Wise be

California gional

cility

Jare to be Wise

AN ADDRESS

Delivered before the ^"Heretics^"Society ⁱⁿ Cambridge, on the 8th December, 1909

BY

JOHN McTAGGART ELLIS McTAGGART

DoctorinLetters,FellowandLecturer of Trinity College inCambridge, Fellow of theBritishAcademy.

LONDON:

WATTS & _CO.,

17, JOHNSON'S COURT, FLEET STREET, E.G.

Price Threepence

Works _by

JOHN McTAGGARTELLIS McTAGGART

STUDIES IN THE HEGELIAN DIALECTIC. Cambridge University Press. 8S.

STUDIESINHEGELIANCOSMOLOGY. _CambridgeUniversity Press. ^8s.

ACOMMENTARYONHEGEL'SLOGIC. CambridgeUniversity Press. ^8s.

SOME DOGMASOFRELIGION. EdwardArnold. 10s.6d. net.

The Rationalist Press Association, ^Ltd.

Chairmani

EDWARDCLODD

HonoraryAssociates!

ALFREDWILLIAM BENN BJORNSTJERNE BJORNSON

SIR EDWARDBRABROOK GEORGE BRANDES

CHARLES CALLAWAY,M.A.,D.Sc.

DR.PAUL CARUS

PROF.B.H.CHAMBERLAIN

DR.STANTON COIT DR.F._J.FURNIVALL

F.J.GOULD

PROF.ERNSTHAECKEL LEONARD HUXLEY JOSEPH McCABE EDENPHILLPOTTS JOHN ^M. ROBERTSON

DR.WASHINGTON SULLIVAN

PROF.LESTER F.WARD

PROF.ED.A.WESTERMARCK

SecretaryanaRegistered^Offices:

CHARLESE.HOOPER,Nos. 5and6,Johnson's Court, FleetStreet,London,^E.C.

How toJoin and _Help the R. P. A.

The minimumsubscription ^to constitute Membership^is 55.,renewable in

Januaryofeach_year.

Aformof application^forMembership,^withfullparticulars,including^latest Annual Report and specimen copyof Literary Guide,can beobtained gratis onapplication^tothe Secretary.

Copies ofnewpublications areforwarded_regularlyon accountofMembers' subscriptions, oraMembercan arrange^tomake hisown selectionfrom the listsofnewbooks whichare issuedfromtimetotime.

Tojoin the Association^istohelpon itswork,but to subscribeliberally^is ofcoursetohelpmoreeffectually. Assubscribers offrom_53.tolos.and more areentitled toreceivebackthewholevalue oftheirsubscriptionsⁱⁿbooks,on which thereis little, ifany,profitmade,^theAssociationisdependent,^forthe capitalrequired^tocarry out^itsobjects,uponsubscriptions ofa_largeramount and upon^donationsand_bequests.

DARE TO

WISE

AN ADDRESS

Delivered_{before the} "Heretics"

Society ⁱⁿ Cambridge, on the 8th December, /pop

BY

JOHN McTAGGART ELLIS McTAGGART

DOCTORINLETTERS,FELLOW AND LECTURER OFTRINITYCOLLEGEINCAMBRIDGE, FELLOW OFTHEBRITISHACADEMY

[ISSUED FOR THE RATIONALIST PRESS ASSOCIATION, LIMITED]

LONDON:

WATTS & CO.,

17,JOHNSON'S COURT, FLEETSTREET, ^E.C.

1910

"DARE TO ^BE WISE

AT the other end of the world is a University' which has adopted ^foritsown the mottowhich best expresses the nature of a University^: SapereAude. It is of the duty^laid onour Society^tofollowthis injunction that I

wishtospeak.

Our _object is to promote ^discussion upon religion, philosophy, and art. And in discussing religion and philosophy ^{there is} a _special significance ⁱⁿ the

command, ^{Dare to be wise. In} seeking ^{truth of all} sorts many ^{virtues are needed,} industry, patience, humility, magnanimity. And _courage also is often needed ⁱⁿ the search, since theobserverof nature must often risk his life in his observations. But there is

another need for courage when we _{approach religion} and philosophy.

And this need comes from the tremendous effect on our own _welfare, and the welfare of our fellow beings, of those aspects of _reality with which _religion and philosophy ^are concerned. This effect is, in the first

1TheUniversity ofNewZealand.

3

2O30294

DARE TOBE

place,acharacteristicofthat_reality, theproblems about which wouldusuallybecalled religious. Butitspreads to all philosophy,^for there _is, I think, no _question in philosophy ^notevenamong^{thosewhichborderclosest} on _logicoronscience ofwhichwecan be sure before- handthatits solutionwillhavenoeffectontheproblems of_religion.

The _{profound importance} ^toourwelfare of the truth onthese questions involves^thatour beliefs about those truths will alsohave _{a great}importance^forourwelfare.

Ifourliveswould_gain enormously^{invalue if}acertain doctrinewere _true,and would loseenormously'in^value

if itwere _false,thenabelief thatit istrue will naturally make us happy, and a belief that it is false make us miserable. And _happiness and misery have much to-

dowithwelfare.

The_{practical importance}toourlives of thesematters hasnotalways beensufficiently recognised of^lateyears.

Thiserrorisdue, ^I think, toexcessivereactionfrom two errorson theotherside.

The firstof these errorsisthe assertion_that, ifcertain views on_religious mattersweretrue,all moralitywould

lose itsvalidity. From this, of course, itwould follow that all persons who believed those views and _yet accepted morality would be acting illogically and

foolishly. That this view is erroneous seems to me

quite^clear. Ourviews on _{religiousquestions} may^affect

DARE TOBE WISE

some ^of the details of morality the observance of a particularday^{of rest, or the useof} wine or of_{beef, for} example. But _they are quite powerless ^{either to} obliteratethe difference between _right and _wrong, orto

change our views on much of the content of morality.

At_least, I do notknowof anyview maintained byany- one on anyreligiousquestionwhich would, ^{if I} held it,

altermy present^beliefthat itisright^togivewater to a thirstydog, and wrong ^tocommit piracy or ^to cheat at cards.

Another form ofthis sameerroris the assertion that certain beliefs on religious matters, though theymight not render _morality absurd, would in practice prevent those who _accepted them from pursuing ^virtue per- sistentlyand enthusiastically. This viewseems refuted byexperience, which, ^I think, ^tells us that the zeal for virtueshown _byvariousmen,^{while it varies}much, and

formanycauses, does notvaryaccording ^{to their}views on _religious matters. The men who believe, for example, ⁱⁿGod, or immortality, or optimism, seem to be neither better nor worse morally than ^those who

disbelieve inthem.

The second error is the viewthat certain beliefs on religious matterswould destroy the value, ^forthose who accepted ^the beliefs, of many ^{of those} parts of expe- riencewhich would otherwise have the highest ^value.

Tennyson, ^for example, maintained that disbelief in

DARE TO BE WISE"

immortalitywoulddestroy the value of ^love, even while

life lasted:

Andlovewould answerwithasigh,

Thesoundof that forgetfulshore Willchangemy^{sweetnessmore andmore,}

Half-deadtoknowthatIshalldie.¹

Here, again, ^it seems to me, ^{there is} certainly error.

Ourviews as tothe ultimate nature and destiny of the universe may^{affect our}judgments ^{as to} the generality ofcertainformsof good, or as^totheirduration, or as^to the possibility of their increase in intensity hereafter.

ButI donot seehow_theycanaffectourjudgment^ofthe goodness^{of these}goodthings, aswe^findthem hereand now. _Indeed, ifwedonot startwith the certainty that loveforan hour on earth is unconditionally good, ^I do not seewhat groundwe should have for believing ^that

itwould begood^foraneternityⁱⁿ heaven.

Theseviews, then, ^I admit tobe_errors,andthosedo wellwho_rejectthem as errors. But the reaction from them,^{as I} said, goes sometimes^toofar,and leadstoa denial of the _practical importance ^{of the} problems ^of religion. And this _is, again, a great mistake. What-

evermaybe the trueanswer^totheproblemsof religion,

good ^{will bedifferent from bad,} and _right from wrong, and much of what we do and feel in this present ^life willbe good, andmuchwillbe bad. Butifweaskhow much _good exists in theuniverse and how muchbad;

*InMemoriam.

"DARE TOBE WISE

ifweaskifthemaincurrent of the universeisfor right, or forwrong, ^or indifferent to both_; if we askwhat is theeventual destiny of the universe or of ourselves ^all thesequestions must be answeredoneway^{or theother} according^tothe solutionwe_adoptof religiousproblems, and of those problems ^of philosophy which bear on

religion. Are there any questions which affect our welfaremorethan these? It istrue that what _primarily

affects ourwelfareis the truth onthese matters, and not ourknowledge^{of thetruth.} Butabeliefthatthings^are well with the world brings happiness, a belief that things ^areillwith theworld brings misery. And this involves the intense _practical importance ^of our beliefs onthe problems^ofreligion.

Let us consider what some of these problems ^are whichwecall religious. In the first place, there is the general question ^of optimism ^or pessimism. ^{Is the} universe as a whole more good ^than bad? It _is, of course, possible^tomaintain that it is impossible^for us to answer this question. But some systems maintain thatitcan be answered, and some of them answer that the good prevails, and some of them hold that it is

outbalanced by ^{the evil.} The _practical importance ^of the truthonthisquestiondoesnot require^tobeenforced.

Forthegoodness^orbadnessof the universe isthewhole ofwhich_everyothermatterof _practical importance ^is a part.

DARE TOBE WISE"

Ourbeliefon the subject, therefore, must have _great influence on our _happiness. So _far, indeed, as I am

only concerned^withmy^{welfareinthis life, or with that}

ofmy^{friends, themore}general question^will have little influence, for in these limited fieldswe have _empirical meansofjudgingthe present or inferring the immediate future,which are more certain than inferencesfromthe general nature of the universe. But few _people limit their interests entirely tothosewhom_theyknow _person-

ally. Andthen thereisalwaysthe questionwhethermy own life, and those of my ^friends, may not, perhaps, extend indefinitelyfurtherthan thatshort period ⁱⁿour present bodies which is all thatwe can now know _by

observation.

And there is another _{question, equally important.}

Doestheuniverse becomebetterorworse as time goes on, and, ^{if it} becomes either, which does it become?

This isof equal importance, becauseit is adisposition ofournature apparentlya fundamental and inevitable disposition ^toregard good and ^{evil in the} future with very^different feelings from those withwhichwe_regard good and^{evil inthe}past. Iftheworldwere known ^to be more evil than good ^on the whole, we should still

regard^itcheerfully, ^ifwebelieved thatmost of the evil lay ⁱⁿ the _past, and that the futurewas predominantly good. And, though ^{theworld as awhole were}known

tobemore good^thanevil, thatwouldaffordus butlittle

"DARE TOBE WISE"

comfort if that part of ^its course which still layⁱⁿthe futurewere moreevil than good.

Then, ^tocometo less general questions, there is the question of immortality. Our beliefs on this subject, also, willprofoundly^affectour_happiness. Somedesire annihilation, some shrink from it, but very few are indifferent. And even of _these, I suppose, none would beindifferent asto the furtherquestion^ofwhat kindthe futurelifewould_be, ifthere werea future lifeatall.

Thenthere is the existence of God. The_importance of this question ^for our welfare has, no _doubt, been exaggerated, through a failure to comprehend ^the

alternatives. It has been supposed ^{that the} only alternativetoa belief inGodisa belief in some _Scepti- cism or Materialismwhichwould be incompatible with any hope ^{that the universe as a} whole was coherent, orderly, or good. But this is a mistake. There are systemswhich holdtheuniversetobeall this, although they deny ^the existence of God. And, on ^{the other} hand, ^{the existence of} God would certainly not be by

itself a guarantee ^{that the universe} was _good. That thereis someevil in the universe is beyond ^{doubt. If}

itistherebecause God did not object ^to it, howdo we know how muchevil hemay^{tolerate, oreven welcome?}

Ifit isthere asmostreasonable Theistswould_say now becauseGodcould not help it, howdowe know how much evil it may ^be beyond ^his power ^to prevent?

DARE TOBE WISE'

Theism maypossibly form a link in a chain of argu- ment _leading to Optimism, but ^{it is far indeed} from being^acomplete proof ofOptimism.

But_{in spite}ofall thisitcannot bedeniedthat tomany

people the^beliefthat there is or is not a God is most intimately connected with their happiness. And even thosewho are indifferent on this pointwould _certainly notbeindifferenton the question whether, ^if there is a God, he^issuch as hewas _supposed to be by the early Jews, ^or, again, by^theJesuits or the Calvinists of the sixteenth century.

Ourbeliefson _religiousquestions, then,do profoundly affect our _happiness. We can conceive indeed, we knowin history,andinthethoughtof the presentday ^>

beliefsthe acceptance of whichwould make life almost intolerably miserable^toanyone whose ^{interests reached} beyond ^{the immediate} present and his immediate environment. And here we find the need of courage.

For, ^ifwearetothink on these matters at _all,we must accept the ^{belief for} which we have evidence, and we must _reject the belief for which we have no _evidence, howevermuchthefirstmayrepelor thesecondallure us.

And,sometimes, ^thisis not easy.

When we deal with the knowledge ^of science, or every-day^life,wehavenosimilar struggle. In thefirst place, ^{it is} hereoftenvery indifferent touswhatthe true solution ofa problem maybe, provided ^that, whateverit

DARE TOBE WISE"

is, wecan know ^it. Itmay ^beof great importance^to us to knowwhatsortof building^will best stand theshock of an earthquake, but comparatively unimportantwhat

sort it is, since, whichever it maybe, we can build in that manner in earthquake ^{districts. It} may ^be very important ^to knowwhich of two medicineswill cure a disease,but_quite unimportantwhich_{it is,} solong^aswe know itand can use it.

If, indeed, wehave to put the question, ^Is there any medicine which can cure this disease? then, indeed, ^it

maymatter verymuch to uswhat the answer ^is. And

in such a case wemay be tempted, ^fora short time, ^to believe thatacurehas been_found, when ⁱⁿ _{point of} fact

ithasnot. But the temptation does ^{not last for} long.

When the medicine is tried, and fails to cure, then convictioncomes to all except ^theweakest. But there is no corresponding help ⁱⁿ religion and philosophy.

For, ^ifthereis ever to be anyexperimental verification ofourbeliefson such subjects, at least ^itwill not beon

this side of death. If through cowardice we. depart from the right path, we must not hope ^for experience to takeus back.

Thestrain issohard thatoftenandoften in the history of thought men have tried to justify theirweakness by asserting that wewereentitled to believe a proposition

if its truth would be very good, ^{or at} any ^{rate if its}

falsitywould _{be very}bad. Over and over, ^indifferent

"DARE TO BE WISE"

forms, ^this demand meets us not infrequently ⁱⁿ the work of themen ^of whom we should least expect ^it.

But, whenever wefind it, we_must, Imaintain, reject^it.

Itmay^wellbethatthe universe,^ifthisorthat beliefwere

false, would_{be very}bad. Buthowdowe knowthatthe universeisnot verybad? There is nointrinsica_priori connection between existence and _goodness. Ifwecan showthatthenature of existenceissuchthat it isgood, so muchthebetter. Butthen the question^ofthe nature of existence is the one which we are setting out ^to determine, andwe have no _rightto begin byassuming thatthatnature^isgood.

Norcanwe fall backontheargument, which ^{is often} used, that our desires for the good ^{those desires the} thwarting^of which produce^themiserywe are avoiding areas realasanything^{else in} the universe, and form as sound a basis for an argument ^as anything ^else.

Unquestionablythey are ^real, and form a basis for an argument; but the question remains, What _argument

can be based on them? If theywere to be any good

here, the argument would ^{have to bethat, because}they really existas desires in us, therefore the universe must be suchaswill gratifythem. Andthisis invalid. The

existence of a desiredoes notinvolve the existence of ^its gratification. Each of us has had many^desireswhich were notsatisfied, and whichcan nownever besatisfied.

We cannot argue, then, from the pain ^that a belief

DARK TORE WISE" 13.

givesus tothe_falsityof that belief. And, ^ifwe decide to think _freely on these _subjects, we run the risk of arriving, as othershavearrived before_{us, at}conclusions the pain of whichmaybe very great. ^{It is}true_that, so farasI know, nopersonwhohas thoughtfreelyonthese subjects has arrived at conclusions so maddening ^as those of sometraditional theologies now_fading intothe past. The ideas ofan endless hell, of an _unjust God, are fruits of ancient _tradition, or of interpretation of alleged revelations never, ^I believe, of independent reasoning. Butto find nomore _{hope, no}more_purpose, no more value in the universe than was found by Hobbes, by Hume, ^or by Schopenhauer ^the pain of this, especially^toonewhohas hoped ^{for better results,}

or, perhaps, has once ^heldthem_gained the pain of this is sometimesnot_trifling.

Why^{should we not endeavour to escape it?} Why

shouldwe not accept, without _inquiry, sometraditional faith? There may ^be arguments ^{for it, there} may ^be arguments against ^it. But others have accepted ^it without_inquiry intothesearguments. Why^{should not}

we?

Such a suggestion has _greater attractions than it

would have had two generations ago. In Europe, ⁱⁿ the present age, a man is not _likely to accept any religion ^{in this}way, except some form of Christianity.

And the Christianity of sixtyyears ago, while no doubt

DARE TO BE WISE

suchthatmany men could honestly^believeittobetrue,

wassuchthatno mancouldwishit to betrue, unlesshe wasdevoideitherofimagination^{or of}humanity. Much

Christianity of the presentday^{is still of} this type. But

it would be most absurd and _unjust to deny ^{that the} type^ofChristianitywhichbecomes _{everyyear relatively} more_powerful ^is _verydifferent. Itsviewoftheuniverse is one which might^{well entitle us to call the universe} good. Why^{should we} not accept ^it without the risks of inquiry?

Or, ^if we cannot do that, why ^{trouble about these} problems ^{at all? Is not the}worldwe see big enough

to occupy^lives so short as ours? Shallwe not enjoy thegood, ^{strive toincreaseit}andtoshare_it, and ask no questionsaboutwhatisbehind,beyond,and _perhaps above?

Yetsomefollowaftertruth. Andwhat shall betheir reward? May^we answer, ⁱⁿwordswhich were written about _Spinoza, and which are worthy ^{to have been} written by him: ''Even that which true and fearless

men have preached through ^{all the} generations ^to unheeding ^ears. Seek the _truth, fear not and _spare not: this_first, this for itsown sake, thisonly^; and the truth itself is your reward ^a reward not measured by length ofdays norbyany reckoning^ofmen"?^'

J SirFrederick Pollock,Spinoza^:His_LifeandPhilosophy^ chap.^ix.

"DARE TOBE WISE" ₁₅

It is most beautiful and most _true, but it is not the whole truth. For knowledge ^{of the} truth, though ^a great good, ^{is not the} only good, nor perhaps ^the highest good. ^Ifmy^{friend is in}pain orestranged from me, ^ifthe universe isworthlessorworse than worthless,

it is no _adequate consolation to know that at least I

see theevil clearly.

And then, ^istruthalways^the reward for seeking ^the truth? Always^itcannotbe, for ^if some have attained, the others must have failed who disagreed with them.

The reward of the search are we sure that it will be anything but^thesearch?

Can we_{give any}other bidding than ^that whichwas once given ^toa_{search yet}moresacred?

Come _painyeshallhave,andbeblind totheending^! Come fearye^shallhave,mid_{the sky's}overcasting^!

Come changeye^shallhave,forfarare yewending^! Come nocrown_yeshallhaveforyour^thirstand_yourfasting,

But ^'

Andherewe must _stop,before thepromise ^thatfollows.

The crown of our thirst and our _fasting may ^{be the} opened ^heavens and the Beatific Vision. It may ^be

nothing but^thethirstand the fasting^itself.

No _great inducement, perhaps, ^{all this?} And no inducement is needed. There are those who _long for truthwith a longingas simple, as ultimate, as powerful

1 William_Morris,Love^isEnough.

"DARE TOBE WISE'

as the drunkard's longing ^{for his}wine and the lover's longing^{forhisbeloved.} They^{willsearch,because}they must. Oursearchhas begun.

University of California

SOUTHERN REGIONALLIBRARYFACILITY Return^thismaterial tothelibrary

from whichitwasborrowed.

REFD LD-URB

JAN17

1 2 1991

i| ^ji DEC