Article 3 Sec.

7 of the Constitution on the right to information on matters of public concern.

1999: PEA and AMARI signed Amended JVA which Pres. Estrada approved

ISSUE:

WON the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations

before a final agreement.

RULING:

Yes. The constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going

negotiations before a final contract. However, it must constitute definite propositions by the

government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and

diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order

Reasoning: Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the peoples right to information on

matters of public concern.

Moreover, the State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest

reinforces the people’s right to information on matters of public concern. This State policy is

expressed in Section 28, Article II of the Constitution.

These two provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in

the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to exercise

effectively other constitutional rights. These are essential to the exercise of freedom of expression and to

hold the accountability of public officials. Moreover, an informed citizenry is essential to the existence and

proper functioning of any democracy.

PEA must prepare all the data and disclose them to the public at the start of the

disposition process, long before the consummation of the contract. While the evaluation or review

is on- going, there are no “official acts, transactions, or decisions” on the bids or proposals. But

once the committee makes its official recommendation, there arises a definite proposition on the

part of the government.

The information that petitioner may access on the renegotiation of the JVA includes evaluation

reports, recommendations, legal and expert opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of reference and other

documents attached to such reports or minutes, all relating to the JVA. However, the right to information

does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like relating to the renegotiation of

the JVA.

_{The right only affords access to records, documents and papers, which means the opportunity}

to inspect and copy them. One who exercises the right must copy the records, documents and papers at

his expense. The exercise of the right is also subject to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of

the public records and to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules specifying when and

how to conduct the inspection and copying.

The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as privileged

information under the separation of powers.

_{The right does not also apply to information on military and}

diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, and information on investigations of crimes by

law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused, which courts have long recognized as

confidential.

_{The right may also be subject to other limitations that Congress may impose by law.}

In this, the information demanded by petitioner is not a privileged information rooted in the

separation of powers.

Baldoza v. Dimaano

A.M. No. 1120-MJ May 5, 1976

FACTS:

Municipal Secretary of Taal, Batangas, charges Municipal Judge Dimaano with abuse of authority

in refusing to allow employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine the criminal docket records of the

Municipal Court to secure data in connection with their contemplated report on peace and order

conditions of the municipality.

Respondent answered that there has never been an intention to refuse access to official court records

but that the same is always subject to reasonable regulation as to who, when, where and how they may

be inspected. He further asserted that a court has the power to prevent an improper use or inspection of

its records and furnishing copies may be refuse when the motivation is not serious and legitimate interest,

out of whim or fancy or mere curiosity or to gratify private site or promote public scandal.

In his answer, respondent observed;

o

Restrictions are imposed by the Court for fear of an abuse in the exercise of the right.

o

There has been recent tampering of padlocks of the door of the Court and with this, to

allow an indiscriminate and unlimited exercise of the right to free access, might do more

harm than good.

o

Request of such a magnitude cannot b immediately granted without adequate

deliberation and advisement

o

Authority should first be secured from the Supreme Court

Case was referred to Judge Riodique for investigation and report. At the preliminary hearing, Taal

Mayor Corazon Caniza filed a motion to dismiss the complaint to preserve harmony and cooperation

among officers. This motion was denied by Investigating Judge but he recommended the exoneration of

respondent.

Investigating Judge’s report avers that complainant was aware of the motion to dismiss and he was in

conformity with it. Communications between complainant and respondent reveal that respondent allowed

the complainant to open and view the docket books of the respondent under certain conditions and under

his control and supervision.

Under the conditions, the Court found that the respondent has not committed any abuse of authority

ISSUE:

WON respondent acted arbitrarily in the premises.

RULING:

No. The respondent did not act arbitrarily in the premises.

The respondent allowed the complainant to open and view the docket books of respondent under

certain conditions and under his control and supervision. It has not been shown that the rules and

condition imposed by the respondent were unreasonable. The access to public records is predicated on

the right of the people to acquire information on public concern.

Justice Briones in his concurring opinion predicated such right on the constitutional right of the

press to have access to information as the essence of press freedom.

The New Constitution (1973?) expressly recognizes that the people are entitled to information on

matters of public concern and thus are expressly granted access to official records. Information is

needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times.

Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato

G.R. No. 92541 November 13, 1991

FACTS:

Carmen Aquino-Sarmiento (pet), a member of Movie and Television Review and

Classification Board (MTRCB) (resp), requested that she be allowed to examine the board's

records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board members after a

review of the movies and television productions.

However, her request was denied by respondent Morato (

chairman of MTRCB)

on the

ground that whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions

partake the nature of conscience votes and are private and personal.

On the other hand, petitioner argues that the records she wishes to examine are public in

character and that respondents Morato and the classification board have no authority to deny any

citizen seeking examination of the board's records.

Respondent Morato called an executive meeting of the MTRCB to discuss the issue raised by

petitioner. In said meeting, seventeen (17) members of the board voted to declare their individual voting

records as classified documents which rendered the same inaccessible to the public without clearance

from the chairman. Thereafter, respondent Morato denied petitioner's request to examine the voting slips.

A board resolution was also issued declaring as confidential, private and personal, the decision

of the reviewing committee and the voting slips of the members.

Petitioner brought the matter to the attention of the Executive Secretary, which in turn, referred

the same to respondent Morato for appropriate comment, and which still denied petitioner’s request;

Hence this petition to

seeks the nullification of

1) MTRCB Resolution No. 88-1-25 which allows the Chairman of the Board to unilaterally

downgrade a film (already) reviewed especially those which are controversial and

2) MTRCB RESOLUTION No. 10-89 (dated July 27, 1989) declaring as strictly confidential,

private and personal a) the decision of a reviewing committee which previously reviewed a certain

film and b) the individual voting slips of the members of the committee that reviewed the film.

Respondents, however, argue at the outset that the instant petition should be dismissed outright

for having failed to comply with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

ISSUE:

1. WON petitioner failed to comply with the said doctrine?

2. WON citizen's right of access to official records is violated?

RULING:

1. No. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrate remedies simply provides that before a party litigant is

allowed resort to the courts, he is required to comply with all administrative remedies available under the

law. The rationale behind this salutory principle is that for reasons of practical considerations, comity and

convenience, the courts of law will not entertain a case until all the available administrative remedies

provided by law have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given ample opportunity

to act and to correct the errors committed in the administrative level. If the error is rectified, judicial

intervention would then be unnecessary. Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative

remedies is not absolute. The applicability of the principle admits of certain exceptions, such as: 1) when

no administrative review is provided by law; 2) when the only question involved is one of law; 3) where the

party invoking the doctrine is guilty of estoppel; 4) where the challenged administrative action is patently

illegal, arbitrary and oppressive; 5) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that would

greatly prejudice the complainant; 6) where to exhaust administrative review is impractical and

unreasonable; and 7) where the rule of qualified political agency applies.

The issue raised in the instant petition is one of law, hence the doctrine of non-exhaustion of

administrative remedy relied upon by respondents is inapplicable and cannot be given any effect. At any

rate, records are replete with events pointing to the fact that petitioner adhered to the administrative

processes in the disposition of the assailed resolutions of public respondents prior to filing the instant

petition by, among others, writing the Executive Secretary and bringing the matter to the attention of the

Office of the President. Respondents' claim that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies must

therefore fail.

2. Yes. The Court found the respondents' refusal to allow petitioner to examine the

records of MTRCB, pertaining to the decisions of the review committee as well as the individual

voting slips of its members, as violative of petitioner's constitutional right of access to public

records. The right to privacy belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a

governmental agency or officers tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties.

More specifically, Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution provides that: The right of the people to

information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to

documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government

research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such

limitations as may be provided by law.

As we held in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, this constitutional provision is self-executory

and supplies "the rules by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed by guaranteeing the

right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right

therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the constitution without need for

any ancillary act of the Legislature. What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable

conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the

declared State Policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art.

II, Sec. 28)."

Respondents contend, however, that what is rendered by the members of the board in reviewing

films and reflected in their individual voting slip is their individual vote of conscience on the motion picture

or television program and as such, makes the individual voting slip purely private and personal; an

exclusive property of the member concerned. The term private has been defined as "belonging to or

concerning, an individual person, company, or interest"; whereas, public means "pertaining to, or

belonging to, or affecting a nation, state, or community at large". May the decisions of respondent Board

and the individual members concerned, arrived at in an official capacity, be considered private? Certainly

not. As may be gleaned from PD 1986 creating the respondent classification board, there is no doubt that

its very existence is public is character; it is an office created to serve public interest. It being the case,

respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. The right to privacy belongs to the individual acting in his

private capacity and not to a governmental agency or officers tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of

public duties. There can be no invasion of privacy in the case at bar since what is sought to be divulged is

a product of action undertaken in the course of performing official functions. To declare otherwise would

be to clothe every public official with an impregnable mantle of protection against public scrutiny for their

official acts.

Further, the decisions of the Board and the individual voting slips accomplished by the members

concerned are acts made pursuant to their official functions, and as such, are neither personal nor private

in nature but rather public in character. They are, therefore, public records access to which is guaranteed

to the citizenry by no less than the fundamental law of the land. Being a public right, the exercise thereof

cannot be made contingent on the discretion, nay, whim and caprice, of the agency charged with the

custody of the official records sought to be examined. The constitutional recognition of the citizen's right of

access to official records cannot be made dependent upon the consent of the members of the board

concerned, otherwise, the said right would be rendered nugatory.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Resolution Nos. 10-89 and 88-1-25 issued

by the respondent Board are hereby declared null and void.

Gonzales vs. Narvasa

G.R. No. 140835, August 14, 2000

FACTS:

Ramon Gonzales (pet) wrote a letter to the Executive Secretary requesting for

information with respect to the names of executive officials holding multiple positions, copies of

their appointments, and a list of recipients of luxury vehicles previously seized by the Bureau of

Customs and turned over to the Office of the President. Petitioner filed this petition to compel

the Executive Secretary to answer his letter.

The president issued EO 43 creating the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional

Reform to recommend amendments to the Constitution. Petitioner, in his capacity as a citizen

and a taxpayer, filed a petition assailing constitutionality of the Commission.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the petitioner has the locus standi for the present petition.

2. WON the respondent has the obligation to furnish the petitioner with the information requested, in

respect of the right to information of the petitioner.

RULING:

1. No. The petitioner has no locus standi for the present petition.

The Court rules that the action is already moot, for it no longer presents a justiciable controversy due

to the extension granted to the PCCR, first instructed to complete its task on June 30, 1999, but eventually

was changed to December 31, 1999 by EO 70. Therefore the PCCRalready submitted its

recommendations to the President on December 20, 1999 and was subsequently dissolved. Thus the

body sought to be enjoined has already ceased to exist, making prohibition an inappropriate remedy. In

addition to that, the petitioner has no standing as a citizen and a taxpayer for he did not establish that he

is suffering or that will suffer some actual or threatened injury due to the creation of the PCCR, or the

creation of the positions. Likewise, there is no illegal disbursement of funds in the exercise of Congress of

its spending or taxing power, for the source of funds for the PCCR will not come from an act of

appropriation by the Congress, but will be sourced out the funds of the Office of the President.

2. Yes. the respondent has the obligation to furnish the petitioner with the information requested, in

respect of the right to information of the petitioner.

On the issue of whether or not Secretary Zamora can be compelled to furnish the petitioner with

information: the names of executive officials holding multiple positions in government, copies of their

appointments, and a list of the recipients of luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned

over to Malacanang, the Court rules in favor of the petitioner. As secured by the Constitution, the right to

information is a self-executory provision which can be invoked by any citizen to assert a public right. The

right to information of the people on matters of public concern shall be recognized, subject to limitations

as may be provided by law such as in RA 6713, which provides that, in the performance of their duties, all

public officials and employees are obliged to respond to letters sent by the public within 15 working days

from receipt thereof and to ensure the accessibility of all public documents for inspection by the public

within reasonable working hours, subject to the reasonable claims of confidentiality.The Court further held

that the right to information is the key in having a meaningful democratic decision-making, to enable the

society to cope up with the exigencies of the times. It is for the courts to determine in a case-by-case

basis whether the matter is of public interest or importance, thus agreeing with the petitioner that

Secretary Zamora has the constitutional duty toanswer the request, involving matters of public concern –

appointments made to public offices and the utilization of public property, also allowing the inspection and

copying of the copies of the appointment papers, subject to reasonable limitations. Wherefore, the petition

is dismissed, with the exception that respondent Zamora is ordered tofurnish petitioner with the

information requested

It is the duty of the Executive Secretary to answer the letter of the petitioner. The letter

deals with matters of public concern, appointments to public offices and utilization of public

property. The Executive Secretary is obliged to allow the inspection and copying of appointment

papers.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed, with the exception that respondent Zamora is

ordered to furnish petitioner with the information requested.