The validation of the selection of male British army officers

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Citation: Dobson, P.M. (1991). The validation of the selection of male British army officers. (Unpublished Doctoral thesis, City University London)

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The validation _of the _{selection of male British army officers.}

Paul Michael Dobson

Ph. D. thesis

The City University _{Business School}

Submitted _{September 1991}

02

C)

2525 &ý

Table _of Contents

page

Table

_{of Contents}

ii

List

_{of Tables}

_vi

List

_{of Figures}

_xiii

Key to Symbols

_{and Abbreviations}

_xiv

Acknowledgements

_xvii

Abstract

_xviii

Introduction

1.1 _{- Background} to _Research 1

1.2 _{- Aims of Research 3}

PART I: REGUIAR COMMISSIONS BOARD IN CONTEXT

The Historica

Board

2.1 _- The

2.2 _- The

2.3 _- The

the

1 Basis _of the _{Regular Commissions}

War Office Selection Boards ₉

Regular Commissions Board ₂₁

history _{of the selection of}

Womens Royal Army Corps _{officer 25}

3. Current Selection _{and early Training of the British}

Army Officer

3.1 _- Types _of Commission _{and Entrants 32}

3.2 _- Pre-Regular Commissions Board briefing ₃₅

3.3 _- 101 type training ₃₇

3.4 _- The Regular Commissions Board selection

process 38

3.5 _- Pre-RMAS training 44

3.6 _- Officer training _at the Royal Military

Academy Sandhurst 46

3.7 _- Special-to-Arm. training 48

3.8 _- Current _{selection and training of} the

Womens Royal Army Corps _officer 49

4. Previous Research Studies

4.1 _- Research into the War Office Selection

Boards 52

4.2 _- Research into the Regular commissions

Board 62

4.3 _- Previous _{research on the selection of}

the _{Womens Royal Army Corps officer 69}

PART II _{: PRESENT} RESEARCH

5. Methodology

5.1 _- Familiarisation ₇₃

5.2 _- Choice _{of validation sample 75}

5.3 _- Pilot Analysis ₇₆

5.4 _- The Total Sample ₈₈

5.5 _- Analyzing the Results ₈₉

6. _{Analysis of Results} (Part 1) _{- Analysis of} Sample,

Predictor _{and Criteria}

6.1 _- Characteristics _of the Validation Sample

6.2 _- Analysis _of the Predictor

6.3 _- Analysis _of the _Criteria

7. Analysis _of Results (Part 2) _{- Validity,} Utility

and Fairness

7.1 _- Validity _of the Regular Commissions

Board

7.2 _- Utility _of the Regular Commissions

Board

7.3 _- Fairness _of the Regular Commissions

Board

8. Discussion _and Conclusions

8.1 _- The Validity _of the Regular Commissions

Board

8.2 _- The Utility _of the Regular Commissions

Board

8.3 _- The Fairness _of the Regular Commissions

Board

8.4 A General Observation _{on the} Selection _and

Training _of Army Officers

8.5 Recommendations

99

104

107

122

135

137

141

155

156

162

164

PART III _: IMPLICATIONS FOR SELECTION THEORY AND PRACTICE

9. Reflections _{and Wider} Implications _of the _Research

9.1 _- Support for Assessment Centres 168

9.2 _- Thoughts _{on Meta-Analysis and}

Heterogeneous _{samples 170}

9.3 _- Design _of Assessment Centres 171

9.4 _- Validation _{as a catalyst} for _{change 171}

9.5 _- Limitations _{of validity and utility as}

indicators _{of satisfactoriness 173}

9.6 _- Learnings from _{re-analysis 175}

References ₁₇₈

Appendices

Appendix 1- Outline _of the Regular Commissions

Board _{programme 183}

Appendix 2- Scale Characteristics _of the Regular

Commissions Board Profile Elements ₁₈₅

Appendix 3- Intercorrelations between the _Regular

Commissions Board Profile Elements ₁₉₀

Appendix 4- Scale Characteristics _of the Special-to-

Arm Young Officers Course ₁₉₂

Appendix 5- Correlations between the Regular

Commissions _{Board elements and Criteria 194}

List _of Tables

Page

Table 1: Changes in the _{selection and} training _of

British _{army officers} (1941-1984) ₂₆

Table 2: Performance _of Rowallan _{passes on the}

Standard Military Course ₄₆

Table 3: Inter-rater _{reliability of} the War Office

Selection Boards 54

Table 4: War Office Selection Board _grade by

Return to Unit _rate 56

Table 5: Comparison _of the War Office Selection Boards _{and -}

the _{Command Interview Boards 57}

Table 6: A five-year follow-up _of the Regular Commissions

Board _{assessments 66}

Table 7: A ten-year follow-up _of the Regular Commissions

Board _{assessments 66}

Table 8: The Officer Intelligence Rating _and the

Standard Military Course _{assessments 68}

Table _{9: Correlations} between the Regular Commissions Board

elements and the Regular Commissions Board Final

Board Grade 68

Table 10: Rating _{scales used at} the Royal Military Academy

Sandhurst 82

Table 11: Scales _used in the Annual Confidential Reports 86

Table 12: The Validation Sample 99

Table 13: Missing Data 101

Table 14: Sample Attrition 102

Table 15: Sample Characteristics 103

Table 16: Scale distribution _of the Regular Commissions Board

Final Board Grades ₁₀₄

Table 17: The Regular Commissions Board Final Board Grade

by entry group 105

Table 18: Problems _{amongst young officer's at} Sandhurst 108

Table 19: Cadet Status during the Standard Military

Course ₁₀₉

Table _{20: outcomes of the} Standard Military Course 109

Table 21: Changes in _commission during the Standard

Military

Course

110

Table 22: Outcomes _{of the} Standard Graduate Course 110

Table 23: Scale distribution _of the Royal Military Academy

Sandhurst _{overall grade} ill

Table 24: The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst _overall

grade

by entry

group

ill

Table 25: Scale distribution _of Special-to-Arm

composite grade (ARM-C) 113

Table 26: Special-to-Arm _{composite grade} (ARM-C) by

entry group 113

Table 27: Intercorrelations between _{some components}

of the Annual Confidential Reports

-U5

Table 28: Scale distribution _of the Annual Confidential

Report (Senior Reporting Officer) _{grade 115}

Table 29: Regimental _{recommendations} for Short

service commissioned Officers ₁₁₆

Table _{30: Annual Confidential} Report (Senior Reporting

Officer)

_grade

by entry

_group

Table 31: Time between _{attendence at} the Regular Commissions

Board _{and criteria} 117

Table 32: _{Age at Regular} Commissions Board _{and criteria 117}

Table 33: Meta-analysis _of the Royal Military Academy

Sandhurst _{and Special-to-Arm} intercorrel _{at ions} 118

Table 34: Meta-analysis _of Annual Confidential Report _and

Special-to-Arm intercorrelations 119

Table 35: Criteria intercorrelations 120

Table 36: Crosstabulation _of the Regular Commissions Board

Final Board Grade _with the Royal Military

Academy Sandhurst _{overall grade 123}

Table 37: Mean _and Standard Deviation _of the Royal Military

Academy Sandhurst _grade by Regular commissions

Board Final Board Grade ₁₂₄

Table 38: Meta-analysis _of the _correlations between

the Regular Commissions Board _{and the} Royal

Military Academy Sandhurst _grades for the

different _{entry groups 124}

Table _{39: Meta-analysis of} the _correlations between

the _Regular Commissions Board _{and the} Royal

Military Academy Sandhurst _grades for the

different _{regiments 125}

Table 40: Crosstabulation _of the Regular _{Commissions Board}

Final Board Grade _with the Special-to-Arm _grade

(ARM-C) ₁₂₆

Table 41: _{Mean and Standard} Deviation _of the Special-to-Arm

(ARM-C) _{grade by Regular Commissions Board Final}

Board Grade ₁₂₆

Table 42: Meta-analysis _of the _correlations between

the _{Regular Commissions Board and the}

Special-to-Arm _grade (ARM-C) for the different

entry groups 127

Table _43: Meta-analysis _of the _correlations between

the _{Regular Commissions Board and the}

Special-to-Arm _grade (ARM-C) for the different

regiments 128

Table _44: Crosstabulation _of the Regular commissions _Board

Final Board Grade _with the Annual Confidential

Report (Senior Reporting Officer) _{grade 129}

Table _{45: Mean and Standard} Deviation _of Annual Confidential

Report (Senior Reporting Officer) _grade by the

Regular Commissions Board Final Board _Grade 130

Table 46: Per _{cent of young officer's commissioned and}

considered 'better than good' by their _regiment

by Regular Commissions Board Final Board _{Grade 130}

Table 47: Meta-analysis _of the _correlations between

the _{Regular Commissions} Board _{and the} Annual

Confidential Report _grades for the different

entry groups 131

Table 48: Meta-analysis _of the _correlations between

the _{Regular Commissions Board and the Annual}

Confidential Report _grades for the different

regiments 131

Table 49: Total _{group validity coefficients 133}

Table 50: Confidence Limits for Validity _{coefficients 133}

Table 51: Correlations between _{statistically combined}

Regular Commissions Board _{elements and criteria 134}

Table 52: Utility _of Regular Commissions Board _{with a}

criterion of those who were commissioned at

the Royal Military _{Academy Sandhurst and}

considered 'better than good' by their regiments 136

Table 53: _{The mean and standard} deviation _of the _Regular

Commissions Board Final Board _Grade for

Independent _{and State schoolboys 137}

Table 54: Differences between Independent _{and State}

schoolboys on Regular Commissions Board elements 138

Table 55: Comparison _{of criterion grades} for

Independent _{and State schoolboys} 140

List _of Figures

Figure 1: Outline _of the _{selection and}

training _{of British army officers}

Figure 2: Regular Commissions Board _organisation

Figure 3: Validation _{sample selection and}

training history

Figure 4: Sub-group _correlations by sample _size

riaci; ý

£--j -

32

40

100

132

Key to Symbols _{and Abbreviations}

ACO _Army Careers Officer

ACR Annual Confidential Report

APRE Army Personnel Research Establishment

ARM Special-to-Arm _{young officer} training _course

ARM-C Composite _scale formed from the different

Special-to-Arm

_young

_officer

training

_courses

Bursars Regular Commissions Board _{entrants who receive a}

bursary

for

_university

CCF Combined Cadet Force

Cadets Regular Commissions Board _{entrants who receive a}

3-year _cadetship through _university

DENG Direct _{entry non-graduates}

DEG Direct _{entry graduates}

FBG Final Board Grade _{of the} Regular Commissions Board

JDSC Junior Division _of Staff _College

MOD Ministry _of Defence

MTO _{Military Testing Officer}

OCTU _{officer cadet} training _unit

OIR _officer intelligence _rating

101 type

_Potential

_officer

training

_prior

_{to Regular}

Commissions Board

PCBC Platoon Commanders Battle Course

PVR Premature Voluntary Retirement

A

A%. " Royal Artillery

RAC Royal Armoured Corps

RLAOC Royal Army Ordnance Corps

Ranks _{Soldier or non-commissioned officer}

RCB _{Regular commissions Board}

RCC _{Regular Careers Course}

RCT Royal Corps _of Transport

RE Royal Engineers

Reg. C Regular Commission

R. Signals Royal Signals

RMAS Royal Military Academy Sandhurst

RTU Return to _Unit

SGC Standard Graduate Course

SLO Schools Liaison Officer

SMC Standard Military Course

SNLR Services _{no longer required} i. e. discharged

SR Selection Ratio

SRC Special Regular _Commission

SRO Senior Reporting Officer

SSC Short Service Commission

SSLC Short Service Limited _Commission

ULO _{University Liaison Officer}

UOTC University Officer Training _Corps

WOSB War Office Selection _Board

WRAC Womens Royal Army Corps

YO Young _officer

SD Standard Deviation

U Ratio _{of corrected and uncorrected standard}

deviations

Uinc _Correction for incidental _{selection effects}

Uexp Correction for _{explicit selection effects}

U2

rc Total variance of corrected sample correlations

U2

ec Error variance of corrected sample correlations

C2 True variance of correlations

P

a Ratio of corrected to uncorrected correlations

Population _correlation

ruc Uncorrected sample correlation

rc Corrected sample correlation

r

YY Criterion reliability

SR

RMAS Selection ratio at the Royal Military Academy

Sandhurst

x2 Chi-square

Acknowledgement

I _wish to thank the _{staff of} the Regular Commissions Board,

Rowallan Company, the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst,

' MS (CR) I

AO(DO),, _{DAR, members of the research steering committee, and Army}

Personnel Research Establishment: _without their _{advice and co-}

operation this research could not have been undertaken. Special

thanks _are due to Professor Allan Williams _{who throughout} this

research has been both mentor and friend.

Paul Dobson

Abstract

This _{report places} the Regular Commissions _Board in its

historical _{context, considers} the _{previous validation research}

into _{the Regular Commissions Board and the War office Selection}

Boards,, _outlines the _{current officer selection and} training

procedures, and then describes the research methodology. The

research analyzes the validity,, utility and fairness of the

Regular Commissions Board _{as a method} for the _{selection of army}

officers. The research suggests that the Regular Commissions

Board _{is moderately predictive of} training _{and regimental}

performance, although little direct evidence is found that the

Board is _able to validly identify those _{who will} be able to lead

a platoon after training. It is estimated that the Regular

Commissions Board is _{cost-effective} though _{perhaps not}

necessarily cost-ef f icient. It is concluded that whilst there is

some evidence of adverse impact against State educated _schoolboys

the _Regular Commissions Board _appears to _{be an acceptably} fair

selection mechanism.

After _a discussion _of the findings, the _{conclusions and}

recommendations made to the Secretary of State for Defence are

reported. These include the consideration of a mechanism which

will provide the various parts of the army involved in the

assessment and training of young officers with objective

information _{on the qualities required and} knowledge _{of success}

in

identifying

_{and developing}

_such

_qualities;

the

introduction

of a system of routinised validation; an investigation into the

nature of the _evidence available to Board members; and the need

to _{assess the validity and} fairness _of the _{Board against more}

objective and independent criteria.

Finally, _{some reflections and wider} implications _{of the research}

for _selection theory _{and practice are} discussed. _These include

the _{value of assessment centres,} the limitations _of traditional

validation as a catalyst for change and of validity and dollar

utility as indicators of satisfactoriness and benefit, and the

frequent insensitivity _{of social science conclusions and}

recommendations to alternative statistical assumptions.

Chapter 1: Introduction

This _{report covers a} three-year _{extra-mural research study}

carried out for the Ministry of Defence, Army Personnel Research

Establishment by the City University, _under Research Agreement

No. 2090/052 (APRE)

.

The Regular Commissions Board (RCB) is _responsible for _assessing

the _{suitability of applicants} for training to be officers in the

British Army. The _{selection system, comprising a} board _of

officers using a series of tests,, interviews and practical

exercises, was originally devised by psychologists and

psychiatrists in 1942. The assessment procedure has remained

essentially the same since this time. The Regular Commissions

Board _opened in 1943 to _{assess applicants} for _regular

commissions, and then in 1961 it took over the role of assessing

applicants

for

short

service

commissions

from

the

War Office

Selection Boards.

1.1 _Backqround to Research

Miles (1979) _{and Wheatley} (1982) have _{made the case} for _{an up-to-}

date _{validation of the} Regular Commissions Board. It is desirable

that _{any selection procedure operating} in _{a changing social and}

technological _{environment should} be _regularly validated. This

provides justification for the procedure's continued use and

enables it to be adapted to new circumstances. At the moment

there is _{no mechanism for the regular validation of the Regular}

Commissions _{Board, and there} has been no comprehensive _validation

study following the Regular Commissions Board _changes initiated

by the 1979 _{Review and} the _{shortening of the Royal Military}

Academy Sandhurst _course for _{potential officers.}

A number of validation studies of the Regular Commissions Board

have been _{made since} its inception. _{Vernon and Parry} (1949)

,

Morris (1949) _and Reeve (1971) _{report studies} based _upon

information _which is _{now nearly 40 years old. The more recent}

studies of Clarke (1965). Clarke (1967), and Laing-Morton et al

(1983),, have included _{only Regular and Special Regular}

Commissioned _officers in their _research. This type _{of officer}

represents less than half of those currently assessed by the

Board. Clarke (1967) _{used 5 and 10 year criteria} to _validate the

Regular Commissions Board, _whilst Laing-Morton _{et al} (1983) _used

grades obtained from the Junior Division of Staff College. As the

Regular Commissions Board is _{neither charged with, nor attempts}

to predict performance over this time-scale, these studies do not

strictly

validate

it.

Little _{previous work} has been _{carried out on the validity of} the

Regular Commissions Board. Those _{studies which are reported} have

been largely based _upon Board _candidates during the 1950's, have

only included Regular Commission candidates, and for the most

part

have

used

training

performance

as the

criterion.

Only

one

study investigated the ability of the Regular Commissions Board

to _predict job _performance. As reported in the 1979 Regular

Commissions _{Board Review,} the _{study of predictive validity} is the

least _{advanced area of} investigation into the _Board.

The lack _{of adequate and up-to-date statistical evidence} to

evaluate its success, together with _{a readiness} to improve the

procedure, led to the commissioning of the present Regular

Commissions Board _{validation study.}

The present study represents the most comprehensive attempt to

validate the Regular Commissions Board that has been undertaken.

It _validates the _present Board _{practices against} Royal Military

Academy Sandhurst _{and Annual} Confidential Report _performance in

the _{context of current} training _{and reporting procedures. The use}

of Special-to-Arm training as a criterion increases the relevance

of the study, and in the case of the Platoon Commanders Battle

Course, it _{approaches a true} test _of the Regular Commissions

Board Charter. All _{groups assessed} by the Board _{are represented}

in _{the sample.}

1.2 _{Aims of} the Research

The principal aim of the research was to validate the present

Regular Commissions Board _{assessment procedure} in _order to

provide

guidelines

for

improving

its

effectiveness

and to act

as

a base-line

for

evaluating

future

changes.

More specifically:

To establish the overall _predictive validity _of the

Regular Commissions Board _{procedure against a range of}

criteria, but with particular emphasis on performance

as a platoon

commander

or equivalent.

(ii) _{To examine the relative effectiveness of components of}

the _{Regular Commissions Board procedure.}

(iii) To _{recommend schemes} for improvement _{of assessment}

procedures and for the conduct of regular validation

studies.

(1v) To _{provide a} data-base for future longer term

validations.

The research began in October 1983. It _{was managed} by a research

steering committee comprising representatives from the Army

Personnel Research Establishment, the Director _of Army

Recruiting, the Regular Commissions Board, _{and the} Womens Royal

Army Corps. The _{research was supervised} by Professor A. P. O.

Williams.

Differences in the _{aims and procedures of selection and training}

of male and female officers resulted in the validation of male

and female selection being undertaken concurrently but

separately. Whilst the history, and the current selection and

training _procedures for Womens Royal Army Corps _{officers are}

included in _{this report,} in _order to _{avoid unnecessary}

repetition,

the

detailed

methodology

and results

of

the

Womens

Royal Army Corps _{validation study are not.} The great _{majority of}

potential Womens Royal Army Corps officers enter on a short

service commission and they are not '*cap-badged' by the regiments

as is the case for the male officers. Consequently, meta-analysis

was not _undertaken in the Womens Royal Army Corps study. In most

other respects the _{research methodology} is _essentially the same

for _{male and female officers, with the Regular Commissions Board}

Final Board _{Grade serving as the predictor and training reports}

at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst _and the Annual

Confidential Report from the _{regiments acting as criteria. The}

main findings, conclusions and recommendations from the Womens

Royal Army Corps _{study are reported} in Chapter _{8 where} they _serve

to supplement the conclusions and recommendations drawn f rom the

male validation study.

The final _report for the _{male validation study was presented} in

January 1987, _{and that} for the female _study in March 1987. Since

the _{completion of} the _{research an outline of} the _major findings

from the _{male validation study} have _{been published} in the _Journal

of Occupational Psychology (Dobson & Williams 1989), and a

technical _paper based _{upon a statistical method} developed during

the _research has been _published in the _{British Journal of}

Mathematical _{and Statistical} Psychology (Dobson 1988).

It

_should

be noted that

the contract

_with

the City

University

_was

the first _{external contract given} to _validate the Regular

Commissions Board, _{and, we were one of very} few _external bodies

to have _{worked on the selection of British army officers. To some}

large _{extent we were ambassadors} f or our sponsors _{and others who}

may follow. Further, the selection of army officers is a

politically sensitive issue. These facts need to be borne in mind

when reviewing the research. Justifiably, we have trod warily in

interpreting _{the findings and in making recommendations.}

PART I

THE REGULAR COMMISSIONS BOARD IN CONTEXT

CChapter _{2: The Historical Basis of} the _{Regular Commissions Board}

Until 1942 the _{selection of officers} in the _British Army _was

based _upon the _{recommendation of} the _{Commanding Officer and a}

twenty _minute interview by _{an Interview Board attached to the}

Army Command. However, by early 1941 it had become _evident that

this traditional _{method of selection was no longer satisfactory.}

A twenty to forty _{per cent} failure _{rate was being reported at}

Officer Cadet Training Units (OCTU)

. and psychiatric examination

of officers who had suffered a breakdown revealed that many

should never have held commissioned rank. Morale, post-Dunkirk,

was not good, and stories of candidates being rejected by the

Command Boards _on inadequate _{grounds such as a Grammar} School

education or socialist opinions were such that there was a real

danger _of insufficient _officers being forthcoming. _{By the middle}

of 1941 as many as thirty questions a week were being asked in

Parliament.

B. S. Morris, _{who was a member of the psychological research staff}

of the War Office Selection Boards (WOSB) from 1942 until 1946,

suggests that the validity of traditional methods was based upon

a social background common to both selector and candidate. War

had, however, _confronted the Interview Boards _{with candidates of}

unfamiliar personality and attitudes (Morris, 1949).

Additionally., _{one may suggest} that _{such a system was} ideally

suited to the use of stereotyped judgements, and in the absence

of

any

external

criterion

(in

the

sense

of

being

outside

the

Army Is own system

of officer

appraisal)

_,

it

_{was self -prophesying}

and self-perpetuating: _whilst the onset of war provided the acid

test _of its _validity.

2.1 War Office Selection Boards.

In June 1940 Area Psychiatrists _{were appointed} to Commands. It

soon became apparent that the number of officers attending

psychiatric clinics was comparatively high, and that their

destiny _could have been foretold by the _{use of a psychiatric}

interview _and intelligence _{tests (Gillman,} 1947). _{Sir Andrew}

Thorne, GOC Scottish Command, _{who had previously} been _military

attache in Berlin and had observed the selection techniques

developed by the _{German military psychologists, encouraged} the

psychiatrists attached to Scottish Command to undertake

experiments in officer selection. A new method was put forward

by the _{Command Psychiatrist who, by means of intelligence} tests,

psychological tests and psychiatric interview, had found it

possible to predict accurately which candidates would do well at

Officer Cadet Training Units, _{which would} be satisfactory, _and

which would be rejected. This method of selection was submitted

to the Adjutant _{-General, and the} first _new-type Officer Selection

Board _{was set up experimentally} in Edinburgh _at the _{end of} 1941.

T. F. Rodger, Wittkower _{and other psychiatrists undertook}

validations of the new board. Two psychiatrists studied two

separate groups of 50 officers attending the Company Commanders

School in Edinburgh. Assessment _{of officer quality was made on}

the basis _{of a group} intelligence test, _{a short questionnaire and}

a psychiatric interview _which lasted _{about an} hour. Overall

agreement between the _{psychiatrist's opinion and the} Commandant

and staff _of the School, _{who had observed} the _officers for five

weeks.. was 85 per _cent. In _{a similar study of} 223 _{officers a}

close

agreement

_{was obtained}

between

the

_psychiatrist

_{and the}

School _reports in _{56 per cent; substantial agreement} in _{36 per}

cent; some discrepancy in 6 per _{cent; and} divergence in 6 per

cent of the cases. Gillman (1947) _states that initial _{studies of}

the _experimental board _also involved _{two complete Officer Cadet}

Training Unit intakes in _{which a high} degree _{of agreement was}

f ound.

Reeve (1971) has with _{some justification criticised} the _adequacy

of the initial empirical work carried out on the experimental

board _and the _conclusions drawn. _{Most of} the _{work used officers}

attending the Company Commanders School, not Officer Cadet

Training Units. These _subjects had _already had _{experience as}

junior _{officers, and reports on their performance were available}

to both the _{psychiatrists and the School staff. The predictor and}

criterion could not, therefore, be considered to be independent.

Further, Reeve (1971) _estimates that the _general failure _{rate at}

the _Company Commanders School _{was about} 10 per cent. _{As a simple}

pass/fail criterion was used, one would even by chance expect _a

considerable level of agreement. "The overstatement of the

evidence resulted in some senior officers believing that the

original work was so successful that all that was necessary to

ensure adequate selection was a psychiatric interview and

intelligence tests" (Reeve, 1971,, _{p. 182).}

With the _{addition of practical outdoor} tests (command tasks)

conducted by the Military Testing Officer, the _{new boards} were

approved and set up in each Command. By the end of 1942 all the

Command Interview Boards had been _replaced by some 17 War Of f ice

Selection Boards. In 1943 War Office Selection Boards _were

introduced _{for the selection of female officers in the Auxiliary}

Territorial Service. And _also in 1943, _{a series of} Leaderless

Group Tasks, developed by Bion based _upon his _work in _group

psychotherapy (Bion 1949), were included. [An interesting

description _{of an early} War Office Selection Board is _given in

the Picture Post, 19 September, 1942].

The _{purpose of} the _early War Office Selection Boards _was to

I

select from the ranks those suitable to hold an Emergency

Commission. After being _recommended by _{a War} Office Selection

Board the _{potential officers underwent six months of officer}

training _{at an Officer} Cadet Training Unit. _{The role of} the War

Office Selection Boards 1942-1946 _was to identify _officer

potential

after

training

and in that

sense

their

role

was very

similar to the present day Regular Commissions Board.

Whilst the development _of the War Of f ice Selection Board _method

in _{the UK was the work of the psychiatrists and psychologists} in

Scottish Command and at the War Of f ice Selection Board Research

and Training Centre, the origins of the War office Selection

Board theory _{and practice} lay elsewhere. Ansbacher (1951) states

that _{origins of} the assessment centre are to be found amongst

German _military psychologists just after the First World War.

J. B. Reiffert, _working in _Germany in _the 1920's, is _considered

to be the _{major architect of the method.}

By 1926 the basis _of the technique later developed for British

of f icer selection _{was in use} in the German f orces. Over _{a period}

of days candidates _completed intelligence tests, psychological

tests _which included the _{study of emotional reactions and}

perception, command tasks, lecturettes, and a leaderless group

discussion. Later, _under the influence _{of the} National Socialist

Party, _{greater emphasis was placed upon} Icharacterology' _and

race. Between 1939 and 1942, that is at the same time as the

development _of the _{War Office Selection Boards in} the _UK, the

work of the German military psychologists fell into disrepute and

the _{psychologists were replaced.} Interestingly, the _major

stimulus to the development of the War Office Selection Boards,

namely an inadequate supply of able officers, was also a major

factor in the demise _{of the German approach.}

German psychology during the 1920's was dominated by the _{work of}

Buhler, Stern _and the Gestalt _{psychologists.} British _military

psychiatrists were similarly influenced., particularly by the

field theory _{approach of} Moreno _and Lewin. Thus the _Command

psychiatrists and the psychologists at the Research and Training

Centre _who devised the initial War Office Selection Boards

considered that the search for particular trait characteristics

of officers, and for tests to measure these traits was likely to

be a waste of time. Gillman, who was Senior Psychiatrist to the

Middle East War Office Selection Board states in 1946:

"It

_{has been}

_impossible

_to

_agree

_upon

_{a complete}

list

_of

officer _{qualities and therefore} to _{make up such} a list and

insist _{upon the Testing Officer making a note of each}

quality in _relation to _{each candidate} is _profitless-"

(Gillman,, 1947, _p-108).

"They (the _{Research & Training Centre psychologists)}

could

not

accept

traits

as

predominantly

constant

qualities

of an individual

which

existed

independently

of the context in which they were expressed.

Successful _{officers do not all show} the _{same traits;}

thus, it _{would seem to} be the total _{configuration of}

traits in their _{personalities rather} than the

individual _{traits which makes for success. It follows}

that _{a candidate should not} be thought _{of as}

possessing a certain amount of leadership which he can

display both in test _{and real} life _{situations. His}

personality is an organised whole, a system of tension

or needs, which interacts dynamically with the varying

demands _of different _situations. "Officer _quality'

should, therefore, be analyzed in terms of the main

roles that future officers will be called on to play.

By _{setting appropriate} tasks _{a similar system of}

forces _can be _{set up at} the War office Selection

Board, _{whose interplay can} then be _observed by the

Military Testing Officer _{or other} board _member. The

candidate's most important role will be that of leader

of a small group, and he should be able to uphold his

own

_position

in

_such

_{a group,}

to

_give

the

_group

direction,

_{and at the}

_{same time}

_maintain

its

_cohesion

or solidarity _against internal _{or external} disruptive

forces" _{(Vernon & Parry, 1949, p. 61).}

For these _reasons the initial _{War Office Selection Boards did not}

use a profile list _of desirable _officer traits _or

characteristics.

In the _original war office Selection Boards _{an experimental}

attitude was encouraged; the framework of testing was elastic _and

principles and techniques were being continuously experimented

with. Until 1946 there was considerable variation in the

procedures adopted by the different War Office Selection Boards.

Harris (1946) _{provides a detailed account of what was considered}

at that time to be best practice drawn from the procedures

operating at 10 War Office Selection Board (Chester) and 5 War

Office Selection Board (Wormley) in 1944 _and 1945 _{respectively.}

The 3-phase War Office Selection Board technique, _where

candidates were observed in group tests before and after the

interviews, _{was considered by Harris} to be the _{optimum procedure.}

The Board _comprised:

A President (Colonel) _and Deputy President (Lt.

Colonel) _{who shared} the interviewing _of the

candidates. After 1945 the President's role became

largely judicial _and the Deputy President _and Senior

Military _{Testing Officers were} then _{constituted as}

Team Leaders _{who shared} the interviewing.

(ii) _{Four Military Testing Officers who were specialists} in

the job _{analysis side of the work. As} fighting

off icers they had experienced the roles required of an

officer in both training and combat. The Military

Testing Officers _{organised and observed command} tasks,

lecturettes, human _{problem sessions, planning of}

projects, physical obstacles, and the group race. They

also assessed the ability and interest of the

candidates for the technical Arms such as the Royal

Engineers _or the Royal Electrical _and Mechanical

Engineers. Tests _were devised for the _specialisms. The

purpose of the Military Testing officer's observation

was to form an opinion of general officer quality. The

Military Testing Officers _{messed with} the _candidates.

(iii) _{The Psychologist, who with 3 or 4 Sergeant} testers _was

responsible for the testing of the candidates and

feeding the _psychiatrist 'personality _{pointers'. Three}

twenty-minute _group tests _{were used} to _assess

intelligence; the _{Army Verbal Intelligence Test and}

newer and nore difficult versions of the Matrices and

Shipley Abstraction Test. Several _other tests _were

occasionally used. Educational achievement tests were

also devised for candidates for University and Army

College. A questionnaire was used to _cover

educational, family and medical history, and formed

the _{basis of} interviews in _order to _{ascertain what}

opportunities the _candidate had had _and what

advantages he had _{made of} them. The _candidates were

required to _{write self-reports;} themselves _{as seen} by

a good friend, _{and as seen} by a severe _critic. A word

association test, the Thematic Apperception Test _and

a sociometric test were also used.

The Psychiatrist, _{who on} the basis _{of personality}

pointers interviewed those referred to him for 20 to

60 minutes. The _{proportion of candidates seen was}

limited. _{Vernon and Parry} (1949) _suggest that _a

contributing factor was the Army's desire to reduce

the _{role of} the _psychiatrist to _{a minimum. The}

psychiatrist's role was to advise the board about:

a. the candidate's present physical and mental

health;

b. his likely _{physical and mental stability at}

officer level in a specific Arm;

C. his present social and emotional maturity and its

likely development in the _near future _{- during}

training _{and early service;}

d. _points indicating _special temperamental _or

vocational suitability or unsuitability for _a

specific Arm.

The War Office Selection Board _process began _{with an opening}

address by the President, and the rest of Day 1 was taken up by

psychological testing. _{The morning of} Day 2, _{after squadding} in

8s, involved _{leaderless tasks and an intra-group race. This was}

followed _{by the first interim conference between observers so}

that _{attention could be directed to disagreements. The afternoon}

of Day 2 and all _of Day 3 comprised the Military Testing Officer

tasks _{and military, psychological and technical} interviews. _This

was followed by a further conference of observers before the

final _{exercise on the morning of Day 4. The} final _{exercise was}

a leaderless group race. This was followed by the Final Board.

In early boards, each member studied the candidates independently

until the final conference. This led to a somewhat unnatural

atmosphere, since members felt constrained not to discuss the

current group even informally, and serious disagreement sometimes

occurred at the conference, when it was too late to make any

further investigation _of the doubtful _{candidates. Thus} the

introduction _{of collaboration and mutual consultation at all}

stages was found to have considerable advantages. Often _{most of}

the _{members would recognise certain candidates as clear passes}

or fails quite early on, and so feel free to concentrate their

study

on the

borderline

or

controversial

cases.

Some of

the

boards _{operated a re-squadding system, where} the _{candidates were}

re-grouped into 'pass', 'fail' and 'unsure' groupings for the

later

_exercises.

Psychiatrists, _{psychologists and Military} Testing Officers _were

technical _advisers to the President; _{and each} President _{would run}

his board _{as he wished,} with as much or as little reference to

the _{technicians as he wished, subject only to the controlling}

authority _of the Director for Selection _of Personnel, himself _a

professional _soldier. Hence, the President, _representing the

Army, _{was responsible for the final decisions; hence also a major}

part was played by Military Testing Officers _{who were regimental}

officers. The _{aim of} the technicians _was to _educate the Army

gradually into accepting _{scientific methods.} However, _{as Vernon}

and Parry (1949) state, the compromise eventually achieved _showed

considerable technical defects.

By 1945 it _{was considered} that there had been _{a major policy}

error with regard to the War Office Selection Boards in _allowing

them to develop their _{own idiom. This} had led to _variations in

the _{standards at different Boards. As a consequence} in 1945, _for

the five _{War Office Selection Boards remaining} in _peacetime,

training _was introduced _{f or} board _{members,, with a standard}

programme and a 17-item candidate profile.

The _{origins of} this _{profile, which presumably encapsulates the}

characteristics of successful officers, is unclear. It _was

obviously not developed by the Research and Training Centre

psychologists, rather it was originated jointly by the Army _and

the industrial _{psychologists working} for the Director for

Selection _of Personnel in the War Office. The _{characteristics}

were identified by a working party with strong Army presence and

were based on little, if any, empirical research. (J. Davies,

Chief Psychologist to D. S. P. in 1944, personal communication).

In 1944 _{the Crocker Report on the War Office Selection Boards}

(Crocker _{Report 1946) concluded that there was a great body of}

opinion in the Army favourable to the War Office Selection Boards

and they

were

_{seen as an attempt}

to be scrupulously

fair

to all

candidates. However, the _{committee also concluded} that

psychiatrists were an object of criticism. It was considered that

they had too _much influence in the boards _and that they _often

recommended the rejection _of suitable candidates. Further, they

apparently upset those whom they interviewed. It was therefore

recommended that psychiatrists should no longer be members of the

boards. This _{was agreed and at} the _same time the _projective

psychological tests were withdrawn from the procedure. It was

also true that at the time there was a shortage of appropriately

trained _staff. Consequently their _{efforts were concentrated} in

a central advisory role.

In fact, the _{psychologists and psychiatrists} had been _{an object}

of criticism for some time prior to 1946. Sir Winston Churchill

on the 19th December 1942 wrote to the Lord President _of the

Council:

am sure it would be sensible to restrict as much _as

possible the work of these gentlemen (psychologists and

psychiatrists),

who are

capable

of doing

an immense amount

of harm with what may very easily degenerate into

charlatanry.

"

Five days _earlier Sir Winston had written to the Secretary _of

State

for

War:

"I _{am told that a very large proportion of candidates have}

been _{rejected by the Selection Boards, returning to the}

ranks _{with a sense of} disappointment. I am of the _opinion

that the _{Commanding officer of a battalion or tank unit} is

the best judge, _{and that} if _he is _{not a good} judge _he is

scarcely fit for his _position. " (Churchill,, W. S. 1951)

Since 1944 the _{role of psychologists} had been limited _{to research}

and development. Vernon and Parry (1949) report that for the most

part they were isolated in the Research and Training Centre at

Hampstead _{and whilst} they _{were responsible} for developing _and

improving _{the method(s) used by all the boards, as their}

functions _{were advisory only,} they had little influence. _The

psychologist sergeant-testers attached to the boards did not

attend the final conference and were occasionally posted to other

duties _{such as cutting} the _grass. The influence _of the

psychiatrist on the boards was curtailed by the limited _number

of interviews he could undertake, and by the Army authorities

manifest desire to reduce his role to a minimum.

As in the Navy, the _{new methods raised considerable controversy}

and opposition. However the criticism came from the regular

officers not from the candidates. The criticism was not

surprising. The President of a War Of f ice Selection Board was in

a difficult position. Charged with selecting officers, which is

partly a character assessment, he was faced with a trained expert

in personality dynamics. A foreign body had been introduced into

the tissues _{of the} Army and to some extent by the end of 1942 the

Army had _{lost control of the selection of} it's _{future officers.}

This _{position was significantly rectified} in _{January 1943 with}

the introduction _{of the Regular Commissions Board, and by 1946}

the Army _{had regained control over the selection of the officer.}

By 1948 the _{War Office selection Board procedure was virtually}

indistinguishable _{from that of the Regular Commissions Board.}

Unfortunately the _{more sophisticated} developments in _procedure

introduced into _{the War Office Selection Boards around 1944/45}

had been thrown _{out with} the _psychiatric bath _{water. The War}

Office Selection Boards _{continued to select officers} for National

Service _and Short Service Commissions _until the _{ending of}

National Service in 1961.

2.2 The Regular Commissions Board

"During 1943,, _{when the general} tide _{of the war had clearly} turned

and planning had begun for peacetime conditions, it became

obvious that special arrangements would have to be made for the

selection of Regular Officers from the many who had taken

Emergency _Commissions. This _{was a different problem} from that

with which the War office Selection Boards had been concerned.

The War Office Selection Board technique had been developed for

assessing the personality of young men very early in their Army

careers when very little was known about them. Those Officers who

wished to transfer from Emergency to Regular Commissions would,

however, have _served in the Army for _{a number of years, would} be

more mature, and would have shown their merits in real wartime

conditions, which obviously presented a more realistic test