SENTIMENT AND VALUE
PI 3007 Spring 2012 Antti Kauppinen
Two Humean Responses to Error Theory
Expressivism/non-cognitivism: moral
thought and talk isn’t in the business of trying to match moral facts (except in the deflationary sense of ‘fact’), so the non- existence of such facts isn’t a problem
Mind-/response-dependence views: moral
facts are not queer, non-natural entities, but
facts about what causes or merits emotional
responses in human beings, so moral claims
can be true in the correspondence sense
Classical Sentimentalism:
Explanation
Anthony Ashley Cooper (Earl of Shaftesbury)
When we become aware of affections behind our own actions or those others, then by way of a “reflected Sense” there arises “another kind of Affection towards those very Affections themselves, which have been already felt, and are now become the Subject of a new Liking or Dislike” (Shaftesbury 1699)
Hume
“When any quality, or character, has a tendency to the good of mankind, we are pleased with it, and approve of it; because it presents the lively idea of pleasure;
which idea affects us by sympathy, and is itself a kind of pleasure.” (Hume 1740)
Approbation from a “common point of view”
Classical Sentimentalism:
Metaphysics
Hume:
“An action, or sentiment, or character is virtuous or vicious; why? because its view causes a
pleasure or uneasiness of a particular kind.”
“Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compared to sounds, colours, heat and cold.”
Adam Smith
“What is agreeable to our moral faculties, is fit,
and right, and proper to be done … The very
words, right, wrong, fit, improper, graceful,
unbecoming, mean only what pleases or
displeases those faculties.” (Smith 1759)
I The Idea of Response-
Dependence
The Basic Schema
If P is a response-dependent property or concept, the following holds a priori:
X is P if and only if X elicits/merits reaction R from subject S in conditions C
Or: X is P if and only if subjects S are disposed to react to X with R in conditions C
R = sensation, feeling, judgment, behaviour...
S = the speaker/thinker, us, most people, everyone, rational agents, ideal observer, virtuous people...
C = normal, common, appropriate, ideal...
It is important that the direction of explanation is meant to go from right to left, reaction to property/concept
Intuitively, X is P because X elicits reaction R from S in C
Priority of Response
To capture the sense that responses determine the extension of the predicate (the right-to-left direction), Crispin Wright (1989) proposes the following three key conditions:
1.
The biconditional must hold a priori
We take our reactions under suitable conditions to determine the extension of response-dependent predicates, so we know from the armchair that we
cannot go wrong under those circumstances – our best opinions are automatically true
2.
Conditions C (as well as S and R) must be substantially specified
If we just define C as “whatever it takes to judge that X is P”, everything turns out to be response-dependent
3.
Conditions C must be specified independently of facts about P
If we need to appeal to facts about P to define C, facts about P must be there independently of our responses
Fashion
X is fashionable if and only if people in the
fashion business think X is fashionable when they do their work
A priori: it is part of understanding the concept of being fashionable that whatever people in the fashion business think is fashionable is fashionable
Substantiality: it is enough to say that fashion
professionals find something fashionable while working – no need to hypothesize that they detect some quality
Independence: the conditions make no reference to facts about what is really fashionable
X is nauseating if and only if X gives rise to
nausea in most people when they are in normal health
Relativity (to species? Cultures? individuals?)
Colours
X is red if and only if X causes red-sensations in normal observers in normal conditions
Note that this is not circular as a conceptual analysis if (and only if) we can pick out red-sensations independently of
having the concept of redness
A priori: Anyone who understands the concept of redness knows that if something looks red under suitable
circumstances, it is red
Substantiality and independence: suitable circumstances can be understood as ’statistically average’ or
’biologically properly functioning’ (in the case of vision) – no need to say they are good colour-detectors
If this kind of analysis of redness is true, it is ontologically subjective
Nevertheless, there is no implication that there are no objective truths about colours – it can be a hard fact about a tomato that is causes red-sensations in normal observers focusing on it in daylight
Shape
Take the following attempt at defining ’square’:
X is square iff X appears square to normal observers in normal conditions
This is not a priori true – the world could be such that square things didn’t normally look square
There’s an alternative definition: X is square if and only if X has four equal sides and four right angles, which does not make reference to our reactions or judgments
To make a response-dependence biconditional a priori true, we would have to specify S or C in non-substantial terms: X is square iff perfect square-detectors in perfect square-detecting conditions take X to be square
So, the definition fails on either the first or second (and third) condition – being square is not a response-
dependent property
The Shapelessness Argument
There is no mind-independent property in common to all the things that are
morally wrong – only the feature that they elicit negative responses in us
“Immoral acts comprise a hodgepodge: lying, stealing, hoarding, hurting, killing, neglecting, harassing, polluting, insulting, molesting,
vandalizing, disrespecting, and so forth. What do these things have in common other than the
fact that we frown on all of them?” (Prinz 2007,
48)
The Promise of Response- Dependence
Phenomenology: moral features of actions do seem to give rise to emotional responses in us
Though response-dependence means that values are ontologically subjective, it is
compatible with them being normatively
objective – there could still be objective truths about values
If values are constitutively tied to our
reactions, the possibility opens up that
becoming aware of them is intrinsically
motivating – of being both cognitivist and
internalist
Dispositional and Sensibility Theories
Following D’Arms and Jacobson (2006), I will distinguish two kinds of response- dependence account:
a)
Dispositional theories
X is P iff X is such as to cause R in S in C
b)
Sensibility theories
X is P iff X is such as to merit R in S in C (we
won’t have time to discuss this view)
II Dispositional Theories of
Value
a) Lewis’s Dispositionalism
According to David Lewis (1989), (non-moral) value can be analyzed as follows:
X is a value (i.e. good) iff we would be disposed to value it in ideal conditions
Lewis wants to cash out this definition in naturalistic and non-circular terms
The aim is to invoke ”only such entities and distinctions we need to believe in anyway”
He also wants to explain internalism while remaining cognitivist
Lewis believes it is possible for us to know, a
posteriori, what is truly valuable
Valuing and Knowing What’s Valuable
What is valuing?
Given Humean psychology and internalism, it must be some kind of desire
But not just any desire, since we can desire things we don’t value and value things we don’t desire
Desiring to desire fits the bill, according to Lewis – it has the right sort of defeasible connection to motivation: if I want to want to exercise, I’ll probably want to exercise, and hence will probably exercise (but won’t necessarily either want or do it); if I want to exercise without wanting to want to exercise, that shows I don’t really value exercise
Knowing what is valuable
”If the dispositional theory is true, we have a canonical way to find out whether something is a value. To find out whether we would be disposed, under ideal conditions, to value it, put yourself in ideal conditions ... Then find out ... whether you desire to desire it.”
Ideal Conditions
Conditions that are ideal for valuing are those of full imaginative acquaintance
Your desire to desire doesn’t indicate what’s valuable unless it results from vividly and thoroughly picturing what it would be like if the putative value would be realized
So, you may actually value watching bull-fighting, but perhaps if you vividly imagined what it’s like for the bull, you wouldn’t value it
These conditions are naturally impossible to obtain in the real world, but we can try to approximate them
Ideal conditions are not the same for all values – what it takes to be imaginatively acquainted with bull-fighting is not the same as with poetry
Who Are ’We’?
Lewis suggests that when I say that something is good, I may be saying that people like me would be disposed to value it under conditions of full imaginative acquaintance
Different people may be saying different things at different times
This would make the analysis subjectivistic and relativistic
This, in turn, would lead to the usual questions if the analysis is extended to moral predicates, such as: if when you say
”Abortion is bad” you’re saying people like you would desire not to desire it under full imaginative acquaintance, and when I say
”Abortion is not bad”, I’m saying people like me would not desire not to desire it, then, counterintuitively, we are not disagreeing
Lewisians have some fancy responses – perhaps when you say
”Abortion is bad”, you are, inter alia, trying to get me to be a person like you, or trying to add among our shared assumptions that people like us would desire not to desire it, and so on...
b) Prinz’s Constructive Sentimentalism
Main thesis: moral judgements are emotional
attitudes that refer to response-dependent properties, and these responses have been shaped by cultural
history
The Argument from Parsimony:
Empirical data:
Emotion-associated areas of the brain are active when people make moral judgments
Manipulation of emotions influences people’s judgments
Emotions are sufficient for judgment: people think sibling incest is wrong even if they can’t rationally support the claim
Emotions are necessary: psychopaths, who suffer from emotional deficits, don’t have moral concepts
The most parsimonious explanation: an occurrent moral judgement consists in an emotion directed towards an action (or trait, event, etc.)
Moral Emotions and Representation
Different moral judgments are constituted by dispositions different emotions
Emotions of blame: other-directed (anger, disgust), self-directed (guilt, shame)
“Possession of the norm that stealing is wrong requires a disposition to feel angry when others steal and guilty when the temptation arises in oneself.”
Moral judgments are manifestations of dispositions
Different judgments have different motivational effects
Emotions are non-cognitive perceptions of bodily changes
Neurological evidence (responses prior to neocortical involvement), somatic feedback – cognitive judgments are neither necessary nor sufficient for emotion
Emotions are nevertheless representational: they represent what they are “set up to be set off by” – what it is their biological or culturally elaborated function to detect
Cf. smoke alarms: “A beep represents smoke, because it is reliably
caused by smoke and it was engineered so as to be caused by smoke”.
Sadness represents loss (selected by evolution to respond to bodily changes linked to loss)
Relativism
Prinz’s formula: “An action has the property of being
morally wrong (right) just in case there is an observer who has a sentiment of disapprobation (approbation) toward it.”
(2007, 92)
Moral debate is like aesthetic debate – reasoning has merely supplemental role (get the facts straight first)
Different individuals and cultures have different
sentimental responses; since moral facts are facts about what causes emotions, moral facts vary from culture to culture
Anti-nativism: the content of moral judgments isn’t a result of evolution, but is instead shaped by culture
Morality is a byproduct of evolution, not an adaptation
Morality serves extra-moral purposes, such as helping us lead fulfilling life; moral progress consists in revising
current values to better achieve these extra-moral aims
c) Firth’s Ideal Observer Theory
Firth’s goal is to offer an analysis of ethical statements that is
absolutist – i.e. non-relativist
dispositional – X is right if an ideal observer would approve of X
objectivist – doesn’t presuppose the existence of subjects (only the hypothetical ideal
observer)
relational – rightness is defined in relation to the reactions of an ideal observer
’empirical’ – it is a posteriori what the ideal
observer would feel
Reactions of the Ideal Observer
Firth talks about ’ethically significant reactions’
Is this circular? No, he argues, for we do not need to judge that something is morally right in order to feel
moral approval toward it, so we can appeal to the feeling when analysing the judgement
Nevertheless, this type of account is subject to what Miller called ’the moral attitude problem’
It seems just false that every moral judgment must involve the same special ethical feeling
If we are to analyse rightness in terms of approval, we can’t define approval in terms of thinking
something right – what we need is an account of ethically significant reactions in non-ethical terms
As we’ll see later, Wiggins and McDowell doubt this is possible
Characteristics of the Ideal Observer
Firth’s strategy: let us look at what makes us discount people’s moral judgments in ordinary practice to locate the dimensions of idealization
1. We disqualify judgments by people who are ignorant about the subject matter – so part of what makes an observer ideal must be knowledge of all the facts, omniscient
2. We know people are sometimes led to error by failure to put
imagine alternative consequences vividly – so the ideal observer must be also omnipercipient
3. We discount judgments by people who have something personal at stake – to avoid this source of error, an ideal observer must be disinterested
4. We don’t trust judgments of people who are emotionally involved – so, the ideal observer will be dispassionate
5. We don’t listen to people who do not judge like cases alike – so the ideal observer must be consistent
6. Otherwise, he is normal
III Problems for
Dispositional Response-
Dependence Accounts
The Euthyphro Dilemma
Several philosophers, such as Wright, Blackburn, and Shafer-Landau, argue that there is a fatal
dilemma for dispositional analyses of moral concepts/properties
The basic idea is simple:
The suitable subjects/conditions on the right-hand side of the analysis are characterised either in non-moral or
moral terms
If they are characterised in non-moral terms, the analysis gets the extension of our moral predicates wrong – the biconditional is false
If they are characterised in moral terms, the analysis tells us nothing new about the status of morality – the biconditional is trivially true
Horn I: Non-Normative Conditions
Lewis-inspired dispositionalism:
X is morally wrong iff we would desire to punish for X-ing under conditions of full imaginative acquaintance
What if ’we’ are close-minded, dishonest, selfish, and unfair?
In that case, it seems false that what we would desire to punish when fully imaginatively acquainted with would be wrong – so the biconditional is neither a priori nor necessary
Normality won’t suffice: ”Convince me that most gay teenagers are ashamed of their sexuality and you won’t have convinced me that it’s shameful.” (D’Arms 2005, 5)
But a Lewisian naturalistic, non-normative definition does not rule out this possibility, so it falls on the first horn
Horn II: Normative Conditions and
Unmotivated Idealization
Firth’s ideal observer theory
X is right iff an ideal observer would approve of X
What if we are close-minded, dishonest, selfish, and unfair?
Insofar as the ideal observer is ’otherwise normal’, this would lead to the first horn
If we further idealize the observer and require him to be fair, just, honest, and conscientious, we threaten to trivialize the
biconditional – Wright’s independence condition is violated
Some argue that Aristotle falls on this horn
”Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of
practical wisdom would determine it.”
That is, X is a virtue iff it is a disposition to choose as the practically wise would
The Unmotivated Idealization Problem: why do only the reactions of fully informed subjects, for example, count?
David Enoch: because we assume that there is a mind-independent moral truth that is tracked only by informed responses
The Modal Problem
What if our moral sensibilities were to change, and we would come to react to murder with approval?
Would this make it right?
Wright: Well, what if we lost colour vision? Would we say that everything lost colours, or that we lost the capacity to detect them?
If the latter, the strategy that suggests itself is rigidifying:
let our actual responses fix what is red
Wiggins suggests a rigidifying response for moral response-dependence accounts
Main problem: couldn’t our actual reactions be
mistaken? Surely we can also change for the better
Response: what is relevant is an improved version
of our actual sensibility
The Missing Normativity Problem
Moral facts are supposed to be categorically reason-giving and action-guiding: if torture is morally wrong, everyone has a reason not to torture, and recognizing that something is wrong must make a motivational difference to a rational agent
Otherwise it would be unfair to blame them for doing something wrong
We use evaluative concepts to criticize, persuade, and guide each other’s responses, not merely to describe or predict them
But facts about how I or someone else or an ideal observer would respond to an action lack these features (cf. the OQA)
Richard Joyce:
Suppose Mary recognizes that a certain action, φ, is such that fully informed persons who share the aim of reaching free and unforced agreement would endorse a norm in favor of φ. The presence of that dispositional property may be of interest to Mary, but it may not be. Certainly its presence doesn’t seem to constitute any kind of practical demand. Mary may be as
unmoved by its instantiation as she is when she reflects that φ is also such that drunken Vikings would mock its performance.
The Conflation Problem
Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson (2000) argue that the most plausible kind of sentimentalist accounts are not directly dispositional, but
X is admirable if and only if it would be appropriate for any subject S to admire X
Maybe admiration is appropriate iff an ideal observer (etc.) would approve of admiring X, or if we have a meta-emotion toward admiring X (Prinz 2007, 115)
The Conflation Problem: taking an attitude toward something may be appropriate for the wrong kind of reason
Morally inappropriate jokes can still be funny
